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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/36882-8.txt b/36882-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3eb3ed3 --- /dev/null +++ b/36882-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,7543 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of A Grammar of Freethought, by Chapman Cohen + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: A Grammar of Freethought + +Author: Chapman Cohen + +Release Date: July 28, 2011 [EBook #36882] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A GRAMMAR OF FREETHOUGHT *** + + + + +Produced by Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe, S.D., and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net + + + + + + + + + + A Grammar of + Freethought. + + BY + CHAPMAN COHEN. + + (_Issued by the Secular Society, Ltd._) + + LONDON: + THE PIONEER PRESS, + 61 FARRINGDON STREET, E.C. 4. + + 1921. + + +_The Publishers wish to express their obligation to Mr. H. Cutner for +the very tasteful design which adorns the cover of this book._ + + + + +CONTENTS. + + + CHAPTER PAGE + + I.--OUTGROWING THE GODS 9 + + II.--LIFE AND MIND 18 + + III.--WHAT IS FREETHOUGHT? 37 + + IV.--REBELLION AND REFORM 51 + + V.--THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CHILD 61 + + VI.--THE NATURE OF RELIGION 72 + + VII.--THE UTILITY OF RELIGION 88 + + VIII.--FREETHOUGHT AND GOD 101 + + IX.--FREETHOUGHT AND DEATH 111 + + X.--THIS WORLD AND THE NEXT 123 + + XI.--EVOLUTION 134 + + XII.--DARWINISM AND DESIGN 146 + + XIII.--ANCIENT AND MODERN 162 + + XIV.--MORALITY WITHOUT GOD.--I. 172 + + XV.--MORALITY WITHOUT GOD.--II. 182 + + XVI.--CHRISTIANITY AND MORALITY 193 + + XVII.--RELIGION AND PERSECUTION 204 + + XVIII.--WHAT IS TO FOLLOW RELIGION? 223 + + + + +PREFACE. + + +It must be left for those who read the following pages to decide how far +this book lives up to its title. That it leaves many aspects of life +untouched is quite clear, but there must be a limit to everything, even +to the size and scope of a book; moreover, the work does not aim at +being an encyclopędia, but only an outline of what may fairly be +regarded as the Freethought position. Freethought, again, is too fluid a +term to permit its teachings being summarized in a set creed, but it +does stand for a certain definite attitude of mind in relation to those +problems of life with which thoughtful men and women concern themselves. +It is that mental attitude which I aim at depicting. + +To those who are not directly concerned with the attack on +supernaturalism it may also be a matter of regret that so much of this +work is concerned with a criticism of religious beliefs. But that is an +accident of the situation. We have not yet reached that stage in affairs +when we can afford to let religion alone, and one may readily be excused +the suspicion that those who, without believing in it, profess to do so, +are more concerned with avoiding a difficult, if not dangerous, subject, +than they are with the problem of developing sane and sound methods of +thinking. And while some who stand forward as leaders of popular thought +fail to do their part in the work of attacking supernaturalistic +beliefs, others are perforce compelled to devote more time than they +would otherwise to the task. That, in brief, is my apology for +concerning myself so largely with religious topics, and leaving almost +untouched other fields where the Freethought attitude would prove +equally fruitful of results. + +After all, it is the mental attitude with which one approaches a problem +that really matters. The man or woman who has not learned to set mere +authority on one side in dealing with any question will never be more +than a mere echo, and what the world needs, now as ever, is not echoes +but voices. Information, knowledge, is essential to the helpful +consideration of any subject; but all the knowledge in the world will be +of very little real help if it is not under the control of a right +method. What is called scientific knowledge is, to-day, the commonest of +acquisitions, and what most people appear to understand by that is the +accumulation of a large number of positive facts which do, indeed, form +the raw material of science. But the getting of mere facts is like the +getting of money. The value of its accumulation depends upon the use +made thereof. It is the power of generalization, the perception and +application of principles that is all-important, and to this the grasp +of a right method of investigation, the existence of a right mental +attitude, is essential. + +The world needs knowledge, but still more imperatively it needs the +right use of the knowledge that is at its disposal. For this reason I +have been mainly concerned in these pages with indicating what I +consider to be the right mental attitude with which to approach certain +fundamental questions. For, in a world so distracted by conflicting +teachings as is ours, the value of a right method is almost +incalculable. Scepticism, said Buckle, is not the result, but the +condition of progress, and the same may be said of Freethought. The +condition of social development is the realization that no institution +and no teaching is beyond criticism. Criticism, rejection and +modification are the means by which social progress is achieved. It is +by criticism of existing ideas and institutions, by the rejection of +what is incapable of improvement, and by the modification of what +permits of betterment, that we show ourselves worthy of the better +traditions of the past, and profitable servants of the present and the +future. + + C. C. + + + + +A GRAMMAR OF FREETHOUGHT. + + + + +CHAPTER I. + +OUTGROWING THE GODS. + + +One of the largest facts in the history of man is religion. If it were +otherwise the justification for writing the following pages, and for +attempting the proof that, so far as man's history is concerned with +religion, it is little better than a colossal blunder, would not be +nearly so complete. Moreover, it is a generalization upon which +religionists of all classes love to dwell, or even to parade as one of +the strongest evidences in their favour; and it is always pleasant to be +able to give your opponent all for which he asks--feeling, meanwhile, +that you lose nothing in the giving. Universality of belief in religion +really proves no more than the universality of telling lies. "All men +are liars" is as true, or as false, as "All men are religious." For some +men are not liars, and some men are not religious. All the +generalization means is that some of both are found in every age and in +every country, and that is true whether we are dealing with the liar or +with the religious person. + +What is ignored is the consideration that while at one stage of culture +religious belief is the widest and most embracing of all beliefs it +subsequently weakens, not quite in direct proportion to the advance of +culture, but yet in such a way that one can say there is an actual +relation between a preponderance of the one and a weakening of the +other. In very primitive communities gods are born and flourish with all +the rank exuberance of a tropical vegetation. In less primitive times +their number diminishes, and their sphere of influence becomes more and +more sharply defined. The gods are still credited with the ability to do +certain things, but there are other things which do somehow get done +without them. How that discovery and that division are made need not +detain us for the moment, but the fact is patent. Advancing civilization +sees the process continued and quickened, nay, that is civilization; for +until nature is rid of her "haughty lords" and man realizes that there +are at least some natural forces that come within the control of his +intelligence, civilization cannot really be said to have commenced. +Continued advance sees the gods so diminished in power and so weakened +in numbers that their very impotency is apt to breed for them the kind +of pity that one feels for a millionaire who becomes a pauper, or for an +autocratic monarch reduced to the level of a voteless citizen. + +The truth is that all the gods, like their human creators, have in their +birth the promise of death. The nature of their birth gives them life, +but cannot promise them immortality. However much man commences by +worshipping gods, he sooner or later turns his back upon them. Like the +biblical deity he may look at his creation and declare it good, but he +also resembles this deity in presently feeling the impulse to destroy +what he has made. To the products of his mind man can no more give +immortality than he can to the work of his hands. In many cases the work +of his hands actually outlives that of his mind, for we have to-day the +remains of structures that were built in the honour of gods whose very +names are forgotten. And to bury his gods is, after all, the only real +apology that man can offer for having created them. + +This outgrowing of religion is no new thing in human history. Thoughtful +observers have always been struck by the mortality among the gods, +although their demise has usually been chronicled in terms of exultation +by rival worshippers. But here and there a keener observer has brought +to bear on the matter a breadth of thought which robbed the phenomenon +of its local character and gave it a universal application. Thus, in one +of his wonderfully modern dialogues Lucian depicts the Olympian deities +discussing, much in the spirit of a modern Church Congress, the +prevalence of unbelief among men. The gods are disturbed at finding that +men are reaching the stage of either not believing, or not troubling +about them. There is a great deal of talk, and finally one of the minor +deities treats them to a little plain truth--which appears to be as +rare, and as unwelcome in heaven as on earth. He says--I quote from +Froude's translation:-- + + What other conclusion could they arrive at when they saw the + confusion around them? Good men neglected, perishing in penury and + slavery, and profligate wretches wealthy, honoured and powerful. + Sacrilegious temple robbers undiscovered and unpunished; devotees + and saints beaten and crucified. With such phenomena before them, + of course men have doubted our existence.... We affect surprise + that men who are not fools decline to put their faith in us. We + ought rather to be pleased that there is a man left to say his + prayers. We are among ourselves with no strangers present. Tell us, + then, Zeus, have you ever really taken pains to distinguish between + good men and bad? Theseus, not you, destroyed the robbers in + Attica. As far as Providence was concerned, Sciron and + Pity-O-Campus might have murdered and plundered to the end of time. + If Eurystheus had not looked into matters, and sent Hercules upon + his labours little would you have troubled yourself with the Hydras + and Centaurs. Let us be candid. All that we have really cared for + has been a steady altar service. Everything else has been left to + chance. And now men are opening their eyes. They perceive that + whether they pray or don't pray, go to church or don't go to + church, makes no difference to them. And we are receiving our + deserts. + +The case could hardly be put more effectively. It is the appeal to +experience with a vengeance, a form of argument of which religionists in +general are very fond. Of course, the argument does not touch the +question of the mere existence of a god, but it does set forth the +revolt of awakened common sense against the worship of a "moral governor +of the universe." We can say of our day, as Lucian said of his, that men +are opening their eyes, and as a consequence the gods are receiving +their deserts. + +Generally speaking, it is not difficult to see the various steps by +which man outgrew the conception of the government of the world by +intelligent forces. From what we know of primitive thought we may say +that at first the gods dominated all. From the fall of a rain-drop to +the movement of a planet all was the work of gods. Merely to question +their power was the wildest of errors and the gravest of crimes. Bit by +bit this vast territory was reclaimed--a task at the side of which the +conquest of the fever-stricken tropics or the frozen north is mere +child's play. It is quite needless to enter into an elaborate +speculation as to the exact steps by which this process of +deanthropomorphization--to use a word of the late John Fiske's--was +accomplished, but one can picture the main line by what we see taking +place at later stages of development. And there is no exception to the +rule that so soon as any group of phenomena is brought within the +conception of law the notion of deity in connection with those phenomena +tends to die out. And the sum of the process is seen in the work of the +great law givers of science, Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, Newton, +Laplace, Lyell, Dalton, Darwin, etc., who between them have presented us +with a universe in which the conception of deity simply has no place. +Apologies apart, the idea of deity is foreign to the spirit and method +of modern science. + +In the region of the purely physical sciences this process may be +regarded as complete. In morals and sociology, purely on account of the +greater complexity of the subjects, mystical and semi-supernatural +conceptions still linger, but it is only a question of time for these +branches of knowledge to follow the same course as the physical +sciences. In morals we are able to trace, more or less completely, the +development of the moral sense from its first beginnings in the animal +world to its highest developments in man. What is called the "mystery of +morality" simply has no existence to anyone who is not a mystery-monger +by profession or inclination. And here, too, the gods have been +receiving their deserts. For it is now clear that instead of being a +help to morals there has been no greater obstacle to a healthy morality +than the play of religious ideas. In the name of God vices have been +declared virtues and virtues branded as vices. Belief in God has been an +unending source of moral perversion, and it lies upon the face of +historical development that an intelligent morality, one that is capable +of adapting itself to the changing circumstances of human nature, has +only become possible with the breaking down of religious authority. + +Exactly the same phenomenon faces us in connection with social life. We +have to go back but a little way in human history to come to a time +when the existence of a State without a religion would have seemed to +people impossible. Much as Christians have quarrelled about other +things, they have been in agreement on this point. The historic fight +between the established Church and the Nonconformists has never really +been for the disestablishment of all religion, and the confining of the +State to the discharge of purely secular functions, but mainly as to +_which_ religion the State shall uphold. To-day, the central issue is +whether the State shall teach any religion, whether that does not lie +right outside its legitimate functions. And this marks an enormous +advance. It is a plain recognition of the truth that the gods have +nothing to contribute of any value to the development of our social +life. It marks the beginning of the end, and registers the truth that +man must be his own saviour here as elsewhere. As in Lucian's day we are +beginning to realize that whether we pray or don't pray, go to church or +don't go to church, believe in the gods or don't believe in them, makes +no real or substantial difference to natural happenings. Now as then we +see good men punished and bad ones rewarded, and they who are not fools +and have the courage to look facts in the face, decline to put their +faith in a deity who is incapable of doing all things right or too +careless to exert his power. + +It is not that the fight is over, or that there is to-day little need to +fight the forces of superstition. If that were so, there would be no +need to write what is here written. Much as has been done, there is much +yet to do. The revolt against specific beliefs only serves to illustrate +a fight that is of much greater importance. For there is little real +social gain if one merely exchanges one superstition for another. And, +unfortunately, the gentleman who declared that he had given up the +errors of the Church of Rome in order to embrace those of the Church of +England represents a fairly common type. It is the prevalence of a +particular type of mind in society that constitutes a danger, and it is +against this that our aim is ultimately directed. Great as is the amount +of organized superstition that exists, the amount of unorganized +superstition is still greater, and probably more dangerous. One of the +revelations of the late war was the evidence it presented of the +tremendous amount of raw credulity, of the low type of intelligence that +was still current, and the small amount of critical ability the mass of +people bring to bear upon life. The legends that gained currency--the +army of Russians crossing England, the number of mutilated Belgian +babies that were seen, the story of the Germans boiling down their dead +to extract the fat, a story that for obscene stupidity beats everything +else, the Mons angels, the craze for mascots--all bore witness to the +prevalence of a frame of mind that bodes ill for progress. + +The truth is, as Sir James Frazer reminds us, that modern society is +honeycombed with superstitions that are not in themselves a whit more +intellectually respectable than those which dominate the minds of +savages. "The smooth surface of cultured society is sapped and mined by +superstition." Now and again these hidden mines explode noisily, but the +superstition is always there, to be exploited by those who have the wit +to use it. From this point of view Christianity is no more than a +symptom of a source of great social weakness, a manifestation of a +weakness that may find expression in strange and unexpected but always +more or less dangerous ways. It is against the prevalence of this type +of mind that the Freethinker is really fighting. Freethinkers +realize--apparently they are the only ones that do realize--that the +creation of a better type of society is finally dependent upon the +existence of a sanely educated intelligence, and that will never exist +while there are large bodies of people who can persuade themselves that +human welfare is in some way dependent upon, or furthered by, practices +and beliefs that are not a bit more intellectually respectable than +those of the cave men. If Christianity, as a mere system of beliefs, +were destroyed, we should only have cleared the way for the final fight. +Thousands of generations of superstitious beliefs and practices that +have embodied themselves in our laws, our customs, our language, and our +institutions, are not to be easily destroyed. It is comparatively simple +to destroy a particular manifestation of this disastrous heritage, but +the type of mind to which it has given birth is not so easily removed. + +The fight is not over, but it is being fought from a new vantage ground, +and with better weapons than have ever before been employed. History, +anthropology, and psychology have combined to place in the hands of the +modern Freethinker more deadly weapons than those of previous +generations were able to employ. Before these weapons the defences of +the faith crumble like wooden forts before modern artillery. It is no +longer a question of debating whether religious beliefs are true. So +long as we give a straightforward and honest meaning to those beliefs we +know that they are not true. It is, to-day, mainly a question of making +plain the nature of the forces which led men and women to regard them as +being true. We know that the history of religion is the history of a +delusion, and the task of the student is to recover those conditions +which gave to this delusion an appearance of truth and reality. That is +becoming more and more evident to all serious and informed students of +the subject. + +The challenge of Freethought to religion constitutes one of the oldest +struggles in human history. It must have had its beginning in the first +glimmer of doubt concerning a tribal deity which crossed the mind of +some more than usually thoughtful savage. Under various forms and in +many ways it has gone on ever since. It has had many variations of +fortune, often apparently completely crushed, only to rise again +stronger and more daring than ever. To-day, Freethought is the accepted +mental attitude of a growing number of men and women whose intelligence +admits of no question. It has taken a recognized place in the +intellectual world, and its hold on the educated intelligence is rapidly +increasing. It may well be that in one form or another the antagonism +between critical Freethought and accepted teaching, whether secular or +religious, will continue as one of the permanent aspects of social +conflict. But so far as supernaturalism is concerned the final issue can +be no longer in doubt. It is not by one voice or by one movement that +supernaturalism is condemned. Its condemnation is written in the best +forms of art, science and literature. And that is only another way of +saying that it is condemned by life. Freethought holds the future in +fee, and nothing but an entire reversal of the order of civilization can +force it to forego its claims. + + + + +CHAPTER II. + +LIFE AND MIND. + + +The outstanding feature of what may be called the natural history of +associated life is the way in which biologic processes are gradually +dominated by psychologic ones. Whatever be the nature of mind, a +question that in no way concerns us here, there is no denying the +importance of the phenomena that come within that category. To speak of +the first beginnings of mind is, in this connection, idle language. In +science there are no real beginnings. Things do not begin to be, they +simply emerge, and their emergence is as imperceptible as the +displacement of night by day, or the development of the chicken from the +egg. But whatever the nature of the beginning of mind, its appearance in +the evolutionary series marked an event of profound and revolutionary +importance. Life received a new impetus, and the struggle for existence +a new significance, the importance of which is not, even to-day, +generally recognized. The old formulę might still be used, but they had +given to them a new significance. The race was still to the swift and +the battle to the strong, but swiftness and strength were manifested in +new ways and by new means. Cunning and intelligence began to do what was +formerly done without their co-operation. A new force had appeared, +arising out of the older forces as chemistry develops from physics and +biology from both. And, as we should expect from analogy, we find the +new force dominating the older ones, and even bending them to its +needs. + +Associated life meets us very early in the story of animal existence, +and we may assume that it ranks as a genuine "survival quality." It +enables some animals to survive the attacks of others that are +individually stronger, and it may even be, as has been suggested, that +associated life is the normal form, and that solitary animals represent +a variation from the normal, or perhaps a case of degeneration. But one +result of associated life is that it paves the way for the emergence of +mind as an active force in social evolution. In his suggestive and +important work on _Mutual Aid_, Kropotkin has well shown how in the +animal world the purely biologic form of the struggle for existence is +checked and transformed by the factors of mutual aid, association and +protection. His illustrations cover a very wide field; they include a +great variety of animal forms, and he may fairly claim to have +established the proposition that "an instinct has been slowly developed +among animals and men in the course of an extremely long evolution ... +which has taught animals and men alike the force they can borrow from +mutual aid and support, and the joys they can find in social life." + +But there is, on the whole, a very sharp limit set to the development of +mind in the animal world. One cause of this is the absence of a true +"social medium," to use the admirable phrase of that versatile thinker, +George Henry Lewes. In the case of man, speech and writing enable him to +give to his advances and discoveries a cumulative force such as can +never exist in their absence. On that subject more will be said later. +At present we may note another very important consequence of the +development of mind in evolution. In pre-human, or sub-human society, +perfection in the struggle for existence takes the form of the creation +or the perfecting of an organic tool. Teeth or claws become stronger or +larger, a limb is modified, sight becomes keener, or there is a new +effect in coloration. The changes here, it will be observed, are all of +an organic kind, they are a part of the animal and are inseparable from +it, and they are only transmissible by biologic heredity. And the rate +of development is, of necessity, slow. + +When we turn to man and note the way in which he overcomes the +difficulties of his environment, we find them to be mainly of a +different order. His instruments are not personal, in the sense of being +a part of his organic structure. We may say they do not belong to him so +much as they do to the race; while they are certainly transmitted from +generation to generation irrespective of individuals. Instead of +achieving conquest of his environment by developing an organic +structure, man creates an inorganic tool. In a sense he subdues and +moulds the environment to his needs, rather than modifies his structure +in order to cope with the environment. Against extremes of temperature +he fashions clothing and builds habitations. He discovers fire, probably +the most important discovery ever made by mankind. He adds to his +strength in defence and attack by inventing weapons. He guards himself +from starvation by planting seeds, and so harnesses the productive +forces of nature to his needs. He tames animals and so secures living +engines of labour. Later, he compensates for his bodily weaknesses by +inventing instruments which aid sight, hearing, etc. Inventions are +multiplied, methods of locomotion and transportation are discovered, and +the difficulties of space and time are steadily minimized. The net +result of all this is that as a mere biologic phenomenon man's evolution +is checked. The biologic modifications that still go on are of +comparatively small importance, except, probably, in the case of +evolution against disease. The developments that take place are mainly +mental in form and are social in their incidence. + +Now if the substantial truth of what has been said be admitted, and I do +not see how it can be successfully challenged, there arise one or two +considerations of supreme importance. The first of these is that social +history becomes more and more a history of social psychology. In social +life we are watching the play of social mind expressed through the +medium of the individual. The story of civilization is the record of the +piling of idea on idea, and the transforming power of the whole on the +environment. For tools, from the flint chip of primitive man, down to +the finished instrument of the modern mechanic, are all so many products +of human mentality. From the primitive dug-out to the Atlantic liner, +from the stone spear-head to the modern rifle, in all the inventions of +civilized life we are observing the application of mind to the conquest +of time, space, and material conditions. Our art, our inventions, our +institutions, are all so many illustrations of the power of mind in +transforming the environment. A history of civilization, as +distinguished from a mere record of biologic growth, is necessarily a +history of the growing power of mind. It is the cumulative ideas of the +past expressed in inventions and institutions that form the driving +power behind the man of to-day. These ideas form the most valuable part +of man's heritage, make him what he is, and contain the promise of all +that he may become. + +So long as we confine ourselves to biologic evolution, the way in which +qualities are transmitted is plain. There is no need to go beyond the +organism itself. But this heritage of ideas, peculiarly human as it is, +requires a "carrier" of an equally unique kind. It is at this point that +the significance of what we have called the "social medium" emerges. +The full significance of this was first seen by G. H. Lewes.[1] Writing +so far back as 1879 he said:-- + + The distinguishing character of human psychology is that to the + three great factors, organism, external medium, and heredity; it + adds a fourth, namely, the relation to a social medium, with its + product, the general mind.... While the mental functions are + products of the individual organism, the product, mind, is more + than an individual product. Like its great instrument language, it + is at once individual and social. Each man speaks in virtue of the + functions of vocal expression, but also in virtue of the social + need of communication. The words spoken are not his creation, yet + he, too, must appropriate them by what may be called a creative + process before he can understand them. What his tribe speaks he + repeats; but he does not simply echo their words, he rethinks them. + In the same way he adopts their experiences when he assimilates + them to his own.... Further, the experiences come and go; they + correct, enlarge, and destroy one another, leaving behind them a + certain residual store, which condensed in intuitions and + formulated in principles, direct and modify all future + experiences.... Men living in groups co-operate like the organs in + an organism. Their actions have a common impulse to a common end. + Their desires and opinions bear the common stamp of an impersonal + direction. Much of their life is common to all. The roads, + market-places and temples are for each and all. Customs arise and + are formulated in laws, the restraint of all.... Each generation is + born in this social medium, and has to adapt itself to the + established forms.... A nation, a tribe, a sect is the medium of + the individual mind, as a sea, a river, or a pond, is the medium of + a fish.[2] + +[1] It will ease my feelings if I am permitted to here make a protest +against the shameless way in which this suggestive writer has been +pillaged by others without the slightest acknowledgement. They have +found him, as Lamb said of some other writers, "damned good to steal +from." His series of volumes, _Problems of Life and Mind_, have been +borrowed from wholesale without the slightest thanks or recognition. + +[2] _Study of Psychology_, pp. 139, 161-5. So again, a more recent +writer says: "It is not man himself who thinks but his social community; +the source of his thoughts is in the social medium in which he lives, +the social atmosphere which he breathes.... The influence of environment +upon the human mind has always been recognized by psychologists and +philosophers, but it has been considered a secondary factor. On the +contrary, the social medium which the child enters at birth, in which he +lives, moves and has his being, is fundamental. Toward this environment +the individual from childhood to ripest old age is more or less +receptive; rarely can the maturest minds so far succeed in emancipating +themselves from this medium so far as to undertake independent +reflection, while complete emancipation is impossible, for all the +organs and modes of thought, all the organs for constructing thoughts +have been moulded or at least thoroughly imbued by it" (L. Gumplowicz, +_Outlines of Sociology_, p. 157). + +Biologically, what man inherits is capacity for acquisition. But what he +shall acquire, the direction in which his native capacity shall express +itself, is a matter over which biologic forces have no control. This is +determined by society and social life. Given quite equal capacity in two +individuals, the output will be very different if one is brought up in a +remote Spanish village and the other in Paris or London. Whether a man +shouts long live King George or long live the Kaiser is mainly a +question of social surroundings, and but very little one of difference +in native capacity. The child of parents living in the highest civilized +society, if taken away while very young and brought up amid a people in +a very primitive state of culture, would, on reaching maturity, differ +but little from the people around him. He would think the thoughts that +were common to the society in which he was living as he would speak +their language and wear their dress. Had Shakespeare been born among +savages he could never have written _Hamlet_. For the work of the +genius, as for that of the average man, society must provide the +materials in the shape of language, ideas, institutions, and the +thousand and one other things that go to make up the life of a group, +and which may be seen reflected in the life of the individual. Suppose, +says Dr. McDougall:-- + + that throughout the period of half a century every child born to + English parents was at once exchanged (by the power of a magician's + wand) for an infant of the French, or other, European nation. Soon + after the close of this period the English nation would be composed + of individuals of French extraction, and the French of individuals + of English extraction. It is, I think, clear that, in spite of this + complete exchange of innate characters between the two nations, + there would be but little immediate change of national + characteristics. The French people would still speak French, and + the English would speak English, with all the local diversities to + which we are accustomed and without perceptible change of + pronunciation. The religion of the French would still be + predominantly Roman Catholic, and the English people would still + present the same diversity of Protestant creeds. The course of + political institutions would have suffered no profound change, the + customs and habits of the two peoples would exhibit only such + changes as might be attributed to the lapse of time, though an + acute observer might notice an appreciable approximation of the two + peoples towards one another in all these respects. The inhabitant + of France would still be a Frenchman and the inhabitant of England + an Englishman to all outward seeming, save that the physical + appearance of the two peoples would be transposed. And we may go + even further and assert that the same would hold good if a similar + exchange of infants were effected between the English and any other + less closely allied nation, say the Turks or the Japanese.[3] + +[3] _Social Psychology_, pp. 330-1. + +The products of human capacity are the material of which civilization is +built; these products constitute the inheritance which one generation +receives from another. Whether this inheritance be large or small, +simple or complex, it is the chief determinant which shapes the +personality of each individual. What each has by biological heredity is +a given structure, that is, capacity. But the direction of that +capacity, the command it enables one to acquire over his environment, is +in turn determined by the society into which he happens to be born. + +It has already been said that the materials of civilization, whether +they be tools, or institutions, or inventions, or discoveries, or +religious or ethical teachings, are facts that can be directly described +as psychological. An institution--the Church, the Crown, the +Magistracy--is not transmitted as a building or as so many sheets of +paper, but as an idea or as a set of ideas. A piece of machinery is, in +the same way, a mental fact, and is a physical one in only a subordinate +sense. And if this be admitted, we reach the further truth that the +environment to which man has to adapt himself is essentially, so far as +it is a social environment, psychological. Not alone are the outward +marks of social life--the houses in which man lives, the machines he +uses to do his bidding--products of his mental activity, but the more +important features of his environment, to which he must adapt himself, +and which so largely shape his character and determine his conduct, are +of a wholly psychological character. In any society that is at all +distinct from the animal, there exist a number of beliefs, ideas and +institutions, traditions, and, in a later stage, a literature which play +a very important part in determining the direction of man's mind. With +increasing civilization, and the development of better means of +intercourse, any single society finds itself brought into touch and +under the influence of other social groups. The whole of these +influences constitute a force which, surrounding an individual at birth, +inevitably shapes character in this or that direction. They dominate the +physical aspect of life, and represent the determining forces of social +growth. Eliminate the psychological forces of life and you eliminate all +that can be properly called civilization. It is wholly the transforming +power of mind on the environment that creates civilization, and it is +only by a steady grasp of this fact that civilization can be properly +understood. + +I have pointed out a distinction between biological and social, or +psychological, heredity. But there is one instance in which the two +agree. This is that we can only understand a thing by its history. We +may catalogue the existing peculiarities of an animal form with no other +material than that of the organism before us, but thoroughly to +understand it we must know its history. Similarly, existing institutions +may have their justification in the present, but the causes of their +existence lie buried in the past. A king may to-day be honoured on +account of his personal worth, but the reason why there is a king to be +honoured carries us back to that state of culture in which the primitive +priest and magic worker inspires fear and awe. When we ring bells to +call people to church we perpetuate the fact that our ancestors rang +them to drive away evil spirits. We wear black at a funeral because our +primitive ancestors wished to hide themselves from the dead man's +ghost. We strew flowers on a grave because food and other things were +once buried with the dead so that their spirits might accompany the dead +to the next world. In short, with all human customs we are forced, if we +wish to know the reason for their present existence, to seek it in the +ideas that have dominated the minds of previous generations.[4] + +[4] "The tyranny exercised unconsciously on men's minds is the only real +tyranny, because it cannot be fought against. Tiberius, Ghengis Khan, +and Napoleon were assuredly redoubtable tyrants, but from the depths of +their graves Moses, Buddha, Jesus, and Mahomet exerted on the human soul +a far profounder tyranny. A conspiracy may overthrow a tyrant, but what +can it avail against a firmly established belief? In its violent +struggle with Roman Catholicism it is the French Revolution that has +been vanquished, and this in spite of the fact that the sympathy of the +crowd was apparently on its side, and in spite of recourse to +destructive measures as pitiless as those of the Inquisition. The only +real tyrants that humanity has known have always been the memories of +its dead, or the illusions it has forged for itself" (Gustave Le Bon, +_The Crowd_, p. 153). + +No one who has studied, in even a cursory manner, the development of our +social institutions can avoid recognition of the profound influence +exerted by the primitive conceptions of life, death, and of the +character of natural forces. Every one of our social institutions was +born in the shadow of superstition, and superstition acts as a powerful +force in determining the form they assume. Sir Henry Maine has shown to +what a large extent the laws of inheritance are bound up with ancestor +worship.[5] Spencer has done the same service for nearly all our +institutions,[6] and Mr. Elton says that "the oldest customs of +inheritance in England and Germany were, in their beginnings, connected +with a domestic religion, and based upon a worship of ancestral spirits +of which the hearthplace was essentially the altar."[7] The same truth +meets us in the study of almost any institution. In fact, it is not long +before one who _thinks_ evolution, instead of merely knowing its +formulę, begins to realize the truth of the saying by a German +sociologist that in dealing with social institutions we are concerned +with the "mental creations of aggregates." They are dependent upon the +persistence of a set of ideas, and so long as these ideas are unshaken +they are substantially indestructible. To remove them the ideas upon +which they rest must be shaken and robbed of their authority. That is +the reason why at all times the fight for reform so largely resolves +itself into a contest of ideas. Motives of self-interest may enter into +the defence of an institution, and in some case may be responsible for +the attempt to plant an institution where it does not already exist, but +in the main institutions persist because of their harmony with a frame +of mind that is favourable to their being. + +[5] See _Early History of Institutions_, and _Early Law and Custom_. + +[6] _Principles of Sociology_, Vol. I. + +[7] _Origins of English History_, p. 261. + +A great deal of criticism has been directed against the conclusion of +Buckle that improvement in the state of mankind has chiefly resulted +from an improvement in the intellectual outlook. And yet when stated +with the necessary qualifications the generalization is as sound as it +can well be. Certainly, the belief held in some quarters, and stated +with an air of scientific precision, that the material environment is +the active force which is ever urging to new mental development will not +fit the facts; for, as we have seen, the environment to which human +nature must adapt itself is mainly mental in character, that is, it is +made up in an increasing measure of the products of man's own mental +activity. The theory of the sentimental religionist that the evil in the +world results from the wickedness of man, or, as he is fond of putting +it, from the hardness of man's heart, is grotesque in its +ineffectiveness. Soft heads have far more to do with the evil in the +world than have hard hearts. Indeed, one of the standing difficulties of +the orthodox moralist is, not to explain the deeds of evil men, which +explain themselves, but to account for the harm done by "good" men, and +often as a consequence of their goodness. The moral monster is a rarity, +and evil is rarely the outcome of a clear perception of its nature and a +deliberate resolve to pursue it. Paradoxical as it may sound, it demands +a measure of moral strength to do wrong, consciously and deliberately, +which the average man or woman does not possess. And the world has never +found it a matter of great difficulty to deal with its "bad" characters; +it is the "good" ones that present it with a constant problem. + +The point is worth stressing, and we may do it from more than one point +of view. We may take, first of all, the familiar illustration of +religious persecution, as exemplified in the quarrels of Catholics and +Protestants. On the ground of moral distinction no line could be drawn +between the two parties. Each shuddered at the persecution inflicted by +the other, and each regarded the teachings of the other with the same +degree of moral aversion. And it has often been noted that the men who +administered so infamous an institution as the Inquisition were not, in +even the majority of cases, bad men.[8] A few may have had interested +motives, but it would have been impossible to have maintained so brutal +an institution in the absence of a general conviction of its rightness. +In private life those who could deliver men, women, and even children +over to torture were not worse husbands or parents than others. Such +differences as existed cannot be attributed to a lack of moral +endeavour, or to a difference of "moral temperament." It was a +difference of intellectual outlook, and given certain religious +convictions persecution became a religious necessity. The moral output +was poor because the intellectual standpoint was a wrong one. + +[8] Speaking of the Inquisition, Mr. H. C. Lea, in his classic _History +of the Inquisition_, says, "There is no doubt that the people were as +eager as their pastors to send the heretic to the stake. There is no +doubt that men of the kindliest tempers, the profoundest aspirations, +the purest zeal for righteousness, professing a religion founded on love +and charity, were ruthless where heresy was concerned, and were ready to +trample it out at any cost. Dominic and Francis, Bonaventure and Thomas +Aquinas, Innocent III. and St. Louis, were types, in their several ways, +of which humanity, in any age, might feel proud, and yet they were as +unsparing of the heretic as Ezzelin di Romano was of his enemies. With +such men it was not hope of gain or lust of blood or pride of opinion or +wanton exercise of power, but sense of duty, and they but represented +what was universal public opinion from the thirteenth to the seventeenth +century." Vol. I., p. 234. + +If we could once get over the delusion of thinking of human nature as +being fundamentally different five hundred years ago from what it is +to-day, we should escape a great many fallacies that are prevalent. The +changes that have taken place in human nature during the historic period +are so slight as to be practically negligible. The motives that animate +men and women to-day are the motives that animated men and women a +thousand or two thousand years ago. The change is in the direction and +form of their manifestation only, and it is in the light of the human +nature around us that we must study and interpret the human nature that +has gone before us. From that point of view we may safely conclude that +bad institutions were kept in being in the past for the same reason +that they are kept alive to-day. The majority must be blind to their +badness; and in any case it is a general perception of their badness +which leads to their destruction. + +The subject of crime illustrates the same point. Against crime as such, +society is as set as ever. But our attitude toward the causation and +cure of crime, and, above all, to the treatment of the criminal, has +undergone a profound alteration. And the change that has taken place +here has been away from the Christian conception which brutalized the +world for so long, towards the point of view taken up by the ancient +Greeks, that wrong doing is the outcome of ignorance. Expressed in the +modern manner we should say that crime is the result of an undeveloped +nature, or of a pathological one, or of a reversion to an earlier +predatory type, or the result of any or all of these factors in +combination with defective social conditions. But this is only another +way of saying that we have exchanged the old, brutal, and ineffective +methods for more humane and effective ones because we look at the +problem of crime from a different intellectual angle. A more exact +knowledge of the causation of crime has led us to a more sensible and a +more humane treatment of the criminal. And this, not alone in his own +behalf, but in the interests of the society in which he lives. We may +put it broadly that improvement comes from an enlightened way of looking +at things. Common observation shows that people will go on tolerating +forms of brutality, year after year, without the least sense of their +wrongness. Familiarity, and the absence of any impetus to examine +current practice from a new point of view seem to account for this. In +the seventeenth century the same people who could watch, without any +apparent hostility, the torture of an old woman on the fantastic charge +of intercourse with Satan, had their feelings outraged by hearing a +secular song on Sunday. Imprisonment for "blasphemy," once regarded as a +duty, has now become ridiculous to all reasonable people. At one and the +same time, a little more than a hundred years ago in this country, the +same people who could denounce cock-fighting on account of its +brutality, could watch unmoved the murdering of little children in the +factories of Lancashire. Not so long ago men in this country fought +duels under a sense of moral compulsion, and the practice was only +abandoned when a changed point of view made people realize the absurdity +of trying to settle the justice of a cause by determining which of two +people were the most proficient with sword or pistol. We have a +continuation of the same absurdity in those larger duels fought by +nations where the old verbal absurdities still retain their full force, +and where we actually add another absurdity by retaining a number of +professional duellists who must be ready to embark on a duel whether +they have any personal feeling in the matter or not. And it seems fairly +safe to say that when it is realized that the duel between nations as a +means of settling differences is not a bit more intellectually +respectable than was the ancient duello we shall not be far removed from +seeing the end of one of the greatest dangers to which modern society is +exposed. + +Examples might be multiplied indefinitely, but enough has been said to +show what small reason there is for assuming that changes in +institutions are brought about by the operation of some occult moral +sense. It is the enlightenment of the moral sense by the growth of new +ideas, by the impact of new knowledge leading to a revaluation of things +that is mainly responsible for the change. The question of whether a man +should or should not be burned for a difference in religious belief was +never one that could be settled by weighing up the moral qualities of +the two parties in the dispute. All the moral judgment that has ever +existed, even if combined in the person of a single individual could +never decide that issue. It was entirely a question of acquiring a new +point of view from which to examine the subject. Until that was done the +whole force of the moral sense was on the side of the persecutor. To put +the matter paradoxically, the better the man the worse persecutor he +became. It was mental enlightenment that was needed, not moral +enthusiasm. + +The question of progress thus becomes, in all directions, one of the +impact of new ideas, in an environment suitable to their reception and +growth. A society shut in on itself is always comparatively +unprogressive, and but for the movement of classes within it would be +completely so. The more closely the history of civilization is studied +the more clearly does that fact emerge. Civilization is a synthetic +movement, and there can be no synthesis in the absence of dissolution +and resolution. + +A fight of old ideas against new ones, a contest of clashing culture +levels, a struggle to get old things looked at from a new point of view, +these are the features that characterize all efforts after reform. It +was said by some of the eighteenth century philosophers that society was +held together by agreement in a bond. That is not quite correct. The +truth is that society is held together, as is any phase of social life, +by a bond of agreement. The agreement is not of the conscious, +documentary order, but it is there, and it consists in sharing a common +life created and maintained by having a common tradition, and a common +stock of ideas and ideals. It is this that makes a man a member of one +social group rather than of another--Chinese, American, French, German, +or Choctaw. There is no discriminating feature in what is called the +economic needs of people. The economic needs of human beings--food, +clothing, and shelter, are of the same order the world over. And +certainly the fact of a Chinaman sharing in the economic life of +Britain, or an Englishman sharing in the economic life of China, would +not entitle either to be called genuine members of the group in which he +happened to be living. Membership only begins to be when those belonging +to a group share in a common mental outfit. Even within a society, and +in relation to certain social groups, one can see illustrations of the +same principle. A man is not really a member of a society of artists, +lawyers, or doctors merely by payment of an annual subscription. He is +that only when he becomes a participant in the mental life of the +group.[9] It is this common stock of mental facts which lies at the +root of all collective ideas--an army, a Church, or a nation. And ever +the fight is by way of attack and defence of the psychologic fact.[10] + +[9] This seems to me to give the real significance of Nationality. It +has been argued by some that nationality is a pure myth, as unreal as +the divinity of a king. The principal ground for this denial of +nationality appears to be that so-called national characteristics are +seen to undergo drastic transformation when their possessors are subject +to a new set of influences. This may be quite true, but if nationality, +in the sense of being a product of biological heredity, is ruled out, it +does not follow that nationality is thereby destroyed. The fact may +remain but it demands a different interpretation. And if what has been +said above be true, it follows that nationality is not a personal fact, +but an extra or super-personal one. It belongs to the group rather than +to the individual, and is created by the possession of a common speech, +a common literature, and a common group life. And quite naturally, when +the individual is lifted out of this special social influence its power +may well be weakened, and in the case of his children may be +non-existent, or replaced by the special characteristics of the new +group into which he is born. The discussion of nationality ought not, +therefore, to move along the lines of acceptance or rejection of the +conception of nationality, but of how far specific national +characteristics admit of modification under the pressure of new +conditions. + +[10] It would take too long to elaborate, but it may be here noted that +in the human group the impelling force is not so much needs as desires, +and that fact raises the whole issue from the level of biology to that +of psychology. So long as life is at a certain level man shares with the +animal the mere need for food. But at another level there arises not +merely the need for food, but a desire for certain kind of food, cooked +in a particular manner, and served in a special style. And provided that +we do not by hunger reduce man to the level of the beast again, the +desire will be paramount and will determine whether food shall be eaten +or not. So, again, with the fact of sex and marriage. At the animal +level we have the crude fact of sex, and this is, indeed, inescapable at +any stage. But the growth of civilization brings about the fact that the +need for the gratification of the sexual appetite is regulated by the +secondary qualities of grace of form, or of disposition, which are the +immediate determinants of whether a particular man shall marry a +particular woman or not. Again, it is the _desire_ for power and +distinction, not the _need_ for money that impels men to spend their +lives in building up huge fortunes. And, finally, we have the fact that +a great many of our present needs are transformed desires. The working +man of to-day counts as needs, as do we all more or less, a number of +things that began as pure desires. We say we need books, pictures, +music, etc. But none of these things can be really brought under the +category of things necessary to life. They are the creation of man's +mental cravings. Without them we say life would not be worth living, and +it is well that we should all feel so. Professor Marshall rightly dwells +upon this point by saying: "Although it is man's wants in the early +stages of development that give rise to his activities, yet afterwards +each new step is to be regarded as the development of new activities +giving rise to new wants, rather than of new wants giving rise to new +activities."--(_Principles of Economics_, Vol. I., p. 164.) + +To do the Churches and other vested interests justice, they have never +lost sight of this truth, and it would have been better for the race +had others been equally alive to its importance. The Churches have never +ceased to fight for the control of those public organs that make for the +formation of opinion. Their struggle to control the press, the platform, +and the school means just this. Whatever they may have taught, +self-interest forced upon them recognition of the truth that it was what +men thought about things that mattered. They have always opposed the +introduction of new ideas, and have fought for the retention of old +ones. It was a necessity of their existence. It was also an admission of +the truth that in order for reform to become a fact the power of +traditional ideas must be broken. Man is what he thinks, is far nearer +the truth than the once famous saying, "Man is what he eats." As a +member of a social group man is dominated by his ideas of things, and +any movement of reform must take cognisance of that fact if it is to +cherish reasonable hopes of success. + + + + +CHAPTER III. + +WHAT IS FREETHOUGHT? + + +Freedom of thought and freedom of speech stand to each other as the two +halves of a pair of scissors. Without freedom of speech freedom of +thought is robbed of the better part of its utility, even if its +existence is not threatened. The one reacts on the other. As thought +provides the material for speech, so, in turn, it deteriorates when it +is denied expression. Speech is, in fact, one of the great factors in +human progress. It is that which enables one generation to hand on to +another the discoveries made, the inventions produced, the thoughts +achieved, and so gives a degree of fixity to the progress attained. For +progress, while expressed through the individual, is achieved by the +race. Individually, the man of to-day is not strikingly superior in form +or capacity to the man of five or ten thousand years ago. But he knows +more, can achieve more, and is in that sense stronger than was his +ancestors. He is the heir of the ages, not as a figure of speech, but as +the most sober of facts. He inherits what previous generations have +acquired; the schoolboy of to-day starts with a capital of inherited +knowledge that would have been an outfit for a philosopher a few +thousand years ago. + +It is this that makes speech of so great importance to the fact of +progress. Without speech, written or verbal, it would be impossible to +conserve the products of human achievement. Each generation would have +to start where its predecessor commenced, and it would finish at about +the same point. It would be the fable of Sisyphus illustrated in the +passing of each generation of human beings. + +But speech implies communication. There is not very much pleasure in +speaking to oneself. Even the man who apologised for the practice on the +ground that he liked to address a sensible assembly would soon grow +tired of so restricted an audience. The function of speech is to +transmit ideas, and it follows, therefore, that every embargo on the +free exchange of ideas, every obstacle to complete freedom of speech, is +a direct threat to the well-being of civilisation. As Milton could say +that a good book "is the precious life-blood of a master spirit, +embalmed and treasured up to a life beyond life," and that "he who +destroys a good book kills reason itself," so we may say that he who +strikes at freedom of thought and speech is aiming a blow at the very +heart of human betterment. + +In theory, the truth of what has been said would be readily admitted, +but in practice it has met, and still meets, with a vigorous opposition. +Governments have exhausted their powers to prevent freedom of +intercourse between peoples, and every Church and chapel has used its +best endeavours to the same end. Even to-day, when all are ready to pay +lip-homage to freedom of thought, the obstacles in the way of a genuine +freedom are still very great. Under the best possible conditions there +will probably always be some coercion of opinion, if only of that +unconscious kind which society as a whole exerts upon its individual +members. But to this we have to add the coercion that is consciously +exerted to secure the formation of particular opinions, and which has +the dual effect of inducing dissimulation in some and impotency in +others. Quite ignorantly parents commence the work when they force upon +children their own views of religion and inculcate an exaggerated +respect for authority. They create an initial bias that is in only too +many cases fatal to real independence of thought. Social pressure +continues what a mistaken early training has commenced. When opinions +are made the test of "good form," and one's social standing partly +determined by the kind of opinions that one holds, there is developed on +the one side hypocrisy, and on the other, because certain opinions are +banned, thought in general is unhealthily freed from the sobering +influence of enlightened criticism.[11] + +[11] It is a curious thing, as Philip Gilbert Hamerton points out in one +of his essays, that in England religious freedom appears to exist in +inverse proportion to rank. The king has no freedom whatever in a choice +of religion. His religion is part of the position. An English nobleman, +speaking generally, has two religions from which to choose. He may be +either a member of the established Church or of the Roman Catholic. In +the middle classes there is the choice of all sorts of religious sects, +so long as they are Christian. Religious dissent is permitted so long as +it does not travel beyond the limits of the chapel. And when we come to +the better class working man, he has the greatest freedom of all. His +social position does not depend upon his belonging to this or that +Church, and he may, to borrow a phrase from Heine, go to hell in his own +fashion. + +To-day the legal prohibition of religious dissent is practically +ineffective, and is certainly far less demoralizing than the pressure +that is exerted socially and unofficially. In all probability this has +always been the case. For legal persecution must be open. Part of its +purpose is publicity, and that in itself is apt to rouse hostility. +Against open, legal persecution a man will make a stand, or if he gives +way to the force arrayed against him may do so with no feeling of +personal degradation. But the conformity that is secured by a threat of +social boycott, the freedom of speech that is prevented by choking the +avenues of intellectual intercourse, is far more deadly in its +consequences, and far more demoralizing in its influence on character. +To give way, as thousands do, not to the open application of force, +which carries no greater personal reflection than does the soldier's +surrender to superior numbers, but to the dread of financial loss, to +the fear of losing a social status, that one may inwardly despise even +while in the act of securing it, or from fear of offending those whom we +may feel are not worthy of our respect, these are the things that cannot +be done without eating into one's sense of self-respect, and inflicting +upon one's character an irreparable injury. + +On this matter more will be said later. For the present I am concerned +with the sense in which we are using the word "Freethought." +Fortunately, little time need be wasted in discussing the once popular +retort to the Freethinker that if the principle of determinism be +accepted "free" thought is impossible. It is surprising that such an +argument should ever have secured a vogue, and is only now interesting +as an indication of the mentality of the defender of orthodox religion. +Certainly no one who properly understands the meaning of the word would +use such an argument. At best it is taking a word from sociology, a +sphere in which the meaning is quite clear and intelligible, and +applying it in the region of physical science where it has not, and is +not intended to have, any meaning at all. In physical science a thing is +what it does, and the business of science is to note the doings of +forces and masses, their actions and reactions, and express them in +terms of natural "law." From the point of view of physical science a +thing is neither free nor unfree, and to discuss natural happenings in +terms of freedom or bondage is equal to discussing smell in terms of +sight or colour in terms of smell. But applied in a legitimate way the +word "free" is not only justifiable, it is indispensible. The confusion +arises when we take a word from a department in which its meaning is +quite clear and apply it in a region where it has no application +whatever. + +Applied to opinion "Free" has the same origin and the same application +as the expressions "a free man," or a "free State," or "a free people." +Taking either of these expressions it is plain that they could have +originated only in a state of affairs where some people are "free," and +some are living in a state of bondage or restraint. There is no need to +trace the history of this since so much is implied in the word itself. A +free State is one in which those belonging to it determine their own +laws without being coerced by an outside power. A free man is one who is +permitted to act as his own nature prompts. The word "free" implies +nothing as to the nature of moral or mental causation, that is a +question of a wholly different order. The free man exists over against +the one who is not free, the free State over against one that is held in +some degree of subjection to another State. There is no other meaning to +the word, and that meaning is quite clear and definite. + +Now Freethought has a precisely similar significance. It says nothing as +to the nature of thought, the origin of thought, or the laws of thought. +With none of these questions is it vitally concerned. It simply asserts +that there are conditions under which thought is not "free," that is, +where it is coerced to a foregone conclusion, and that these conditions +are fatal to thought in its higher and more valuable aspects. +Freethought is that form of thinking that proceeds along lines of its +own determining, rather than along lines that are laid down by +authority. In actual practice it is immediately concerned with the +expression of opinion rather than with its formation, since no authority +can prevent the formation of opinion in any mind that is at all +independent in its movements and forms opinions on the basis of observed +facts and adequate reasoning. But its chief and primary significance +lies in its repudiation of the right of authority to say what form the +expression of opinion shall take. And it is also clear that such a term +as "Freethought" could only have come into general use and prominence in +a society in which the free circulation of opinion was more or less +impeded. + +It thus becomes specially significant that, merely as a matter of +history, the first active manifestation of Freethought should have +occurred in connection with a revolt against religious teaching and +authority. This was no accident, but was rather a case of necessity. +For, in the first place, there is no other subject in which pure +authority plays so large a part as it does in religion. All churches and +all priesthoods, ancient and modern, fall back upon the principle of +pure authority as a final method of enforcing their hold upon the +people. That, it may be noted in passing, is one of the chief reasons +why in all ages governments have found religion one of the most +serviceable agencies in maintaining their sway. Secondly, there seems to +have been from the very earliest times a radically different frame of +mind in the approach to secular and religious matters. So far as one can +see there appears to be, even in primitive societies, no very strong +opposition to the free discussion of matters that are of a purely +secular nature. Questions of ways and means concerning these are freely +debated among savage tribes, and in all discussion differences of +opinion must be taken for granted. It is when we approach religious +subjects that a difference is seen. Here the main concern is to +determine the will of the gods, and all reasoning is thus out of place, +if not a positive danger. The only thing is to discover "God's will," +and when we have his, or his will given in "sacred" books the embargo on +free thinking is complete. This feature continues to the end. We do not +even to-day discuss religious matters in the same open spirit in which +secular matters are debated. There is a bated breath, a timidity of +criticism in discussing religious subjects that does not appear when we +are discussing secular topics. With the thoroughly religious man it is +solely a question of what God wishes him to do. In religion this affords +the only latitude for discussion, and even that disappears largely when +the will of God is placed before the people in the shape of "revealed" +writings. Fortunately for the world "inspired" writings have never been +so clearly penned as to leave no room for doubt as to what they actually +meant. Clarity of meaning has never been one of the qualities of divine +authorship. + +In this connection it is significant that the first form of democratic +government of which we have any clear record should have been in +freethinking, sceptical Greece. Equally notable is it that in both Rome +and Greece the measure of mental toleration was greater than it has ever +been in other countries before or since. In Rome to the very end of the +Pagan domination there existed no legislation against opinions, as such. +The holders of certain opinions might find themselves in uncomfortable +positions now and then, but action against them had to rest on some +ground other than that which was afterwards known as heresy. There +existed no law in the Roman Empire against freedom of opinion, and those +who are familiar with Mr. H. C. Lea's classic, _History of the +Inquisition_, will recall his account of the various tactics adopted by +the Christian Church to introduce measures that would accustom the +public mind to legislation which should establish the principle of +persecution for opinion.[12] In the end the Church succeeded in +effecting this, and its success was registered in the almost +unbelievable degradation of the human intellect which was exhibited in +the Christian world for centuries. So complete was this demoralization +that more than a thousand years later we find men announcing as a most +daring principle a demand for freedom of discussion which in old Greece +and Rome was never officially questioned. Christianity not merely killed +freedom wherever it established itself, but it came very near killing +even the memory of it. + +[12] See specially Vol. I., chapters 6, 7, and 8. One is sorely tempted +to engage in what would be a rather lengthy aside on the mental freedom +enjoyed by the people of ancient Greece, but considerations of cogency +advise a shorter comment in this form. In the first place we have to +note that neither the Greeks nor the Romans possessed anything in the +shape of "sacred" books. That, as the history of Mohammedanism and +Christianity shows, is one of the most disastrous things that can happen +to any people. But apart from this there were several circumstances +connected with the development of the Greek peoples that made for +freedom of opinion. There was no uniform theology to commence with, and +the configuration of the country, while enough to maintain local +independence, was not enough to prevent a certain amount of intercourse. +And it would certainly seem that no people were ever so devoid of +intolerance as were the ancient Greeks. It is true that the history of +Greece was not without its examples of intolerance, but these were +comparatively few, and, as Professor Bury says, persecution was never +organized. The gods were criticized in both speeches and plays. Theories +of Materialism and Atheism were openly taught and were made the topic of +public discussion. There was, indeed, a passion for the discussion of +all sorts of subjects, and to discussion nothing is sacred. The best +thought of Rome owed its impetus to Greece, and at a later date it was +the recovered thought of Greece which gave the impetus to Mohammedan +Spain in its cultivation of science and philosophy, and so led to the +partial recovery of Europe from the disastrous control of the Christian +Church. Nor need it be assumed that the work of Greece was due to the +possession of a superior brain power. Of that there is not the slightest +vestige of proof. It is simply that the ancient Greek lived in a freer +mental atmosphere. The mind had less to hamper it in its operations; it +had no organized and powerful Church that from the cradle to the grave +pursued its work of preventing free criticism and the play of +enlightened opinion. For several centuries the world has been seeking to +recover some of its lost liberties with only a very moderate success. +But if one thinks of what the Greeks were, and if one adds to what they +had achieved a possible two thousand years of development, he will then +have some notion of what the triumph of the Christian Church meant to +the world. + +It was, therefore, inevitable that in the western world Freethought +should come into prominence in relation to the Christian religion and +its claims. In the Christian Church there existed an organization which +not alone worked with the avowed intention of determining what men +should think, but finally proceeded to what was, perhaps, the logical +conclusion, to say what they should not think. No greater tyranny than +the Christian Church has ever existed. And this applies, not to the +Roman Church alone, but to every Church within the limit of its +opportunities. In the name and in the interests of religion the +Christian Church took some of the worst passions of men and consecrated +them. The killing of heretics became one of the most solemn duties and +it was urged upon secular rulers as such. The greatest instrument of +oppression ever formed, the Inquisition, was fashioned for no other +purpose than to root out opinions that were obnoxious to the Church. It +would have been bad enough had the attempts of the Church to control +opinion been limited to religion. But that was not the case. It aimed at +taking under its control all sorts of teaching on all sorts of +subjects. Nothing would have surprised an inhabitant of ancient Rome +more, could he have revisited the earth some dozen centuries after the +establishment of Christianity, than to have found men being punished for +criticising doctrines that were in his day openly laughed at. And +nothing could have given an ancient Athenian greater cause for wonder +than to have found men being imprisoned and burned for teaching cosmical +theories that were being debated in the schools of Athens two thousand +years before. Well might they have wondered what had happened to the +world, and well might they have come to the conclusion that it had been +overtaken by an attack of universal insanity. And the explanation would +not have been so very wide of the truth. + +In this matter of suppression of freedom of thinking there was little to +choose between the Churches. Each aimed at controlling the thought of +mankind, each was equally intolerant of any variation from the set line, +and each employed the same weapon of coercion so far as circumstances +permitted. At most the Protestant Churches substituted a dead book for a +living Church, and in the end it may be questioned, when all allowance +is made for the changed circumstances in which Protestantism operated, +whether the rule of the new Church was not more disastrous than the +older one. It had certainly less excuse for its intolerance. The Roman +Catholic Church might urge that it never claimed to stand for freedom of +opinion, and whatever its sins it was so far free from the offence of +hypocrisy. But the Protestant Churches could set up no such plea; they +professed to stand on freedom of conscience. And they thus added the +quality of inconsistency and hypocrisy to an offence that was already +grave enough in itself. + +But whatever opinion one may have on that point, it is certain that in +practice the Protestant leaders were as opposed to freedom of thought as +were the Roman Catholics. And Protestant bigotry left a mark on European +history that deserves special recognition. For the first time it made +the profession of Christianity a definite part of the law of the secular +State.[13] Hitherto there had been no law in any of the European States +which made a profession of Christianity necessary. There had been plenty +of persecutions of non-Christians, and the consequences of a rejection +of Christianity, if one lived in a Christian State, were serious enough. +But when the secular State punished the heretic it was a manifestation +of good will towards the Church and not the expression of a legal +enactment. It was the direct influence of the Church on the State. +Church and State were legally distinct during the medięval period, +however closely they may have been allied in practice. With the arrival +of Protestantism and the backing of the reformed religion given by +certain of the Princes, the machinery of intolerance, so to speak, was +taken over by the State and became one of its functions. It became as +much the duty of the secular officials to extirpate heresy, to secure +uniformity of religious belief as it was to the interest of the Church +to see that it was destroyed. Up to that time it was the aim of the +Church to make the State one of its departments. It had never legally +succeeded in doing this, but it was not for the Roman Church to sink to +the subordinate position of becoming a department of the State. It was +left for Protestantism to make the Church a branch of the State and to +give religious bigotry the full sanction of secular law. + +[13] See on this point Heeren's _Historical Treatises_, 1836, pp. +61-70. + +Neither with Catholic nor Protestant could there be, therefore, any +relaxation in the opposition offered to independent thinking. That still +remained the cardinal offence to the religious mind. In the name of +religion Protestants opposed the physics of Newton as bitterly as +Catholics opposed the physics of Galileo. The geology of Hutton and +Lyell, the chemistry of Boyle and Dalton, the biology of Von Baer, +Lamarck and Darwin, with almost any other branch of science that one +cares to select, tell the same tale. And when the desire for reform took +a social turn there was the same influence to be fought. For while the +Roman Catholic laid the chief insistence on obedience to the Church, the +Protestant laid as strong insistence on obedience to the State, and made +disobedience to its orders a matter of almost religious revolt. The +whole force of religion was thus used to induce contentment with the +existing order, instead of to the creation of an intelligent discontent +which would lead to continuous improvement. In view of these +circumstances it is not surprising that the word "Freethought" should +have lost in actual use its more general significance of a denial of the +place of mere authority in matters of opinion, and have acquired a more +definite and precise connotation. It could not, of course, lose its +general meaning, but it gained a special application and became properly +associated with a definitely anti-theological attitude. The growth in +this direction was gradual but inevitable. When the term first came into +general use, about the end of the seventeenth century, it was mainly +used with reference to those deists who were then attacking +Christianity. In that sense it continued to be used for some time. But +as Deism lost ground, thanks partly to the Christian attack, the clear +and logical issue between Theism and Atheism became apparent, with the +result that the definite anti-religious character of "Freethought" +became firmly established. And to-day it is mere affectation or timidity +to pretend that the word has any other vital significance. To say that a +man is a Freethinker is to give, to ninety-nine people out of a hundred, +the impression that he is anti-religious. And in this direction the +popular sense of the word discloses what has been its important historic +function. Historically, the chief stronghold of mere authority has been +religion. In science and in sociology, as well as in connection with +supernaturalism proper, every movement in the direction of the free +exercise of the intellect has met with the unceasing opposition of +religion. That has always been at once the symbol and the instrument of +oppression. To attack religion has been to attack the enemy in his +capital. All else has been matter of outpost skirmishing. + +I have apparently gone a long way round to get at the meaning of the +word "Freethought," but it was necessary. For it is of very little use, +in the case of an important word that has stood and stands for the name +of a movement, to go to a dictionary, or to appeal to etymology. The +latter has often a mere antiquarian interest, and the former merely +registers current meanings, it does not make them. The use of a word +must ultimately be determined by the ideas it conveys to those who hear +it. And from what has been said the meaning of this particular word +should be fairly clear. While standing historically for a reasoned +protest against the imposition of opinion by authority, and, negatively, +against such artificial conditions as prevent the free circulation of +opinion, it to-day stands actually for a definitely anti-religious +mental attitude. And this is what one would naturally expect. Protests, +after all, are protests against something in the concrete, even though +they may embody the affirmation of an abstract principle. And nowadays +the principle of pure authority has so few defenders that it would be +sheer waste of time, unless the protest embodied a definite attitude +with regard to specific questions. We may, then, put it that to us +"Freethought" stands for a reasoned and definite opposition to all forms +of supernaturalism, it claims the right to subject all religious beliefs +to the test of reason, and further claims that when so tested they break +down hopelessly. It is from this point of view that these pages are +written, and the warranty for so defining it should be apparent from +what has been said in this and the preceding chapter. + + + + +CHAPTER IV. + +REBELLION AND REFORM. + + +Rebellion and reform are not exactly twins, but they are very closely +related. For while all rebellion is not reform, yet in the widest sense +of the word, there is no reform without rebellion. To fight for reform +is to rebel against the existing order and is part of the eternal and +fundamentally healthful struggle of the new against the old, and of the +living present against the dead past. The rebel is thus at once a public +danger and a benefactor. He threatens the existing order, but it is in +the name of a larger and better social life. And because of this it is +his usual lot to be crucified when living and deified when dead. So it +has always been, so in its main features will it always be. If +contemporaries were to recognize the reformer as such, they would +destroy his essential function by making it useless. Improvement would +become an automatic process that would perfect itself without +opposition. As it is, the function of the rebel is to act as an +explosive force, and no society of average human beings likes +explosions. They are noisy, and they are dangerous. For the reformer to +complain at not being hailed as a deliverer is for him to mistake his +part and place in social evolution. + +The rebel and the reformer is, again, always in minority. That follows +from what has already been said. It follows, too, from what we know of +development in general. Darwinism rests on the supreme importance of the +minority. It is an odd variation here and there that acts as the +starting point for a new species--and it has against it the swamping +influence of the rest of its kind that treads the old biological line. +Nature's choicest variations are of necessity with the few, and when +that variation has established itself and become normal another has to +appear before a new start can be made. + +Whether we take biology or psychology the same condition appears. A new +idea occurs to an individual and it is as strictly a variation from the +normal as anything that occurs in the animal world. The idea may form +the starting point of a new theory, or perhaps of a new social order. +But to establish itself, to become the characteristic property of the +group, it must run the gamut of persecution and the risk of suppression. +And suppressed it often is--for a time. It is an idle maxim which +teaches that truth always conquers, if by that is implied that it does +so at once. That is not the truth. Lies have been victorious over and +over again. The Roman Catholic Church, one of the greatest lies in the +history of the human race, stood the conqueror for many centuries. The +teaching of the rotundity of the earth and its revolution round the sun +was suppressed for hundreds of years until it was revived in the 16th +century. In the long run truth does emerge, but a lie may have a +terribly lengthy innings. For the lie is accepted by the many, while the +truth is seen only by the few. But it is the few to whom we turn when we +look over the names of those who have made the world what is it. All the +benefits to society come from the few, and society crucifies them to +show its gratitude. One may put it that society lives on the usual, but +flourishes on account of the exception. + +Now there is something extremely significant in the Christian religion +tracing all the disasters of mankind to a primal act of disobedience. It +is a fact which discloses in a flash the chief social function of +religion in general and of Christianity in particular. Man's duty is +summed up in the one word obedience, and the function of the +(religiously) good man is to obey the commands of God, as that of the +good citizen is to obey the commands of government. The two commands +meet and supplement each other with the mutual advantage which results +from the adjustment of the upper and lower jaws of a hyena. And it +explains why the powers that be have always favoured the claims of +religion. It enabled them to rally to their aid the tremendous and +stupefying aid of religion and to place rebellion to their orders on the +same level as rebellion against God. In Christian theology Satan is the +arch-rebel; hell is full of rebellious angels and disobedient men and +women. Heaven is reserved for the timid, the tame, the obedient, the +sheep-like. When the Christ of the Gospels divides the people into goats +and sheep, it is the former that go to hell, and the latter to heaven. +The Church has not a rebel in its calendar, although it has not a few +rogues and many fools. To the Church rebellion is always a sin, save on +those rare occasions when revolt is ordered in the interests of the +Church itself. In Greek mythology Prometheus steals fire from heaven for +the benefit of man and suffers in consequence. The myth symbolizes the +fact. Always the man has had to win knowledge and happiness in the teeth +of opposition from the gods. Always the race has owed its progress to +the daring of the rebel or of the rebellious few. + +Often the Freethinker is denounced because he is destructive or +dangerous. What other is he expected to be? And would he be of much use +if he were otherwise?? I would go further and say that he is the most +destructive of all agencies because he is so intimately concerned with +the handling of the most destructive of weapons--ideas. We waste a good +deal of time in denouncing certain people as dangerous when they are in +reality comparatively harmless. A man throws a bomb, or breaks into a +house, or robs one of a purse, and a judge solemnly denounces him as a +most "dangerous member of society." It is all wrong. These are +comparatively harmless individuals. One man throws a bomb, kills a few +people, damages some property, and there the matter ends. Another man +comes along and drops instead of a bomb a few ideas, and the whole +country is in a state of eruption. Charles Peace pursues a career of +piety and crime, gets himself comfortably and religiously hanged, and +society congratulates itself on having got rid of a dangerous person, +and then forgets all about it. Karl Marx visits England, prowls round +London studying the life of rich and poor, and drops _Das Kapital_ on +us. A quiet and outwardly inoffensive individual, one who never gave the +police a moment's anxiety, spends years studying earthworms, and +flowers, and horses and cats, and all sorts of moving things and +presents society with _The Origin of Species_. Organized society found +itself able to easily guard itself against the attacks of men such as +Charles Peace, it may with impunity extend its hospitality to the +thrower of bombs, or robber of houses, but by what means can it protect +itself against the "peaceful" Marx or the "harmless" Darwin? No society +can afford to ignore in its midst a score of original or independent +thinkers, or if society does ignore them they will not for long ignore +society. The thinker is really destructive. He destroys because he +creates; he creates because he destroys. The one is the obverse of the +other. + +I am not making idle play with the word "destruction." It is literally +true that in human society the most destructive and the most coercive +forces at work are ideas. They strike at established institutions and +demand either their modification or their removal. That is why the +emergence of a new idea is always an event of social significance. +Whether it be a good idea or a bad one will not affect the truth of this +statement. For over four years our political mediocrities and muddle +headed militarists were acting as though the real problem before them +was to establish the superiority of one armed group of men over another +group. That was really a simple matter. The important issue which +society had to face was the ideas that the shock of the war must give +rise to. Thinkers saw this; but thinkers do not get the public ear +either as politicians or militarists. And now events are driving home +the lesson. The ideas of Bolshevism and Sinn Feinism proved far more +"dangerous" than the German armies. The Allied forces could handle the +one, but they were powerless before the other. It is not a question of +whether these particular ideas are good or bad, or whether we approve or +disapprove of them, but entirely one that, being ideas, they represent a +far more "destructive" power than either bomb or gun. They are at once +the forces that act as the cement of society and those that may hurl it +into chaotic fragments. + +Whether an idea will survive or not must, in the end, be determined by +circumstances, but in itself a new idea may be taken as the mental +analogue of the variation which takes place in physical structures, and +which forms the raw material of natural selection. And if that is so, it +is evident that any attempt to prevent the play of new ideas on old +institutions is striking at the very fact of progress. For if we are to +encourage variation we must permit it in all directions, up as well as +down, for evil as well as for good. You cannot check variation in one +direction without checking it in all. You cannot prevent the appearance +of a new idea that you do not want without threatening the appearance of +a number of ideas that you would eagerly welcome. It is, therefore, +always better to encourage the appearance of a bad idea than it is to +risk the suppression of a good one. Besides, it is not always that force +applied to the suppression of ideas succeeds in its object. What it +often does is to cause the persecuted idea to assume a more violent +form, to ensure a more abrupt break with the past than would otherwise +occur, with the risk of a period of reaction before orderly progress is +resumed. The only way to silence an idea is to answer it. You cannot +reply to a belief with bullets, or bayonet a theory into silence. +History contains many lessons, but none that is plainer than this one, +and none that religious and secular tyrannies learn with greater +reluctance. + +The Churches admit by their practice the truth of what has been said. +They have always understood that the right way to keep society in a +stationary position is to prevent the introduction of new ideas. It is +thought against which they have warred, the thinker against whom they +have directed their deadliest weapons. The Christian Church has been +tolerant towards the criminal, and has always been intolerant towards +the heretic and the Freethinker. For the latter the naming _auto da fé_, +for the former the moderate penance and the "go, and sin no more." The +worst of its tortures were neither created for nor applied to the thief +and the assassin, but were specially designed for the unbeliever. In +this the Church acted with a sure instinct. The thief threatens no +institution, not even that of private property. "Thou shalt not steal" +is as much the law of a thieves' kitchen as it is of Mayfair. But +Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, Lyell, Darwin, these are the men who +convey a threat in all they write, who destroy and create with a +splendour that smacks of the power with which Christians have endowed +their mythical deity. No aggregation of criminals has ever threatened +the security of the Church, or even disturbed its serenity. On the +contrary, the worse, morally, the time, the greater the influence of +Christianity. It flourishes on human weakness and social vice as the +bacilli of tuberculosis do in darkness and dirt. It is when weakness +gives place to strength, and darkness to light that the Church finds its +power weakening. The Church could forgive the men who instituted the +black slave trade, she could forgive those who were responsible for the +horrors of the English factory system, but she could never forgive the +writer of the _Age of Reason_. She has always known how to distinguish +her friends from her foes. + +Right or wrong, then, the heretic, the Freethinker, represents a figure +of considerable social significance. His social value does not lie +wholly in the fact of his opinions being sound or his judgment +impeccable. Mere revolt or heresy can never carry that assurance with +it. The important thing about the rebel is that he represents a spirit, +a temper, in the absence of which society would stagnate. It is bad when +people revolt without cause, but it is infinitely better that a people +should revolt without cause than that they should have cause for +rebellion without possessing the courage of a kick. That man should have +the courage to revolt against the thing which he believes to be wrong is +of infinitely greater consequence than that he should be right in +condemning the thing against which he revolts. Whether the rebel is +right or wrong time and consequence alone can tell, but nothing can make +good the evil of a community reduced to sheep-like acquiescence in +whatever may be imposed upon them. The "Their's not to reason why" +attitude, however admirable in an army, is intolerable and dangerous in +social life. Replying to those who shrieked about the "horrors" of the +French Revolution, and who preached the virtue of patriotic obedience to +established authority, Carlyle, with an eye on Ireland, sarcastically +admitted that the "horrors" were very bad indeed, but he added:-- + + What if history somewhere on this planet were to hear of a nation, + the third soul of whom had not for thirty weeks of each year as + many third-rate potatoes as would sustain him? History in that + case, feels bound to consider that starvation is starvation; that + starvation presupposes much; history ventures to assert that the + French Sansculotte of Nine-three, who roused from a long death + sleep, could rush at once to the frontiers and die fighting for an + immortal hope and faith of deliverance for him and his, was but the + second miserablest of men. + +And that same history, looking back through the ages, is bound to +confess that it is to the great rebels, from Satan onward, that the +world mainly owes whatever of greatness or happiness it has achieved. + +One other quality of the rebel remains to be noted. In his revolt +against established authority, in his determination to wreck cherished +institutions for the realization of an ideal, the rebel is not the +representative of an anti-social idea or of an anti-social force. He is +the true representative of the strongest of social influences. The very +revolt against the social institutions that exist is in the name and for +the realization of a larger and a better social order that he hopes to +create. A man who is ready to sacrifice his life in the pursuit of an +ideal cannot, whatever else he may be accused of, be reasonably accused +of selfishness or of a want of "social consciousness." He is a vital +expression of the centuries of social life which have gone before and +which have made us all what we are. Were his social sense weaker he +would risk less. Were he selfish he would not trouble about the +conversion of his fellows. The spirit of revolt represents an important +factor in the process of social development, and they who are most +strenuous in their denunciation of social control, are often, even +though unconsciously, the strongest evidence of its overpowering +influence. + +Fed as we are with the mental food prepared by our Churches and +governments, to whose interests it is that the rebel and the Freethinker +should be decried and denounced, we are all too apt to overlook the +significance of the rebel. Yet he is invariably the one who voices what +the many are afraid or unable to express. The masses suffer dumbly, and +the persistence of their suffering breeds a sense of its inevitability. +It is only when these dumb masses find a voice that they threaten the +established order, and for this the man of ideas is essential. That is +why all vested interests, religious and social, hate him so heartily. +They recognize that of all the forces with which they deal an idea is +the greatest and the most untamable. Once in being it is the most +difficult to suppress. It is more explosive than dynamite and more +shattering in its effects. Physical force may destroy a monarch, but it +is only the force of an idea that can destroy a monarchy. You may +destroy a church with cannon, but cannon are powerless against Church +doctrines. An idea comes as near realizing the quality of +indestructibility as anything we know. You may quiet anything in the +world with greater ease than you may reduce a strong thinker to silence, +or subdue anything with greater facility than you may subdue the idea +that is born of strenuous thought. Fire may be extinguished and strife +made to cease, ambition may be killed and the lust for power grow faint. +The one thing that defies all and that finally conquers is the truth +which strong men see and for which brave men fight. + +It is thus left for the philosophy of Freethought, comprehensive here as +elsewhere, to find a place for the rebel and to recognize the part he +plays in the evolution of the race. For rebellion roots itself +ultimately in the spirit of mental independence. And that whether a +particular act of revolt may be justifiable or not. It is bred of the +past, but it looks forward hopefully and fearlessly to the future, and +it sees in the present the material out of which that better future may +be carved. That the mass of people find in the rebel someone whom it is +moved to suppress is in no wise surprising. New things are not at first +always pleasant, even though they may be necessary. But the temper of +mind from which rebellion springs is one that society can only suppress +at its peril. + + + + +CHAPTER V. + +THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CHILD. + + +If the truth of what has been said above be admitted, it follows that +civilization has two fundamental aspects. On the one side there is the +environment, made up--so far as civilized humanity is concerned--of the +ideas, the beliefs, the customs, and the stored up knowledge of +preceding generations, and on the other side we have an organism which +in virtue of its education responds to the environmental stimuli in a +given manner. Between the man of to-day and the man of an earlier +generation the vital distinction is not that the present day one is, as +an organism, better, that he has keener sight, or stronger muscles, or a +brain of greater capacity, but that he has a truer perception of things, +and in virtue of his enlarged knowledge is able to mould natural forces, +including the impulses of his own nature, in a more desirable manner. +And he can do this because, as I have already said, he inherits what +previous generations have acquired, and so reaps the benefits of what +they have done. + +We may illustrate this in a very simple manner. One of the most striking +differences between the man of to-day and the man of the past is the +attitude of the two in relation to natural phenomena. To the people of +not so many generations ago an eclipse was a very serious thing, fraught +with the promise of disaster to mankind. The appearance of a comet was +no less ominous. John Knox saw in comets an indication of the wrath of +heaven, and in all countries the Churches fought with all their might +against the growth of the scientific view. Away back in antiquity we +meet with the same view. There is, for example, the classic case of the +Greek general Nikias, who, when about to extricate his army from a +dangerous position before Syracuse, was told that an eclipse of the sun +indicated that the gods wished him to stay where he was for three times +nine days. Nikias obeyed the oracles with the result that his army was +captured. Now it is certain that no general to-day would act in that +manner, and if he did it is equally certain that he would be +court-martialled. Equally clear is it that comets and eclipses have +ceased to infect the modern mind with terror, and are now only objects +of study to the learned, and of curiosity to the unlearned. But the +difference here is entirely one of knowledge. Our ancestors reacted to +the appearance of a comet or an eclipse in a particular manner because +their knowledge of these things was of a certain kind. It was not at all +a case of feeling, or of degree of feeling, or of having a better brain, +but simply a matter of reacting to an environmental influence in terms +of an understanding of certain things. Had we the same conception of +these things that our ancestors had we should react in the same manner. +We act differently because our understanding of things is different. We +may put it briefly that the kind of reaction which we make to the things +around us is mainly determined by our knowledge concerning their nature. + +There is one other fact that brings into prominence the importance of +the kind of reaction which we make to environmental stimuli. Put +briefly, we may say that an important distinction between the animal and +man is that the animal passes its existence in a comparatively simple +environment where the experiences are few in kind and often repeated, +whereas with man the environment is very complex, the experiences are +varied in character, and may be only repeated after long intervals. The +consequence is that in order to get through life an animal needs a few +simple instincts which automatically respond to frequently repeated +experiences, while on the other hand there must be with man opportunity +for the kind of response which goes under the name of intelligent +action. It is this which gives us the reason, or the explanation, why of +all animals the human being is born the most helpless, and why he +remains helpless for a longer period than does any other. The prolonged +infancy is the opportunity given to the human being to acquire the +benefits of education and so to reap the full advantage of that social +heritage which, as we have shown, raises him so far above the level of +past generations. Or we may express the matter with the late Professor +Fiske, who was the first, I think, to dwell at length upon this +phenomenon, that the distinction between man and the animal world is +that in the one case we have developed instincts with small capacity for +education, in the other few instincts with great capacity for education. + +It is often said that the Churches have failed to pay attention to +education, or have not taken it seriously. That is quite wrong. It may, +indeed, be said that they have never failed to attend to education, and +have always taken it seriously--with disastrous results to education and +to social life. Ever since the birth of the modern movement for +education the Church has fought hard to maintain its control of schools, +and there is every reason why this should be so. Survival in the animal +world may be secured in two ways. On the one side we may have a +continuance of a special sort of environment to which a given structure +is properly adapted; on the other there may be a modification of the +animal to meet the demands of a changing environment. + +Applying this principle to the question of the Churches and education +the moral is clear. The human environment changes more than that of any +other animal. The mere amassing of experience and its expression in the +form of new institutions or in the modification of already existing +ones, is enough to effect a change in the environment of successive +generations. The Christian Church, or for the matter of that, any form +of religion, has before it two possible courses. Either it must maintain +an environment that is as little as possible unchanged, or it must +modify its body of teaching to meet the changed surroundings. As a mere +matter of fact both processes go on side by side, but consciously the +Churches have usually followed the course of trying to maintain an +unchanged environment. This is the real significance of the attempt of +the more orthodox to boycott new, or heretical literature, or lectures, +or to produce a "religious atmosphere" round the child. It is an attempt +to create an environment to which the child's mind will respond in a +manner that is favourable to the claims and teachings of the Christian +Church. The Church dare not openly and plainly throw overboard its body +of doctrines to meet the needs of the modern mind; and the only thing +remaining is to keep the modern mind as backward as possible in order +that it may rest content with a teaching that is reminiscent of a past +stage of civilization. + +In this connection it is interesting to note that the struggle for the +child is essentially a modern phrase. So long as the teaching of +religion is in, at least, a working harmony with current knowledge and +the general body of the social forces the question of religious +instruction does not emerge. Life itself--social life that is--to a very +considerable extent enforces religious teaching. At all events it does +not violently contradict it. But as, owing to the accumulation of +knowledge, views of the world and of man develop that are not in harmony +with accepted religious teaching, the Churches are forced to attempt the +maintenance of an environment of a special religious kind to which their +teaching is adapted. Hence the growing prominence of the division of +secular and sacred as things that have to do with religion and things +that have not. Hence, too, the importance to the Churches of acquiring +power over the child's mind before it is brought completely under the +influence of an environment in which orthodox teachings can only present +themselves as a gross anachronism. + +Thus, one may say with absolute confidence that if in a modern +environment a child was left free with regard to modern influences there +is nothing that would lead to an acceptance of religion. Our ancestors +grew up familiar with the idea of the miraculous and the supernatural +generally because there was nothing in the existing knowledge of the +world that contradicted it. But what part is there in the general +education of the child in modern society that would lead to that end? So +far as it is taught anything about the world it learns to regard it in +terms of causation and of positive knowledge. It finds itself surrounded +with machinery, and inventions, and with a thousand and one mechanical +and other inventions which do not in the very remotest degree suggest +the supernatural. In other words, the response of a modern child in a +modern environment is of a strictly non-religious kind. Left alone it +would no more become religious in the sense of believing in the +religious teachings of any of the Churches than it would pass through +life looking for miracles or accepting fairy tales as sober statements +of historic fact. It would no more express itself in terms of religion +than it would describe an eclipse in the language of our ancestors of +five hundred years ago. + +In self defence the Churches are thus bound to make a fight for the +possession of the child. They cannot wait, because that means allowing +the child to grow to maturity and then dealing with it when it is able +to examine religion with some regard to its historic evolution, and with +a due appreciation of the hopelessly unscientific character of the +conception of the supernatural. They must, so far as they can, protect +the growing child from the influence of all those environmental forces +that make for the disintegration of religious beliefs. The only way in +which the Churches can at all make sure of a supply of recruits is by +impressing them before they are old enough to resist. As the Germany of +the Kaiser is said to have militarized the nation by commencing with the +schools, so the Churches hope to keep the nations religious by +commencing with the children. Apart from these considerations there is +no reason why religion could not wait, as other subjects wait, till the +child is old enough to understand and appreciate it. But with the +Churches it is literally the child or nothing. + +From the point of view of citizenship the retention of religion in State +schools is a manifest injustice. If ever religious instruction could be +justified in any circumstances it is when the religion taught represents +at least the professed beliefs of the whole of the people. But that is +clearly not the case to-day. Only a section of the people can be called, +even formally, Christian. Large numbers are quite opposed to +Christianity, and large numbers deliberately reject all religion. How, +then, can the State undertake the teaching of a religion without at the +same time rousing resentment in and inflicting an injustice on a large +number of its members? It cannot be done, and the crowning absurdity is +that the State acknowledges the non-essential character of religion by +permitting all who will to go without. In secular subjects it permits no +such option. It says that all children shall receive certain tuition in +certain subjects for a given period. It makes instruction in these +subjects compulsory on the definite and intelligible ground that the +education given is necessary to the intelligent discharge of the duties +of citizenship. It does not do that in the case of religion, and it dare +not do that. No government to-day would have the impudence to say that +discharge of the duties of citizenship is dependent upon acceptance of +the Athanasian Creed, or upon the belief in the Bible, or in an after +life. And not being able to say this it is driven to the absurd position +of, on the one hand saying to the people, that religion shall be taught +in the State schools, and on the other, if one doesn't care to have it +he may leave it alone without suffering the slightest disqualification. + +Indeed, it is impossible for instruction in religion to be genuinely +called education at all. If I may be allowed to repeat what I have said +elsewhere on this subject, one may well ask:-- + + What is it that the genuine educationalist aims at? The imparting + of knowledge is, of course, essential. But, in the main, education + consists in a wholesome training of mind and body, in forming + habits of cleanliness, truthfulness, honesty, kindness, the + development of a sense of duty and of justice. Can it be said in + truth that what is called religious instruction does these things, + or that instruction in them is actually inseparable from religion? + Does the creation of a religious "atmosphere," the telling of + stories of God or Jesus or angels or devils--I omit hell--have any + influence in the direction of cultivating a sound mind in a sound + body? Will anyone contend that the child has even a passing + understanding of subjects over which all adults are more or less + mystified? To confuse is not to instruct, to mystify is not to + enlighten, the repetition of meaningless phrases can leave behind + no healthy residuum in the mind. It is the development of capacity + along right lines that is important, not the mere cramming of + verbal formulę. Above all, it is the function of the true teacher + to make his pupil independent of him. The aim of the priest is to + keep one eternally dependent upon his ministrations. The final and + fatal criticism upon religious instruction is that it is not + education at all. + + It may be argued that a policy of creating sentiments in favour of + certain things not wholly understood by the child is followed in + connection with matters other than religion. We do not wait until a + child is old enough to appreciate the intellectual justification of + ethics to train it in morals. And in many directions we seek to + develop some tendencies and to suppress others in accordance with + an accepted standard. All this may be admitted as quite true, but + it may be said in reply that these are things for which an adequate + reason _can_ be given, and we are sure of the child's approbation + when it is old enough to appreciate what has been done. But in the + case of religion the situation is altogether different. We are here + forcing upon the child as true, as of the same admitted value as + ordinary ethical teaching, certain religious doctrines about which + adults themselves dispute with the greatest acrimony. And there is + clearly a wide and vital distinction between cultivating in a child + sentiments the validity of which may at any time be demonstrated, + or teachings upon the truth of which practically all adults are + agreed, and impressing upon it teachings which all agree may be + false. We are exploiting the child in the interests of a Church. + Parents are allowing themselves to be made the catspaws of priests; + and it is not the least formidable of the counts against the + Church's influence that it converts into active enemies of children + those who should stand as their chief protectors. It is religion + which makes it true that "a _child's_ foes shall be those of his + own household."[14] + +[14] _Religion and the Child_, Pioneer Press. + +Where the claim to force religion upon the child breaks down on such +grounds as those outlined above it is quite certain that it cannot be +made good upon any other ground. Historically, it is also clear that we +do not find that conduct was better in those ages when the Christian +religion was held most unquestioningly, but rather the reverse. The +moralization of the world has, as a matter of historic fact, kept pace +with the secularizing of life. This is true both as regards theory and +fact. The application of scientific methods to ethical problems has +taught us more of the nature of morality in the short space of three or +four generations than Christian teaching did in a thousand years. And it +is not with an expansion of the power and influence of religion that +conduct has undergone an improvement, but with the bringing of people +together in terms of secular relationships and reducing their religious +beliefs to the level of speculative ideas which men may hold or reject +as they think fit, so long as they do not allow them to influence their +relations to one another. + +On all grounds it is urgent that the child should be rescued from the +clutches of the priest. It is unfair to the child to so take advantage +of its trust, its innocence, and its ignorance, and to force upon it as +true teachings that which we must all admit may be false, and which, in +a growing number of cases, the child when it grows up either rejects +absolutely or considerably modifies. It is unjust to the principle upon +which the modern State rests, because it is teaching the speculative +beliefs of a few with money raised from the taxation of all. The whole +tendency of life in the modern State is in the direction of +secularization--confining the duties and activities of the State to +those actions which have their meaning and application to this life. +Every argument that is valid against the State forcing religion upon the +adult is valid also against the State forcing religion upon the child. +And, on the other hand, it is really absurd to say that religion must be +forced upon the child, but we are outraging the rights of the individual +and perpetuating an intolerable wrong if we force it upon the adult. +Surely the dawning and developing individuality of the child has claims +on the community that are not less urgent than those of the adult. + +Finally, the resolve to rescue the child from the clutches of the priest +is in the interest of civilization itself. All human experience shows +that a civilization that is under the control of a priesthood is doomed. +From the days of ancient Egypt there is no exception to this rule. And +sooner or later a people, if they are to progress, are compelled to +attempt to limit the control of the priest over life. The whole of the +struggle of the Reformation was fundamentally for the control of the +secular power--whether life should or should not be under the control of +the Church. In that contest, over a large part of Europe, the Roman +Church lost. But the victory was only a very partial one. It was never +complete. The old priest was driven out, but the new Presbyter remained, +and he was but the old tyrant in another form. Ever since then the fight +has gone on, and ever since, the Protestant minister, equally with the +Catholic priest, has striven for the control of education and so to +dominate the mind of the rising generation. The fight for the liberation +of the child is thus a fight for the control or the directing of +civilization. It is a question of whether we are to permit the priest to +hold the future to ransom by permitting this control of the child, or +whether we are to leave religious beliefs, as we leave other beliefs of +a speculative character, to such a time as the child is old enough to +understand them. It is a fight for the future of civilization. + + + + +CHAPTER VI. + +THE NATURE OF RELIGION. + + +It is no mere paradox to say that religion is most interesting to those +who have ceased to believe in it. The reason for this is not far to +seek. Religious beliefs play so large a part in the early history of +society, and are so influential in social history generally, that it is +impossible to leave religion alone without forfeiting an adequate +comprehension of a large part of social evolution. Human development +forms a continuous record; our institutions, whatever be their nature, +have their roots in the far past, and often, even when modified in form, +retain their essential characteristics. No student of social history can +travel far or dig deeply without finding himself in contact with +religion in some form. And the mass of mankind are not yet so far +removed from "primitive" humanity as to give to the study of religion an +exclusively archęological interest. + +Where so much is discord it is well, if it be possible, to start with a +basis of agreement. And on one point, at least, there is substantial +unity among critics. There is a general agreement among students of folk +lore, comparative mythology, and anthropology, that religious ideas rest +ultimately upon an interpretation of nature that is now generally +discarded. Differing as they do on details, there is consent upon this +point. It is the world of the savage that originates the religion of the +savage, and upon that rests the religions of civilized man as surely as +his physical structure goes back to the animal world for its beginning. +And in giving birth to a religious explanation of his world the savage +was only pursuing the normal path of human development. Mankind +progresses through trial and error; doubtful and erroneous theories are +framed before more reliable ones are established, and while truth may +crown our endeavours it seldom meets us at the outset. Religious beliefs +thus form man's earliest interpretation of nature. On this there is, as +I have said, general agreement, and it is as well not to permit +ourselves to lose sight of that in the discussion of the various +theories that are put forward as to the exact nature of the stages of +religious development. + +In many directions the less accurate theories of things are replaced +gradually and smoothly by more reliable explanations. But in religion +this is not so. For many reasons, with which we are not now immediately +concerned, religious beliefs are not outgrown without considerable +"growing pains." And a long time after the point of view from which +religious beliefs sprang has been given up, the conclusions that were +based on that point of view are held to most tenaciously. And yet if one +accepts the scientific story of the origins of religious ideas there +seems no justification whatever for this. Religion cannot transcend its +origin. Multiply nothing to infinity and the result is still nothing. +Illusion can beget nothing but illusion, even though in its pursuit we +may stumble on reality. And no amount of ingenuity can extract truth +from falsehood. + +One's surprise at the perpetuation of this particular delusion is +diminished by the reflection that the period during which we have +possessed anything like an exact knowledge of the character and +operations of natural forces is, after all, but an infinitesimal +portion of the time the race has been in existence. Three or four +centuries at most cover the period during which such knowledge has been +at our command, and small as this is in relation to the thousands of +generations wherein superstition has reigned unchallenged, a knowledge +of the laws of mental life belongs only to the latter portion. And even +then the knowledge available has been till recently the possession of a +class, while to-day, large masses of the population are under the +domination of the crudest of superstitions. The belief that thirteen is +an unlucky number, that a horse-shoe brings luck, the extent to which +palmistry and astrology flourishes, the cases of witchcraft that crop up +every now and again, all bear testimony to the vast mass of superstition +that is still with us. The primitive mind is still alive and active, +disguised though it may be by a veneer of civilization and a terribly +superficial education. And when one reflects upon all the facts there is +cause for astonishment that in the face of so great a dead weight of +custom and tradition against a rational interpretation of the universe +so much has been done and in so short a time. + +In discussing religion very much turns upon the meaning of the word, and +unfortunately "religion" is to-day used in so many differing and +conflicting senses that without the most careful definition no one is +quite sure what is meant by it. The curious disinclination of so many to +avow themselves as being without a religion must also be noted. To be +without a religion, or rather to be known as one who is without a +religion, would seem to mark one off as apart from the rest of one's +kind, and to infringe all the tribal taboos at one sweep. And very few +seem to have the courage to stand alone. Mr. Augustine Birrell once +said, in introducing to the House of Commons an Education Bill, that +children would rather be wicked than singular. That is quite true, and +it is almost as true of adults as it is of children. There is no great +objection to having a religion different from that of other people, +because the religions of the world are already of so varied a character +that there is always companionship in difference. But to be without a +religion altogether is a degree of isolation that few can stand. The +consequence is that although vast numbers have given up everything that +is really religious they still cling to the name. They have left the +service, but they show a curious attachment to the uniform. Thus it +happens that we have a religion of Socialism, a religion of Ethics, +etc., and I should not be surprised to find one day a religion of +Atheism--if that has not already appeared. + +But all this is a mistake, and a very serious mistake. The Freethinker, +or Socialist, who calls his theory of life a religion is not causing the +religionist to think more highly of him, he is making his opponent think +more highly of his own opinions. Imitation becomes in such a case not +alone flattery, but confirmation. The Goddite does not think more highly +of Freethought because it is labelled religion, he merely becomes the +more convinced of the supreme value of his own faith, and still hopes +for the Freethinker's return to the fold. If Freethinkers are to command +the respect of the religious world they must show not only that they can +get along without religion, but that they can dispense with the name +also. If strength does not command respect weakness will certainly fail +to secure it. And those of us who are genuinely anxious that the world +should be done with false ideas and mischievous frames of mind ought to +at least take care that our own speech and thought are as free from +ambiguity as is possible. + +There is another and deeper aspect of the matter. As I have already +said, language not alone expresses thought, it also governs and directs +it. Locke expressed this truth when he said, "It is impossible that men +should ever truly seek, or certainly discover, the disagreement of ideas +themselves whilst their thoughts flutter about, or stick only on sounds +of doubtful and uncertain significance." Quite a number of theological +and metaphysical conundrums would lose their significance if it were +only realized that the words used are not alone of doubtful and +uncertain significance, but often of no possible significance whatever. +They are like counterfeit coins, which retain their value only so long +as they are not tested by a proper standard. And the evil of these +counterfeits is that they deceive both those who tender and those who +accept them. For even though slovenliness of speech is not always the +product of slovenly thought, in the long run it tends to induce it, and +those who realize this need to be specially on their guard against using +language which can only further confuse an already sufficiently confused +public opinion, and strengthen superstitions that are already +sufficiently strong without our clandestine or unintended assistance.[15] + +[15] Of the evil of an incautious use of current words we have an +example in the case of Darwin. Neither his expressions of regret at +having "truckled to public opinion" at having used the term "creator," +nor his explicit declaration that the word was to him only a synonym of +ignorance, prevented religious apologists from citing him as a believer +in deity on the strength of his having used the word. + +Unfortunately, it remains a favourite policy with many writers to use +and define the word religion, not in accordance with a comprehensive +survey of facts, but in a way that will harmonize with existing +pre-possessions. To this class belongs Matthew Arnold's famous +definition of religion as "Morality touched with emotion," Professor +Seeley's statement that we are entitled to call religion "any habitual +and permanent admiration," or the common description of religion as +consisting in devotion to an ideal. All such definitions may be set on +one side as historically worthless, and as not harmonizing with the +facts. Arnold's definition is in the highest degree superficial, since +there exists no morality that is not touched with emotion, and on the +other hand there exist phases of religion that have not any connection +with morality, however slight. Professor Leuba properly rules +definitions of this class out of order in the comment that, as it is +"the function of words to delimitate, one defeats the purpose of +language by stretching the meaning of a word until it has lost all +precision and unity of meaning."[16] A definition that includes +everything may as well, for all the use it is, not cover anything. + +[16] _The Psychological Origin and Nature of Religion_, p. 92. + +Equally faulty are those definitions that are based upon an assumed +conscious effort to explain the mysteries of existence. No stranger +lapse ever overtook a great thinker than occurred to Herbert Spencer +when he described religion as consisting in a worship of the unknowable, +and as due to the desire to explain a mystery ever pressing for +interpretation. Granting the existence of an Unknowable, the sense of +its presence belongs to the later stages of mental evolution, not to the +earlier ones. Metaphysical and mystical theories of religion are +indications of its disintegration, not of its beginnings. Primitive man +began to believe in ghosts and gods for the same reasons that he +believed in other things; he worshipped his gods for very concrete +considerations. Even the distinction between "spiritual" and material +existence is quite foreign to his mind. Such distinctions arise +gradually with the progress of knowledge and its disintegrating +influence on inherited beliefs. If primitive man may be credited with a +philosophy, and if one may use the word in a purely convenient sense, +then one may say that he is neither a dualist, nor a pluralist, but a +monist. The soul or double he believes in is similar to the body he +sees; the unseen forces he credits with various activities are of the +same kind as those with which he is acquainted. To read our conceptions +into the mind of primitive man because we use our words to explain his +thoughts is a procedure that is bound to end in confusion. Man's +earliest conception of things is vague and indefinite. Later, he +distinguishes differences, qualitative and quantitative, his conception +of things becomes more definite, and distinctions are set up that lay +the foundations of science and philosophy, and which mark their +separation from religion. + +So far as one can see there are only two causes why people should +continue to use the word religion after giving up all for which it +properly stands. One is sheer conservatism. When, for instance, Thomas +Paine said, "To do good is my religion," he had at least the +justification of believing in a deity, but apart from this the only +cause for his calling the desire to do good a religion is that there had +grown up the fashion of calling one's rule of life a religion. The other +cause is the ill-repute that has been attached to those who avow +themselves as being without religion. Orthodoxy saw to it that they were +treated as pariahs without social status, and, in many cases, legal +rights. Once upon a time it was useless unless one believed in the +_right_ religion. Nowadays, any religion will do, or anything that one +cares to call a religion. But not to have any religion at all still puts +one outside the pale of respectability, and there seem to be few who +can stand that. And supernatural religion--the only genuine +article--being impossible with many, these may still, if they care to, +save their face by professing to use the name, even if they have not the +thing. Orthodoxy is very accommodating nowadays. + +Leaving for a time the question of how religion actually does arise, we +may turn to those writers who define religion in terms of ethics. It may +be admitted that so far as the later stages of religion are concerned +considerable emphasis is laid upon ethics. But we can only make religion +a part of ethics by expanding the term morality so as to include +everything, or by contracting it so as to exclude all the lower forms of +religious belief. And any definition of religion that does not embrace +all its forms is obviously inaccurate. It is not at all a question of +defining the higher in terms of the lower, or the lower in terms of the +higher, it is simply the need of so defining religion that our +definition will cover all religions, high and low, and thus deal with +their essential characteristics. + +The only sense in which ethics may be said to be included in religion +lies in the fact that in primitive times religion includes everything. +The fear of unseen intelligences is one of the most powerful factors of +which early humanity is conscious, and the necessity for conciliating +them is always present. The religious ceremonies connected with eating +and drinking, with lying down and rising up, with sowing and reaping, +with disease, hunting, and almost every circumstance of primitive life +prove this. Differentiation and discrimination arise very slowly, but +one after another the various departments of life do shake off the +controlling influence of religion. Ethics may, therefore, be said to +originate in the shadow of religion--as do most other things--but in no +sense can morality be said to owe its origin to religion. Its origin is +deeper and more fundamental than religion. As a matter of practice +morality is independent of religious belief and moral theory, and as a +matter of theory the formulation of definite moral rules is +substantially independent of religion and is an assertion of its +independence. Indeed, the conflict between a growing moral sense and +religion is almost as large a fact in the social sphere as the conflict +between religion and science is in the intellectual one. + +In all its earlier stages religion is at best non-moral. It becomes +otherwise later only because of the reaction of a socialized morality on +religious beliefs. Early religion is never concerned with the morality +of its teaching, nor are the worshippers concerned with the morality of +their gods. The sole question is what the gods desire and how best to +satisfy them. We cannot even conceive man ascribing ethical qualities to +his gods until he has first of all conceived them in regard to his +fellow men. The savage has no _moral_ reverence for his gods; they are +magnified men, but not perfect ones. He worships not because he admires, +but because he fears. Fear is, indeed, one of the root causes of +religious belief. Professor Leuba quite admits the origin of religion is +fear, but he reserves the possibility of man being occasionally placed +under such favourable conditions that fear may be absent. We admit the +possibility, but at present it remains a possibility only. At present +all the evidence goes to prove the words of Ribot that, "The religious +sentiment is composed first of all of the emotion of fear in its +different degrees, from profound terror to vague uneasiness, due to +faith in an unknown mysterious and impalpable power." And if that be +admitted, we can scarcely find here the origin of morality. + +What is here overlooked is the important fact that while religion, as +such, commences in a reasoned process, morality is firmly established +before mankind is even aware of its existence. A formulated religion is +essentially of the nature of a theory set forth to explain or to deal +with certain experiences. Morality, on the other hand, takes its rise in +those feelings and instincts that are developed in animal and human +societies under the pressure of natural selection. The affection of the +animal for its young, of the human mother for its child, the attraction +of male and female, the sympathetic feelings that bind members of the +same species together, these do not depend upon theory, or even upon an +intellectual perception of their value. Theory tries to account for +their existence, and reason justifies their being, but they are +fundamentally the product of associated life. And it is precisely +because morality is the inevitable condition of associated life that it +has upon religion the effect of modifying it until it is at least not +too great an outrage upon the conditions of social well-being. All along +we can, if we will, see how the developing moral sense forces a change +in religious teaching. At one time there is nothing revolting in the +Christian doctrine of election which dooms one to heaven and another to +hell without the slightest regard to personal merit. At another the +doctrine of eternal damnation is rejected as a matter of course. Heresy +hunting and heretic burning, practised as a matter of course by one +generation become highly repulsive to another. In every direction we see +religious beliefs undergoing a modification under the influence of moral +and social growth. It is always man who moralizes his gods; never by any +chance is it the gods who moralize man. + +If we are to arrive at a proper understanding of religion we can, +therefore, no more assume morals to be an integral part of religion +than we can assume medicine or any of the special arts, all of which may +be associated with religion. It will not even do to define religion with +Mr. W. H. Mallock[17] as a belief that the world "has been made and is +sustained by an intelligence external to and essentially independent of +it." That may pass as a definition of Theism, but Theism is only one of +the phases of religion, and the idea of a creator independent of the +universe is one that is quite alien to the earlier stages of religion. +And to deny the name of religion to primitive beliefs is to put oneself +on the level of the type of Christian who declines to call any +superstition but his own religion. It is for this reason impossible to +agree with Professor Leuba when he says that "the idea of a creator must +take precedence of ghosts and nature beings in the making of a +religion." If by precedence the order of importance, from the standpoint +of later and comparatively modern forms of religion, is intended, the +statement may pass. But if the precedence claimed is a time order, the +reply is that, instead of the idea of a creator taking precedence of +ghosts and nature beings, it is from these that the idea of a creator is +evolved. It is quite true Professor Leuba holds that "belief in the +existence of unseen anthropopathic beings is not religion. It is only +when man enters into relation with them that religion comes into +existence," but so soon as man believes in the existence of them he +believes himself to be in relation with them, and a large part of his +efforts is expended in making these relations of an amicable and +profitable character. + +[17] _Religion as a Credible Doctrine_, p. 11. + +A further definition of religion, first given, I think, by the late +Professor Fiske, but since widely used, as a craving for "fulness of +life," must be dismissed as equally faulty. For if by fulness of life +is meant the desire to make it morally and intellectually richer, the +answer is that this desire is plainly the product of a progressive +social life, of which much that now passes for religion is the +adulterated expression. Apologetically, it is an attempt so to state +religion that it may evade criticism of its essential character. From +one point of view this may be gratifying enough, but it is no help to an +understanding of the nature of religion. And how little religion does +help to a fuller life will be seen by anyone who knows the part played +by organized religion in mental development and how blindly obstructive +it is to new ideas in all departments of life. All these attempts to +define religion in terms of ethics, of metaphysics, or as the craving +after an ideal are wholly misleading. It is reading history backwards, +and attributing to primitive human nature feelings and conceptions which +it does not and cannot possess. + +In another work[18] I have traced the origin of the belief in God to the +mental state of primitive mankind, and there is no need to go over the +same ground here at any length. Commencing with the indisputable fact +that religion is something that is acquired, an examination of the state +of mind in which primitive mankind faced, and still faces, the world, +led to the conclusion that the idea of god begins in the personification +of natural forces by the savage. The growth of the idea of God was there +traced back to the ghost, not to the exclusion of other methods of god +making, but certainly as one of its prominent causes. I must refer +readers to that work who desire a more extended treatment of the +god-idea. + +[18] _Theism or Atheism_, Chapter 2. + +What remains to be traced here, in order to understand the other factor +that is common to religions, is the belief in a continued state of +existence after death, or at least of a soul. + +It has been shown to the point of demonstration by writers such as +Spencer, Tylor, and Frazer, that the idea of a double is suggested to +man by his experience of dreams, swoons, and allied normal and abnormal +experiences. Even in the absence of evidence coming to us from the +beliefs of existing tribes of savages, the fact that the ghost is always +depicted as identical in appearance with the living person would be +enough to suggest its dream origin. But there are other considerations +that carry the proof further. The savage sees in his dreams the figures +of dead men and assumes that there is a double that can get out of the +body during sleep. But he also dreams of dead men, and this is also +proof that the dead man still exists. Death does not, then, involve the +death of the ghost, but only its removal to some other sphere of +existence. Further, the likeness of sleep itself to death is so obvious +and so striking that it has formed one of the most insistent features of +human thought and speech. With primitive man it is far more than a +figure of speech. The Melanesians put this point of view when they say, +"the soul goes out of the body in some dreams, and if for some reason it +does not come back the man is found dead in the morning." Death and +dreaming have, therefore, this in common, they are both due to the +withdrawal of the double. Hence we find a whole series of ceremonies +designed to avert death or to facilitate the return of the double. The +lingering of this practice is well illustrated by Sir Frederick Treves +in his book, _The Other Side of the Lantern_. He there tells how he saw +a Chinese mother, with the tears streaming down her face, waving at the +door of the house the clothing of a recently deceased child in order to +bring back the departed spirit. + +Death is thus the separation of the double from the body; but if it may +return, its return is not always a matter of rejoicing, for we find +customs that are plainly intended to prevent the ghost recognizing the +living or to find its way back to its old haunts. Thus Frazer has shown +that the wearing of black is really a form of disguise. It is a method +taken to disguise the living from the attentions of the dead. It is in +order to avoid recognition by spirits who wish to injure them that the +Tongans change their war costume at every battle. The Chinese call their +best beloved children by worthless names in order to delude evil +spirits. In Egypt, too, the children who were most thought of were the +worst clad. In some places the corpse is never carried out through the +door, but by a hole in the side of the hut, which is afterwards closed +so that the ghost may not find its way back. + +The ghost being conceived as at all points identical with living beings, +it demands attention after death. It needs food, weapons, servants, +wives. In this way there originates a whole group of burial customs, +performed partly from fear of what the ghost may do if its wants are +neglected. The custom of burying food and weapons with the dead thus +receives a simple explanation. These things are buried with the dead man +in order that their spirit may accompany his to the next world and serve +the same uses there that they did here. The modern custom of scattering +flowers over a grave is unquestionably a survival of this primitive +belief. The killing of a wife on the husband's grave has the same +origin. Her spirit goes to attend the husband in the ghost-land. In the +case of a chief we have the killing of servants for the same reason. +When Leonidas says, "Bury me on my shield, I will enter even Hades as a +Lacedęmonian," he was exhibiting the persistence of this belief in +classical times. The Chinese offer a further example by making little +paper houses, filling them with paper models of the things used by the +dead person, and burning them on the grave. All over the world we have +the same class of customs developing from the same beliefs, and the same +beliefs projected by the human mind when brought face to face with the +same class of phenomena. + +As the ghost is pictured as like the physical man, so the next world is +more or less a replica of this. The chief distinction is that there is a +greater abundance of desirable things. Hunting tribes have elysiums +where there is an abundance of game. The old Norse heaven was a place +where there was unlimited fighting. The gold and diamonds and rubies of +the Christian heaven represent a stage of civilization where these +things had acquired a special value. Social distinctions, too, are often +maintained. The Caribs believe that every time they secure an enemy's +head they have gained a servant in the next world. And all know the +story of the French aristocrat who, when threatened with hell, replied, +"God will think twice before damning a person of my quality." + +Several other consequences of this service paid to the dead may be +noted. The ghost being drawn to the place where the body is buried, the +desire to preserve the corpse probably led to the practice of embalming. +The grave becomes a place of sanctity, of pilgrimage, and of religious +observance, and it has been maintained by many writers, notably by Mr. +W. Simpson in his _Worship of Death_, that the service round the grave +gives us the beginning of all temple worship. + +But from this brief view of the beginnings of religion we are able to +see how completely fallacious are all those efforts to derive religion +from an attempt to achieve an ideal, from a desire to solve certain +philosophical problems, or from any of the other sources that are +paraded by modern apologists. The origin and nature of religion is +comparatively simple to understand, once we have cleared our minds of +all these fallacies and carefully examine the facts. Religion is no more +than the explanation which the primitive mind gives of the experiences +which it has of the world. And, therefore, the only definition that +covers all the facts, and which stresses the essence of all religions, +high and low, savage and civilized, is that given by Tylor, namely, the +belief in supernatural beings. It is the one definition that expresses +the feature common to all religions, and with that definition before us +we are able to use language with a precision that is impossible so long +as we attempt to read into religion something that is absent from all +its earlier forms, and which is only introduced when advanced thought +makes the belief in the supernatural more and more difficult to retain +its hold over the human mind. + + + + +CHAPTER VII. + +THE UTILITY OF RELIGION. + + +The real nature of religion being as stated, it having originated in an +utterly erroneous view of things, it would seem that nothing more can be +needed to justify its rejection. But the conclusion would not be +correct, at least so far as the mass of believers or quasi-believers are +concerned. Here the conviction still obtains that religion, no matter +what its origin, still wields an enormous influence for good. The +curious thing is that when one enquires "what religion is it that has +exerted this beneficent influence?" the replies effectually cancel one +another. Each means by religion his own religion, and each accuses the +religion of the other man of all the faults with which the Freethinker +accuses the whole. The avowed object of our widespread missionary +activity is to save the "heathen" from the evil effects of their +religion; and there is not the least doubt that if the heathen had the +brute force at their command, and the impudence that we have, they would +cordially reciprocate. And the efforts of the various Christian sects to +convert each other is too well known to need mention. So that the only +logical inference from all this is that, while all religions are, when +taken singly, injurious, taken in the bulk they are sources of profound +benefit. + +It is not alone the common or garden order of religionist who takes up +this curious position, nor is it even the better educated believer; it +is not uncommon to find those who have rejected all the formal +religions of the world yet seeking to discover some good that religion +has done or is doing. As an illustration of this we may cite an example +from Sir James Frazer, than whom no one has done more to bring home to +students a knowledge of the real nature of religious beliefs. It is the +more surprising to find him putting in a plea for the good done by +religion, not in the present, but in the past. And such an instance, if +it does nothing else, may at least serve to mitigate our ferocity +towards the common type of religionist. + +In an address delivered in 1909, entitled "Psyche's Task: A discourse +concerning the influence of superstition on the growth of Institutions," +he puts in a plea for the consideration of superstition (religion) at +various stages of culture. Of its effects generally, he says:-- + + That it has done much harm in the world cannot be denied. It has + sacrificed countless lives, wasted untold treasures, embroiled + nations, severed friends, parted husbands and wives, parents and + children, putting swords and worse than swords between them; it has + filled gaols and madhouses with its deluded victims; it has broken + many hearts, embittered the whole of many a life, and not content + with persecuting the living it has pursued the dead into the grave + and beyond it, gloating over the horrors which its foul imagination + has conjured up to appal and torture the survivors. It has done all + this and more. + +Now this is a severe indictment, and one is a little surprised to find +following that a plea on behalf of this same superstition to the effect +that it has "among certain races and at certain times strengthened the +respect for government, property, marriage, and human life." In support +of this proposition he cites a large number of instances from various +races of people, all of which prove, not what Sir James sets out to +prove, but only that religious observances and beliefs have been +connected with certain institutions that are in themselves admirable +enough. And on this point there is not, nor can there be, any serious +dispute. One can find many similar instances among ourselves to-day. But +the real question at issue is a deeper one than that. It is not enough +for the religionist to show that religion has often been associated with +good things and has given them its sanction. The reply to this would be +that if it had been otherwise religion would long since have +disappeared. The essential question here is, Have the institutions named +a basis in secular and social life, and would they have developed in the +absence of superstition as they have developed with superstition in the +field? + +Now I do not see that Sir James Frazer proves either that these +institutions have not a sufficient basis in secular life--he would, I +imagine, admit that they have; or that they would not have developed as +well in the absence of superstition as they have done with it. In fact, +the whole plea that good has been done by superstition seems to be +destroyed in the statements that although certain institutions "have +been based partly on superstitions, it by no means follows that even +among these races they have never been based on anything else," and that +whenever institutions have proved themselves stable and permanent "there +is a strong presumption that they rest on something more solid than +superstition." So that, after all, it may well be that superstition is +all the time taking credit for the working of forces that are not of its +kind or nature. + +Let us take the example given of the respect for human life as a crucial +test. Admitting that religions have taught that to take life was a +sinful act, one might well interpose with the query as to whether it +was ever necessary to teach man that homicide within certain limits was +a wrong thing. Pre-evolutionary sociology, which sometimes taught that +man originally led an existence in which his hand was against every +other man, and who, therefore, fought the battle of life strictly off +his own bat, may have favoured that assumption. But that we now know is +quite wrong. We know that man slowly emerged from a pre-human gregarious +stage, and that in all group life there is an organic restraint on +mutual slaughter. The essential condition of group life is that the +nature of the individual shall be normally devoid of the desire for the +indiscriminate slaughter of his fellows. And if that is true of animals, +it is certainly true of man. Primitive human society does not and cannot +represent a group of beings each of whom must be restrained by direct +coercion from murdering the other. + +In this case, therefore, we have to reckon with both biological and +sociological forces, and I do not see that it needs more than this to +explain all there is to explain. Human life is always associated life, +and this means not alone a basis of mutual forbearance and co-operation, +but a development of the sympathetic feelings which tends to increase as +society develops, they being, as a matter of fact, the conditions of its +growth. And whatever competition existed between tribes would still +further emphasize the value of those feelings that led to effective +co-operation. + +The question, then, whether the anti-homicidal feeling is at all +dependent upon religion is answered in the negative by the fact that it +ante-dates what we may term the era of conscious social organization. +That of whether religion strengthens this feeling still remains, +although even that has been answered by implication. And the first thing +to be noted here is that whatever may be the value of the superstitious +safeguard against homicide it certainly has no value as against people +outside the tribe. In fact, when a savage desires to kill an enemy he +finds in superstition a fancied source of strength, and often of +encouragement. Westermarck points out that "savages carefully +distinguish between an act of homicide committed in their own community +and one where the victim is a stranger. Whilst the former is under +ordinary circumstances disapproved of, the latter is in most cases +allowed and often regarded as praiseworthy." And Frazer himself points +out that the belief in immortality plays no small part in encouraging +war among primitive peoples,[19] while if we add the facts of the killing +of children, of old men and women, and wives, together with the practice +of human sacrifice, we shall see little cause to attribute the +development of the feeling against homicide to religious beliefs. + +[19] The state of war which normally exists between many, if not most, +neighbouring savage tribes, springs in large measure directly from their +belief in immortality; since one of the commonest motives to hostility +is a desire to appease the angry ghosts of friends who are supposed to +have perished by baleful arts of sorcerers in another tribe, and who, if +vengeance is not inflicted on their real or imaginary murderers, will +wreak their fury on their undutiful fellow-tribesmen.--_The Belief in +Immortality_, Vol. I., p. 468. + +In one passage in his address Sir James does show himself quite alive to +the evil influence of the belief in immortality. He says:-- + + It might with some show of reason be maintained that no belief has + done so much to retard the economic and thereby the social progress + of mankind as the belief in the immortality of the soul; for this + belief has led race after race, generation after generation, to + sacrifice the real wants of the living to the imaginary wants of + the dead. The waste and destruction of life and property which + this faith has entailed has been enormous and incalculable. But I + am not here concerned with the disastrous and deplorable + consequences, the unspeakable follies and crimes and miseries which + have flowed in practice from the theory of a future life. My + business at present is with the more cheerful side of a gloomy + subject. + +Every author has, of course, the fullest right to select whichever +aspect of a subject he thinks deserves treatment, but all the same one +may point out that it is this dwelling on the "cheerful side" of these +beliefs that encourages the religionist to put forward claims on behalf +of present day religion that Sir James himself would be the first to +challenge. There is surely greater need to emphasize the darker side of +a creed that has thousands of paid advocates presenting an imaginary +bright side to the public gaze. + +But what has been said of the relation of the feeling against homicide +applies with no more than a variation of terms to the other instances +given by Sir James Frazer. Either these institutions have a basis in +utility or they have not. If they have not, then religion can claim no +social credit for their preservation. If they have a basis in utility, +then the reason for their preservation is to be found in social +selection, although the precise local form in which an institution +appears may be determined by other circumstances. And when Sir James +says that the task of government has been facilitated by the +superstition that the governors belonged to a superior class of beings, +one may safely assume that the statement holds good only of individual +governors, or of particular forms of government. It may well be that +when a people are led to believe that a certain individual possesses +supernatural powers, or that a particular government enjoys the favour +of supernatural beings, there will be less inclination to resentment +against orders than there would be otherwise. But government and +governors, in other words, a general body of rules for the government of +the tribe, and the admitted leadership of certain favoured individuals, +would remain natural facts in the absence of superstition, and their +development or suppression would remain subject to the operation of +social or natural selection. So, again, with the desire for private +property. The desire to retain certain things as belonging to oneself is +not altogether unnoticeable among animals. A dog will fight for its +bone, monkeys secrete things which they desire to retain for their own +use, etc., and so far as the custom possesses advantages, we may +certainly credit savages with enough common-sense to be aware of the +fact. But the curious thing is that the institution of private property +is not nearly so powerful among primitive peoples as it is among those +more advanced. So that we are faced with this curious comment upon Sir +James's thesis. Granting that the institution of private property has +been strengthened by superstition we have the strange circumstance that +that institution is weakest where superstition is strongest and +strongest where superstition is weakest. + +The truth is that Sir James Frazer seems here to have fallen into the +same error as the late Walter Bagehot, and to have formed the belief +that primitive man required breaking in to the "social yoke." The truth +is that the great need of primitive mankind is not to be broken in but +to acquire the courage and determination to break out. This error may +have originated in the disinclination of the savage to obey _our_ rules, +or it may have been a heritage from the eighteenth century philosophy of +the existence of an idyllic primitive social state. The truth is, +however, that there is no one so fettered by custom as is the savage. +The restrictions set by a savage society on its members would be +positively intolerable to civilized beings. And if it be said that these +customs required formation, the reply is that inheriting the imitability +of the pre-human gregarious animal, this would form the basis on which +the tyrannizing custom of primitive life is built. + +There was, however, another generalization of Bagehot's that was +unquestionably sound. Assuming that the first step necessary to +primitive mankind was to frame a custom as the means of his being +"broken in," the next step in progress was to break it, and that was a +far more difficult matter. Progress was impossible until this was done, +and how difficult it is to get this step taken observation of the people +living in civilized countries will show. But it is in relation to this +second and all important step that one can clearly trace the influence +of religion. And its influence is completely the reverse of being +helpful. For of all the hindrances to a change of custom there is none +that act with such force as does religion. This is the case with those +customs with which vested interest has no direct connection, but it +operates with tenfold force where this exists. Once a custom is +established in a primitive community the conditions of social life +surround it with religious beliefs, and thereafter to break it means a +breach in the wall of religious observances with which the savage is +surrounded. And so soon as we reach the stage of the establishment of a +regular priesthood, we have to reckon with the operation of a vested +interest that has always been keenly alive to anything which affected +its profit or prestige. + +It would not be right to dismiss the discussion of a subject connected +with so well-respected a name as that of Sir James Frazer and leave the +reader with the impression that he is putting in a plea for current +religion. He is not. He hints pretty plainly that his argument that +religion has been of some use to the race applies to savage times only. +We see this in such sentences as the following: "More and more, as time +goes on, morality shifts its grounds from the sands of superstition to +the rock of reason, from the imaginary to the real, from the +supernatural to the natural.... The State has found a better reason than +these old wives' fables for guarding with the flaming sword of justice +the approach to the tree of life," and also in saying that, "If it can +be proved that in certain races and at certain times the institutions in +question have been based partly on superstition, it by no means follows +that even among these races they have never been based on anything else. +On the contrary ... there is a strong presumption that they rest mainly +on something much more solid than superstition." In modern times no such +argument as the one I have been discussing has the least claim to +logical force. But that, as we all know, does not prevent its being used +by full-blown religionists, and by those whose minds are only partly +liberated from a great historic superstition. + +It will be observed that the plea of Frazer's we have been examining +argues that the function of religion in social life is of a conservative +character. And so far he is correct, he is only wrong in assuming it to +have been of a beneficial nature. The main function of religion in +sociology is conservative, not the wise conservatism which supports an +institution or a custom because of its approved value, but of the kind +that sees in an established custom a reason for its continuance. Urged, +in the first instance, by the belief that innumerable spirits are +forever on the watch, punishing the slightest infraction of their +wishes, opposition to reform or to new ideas receives definite shape and +increased strength by the rise of a priesthood. Henceforth economic +interest goes hand in hand with superstitious fears. Whichever way man +turns he finds artificial obstacles erected. Every deviation from the +prescribed path is threatened with penalties in this world and the next. +The history of every race and of every science tells the same story, and +the amount of time and energy that mankind has spent in fighting these +ghosts of its own savage past is the measure of the degree to which +religion has kept the race in a state of relative barbarism. + +This function of unreasoning conservatism is not, it must be remembered, +accidental. It belongs to the very nature of religion. Dependent upon +the maintenance of certain primitive conceptions of the world and of +man, religion dare not encourage new ideas lest it sap its own +foundations. Spencer has reminded us that religion is, under the +conditions of its origin, perfectly rational. That is quite true.[20] +Religion meets science, when the stage of conflict arises, as an +opposing interpretation of certain classes of facts. The one +interpretation can only grow at the expense of the other. While +religion is committed to the explanation of the world in terms of vital +force, science is committed to that of non-conscious mechanism. +Opposition is thus present at the outset, and it must continue to the +end. The old cannot be maintained without anathematizing the new; the +new cannot be established without displacing the old. The conflict is +inevitable; the antagonism is irreconcilable. + +[20] It may with equal truth be said that all beliefs are with a similar +qualification quite rational. The attempt to divide people into +"Rationalists" and "Irrationalists" is quite fallacious and is +philosophically absurd. Reason is used in the formation of religious as +in the formation of non-religious beliefs. The distinction between the +man who is religious and one who is not, or, if it be preferred, one who +is superstitious and one who is not, is not that the one reasons and the +other does not. Both reason. Indeed, the reasoning of the superstitionist +is often of the most elaborate kind. The distinction is that of one +having false premises, or drawing unwarrantable conclusions from sound +premises. The only ultimate distinctions are those of religionist and +non-religionist, supernaturalist and non-supernaturalist, Theist or +Atheist. All else are mere matters of compromise, exhibitions of +timidity, or illustrations of that confused thinking which itself gives +rise to religion in all its forms. + +It lies, therefore, in the very nature of the case that religion, as +religion, can give no real help to man in the understanding of himself +and the world. Whatever good religion may appear to do is properly to be +attributed to the non-religious forces with which it is associated. But +religion, being properly concerned with the relations between man and +mythical supernatural beings, can exert no real influence for good on +human affairs. Far from that being the case, it can easily be shown to +have had quite an opposite effect. There is not merely the waste of +energy in the direction above indicated, but in many other ways. If we +confine ourselves to Christianity some conception of the nature of its +influence may be formed if we think what the state of the world might +have been to-day had the work of enlightenment continued from the point +it had reached under the old Greek and Roman civilizations. Bacon and +Galileo in their prisons, Bruno and Vanini at the stake are +illustrations of the disservice that Christianity has done the cause of +civilization, and the obstruction it has offered to human well-being. + +Again, consider the incubus placed on human progress by the institution +of a priesthood devoted to the service of supernatural beings. In the +fullest and truest sense of the word a priesthood represents a parasitic +growth on the social body. I am not referring to individual members of +the priesthood in their capacity as private citizens, but as priests, as +agents or representatives of the supernatural. And here the truth is +that of all the inventions and discoveries that have helped to build up +civilization not one of them is owing to the priesthood, as such. One +may confidently say that if all the energies of all the priests in the +whole world were concentrated on a single community, and all their +prayers, formulę, and doctrines devoted to the one end, the well-being +of that community would not be advanced thereby a single iota. + +Far and away, the priesthood is the greatest parasitic class the world +has known. All over the world, in both savage and civilized times, we +see the priesthoods of the world enthroned, we see them enjoying a +subsistence wrung from toil through credulity, and from wealth through +self-interest. From the savage medicine hut up to the modern cathedral +we see the earth covered with useless edifices devoted to the foolish +service of imaginary deities. We see the priesthood endowed with special +privileges, their buildings relieved from the taxes which all citizens +are compelled to pay, and even special taxes levied upon the public for +their maintenance. The gods may no longer demand the sacrifice of the +first born, but they still demand the sacrifice of time, energy, and +money that might well be applied elsewhere. And the people in every +country, out of their stupidity, continue to maintain a large body of +men who, by their whole training and interest, are compelled to act as +the enemies of liberty and progress. + +It is useless arguing that the evils that follow religion are not +produced by it, that they are casual, and will disappear with a truer +understanding of what religion is. It is not true, and the man who +argues in that way shows that he does not yet understand what religion +is. The evils that follow religion are deeply imbedded in the nature of +religion itself. All religion takes its rise in error, and vested error +threatened with destruction instinctively resorts to force, fraud, and +imposture, in self defence. The universality of the evils that accompany +religion would alone prove that there is more than a mere accident in +the association. The whole history of religion is, on the purely +intellectual side, the history of a delusion. Happily this delusion is +losing its hold on the human mind. Year by year its intellectual and +moral worthlessness is being more generally recognized. Religion +explains nothing, and it does nothing that is useful. Yet in its name +millions of pounds are annually squandered and many thousands of men +withdrawn from useful labour, and saddled on the rest of the community +for maintenance. But here, again, economic and intellectual forces are +combining for the liberation of the race from its historic incubus. +Complete emancipation will not come in a day, but it will come, and its +arrival will mark the close of the greatest revolution that has taken +place in the history of the race. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII. + +FREETHOUGHT AND GOD. + + +Why do people believe in God? If one turns to the pleas of professional +theologians there is no lack of answers to the question. These answers +are both numerous and elaborate, and if quantity and repetition were +enough, the Freethinker would find himself hopelessly "snowed under." +But on examination all these replies suffer from one defect. They should +ante-date the belief, whereas they post-date it. They cannot be the +cause of belief for the reason that the belief was here long before the +arguments came into existence. Neither singly nor collectively do these +so-called reasons correspond to the causes that have ever led a single +person, at any time or at any place, to believe in a God. If they +already believed, the arguments were enough to provide them with +sufficient justification to go on believing. If they did not already +believe, the arguments were powerless. And never, by any chance, do they +describe the causes that led to the existence of the belief in God, +either historically or individually. They are, in truth, no more than +excuses for continuing to believe. They are never the causes of belief. + +The evidence for the truth of this is at hand in the person of all who +believe. Let one consider, on the one hand, the various arguments for +the existence of God--the argument from causation, from design, from +necessary existence, etc., then put on the other side the age at which +men and women began to believe in deity, and their grasp of arguments of +the kind mentioned. There is clearly no relation between the two. +Leaving on one side the question of culture, it is at once apparent that +long before the individual is old enough to appreciate in the slightest +degree the nature of the arguments advanced he is already a believer. +And if he is not a believer in his early years, he is never one when he +reaches maturity, certainly not in a civilized society. And when we turn +from the individual Goddite to Goddites in the mass, the assumption that +they owe their belief to the philosophical arguments advanced becomes +grotesque in its absurdity. To assume that the average Theist, whose +philosophy is taken from the daily newspaper and the weekly sermon, +derives his conviction from a series of abstruse philosophical arguments +is simply ridiculous. Those who are honest to themselves will admit that +they were taught the belief long before they were old enough to bring +any real criticism to bear upon it. It was the product of their early +education, impressed upon them by their parents, and all the "reasons" +that are afterwards alleged in justification are only pleas why they +should not be disturbed in their belief. + +Are we in any better position if we turn from the individual to the +race? Is the belief in God similar to, say, the belief in gravitation, +which, discovered by a genius, and resting upon considerations which the +ordinary person finds too abstruse to thoroughly understand, becomes a +part of our education, and is accepted upon well established authority? +Again, the facts are dead against such an assumption. It is with the +race as with the individual. Science and philosophy do not precede the +belief in God and provide the foundation for it, they succeed it and +lead to its modification and rejection. We are, in this respect, upon +very solid ground. In some form or another the belief in God, or gods, +belongs to very early states of human society. Savages have it long +before they have the slightest inkling of what we moderns would call a +scientific conception of the world. And to assume that the savage, as we +know him, began to believe in his gods because of a number of scientific +reasons, such as the belief in universal causation, or any of the other +profound speculations with which the modern theologian beclouds the +issue, is as absurd as to attribute the belief of the Salvation Army +preacher to philosophical speculations. Added to which we may note that +the savage is a severely practical person. He is not at all interested +in metaphysics, and his contributions to the discussions of a +philosophical society would be of a very meagre character. His problem +is to deal with the concrete difficulties of his everyday life, and when +he is able to do this he is content. + +But, on the other hand, we know that our own belief in God is descended +from his belief. We know that we can trace it back without a break +through generations of social culture, until we reach the savage stage +of social existence. It is he who, so to speak, discovers God, he +establishes it as a part of the social institutions that govern the +lives of every member of the group; we find it in our immaturity +established as one of those many thought-forms which determine so +powerfully our intellectual development. The belief in God meets each +newcomer into the social arena. It is impressed upon each in a thousand +and one different ways, and it is only when the belief is challenged by +an opposing system of thought that philosophical theories are elaborated +in its defence. + +The possibility of deriving the idea of God from scientific and +philosophic thought being ruled out, what remains? The enquiry from +being philosophical becomes historical. That is, instead of discussing +whether there are sufficient reasons for justifying the belief in God, +we are left with the question of determining the causes that led people +to ever regard the belief as being solidly based upon fact. It is a +question of history, or rather, one may say, of anthropology of the +mental history of man. When we read of some poor old woman who has been +persecuted for bewitching someone's cattle or children we no longer +settle down to discuss whether witchcraft rests upon fact or not; we +know it does not, and our sole concern is to discover the conditions, +mental and social, which enabled so strange a belief to flourish. The +examination of evidence--the legal aspect--thus gives place to the +historical, and the historical finally resolves itself into the +psychological. For what we are really concerned with in an examination +of the idea of God is the discovery and reconstruction of those states +of mind which gave the belief birth. And that search is far easier and +the results far more conclusive than many imagine. + +In outlining this evidence it will only be necessary to present its +general features. This for two reasons. First, because a multiplicity of +detail is apt to hide from the general reader many of the essential +features of the truth; secondly, the fact of a difference of opinion +concerning the time order of certain stages in the history of the +god-idea is likely to obscure the fact of the unanimity which exists +among all those qualified to express an authoritative opinion as to the +nature of the conditions that have given the idea birth. The various +theories of the sequence of the different phases of the religious idea +should no more blind us to the fact that there exists a substantial +agreement that the belief in gods has its roots in the fear and +ignorance of uncivilized mankind, than the circumstance that there is +going on among biologists a discussion as to the machinery of evolution +should overshadow the fact that evolution itself is a demonstrated +truth which no competent observer questions. + +In an earlier chapter we have already indicated the essential conditions +which lead to the origin of religious beliefs, and there is no need +again to go over that ground. What is necessary at present is to sketch +as briefly as is consistent with lucidity those frames of mind to which +the belief in God owes its existence. + +To realize this no very recondite instrument of research is required. We +need nothing more elaborate than the method by which we are hourly in +the habit of estimating each other's thoughts, and of gauging one +another's motives. When I see a man laugh I assume that he is pleased; +when he frowns I assume that he is angry. There is here only an +application of the generally accepted maxim that when we see identical +results we are warranted in assuming identical causes. In this way we +can either argue from causes to effects or from effects to causes. A +further statement of the same principle is that when we are dealing with +biological facts we may assume that identical structures imply identical +functions. The structure of a dead animal will tell us what its +functions were when living as certainly as though we had the living +animal in front of us. We may relate function to structure or structure +to function. And in this we are using nothing more uncommon than the +accepted principle of universal causation. + +Now, in all thinking there are two factors. There is the animal or human +brain, the organ of thought, and there is the material for thought as +represented by the existing knowledge of the world. If we had an exact +knowledge of the kind of brain that functioned, and the exact quantity +and quality of the knowledge existing, the question as to the ideas +which would result would be little more than a problem in mathematics. +We could make the calculation with the same assurance that an +astronomer can estimate the position of a planet a century hence. In the +case of primitive mankind we do not possess anything like the exact +knowledge one would wish, but we do know enough to say in rather more +than a general way the kind of thinking of which our earliest ancestors +were capable, and what were its products. We can get at the machinery of +the primitive brain, and can estimate its actions, and that without +going further than we do when we assume that primitive man was hungry +and thirsty, was pleased and angry, loved and feared. And, indeed, it +was because he experienced fear and pleasure and love and hate that the +gods came into existence. + +Of the factors which determine the kind of thinking one does, we know +enough to say that there were two things certain of early mankind. We +know the kind of thinking of which he was capable, and we have a general +notion of the material existing for thinking. Speaking of one of these +early ancestors of ours, Professor Arthur Keith says, "Piltdown man saw, +heard, felt, thought and dreamt much as we do," that is, there was the +same _kind_ of brain at work that is at work now. And that much we could +be sure of by going no farther back than the savages of to-day. But as +size of brain is not everything, we are warranted in saying that the +brain was of a relatively simple type, while the knowledge of the world +which existed, and which gives us the material for thinking, was of a +very imperfect and elementary character. There was great ignorance, and +there was great fear. From these two conditions, ignorance and fear, +sprang the gods. Of that there is no doubt whatever. There is scarcely a +work which deals with the life of primitive peoples to-day that does not +emphasize that fact. Consciously or unconsciously it cannot avoid doing +so. Long ago a Latin writer hit on this truth in the well-known saying, +"Fear made the gods," and Aristotle expressed the same thing in a more +comprehensive form by saying that fear first set man philosophizing. The +undeveloped mind troubles little about things so long as they are going +smoothly and comfortably. It is when something painful happens that +concern is awakened. And all the gods of primitive life bear this primal +stamp of fear. That is why religion, with its persistent harking back to +the primitive, with its response to the "Call of the Wild" still dwells +upon the fear of the Lord as a means of arousing a due sense of piety. +The gods fatten on fear as a usurer does upon the folly of his clients, +and in both cases the interest demanded far outweighs the value of the +services rendered. At a later stage man faces his gods in a different +spirit; he loses his fear and examines them; and gods that are not +feared are but poor things. They exist mainly as indisputable records of +their own deterioration. + +Now to primitive man, struggling along in a world of which he was so +completely ignorant, the one certain thing was that the world was alive. +The wind that roared, the thunder that growled, the disease that left +him so mysteriously stricken, were all so many living things. The +division of these living forces into good and bad followed naturally +from this first conception of their nature. And whatever be the stages +of that process the main lines admit of no question, nor is there any +question as to the nature of the conditions that brought the gods into +existence. On any scientific theory of religion the gods represent no +more than the personified ignorance and fear of primitive humanity. +However much anthropologists may differ as to whether the god always +originates from the ghost or not, whether animism is first and the +worship of the ghost secondary or not, there is agreement on that +point. Whichever theory we care to embrace, the broad fact is generally +admitted that the gods are the products of ignorance and fear. Man fears +the gods as children and even animals fear the unknown and the +dangerous. + +And as the gods are born of conditions such as those outlined, as man +reads his own feelings and passions and desires into nature, so we find +that the early gods are frankly, obtrusively, man-like. The gods are +copies of their worshippers, faithful reflections of those who fear +them. This, indeed, remains true to the end. When the stage is reached +that the idea of God as a physical counterpart of man becomes repulsive, +it is still unable to shake off this anthropomorphic element. To the +modern worshipper God must not possess a body, but he must have love, +and intelligence--as though the mental qualities of man are less human +than the bodily ones! They are as human as arms or legs. And every +reason that will justify the rejection of the conception of the universe +being ruled over by a being who is like man in his physical aspects is +equally conclusive against believing the universe to be ruled over by a +being who resembles man in his mental characteristics. The one belief is +a survival of the other; and the one would not now be accepted had not +the other been believed in beforehand. + +I have deliberately refrained from discussing the various arguments put +forward to justify the belief in God in order that attention should not +be diverted from the main point, which is that the belief in deity owes +its existence to the ignorant interpretation of natural happenings by +early or uncivilized mankind. Everything here turns logically on the +question of origin. If the belief in God began in the way I have +outlined, the question of veracity may be dismissed. The question is +one of origin only. It is not a question of man first seeing a thing but +dimly and then getting a clearer vision as his knowledge becomes more +thorough. It is a question of a radical misunderstanding of certain +experiences, the vogue of an altogether wrong interpretation, and its +displacement by an interpretation of a quite different nature. The god +of the savage was in the nature of an inference drawn from the world of +the savage. There was the admitted premiss and there was the obvious +conclusion. But with us the premiss no longer exists. We deliberately +reject it as being altogether unwarrantable. And we cannot reject the +premiss while retaining the conclusion. Logically, the god of the savage +goes with the world of the savage; it should have no place in the mind +of the really civilized human being. + +It is for this reason that I am leaving on one side all those +semi-metaphysical and pseudo-philosophical arguments that are put +forward to justify the belief in God. As I have already said, they are +merely excuses for continuing a belief that has no real warranty in +fact. No living man or woman believes in God because of any such +argument. We have the belief in God with us to-day for the same reason +that we have in our bodies a number of rudimentary structures. As the +one is reminiscent of an earlier stage of existence so is the other. To +use the expressive phrase of Winwood Reade's, we have tailed minds as +well as tailed bodies. The belief in God meets each newcomer to the +social sphere. It is forced upon them before they are old enough to +offer effective resistance in the shape of acquired knowledge that would +render its lodgement in the mind impossible. Afterwards, the dice of +social power and prestige are loaded in its favour, while the mental +inertia of some, and the self-interest of others, give force to the +arguments which I have called mere mental subterfuges for perpetuating +the belief in God. + +Only one other remark need be made. In the beginning the gods exist as +the apotheosis of ignorance. The reason the savage had for believing in +God was that he did not know the real causes of the phenomena around +him. And that remains the reason why people believe in deity to-day. +Under whatever guise the belief is presented, analysis brings it +ultimately to that. The whole history of the human mind, in relation to +the idea of God, shows that so soon as man discovers the natural causes +of any phenomenon or group of phenomena the idea of God dies out in +connection therewith. God is only conceived as a cause or as an +explanation so long as no other cause or explanation is forthcoming. In +common speech and in ordinary thought we only bring in the name of God +where uncertainty exists, never where knowledge is obtainable. We pray +to God to cure a fever, but never to put on again a severed limb. We +associate God with the production of a good harvest, but not with a +better coal output. We use "God only knows" as the equivalent of our own +ignorance, and call on God for help only where our own helplessness is +manifest. The idea remains true to itself throughout. Born in ignorance +and cradled in fear, it makes its appeal to the same elements to the +end. And if it apes the language of philosophy, it does so only as do +those who purchase a ready-made pedigree in order to hide the obscurity +of their origin. + + + + +CHAPTER IX. + +FREETHOUGHT AND DEATH. + + +In the early months of the European war a mortally wounded British +soldier was picked up between the lines, after lying there unattended +for two days. He died soon after he was brought in, and one of his last +requests was that a copy of Ruskin's _Crown of Wild Olive_ should be +buried with him. He said the book had been with him all the time he had +been in France, it had given him great comfort, and he wished it to be +buried with him. Needless to say, his wish was carried out, and +"somewhere in France" there lies a soldier with a copy of the _Crown of +Wild Olive_ clasped to his breast. + +There is another story, of a commoner character, which, although +different in form, is wholly similar in substance. This tells of the +soldier who in his last moments asks to see a priest, accepts his +ministrations with thankfulness, and dies comforted with the repetition +of familiar formulę and customary prayers. In the one case a Bible and a +priest; in the other a volume of lectures by one of the masters of +English prose. The difference is, at first, striking, but there is an +underlying agreement, and they may be used together to illustrate a +single psychological principle. + +Freethinker and Christian read the record of both cases, but it is the +Freethinker alone whose philosophy of life is wide enough to explain +both. The Freethinker knows that the feeling of comfort and the fact of +truth are two distinct things. They may coalesce, but they may be as +far asunder as the poles. A delusion may be as consoling as a reality +provided it be accepted as genuine. The soldier with his copy of Ruskin +does not prove the truth of the teachings of the _Crown of Wild Olive_, +does not prove that Ruskin said the last word or even the truest word on +the subjects dealt with therein. Neither does the consolation which +religion gives some people prove the truth of its teachings. The comfort +which religion brings is a product of the belief in religion. The +consolation that comes from reading a volume of essays is a product of +the conviction of the truth of the message delivered, or a sense of the +beauty of the language in which the book is written. Both cases +illustrate the power of belief, and that no Freethinker was ever stupid +enough to question. The finest literature in the world would bring small +comfort to a man who was convinced that he stood in deadly need of a +priest, and the presence of a priest would be quite useless to a man who +believed that all the religions of the world were so many geographical +absurdities. Comfort does not produce conviction, it follows it. The +truth and the social value of convictions are quite distinct questions. + +There is here a confusion of values, and for this we have to thank the +influence of the Churches. Because the service of the priest is sought +by some we are asked to believe that it is necessary to all. But the +essential value of a thing is shown, not by the number of people who get +on with it, but by the number that can get on without it. The canon of +agreement and difference is applicable whether we are dealing with human +nature or conducting an ordinary scientific experiment. Thus, the +indispensability of meat-eating is not shown by the number of people who +swear that they cannot work without it, but by noting how people fare in +its absence. The drinker does not confound the abstainer; it is the +other way about. In the same way there is nothing of evidential value in +the protests of those who say that human nature cannot get along without +religion. We have to test the statement by the cases where religion is +absent. And here, it is not the Christian that confounds the +Freethinker, it is the Freethinker who confounds the Christian. If the +religious view of life is correct the Freethinker should be a very rare +bird indeed; he should be clearly recognizable as a departure from the +normal type, and, in fact, he was always so represented in religious +literature until he disproved the legend by multiplying himself with +confusing rapidity. Now it is the Freethinker who will not fit into the +Christian scheme of things. It is puzzling to see what can be done with +a man who repudiates the religious idea in theory and fact, root and +branch, and yet appears to be getting on quite well in its absence. That +is the awkward fact that will not fit in with the religious theory. And, +other things equal, one man without religion is greater evidential value +than five hundred with it. All the five hundred prove at the most is +that human nature can get on with religion, but the one case proves that +human nature can get on without it, and that challenges the whole +religious position. And unless we take up the rather absurd position +that the non-religious man is a sheer abnormality, this consideration at +once reduces religion from a necessity to a luxury or a dissipation. + +The bearing of this on our attitude towards such a fact as death should +be obvious. During the European war death from being an ever-present +fact became an obtrusive one. Day after day we received news of the +death of friend or relative, and those who escaped that degree of +intimacy with the unpleasant visitor, met him in the columns of the +daily press. And the Christian clergy would have been untrue to their +traditions and to their interests--and there is no corporate body more +alert in these directions--if they had not tried to exploit the +situation to the utmost. There was nothing new in the tactics employed, +it was the special circumstances that gave them a little more force than +was usual. The following, for example, may be accepted as typical:-- + + The weight of our sorrow is immensely lightened if we can feel sure + that one whom we have loved and lost has but ascended to spheres of + further development, education, service, achievement, where, by and + by, we shall rejoin him. + +Quite a common statement, and one which by long usage has become almost +immune from criticism. And yet it has about as much relation to fact as +have the stories of death-bed conversions, or of people dying and +shrieking for Jesus to save them. One may, indeed, apply a rough and +ready test by an appeal to facts. How many cases has the reader of these +lines come across in which religion has made people calmer and more +resigned in the presence of death than others have been who were quite +destitute of belief in religion? Of course, religious folk will repeat +religious phrases, they will attend church, they will listen to the +ministrations of their favourite clergyman, and they will say that their +religion brings them comfort. But if one gets below the stereotyped +phraseology and puts on one side also the sophisticated attitude in +relation to religion, one quite fails to detect any respect in which the +Freethinking parent differs from the Christian one. Does the religious +parent grieve less? Does he bear the blow with greater fortitude? Is his +grief of shorter duration? To anyone who will open his eyes the talk of +the comfort of religion will appear to be largely cant. There are +differences due to character, to temperament, to training; there is a +use of traditional phrases in the one case that is absent in the other, +but the incidence of a deep sorrow only serves to show how superficial +are the vapourings of religion to a civilized mind, and how each one of +us is thrown back upon those deeper feelings that are inseparable from a +common humanity. The thought of an only son who is living with the +angels brings no real solace to a parent's mind. Whatever genuine +comfort is available must come from the thought of a life that has been +well lived, from the sympathetic presence of friends, from the silent +handclasp, which on such occasions is so often more eloquent than +speech--in a word, from those healing currents that are part and parcel +of the life of the race. A Freethinker can easily appreciate the +readiness of a clergyman to help a mind that is suffering from a great +sorrow, but it is the deliberate exploitation of human grief in the name +and in the interests of religion, the manufacturing of cases of +death-bed consolation and repentance, the citation of evidence to which +the experience of all gives the lie, that fill one with a feeling akin +to disgust. + +The writer from whom I have quoted says:-- + + It is, indeed, possible for people who are Agnostic or unbelieving + with regard to immortality to give themselves wholly to the pursuit + of truth and to the service of their fellowmen, in moral + earnestness and heroic endeavour; they may endure pain and sorrow + with calm resignation, and toil on in patience and perseverance. + The best of the ancient Stoics did so, and many a modern Agnostic + is doing so to-day. + +The significance of such a statement is in no wise diminished by the +accompanying qualification that Freethinkers are "missing a joy which +would have been to them a well-spring of courage and strength." That is +a pure assumption. They who are without religious belief are conscious +of no lack of courage, and they are oppressed by no feeling of despair. +On this their own statement must be taken as final. Moreover, they are +speaking as, in the main, those who are fully acquainted with the +Christian position, having once occupied it. They are able to measure +the relative value of the two positions. The Christian has no such +experience to guide him. In the crises of life the behaviour of the +Freethinker is at least as calm and as courageous as that of the +Christian. And it may certainly be argued that a serene resignation in +the presence of death is quite as valuable as the hectic emotionalism of +cultivated religious belief. + +What, after all, is there in the fact of natural death that should breed +irresolution, rob us of courage, or fill us with fear? Experience proves +there are many things that people dread more than death, and will even +seek death rather than face, or, again, there are a hundred and one +things to obtain which men and women will face death without fear. And +this readiness to face or seek death does not seem to be at all +determined by religious belief. The millions of men who faced death +during the war were not determined in their attitude by their faith in +religious dogmas. If questioned they might, in the majority of cases, +say that they believed in a future life, and also that they found it a +source of strength, but it would need little reflection to assess the +reply at its true value. And as a racial fact, the fear of death is a +negative quality. The positive aspect is the will to live, and that may +be seen in operation in the animal world as well as in the world of man. +But this has no reference, not even the remotest, to a belief in a +future life. There are no "Intimations of Immortality" here. There is +simply one of the conditions of animal survival, developed in man to +the point at which its further strengthening would become a threat to +the welfare of the species. The desire to live is one of the conditions +that secures the struggle to live, and a species of animals in which +this did not exist would soon go under before a more virile type. And it +is one of the peculiarities of religious reasoning that a will to live +here should be taken as clear proof of a desire to live somewhere else. + +The fear of death could never be a powerful factor in life; existence +would be next to impossible if it were. It would rob the organism of its +daring, its tenacity, and ultimately divest life itself of value. +Against that danger we have an efficient guard in the operation of +natural selection. In the animal world there is no fear of death, there +is, in fact, no reason to assume that there exists even a consciousness +of death. And with man, when reflection and knowledge give birth to that +consciousness, there arises a strong other regarding instinct which +effectively prevents it assuming a too positive or a too dangerous form. +Fear of death is, in brief, part of the jargon of priestcraft. The +priest has taught it the people because it was to his interest to do so. +And the jargon retains a certain currency because it is only the +minority that rise above the parrot-like capacity to repeat current +phrases, or who ever make an attempt to analyse their meaning and +challenge their veracity. + +The positive fear of death is largely an acquired mental attitude. In +its origin it is largely motived by religion. Generally speaking there +is no very great fear of death among savages, and among the pagans of +old Greece and Rome there was none of that abject fear of death that +became so common with the establishment of Christianity. To the pagan, +death was a natural fact, sad enough, but not of necessity terrible. Of +the Greek sculptures representing death Professor Mahaffy says: "They +are simple pictures of the grief of parting, of the recollection of +pleasant days of love and friendship, of the gloom of an unknown future. +But there is no exaggeration in the picture." Throughout Roman +literature also there runs the conception of death as the necessary +complement of life. Pliny puts this clearly in the following: "Unto all, +the state of being after the last day is the same as it was before the +first day of life; neither is there any more variation of it in either +body or soul after death than there was before death." Among the +uneducated there does appear to have been some fear of death, and one +may assume that with some of even of the educated this was not +altogether absent. It may also be assumed that it was to this type of +mind that Christianity made its first appeal, and upon which it rested +its nightmare-like conception of death and the after-life. On this +matter the modern mind can well appreciate the attitude of Lucretius, +who saw the great danger in front of the race and sought to guard men +against it by pointing out the artificiality of the fear of death and +the cleansing effect of genuine knowledge. + + So shalt thou feed on Death who feeds on men, + And Death once dead there's no more dying then. + +The policy of Christianity was the belittling of this life and an +exaggeration of the life after death, with a boundless exaggeration of +the terrors that awaited the unwary and the unfaithful. The state of +knowledge under Christian auspices made this task easy enough. Of the +medięval period Mr. Lionel Cust, in his _History of Engraving during the +Fifteenth Century_, says:-- + + The keys of knowledge, as of salvation, were entirely in the hands + of the Church, and the lay public, both high and low, were, + generally speaking, ignorant and illiterate. One of the secrets of + the great power exercised by the Church lay in its ability to + represent the life of man as environed from the outset by legions + of horrible and insidious demons, who beset his path throughout + life at every stage up to his very last breath, and are eminently + active and often triumphant when man's fortitude is undermined by + sickness, suffering, and the prospect of dissolution. + +F. Parkes Weber also points out that, "It was in medięval Europe, under +the auspices of the Catholic Church, that descriptions of hell began to +take on their most horrible aspects."[21] So, again, we have Sir James +Frazer pointing out that the fear of death is not common to the lower +races, and "Among the causes which thus tend to make us cowards may be +numbered the spread of luxury and the doctrines of a gloomy theology, +which by proclaiming the eternal damnation and excruciating torments of +the vast majority of mankind has added incalculably to the dread and +horror of death."[22] + +[21] _Aspects of Death in Art and Epigram_, p. 28. + +[22] _Golden Bough_, Vol. IV., p. 136. + +No religion has emphasized the terror of death as Christianity has done, +and in the truest sense, no religion has so served to make men such +cowards in its presence. Upon that fear a large part of the power of the +Christian Church has been built, and men having become so obsessed with +the fear of death and what lay beyond, it is not surprising that they +should turn to the Church for some measure of relief. The poisoner thus +did a lucrative trade by selling a doubtful remedy for his own toxic +preparation. More than anything else the fear of death and hell laid the +foundation of the wealth and power of the Christian Church. If it drew +its authority from God, it derived its profit from the devil. The two +truths that emerge from a sober and impartial study of Christian history +are that the power of the Church was rooted in death and that it +flourished in dishonour. + +It was Christianity, and Christianity alone that made death so abiding a +terror to the European mind. And society once Christianized, the +uneducated could find no adequate corrective from the more educated. The +baser elements which existed in the Pagan world were eagerly seized upon +by the Christian writers and developed to their fullest extent. Some of +the Pagan writers had speculated, in a more or less fanciful spirit, on +a hell of a thousand years. Christianity stretched it to eternity. +Pre-Christianity had reserved the miseries of the after-life for adults. +Christian writers paved the floor of hell with infants, "scarce a span +long." Plutarch and other Pagan moralists had poured discredit upon the +popular notions of a future life. Christianity reaffirmed them with all +the exaggerations of a diseased imagination. The Pagans held that death +was as normal and as natural as life. Christianity returned to the +conception current among savages and depicted death as a penal +infliction. The Pagan art of living was superseded by the Christian art +of dying. Human ingenuity exhausted itself in depicting the terrors of +the future life, and when one remembers the powers of the Church, and +the murderous manner in which it exercised them, there is small wonder +that under the auspices of the Church the fear of death gained a +strength it had never before attained. + +Small wonder, then, that we still have with us the talk of the comfort +that Christianity brings in the face of death. Where the belief in the +Christian after-life really exists, the retention of a conviction of the +saving power of Christianity is a condition of sanity. Where the belief +does not really exist, we are fronted with nothing but a parrot-like +repetition of familiar phrases. The Christian talk of comfort is thus, +on either count, no more than a product of Christian education. +Christianity does not make men brave in the presence of death, that is +no more than a popular superstition. What it does is to cover a natural +fact with supernatural terrors, and then exploit a frame of mind that it +has created. The comfort is only necessary so long as the special belief +is present. Remove that belief and death takes its place as one of the +inevitable facts of existence, surrounded with all the sadness of a last +farewell, but rid of all the terror that has been created by religion. + +Our dying soldier, asking for a copy of the _Crown of Wild Olive_ to be +buried with him, and the other who calls for priestly ministrations, +represent, ultimately, two different educational results. The one is a +product of an educational process applied during the darkest periods of +European history, and perpetuated by a training that has been mainly +directed by the self-interest of a class. The other represents an +educational product which stands as the triumph of the pressure of life +over artificial dogmas. The Freethinker, because he is a Freethinker, +needs none of those artificial stimulants for which the Christian +craves. And he pays him the compliment--in spite of his protests--of +believing that without his religion the Christian would display as much +manliness in the face of death as he does himself. He believes there is +plenty of healthy human nature in the average Christian, and the +Freethinker merely begs him to give it a chance of finding expression. +In this matter, it must be observed, the Freethinker makes no claim to +superiority over the Christian; it is the Christian who forces that +claim upon him. The Freethinker does not assume that the difference +between himself and the Christian is nearly so great as the latter would +have him believe. He believes that what is dispensable by the one, +without loss, is dispensable by the other. If Freethinkers can devote +themselves to "the pursuit of truth and the service of their fellow +men," if they can "endure pain and sorrow with calm resignation," if +they live with honour and face death without fear, I see no reason why +the Christian should not be able to reach the same level of development. +It is paying the Freethinker a "violent compliment," to use an +expression of John Wesley's, to place him upon a level of excellence +that is apparently so far above that of the average Christian. As a +Freethinker, I decline to accept it. I believe that what the Freethinker +is, the Christian may well become. He, too, may learn to do his duty +without the fear of hell or the hope of heaven. All that is required is +that he shall give his healthier instincts an opportunity for +expression. + + + + +CHAPTER X. + +THIS WORLD AND THE NEXT. + + +In the preceding chapter I have only discussed the fact of death in +relation to a certain attitude of mind. The question of the survival of +the human personality after death is a distinct question and calls for +separate treatment. Nor is the present work one in which that topic can +be treated at adequate length. The most that can now be attempted is a +bird's eye view of a large field of controversy, although it may be +possible in the course of that survey to say something on the more +important aspects of the subject. + +And first we may notice the curious assumption that the man who argues +for immortality is taking a lofty view of human nature, while he who +argues against it is taking a low one. In sober truth it is the other +way about. Consider the position. It is tacitly admitted that if human +motive, considered with reference to this world alone, is adequate as an +incentive to action, and the consequences of actions, again considered +with reference to this world, are an adequate reward for endeavour, then +it is agreed that the main argument for the belief in immortality breaks +down. To support or to establish the argument it is necessary to show +that life divorced from the conception of a future life can never reach +the highest possible level. Natural human society is powerless in itself +to realize its highest possibilities. It remains barren of what it might +be, a thing that may frame ideals, but can never realize them. + +Now that is quite an intelligible, and, therefore, an arguable +proposition. But whether true or not, there should be no question that +it involves a lower view of human nature than the one taken by the +Freethinker. He does at least pay human nature the compliment of +believing it capable, not alone of framing high ideals, but also of +realizing them. He says that by itself it is capable of realizing all +that may be legitimately demanded from it. He does not believe that +supernatural hopes or fears are necessary to induce man to live cleanly, +or die serenely, or to carry out properly his duties to his fellows. The +religionist denies this, and asserts that some form of supernaturalism +is essential to the moral health of men and women. If the Freethinker is +wrong, it is plain that his fault consists in taking a too optimistic +view of human nature. His mistake consists in taking not a low view of +human nature, but a lofty one. Substantially, the difference between the +two positions is the difference between the man who is honest from a +conviction of the value of honesty, and the one who refrains from +stealing because he feels certain of detection, or because he is afraid +of losing something that he might otherwise gain. Thus, we are told by +one writer that:-- + + If human life is but a by-product of the unconscious play of + physical force, like a candle flame soon to be blown out or burnt + out, what a paltry thing it is! + +But the questions of where human life came from, or where it will end, +are quite apart from the question of the value and capabilities of human +life now. That there are immense possibilities in this life none but a +fool will deny. The world is full of strange and curious things, and its +pleasures undoubtedly outweigh its pains in the experience of normal man +or woman. But the relations between ourselves and others remain +completely unaffected by the termination of existence at the grave, or +its continuation beyond. It is quite a defensible proposition that life +is not worth living. So is the reverse of the proposition. But it is +nonsense to say that life is a "paltry thing" merely because it ends at +the grave. It is unrestricted egotism manifesting itself in the form of +religious conviction. One might as well argue that a sunset ceases to be +beautiful because it does not continue all night. + +If I cannot live for ever, then is the universe a failure! That is +really all that the religious argument amounts to. And so to state it, +to reduce it to plain terms, and divest it of its disguising verbiage, +almost removes the need for further refutation. But it is seldom stated +in so plain and so unequivocal a manner. It is accompanied with much +talk of growth, of an evolutionary purpose, of ruined lives made good, +thus: + + Seeing that man is the goal towards which everything has tended + from the beginning, seeing that the same eternal and infinite + Energy has laboured through the ages at the production of man, and + man is the heir of the ages, nothing conceivable seems too great or + glorious to believe concerning his destiny.... If there is no limit + to human growth in knowledge and wisdom, in love and constructive + power, in beauty and joy, we are invested with a magnificent worth + and dignity. + +So fallacy and folly run on. What, for example, does anyone mean by man +as the goal towards which everything has tended since the beginning? +Whatever truth there is in the statement applies to all things without +exception. It is as true of the microbe as it is of man. If the +"infinite and eternal Energy" laboured to produce man, it laboured also +to produce the microbe which destroys him. The one is here as well as +the other; and one can conceive a religious microbe thanking an almighty +one for having created it, and declaring that unless it is to live for +ever in some microbic heaven, with a proper supply of human beings for +its nourishment, the whole scheme of creation is a failure. It is quite +a question of the point of view. As a matter of fact there are no "ends" +in nature. There are only results, and each result becomes a factor in +some further result. It is human folly and ignorance which makes an end +of a consequence. + +After all, what reason is there for anyone assuming that the survival of +man beyond the grave is even probably true? We do not know man as a +"soul" first and a body afterwards. Neither do we know him as a detached +"mind" which afterwards takes possession of a body. Our knowledge of man +commences with him, as does our knowledge of any animal, as a body +possessing certain definite functions of which we call one group mental. +And the two things are so indissolubly linked that we cannot even think +of them as separate. If anyone doubts this let him try and picture to +himself what a man is like in the absence of a body. He will find the +thing simply inconceivable. In the absence of the material organism, to +which the mind unquestionably stands in the relation of function to +organ, what remains is a mere blank. To the informed mind, that is. To +the intelligence of the savage, who is led, owing to his erroneous +conception of things, to think of something inside the body which leaves +it during sleep, wanders about, and then returns on awakening, and who +because of this affiliates sleep to death, the case may be different. +But to a modern mind, one which is acquainted with something of what +science has to say on the subject, the conception of a mind existing +apart from organization is simply unthinkable. All our knowledge is +against it. The development of mind side by side with the development of +the brain and the nervous system is one of the commonplaces of +scientific knowledge. The treatment of states of mind as functions of +the brain and the nervous system is a common-place of medical practice. +And the fact that diet, temperature, health and disease, accidents and +old age, all have their effects on mental manifestations is matter of +everyday observation. The whole range of positive science may safely be +challenged to produce a single indisputable fact in favour of the +assumption that there exists anything about man independent of the +material organism. + +All that can be urged in favour of such a belief is that there are still +many obscure facts which we are not altogether able to explain on a +purely mechanistic theory. But that is a confession of ignorance, not an +affirmation of knowledge. At any rate, there does not exist a single +fact against the functional theory of mind. All we _know_ is decidedly +in its favour, and a theory must be tested by what we know and by what +it explains, not by what we do not know or by what it cannot explain. +And there is here the additional truth that the only ground upon which +the theory can be opposed is upon certain metaphysical assumptions which +are made in order to bolster up an already existing belief. If the +belief in survival had not been already in existence these assumptions +would never have been made. They are not suggested by the facts, they +are invented to support an already established theory, which can no +longer appeal to the circumstances which gave it birth. + +And about those circumstance there is no longer the slightest reason for +justifiable doubt. We can trace the belief in survival after death +until we see it commencing in the savage belief in a double that takes +its origin in the phenomena of dreaming and unusual mental states. It is +from that starting point that the belief in survival takes its place as +an invariable element in the religions of the world. And as we trace the +evolution of knowledge we see every fact upon which was built the belief +in a double that survived death gradually losing its hold on the human +intelligence, owing to the fact that the experiences that gave it birth +are interpreted in a manner which allows no room for the religious +theory. The fatal fact about the belief in survival is its history. That +history shows us how it began, as surely as the course of its evolution +indicates the way in which it will end. + +So, as with the idea of God, what we have left in modern times are not +the reasons why such a belief is held, but only excuses why those who +hold it should not be disturbed. That and a number of arguments which +only present an air of plausibility because they succeed in jumbling +together things that have no connection with each other. As an example +of this we may take the favourite modern plea that a future life is +required to permit the growth and development of the individual. We find +this expressed in the quotation above given in the sentence "if there is +no limit to human growth, etc.," the inference being that unless there +is a future life there is a very sharp limit set to human growth, and +one that makes this life a mockery. This plea is presented in so many +forms that it is worth while analysing it a little, if only to bring out +more clearly the distinction between the religious and the Freethought +view of life. + +What now is meant by there being no limit to human growth? If by it is +meant individual growth, the reply is that there is actually a very +sharp limit set to growth, much sharper than the average person seems +to be aware of. It is quite clear that the individual is not capable of +unlimited growth in this world. There are degrees of capacity in +different individuals which will determine what amount of development +each is capable of. Capacity is not an acquired thing, it is an +endowment, and the child born with the brain capacity of a fool will +remain a fool to the end, however much his folly may be disguised or +lost amid the folly of others. And with each one, whether he be fool or +genius, acquisitions are made more easily and more rapidly in youth, the +power of mental adaptation is much greater in early than in later life, +while in old age the capacities of adaptation and acquisition become +negligible quantities. And provided one lives long enough, the last +stage sees, not a promise of further progress if life were continued, +but a process of degradation. The old saying that one can't put a quart +into a pint pot is strictly applicable here. Growth assumes acquisition; +acquisition is determined by capacity, and this while an indefinite +quantity (indefinite here is strictly referable to our ignorance, not to +the actual fact) is certainly not an unlimited one. Life, then, so far +as the individual is concerned, does not point to unlimited growth. It +indicates, so far as it indicates anything at all, that there is a limit +to growth as to all other things. + +Well, but suppose we say that man is capable of indefinite growth, what +do we mean? Let us also bear in mind at this point that we are strictly +concerned with the individual. For if man survives death he must do it +as an individual. To merely survive as a part of the chemical and other +elements of the world, or, to follow some mystical theologians, as an +indistinguishable part of a "world-soul," is not what people mean when +they talk of living beyond the grave. Here, again, it will be found +that we have confused two quite distinct things, even though the one +thing borrows its meaning from the other. + +When we compare the individual, as such, with the individual of three or +four thousand years ago, can we say with truth that the man of to-day is +actually superior to the man of the earlier date? To test the question +let us put it in this way. Does the man of to-day do anything or think +anything that is beyond the capacity of an ancient Egyptian or an +ancient Greek, if it were possible to suddenly revive one and to enable +him to pass through the same education that each one of us passes +through? I do not think that anyone will answer that question in the +affirmative. Reverse the process. Suppose that a modern man, with +exactly the same capacity that he now has had lived in the days of the +ancient Egyptians or the ancient Greeks, can we say that his capacity is +so much greater than theirs, that he would have done better than they +did? I do not think that anyone will answer that question in the +affirmative either. Is the soldier of to-day a better soldier, or the +sailor a better sailor than those who lived three thousand years ago? +Once more the answer will not be in the affirmative. And yet there are +certain things that are obvious. It is plain that we all know more than +did the people of long ago, we can do more, we understand the past +better, and we can see farther into the future. A schoolboy to-day +carries in his head what would have been a philosopher's outfit once +upon a time. Our soldiers and sailors utilize, single-handed, forces +greater than a whole army or navy wielded in the far-off days of the +Ptolemies. We call ourselves greater, we think ourselves greater, and in +a sense we are greater than the people of old. What, then, is the +explanation of the apparent paradox? + +The explanation lies in the simple fact that progress is not a +phenomenon of individual life at all. It is a phenomenon of social +existence. If each generation had to commence at the exact point at +which its predecessors started it would get no farther than they got. It +would be an eternal round, with each generation starting from and +reaching the same point, and progress would be an inconceivable thing. +But that we know is not the case. Instead of each generation starting +from precisely the same point, one inherits at least something of the +labours and discoveries of its predecessors. A thing discovered by the +individual is discovered for the race. A thought struck out by the +individual is a thought for the race. By language, by tradition, and by +institutions the advances of each generation are conserved, handed on, +and made part of our racial possessions. The strength, the knowledge, of +the modern is thus due not to any innate superiority over the ancient, +but because one is modern and the other ancient. If we could have +surrounded the ancient Assyrians with all the inventions, and given them +all the knowledge that we possess, they would have used that knowledge +and those inventions as wisely, or as unwisely as we use them. Progress +is thus not a fact of individual but of racial life. The individual +inherits more than he creates, and it is in virtue of this racial +inheritance that he is what he is. + +It is a mere trick of the imagination that converts this fact of social +growth into an essential characteristic of individual life. We speak of +"man" without clearly distinguishing between man as a biological unit +and man as a member of a social group developing in correspondence with +a true social medium. But if that is so, it follows that this capacity +for growth is, so to speak, a function of the social medium. It is +conditioned by it, it has relevance only in relation to it. Our +feelings, our sentiments, even our desires, have reference to this life, +and in a far deeper sense than is usually imagined. And removed from its +relation to this life human nature would be without meaning or value. + +There is nothing in any of the functions of man, in any of his +capacities, or in any of his properly understood desires that has the +slightest reference to any life but this. It is unthinkable that there +should be. An organ or an organism develops in relation to a special +medium, not in relation to one that--even though it exists--is not also +in relation with it. This is quite an obvious truth in regard to +structures, but it is not always so clearly recognized, or so carefully +borne in mind, that it is equally true of every feeling and desire. For +these are developed in relation to their special medium, in this case, +the existence of fellow beings with their actions and reactions on each +other. And man is not only a member of a social group, that much is an +obvious fact; but he is a product of the group in the sense that all his +characteristic human qualities have resulted from the interactions of +group life. Take man out of relation to that fact, and he is an enigma, +presenting fit opportunities for the wild theorizing of religious +philosophers. Take him in connection with it, and his whole nature +becomes susceptible of understanding in relation to the only existence +he knows and desires. + +The twin facts of growth and progress, upon which so much of the +argument for a future life turns nowadays, have not the slightest +possible reference to a life beyond the grave. They are fundamentally +not even personal, but social. It is the race that grows, not the +individual, he becomes more powerful precisely because the products of +racial acquisition are inherited by him. Remove, if only in thought, the +individual from all association with his fellows, strip him of all that +he inherits from association with them, and he loses all the qualities +we indicate when we speak of him as a civilized being. Remove him, in +fact, from that association, as when a man is marooned on a desert +island, and the more civilized qualities of his character begin to +weaken and in time disappear. Man, as an individual, becomes more +powerful with the passing of each generation, precisely because he is +thus dependent upon the life of the race. The secret of his weakness is +at the same time the source of his strength. We are what we are because +of the generations of men and women who lived and toiled and died before +we were born. We inherit the fruits of their labours, as those who come +after us will inherit the fruits of our struggles and conquests. It is +thus in the life of the race that man achieves immortality. None other +is possible, or conceivable. And to those whose minds are not distorted +by religious teaching, and who have taken the trouble to analyse and +understand their own mental states, it may be said that none other is +even desirable. + + + + +CHAPTER XI. + +EVOLUTION. + + +Language, we have said above, is one of the prime conditions of human +greatness and progress. It is the principal means by which man conserves +his victories over the forces of his environment, and transmits them to +his descendants. But it is, nevertheless, not without its dangers, and +may exert an influence fatal to exact thought. There is a sense in which +language necessarily lags behind thought. For words are coined to +express the ideas of those who fashion them; and as the knowledge of the +next generation alters, and some modification of existing conceptions is +found necessary, there is nothing but the existing array of words in +which to express them. The consequence is that there are nearly always +subtle shades of meaning in the words used differing from the exact +meaning which the new thought is trying to express. Thought drives us to +seek new or improved verbal tools, but until we get them we must go on +using the old ones, with all their old implications. And by the time the +new words arrive thought has made a still further advance, and the +general position remains. It is an eternal chase in which the pursued is +always being captured, but is never caught. + +Another way in which language holds a danger is that with many words, +especially when they assume the character of a formula, they tend to +usurp the place of thinking. The old lady who found so much consolation +in the "blessed" word Mesopotamia, is not alone in using that method of +consolation. It does not meet us only in connection with religion, it +is encountered over the whole field of sociology, and even of science. +A conception in science or sociology is established after a hard fight. +It is accepted generally, and thereafter takes its place as one of the +many established truths. And then the danger shows itself. It is +repeated as though it had some magical virtue in itself; it means +nothing to very many of those who use it, they simply hand over their +mental difficulties to its care, much as the penitent in the +confessional hands over his moral troubles to the priest, and there the +matter ends. But in such cases the words used do not express thought, +they simply blind people to its absence. And not only that, but in the +name of these sacred words, any number of foolish inferences are drawn +and receive general assent. + +A striking illustration of this is to be found in such a word as +"Evolution." One may say of it that while it began as a formula, it +continues as a fiat. Some invoke it with all the expectancy of a +medięval magician commanding the attendance of his favourite spirits. +Others approach it with a hushed reverence that is reminiscent of a +Catholic devotee before his favourite shrine. In a little more than half +a century it has acquired the characteristics of the Kismet of the +Mohammedan, the Beelzebub of the pious Christian, and the power of a +phrase that gives inspiration to a born soldier. It is used as often to +dispel doubt as it is to awaken curiosity. It may express comprehension +or merely indicate vacuity. Decisions are pronounced in its name with +all the solemnity of a "Thus saith the Lord." We are not sure that even +to talk about evolution in this way may not be considered wrong. For +there are crowds of folk who cannot distinguish profundity from +solemnity, and who mistake a long face for the sure indication of a +well-stored brain. The truth here is that what a man understands +thoroughly he can deal with easily; and that he laughs at a difficulty +is not necessarily a sign that he fails to appreciate it, he may laugh +because he has taken its measure. And why people do not laugh at such a +thing as religion is partly because they have not taken its measure, +partly from a perception that religion cannot stand it. Everywhere the +priest maintains his hold as a consequence of the narcotizing influence +of ill-understood phrases, and in this he is matched by the +pseudo-philosopher whose pompous use of imperfectly appreciated formulę +disguises from the crowd the mistiness of his understanding. + +A glance over the various uses to which the word "Evolution" is put will +well illustrate the truth of what has been said. These make one wonder +what, in the opinion of some people, evolution stands for. One of these +uses of evolution is to give it a certain moral implication to which it +has not the slightest claim. A certain school of Non-Theists are, in +this matter, if not the greatest offenders, certainly those with the +least excuse for committing the blunder. By these evolution is +identified with progress, or advancement, or a gradual "levelling up" of +society, and is even acclaimed as presenting a more "moral" view of the +Universe than is the Theistic conception. Now, primarily, this +ascription of what one may call a moral element to evolution is no more +than a carrying over into science of a frame of mind that properly +belongs to Theism. Quite naturally the Theist was driven to try and find +some moral purpose in the Universe, and to prove that its working did +not grate on our moral sense. That was quite understandable, and even +legitimate. The world, from the point of view of the Goddite, was God's +world, he made it; and we are ultimately compelled to judge the +character of God from his workmanship. An attack on the moral character +of the world is, therefore, an attack on the character of its maker. And +the Theist proceeded to find a moral justification for all that God had +done. + +So far all is clear. But now comes a certain kind of Non-Theist. And he, +always rejecting a formal Theism and substituting evolution, proceeds to +claim for his formula all that the Theist claimed for his. He also +strives to show that the idea of cosmic evolution involves conceptions +of nobility, justice, morality, etc. There is no wonder that some +Christians round on him, and tell him that he still believes in a god. +Substantially he does. That is, he carries over into his new camp the +same anthropomorphic conception of the workings of nature, and uses the +same pseudo-scientific reasoning that is characteristic of the Theist. +He has formally given up God, but he goes about uncomfortably burdened +with his ghost. + +Now, evolution is not a fiat, but a formula. It has nothing whatever to +do with progress, as such, nor with morality, as such, nor with a +levelling up, nor a levelling down. It is really no more than a special +application of the principle of causation, and whether the working out +of that principle has a good effect or a bad one, a moralizing, or a +demoralizing, a progressive, or a retrogressive consequence is not +"given" in the principle itself. Fundamentally, all cosmic phenomena +present us with two aspects--difference and change--and that is so +because it is the fundamental condition of our knowing anything at all. +But the law of evolution is no more, is nothing more serious or more +profound than an attempt to express those movements of change and +difference in a more or less precise formula. It aims at doing for +phenomena in general exactly what a particular scientific law aims at +doing for some special department. But it has no more a moral +implication, or a progressive implication than has the law of +gravitation or of chemical affinity. The sum of those changes that are +expressed in the law of evolution may result in one or the other; it has +resulted in one or the other. At one time we call its consequences moral +or progressive, at another time we call them immoral or retrogressive, +but these are some of the distinctions which the human mind creates for +its own convenience, they have no validity in any other sense. And when +we mistake these quite legitimate distinctions, made for our own +convenience, and argue as though they had an actual independent +existence, we are reproducing exactly the same mental confusion that +keeps Theism alive. + +The two aspects that difference and change resolve themselves into when +expressed in an evolutionary formula are, in the inorganic world, +equilibrium, and, in the organic world, adaptation. Of course, +equilibrium also applies to the organic world, I merely put it this way +for the purpose of clarity. Now, if we confine our attention to the +world of animal forms, what we have expressed, primarily, is the fact of +adaptation. If an animal is to live it must be adapted to its +surroundings to at least the extent of being able to overcome or to +neutralize the forces that threaten its existence. That is quite a +common-place, since all it says is that to live an animal must be fit to +live, but all great truths are common-places--when one sees them. Still, +if there were only adaptations to consider, and if the environment to +which adaptation is to be secured, remained constant, all we should have +would be the deaths of those not able to live, with the survival of +those more fortunately endowed. There would be nothing that we could +call, even to please ourselves, either progress or its reverse. Movement +up or down (both human landmarks) occurs because the environment itself +undergoes a change. Either the material conditions change, or the +pressure of numbers initiates a contest for survival, although more +commonly one may imagine both causes in operation at the same time. But +the consequence is the introduction of a new quality into the struggle +for existence. It becomes a question of a greater endowment of the +qualities that spell survival. And that paves the way to progress--or +the reverse. But one must bear in mind that, whether the movement be in +one direction or the other, it is still the same process that is at +work. Evolution levels neither "up" nor "down." Up and down is as +relative in biology as it is in astronomy. In nature there is neither +better nor worse, neither high nor low, neither good nor bad, there are +only differences, and if that had been properly appreciated by all, very +few of the apologies for Theism would ever have seen the light. + +There is not the slightest warranty for speaking of evolution as being a +"progressive force," it is, indeed, not a force at all, but only a +descriptive term on all fours with any other descriptive term as +expressed in a natural law. It neither, of necessity, levels up nor +levels down. In the animal world it illustrates adaptation only, but +whether that adaptation involves what we choose to call progression or +retrogression is a matter of indifference. On the one hand we have +aquatic life giving rise to mammalian life, and on the other hand, we +have mammalian life reverting to an aquatic form of existence. In one +place we have a "lower" form of life giving place to a "higher" form. In +another place we can see the reverse process taking place. And the +"lower" forms are often more persistent than the "higher" ones, while, +as the course of epidemical and other diseases shows certain lowly forms +of life may make the existence of the higher forms impossible. The +Theistic attempt to disprove the mechanistic conception of nature by +insisting that evolution is a law of progress, that it implies an end, +and indicates a goal, is wholly fallacious. From a scientific point of +view it is meaningless chatter. Science knows nothing of a plan, or an +end in nature, or even progress. All these are conceptions which we +humans create for our own convenience. They are so many standards of +measurement, of exactly the same nature as our agreement that a certain +length of space shall be called a yard, or a certain quantity of liquid +shall be called a pint. To think otherwise is pure anthropomorphism. It +is the ghost of God imported into science. + +So far, then, it is clear that the universal fact in nature is change. +The most general aspect of nature which meets us is that expressed in +the law of evolution. And proceeding from the more general to the less +general, in the world of living beings this change meets us in the form +of adaptation to environment. But what constitutes adaptation must be +determined by the nature of the environment. That will determine what +qualities are of value in the struggle for existence, which is not +necessarily a struggle against other animals, but may be no more than +the animal's own endeavours to persist in being. It is, however, in +relation to the environment that we must measure the value of qualities. +Whatever be the nature of the environment that principle remains true. +Ideally, one quality may be more desirable than another, but if it does +not secure a greater degree of adaptation to the environment it brings +no advantage to its possessor. It may even bring a positive +disadvantage. In a thieves' kitchen the honest man is handicapped. In a +circle of upright men the dishonest man is at a discount. In the +existing political world a perfectly truthful man would be a +parliamentary failure. In the pulpit a preacher who knew the truth about +Christianity and preached it would soon be out of the Church. +Adaptation is not, as such, a question of moral goodness or badness, it +is simply adaptation. + +A precautionary word needs be said on the matter of environment. If we +conceive the environment as made up only of the material surroundings we +shall not be long before we find ourselves falling into gross error. For +that conception of environment will only hold of the very lowest +organisms. A little higher, and the nature of the organism begins to +have a modifying effect on the material environment, and when we come to +animals living in groups the environment of the individual animal +becomes partly the habits and instincts of the other animals with which +it lives. Finally, when we reach man this transformation of the nature +of the environment becomes greatest. Here it is not merely the existence +of other members of the same species, with all their developed feelings +and ideas to which each must become adapted to live, but in virtue of +what we have described above as the social medium, certain "thought +forms" such as institutions, conceptions of right and wrong, ideals of +duty, loyalty, the relation of one human group to other human groups, +not merely those that are now living, but also those that are dead, are +all part of the environment to which adjustment must be made. And in the +higher stages of social life these aspects of the environment become of +even greater consequence than the facts of a climatic, geographic, or +geologic nature. In other words, the environment which exerts a +predominating influence on civilized mankind is an environment that has +been very largely created by social life and growth. + +If we keep these two considerations firmly in mind we shall be well +guarded against a whole host of fallacies and false analogies that are +placed before us as though they were unquestioned and unquestionable +truths. There is, for instance, the misreading of evolution which +asserts that inasmuch as what is called moral progress takes place, +therefore evolution involves a moral purpose. We find this view put +forward not only by avowed Theists, but by those who, while formally +disavowing Theism, appear to have imported into ethics all the false +sentiment and fallacious reasoning that formerly did duty in bolstering +up the idea of God. Evolution, as such, is no more concerned with an +ideal morality than it is concerned with the development of an ideal +apple dumpling. In the universal process morality is no more than a +special illustration of the principle of adaptation. The morality of man +is a summary of the relations between human beings that must be +maintained if the two-fold end of racial preservation and individual +development are to be secured. Fundamentally morality is the formulation +in either theory or practice of rules or actions that make group-life +possible. And the man who sees in the existence or growth of morality +proof of a "plan" or an "end" is on all fours with the mentality of the +curate who saw the hand of Providence in the fact that death came at the +end of life instead of in the middle of it. What we are dealing with +here is the fact of adaptation, although in the case of the human group +the traditions and customs and ideals of the group form a very important +part of the environment to which adaptation must be made and have, +therefore, a distinct survival value. The moral mystery-monger is only a +shade less objectionable than the religious mystery-monger, of whom he +is the ethical equivalent. + +A right conception of the nature of environment and the meaning of +evolution will also protect us against a fallacy that is met with in +connection with social growth. Human nature, we are often told, is +always the same. To secure a desired reform, we are assured, you must +first of all change human nature, and the assumption is that as human +nature cannot be changed the proposed reform is quite impossible. + +Now there is a sense in which human nature is the same, generation after +generation. But there is another sense in which human nature is +undergoing constant alteration, and, indeed, it is one of the +outstanding features of social life that it should be so. So far as can +be seen there exists no difference between the fundamental capacities +possessed by man during at least the historic period. There are +differences in people between the relative strengths of the various +capacities, but that is all. An ancient Assyrian possessed all the +capacities of a modern Englishman, and in the main one would feel +inclined to say the same of them in their quantitative aspect as well as +in their qualitative one. For when one looks at the matter closely it is +seen that the main difference between the ancient and the modern man is +in expression. Civilization does not so much change the man so much as +it gives a new direction to the existing qualities. Whether particular +qualities are expressed in an ideally good direction or the reverse +depends upon the environment to which they react. + +To take an example. The fundamental evil of war in a modern state is +that it expends energy in a harmful direction. But war itself, the +expression of the war-like character, is the outcome of pugnacity and +the love of adventure without which human nature would be decidedly the +poorer, and would be comparatively ineffective. It is fundamentally an +expression of these qualities that lead to the quite healthy taste for +exploration, discovery, and in intellectual pursuits to that contest of +ideas which lies at the root of most of our progress. And what war means +in the modern State is that the love of competition and adventure, the +pugnacity which leads a man to fight in defence of a right or to redress +a wrong, and without which human nature would be a poor thing, are +expended in the way of sheer destruction instead of through channels of +adventure and healthy intellectual contest. Sympathies are narrowed +instead of widened, and hatred of the stranger and the outsider, of +which a growing number of people in a civilized country are becoming +ashamed, assumes the rank of a virtue. In other words, a state of war +creates an environment--fortunately for only a brief period--which gives +a survival value to such expressions of human capacity as indicate a +reversion to a lower state of culture. + +We may put the matter thus. While conduct is a function of the organism, +and while the _kind_ of reaction is determined by structure, the _form_ +taken by the reaction is a matter of response to environmental +influences. It is this fact which explains why the capacities of man +remain fairly constant, while there is a continuous redirecting of these +capacities into new channels suitable to a developing social life. + +We are only outlining here a view of evolution that would require a +volume to discuss and illustrate adequately, but enough has been said to +indicate the enormous importance of the educative power of the +environment. We cannot alter the capacities of the individual for they +are a natural endowment. But we can, in virtue of an increased emphasis, +determine whether they shall be expressed in this or that direction. The +love of adventure may, for example, be exhausted in the pursuit of some +piratical enterprise, or it may be guided into channels of some useful +form of social effort. It lies with society itself to see that the +environment is such as to exercise a determining influence with regard +to expressions of activity that are beneficial to the whole of the +group. + +To sum up. Evolution is no more than a formula that expresses the way in +which a moving balance of forces is brought about by purely mechanical +means. So far as animal life is concerned this balance is expressed by +the phrase "adaptation to environment." But in human society the +environment is in a growing measure made up of ideas, customs, +traditions, ideals, and beliefs; in a word, of factors which are +themselves products of human activities. And it is for this reason that +the game of civilization is very largely in our own hands. If we +maintain an environment in which it is either costly or dangerous to be +honest and fearless in the expression of opinion, we shall be doing our +best to develop mental cowardice and hypocrisy. If we bring up the young +with the successful soldier or money-maker before them as examples, +while we continue to treat the scientist as a crank, and the reformer as +a dangerous criminal, we shall be continuing the policy of forcing the +expression of human capacity on a lower level than would otherwise be +the case. If we encourage the dominance of a religion which while making +a profession of disinterested loftiness continues to irradiate a narrow +egotism and a pessimistic view of life, we are doing our best to +perpetuate an environment which emphasizes only the poorer aspects of +human motive. Two centuries of ceaseless scientific activity have taught +us something of the rules of the game which we are all playing with +nature whether we will or no. To-day we have a good many of the winning +cards in our hands, if we will only learn to play them wisely. It is not +correct to say that evolution necessarily involves progress, but it does +indicate that wisdom and foresight may so control the social forces as +to turn that ceaseless change which is indicated by the law of evolution +into channels that make for happiness and prosperity. + + + + +CHAPTER XII. + +DARWINISM AND DESIGN. + + +The influence of the hypothesis of evolution on religion was not long in +making itself felt. Professor Huxley explained the rapid success of +Darwinism by saying that the scientific world was ready for it. And much +the same thing may be said of the better representatives of the +intellectual world with regard to the bearing of evolution on religion. +In many directions the cultivated mind had for more than half a century +been getting familiar with the general conception of growth in human +life and thought. Where earlier generations had seen no more than a +pattern to unravel there had developed a conviction that there was a +history to trace and to understand. Distant parts of the world had been +brought together during the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, +readers and students were getting familiarized with the mass of customs +and religious ideas that were possessed by these peoples, and it was +perceived that beneath the bewildering variety of man's mental output +there were certain features which they had in common, and which might +hold in solution some common principle or principles. + +This common principle was found in the conception of evolution. It was +the one thing which, if true, and apart from the impossible idea of a +revelation, nicely graduated to the capacities of different races, +offered an explanation of the religions of the world in terms more +satisfactory than those of deliberate invention or imposture. Once it +was accepted, if only as an instrument of investigation, its use was +soon justified. And the thorough-going nature of the conquest achieved +is in no wise more clearly manifested than in the fact that the +conception of growth is, to-day, not merely an accepted principle with +scientific investigators, it has sunk deeply into all our literature and +forms an unconscious part of popular thought. + +One aspect of the influence of evolution on religious ideas has already +been noted. It made the religious idea but one of the many forms that +were assumed by man's attempt to reduce his experience of the world to +something like an orderly theory. But that carried with it, for +religion, the danger of reducing it to no more than one of the many +theories of things which man forms, with the prospect of its rejection +as a better knowledge of the world develops. Evolution certainly +divested religion of any authority save such as it might contain in +itself, and that is a position a religious mind can never contemplate +with equanimity. + +But so far as the theory of Darwinism is concerned it exerted a marked +and rapid influence on the popular religious theory of design in nature. +This is one of the oldest arguments in favour of a reasoned belief in +God, and it is the one which was, and is still in one form or another, +held in the greatest popular esteem. To the popular mind--and religion +in a civilized country is not seriously concerned about its failing grip +on the cultured intelligence so long as it keeps control of the ordinary +man and woman--to the popular mind the argument from design appealed +with peculiar force. Anyone is capable of admiring the wonders of +nature, and in the earlier developments of popular science the marvels +of plant and animal structures served only to deepen the Theist's +admiration of the "divine wisdom." The examples of complexity of +structure, of the interdependence of parts, and of the thousand and one +cunning devices by which animal life maintains itself in the face of a +hostile environment were there for all to see and admire. And when man +compared these with his own conscious attempts to adapt means to ends, +there seemed as strong proof here as anywhere of some scheming +intelligence behind the natural process. + +But the strength of the case was more apparent than real. It was weakest +at the very point where it should have been strongest. In the case of a +human product we know the purpose and can measure the extent of its +realization in the nature of the result. In the case of a natural +product we have no means of knowing what the purpose was, or even if any +purpose at all lies behind the product. The important element in the +argument from design--that of purpose--is thus pure assumption. In the +case of human productions we argue from purpose to production. In the +case of a natural object we are arguing from production to an assumed +purpose. The analogy breaks down just where it should be strongest and +clearest. + +Now it is undeniable that to a very large number of the more thoughtful +the old form of the argument from design received its death blow from +the Darwinian doctrine of natural selection. In the light of this theory +there was no greater need to argue that intelligence was necessary to +produce animal adaptations than there was to assume intelligence for the +sifting of sand by the wind. As the lighter grains are carried farthest +because they are lightest, so natural selection, operating upon organic +variations, favoured the better adapted specimens by killing off the +less favoured ones. The fittest is not created, it survives. The world +is not what it is because the animal is what it is, the animal is what +it is because the world is as it is. It cannot be any different and +live--a truth demonstrated by the destruction of myriads of animal +forms, and by the disappearance of whole species. The case was so plain, +the evidence so conclusive, that the clearer headed religionists dropped +the old form of the argument from design as no longer tenable. + +But the gentleman who exchanged the errors of the Church of Rome for +those of the Church of England is always with us. And the believer in +deity having dropped the argument from design in one form immediately +proceeded to revive it in another. This was, perhaps, inevitable. After +all, man lives in this world, and if proof of the existence of deity is +to be gathered from his works, it must be derived from the world we +know. So design _must_ be found somewhere, and it must be found here. +Only one chance was left. The general hypothesis of evolution--either +Darwinism alone, or Darwinism plus other factors--explained the +development of animal life. But that was _within_ the natural process. +What, then, of the process as a whole? If the hand of God could not be +seen in the particular adaptations of animal life, might it not be that +the whole of the process, in virtue of which these particular +adaptations occurred, might be the expression of the divine +intelligence? God did not create the particular parts directly, but may +he not have created the whole, leaving it for the forces he had set in +motion to work out his "plan." The suggestion was attractive. It +relieved religion from resting its case in a region where proof and +disproof are possible, and removed it to a region where they are +difficult, if not impossible. So, as it was not possible to uphold the +old teleology, one began to hear a great deal of the "wider teleology," +which meant that the Theist was thinking vaguely when he imagined he was +thinking comprehensively, and that, because he had reached a region +where the laws of logic could not be applied, he concluded that he had +achieved demonstration. And, indeed, when one gets outside the region of +verification there is nothing to stop one theorizing--save a dose of +common-sense and a gracious gift of humour. + +In another work (_Theism or Atheism_) I have dealt at length with the +argument from design. At present my aim is to take the presentation of +this "wider teleology" as given by a well-known writer on philosophical +subjects, Mr. F. C. S. Schiller, in a volume published a few years ago +entitled _Humanism: Philosophical Essays_. And in doing so, it is +certain that the theologian will lose nothing by leaving himself in the +hands of so able a representative. + +Mr. Schiller naturally accepts Darwinism as at least an important factor +in organic evolution, but he does not believe that it excludes design, +and he does believe that "our attitude towards life will be very +different, according as we believe it to be inspired and guided by +intelligence or hold it to be the fortuitous product of blind +mechanisms, whose working our helpless human intelligence can observe, +but cannot control." + +Now within its scope Darwinism certainly does exclude design, and even +though the forces represented by natural selection may be directed +towards the end produced, yet so far as the play of these forces is +concerned they are really self-directing, or self-contained. The +argument really seems to be just mere theology masquerading as +philosophy. Theories do play some part in the determination of the +individual attitude towards life, but they do not play the important +part that Mr. Schiller assumes they play. It is easily observable that +the same theory of life held by a Christian in England and by another +Christian in Asia Minor has, so far as it affects conduct, different +results. And if it be said that even though the results be different +they are still there, the reply is that they differ because the facts of +life compel an adjustment in terms of the general environment. Mr. +Schiller admits that the "prevalent conduct and that adapted to the +conditions of life must coincide," and the admission is fatal to his +position. The truth of the matter is that the conditions of life being +what they are, and the consequences of conduct being also what they are, +speculative theories of life cannot, in the nature of the case, affect +life beyond a certain point; that is, if life is to continue. That is +why in the history of belief religious teachings have sooner or later to +accommodate themselves to persistent facts. + +Mr. Schiller brings forward two arguments in favour of reconciling +Darwinism and Design, both of them ingenious, but neither of them +conclusive. With both of these I will deal later; but it is first +necessary to notice one or two of his arguments against a non-Theistic +Darwinism. The denial of the argument from design, he says, leads +farther than most people imagine:-- + + A complete denial of design in nature must deny the efficacy of all + intelligence as such. A consistently mechanical view has to regard + all intelligence as otiose, as an "epi-phenomenal by-product" or + fifth wheel to the cart, in the absence of which the given results + would no less have occurred. And so, if this view were the truth, + we should have to renounce all effort to direct our fated and + ill-fated course down the stream of time. Our consciousness would + be an unmeaning accident. + +A complete reply to this would involve an examination of the meaning +that is and ought to be attached to "intelligence," and that is too +lengthy an enquiry to be attempted here. It is, perhaps, enough to +point out that Mr. Schiller's argument clearly moves on the assumption +that intelligence is a _thing_ or a quality which exists, so to speak, +in its own right and which interferes with the course of events as +something from without. It is quite probable that he would repudiate +this construction being placed on his words, but if he does not mean +that, then I fail to see what he does mean, or what force there is in +his argument. And it is enough for my purpose to point out that +"intelligence" or mind is not a thing, but a relation. It asserts of a +certain class of actions exactly what "gravitation" asserts of a certain +class of motion, and "thingness" is no more asserted in the one case +than it is in the other. + +Intelligence, as a name given to a special class of facts or actions, +remains, whatever view we take of its nature, and it is puzzling to see +why the denial of extra natural intelligence--that is, intelligence +separated from all the conditions under which we know the phenomenon of +intelligence--should be taken as involving the denial of the existence +of intelligence as we know it. Intelligence as connoting purposive +action remains as much a fact as gravity or chemical attraction, and +continues valid concerning the phenomena it is intended to cover. All +that the evolutionist is committed to is the statement that it is as +much a product of evolution as is the shape or colouring of animals. It +is not at all a question of self-dependence. Every force in nature must +be taken for what it is worth, intelligence among them. Why, then, does +the view that intelligence is both a product of evolution and a cause of +another phase of evolution land us in self-contradiction, or make the +existence of itself meaningless? The truth is that intelligence +determines results exactly as every other force in nature determines +results, by acting as a link in an unending sequential chain. And the +question as to what intelligence is _per se_ is as meaningless as what +gravitation is _per se_. These are names which we give to groups of +phenomena displaying particular and differential characteristics, and +their purpose is served when they enable us to cognize and recognize +these phenomena and to give them their place and describe their function +in the series of changes that make up our world. + +Mr. Schiller's reply to this line of criticism is the familiar one that +it reduces human beings to automata. He says:-- + + The ease with which the Darwinian argument dispenses with + intelligence as a factor in survival excites suspicion. It is + proving too much to show that adaptation might equally well have + arisen in automata. For we ourselves are strongly persuaded that we + are not automata and strive hard to adapt ourselves. In us at + least, therefore, intelligence _is_ a source of adaptation.... + Intelligence therefore is a _vera causa_ as a source of adaptations + at least co-ordinate with Natural Selection, and this can be denied + only if it is declared inefficacious _everywhere_; if all living + beings, including ourselves, are declared to be automata. + +One is compelled again to point out that Darwinism does not dispense +with intelligence as a factor in survival, except so far as the +intelligence which determines survival is declared to be operating apart +from the organisms which survive. The conduct of one of the lower +animals which reacts only to the immediate promptings of its environment +is of one order, but the response of another animal not merely to the +immediate promptings of the environment, but to remote conditions, as +in the selection of food or the building of a home of some sort, or to +the fashioning of a tool, does obviously give to the intelligence +displayed a distinct survival value. And that effectively replies to the +triumphant conclusion, "If intelligence has no efficacy in promoting +adaptations, _i.e._, if it has no survival value, how comes it to be +developed at all?" + +Darwinism would never have been able to dispense with intelligence in +the way it did but for the fact that the opposite theory never stood for +more than a mere collection of words. That species are or were produced +by the operations of "Divine Intelligence" is merely a grandiloquent way +of saying nothing at all. It is absurd to pretend that such a formula +ever had any scientific value. It explains nothing. And it is quite +obvious that some adaptations do, so far as we know, arise without +intelligence, and are, therefore, to use Mr. Schiller's expression, +automata. (I do not like the word, since it conveys too much the notion +of someone behind the scenes pulling strings.) And it is on his theory +that animals actually are automata. For if there be a "Divine mind" +which stands as the active cause of the adaptations that meet us in the +animal world, and who arranges forces so that they shall work to their +pre-destined end, what is that but converting the whole of the animal +world into so many automata. One does not escape determinism in this +way; it is only getting rid of it in one direction in order to +reintroduce it in another. + +And one would like to know what our conviction that we are not automata +has to do with it. Whether the most rigid determinism is true or not is +a matter to be settled by an examination of the facts and a careful +reflection as to their real significance. No one questions that there is +a persuasion to the contrary; if there were not there would be nothing +around which controversy could gather. But it is the conviction that is +challenged, and it is idle to reply to the challenge by asserting a +conviction to the contrary. The whole history of human thought is the +record of a challenge and a reversal of such convictions. There never +was a conviction which was held more strenuously than that the earth was +flat. The experience of all men in every hour of their lives seemed to +prove it. And yet to-day no one believes it. The affirmation that we are +"free" rests, as Spinoza said, ultimately on the fact that all men know +their actions and but few know the causes thereof. A feather endowed +with consciousness, falling to the ground in a zigzag manner, might be +equally convinced that it determined the exact spot on which it would +rest, yet its persuasion would be of no more value than the "vulgar" +conviction that we independently adapt ourselves to our environment. + +Mr. Schiller's positive arguments in favour of reconciling Darwinism +with design--one of them is really negative;--are concerned with (1) the +question of variation, and (2) with the existence of progress. On the +first question it is pointed out that while Natural Selection operates +by way of favouring certain variations, the origin or cause of these +variations remains unknown. And although Mr. Schiller does not say so in +as many words, there is the implication, if I rightly discern his drift, +that there is room here for a directing intelligence, inasmuch as +science is at present quite unable to fully explain the causes of +variations. We are told that Darwin assumed for the purpose of his +theory that variations were indefinite both as to character and extent, +and it is upon these variations that Natural Selection depends. This +indefinite variation Mr. Schiller asserts to be a methodological device, +that is, it is something assumed as the groundwork of a theory, but +without any subsequent verification, and it is in virtue of this +assumption that intelligence is ruled out of evolution. And inasmuch as +Mr. Schiller sees no reason for believing that variations are of this +indefinite character, he asserts that there is in evolution room for a +teleological factor, in other words, "a purposive direction of +variations." + +Now it hardly needs pointing out to students of Darwinism that +indefinite variation is the equivalent of "a variation to which no exact +limits can be placed," and in this sense the assumption is a perfectly +sound one. From one point of view the variations must be definite, that +is, they can only occur within certain limits. An elephant will not vary +in the direction of wings, nor will a bird in the direction of a rose +bush. But so long as we cannot fix the exact limits of variation we are +quite warranted in speaking of them as indefinite. That this is a +methodological device no one denies, but so are most of the other +distinctions that we frame. Scientific generalizations consist of +abstractions, and Mr. Schiller himself of necessity employs the same +device. + +Mr. Schiller argues, quite properly, that while Natural Selection states +the conditions under which animal life evolves, it does not state any +reason why it should evolve. Selection may keep a species stationary or +it may even cause it to degenerate. Both are fairly common phenomena in +the animal and plant world. Moreover, if there are an indefinite number +of variations, and if they tend in an indefinite number of directions, +then the variation in any one direction can never be more than an +infinitesimal portion of the whole, and that this one should persist +supplies a still further reason for belief in "a purposive direction of +variations." Mr. Schiller overlooks an important point here, but a very +simple one. It is true that any one variation is small in relation to +the whole of the possible or actual number of variations. But it is not +in relation to quantity but quality that survival takes place, and in +proportion to the keenness of the struggle the variation that gives its +possessor an advantage need only be of the smaller kind. In a struggle +of endurance between two athletes it is the one capable of holding out +for an extra minute who carries off the prize. + +Further, as Mr. Schiller afterwards admits, the very smallness of the +number of successful variations makes against intelligence rather than +for it, and he practically surrenders his position in the statement, +"the teleological and anti-teleological interpretation of events will +ever decide their conflict by appealing to the facts; for in the facts +each finds what it wills and comes prepared to see." After this lame +conclusion it is difficult to see what value there is in Mr. Schiller's +own examination of the "facts." Not that it is strictly correct to say +that the facts bear each view out equally. They do not, and Mr. Schiller +only justifies his statement by converting the Darwinian position, which +is teleologically negative, into an affirmative. The Darwinian, he says, +denies intelligence as a cause of evolution. What the Darwinian does is +to deny the validity of the evidence which the teleologist brings to +prove his case. The Theist asserts mind as a cause of evolution. The +Darwinian simply points out that the facts may be explained in quite +another way and without the appeal to a quite unknown factor. + +And here one might reasonably ask, why, if there is a directive mind at +work, are there variations at all? Why should the "directive +intelligence" not get earlier to work, and instead of waiting until a +large number of specimens have been produced and then looking them over +with a view to "directing" the preservation of the better specimens, why +should it not set to work at the beginning and see that only the +desirable ones make their appearance? Certainly that is what a mere +human intelligence would do if it could. But it is characteristic of the +"Divine Intelligence" of the Theist that it never seems to operate with +a tenth part of the intelligence of an ordinary human being. + +Moreover, Mr. Schiller writes quite ignoring the fact that the +"directive intelligence" does not direct the preservation of the better +specimens. What it does, if it does anything at all, is to kill off the +less favoured ones. Natural Selection--the point is generally overlooked +by the Theistic sentimentality of most of our writers--does not preserve +anything. Its positive action is not to keep alive but to kill. It does +not take the better ones in hand and help them. It seizes on all it can +and kills them. It is the difference between a local council that tried +to raise the standard of health by a general improvement of the +conditions of life, and one that aimed at the same end by killing off +all children that failed to come up to a certain standard. The actual +preservation of a better type is, so far as Natural Selection is +concerned, quite accidental. So far as Natural Selection operates it +does so by elimination, not by preservation. + +Mr. Schiller's other plea in favour of Design is concerned with the +conception of progress. He points out that while degeneration and +stagnation both occur in nature, yet-- + + life has been on the whole progressive; but progress and + retrogression have both been effected under the same law of Natural + Selection. How, then, can the credit of that result be ascribed to + Natural Selection? Natural Selection is equally ready to bring + about degeneration or to leave things unchanged. How, then, can it + be that which determines which of the three possible (and actual) + cases shall be realized?... It cannot be Natural Selection that + causes one species to remain stationary, another to degenerate, a + third to develop into a higher form.... Some variable factor must + be added to Natural Selection. + +But why? Evolution, as we have pointed out in a previous chapter, makes +for adaptation in terms of animal preservation. If the adaptation of an +animal to its environment is secured by "degenerating" or "developing" +or by remaining stationary, it will do one of the three. That is the +normal consequence of Natural Selection, and it is surprising that Mr. +Schiller does not see this. He is actually accusing Natural Selection of +not being able to do what it does on his own showing. The proof he +himself gives of this operation of Natural Selection in the examples he +cites of its ineffectiveness. If Natural Selection could not make for +degeneration or development, in what way would it be able to establish +an equilibrium between an animal and its surroundings? Really, there is +nothing that so strengthens one's conviction of the truth of the +Freethought position so much as a study of the arguments that are +brought against it. + +Mr. Schiller is really misled, and so misleads his readers by an +unjustifiable use of the word "progress." He says that evolution has +been, on the whole, progressive, and appeals to "progress" as though it +were some objective fact. But that is not the case. There is no +"progress" in the animal world, there is only change. We have dealt with +this in a previous chapter, and there is no need to again labour the +point. "Progress" is a conception which we ourselves frame, and we +measure a movement towards or away from this arbitrary standard of ours +in terms of better or worse, higher or lower. But nature knows nothing +of a higher or a lower, it knows only of changing forms more or less +fitted to live in the existing environment. Scientifically, life has +not progressed, it has persisted, and a _sine qua non_ of its +persistence has been adaptation to environment. + +Progress, then, is not a "natural" fact, but a methodological one. It is +a useful word and a valuable ideal. I am not protesting against its use, +only against its misuse. It is one of the many abstractions created by +thinkers, and then worshipped as a reality by those who forget the +origin and purpose of its existence. And in this we can see one of the +fatal legacies we have inherited from Theistic methods of thinking. The +belief that things are designed to be as they are comes to us from those +primitive methods of thinking which personify and vitalize all natural +phenomena. We have outgrown the crude frame of mind which saw direct +volitional action in a storm or in the movements of natural forces. The +development of civilized and scientific thinking has removed these +conceptions from the minds of educated men and women, but it has left +behind it as a residuum the habit of looking for purpose where none +exists, and of reading into nature as objective facts our own +generalizations and abstractions. And so long as we have not outgrown +that habit we are retaining a fatal bar to exact scientific thinking. + +Finally, and this consideration is fatal to any theory of design such as +Mr. Schiller champions, adaptation is not a special quality of one form +of existence, but a universal quality of all. There is not a greater +degree of adaptation here and a less degree there, but the same degree +in every case. There is no other meaning to adaptation except that of +adjustment to surroundings. But whether an animal lives or dies, whether +it is higher or lower, deformed or perfect, the adjustment is the same. +That is, every form of existence represents the product of forces that +have made it what it is, and the same forces could not have produced +anything different. Every body in existence, organic or inorganic, +constitutes in ultimate analysis a balance of the forces represented by +it. It is not possible, therefore, for the Theist to say that design is +evidenced by adaptation in one case and its absence in another. There is +adaptation in every case, even though it may not be the adaptation we +should like to see. It is not possible for the Theist to say that the +_degree_ of adaptation is greater in the one case than in the other, for +_that_ is the same in every case. What needs to be done if design is to +be established is to prove that the forces we see at work could not have +produced the results that emerge without the introduction of a factor +not already given in our experience. Anything else is mere waste of +time. + + + + +CHAPTER XIII. + +ANCIENT AND MODERN. + + +In the preceding chapters we have, without saying it in so many words, +been emphasizing the modern as against the ancient point of view. The +distinction may not at first glance appear to be of great moment, and +yet reflection will prove it to be of vital significance. It expresses, +in a sentence, the essence of the distinction between the Freethinker +and the religionist. Objectively, the world in which we are living is +the same as that in which our ancestors lived. The same stars that +looked down upon them look down upon us. Natural forces affected them as +they affect us. Even the play of human passion and desire was the same +with them as with us. Hunger and thirst, love and hatred, cowardice and +courage, generosity and greed operate now as always. The world remains +the same in all its essential features; what alters is our conception of +it--in other words, the point of view. + +The question thus resolves itself into one of interpretation. +Freethinker and religionist are each living in the same world, they are +each fed with the same foods and killed with the same poisons. The same +feelings move both and the same problems face both. Their differences +are constituted by the canon of interpretation applied. It is on this +issue that the conflict between religion and science arises. For +religion is not, as some have argued, something that is supplementary or +complementary to science, nor does it deal with matters on which +science is incompetent to express an opinion. Religion and science face +each other as rival interpretations of the same set of facts, precisely +as the Copernican and the Ptolemaic systems once faced each other as +rival interpretations of astronomical phenomena. If the one is true the +other is false. You may reject the religious or the scientific +explanation of phenomena, but you cannot logically accept both. As Dr. +Johnson said, "Two contradictory ideas may inhere in the same mind, but +they cannot both be correct." + +Now while it is true that in order to understand the present we must +know the past, and that because the present is a product of the past, it +is also true that a condition of understanding is to interpret the past +by the present. In ordinary affairs this is not questioned. When +geologists set out to explain the causes of changes in the earth's +surface, they utilize the present-day knowledge of existing forces, and +by prolonging their action backward explain the features of the period +they are studying. When historians seek to explain the conduct of, say +Henry the Eighth, they take their knowledge of the motives animating +existing human nature, and by placing that in a sixteenth century +setting manage to present us with a picture of the period. So, again, +when the thirteenth century monkish historian gravely informs us that a +particular epidemic was due to the anger of God against the wickedness +of the people, we put that interpretation on one side and use our own +knowledge to find in defective social and sanitary conditions the cause +of what occurred. Illustrations to the same end may be found in every +direction. It is, indeed, not something that one may accept or reject as +one may take or leave a political theory, it is an indispensible +condition of rational thinking on any subject whatsoever. + +Accepted everywhere else, it is in connection with religion that one +finds this principle, not openly challenged, for there are degrees of +absurdity to which even the most ardent religionist dare not go, but it +is quietly set on one side and a method adopted which is its practical +negation. Either the procedure is inverted and the present is +interpreted by the past, as when it is assumed that because God did +certain things in the past therefore he will continue to do the same +things in the present, or it is assumed that the past was unlike the +present, and, therefore, the same method of interpretation cannot be +applied to both cases. Both plans have the effect of landing us, if not +in lunacy, at least well on the way to it. + +It is indispensible to the religionist to ignore the principle above +laid down. For if it is admitted that human nature is always and +everywhere the same, and that natural forces always and everywhere act +in the same manner, religious beliefs are brought to the test of their +conformity with present day knowledge of things and all claim to +objective validity must be abandoned. Yet the principle is quite clear. +The claim of the prophets of old to be inspired must be tested by what +we know of the conditions of "inspiration" to-day, and not by what +unenlightened people thought of its nature centuries ago. Whether the +story of the Virgin Birth is credible or not must be settled by an +appeal to what we know of the nature of animal procreation, and not by +whether our faith urges us to accept the statement as true. To act +otherwise is to raise an altogether false issue, the question of +evidence is argued when what is really at issue is that of credibility. +It is not at all a matter of whether there is evidence enough to +establish the reality of a particular recorded event, but whether our +actual knowledge of natural happenings is not enough for us to rule it +out as objectively untrue, and to describe the conditions which led to +its being accepted as true. + +Let us take as an illustration of this the general question of miracles. +The _Oxford Dictionary_ defines a miracle as "A marvellous event +occurring within human experience which cannot have been brought about +by human power or by the operation of any natural agency, and must, +therefore, be ascribed to the special intervention of the deity or some +supernatural being." That is a good enough definition, and is certainly +what people have had in mind when they have professed a belief in +miracles. A miracle must be something marvellous, that is, it must be +unusual, and it must not be even conceivably explainable in terms of the +operation of natural forces. If it is admitted that what is claimed as a +miracle might be explained as the result of natural forces provided our +knowledge was extensive enough and exact enough, it is confessed that +miracle and ignorance are convertible terms. And while that may be true +enough as a matter of fact, it would never suit the religious case to +admit it in so many words. + +Nor would it make the case any better to argue that the alleged miracle +has been brought about by some superior being with a much greater +knowledge of nature than man possesses, but which the latter may one day +acquire. That is placing a miracle on the same level as a performance +given by a clever conjuror, which puzzles the onlooker because he lacks +the technical knowledge requisite to understand the methods employed. A +miracle to be a miracle must not be in accordance with natural laws, +known or unknown, it must contravene them or suspend their operation. + +On the other hand, the demand made by some critics of the miraculous, +namely, that the alleged miracle shall be performed under test +conditions, is absurd, and shows that they have not grasped the +essential point at issue. The believer's reply to such a demand is plain +and obvious. He says, a miracle is by its nature a rare event, it is +performed under special circumstances to serve a special purpose. Where, +then, is the reason in asking that this miracle shall be re-performed in +order to convince certain people that it has already occurred? To +arrange for the performance of a miracle is an absurdity. For it to +become common is to destroy both its character as a miracle and the +justification for its existence. A miracle must carry its own evidence +or it fails of its purpose and ceases to be a miracle at all. Discussion +on these lines ends, at best, in a stalemate. + +It is just as wide of the mark to discuss miracles as though it were a +question of evidence. What possible evidence could there be, for +example, that Jesus fed five thousand people with a few loaves and +fishes, and had basketfuls left at the end of the repast? Suppose it +were possible to produce the sworn testimony of the five thousand +themselves that they had been so fed. Would that produce conviction? +Would it do any more than prove that they believed the food had been so +expanded or multiplied that it was enough for them all? It would be +convincing, perhaps, as proof of an act of belief. But would it prove +any more than that? Would it prove that these five thousand were not the +victims of some act of deception or of some delusion? A belief in a +miracle, whether the belief dates from two thousand years since or from +last week, proves only--belief. And the testimony of a Salvation Army +convert as to the truth of the resurrection of Jesus Christ is as good, +as evidence, as though we had the sworn testimony of the twelve +apostles, with that of the grave-diggers thrown in. + +The truth is that the question of belief in the miraculous has nothing +whatever to do with evidence. Miracles are never established by +evidence, nor are they disproved by evidence, that is, so long as we use +the term evidence with any regard to its judicial significance. What +amount or what kind of evidence did the early Christians require to +prove the miracles of Christianity? Or what evidence did our ancestors +require to prove to them that old women flew through the air on +broomsticks, or bewitched cows, or raised storms? Testimony in volumes +was forthcoming, and there is not the slightest reason for doubting its +genuineness. But what amount or kind of evidence was required to +establish the belief? Was it evidence to which anyone to-day would pay +the slightest regard? The slightest study of the available records is +enough to show that the question of evidence had nothing whatever to do +with the production of the belief. + +And, on the other hand, how many people have given up the belief in +miracles as a result of a careful study of the evidence against them? I +have never heard of any such case, although once a man disbelieves in +miracles he may be ready enough to produce reasons to justify his +disbelief in them. The man who begins to weigh evidence for and against +miracles has already begun to disbelieve them. + +The attitude of children in relation to the belief in fairies may well +be taken to illustrate the attitude of the adult mind in face of the +miraculous. No evidence is produced to induce the belief in fairies, and +none is ever brought forward to induce them to give it up. At one stage +of life it is there, at another it is gone. It is not reasoned out or +evidenced out, it is simply outgrown. In infancy the child's conception +of life is so inchoate that there is room for all kinds of fantastic +beliefs. In more mature years certain beliefs are automatically ruled +out by the growth of a conception of things which leaves no room for +beliefs that during childhood seemed perfectly reasonable. + +Now this is quite on all-fours with the question of miracles. The issue +is essentially one of psychology. Belief or disbelief is here mainly +determined by the psychological medium in which one lives and moves. +Given a psychological medium which is, scientifically, at its lowest, +and the belief in the miraculous flourishes. At the other extreme +miracles languish and decay. Tell a savage that the air is alive with +good and bad spirits and he will readily believe you. Tell it to a man +with a genuine scientific mind and he will laugh at you. Tell a peasant +in some parts of the country that someone is a witch and he will at once +believe it. Tell it to a city dweller and it will provide only occasion +for ridicule. People who accept miracles believe them before they +happen. The expressed belief merely registers the fact. Miracles never +happen to those who do not believe in them; as has been said, they never +occur to a critic. Those who reject miracles do so because their +acceptance would conflict with their whole conception of nature. That is +the sum and substance of the matter. + +A further illustration may be offered in the case of the once much +debated question of the authenticity of the books of the New Testament +and the historicity of the figure of Jesus. It appears to have been +assumed that if it could be shown that the books of the New Testament +were not contemporary records the case against the divinity of Jesus was +strengthened. On the other hand it was assumed that if these writings +represented the narratives of contemporaries the case for the truth of +the narratives was practically proven. In reality this was not the vital +issue at all. It would be, of course, interesting if it could be shown +that there once existed an actual personage around whom these stories +gathered, but it would make as little difference to the real question at +issue as the demonstration of the Baconian authorship of _Hamlet_ would +make in the psychological value of the play. + +Suppose then it were proven that a person named Jesus actually existed +at a certain date in Judea, and that this person is the Jesus of the New +Testament. Suppose it be further proven, or admitted, that the followers +whom this person gathered around him believed that he was born of a +virgin, performed a number of miracles, was crucified, and then rose +from the dead, and that the New Testament represents their written +memoirs. Suppose all this to be proven or granted, what has been +established? Simply this. That a number of people believed these things +of someone whom they had known. But no Freethinker need seriously +concern himself to disprove this. He may, indeed, take it as the data of +the problem which he sets out to solve. The scientific enquirer is not +really concerned with the New Testament as a narrative of fact any more +than he is concerned with Cotton Mather's _Invisible World Displayed_ as +a narrative of actual fact. What he is concerned with is the frame of +mind to which these stories seemed true, and the social medium which +gave such a frame of mind a vogue. It is not at all a question of +historical evidence, but of historical psychology. It is not a question +of the honesty of the witnesses, but of their ability, not whether they +wished to tell the truth, or intended to tell the truth, but whether +they were in a position to know what the truth was. We have not to +discuss whether these events occurred, such a proposition is an insult +to a civilized intelligence, the matter for discussion is the +conditions that bring such beliefs into existence and the conditions +that perpetuate them. + +The development of social life and of education thus shifts the point of +view from the past to the present. To understand the past we do not ask +what was it that people believed concerning the events around them, but +what do we know of the causes which produce beliefs of a certain kind. +Thus, we do not really reject the story of Jesus turning water into wine +because we are without legal evidence that he ever did anything of the +kind, but because, knowing the chemical constituents of both water and +wine we know that such a thing is impossible. It is only possible to an +uninstructed mind to which water and wine differ only in taste or +appearance. We do not reject the story of the demoniacs in the New +Testament because we have no evidence that these men were possessed of +devils, or that Jesus cast them out, but because we have exactly the +same phenomena with us to-day and know that it comes within the province +of the physician and not of the miracle worker. It is not a matter of +evidence whether a man rose from the dead or not, or whether he was born +of a virgin or not, but solely a question of examining these and similar +stories in the light of present day knowledge. The "evidence" offered is +proof only of belief, and no one ever questioned the existence of that. +And if the proof of belief is required there is no need to go back a +couple of thousand years or to consult ancient records. The testimony of +a present day believer, and the account of a revival meeting such as one +may find in any religious newspaper will serve equally well. As is so +often the case, the evidence offered is not merely inadequate, it is +absolutely irrelevant. + +Past events must be judged in the light of present knowledge. That is +the golden rule of guidance in judging the world's religious legends. +And that canon is fatal to their pretensions. On the one hand we see in +the life of contemporary savages and in that of semi-civilized peoples +all the conditions and the beliefs that meet us in the Bible and among +the early Christians. And with our wider and more exact knowledge we are +able to take exactly the same phenomena that impressed those of an +earlier generation and explain them without the slightest reference to +supernatural powers or beings. The modern mind is really not looking +round for evidence to disprove the truth of Christian legends. It knows +they are not true. There is no greater need to prove that the miracles +of Christianity never occurred, than there is to prove that an old woman +never raised a storm to wreck one of the kings of England. The issue has +been changed from one of history to one of psychology. It is the present +that of necessity sits in judgment on the past, and it is in the light +of the knowledge of the present that the religions of the past stand +condemned. + + + + +CHAPTER XIV. + +MORALITY WITHOUT GOD. + + +The mystery-monger flourishes almost as well in ethics as he does in +theology. Indeed, in some respects he seems to have forsaken one field +of exercise only to find renewed scope in the other. He approaches the +consideration of moral questions with the same hushed voice and +"reverential" air that is so usual in theology, and talks of the mystery +of morality with the same facility that he once talked about the mystery +of godliness--and with about an equal amount of enlightenment to his +hearers or readers. + +But the mystery of morality is nearly all of our own making. Essentially +there is no more mystery in morality than there is in any other question +that may engage the attention of mankind. There are, of course, problems +in the moral world as there are in the physical one, and he would be a +fool who pretended to the ability to satisfactorily solve them all. The +nature of morality, the causes that led to the development of moral +"laws," and still more to the development of a sense of morality, all +these are questions upon which there is ample room for research and +speculation. But the talk of a mystery is misleading and mystifying. It +is the chatter of the charlatan, or of the theologian, or of the partly +liberated mind that is still under the thraldom of theology. In ethics +we have exactly the same kind of problem that meets us in any of the +sciences. We have a fact, or a series of facts, and we seek some +explanation of them. We may fail in our search, but that is not +evidence of a "mystery," it is proof only of inadequate knowledge, of +limitations that we may hope the future will enable us to overcome. + +For the sake of clarity it will be better to let the meaning of morality +emerge from the discussion rather than to commence with it. And one of +the first things to help to clear the mind of confusion is to get rid of +the notion that there is any such thing as moral "laws" which correspond +in their nature to law as the term is used in science. In one sense +morality is not part of physical nature at all. It is characteristic of +that part of nature which is covered by the human--at most by the higher +animal--world. Nature can only, therefore, be said to be moral in the +sense that the term "Nature" includes all that is. In any other sense +nature is non-moral. The sense of values, which is, as we shall see, of +the essence of the conception of morality, nature knows nothing of. To +speak of nature punishing us for _bad_ actions or rewarding us for +_good_ ones is absurd. Nature neither punishes nor rewards. She meets +actions with consequences, and is quite indifferent to any moral +consideration. If I am weakly, and go out on a cold, wet night to help +someone in distress, nature does not act differently than it would if I +had gone out to commit a murder. I stand exactly the same chances in +either case of contracting a deadly chill. It is not the moral value of +an action with which natural forces are concerned, but merely with the +action, and in that respect nature never discriminates between the good +man and the bad, between the sinner and the saint. + +There is another sense in which moral laws differ from natural laws. We +can break the former but not the latter. The expression so often used, +"He broke a law of nature," is absurd. You cannot break a law of +nature. You do not break the law of gravitation when you prevent a stone +falling to the ground; the force required to hold it in the air is an +illustration of the law. It is, indeed, one of the proofs that our +generalization does represent a law of nature that it cannot be +"broken." For broken is here only another word for inoperative, and a +law of nature that is inoperative is non-existent. But in the moral +sphere we are in a different world. We not only can break moral laws, we +do break them; that is one of the problems with which our teachers and +moralisers have constantly to deal. Every time we steal we break the law +"Thou shalt not steal." Every time we murder we break the law "Thou +shalt not kill." We may keep moral laws, we ought to keep them, but we +can, quite clearly, break them. Between a moral law and a law of nature +there is plainly a very radical distinction. The discovery of that +distinction will, I think, bring us to the heart of the subject. + +Considering man as merely a natural object, or as a mere animal, there +is only one quality that nature demands of him. This is efficiency. +Nature's sole law is here "Be Strong." How that strength and efficiency +is secured and maintained is of no consequence whatever. The heat he +requires, the food he needs may be stolen from others, but it will +serve. The food will not nourish the less, the fire will not warm the +less. So long as efficiency is acquired it is a matter of absolute +indifference how it is secured. Considered as a mere animal object it is +difficult to see that morality has any meaning at all for man. It is +when we come to regard him in his relation to others that we begin to +see the meaning and significance of morality emerge. + +Now one of the first things that strike us in connection with moral laws +or rules is that they are all statements of relation. Such moral +commands as "Thou shalt not steal," "Thou shalt not kill," the commands +to be truthful, kind, dutiful, etc., all imply a relation to others. +Apart from this relation moral rules have simply no meaning whatever. By +himself a man could neither steal, nor lie, nor do any of the things +that we habitually characterize as immoral. A man living by himself on +some island would be absolved from all moral law; it would have no +meaning whatever for him. He would be neither moral nor immoral, he +would simply be without the conditions that make morality possible. But +once bring him into relations with his kind and his behaviour begins to +have a new and peculiar significance, not alone to these others, but +also to himself. What he does affects them, and also affects himself so +far as they determine the character of his relations to these others. He +must, for example, either work with them or apart from them. He must +either be on his guard against their securing their own efficiency at +his expense, or rest content that a mutual forbearance and trust will +govern their association. To ignore them is an impossibility. He must +reckon with these others in a thousand and one different ways, and this +reckoning will have its effect on the moulding of his nature and upon +theirs. + +Morality, then, whatever else it may be, is primarily the expression of +a relation. And the laws of morality are, consequently, a summary or +description of those relations. From this point of view they stand upon +exactly the same level as any of the arts or sciences. Moral actions are +the subject matter of observation, and the determination of their +essential quality or character is by the same methods as we determine +the essential quality of the "facts" in chemistry or biology. The task +before the scientific enquirer is, therefore, to determine the +conditions which give to moral rules or "laws" their meaning and +validity. + +One of the conditions of a moral action has already been pointed out. +This is that all moral rules imply a relation to beings of a similar +nature. A second feature is that conduct represents a form of +efficiency, it is a special feature of the universal biological fact of +adaptation. And the question of why man has a "moral sense" is really on +all fours with, and presents no greater mystery than is involved in, the +question of why man has digestive organs, and prefers some kinds of food +to others. Substantially, the question of why man should prefer a diet +of meat and potatoes to one of prussic acid is exactly the question of +why society should discourage certain actions and encourage others, or +why man's moral taste should prefer some forms of conduct to other +forms. The answer to both questions, while differing in form, is the +same in substance. + +Man as we know him is always found as a member of a group, and his +capacities, his feelings, and tastes must always be considered in +relation to that fact. But considering man merely as an animal, and his +conduct as merely a form of adaptation to environment, the plain +consideration which emerges is that even as an individual organism he is +compelled, in order to live, to avoid certain actions and to perform +others, to develop certain tastes and to form certain distastes. To take +our previous illustration it would be impossible for man to develop a +liking for life-destroying foods. It is one of the conditions of living +that he shall eat only that food which sustains life, or that he shall +abstain from eating substances which destroy it. But conduct at that +stage is not of the kind which considers the reasons for acting; indeed, +life cannot be based upon considered action, however much reason may +justify the actions taken. Further, as all conscious action is prompted +by the impulse to do what is pleasant and to avoid what is unpleasant, +it follows, as Spencer pointed out, that the course of evolution sets up +a close relation between actions that are pleasurable in the performance +and actions that are life preserving. It is one of the conditions of the +maintenance of life that the pleasurable and the beneficial shall in the +long run coincide. + +When we take man as a member of a group we have the same principle in +operation, even though the form of its expression undergoes alteration. +To begin with, the mere fact of living in a group implies the growth of +a certain restraint in one's relations to, and of reciprocity in dealing +with, others. Men can no more live together without some amount of trust +and confidence in each other, or without a crude sense of justice in +their dealings with each other, than an individual man can maintain his +life by eating deadly poisons. There must be a respect for the rights of +others, of justice in dealing with others, and of confidence in +associating with others, at least to the extent of not threatening the +possibility of group life. There are rules in the game of social life +that must be observed, and in its own defence society is bound to +suppress those of its members who exhibit strong anti-social tendencies. +No society can, for example, tolerate homicide as an admitted practice. +There is, thus, from the earliest times, a certain form of elimination +of the anti-social character which results in the gradual formation of +an emotional and mental disposition that habitually and instinctively +falls into line with the requirements of the social whole. + +To use an expression of Sir Leslie Stephen's, man as a member of the +group becomes a cell in the social tissue, and his fitness to survive is +dependent upon, positively, his readiness to perform such actions as the +welfare of the group require, and, negatively, upon his refraining from +doing those things that are inimical to social welfare.[23] Moreover, +there is the additional fact that the group itself is, as a whole, +brought into contact with other groups, and the survival of one group as +against another is determined by the quality and the degree of cohesion +of its units. From this point of view, participation in the life of the +group means more than refraining from acts that are injurious to the +group, it involves some degree of positive contribution to social +welfare. + +[23] The question of what are the things that are essential to the +welfare of the group, and the fact that individuals are often suppressed +for doing what they believe is beneficial to the group, with the kindred +fact that there may exist grave differences of opinion on the matter, +does not alter the essential point, which is that there must exist +sufficient conformity between conduct and group welfare to secure +survival. + +But the main thing to note is that from the very dawn of animal life the +organism is more or less under the pressure of a certain discipline that +tends to establish an identity between actions which there is a tendency +to perform and those that are beneficial to the organism. In the social +state we simply have this principle expressed in another way, and it +gives a degree of conscious adaptation that is absent from the +pre-social or even the lower forms of the social state. It is in the +truly social state also that we get the full influence of what may be +called the characteristically human environment, that is, the operation +of ideas and ideals. The importance of this psychological factor in the +life of man has been stressed in an earlier chapter. It is enough now to +point out that from the earliest moment the young human being is, by a +process of training, imbued with certain ideals of truthfulness, +loyalty, duty, etc., all of which play their part in the moulding of his +character. However much these ideals may vary in different societies, +the fact of the part played by them in moulding character is plain. They +are the dominant forces in moulding the individual to the social state, +even while the expressions of the social life may be in turn checked by +the fact that social conduct cannot persist if it threatens those +conditions upon which the persistence of life ultimately depends. + +There is one other consideration that must be noted. One very pregnant +fact in life is that nature seldom creates a new organ. What it usually +does is to refashion an old one, or to devote an old one to new uses. +This principle may be seen clearly in operation in connection with moral +evolution. On the one hand the various forces that play upon human +nature drive the moral feelings deeper into it. On the other hand it +develops them by their steady expansion over a wider area. Whether it is +an actual fact or not--I do not stress it because the point is the +subject of discussion--it is at least possible that the earliest human +group is the family. And so long as that was the case such feelings of +right and wrong as then existed will have been confined to the family. +But when a group of families combine and form the tribe, all those +feelings of confidence, justice, etc., which were formerly +characteristic of the smaller group are expanded to cover the larger +one. With the expansion of the tribe to the nation we have a further +development of the same phenomenon. There is no new creation, there is +nothing more than expansion and development. + +The process does not and cannot, obviously, stop here. From the tribe to +the nation, from the nation to the collection of nations which we call +an empire, and from the empire to the whole of humanity. That seems the +inevitable direction of the process, and there does not require profound +insight to see it already on the way. Development of national life +involves a growing interdependence of the world of humankind. Of hardly +any nation can it be said to-day that it is self-supporting or +self-contained or independent. There is nothing national or sectarian in +science, and it is to science that we have to look for our principal +help. All over the world we utilize each other's discoveries and profit +by each other's knowledge. Even economic interdependence carries with it +the same lesson. The human environment gets gradually broader and wider, +and the feelings that have hitherto been expanded over the narrower area +have now to be expanded over the wider one. It is the gradual +development of a human nature that is becoming adapted to a conception +of mankind as an organic unit. Naturally, in the process of adaptation +there is conflict between the narrower ideals, conserved in our +educational influences, and the wider ones. There are still large +numbers of those who, unable to picture the true nature of the +evolutionary process owing to their own defective education, yet think +of the world in terms of a few centuries ago, and still wave the flag of +a political nationalism as though that were the end of social growth, +instead of its being an early and transient expression of it. But this +conflict is inevitable, and the persistence of that type can no more +ensure its permanent domination than the persistence of the medicine man +in the person of the existing clergyman can give permanence to the +religious idea. + +There is, then, no mystery about the fact of morality. It is no more of +a mystery than is the compilation of the multiplication table, and it +has no greater need of a supernatural sanction than has the law of +gravitation. Morality is a natural fact, and its enforcement and growth +are brought about by natural means. In its lower form, morality is no +more than an expression of those conditions under which social life is +possible, and in its higher one, an expression of those ideal conditions +under which corporate life is desirable. In studying morality we are +really studying the physiology of associated life, and that study aims +at the determination of the conditions under which the best form of +living is possible. It is thus that here, as elsewhere, man is thrown +back upon himself for enlightenment and help. And if the process is a +slow one we may at least console ourselves with the reflection that the +labours of each generation are making the weapons which we bring to the +fight keener and better able to do their work. + + + + +CHAPTER XV. + +MORALITY WITHOUT GOD. + +(_Continued._) + + +In the preceding chapter I have been concerned with providing the most +meagre of skeleton outlines of the way in which our moral laws and our +moral sense have come into existence. To make this as clear as possible +the chapter was restricted to exposition. Controversial points were +avoided. And as a matter of fact there are many religionists who might +concede the truth of what has been said concerning the way in which +morality has arisen, and the nature of the forces that have assisted in +its development. But they would proceed to argue, as men like Mr. +Balfour and Mr. Benjamin Kidd, with others of the like, have argued, +that a natural morality lacks all coercive power. The Freethought +explanation of morality, they say, is plausible enough, and may be +correct, but in conduct we have to deal not merely with the correctness +of things but with sanctions and motives that exercise a compulsive +influence on men and women. The religionist, it is argued, has such a +compulsive force in the belief in God and in the effect on our future +life of our obedience or disobedience to his commands. But what kind of +coercion can a purely naturalistic system of morals exert? If a man is +content to obey the naturalistic command to practise certain virtues and +to abstain from certain vices, well and good. But suppose he chooses to +disregard it. What then? Above all, on what compulsion is a man to +disregard his own inclinations to act as seems desirable to himself, +and not in conformity with the general welfare? We disregard the +religious appeal as pure sentimentalism, or worse, and we at once +institute an ethical sentimentalism which is, in practice, foredoomed to +failure. + +Or to put the same point in another way. Each individual, we say, should +so act as to promote the general welfare. Freethinker and religionist +are in agreement here. And so long as one's inclinations jump with the +advice no difficulty presents itself. But suppose a man's inclinations +do not run in the desired direction? You tell him that he must act so as +to promote the general well-being, and he replies that he is not +concerned with the promotion of the public welfare. You say that he +_ought_ to act differently, and he replies, "My happiness must consist +in what I regard as such, not in other people's conception of what it +should be." You proceed to point out that by persisting in his present +line of conduct he is laying up trouble for the future, and he retorts, +"I am willing to take the risk." What is to be done with him? Can +naturalism show that in acting in that way a man is behaving +unreasonably, that is, in the sense that he can be shown to be really +acting against his own interests, and that if he knew better he would +act differently? + +Now before attempting a reply to this it is worth while pointing out +that whatever strength there may be in this criticism when directed +against naturalism, it is equally strong when directed against +supernaturalism. We can see this at once if we merely vary the terms. +You tell a man to act in this or that way "in the name of God." He +replies, "I do not believe in God," and your injunction loses all force. +Or, if he believes in God, and you threaten him with the pains and +penalties of a future life, he may reply, "I am quite willing to risk a +probable punishment hereafter for a certain pleasure here." And it is +certain that many do take the risk, whether they express their +determination to do so in as many words or not. + +What is a supernaturalist compelled to do in this case? His method of +procedure is bound to be something like the following. First of all he +will seek to create assent to a particular proposition such as "God +exists, and also that a belief in his existence creates an obligation to +act in this or that manner in accordance with what is believed to be his +will." That proposition once established, his next business will be to +bring the subject's inclinations into line with a prescribed course of +action. He is thus acting in precisely the same manner as is the +naturalist who starts from an altogether different set of premises. And +both are resting their teaching of morals upon an intellectual +proposition to which assent is either implied or expressed. And that +lies at the basis of all ethical teaching--not ethical practice, be it +observed, but teaching. The precise form in which this intellectual +proposition is cast matters little. It may be the existence of God, or +it may be a particular view of human nature or of human evolution, but +it is there, and in either case the authoritative character of moral +precepts exists for such as accept it, and for none other. Moral +practice is rooted in life, but moral theory is a different matter. + +So far, then, it is clear that the complaint that Freethought ethics has +nothing about it of a compulsive or authoritative character is either a +begging of the question or it is absurd. + +Naturalistic ethics really assert three things. The first is that the +continuance of life ensures the performance of a certain level of +conduct, conduct being merely one of the means by which human beings +react to the necessities of their environment. Second, it asserts that +a proper understanding of the conditions of existence will in the +normally constituted mind strengthen the development of a feeling of +obligation to act in such and such a manner; and that while all +non-reasonable conduct is not immoral, all immoral conduct is +fundamentally irrational. Third, there is the further assumption that at +bottom individual and general welfare are not contradictory, but two +aspects of the same thing. + +Concerning the second point, Sir Leslie Stephen warns us (_Science of +Ethics_, p. 437) that every attempt so to state the ethical principle +that disobedience will be "unreasonable" is "doomed to failure in a +world which is not made up of working syllogisms." And for the other two +points Professor Sorley (_Ethics of Naturalism_, p. 42) tells us that +"It is difficult ... to offer any consideration fitted to convince the +individual that it is reasonable for him to seek the happiness of the +community rather than his own"; while Mr. Benjamin Kidd asserts that +"the interests of the individual and those of the social organism are +not either identical or capable of being reconciled, as has been +necessarily assumed in all those systems of ethics which have sought to +establish a naturalistic basis of conduct. The two are fundamentally and +inherently irreconcilable, and a large proportion of the existing +individuals at any time have ... no personal interest whatever in the +progress of the race, or in the social development we are undergoing." + +It has already been said that however difficult it may be to establish +the precise relationship between reason and ethical commands, such a +connection must be assumed, whether we base our ethics on naturalistic +or supernaturalistic considerations. And it cannot be denied by anyone +to-day that a causal relation must exist between actions and their +consequences, whether those causal consequences be of the natural and +non-moral kind, or of the more definitely moral order such as exists in +the shape of social approval and disapproval. And if we once grant that, +then it seems quite allowable to assume that provided a man perceives +the reason underlying moral judgments, and also the justification for +the sense of approval and disapproval expressed, we have as much reason +for calling his conduct reasonable or unreasonable as we have for +applying the same terms to a man's behaviour in dressing in view of the +variations of the temperature. + +Consequently, while I agree that _in the present state of knowledge_ it +is impossible in all cases to demonstrate that immoral conduct is +irrational in the sense that it would be unreasonable to refuse assent +to a mathematical proposition, there seems no justification for +regarding such a state of things as of necessity permanent. If a +scientific system of ethics consists in formulating rules for the +profitable guidance of life, not only does their formulation presuppose +a certain constancy in the laws of human nature and of the world in +general, but the assumption is also involved that one day it may be +possible to give to moral laws the same precision that now is attached +to physiological laws and to label departure from them as "unreasonable" +in a very real sense of the word. + +The other objection that it is impossible to establish a "reasonable" +relation between individual and social well-being arises from a dual +confusion as to what is the proper sphere of ethics, and of the mutual +relation of the individual and society. To take an individual and ask, +"Why should he act so as to promote the general welfare?" is to imply +that ethical rules may have an application to man out of relation with +his fellows. That, we have already seen, is quite wrong, since moral +rules fail to be intelligible once we separate man from his fellows. +Discussing ethics while leaving out social life is like discussing the +functions of the lungs and leaving out of account the existence of an +atmosphere. + +If, then, instead of treating the individual and society as two distinct +things, either of which may profit at the expense of the other, we treat +them as two sides of the same thing, each an abstraction when treated +alone, the problem is simplified, and the solution becomes appreciably +easier. For the essential truth here is that just as there is no such +thing as a society in the absence of the individuals composing it, so +the individual, as we know him, disappears when we strip him of all that +he is in virtue of his being a part of the social structure. Every one +of the characteristic human qualities has been developed in response to +the requirements of the social medium. It is in virtue of this that +morality has anything of an imperative nature connected with it, for if +man is, to use Sir Leslie Stephen's phrase, a cell in the social tissue, +receiving injury as the body social is injured, and benefitting as it is +benefitted, then the refusal of a man to act so that he may promote the +general welfare can be shown to be unreasonable, and also unprofitable +to the individual himself. In other words, our efficiency as an +individual must be measured in terms of our fitness to form part of the +social structure, and consequently the antithesis between social and +personal well-being is only on the surface. Deeper knowledge and a more +exact understanding reveals them as two sides of the same fact. + +It may be granted to Mr. Kidd that "a large proportion of the existing +individuals at any time" have no _conscious_ interest in "the progress +of the race or in the development we are undergoing," and that is only +what one would expect, but it would be absurd to therefore come to the +conclusion that no such identity of interest exists. Moličre's +character, who all his life had been talking prose without knowing it, +is only a type of the majority of folk who all their lives are acting in +accordance with principles of which they are ignorant, and which they +may even repudiate when they are explained to them. From one point of +view the whole object of a scientific morality is to awaken a conscious +recognition of the principles underlying conduct, and by this means to +strengthen the disposition to right action. We make explicit in language +what has hitherto been implicit in action, and thus bring conscious +effort to the aid of non-conscious or semi-conscious behaviour. + +In the light of the above consideration the long and wordy contest that +has been waged between "Altruists" and "Egoists" is seen to be very +largely a waste of time and a splutter of words. If it can be shown on +the one hand that all men are not animated by the desire to benefit +self, it is as easy to demonstrate that so long as human nature is human +nature, all conduct must be an expression of individual character, and +that even the morality of self-sacrifice is self-regarding viewed from +the personal feelings of the agent. And it being clear that the position +of Egoist and Altruist, while each expressing a truth, is neither +expressing the whole truth, and that each does in fact embody a definite +error, it seems probable that here, as in so many other cases, the truth +lies between the two extremes, and that a reconciliation may be effected +along these lines. + +Taking animal life as a whole it is at least clear that what are called +the self-regarding feelings must come first in order of development. +Even with the lower races of human beings there is less concern shown +with the feelings and welfare of others than is the case with the +higher races of men. Or, again, with children we have these feelings +strongest in childhood and undergoing a gradual expansion as maturity is +reached. This is brought about, as was shown in the last chapter, not by +the destruction of existing feelings, but by their extension to an ever +widening area. There is a transformation, or an elaboration of existing +feelings under the pressure of social growth. One may say that ethical +development does not proceed by the destruction of the feeling of +self-interest, so much as by its extension to a wider field. Ethical +growth is thus on all fours with biological growth. In biology we are +all familiar with the truth that maintenance of life is dependent upon +the existence of harmonious relations between an organism and its +environment. Yet it is not always recognized that this principle is as +true of the moral self as it is of the physical structure, nor that in +human evolution the existence of others becomes of increasing importance +and significance. For not only do I have to adapt myself, mentally and +morally, to the society now existing, but also to societies that have +long since passed away and have left their contribution to the building +up of _my_ environment in the shape of institutions and beliefs and +literature. + +We have in this one more illustration that while the environment of the +animal is overwhelmingly physical in character, that of man tends to +become overwhelmingly social or psychological. Desires are created that +can only be gratified by the presence and the labour of others. Feelings +arise that have direct reference to others, and in numerous ways a body +of "altruistic" feeling is created. So by social growth first, and +afterwards by reflection, man is taught that the only life that is +enjoyable to himself is one that is lived in the companionship and by +the co-operation of others. As Professor Ziegler well puts the +process:-- + + Not only on the one hand does it concern the interests of the + general welfare that every individual should take care of himself + outwardly and inwardly; maintain his health; cultivate his + faculties and powers; sustain his position, honour, and worth, and + so his own welfare being secured, diffuse around him happiness and + comfort; but also, on the other hand, it concerns the personal, + well understood interests of the individual himself that he should + promote the interests of others, contribute to their happiness, + serve their interests, and even make sacrifices for them. Just as + one forgoes a momentary pleasure in order to secure a lasting and + greater enjoyment, so the individual willingly sacrifices his + personal welfare and comfort for the sake of society in order to + share in the welfare of this society; he buries his individual + well-being in order that he may see it rise in richer and fuller + abundance in the welfare and happiness of the whole community + (_Social Ethics_, pp. 59-60). + +These motives are not of necessity conscious ones. No one imagines that +before performing a social action each one sits down and goes through a +more or less elaborate calculation. All that has been written on this +head concerning a "Utilitarian calculus" is poor fun and quite beside +the mark. In this matter, as in so many others, it is the evolutionary +process which demands consideration, and generations of social struggle, +by weeding out individuals whose inclinations were of a pronounced +anti-social kind, and tribes in which the cohesion between its members +was weak, have resulted in bringing about more or less of an +identification between individual desires and the general welfare. It is +not a question of conscious evolution so much as of our becoming +conscious of an evolution that is taking place, and in discussing the +nature of morals one is bound to go beyond the expressed reasons for +conduct--more often wrong than right--and discover the deeper and truer +causes of instincts and actions. When this is done it will be found that +while it is absolutely impossible to destroy the connection between +conduct and self-regarding actions, there is proceeding a growing +identity between the gratification of desire and the well-being of the +whole. This will be, not because of some fantastical or ascetic teaching +of self-sacrifice, but because man being an expression of social life is +bound to find in activities that have a social reference the beginning +and end of his conduct. + +The fears of a morality without God are, therefore, quite unfounded. If +what has been said be granted, it follows that all ethical rules are +primarily on the same level as a generalization in any of the sciences. +Just as the "laws" of astronomy or of biology reduce to order the +apparently chaotic phenomena of their respective departments, so ethical +laws seek to reduce to an intelligible order the conditions of +individual and social betterment. There can be no ultimate antithesis +between individual reason and the highest form of social conduct, +although there may exist an apparent conflict between the two, chiefly +owing to the fact that we are often unable to trace the remote effects +of conduct on self and society. Nor can there be an ultimate or +permanent conflict between the true interests of the individual and of +society at large. That such an opposition does exist in the minds of +many is true, but it is here worthy of note that the clearest and most +profound thinkers have always found in the field of social effort the +best sphere for the gratification of their desires. And here again we +may confidently hope that an increased and more accurate appreciation +of the causes that determine human welfare will do much to diminish +this antagonism. At any rate it is clear that human nature has been +moulded in accordance with the reactions of self and society in such a +way that even the self has become an expression of social life, and with +this dual aspect before us there is no reason why emphasis should be +laid on one factor rather than on the other. + +To sum up. Eliminating the form of coercion that is represented by a +policeman, earthly or otherwise, we may safely say that a naturalistic +ethics has all the coercive force that can be possessed by any system. +And it has this advantage over the coercive force of the +supernaturalist, that while the latter tends to weaken with the advance +of intelligence, the former gains strength as men and women begin to +more clearly appreciate the true conditions of social life and +development. It is in this way that there is finally established a +connection between what is "reasonable" and what is right. In this case +it is the function of reason to discover the forces that have made for +the moralization--really the socialization--of man, and so strengthen +man's moral nature by demonstrating the fundamental identity between his +own welfare and that of the group to which he belongs. That the coercion +may in some cases be quite ineffective must be admitted. There will +always, one fancies, be cases where the personal character refuses to +adapt itself to the current social state. That is a form of +mal-adaptation which society will always have to face, exactly as it has +to face cases of atavism in other directions. But the socializing and +moralizing process continues. And however much this may be, in its +earlier stages, entangled with conceptions of the supernatural, it is +certain that growth will involve the disappearance of that factor here +as it has done elsewhere. + + + + +CHAPTER XVI. + +CHRISTIANITY AND MORALITY. + + +The association of religion with morality is a very ancient one. This is +not because the one is impossible without the other, we have already +shown that this is not the case. The reason is that unless religious +beliefs are associated with certain essential social activities their +continuance is almost impossible. Thus it happens in the course of +social evolution that just in proportion as man learns to rely upon the +purely social activities to that extent religion is driven to dwell more +upon them and to claim kinship with them. + +While this is true of religions in general, it applies with peculiar +force to Christianity. And in the last two or three centuries we have +seen the emphasis gradually shifted from a set of doctrines, upon the +acceptance of which man's eternal salvation depends, to a number of +ethical and social teachings with which Christianity, as such, has no +vital concern. The present generation of Christian believers has had +what is called the moral aspect of Christianity so constantly impressed +upon them, and the essential and doctrinal aspect so slurred over, that +many of them have come to accept the moral teaching associated with +Christianity as its most important aspect. More than that, they have +come to regard the immense superiority of Christianity as one of those +statements the truth of which can be doubted by none but the most +obtuse. To have this alleged superiority of Christian ethical teaching +questioned appears to them proof of some lack of moral development on +the part of the questioner. + +To this type of believer it will come with something of a shock to be +told quite plainly and without either circumlocution or apology that his +religion is of an intensely selfish and egoistic character, and that its +ethical influence is of a kind that is far from admirable. It will shock +him because he has for so long been told that his religion is the very +quintessence of unselfishness, he has for so long been telling it to +others, and he has been able for so many generations to make it +uncomfortable for all those who took an opposite view, that he has +camouflaged both the nature of his own motives and the tendency of his +religion. + +From one point of view this is part of the general scheme in virtue of +which the Christian Church has given currency to the legend that the +doctrines taught by it represented a tremendous advance in the +development of the race. In sober truth it represented nothing of the +kind. That the elements of Christian religious teaching existed long +before Christianity as a religious system was known to the world is now +a commonplace with all students of comparative religions, and is +admitted by most Christian writers of repute. Even in form the Christian +doctrines represented but a small advance upon their pagan prototypes, +but it is only when one bears in mind the fact that the best minds of +antiquity were rapidly throwing off these superstitions and leading the +world to a more enlightened view of things, we realize that in the main +Christianity represented a step backward in the intellectual evolution +of the race. What we then see is Christianity reaffirming and +re-establishing most of the old superstitions in forms in which only the +more ignorant classes of antiquity accepted them. We have an assertion +of demonism in its crudest forms, an affirmation of the miraculous that +the educated in the Roman world had learned to laugh at, and which is +to-day found among the savage people of the earth, while every form of +scientific thought was looked upon as an act of impiety. The scientific +eclipse that overtook the old pagan civilization was one of the +inevitable consequences of the triumph of Christianity. From the point +of view of general culture the retrogressive nature of Christianity is +unmistakable. It has yet to be recognized that the same statement holds +good in relation even to religion. One day the world will appreciate the +fact that no greater disaster ever overtook the world than the triumph +of the Christian Church. + +For the moment, however, we are only concerned with the relation of +Christianity to morality. And here my thesis is that Christianity is an +essentially selfish creed masking its egoistic impulses under a cover of +unselfishness and self-sacrifice. To that it will probably be said that +the charge breaks down on the fact that Christian teaching is full of +the exhortation that this world is of no moment, that we gain salvation +by learning to ignore its temptations and to forgo its pleasures, and +that it is, above all other faiths, the religion of personal sacrifice. +And that this teaching is there it would be stupid to deny. But this +does not disprove what has been said, indeed, analysis only serves to +make the truth still plainer. That many Christians have given up the +prizes of the world is too plain to be denied; that they have forsaken +all that many struggle to possess is also plain. But when this has been +admitted there still remains the truth that there is a vital distinction +in the consideration of whether a man gives up the world in order to +save his own soul, or whether he saves his soul as a consequence of +losing the world. In this matter it is the aim that is important, not +only to the outsider who may be passing judgment, but more importantly +to the agent himself. It is the effect of the motive on character with +its subsequent flowering in social life that must be considered. + +The first count in the indictment here is that the Christian appeal is +essentially a selfish one. The aim is not the saving of others but of +one's self. If other people must be saved it is because their salvation +is believed to be essential to the saving of one's own soul. That this +involves, or may involve, a surrender of one's worldly possessions or +comfort, is of no moment. Men will forgo many pleasures and give up much +when they have what they believe to be a greater purpose in view. We see +this in directions quite unconnected with religion. Politics will show +us examples of men who have forsaken many of what are to others the +comforts of life in the hopes of gaining power and fame. Others will +deny themselves many pleasures in the prospect of achieving some end +which to them is of far greater value than the things they are +renouncing. And it is the same principle that operates in the case of +religious devotees. There is no reason to doubt but that when a young +woman forsakes the world and goes into a cloister she is surrendering +much that has considerable attractions for her. But what she gives is to +her of small importance to what she gains in return. And if one believed +in Christianity, in immortal damnation, with the intensity of the great +Christian types of character, it would be foolish not to surrender +things of so little value for others of so great and transcendent +importance. + +To do Christians justice they have not usually made a secret of their +aim. Right through Christian literature there runs the teaching that it +is the desire of personal and immortal salvation that inspires them, and +they have affirmed over and over again that but for the prospect of +being paid back with tremendous interest in the next world they could +see no reason for being good in this one. That is emphatically the +teaching of the New Testament and of the greatest of Christian +characters. You are to give in secret that you may be rewarded openly, +to cast your bread upon the waters that it may be returned to you, and +Paul's counsel is that if there be no resurrection from the dead then we +may eat, drink, and be merry for death only is before us. Thus, what you +do is in the nature of a deliberate and conscious investment on which +you will receive a handsome dividend in the next world. And your +readiness to invest will be exactly proportionate to your conviction of +the soundness of the security. But there is in all this no perception of +the truly ethical basis of conduct, no indication of the inevitable +consequences of conduct on character. What is good is determined by what +it is believed will save one's own soul and increase the dividend in the +next world. What is bad is anything that will imperil the security. It +is essentially an appeal to what is grasping and selfish in human +nature, and while you may hide the true character of a thing by the +lavish use of attractive phrases, you cannot hinder it working out its +consequences in actual life. And the consequence of this has been that +while Christian teaching has been lavish in the use of attractive +phrases its actual result has been to create a type of character that +has been not so much immoral as _a_moral. And with that type the good +that has been done on the one side has been more than counterbalanced by +the evil done on the other. + +What the typical Christian character had in mind in all that he did was +neither the removal of suffering nor of injustice, but the salvation of +his own soul. That justified everything so long as it was believed to +contribute to that end. The social consequences of what was done simply +did not count. And if, instead of taking mere phrases from the +principal Christian writers, we carefully examine their meaning we shall +see that they were strangely devoid of what is now understood by the +expression "moral incentive." The more impressive the outbreak of +Christian piety the clearer does this become. No one could have +illustrated the Christian ideal of self-sacrifice better than did the +saints and monks of the earlier Christian centuries. Such a character as +the famous St. Simon Stylites, living for years on his pillar, filthy +and verminous, and yet the admired of Christendom, with the lives of +numerous other saints, whose sole claim to be remembered is that they +lived the lives of worse than animals in the selfish endeavours to save +their shrunken souls, will well illustrate this point. If it entered the +diseased imagination of these men that the road to salvation lay through +attending to the sick and the needy, they were quite ready to labour in +that direction; but of any desire to remove the horrible social +conditions that prevailed, or to remedy the injustice of which their +clients were the victims, there is seldom a trace. And, on the other +hand, if they believed that their salvation involved getting away from +human society altogether and leading the life of a hermit, they were as +ready to do that. If it meant the forsaking of husband or wife or parent +or child, these were left without compunction, and their desertion was +counted as proof of righteousness. The lives of the saints are full of +illustrations of this. Professor William James well remarks, in his +_Varieties of Religious Experience_, that "In gentle characters, where +devoutness is intense and the intellect feeble, we have an imaginative +absorption in the love of God to the exclusion of all practical human +interests.... When the love of God takes possession of such a mind it +expels all human loves and human uses." Of the Blessed St. Mary +Alacoque, her biographer points out that as she became absorbed in the +love of Christ she became increasingly useless to the practical life of +the convent. Of St. Teresa, James remarks that although a woman of +strong intellect his impression of her was a feeling of pity that so +much vitality of soul should have found such poor employment. And of so +famous a character as St. Augustine a Christian writer, Mr. A. C. +Benson, remarks:-- + + I was much interested in reading St. Augustine's _Confessions_ + lately to recognize how small a part, after his conversion, any + aspirations for the welfare of humanity seem to play in his mind + compared with the consciousness of his own personal relations with + God. It was this which gave him his exuberant sense of joy and + peace, and his impulse was rather the impulse of sharing a + wonderful and beautiful secret with others than an immediate desire + for their welfare, forced out of him, so to speak, by his own + exultation rather than drawn out of him by compassion for the needs + of others. + +That is one of the most constant features which emerges from a careful +study of the character of Christian types. St. Francis commenced his +career by leaving his parents. John Fox did the same. In that Puritan +classic, _The Pilgrim's Progress_, one of the outstanding features is +the striking absence of emphasis on the value of the social and domestic +virtues, and the Rev. Principal Donaldson notes this as one of the +features of early Christian literature in general. Christian preaching +was for centuries full of contemptuous references to "filthy rags of +righteousness," "mere morality," etc. The aim of the saints was a purely +selfish and personal one. It was not even a refined or a metaphysical +selfishness. It was a simple teaching that the one thing essential was +to save one's own soul, and that the main reason for doing good in this +world was to reap a benefit from it in the world to come. If it can +properly be called morality, it was conduct placed out at the highest +rate of interest. Christianity may often have used a naturally lofty +character, it was next to impossible for it to create one. + +If one examines the attack made by Christians upon Freethought morality, +it is surprising how often the truth of what has been said is implied. +For the complaint here is, in the main, not that naturalism fails to +give an adequate account of the nature and development of morality, but +that it will not satisfy mankind, and so fails to act as an adequate +motive to right conduct. When we enquire precisely what is meant by +this, we learn that if there is no belief in God, and if there is no +expectation of a future state in which rewards and punishments will be +dispensed, there remains no inducement to the average man or woman to do +right. It is the moral teaching of St. Paul over again. We are in the +region of morality as a deliberate investment, and we have the threat +that if the interest is not high enough or certain enough to satisfy the +dividend hunting appetite of the true believer, then the investment will +be withdrawn. Really this is a complaint, not that the morality which +ignores Christianity is too low but that it is too high. It is doubted +whether human nature, particularly Christian human nature, can rise to +such a level, and whether, unless you can guarantee a Christian a +suitable reward for not starving his family or for not robbing his +neighbour, he will continue to place any value on decency or honesty. + +So to state the case makes the absurdity of the argument apparent, but +unless that is what is meant it is difficult to make it intelligible. To +reply that Christians do not require these inducements to behave with a +tolerable amount of decency is not a statement that I should dispute; on +the contrary, I would affirm it. It is the Christian defender who makes +himself and his fellow believers worse than the Freethinker believes +them to be. For it is part of the case of the Freethinker that the +morality of the Christian has really no connection with his religion, +and that the net influence of his creed is to confuse and distort his +moral sense instead of developing it. It is the argument of the +Christian that makes the Freethinker superior to the Christian; it is +the Freethinker who declines the compliment and who asserts that the +social forces are adequate to guarantee the continuance of morality in +the complete absence of religious belief. + +How little the Christian religion appreciates the nature of morality is +seen by the favourite expression of Christian apologists that the +tendency of non-religion is to remove all moral "restraints." The use of +the word is illuminating. To the Christian morality is no more than a +system of restraints which aim at preventing a man gratifying his +appetite in certain directions. It forbids him certain enjoyments here, +and promises him as a reward for his abstention a greater benefit +hereafter. And on that assumption he argues, quite naturally, that if +there be no after life then there seems no reason why man should undergo +the "restraints" which moral rules impose. On this scheme man is a born +criminal and God an almighty policeman. That is the sum of orthodox +Christian morality. To assume that this conception of conduct can have a +really elevating effect on life is to misunderstand the nature of the +whole of the ethical and social problem. + +What has been said may go some distance towards suggesting an answer to +the question so often asked as to the reason for the moral failure of +Christianity. For that it has been a moral failure no one can doubt. +Nay, it is an assertion made very generally by Christians themselves. +Right from New Testament times the complaint that the conduct of +believers has fallen far short of what it should have been is constantly +met with. And there is not a single direction in which Christians can +claim a moral superiority over other and non-Christian peoples. They are +neither kinder, more tolerant, more sober, more chaste, nor more +truthful than are non-Christian people. Nor is it quite without +significance that those nations that pride themselves most upon their +Christianity are what they are. Their state reflects the ethical spirit +I have been trying to describe. For when we wipe out the disguising +phrases which we use to deceive ourselves--and it is almost impossible +to continually deceive others unless we do manage to deceive +ourselves--when we put on one side the "rationalizing" phrases about +Imperial races, carrying civilization to the dark places of the earth, +bearing the white man's burden, peopling the waste places of the earth, +etc., we may well ask what for centuries have the Christian nations of +the world been but so many gangs of freebooters engaged in world-wide +piracy? All over the world they have gone, fighting, stealing, killing, +lying, annexing, in a steadily rising crescendo. To be possessed of +natural wealth, without the means of resisting aggression, has for four +centuries been to invite the depredations of some one or more of the +Christian powers. It is the Christian powers that have militarized the +world in the name of the Prince of Peace, and made piracy a national +occupation in the name of civilization. Everywhere they have done these +things under the shelter of their religion and with the sanction of +their creed. Christianity has offered no effective check to the +cupidity of man, its chief work has been to find an outlet for it in a +disguised form. To borrow a term from the psycho-analysts, the task of +Christianity has been to "rationalize" certain ugly impulses, and so +provide the opportunity for their continuous expression. The world of +to-day is beginning to recognize the intellectual weakness of +Christianity; what it has next to learn is that its moral bankruptcy is +no less assured. + +One of the great obstacles in the way of this is the sentimentalism of +many who have given up all intellectual adherence to the Christian +creed. The power of the Christian Church has been so great, it has for +so long had control of the machinery of public education and +information, that many find it almost impossible to conclude that the +ethical spirit of Christianity is as alien to real progress as are its +cosmical teachings. The very hugeness of this century-old imposture +blinds many to its inherent defects. And yet the continuous and +world-wide moral failure of Christianity can only be accounted for on +the ground that it had a fatal moral defect from the start. I have +suggested above what is the nature of that defect. It has never regarded +morality as a natural social growth, but only as something imposed upon +man from without. It has had no other reason for its existence than the +fear of punishment and the hope of reward. Christian morality is the +morality of the stock exchange _plus_ the intellectual outlook of the +savage. And with that in control of national destinies our surprise +should be, not that things are as they are, but rather that with so +great a handicap the world has contrived to reach its present moderate +degree of development. + + + + +CHAPTER XVII. + +RELIGION AND PERSECUTION. + + +Intolerance is one of the most general of what we may call the mental +vices. It is so general that few people seem to look upon it as a fault, +and not a few are prepared to defend it as a virtue. When it assumes an +extreme form, and its consequences are unpleasantly obvious, it may meet +with condemnation, but usually its nature is disguised under a show of +earnestness and sincere conviction. And, indeed, no one need feel called +upon to dispute the sincerity and the earnestness of the bigot. As we +have already pointed out, that may easily be seen and admitted. All that +one need remark is that sincerity is no guarantee of accuracy, and +earnestness naturally goes with a conviction strongly held, whether the +conviction be grounded on fact or fancy. The essential question is not +whether a man holds an opinion strongly, but whether he has taken +sufficient trouble to say that he has a right to have that opinion. Has +he taken the trouble to acquaint himself with the facts upon which the +expressed opinion is professedly based? Has he made a due allowance for +possible error, and for the possibility of others seeing the matter from +another and a different point of view? If these questions were frankly +and truthfully answered, it would be found that what we have to face in +the world is not so much opinion as prejudice. + +Some advance in human affairs is indicated when it is found necessary to +apologise for persecution, and a still greater one when men and women +feel ashamed of it. It is some of these apologies at which we have now +to glance, and also to determine, if possible, the probable causes of +the change in opinion that has occurred in relation to the subject of +persecution. + +A favourite argument with the modern religionist is that the element of +persecution, which it is admitted, has hitherto been found in +association with religion, is not due to religion as such, but results +from its connection with the secular power. Often, it is argued, the +State for its own purposes has seen fit to ally itself with the Church, +and when that has taken place the representatives of the favoured Church +have not been strong enough to withstand the temptation to use physical +force in the maintenance of their position. Hence the generalization +that a State Church is always a persecuting Church, with the corollary +that a Church, as such, has nothing to do with so secular a thing as +persecution. + +The generalization has all the attractiveness which appeals to those who +are not in the habit of looking beneath the surface, and in particular +to those whose minds are still in thraldom to religious beliefs. It is +quite true that State Churches have always persecuted, and it is equally +true that persecution on a general scale could not have been carried on +without the assistance of the State. On the other hand, it is just as +true that all Churches have persecuted within the limits of their +opportunity. There is no exception to this rule in any age or country. +On a wider survey it is also clear that all forms of religious belief +carry with them a tendency to persecution more or less marked. A close +examination of the facts will show that it is the tendency to toleration +that is developed by the secular power, and the opposite tendency +manifested by religion. + +It is also argued that intolerance is not a special quality of religion; +it is rather a fault of human nature. There is more truth in this than +in the previous plea, but it slurs over the indictment rather than meets +it. At any rate, it is the same human nature that meets us in religion +that fronts us in other matters, and there is no mistaking the fact that +intolerance is far more pronounced in relation to religion than to any +other subject. In secular matters--politics, science, literature, or +art--opinions may differ, feelings run high, and a degree of intolerance +be exhibited, but the right to differ remains unquestioned. Moreover, +the settlement of opinion by discussion is recognized. In religion it is +the very right of difference that is challenged, it is the right of +discussion that is denied. And it is in connection with religion alone +that intolerance is raised to the level of a virtue. Refusal to discuss +the validity of a religious opinion will be taken as the sign of a +highly developed spiritual nature, and a tolerance of diverging opinions +as an indication of unbelief. If a political leader refused to stand +upon the same platform with political opponents, on non-political +questions, nearly everyone would say that such conduct was intolerable. +But how many religious people are there who would see anything wrong in +the Archbishop of Canterbury refusing to stand upon the same platform as +a well-known Atheist? + +We are here approaching the very heart of the subject, and in what +follows I hope to make clear the truth of the following propositions: +(1) That the great culture ground of intolerance is religion; (2) That +the natural tendency of secular affairs is to breed tolerance; (3) That +the alliance of religion with the State has fostered persecution by the +State, the restraining influences coming from the secular half of the +partnership; (4) That the decline of persecution is due to causes that +are quite unconnected with religious beliefs. + +The first three points can really be taken together. So far as can be +seen there is no disinclination among primitive peoples to discuss the +pros and cons of matters that are unconnected with religious beliefs. So +soon as we get people at a culture stage where the course of events is +seen to be decided by human action, there goes on a tolerance of +conflicting opinions that is in striking contrast with what occurs with +such matters as are believed to directly involve the action of deity. +One could not expect things to be otherwise. In the carrying on of +warfare, as with many other tribal activities, so many of the +circumstances are of a determinable character, and are clearly to be +settled by an appeal to judgment and experience, that very early in +social history they must have presented themselves as a legitimate field +for discussion, and to discussion, as Bagehot says, nothing is sacred. +And as a matter of fact we have a survival of this to-day. However +intolerant the character, so long as we are dealing with secular matters +it is admitted that differences of opinion must be tolerated, and are, +indeed, necessary if we are to arrive at the wisest conclusion. The most +autocratic of monarchs will call upon his advisers and take their +dissension from his own views as a matter of course. But when we get to +the field of religion, it is no longer a question of the legitimacy of +difference, but of its wrongness. For a religious man to admit a +discussion as to whether his religious belief is founded on fact or not +is to imply a doubt, and no thoroughly religious man ever encourages +that. What we have is prayers to be saved from doubt, and deliberate +efforts to keep away from such conditions and circumstances as may +suggest the possibility of wrong. The ideal religious character is the +one who never doubts. + +It may also be noted, in passing, that in connection with religion there +is nothing to check intolerance at any stage. In relation to secular +matters an opinion is avowedly based upon verifiable facts and has no +value apart from those facts. The facts are common property, open to +all, and may be examined by all. In religion facts of a common and +verifiable kind are almost wanting. The facts of the religious life are +mainly of an esoteric character--visions, intuitions, etc. And while on +the secular side discussion is justified because of the agreement which +results from it, on the religious side the value of discussion is +discounted because it never does lead to agreement. The more people +discuss religion the more pronounced the disagreement. That is one +reason why the world over the only method by which people have been +brought to a state of agreement in religious doctrines is by excluding +all who disagreed. It is harmony in isolation. + +Now if we turn to religion we can see that from the very beginning the +whole tendency here was to stifle difference of opinion, and so +establish intolerance as a religious duty. The Biblical story of Jonah +is a case that well illustrates the point. God was not angry with the +rest of the ship's inhabitants, it was Jonah only who had given offence. +But to punish Jonah a storm was sent and the whole crew was in danger of +shipwreck. In their own defence the sailors were driven to throw Jonah +overboard. Jonah's disobedience was not, therefore, his concern alone. +All with him were involved; God was ready to punish the whole for the +offence of one. + +Now if for the ship we take a primitive tribe, and for Jonah a primitive +heretic, or one who for some reason or other has omitted a service to +the gods, we have an exact picture of what actually takes place. In +primitive societies rights are not so much individual as they are +social. Every member of the tribe is responsible to the members of other +tribes for any injury that may have been done. And as with the members +of another tribe, so with the relation of the tribe to the gods. If an +individual offends them the whole of the tribe may suffer. There is a +splendid impartiality about the whole arrangement, although it lacks all +that we moderns understand by Justice. But the point here is that it +makes the heretic not merely a mistaken person, but a dangerous +character. His heresy involves treason to the tribe, and in its own +defence it is felt that the heretic must be suppressed. How this feeling +lingers in relation to religion is well seen in the fact that there are +still with us large numbers of very pious people who are ready to see in +a bad harvest, a war, or an epidemic, a judgment of God on the whole of +the people for the sins of a few. It is this element that has always +given to religious persecutions the air of a solemn duty. To suppress +the heretic is something that is done in the interests of the whole of +the people. Persecution becomes both a religious and a social duty. + +The pedigree of religious persecution is thus clear. It is inherent in +religious belief, and to whatever extent human nature is prone to +intolerance, the tendency has been fostered and raised to the status of +a virtue by religious teaching and practice. Religion has served to +confuse man's sense of right here as elsewhere. + +We have thus two currents at work. On the one hand, there is the +influence of the secular side of life, which makes normally for a +greater tolerance of opinion, on the other side there is religion which +can only tolerate a difference of opinion to the extent that religious +doctrines assume a position of comparative unimportance. Instead of it +being the case that the Church has been encouraged to persecute by the +State, the truth is the other way about. I know all that may be said as +to the persecutions that have been set on foot by vested interests and +by governments, but putting on one side the consideration that this begs +the question of how far it has been the consequence of the early +influence of religion, there are obvious limits beyond which a secular +persecution cannot go. A government cannot destroy its subjects, or if +it does the government itself disappears. And the most thorough scheme +of exploitation must leave its victims enough on which to live. There +are numerous considerations which weigh with a secular government and +which have little weight with a Church. + +It may safely be said, for example, that no government in the world, in +the absence of religious considerations would have committed the +suicidal act which drove the Moors and the Jews from Spain.[24] As a +matter of fact, the landed aristocracy of Spain resisted suggestions for +expulsions for nearly a century because of the financial ruin they saw +would follow. It was the driving power of religious belief that finally +brought about the expulsion. Religion alone could preach that it was +better for the monarch to reign over a wilderness than over a nation of +Jews and unbelievers. The same thing was repeated a century later in the +case of the expulsion of the Huguenots from France. Here again the crown +resisted the suggestions of the Church, and for the same reason. And it +is significant that when governments have desired to persecute in their +own interests they have nearly always found it advantageous to do so +under the guise of religion. So far, and in these instances, it may be +true that the State has used religion for its own purpose of +persecution, but this does not touch the important fact that, given the +sanction of religion, intolerance and persecution assume the status of +virtues. And to the credit of the State it must be pointed out that it +has over and over again had to exert a restraining influence in the +quarrels of sects. It will be questioned by few that if the regulative +influence of the State had not been exerted the quarrels of the sects +would have made a settled and orderly life next to impossible. + +[24] For this, as well as for the general consequences of persecution on +racial welfare, see my pamphlet _Creed and Character_. + +So far as Christianity is concerned it would puzzle the most zealous of +its defenders to indicate a single direction in which it did anything to +encourage the slightest modification of the spirit of intolerance. +Mohammedans can at least point to a time when, while their religion was +dominant, a considerable amount of religious freedom was allowed to +those living under its control. In the palmy days of the Mohammedan rule +in Spain both Jews and Christians were allowed to practise their +religion with only trifling inconveniences, certainly without being +exposed to the fiendish punishments that characterized Christianity all +over the world. Moreover, it must never be overlooked that in Europe all +laws against heresy are of Christian origin. In the old Roman Empire +liberty of worship was universal. So long as the State religion was +treated with a moderate amount of respect one might worship whatever god +one pleased, and the number was sufficient to provide for the most +varied tastes. When Christians were proceeded against it was under laws +that did not aim primarily to shackle liberty of worship or of opinion. +The procedure was in every case formal, the trial public, time was given +for the preparation of the defence, and many of the judges showed their +dislike to the prosecutions.[25] But with the Christians, instead of +persecution being spasmodic it was persistent. It was not taken up by +the authorities with reluctance, but with eagerness, and it was counted +as the most sacred of duties. Nor was it directed against a sectarian +movement that threatened the welfare of the State. The worst periods of +Christian persecution were those when the State had the least to fear +from internal dissension. The persecuted were not those who were guilty +of neglect of social duty. On the contrary they were serving the State +by the encouragement of literature, science, philosophy, and commerce. +One of the Pagan Emperors, the great Trajan, had advised the magistrates +not to search for Christians, and to treat anonymous accusations with +contempt. Christians carried the search for heresy into a man's own +household. It used the child to obtain evidence against its own parents, +the wife to secure evidence against the husband; it tortured to provide +dictated confessions, and placed boxes at church doors to receive +anonymous accusations. It established an index of forbidden books, an +institution absolutely unknown to the pagan world. The Roman trial was +open, the accused could hear the charge and cite witnesses for the +defence. The Christian trial was in secret; special forms were used and +no witnesses for the defence were permitted. Persecution was raised to a +fine art. Under Christian auspices it assumed the most damnable form +known in the history of the world. "There are no wild beasts so +ferocious as Christians" was the amazed comment of the Pagans on the +behaviour of Christians towards each other, and the subsequent history +of Christianity showed that the Pagans were but amateurs in the art of +punishing for a difference of opinion. + +[25] I am taking the story of the persecutions of the early Christians +for granted, although the whole question is surrounded with the greatest +suspicion. As a matter of fact the accounts are grossly exaggerated, and +some of the alleged persecutions never occurred. The story of the +persecutions is so foreign to the temper of the Roman government as to +throw doubt on the whole account. The story of there being ten +persecutions is clearly false, the number being avowedly based upon the +legend of the ten plagues of Egypt. + +Up to a comparatively recent time there existed a practically unanimous +opinion among Christians as to the desirability of forcibly suppressing +heretical opinions. Whatever the fortunes of Christianity, and whatever +the differences of opinion that gradually developed among Christians +there was complete unanimity on this point. Whatever changes the +Protestant Reformation effected it left this matter untouched. In his +_History of Rationalism_ Lecky has brought forward a mass of evidence in +support of this, and I must refer to that work readers who are not +already acquainted with the details. Luther, in the very act of pleading +for toleration, excepted "such as deny the common principles of the +Christian religion, and advised that the Jews should be confined as +madmen, their synagogues burned and their books destroyed." The +intolerance of Calvin has became a byword; his very apology for the +burning of Servetus, entitled _A Defence of the Orthodox Faith_, bore +upon its title page the significant sentence "In which it is proved that +heretics may justly be coerced with the sword." His follower, Knox, was +only carrying out the teaching of the master in declaring that +"provoking the people to idolatry ought not to be exempt from the +penalty of death," and that "magistrates and people are bound to do so +(inflict the death penalty) unless they will provoke the wrath of God +against themselves." In every Protestant country laws against heresy +were enacted. In Switzerland, Geneva, Sweden, England, Germany, +Scotland, nowhere could one differ from the established faith without +running the risk of torture and death. Even in America, with the +exception of Maryland,[26] the same state of things prevailed. In some +States Catholic priests were subject to imprisonment for life, Quaker +women were whipped through the streets at the cart's tail, old men of +the same denomination were pressed to death between stones. At a later +date (about 1770) laws against heresy were general. "Anyone," says +Fiske,-- + + who should dare to speculate too freely about the nature of Christ, + or the philosophy of the plan of salvation, or to express a doubt + as to the plenary inspiration of every word between the two covers + of the Bible, was subject to fine and imprisonment. The tithing man + still arrested the Sabbath-breakers, and shut them up in the town + cage in the market-place; he stopped all unnecessary riding or + driving on Sunday, and haled people off to the meeting-house + whether they would or no.[27] + +[26] The case of Maryland is peculiar. But the reason for the toleration +there seems to have been due to the desire to give Catholics a measure +of freedom they could not have elsewhere in Protestant countries. + +[27] For a good sketch of the Puritan Sunday in New England see _The +Sabbath in Puritan New England_, by Alice Morse Earle. For an account of +religious intolerance see the account of the Blue Laws of Connecticut as +contained in Hart's _American History told by Contemporaries_, Vol. I. + +And we have to remember that the intolerance shown in America was +manifested by men who had left their own country on the ostensible +ground of freedom of conscience. As a matter of fact, in Christian +society genuine freedom of conscience was practically unknown. What was +meant by the expression was the right to express one's own religious +opinions, with the privilege of oppressing all with whom one happened to +disagree. The majority of Christians would have as indignantly +repudiated the assertion that they desired to tolerate non-Christian or +anti-Christian opinions as they would the charge of themselves holding +Atheistic ones. + +How deeply ingrained was the principle that the established religion was +justified in suppressing all others may be seen from a reading of such +works as Locke's _Letters on Toleration_, and Milton's _Areopagitica_, +which stand in the forefront of the world's writings in favour of +liberty of thought and speech. Yet Locke was of opinion that "Those are +not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of a God. Promises, +covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no +hold upon an Atheist. The taking away of God, though but even in +thought, dissolves all." And Milton, while holding that it was more +prudent and wholesome that many be tolerated rather than all compelled, +yet hastened to add "I mean not tolerated popery and open superstition, +which as it extirpates all religious and civil supremacies so should +itself be extirpated." In short, intolerance had become so established a +part of a society saturated in religion that not even the most liberal +could conceive a state of being in which all opinions should be placed +upon an equal footing. + +Yet a change was all the time taking place in men's opinions on this +matter, a change which has in recent years culminated in the affirmation +of the principle that the coercion of opinion is of all things the least +desirable and the least beneficial to society at large. And as in so +many other cases, it was not the gradual maturing of that principle that +attracted attention so much as its statement in something like a +complete and logical form. The tracing of the conditions which have led +to this tremendous revolution in public opinion will complete our survey +of the subject. + +It has already been pointed out that in primitive societies a very +important fact is that the relation of the individual to the community +is of a different nature from that which exists in a later stage of +culture. The whole is responsible for the part in a very literal sense, +and especially so in regard to religious beliefs. Individual rights and +responsibilities have but a precarious existence at best. The individual +exists far more for the benefit of the tribe than the tribe can be said +to exist for the benefit of the individual. The sense of corporate +responsibility is strong, and even in secular affairs we see this +constantly manifested. When a member of one tribe inflicts an injury +upon a member of another tribe, retaliation on any one of the group to +which the offending person belongs will suffice. We see the remnants of +this primitive view of life in the feuds of schoolboys, and it is also +manifested in the relations of nations, which move upon a lower ethical +level than do individuals. Most wars are ostensibly waged because in +some obscure way the nation is held responsible for the offences of one +or more individuals. And an instance of the same feeling is seen in the +now obsolete practice of punishing the members of a man's family when +the parents happen to have committed certain offences. + +In religion, as we have already pointed out, the sense of corporate +responsibility completely governs primitive man's sense of his relation +to the tribal gods. In the development of the tribal chief into the +tribal god the ghost is credited with much the same powers as the man, +with the added terror of having more subtle and terrible ways of +inflicting punishment. The man who offends the ghost or the god is a +standing danger to the whole of the tribe. The whole of the tribe +becomes responsible for the offence committed, and the tribe in self +protection must not alone take measures to punish the offender, but must +also guard itself against even the possibility of the offence being +perpetrated. The consequence is that there is not a religion in which +one can fail to trace the presence of this primitive conception of +personal and social responsibility, and consequently, where we cannot +find persecution, more or less severe, and also more or less organized, +in the interest of what is believed to be social welfare. In the case of +the failure of the Spanish Armada to effect the conquest of England, the +Spanish monarch was convinced that its non-success was partly due to his +not having weeded out the heretics from his own dominion before +troubling about the heretics abroad. And right down to our own day there +has not been a national calamity the cause of which has not been found +by numbers of religious people to lie in the fact that some members of +the suffering nation have offended God. The heretic becomes, as we have +already said, a social danger of the gravest description. Society must +be guarded against his presence just as we learn to-day to protect +ourselves against the presence of a death-dealing germ. The suppression +of heresy thus becomes a social duty, because it protects society from +the anger of the gods. The destruction of the heretic is substantially +an act of social sanitation. Given the primitive conception of religion, +affiliated to the existing conception of corporate responsibility, and +persecution becomes one of the most important of social duties. + +This, I believe, is not alone the root of persecution, but it serves to +explain as nothing else can its persistence in social life and the fact +of its having became almost a general mental characteristic. To realize +this one need only bear in mind the overpowering part played by +religious conceptions in early communities. There is nothing done that +is not more or less under the assumed control of supernatural agencies. +Fear is the dominant emotion in relation to the gods, and experience +daily proves that there is nothing that can make men so brutal and so +callous to the sufferings of others as can religious belief. And while +there has all along been a growing liberation of the mind from the +control of religion, the process has been so slow that this particular +product of religious rule has had time to root itself very deeply in +human nature. And it is in accordance with all that we know of the order +of development that the special qualities engendered by a particular set +of conditions should persist long after the conditions themselves have +passed away. + +The conditions that co-operate in the final breaking down of the +conviction of the morality of persecution are many and various. +Primarily, there is the change from the social state in which the +conception of corporate responsibility is dominant to one in which there +is a more or less clearly marked line between what concerns the +individual alone and what concerns society as a whole. This is +illustrated in the growth from what Spencer called the military type of +society to an industrial one. In the case of a militant type of society, +to which the religious organization is so closely affiliated, a State is +more self contained, and the governing principle is, to use a +generalization of Sir Henry Maine's, status rather than contract. With +the growth of commerce and industrialism there is developed a greater +amount of individual initiative, a growing consideration for personal +responsibility, and also the development of a sense of interdependence +between societies. And the social developments that go on teach people, +even though the lesson may be unconsciously learned, to value each +other in terms of social utility rather than in terms of belief in +expressed dogmas. They are brought daily into contact with men of widely +differing forms of opinion; they find themselves working in the same +movements, and participating in the same triumphs or sharing the same +defeats. Insensibly the standard of judgment alters; the strength of the +purely social feelings overpowers the consciousness of theological +differences, and thus serves to weaken the frame of mind from which +persecution springs. + +The growing complexity of life leads to the same end. Where the +conditions of life are simple, and the experiences through which people +pass are often repeated, and where, moreover, the amount of positive +knowledge current is small, conclusions are reached rapidly, and the +feeling of confidence in one's own opinions is not checked by seeing +others draw different conclusions from the same premises. Under such +conditions an opinion once formed is not easily or quickly changed. +Experience which makes for wider knowledge makes also for greater +caution in forming opinions and a greater readiness to tolerate +conclusions of an opposite character at which others may have arrived. + +Finally, on the purely intellectual side one must reckon with the growth +of new ideas, and of knowledge that is in itself quite inconsistent with +the established creed. If the primary reason for killing the heretic is +that he is a social danger, one who will draw down on the tribe the +vengeance of the gods, the strength of that feeling against the heretic +must be weakened by every change that lessens men's belief in the power +of their deity. And one must assume that every time a fresh piece of +definite knowledge was acquired towards the splendid structure that now +meets us in the shape of modern science there was accomplished +something that involved an ultimate weakening of the belief in the +supremacy of the gods. The effect is cumulative, and in time it is bound +to make itself felt. Religious opinion after religious opinion finds +itself attacked and its power weakened. Things that were thought to be +solely due to the action of the gods are found to occur without their +being invoked, while invocation does not make the slightest difference +to the production of given results. Scientific generalizations in +astronomy, in physics, in biology, etc., follow one another, each +helping to enforce the lesson that it really does not matter what +opinions a man may hold about the gods provided his opinions about the +world in which he is living and the forces with which he _must_ deal are +sound and solidly based. In a world where opinion is in a healthy state +of flux it is impossible for even religion to remain altogether +unchanged. So we have first a change in the rigidity of religious +conceptions, then a greater readiness to admit the possibility of error, +and, finally, the impossibility of preventing the growth and expression +of definitely non-religious and anti-religious opinions in a community +where all sorts of opinions cannot but arise. + +With the social consequences of religious persecution, and particularly +of Christian persecution, I have dealt elsewhere, and there is no need +to repeat the story here. I have been here concerned with making plain +the fact that persecution does not arise with a misunderstanding of +religion, or with a decline of what is vaguely called "true religion," +nor does it originate in the alliance of some Church with the secular +State. It lies imbedded in the very nature of religion itself. With +polytheism there is a certain measure of toleration to gods outside the +tribe, because here the admitted existence of a number of gods is part +of the order of things. But this tendency to toleration disappears when +we come to the monotheistic stage which inevitably treats the claim to +existence of other gods in the same spirit as an ardent royalist treats +the appearance of a pretender to the throne. To tolerate such is a crime +against the legitimate ruler. And when we get the Christian doctrine of +eternal damnation and salvation tacked on to the religious idea we have +all the material necessary to give the persecutor the feeling of moral +obligation, and to make him feel that he is playing the part of a real +saviour to society. + +At bottom that is one of the chief injuries that a religion such as +Christianity inflicts on the race; it throws human feeling into some of +the most objectionable forms, and provides a religious and moral +justification for their expression. The very desire to benefit one's +fellows, normally and naturally healthy, thus becomes under Christian +influences an instrument of oppression and racial degradation. The +Christian persecutor does not see himself for what he is, he pictures +himself as a saviour of men's souls by suppressing the unbeliever who +would corrupt them. And if Christianity be true he is correct in +thinking himself such. I have no hesitation in saying that if +Christianity be true persecution becomes the most important of duties. A +community that is thoroughly Christian is bound to persecute, and as a +mere matter of historic fact every wholly Christian community has +persecuted. The community which says that a man may take any religion he +pleases, or go without one altogether if he so chooses, proclaims its +disbelief in the importance of religion. The measure of religious +freedom is also the measure of religious indifference. + +There are some experiences through which a human being may pass the +effects of which he never completely outgrows. Usually he may appear to +have put them quite out of his mind, but there are times when he is +lifted a little out of the normal, and then the recollection of what he +has passed through comes back with terrifying force. And acute observers +may also be able to perceive that even in normal circumstances what he +has passed through manifests itself for the worse in his everyday +behaviour. So with religion and the life history of the race. For +thousands of generations the race has been under the influence of a +teaching that social welfare depended upon a right belief about the +gods. The consequence of this has been that persecution became deeply +ingrained in human nature and in the social traditions which play so +large a part in the character building of each new generation. We have +as yet hardly got beyond the tradition that lack of religion robs a man +of social rights and dispenses with the necessity for courteous and +considered treatment. And there is, therefore, small cause for wonder +that the element of intolerance should still manifest itself in +connection with non-religious aspects of life. But the certain thing is +that throughout the whole of our social history it is religion that has +been responsible for the maintenance of persecution as a social duty. +Something has been done in more recent times to weaken its force, the +growth of science, the rationalizing of one institution after +another--in a word, the secularizing of life--is slowly creating more +tolerant relations between people. But the poison is deep in the blood, +and will not be eradicated in a generation. Religion is still here, and +so long as it remains it will never cease--under the guise of an appeal +to the higher sentiments of man--to make its most effective appeals to +passions of which the best among us are most heartily ashamed. + + + + +CHAPTER XVIII. + +WHAT IS TO FOLLOW RELIGION? + + +Books on the future of religion are numerous, and to one blessed with a +sense of humour, full of entertainment. They are also not without +instruction of a psychological kind. Reliable information as to what the +future will be like they certainly do not give, but they do unlock the +innermost desires of the writers thereof. They express what the writers +of the prophecies would like the future to be. And they create the +future state on earth exactly as devout believers have built up the +character of their heaven beyond the clouds. Every form of faith which +they disagree with is rejected as not possessing the element of +vitality, with the result that there is only their own form left. And +that, they triumphantly proclaim, is the religion of the future. + +But the future has an old-fashioned and disconcerting habit of +disappointing expectations. The factors that govern human nature are so +many and so complex, their transmutations and combinations are so +numerous, that it is as well to tread cautiously, and to a very +considerable extent leave the future to take care of itself. At the +utmost all that we can do with safety is to detect tendencies, and to +hasten or retard their development as we think them good or bad. The +factors that make up a science of human nature are not to-day so +well-known and so well understood that we can depict the state of +society a century hence with the same certainty that we can foretell the +position of the planet Venus in the year 2000. + +My aim in this chapter is, therefore, not to describe precisely what +will be the state of society when religious belief has ceased to exist. +It is rather to offer a general reply to those gloomy individuals who +declare that when the aims of the Freethinker are fully realized we +shall find that in destroying religion we have destroyed pretty much all +that makes human life worth living. We have managed to empty the baby +out with the bath. + +The most general form of this fear is expressed in calling Freethought a +creed of negation, or a policy of destruction, and assuring the world +that mankind can never rest content with such things. That may be quite +true, but we fail to see in what way it touches Freethought. A +Freethought that is wholly destructive, that is a mere negation, is a +creation of the pulpit, and belongs to the same class of imaginative +efforts as the pietistic outbursts of famous unbelievers on their +death-beds. That such things could have obtained so wide a currency, and +be looked upon as quite natural occurrences, offers demonstrative +evidence of the paralyzing power of Christian belief on the human mind. + +As a matter of fact, neither reformers in general nor Freethinkers in +particular deserve the charge of being mere destructionists. They are +both far more interested in building up than they are in pulling down, +and it is sheer lack of understanding that fixes the eyes of so many on +one aspect of the reformer's task and so steadily ignores the other one. +Of course, the phenomenon is not an unusual one. In a revolution it is +the noise, the street fighting, the breaking of old rules and the +shattering of established institutions that attract the most attention. +The deeper aims of the revolutionists, the hidden social forces of which +the revolution is the expression, the work of reconstruction that is +attempted, escape notice. The old order shrieks its loudest at the +threat of dissolution, the new can hardly make its voice heard. +Carlyle's division of the people into the shrieking thousands and the +dumb millions is eternally true. And even the millions are impressed +with the importance of the thousands because of the noise they are able +to make. + +Actually the charge to which reformers in general are open is that of a +too great zeal for reconstruction, a belittling of the difficulties that +stand in the way of a radical change. They are apt to make too small an +allowance for the occurrence of the unexpected and the incalculable, +both of which are likely to interfere with the fruition of the most +logical of schemes. And they are so obsessed with reconstruction that +destruction seems no more than an incident by the way. A little less +eagerness for reconstruction might easily result in a greater concern +for what is being pulled down. The two greatest "destructive" movements +of modern times--the French revolution of 1789 and the Russian +revolution--both illustrate this point. In both movements the leading +figures were men who were obsessed with the idea of building a new +world. They saw this new world so clearly that the old one was almost +ignored. And this is equally true of the literature that precedes and is +the mouthpiece of such movements. The leading appeal is always to what +is to be, what existed is only used as a means of enforcing the +desirability of the new order. It is, in short, the mania for +reconstruction that is chiefly responsible for the destruction which so +horrifies those whose vision can never see anything but the world to +which they have become accustomed. + +In parenthesis it may be remarked that it is a tactical blunder to make +one's attack upon an existing institution or idea depend upon the +attractiveness of the ideal state depicted. It enables critics to fix +attention on the precise value of the proposed remedy instead of +discussing whether the suggested reform is necessary. The attacker is +thus placed in the position of the defender and the point at issue +obscured. This is, that a certain institution or idea has outgrown its +usefulness and its removal is necessary to healthy growth. And it may +well be that its removal is all that is required to enable the social +organism to function naturally and healthily. The outworn institution is +often the grit in the machine that prevents it running smoothly. + +This by the way. The fact remains that some of our best teachers have +shown themselves apt to stumble in the matter. Without belief in +religion they have too often assumed that its removal would leave a +serious gap in life, and so would necessitate the creation of a number +of substitutes to "take the place of religion." Thus, no less profound a +thinker than Herbert Spencer remarks in the preface to his _Data of +Ethics_:-- + + Few things can happen more disastrous than the death and decay of a + regulative system no longer fit, before another and a better + regulative system has grown up to replace it. Most of those who + reject the current creed appear to assume that the controlling + agency furnished by it may safely be thrown aside, and the vacancy + left unfilled by any other controlling agency. + +Had Spencer first of all set himself to answer the question, "What is it +that the Freethinker sets himself to remove?" or even the question, +"What is the actual control exerted by religion?" one imagines that the +passage above given would either never have been written or would have +been differently worded. And when a man such as Spencer permits himself +to put the matter in this form one need not be surprised at the ordinary +believer assuming that he has put an unanswerable question to the +Freethinker when he asks what it is that we propose to put in the place +of religion, with the assumption that the question is on all fours with +the enquiry as to what substitutes we have for soap and coal if we +destroy all stocks of these articles. + +The question assumes more than any scientific Freethinker would ever +grant. It takes for granted the statement that religion does at present +perform some useful function in the State. And that is the very +statement that is challenged. Nor does the Freethinker deny that some +"controlling agency" is desirable. What he does say is that in the +modern State, at least, religion exerts no control for good, that its +activities make for stagnation or retrogression, that its removal will +make for the healthier operation of other agencies, and that to these +other and non-religious agencies belongs the credit which is at present +given to religion. + +Moreover, Spencer should not have needed reminding that systems of +thought while they have any vital relation to life will successfully +defy all attempts at eradication. The main cause of the decay of +religion is not the attack made upon it by the forces of reasoned +unbelief. That attack is largely the conscious expression of a revolt +against a system that has long lost all touch with reality, and so has +ceased to derive support from current life and thought. From this point +of view the reformer is what he is because he is alive to the drift of +events, susceptible to those social influences which affect all more or +less, and his strength is derived from the thousand and one subtle +influences that extend from generation to generation and express +themselves in what we are pleased to call the story of civilization. + +But the quotation given does represent a fairly common point of view, +and it is put in a form that is most favourable to religious +pretensions. For it assumes that religion does really in our modern +lives perform a function so useful that it would be the height of folly +to remove it before we had something equally useful to take its place. +But something in the place of religion is a thing that no scientific +Freethinker desires. It is not a new religion, or another religion that +the world needs, but the removal of religion from the control of life, +and a restatement of those social qualities that have hitherto been +expressed in a religious form so that their real nature will be apparent +to all. Then we shall at last begin to make progress with small chance +of getting a serious set-back. + +This does not, of course, deny that there are many things associated +with religion for the absence of which society would have cause for +regret. It is part of the Freethought case that this is so. And it may +also be admitted that large numbers of people honestly believe that +their religious beliefs serve as motives to the expression of their +better qualities. That, again, is part of the delusion we are fighting. +We cannot agree that religion, as such, contains anything that is +essentially useful to the race. It has maintained its power chiefly +because of its association with serviceable social qualities, and it is +part of the work of Freethought to distinguish between what properly +belongs to religion and what has become associated with it during its +long history. At present the confusion exists and the fact need cause no +surprise. At best the instincts of man are deep-laid, the motives to +conduct are mostly of an obscure kind, and it would be cause for +surprise if, seeing how closely religion is associated with every phase +of primitive life, and how persistent are primitive modes of thinking, +there were not this confusion between the actual part played by religion +in life and the part assigned it by tradition. + +At any rate, it is idle to argue as though human conduct was governed by +a single idea--that of religion. At the most religious beliefs represent +no more than a part of the vast mass of influences that determine human +effort. And when we see how largely religious beliefs are dependent upon +constant stimulation and protection for their existence, it seems +extremely unlikely that they can hold a very vital relation to life. The +impotency of religion in matters of conduct is, too, decisively shown in +the fact that it is quite impossible to arrange men and women in a scale +of values that shall correspond with the kind or the fervency of their +religious beliefs. A religious person may be a useful member of society +or he may be a quite useless one. A profound religious conviction may be +accompanied by the loftiest of ideals or by the meanest of aims. The +unbeliever may be, and often is, a better man than the believer. No +business man would ever think of making a man's religion the condition +of taking one into his service, or if he did the general opinion would +be that it indicated bigotry and not shrewdness. We find it quite +impossible to determine the nature of religious belief by watching the +way people behave. In no stage of social life does religion provide us +with anything in the nature of a differentiating factor. + +It was argued by the late Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, himself a +Freethinker, that as men have for a long time been in the habit of +associating moral feelings with the belief in God, a severance of the +two may entail moral disaster. It is, of course, hard to say what may +not happen in certain cases, but it is quite certain that such a +consequence could not follow on any general scale. One has only to bring +a statement of this kind down from the region of mere theory to that of +definite fact to see how idle the fear is. If, instead of asserting in a +vague way that the moral life is in some way bound up with religious +beliefs we ask what moral action or moral disposition is so connected, +we realize the absurdity of the statement. Professor Leuba well says:-- + + Our alleged essential dependence upon transcendental beliefs is + belied by the most common experiences of daily life. Who does not + feel the absurdity of the opinion that the lavish care for a sick + child by a mother is given because of a belief in God and + immortality? Are love of father and mother on the part of children, + affection and serviceableness between brothers and sisters, + straightforwardness and truthfulness between business men + essentially dependent upon these beliefs? What sort of person would + be the father who would announce divine punishment or reward in + order to obtain the love and respect of his children? And if there + are business men preserved from unrighteousness by the fear of + future punishment, they are far more numerous who are deterred by + the threat of human law. Most of them would take their chances with + heaven a hundred times before they would once with society, or + perchance with the imperative voice of humanity heard in the + conscience (_The Belief in God and Immortality_, p. 323). + +And in whatever degree the fear may be justified in special cases, it +applies to any attempt whatever that may be made to disturb existing +conventions. Luther complained that some of his own converts were +behaving worse as Protestants than they behaved as Catholics, and even +in the New Testament we have the same unfavourable comparison made of +many of Christ's followers when compared with the Pagans around them. A +transference of allegiance may easily result in certain ill-balanced +minds kicking over the traces, but in the long run, and with the mass, +the deeper social needs are paramount. There was the same fear expressed +concerning man's political and social duties when the relations of +Church and State were first challenged. Yet the connection between the +two has been quite severed in some countries, and very much weakened in +many more, without society in the least suffering from the change. On +the contrary, one may say that man's duties towards the State have been +more intelligently perceived and more efficiently discharged in +proportion as those religious considerations that once ruled have been +set on one side. + +The reply of the Freethinker to the question of "What is to follow +religion?" may, therefore, easily be seen. In effect it is, "Nothing at +all." In any study of social evolution the properly equipped student +commences his task with the full conviction that whatever the future may +be like its germs are already with us. If nature does not "abhor a +vacuum" it has at least an intense dislike to absolute beginnings. The +future will be an elaboration of the present as the present is an +elaboration of the past. For good or evil that principle remains +unimpeachable. + +The essential question is not, What is to follow religion? but rather +what will the disappearance of religion affect that is of real value to +the world. The moment the question is raised in this unambiguous manner +the answer suggests itself. For assume that by some strange and +unexpected happening there set in a raging epidemic of common sense. +Assume that as a consequence of this the world was to awake with its +mind completely cleared of all belief in religion. What would be the +effect of the transformation? It is quite clear that it would not affect +any of the fundamental processes of life. The tragi-comedy of life would +still be performed, it would run through the same number of acts, and it +would end in the same happy or unhappy manner. Human beings would still +get born, they would grow up, they would fall in love, they would marry, +they would beget their kind, and they would in turn pass away to make +room for another generation. Birth and death, with all their +accompanying feelings, would remain. Human society would continue, all +the glories of art, the greatness of science, all the marvels and +wonders of the universe would be there whether we believed in a God or +not. The only difference would be that we should no longer associate +these things with the existence of a God. And in that respect we should +be following the same course of development that has been followed in +many other departments of life. We do not nowadays associate the +existence of spirits with a good or a bad harvest, the anger of God with +an epidemic, or the good-will of deity with a spell of fine weather. Yet +in each case there was once the same assumed association between these +things, and the same fears of what would happen if that association was +discarded. We are only carrying the process a step further; all that is +required is a little courage to take the step. In short, there is not a +single useful or worthy quality, intellectual or moral, that can +possibly suffer from the disappearance of religion. + +On this point we may again quote from Professor Leuba:-- + + The heroism of religious martyrs is often flaunted as marvellous + instances of the unique sustaining strength derived from the belief + in a personal God and the anticipation of heaven. And yet for + every martyr of this sort there has been one or more heroes who has + risked his life for a noble cause, without the comfort which + transcendental beliefs may bring. The very present offers almost + countless instances of martyrs to the cause of humanity, who are + strangers to the idea of God and immortality. How many men and + women in the past decade gladly offered and not infrequently lost + their lives in the cause of freedom, or justice, or science? In the + monstrous war we are now witnessing, is there a less heroic defence + of home and nation, and less conscious self-renunciation among the + non-believers than among the professed Christians? Have modern + nations shown a more intense or a purer patriotism than ancient + Greece and Rome, where men did not pretend to derive inspiration + for their deeds of devotion in the thoughts of their gods.... The + fruitful deeds of heroism are at bottom inspired not by the thought + of God or a future life, but by innate tendencies or promptings + that have reference to humanity. Self sacrifice, generosity, is + rooted in nothing less superficial and accidental than social + instincts older than the human race, for they are already present + in a rudimentary form in the higher animals. + +These are quite familiar statements to all Freethinkers, but to a great +many Christians they may come with all the force of a new revelation. + +In the earlier pages of this work I have given what I conceive solid +reasons for believing that every one of the social and individual +virtues is born of human intercourse and can never be seriously deranged +for any length of time, so long as human society endures. The scale of +values may well undergo a change with the decay of religion, but that is +something which is taking place all the time, provided society is not in +a state of absolute stagnation. There is not any change that takes +place in society that does not affect our view of the relative value of +particular qualities. The value we place upon personal loyalty to a king +is not what it once was. At one stage a man is ready to place the whole +of his fortune at the disposal of a monarch merely because he happens to +be his "anointed" king. To-day, the man who had no better reason for +doing that would be looked upon as an idiot. Unquestioning obedience to +established authority, which once played so high a part in the education +of children, is now ranked very low by all who understand what genuine +education means. From generation to generation we go on revising our +estimate of the value of particular qualities, and the world is the +better for the revision. And that is what we may assume will occur with +the decay of religious belief. We shall place a higher value upon +certain qualities than we do at present and a lower value upon others. +But there will be no discarding the old qualities and creation of new +ones. Human nature will be the same then as now, as it has been for +thousands of years. The nature of human qualities will be more directly +conceived and more intelligently applied, and that will be an +undesirable development only for those who live by exploiting the +ignorance and the folly of mankind. + +Thus, if one may venture upon a prophecy with regard to the +non-religious society of the future it may be said with confidence that +what are known as the ascetic qualities are not likely to increase in +value. The cant of Christianity has always placed an excessive value +upon what is called self-sacrifice. But there is no value in +self-sacrifice, as such. At best it is only of value in exceptional +circumstances, as an end it is worse than useless, and it may easily +degenerate from a virtue to a vice. It assumed high rank with Christian +teachers for various reasons. First, it was an expression of that +asceticism which lies at the root of Christianity, second, because +Christianity pictured this world as no more than a preparation for +another, and taught that the deprivations and sufferings of the present +life would be placed to a credit account in the next one, and third, +because it helped men and women to tolerate injustice in this world and +so helped the political game that governments and the Christian Church +have together played. A really enlightened society would rank +comparatively low the virtue of asceticism. Its principle would be not +self-sacrifice but self-development. + +What must result from this is an enlargement of our conception of +justice and also of social reform. Both of these things occupy a very +low place in the Christian scale of virtues. Social reform it has never +bothered seriously about, and in its earlier years simply ignored. A +people who were looking for the end of the world, whose teaching was +that it was for man's spiritual good to suffer, and who looked for all +help to supernatural intervention, could never have had seriously in +their minds what we understand by social reform. And so with the +conception of Justice. There is much of this in pre-Christian +literature, and its entrance into the life and thought of modern Europe +can be traced directly back to Greek and Roman sources. But the work of +the Christian, while it may have been to heal wounds, was not to prevent +their infliction. It was to minister to poverty, not to remove those +conditions that made poverty inevitable. + +A Spanish writer has put this point so well that I cannot do better than +quote him. He says:-- + + The notion of justice is as entirely foreign to the spirit of + Christianity as is that of intellectual honesty. It lies wholly + outside the field of its ethical vision. Christianity--I am not + referring to interpretations disclaimed as corruptions or + applications which may be set down to frailty and error, but to the + most idealized conceptions of its substance and the most exalted + manifestations of its spirit--Christianity has offered consolation + and comfort to men who suffered under injustice, but of that + injustice itself it has remained absolutely incognizant. It has + called upon the weary and heavy laden, upon the suffering and the + afflicted, it has proclaimed to them the law of love, the duty of + mercy and forgiveness, the Fatherhood of God; but in that torment + of religious and ethical emotion which has impressed men as the + summit of the sublime, and been held to transcend all other ethical + ideals, common justice, common honesty have no place. The ideal + Christian is seen in the saint who is seen descending like an angel + from heaven amid the welter of human misery, among the victims of + ruthless oppression and injustice ... but the cause of that misery + lies wholly outside the range of his consciousness; no glimmer of + right or wrong enters into his view of it. It is the established + order of things, the divinely appointed government of the world, + the trial laid upon sinners by divine ordinance. St. Vincent de + Paul visits the hell of the French galleys; he proclaims the + message of love and calls sinners to repentance; but to the + iniquity which creates and maintains that hell he remains + absolutely indifferent. He is appointed Grand Almoner to his Most + Christian Majesty. The world might groan in misery under the + despotism of oppressors, men's lives and men's minds might be + enslaved, crushed and blighted; the spirit of Christianity would go + forth and _comfort_ them, but it would never occur to it to redress + a single one of those wrongs. It has remained unconscious of them. + To those wrongs, to men's right to be delivered from them, it was + by nature completely blind. In respect to justice, to right and + wrong, the spirit of Christianity is not so much immoral as amoral. + The notion was as alien to it as the notion of truth. Included in + its code was, it might be controversially alleged, an old formula, + "the golden rule," a commonplace of most literature, which was + popular in the East from China to Asia Minor; but that isolated + precept was never interpreted in the sense of justice. It meant + forgiveness, forbearing, kindness, but never mere justice, common + equity; those virtues were far too unemotional in aspect to appeal + to the religious enthusiast. The renunciation of life and all its + vanities, the casting overboard of all sordid cares for its + maintenance, the suppression of desire, prodigal almsgiving, the + consecration of a life, the value of which had disappeared in his + eyes, to charity and love, non-resistance, passive obedience, the + turning of the other cheek to an enemy, the whole riot of these + hyperbolic ethical emotions could fire the Christian consciousness, + while it remained utterly unmoved by every form of wrong, iniquity + and injustice (Dr. Falta de Gracia. Cited by Dr. R. Briffault, _The + Making of Humanity_, pp. 334-5.) + +That, we may assume, will be one of the most striking consequences of +the displacement of Christianity in the social economy. There will be +less time wasted on what is called philanthropic work--which is often +the most harmful of all social labours--and more attention to the +removal of those conditions that have made the display of philanthropy +necessary. There will not be less feeling for the distressed or the +unfortunate, but it will be emotion under the guidance of the intellect, +and the dominant feeling will be that of indignation against the +conditions that make human suffering and degradation inevitable, rather +than a mere gratification of purely egoistic feeling which leaves the +source of the evil untouched. + +That will mean a rise in the scale of values of what one may call the +intellectual virtues--the duty of truthseeking and truth speaking. +Hitherto the type of character held up for admiration by Christianity +has been that of the blind believer who allowed nothing to stand in the +way of his belief, who required no proofs of its truth and allowed no +disproofs to enter his mind. A society in which religion does not hold a +controlling place is not likely to place a very high value upon such +precepts as "Blessed are those who have not seen and yet have believed," +or "Though he slay me yet will I trust him." But a very high value will +be placed upon the duty of investigation and the right of criticism. And +one cannot easily over-estimate the consequences of a generation or two +brought up in an atmosphere where such teachings obtain. It would mean a +receptiveness to new ideas, a readiness to overhaul old institutions, a +toleration of criticism such as would rapidly transform the whole mental +atmosphere and with it enormously accentuate the capacity for, and the +rapidity of, social progress. + +There is also to be borne in mind the effect of the liberation of the +enormous amount of energy at present expended in the service of +religion. Stupid religious controversialists often assume that it is +part of the Freethinker's case that religion enlists in its service bad +men, and much time is spent in proving that religious people are mostly +worthy ones. That could hardly be otherwise in a society where the +overwhelming majority of men and women profess a religion of some sort. +But that is, indeed, not the Freethinker's case at all, and if the +badness of some religious people is cited it is only in answer to the +foolish argument that religionists are better than others. The real +complaint against religion is of a different kind altogether. Just as +the worst thing that one can say about a clergyman intellectually is, +not that he does not believe in what he preaches, but that he does, so +the most serious indictment of current religion is not that it enlists +in its service bad characters, but that it dissipates the energy of +good men and women in a perfectly useless manner. The dissipation of +Christian belief means the liberating of a store of energy for service +that is at present being expended on ends that are without the least +social value. A world without religion would thus be a world in which +the sole ends of endeavour would be those of human betterment or human +enlightenment, and probably in the end the two are one. For there is no +real betterment without enlightenment, even though there may come for a +time enlightenment without betterment. It would leave the world with all +the means of intellectual and ęsthetic and social enjoyment that exist +now, and one may reasonably hope that it will lead to their cultivation +and diffusion over the whole of society. + + + _Printed and Published by_ + THE PIONEER PRESS + (G. W. FOOTE & CO., LTD.), + _61 Farringdon Street, London, E.C. 4_. + + + + +ANNOUNCEMENTS. + + +THE SECULAR SOCIETY, Limited. + +_Registered Office_: 62 Farringdon Street, London, E.C. 4. + +_Secretary_: Miss E. M. 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Price 1s. 6d. per + 100, postage 3d. + + DYING FREETHINKERS. By CHAPMAN COHEN. Price 1s. 6d. per 100, postage + 3d. + + THE BELIEFS OF UNBELIEVERS. By CHAPMAN COHEN. Price 1s. 6d. per 100, + postage 3d. + + ARE CHRISTIANS INFERIOR TO FREETHINKERS? By CHAPMAN COHEN. Price 1s. + 6d., per 100, postage 3d. + + DOES MAN DESIRE GOD? By CHAPMAN COHEN. Price 1s. 6d. per 100, postage + 3d. + +THE PIONEER PRESS, 61 Farringdon Street, E.C. 4. + + + READ + + THE FREETHINKER + + EDITED BY + CHAPMAN COHEN. + + Brilliant Articles by Capable Writers on + Religion, Literature, and Life. + + One of the Liveliest and Most Outspoken + Journals in Great Britain. + + _PUBLISHED EVERY THURSDAY._ + + PRICE THREEPENCE. + + Of all Newsagents, or direct from the Publishing Office, + 61 FARRINGDON STREET, LONDON, E.C. 4. + + _SPECIMEN COPY POST FREE._ + + + + +Transcriber's Note: + + +Minor punctuation errors and letters printed upside down have been +corrected without note. Inconsistent hyphenation (e.g. common-place vs. +commonplace) has been retained. Variant and unusual spellings used +consistently (e.g. indispensible) have also been kept. + +The following corrections and changes were made to the text: + +p. 65: knowlelge to knowledge (accumulation of knowledge) + +p. 98: upder to under (under the old Greek) + +p. 102: extra "to" removed (owe their belief to the philosophical) + +p. 114: sterotyped to stereotyped (stereotyped phraseology) + +p. 132: developes to develops (organ or an organism develops) + +p. 157: it to is (After this lame conclusion it is difficult) + +p. 186: percieves to perceives (provided a man perceives) + +p. 190: Zeigler to Ziegler (Professor Ziegler) + +p. 215: mayority to majority (majority of Christians) + +p. 216: precariout to precarious (precarious existence at best) + +Advertisements: entrace to entrance (an entrance fee of ten shillings) + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's A Grammar of Freethought, by Chapman Cohen + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A GRAMMAR OF FREETHOUGHT *** + +***** This file should be named 36882-8.txt or 36882-8.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/3/6/8/8/36882/ + +Produced by Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe, S.D., and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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(a Project Gutenberg eBook) + </title> + <style type="text/css"> + +body { +margin-left:10%; +margin-right:10%; +} + +h1,h2,h3,h4 { +clear:both; +text-align:center; +} + +h1,h2,h3 { +padding-top:1.5em; +} + +h3 { +font-size:105%; +} + +h3.big { +font-size:140%; +} + +p { +margin-bottom:.75em; +margin-top:.75em; +text-align:justify; +} + +table { +margin-left:auto; +margin-right:auto; +} + +blockquote { +font-size:90%; +margin:1.5em 0 1.5em 2em; +} + +h2#ads { +font-size:140%; +padding:1em 0 2em; +} + +p#begin { +font-size:140%; +font-weight:700; +padding-top:1.5em; +text-align:center; +} + +p#end { +font-size:90%; +padding:2.5em 0; +text-align:center; +} + +p.ralign { +padding-right:2em; +text-align:right; +} + +p.hang { +margin-left:0.5em; +padding-left:0.5em; +text-indent:-1em; +} + +p.pad-t { +padding-top:2em; +} + +div#cover { +margin: auto; +text-align: center; +} + +div#titlepg { +padding:2em; +} + +div#titlepg p { +font-size:90%; +padding:1em 0; +} + +div#tn { +background-color:#CFC; +border:solid #38610B 1px; +color:#000; +font-size:80%; +margin-top:1.5em; +padding:1em; +} + +span.pagenum { +color:gray; +font-size:small; +font-style:normal; +left:92%; +position:absolute; +text-align:right; +} + +.center { +text-align:center; +} + +.smcap { +font-variant:small-caps; +} + +.sm { +font-size:75%; +} + +.med { +font-size:85%; +} + +.xlg { +font-size:135%; +} + +div#footnotes { +background-color:#F2F2F2; +border:solid #A4A4A4 1px; +margin-top:3em; +padding:1em; +} + +div.footnote { +font-size:85%; +margin-left:10%; +margin-right:10%; +} + +div.footnote a { +text-decoration:none; +} + +div.footnote .label { +padding:8px; +} + +.fnanchor { +background-color:#F2F2F2; +font-size:.7em; +font-weight:400; +text-decoration:none; +vertical-align:super; +} + +h2,.lg { +font-size:120%; +} + + </style> + </head> +<body> + + +<pre> + +The Project Gutenberg EBook of A Grammar of Freethought, by Chapman Cohen + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: A Grammar of Freethought + +Author: Chapman Cohen + +Release Date: July 28, 2011 [EBook #36882] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A GRAMMAR OF FREETHOUGHT *** + + + + +Produced by Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe, S.D., and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net + + + + + + +</pre> + + +<div id="cover" style="width: 383px;"> +<img src="images/cover.jpg" width="383" height="600" alt="Cover" title="A Grammar of Freethought" /> +</div> + +<div id="titlepg"> +<h1> +A Grammar of<br /> +Freethought.</h1> + +<p class="center">BY<br /> +<span class="lg">CHAPMAN COHEN.</span></p> + +<p class="center">(<i>Issued by the Secular Society, Ltd.</i>)</p> + +<p class="center smcap">London:<br /> +THE PIONEER PRESS,<br /> +61 Farringdon Street, E.C. 4.<br /> +1921.</p> +</div> + +<p class="center"> +<i>The Publishers wish to express their obligation to Mr.<br /> +H. Cutner for the very tasteful design which adorns the<br /> +cover of this book.</i></p> + +<h2>CONTENTS.</h2> + +<table border="0" class="smcap" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" summary="Table of Contents"> +<tr class="sm"><td align="left">CHAPTER</td><td></td><td align="right">PAGE</td></tr> +<tr><td align="right">I.—</td><td align="left"><a href="#CHAPTER_I">Outgrowing the Gods</a></td><td align="right">9</td></tr> +<tr><td align="right">II.—</td><td align="left"><a href="#CHAPTER_II">Life and Mind</a></td><td align="right">18</td></tr> +<tr><td align="right">III.—</td><td align="left"><a href="#CHAPTER_III">What is Freethought?</a></td><td align="right">37</td></tr> +<tr><td align="right">IV.—</td><td align="left"><a href="#CHAPTER_IV">Rebellion and Reform</a></td><td align="right">51</td></tr> +<tr><td align="right">V.—</td><td align="left"><a href="#CHAPTER_V">The Struggle for the Child</a></td><td align="right">61</td></tr> +<tr><td align="right">VI.—</td><td align="left"><a href="#CHAPTER_VI">The Nature of Religion</a></td><td align="right">72</td></tr> +<tr><td align="right">VII.—</td><td align="left"><a href="#CHAPTER_VII">The Utility of Religion</a></td><td align="right">88</td></tr> +<tr><td align="right">VIII.—</td><td align="left"><a href="#CHAPTER_VIII">Freethought and God</a></td><td align="right">101</td></tr> +<tr><td align="right">IX.—</td><td align="left"><a href="#CHAPTER_IX">Freethought and Death</a></td><td align="right">111</td></tr> +<tr><td align="right">X.—</td><td align="left"><a href="#CHAPTER_X">This World and the Next</a></td><td align="right">123</td></tr> +<tr><td align="right">XI.—</td><td align="left"><a href="#CHAPTER_XI">Evolution</a></td><td align="right">134</td></tr> +<tr><td align="right">XII.—</td><td align="left"><a href="#CHAPTER_XII">Darwinism and Design</a></td><td align="right">146</td></tr> +<tr><td align="right">XIII.—</td><td align="left"><a href="#CHAPTER_XIII">Ancient and Modern</a></td><td align="right">162</td></tr> +<tr><td align="right">XIV.—</td><td align="left"><a href="#CHAPTER_XIV">Morality Without God.—I.</a></td><td align="right">172</td></tr> +<tr><td align="right">XV.—</td><td align="left"><a href="#CHAPTER_XV">Morality Without God.—II.</a></td><td align="right">182</td></tr> +<tr><td align="right">XVI.—</td><td align="left"><a href="#CHAPTER_XVI">Christianity and Morality</a></td><td align="right">193</td></tr> +<tr><td align="right">XVII.—</td><td align="left"><a href="#CHAPTER_XVII">Religion and Persecution</a></td><td align="right">204</td></tr> +<tr><td align="right">XVIII.—</td><td align="left"><a href="#CHAPTER_XVIII">What is to Follow Religion?</a></td><td align="right">223</td></tr> +</table> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vii" id="Page_vii">{vii}</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="PREFACE" id="PREFACE"></a>PREFACE.</h2> + +<p>It must be left for those who read the following pages to +decide how far this book lives up to its title. That it +leaves many aspects of life untouched is quite clear, but +there must be a limit to everything, even to the size and +scope of a book; moreover, the work does not aim at +being an encyclopędia, but only an outline of what may +fairly be regarded as the Freethought position. Freethought, +again, is too fluid a term to permit its teachings +being summarized in a set creed, but it does stand for a +certain definite attitude of mind in relation to those problems +of life with which thoughtful men and women +concern themselves. It is that mental attitude which I +aim at depicting.</p> + +<p>To those who are not directly concerned with the attack +on supernaturalism it may also be a matter of regret that +so much of this work is concerned with a criticism of +religious beliefs. But that is an accident of the situation. +We have not yet reached that stage in affairs when we can +afford to let religion alone, and one may readily be excused +the suspicion that those who, without believing in it, +profess to do so, are more concerned with avoiding a +difficult, if not dangerous, subject, than they are with the +problem of developing sane and sound methods of thinking. +And while some who stand forward as leaders of +popular thought fail to do their part in the work of attacking +supernaturalistic beliefs, others are perforce compelled +to devote more time than they would otherwise to the +task. That, in brief, is my apology for concerning myself +so largely with religious topics, and leaving almost untouched +other fields where the Freethought attitude would +prove equally fruitful of results.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_viii" id="Page_viii">{viii}</a></span> +After all, it is the mental attitude with which one +approaches a problem that really matters. The man or +woman who has not learned to set mere authority on one +side in dealing with any question will never be more than +a mere echo, and what the world needs, now as ever, is +not echoes but voices. Information, knowledge, is +essential to the helpful consideration of any subject; but +all the knowledge in the world will be of very little real +help if it is not under the control of a right method. +What is called scientific knowledge is, to-day, the +commonest of acquisitions, and what most people appear +to understand by that is the accumulation of a large +number of positive facts which do, indeed, form the raw +material of science. But the getting of mere facts is like +the getting of money. The value of its accumulation depends +upon the use made thereof. It is the power of +generalization, the perception and application of principles +that is all-important, and to this the grasp of a +right method of investigation, the existence of a right +mental attitude, is essential.</p> + +<p>The world needs knowledge, but still more imperatively +it needs the right use of the knowledge that is at its +disposal. For this reason I have been mainly concerned +in these pages with indicating what I consider to be the +right mental attitude with which to approach certain +fundamental questions. For, in a world so distracted by +conflicting teachings as is ours, the value of a right method +is almost incalculable. Scepticism, said Buckle, is not the +result, but the condition of progress, and the same may be +said of Freethought. The condition of social development +is the realization that no institution and no teaching is +beyond criticism. Criticism, rejection and modification +are the means by which social progress is achieved. It is +by criticism of existing ideas and institutions, by the +rejection of what is incapable of improvement, and by the +modification of what permits of betterment, that we show +ourselves worthy of the better traditions of the past, and +profitable servants of the present and the future.</p> + +<p class="ralign">C. C.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">{9}</a></span></p> + +<p id="begin">A GRAMMAR OF FREETHOUGHT.</p> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_I" id="CHAPTER_I"></a> +CHAPTER I.<br /> +OUTGROWING THE GODS.</h2> + +<p>One of the largest facts in the history of man is +religion. If it were otherwise the justification for writing +the following pages, and for attempting the proof +that, so far as man's history is concerned with religion, +it is little better than a colossal blunder, would not be +nearly so complete. Moreover, it is a generalization +upon which religionists of all classes love to dwell, or +even to parade as one of the strongest evidences in +their favour; and it is always pleasant to be able to +give your opponent all for which he asks—feeling, +meanwhile, that you lose nothing in the giving. +Universality of belief in religion really proves no more +than the universality of telling lies. "All men are +liars" is as true, or as false, as "All men are religious." +For some men are not liars, and some men are not +religious. All the generalization means is that some of +both are found in every age and in every country, and +that is true whether we are dealing with the liar or +with the religious person.</p> + +<p>What is ignored is the consideration that while at +one stage of culture religious belief is the widest and +most embracing of all beliefs it subsequently weakens, +not quite in direct proportion to the advance of culture, +but yet in such a way that one can say there is an<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">{10}</a></span> +actual relation between a preponderance of the one +and a weakening of the other. In very primitive +communities gods are born and flourish with all the +rank exuberance of a tropical vegetation. In less +primitive times their number diminishes, and their +sphere of influence becomes more and more sharply +defined. The gods are still credited with the ability to +do certain things, but there are other things which do +somehow get done without them. How that discovery +and that division are made need not detain us for the +moment, but the fact is patent. Advancing civilization +sees the process continued and quickened, nay, that is +civilization; for until nature is rid of her "haughty +lords" and man realizes that there are at least some +natural forces that come within the control of his intelligence, +civilization cannot really be said to have +commenced. Continued advance sees the gods so +diminished in power and so weakened in numbers that +their very impotency is apt to breed for them the kind +of pity that one feels for a millionaire who becomes a +pauper, or for an autocratic monarch reduced to the +level of a voteless citizen.</p> + +<p>The truth is that all the gods, like their human +creators, have in their birth the promise of death. +The nature of their birth gives them life, but cannot +promise them immortality. However much man commences +by worshipping gods, he sooner or later turns +his back upon them. Like the biblical deity he may +look at his creation and declare it good, but he also resembles +this deity in presently feeling the impulse to +destroy what he has made. To the products of his +mind man can no more give immortality than he can +to the work of his hands. In many cases the work +of his hands actually outlives that of his mind, for we +have to-day the remains of structures that were built +in the honour of gods whose very names are forgotten.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">{11}</a></span> +And to bury his gods is, after all, the only real apology +that man can offer for having created them.</p> + +<p>This outgrowing of religion is no new thing in +human history. Thoughtful observers have always +been struck by the mortality among the gods, although +their demise has usually been chronicled in terms of +exultation by rival worshippers. But here and there a +keener observer has brought to bear on the matter a +breadth of thought which robbed the phenomenon of +its local character and gave it a universal application. +Thus, in one of his wonderfully modern dialogues +Lucian depicts the Olympian deities discussing, much +in the spirit of a modern Church Congress, the prevalence +of unbelief among men. The gods are disturbed +at finding that men are reaching the stage of either not +believing, or not troubling about them. There is a +great deal of talk, and finally one of the minor deities +treats them to a little plain truth—which appears to be +as rare, and as unwelcome in heaven as on earth. He +says—I quote from Froude's translation:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>What other conclusion could they arrive at when +they saw the confusion around them? Good men +neglected, perishing in penury and slavery, and profligate +wretches wealthy, honoured and powerful. +Sacrilegious temple robbers undiscovered and unpunished; +devotees and saints beaten and crucified. +With such phenomena before them, of course men have +doubted our existence.... We affect surprise that men +who are not fools decline to put their faith in us. We +ought rather to be pleased that there is a man left +to say his prayers. We are among ourselves with no +strangers present. Tell us, then, Zeus, have you ever +really taken pains to distinguish between good men +and bad? Theseus, not you, destroyed the robbers in +Attica. As far as Providence was concerned, Sciron +and Pity-O-Campus might have murdered and +plundered to the end of time. If Eurystheus had not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">{12}</a></span> +looked into matters, and sent Hercules upon his +labours little would you have troubled yourself with +the Hydras and Centaurs. Let us be candid. All +that we have really cared for has been a steady altar +service. Everything else has been left to chance. And +now men are opening their eyes. They perceive that +whether they pray or don't pray, go to church or +don't go to church, makes no difference to them. And +we are receiving our deserts.</p></blockquote> + +<p>The case could hardly be put more effectively. It is +the appeal to experience with a vengeance, a form of +argument of which religionists in general are very fond. +Of course, the argument does not touch the question +of the mere existence of a god, but it does set forth +the revolt of awakened common sense against the worship +of a "moral governor of the universe." We can +say of our day, as Lucian said of his, that men are +opening their eyes, and as a consequence the gods are +receiving their deserts.</p> + +<p>Generally speaking, it is not difficult to see the +various steps by which man outgrew the conception of +the government of the world by intelligent forces. +From what we know of primitive thought we may say +that at first the gods dominated all. From the fall of +a rain-drop to the movement of a planet all was the +work of gods. Merely to question their power was the +wildest of errors and the gravest of crimes. Bit by +bit this vast territory was reclaimed—a task at the side +of which the conquest of the fever-stricken tropics or +the frozen north is mere child's play. It is quite needless +to enter into an elaborate speculation as to the +exact steps by which this process of deanthropomorphization—to +use a word of the late John Fiske's—was +accomplished, but one can picture the main line +by what we see taking place at later stages of development. +And there is no exception to the rule that so<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">{13}</a></span> +soon as any group of phenomena is brought within the +conception of law the notion of deity in connection +with those phenomena tends to die out. And the sum +of the process is seen in the work of the great law +givers of science, Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, Newton, +Laplace, Lyell, Dalton, Darwin, etc., who between +them have presented us with a universe in which the +conception of deity simply has no place. Apologies +apart, the idea of deity is foreign to the spirit and +method of modern science.</p> + +<p>In the region of the purely physical sciences this +process may be regarded as complete. In morals and +sociology, purely on account of the greater complexity +of the subjects, mystical and semi-supernatural conceptions +still linger, but it is only a question of time +for these branches of knowledge to follow the same +course as the physical sciences. In morals we are able +to trace, more or less completely, the development of +the moral sense from its first beginnings in the animal +world to its highest developments in man. What is +called the "mystery of morality" simply has no +existence to anyone who is not a mystery-monger by +profession or inclination. And here, too, the gods +have been receiving their deserts. For it is now clear +that instead of being a help to morals there has been +no greater obstacle to a healthy morality than the play +of religious ideas. In the name of God vices have been +declared virtues and virtues branded as vices. Belief +in God has been an unending source of moral perversion, +and it lies upon the face of historical development +that an intelligent morality, one that is capable +of adapting itself to the changing circumstances of +human nature, has only become possible with the +breaking down of religious authority.</p> + +<p>Exactly the same phenomenon faces us in connection +with social life. We have to go back but a little way<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">{14}</a></span> +in human history to come to a time when the existence +of a State without a religion would have seemed to +people impossible. Much as Christians have quarrelled +about other things, they have been in agreement on +this point. The historic fight between the established +Church and the Nonconformists has never really been +for the disestablishment of all religion, and the confining +of the State to the discharge of purely secular +functions, but mainly as to <em>which</em> religion the State +shall uphold. To-day, the central issue is whether +the State shall teach any religion, whether that does +not lie right outside its legitimate functions. And this +marks an enormous advance. It is a plain recognition +of the truth that the gods have nothing to contribute +of any value to the development of our social life. It +marks the beginning of the end, and registers the +truth that man must be his own saviour here as elsewhere. +As in Lucian's day we are beginning to +realize that whether we pray or don't pray, go to +church or don't go to church, believe in the gods or +don't believe in them, makes no real or substantial +difference to natural happenings. Now as then we see +good men punished and bad ones rewarded, and they +who are not fools and have the courage to look facts +in the face, decline to put their faith in a deity who is +incapable of doing all things right or too careless to +exert his power.</p> + +<p>It is not that the fight is over, or that there is to-day +little need to fight the forces of superstition. If that +were so, there would be no need to write what is here +written. Much as has been done, there is much yet to +do. The revolt against specific beliefs only serves to +illustrate a fight that is of much greater importance. +For there is little real social gain if one merely exchanges +one superstition for another. And, unfortunately, +the gentleman who declared that he had<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">{15}</a></span> +given up the errors of the Church of Rome in order to +embrace those of the Church of England represents a +fairly common type. It is the prevalence of a particular +type of mind in society that constitutes a +danger, and it is against this that our aim is ultimately +directed. Great as is the amount of organized superstition +that exists, the amount of unorganized superstition +is still greater, and probably more dangerous. +One of the revelations of the late war was the evidence +it presented of the tremendous amount of raw credulity, +of the low type of intelligence that was still current, +and the small amount of critical ability the mass of +people bring to bear upon life. The legends that +gained currency—the army of Russians crossing +England, the number of mutilated Belgian babies that +were seen, the story of the Germans boiling down their +dead to extract the fat, a story that for obscene +stupidity beats everything else, the Mons angels, the +craze for mascots—all bore witness to the prevalence +of a frame of mind that bodes ill for progress.</p> + +<p>The truth is, as Sir James Frazer reminds us, that +modern society is honeycombed with superstitions that +are not in themselves a whit more intellectually respectable +than those which dominate the minds of +savages. "The smooth surface of cultured society is +sapped and mined by superstition." Now and again +these hidden mines explode noisily, but the superstition +is always there, to be exploited by those who +have the wit to use it. From this point of view Christianity +is no more than a symptom of a source of great +social weakness, a manifestation of a weakness that +may find expression in strange and unexpected but +always more or less dangerous ways. It is against +the prevalence of this type of mind that the Freethinker +is really fighting. Freethinkers realize—apparently +they are the only ones that do realize<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">{16}</a></span>—that +the creation of a better type of society is finally +dependent upon the existence of a sanely educated intelligence, +and that will never exist while there are +large bodies of people who can persuade themselves +that human welfare is in some way dependent upon, or +furthered by, practices and beliefs that are not a bit +more intellectually respectable than those of the cave +men. If Christianity, as a mere system of beliefs, were +destroyed, we should only have cleared the way for the +final fight. Thousands of generations of superstitious +beliefs and practices that have embodied themselves in +our laws, our customs, our language, and our institutions, +are not to be easily destroyed. It is comparatively +simple to destroy a particular manifestation of +this disastrous heritage, but the type of mind to which +it has given birth is not so easily removed.</p> + +<p>The fight is not over, but it is being fought from a +new vantage ground, and with better weapons than +have ever before been employed. History, anthropology, +and psychology have combined to place in +the hands of the modern Freethinker more deadly +weapons than those of previous generations were able +to employ. Before these weapons the defences of the +faith crumble like wooden forts before modern artillery. +It is no longer a question of debating whether +religious beliefs are true. So long as we give a +straightforward and honest meaning to those beliefs +we know that they are not true. It is, to-day, mainly +a question of making plain the nature of the forces +which led men and women to regard them as being +true. We know that the history of religion is the +history of a delusion, and the task of the student is to +recover those conditions which gave to this delusion +an appearance of truth and reality. That is becoming +more and more evident to all serious and informed +students of the subject.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">{17}</a></span> +The challenge of Freethought to religion constitutes +one of the oldest struggles in human history. It must +have had its beginning in the first glimmer of doubt +concerning a tribal deity which crossed the mind of +some more than usually thoughtful savage. Under +various forms and in many ways it has gone on ever +since. It has had many variations of fortune, often +apparently completely crushed, only to rise again +stronger and more daring than ever. To-day, Freethought +is the accepted mental attitude of a growing +number of men and women whose intelligence admits +of no question. It has taken a recognized place in the +intellectual world, and its hold on the educated intelligence +is rapidly increasing. It may well be that +in one form or another the antagonism between +critical Freethought and accepted teaching, whether +secular or religious, will continue as one of the permanent +aspects of social conflict. But so far as supernaturalism +is concerned the final issue can be no longer +in doubt. It is not by one voice or by one movement +that supernaturalism is condemned. Its condemnation +is written in the best forms of art, science and literature. +And that is only another way of saying that it +is condemned by life. Freethought holds the future +in fee, and nothing but an entire reversal of the order +of civilization can force it to forego its claims.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">{18}</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_II" id="CHAPTER_II"></a> +CHAPTER II.<br /> +LIFE AND MIND.</h2> + +<p>The outstanding feature of what may be called the +natural history of associated life is the way in which +biologic processes are gradually dominated by psychologic +ones. Whatever be the nature of mind, a question +that in no way concerns us here, there is no +denying the importance of the phenomena that come +within that category. To speak of the first beginnings +of mind is, in this connection, idle language. In +science there are no real beginnings. Things do not +begin to be, they simply emerge, and their emergence +is as imperceptible as the displacement of night by +day, or the development of the chicken from the egg. +But whatever the nature of the beginning of mind, its +appearance in the evolutionary series marked an event +of profound and revolutionary importance. Life received +a new impetus, and the struggle for existence +a new significance, the importance of which is not, +even to-day, generally recognized. The old formulę +might still be used, but they had given to them a new +significance. The race was still to the swift and the +battle to the strong, but swiftness and strength were +manifested in new ways and by new means. Cunning +and intelligence began to do what was formerly done +without their co-operation. A new force had appeared, +arising out of the older forces as chemistry develops +from physics and biology from both. And, as we +should expect from analogy, we find the new force +dominating the older ones, and even bending them to +its needs.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">{19}</a></span> +Associated life meets us very early in the story of +animal existence, and we may assume that it ranks as a +genuine "survival quality." It enables some animals +to survive the attacks of others that are individually +stronger, and it may even be, as has been suggested, +that associated life is the normal form, and that +solitary animals represent a variation from the normal, +or perhaps a case of degeneration. But one result of +associated life is that it paves the way for the emergence +of mind as an active force in social evolution. +In his suggestive and important work on <cite>Mutual Aid</cite>, +Kropotkin has well shown how in the animal world +the purely biologic form of the struggle for existence +is checked and transformed by the factors of mutual +aid, association and protection. His illustrations +cover a very wide field; they include a great variety of +animal forms, and he may fairly claim to have established +the proposition that "an instinct has been +slowly developed among animals and men in the course +of an extremely long evolution ... which has taught +animals and men alike the force they can borrow from +mutual aid and support, and the joys they can find in +social life."</p> + +<p>But there is, on the whole, a very sharp limit set +to the development of mind in the animal world. One +cause of this is the absence of a true "social medium," +to use the admirable phrase of that versatile thinker, +George Henry Lewes. In the case of man, speech and +writing enable him to give to his advances and discoveries +a cumulative force such as can never exist in +their absence. On that subject more will be said later. +At present we may note another very important consequence +of the development of mind in evolution. In +pre-human, or sub-human society, perfection in the +struggle for existence takes the form of the creation or +the perfecting of an organic tool. Teeth or claws be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">{20}</a></span>come +stronger or larger, a limb is modified, sight becomes +keener, or there is a new effect in coloration. +The changes here, it will be observed, are all of an +organic kind, they are a part of the animal and are +inseparable from it, and they are only transmissible +by biologic heredity. And the rate of development is, +of necessity, slow.</p> + +<p>When we turn to man and note the way in which he +overcomes the difficulties of his environment, we find +them to be mainly of a different order. His instruments +are not personal, in the sense of being a part of +his organic structure. We may say they do not belong +to him so much as they do to the race; while they are +certainly transmitted from generation to generation +irrespective of individuals. Instead of achieving conquest +of his environment by developing an organic +structure, man creates an inorganic tool. In a sense +he subdues and moulds the environment to his needs, +rather than modifies his structure in order to cope with +the environment. Against extremes of temperature +he fashions clothing and builds habitations. He discovers +fire, probably the most important discovery +ever made by mankind. He adds to his strength in +defence and attack by inventing weapons. He guards +himself from starvation by planting seeds, and so +harnesses the productive forces of nature to his needs. +He tames animals and so secures living engines of +labour. Later, he compensates for his bodily weaknesses +by inventing instruments which aid sight, hearing, +etc. Inventions are multiplied, methods of +locomotion and transportation are discovered, and the +difficulties of space and time are steadily minimized. +The net result of all this is that as a mere biologic +phenomenon man's evolution is checked. The biologic +modifications that still go on are of comparatively +small importance, except, probably, in the case of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">{21}</a></span> +evolution against disease. The developments that +take place are mainly mental in form and are social +in their incidence.</p> + +<p>Now if the substantial truth of what has been said be +admitted, and I do not see how it can be successfully +challenged, there arise one or two considerations of +supreme importance. The first of these is that social +history becomes more and more a history of social +psychology. In social life we are watching the play of +social mind expressed through the medium of the individual. +The story of civilization is the record of the +piling of idea on idea, and the transforming power of +the whole on the environment. For tools, from the +flint chip of primitive man, down to the finished instrument +of the modern mechanic, are all so many products +of human mentality. From the primitive dug-out to +the Atlantic liner, from the stone spear-head to the +modern rifle, in all the inventions of civilized life we +are observing the application of mind to the conquest +of time, space, and material conditions. Our art, our +inventions, our institutions, are all so many illustrations +of the power of mind in transforming the +environment. A history of civilization, as distinguished +from a mere record of biologic growth, is +necessarily a history of the growing power of mind. It +is the cumulative ideas of the past expressed in inventions +and institutions that form the driving power +behind the man of to-day. These ideas form the most +valuable part of man's heritage, make him what he is, +and contain the promise of all that he may become.</p> + +<p>So long as we confine ourselves to biologic evolution, +the way in which qualities are transmitted is +plain. There is no need to go beyond the organism +itself. But this heritage of ideas, peculiarly human as +it is, requires a "carrier" of an equally unique kind. +It is at this point that the significance of what we have<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">{22}</a></span> +called the "social medium" emerges. The full +significance of this was first seen by G. H. Lewes.<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> +Writing so far back as 1879 he said:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>The distinguishing character of human psychology +is that to the three great factors, organism, external +medium, and heredity; it adds a fourth, namely, the +relation to a social medium, with its product, the +general mind.... While the mental functions are products +of the individual organism, the product, mind, +is more than an individual product. Like its great +instrument language, it is at once individual and +social. Each man speaks in virtue of the functions of +vocal expression, but also in virtue of the social need +of communication. The words spoken are not his +creation, yet he, too, must appropriate them by what +may be called a creative process before he can understand +them. What his tribe speaks he repeats; but +he does not simply echo their words, he rethinks them. +In the same way he adopts their experiences when he +assimilates them to his own.... Further, the experiences +come and go; they correct, enlarge, and +destroy one another, leaving behind them a certain +residual store, which condensed in intuitions and +formulated in principles, direct and modify all future +experiences.... Men living in groups co-operate like +the organs in an organism. Their actions have a +common impulse to a common end. Their desires and +opinions bear the common stamp of an impersonal +direction. Much of their life is common to all. The +roads, market-places and temples are for each and all.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">{23}</a></span> +Customs arise and are formulated in laws, the +restraint of all.... Each generation is born in this +social medium, and has to adapt itself to the established +forms.... A nation, a tribe, a sect is the medium +of the individual mind, as a sea, a river, or a pond, +is the medium of a fish.<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p> +</blockquote> + +<p>Biologically, what man inherits is capacity for acquisition. +But what he shall acquire, the direction in which +his native capacity shall express itself, is a matter over +which biologic forces have no control. This is determined +by society and social life. Given quite equal +capacity in two individuals, the output will be very +different if one is brought up in a remote Spanish +village and the other in Paris or London. Whether +a man shouts long live King George or long live the +Kaiser is mainly a question of social surroundings, and +but very little one of difference in native capacity. The +child of parents living in the highest civilized society, +if taken away while very young and brought up amid +a people in a very primitive state of culture, would, on +reaching maturity, differ but little from the people<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">{24}</a></span> +around him. He would think the thoughts that were +common to the society in which he was living as he +would speak their language and wear their dress. Had +Shakespeare been born among savages he could never +have written <cite>Hamlet</cite>. For the work of the genius, as +for that of the average man, society must provide the +materials in the shape of language, ideas, institutions, +and the thousand and one other things that go to make +up the life of a group, and which may be seen reflected +in the life of the individual. Suppose, says +Dr. McDougall:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>that throughout the period of half a century every +child born to English parents was at once exchanged +(by the power of a magician's wand) for an infant of +the French, or other, European nation. Soon after +the close of this period the English nation would be +composed of individuals of French extraction, and the +French of individuals of English extraction. It is, I +think, clear that, in spite of this complete exchange +of innate characters between the two nations, there +would be but little immediate change of national +characteristics. The French people would still speak +French, and the English would speak English, with +all the local diversities to which we are accustomed +and without perceptible change of pronunciation. The +religion of the French would still be predominantly +Roman Catholic, and the English people would still +present the same diversity of Protestant creeds. The +course of political institutions would have suffered no +profound change, the customs and habits of the two +peoples would exhibit only such changes as might be +attributed to the lapse of time, though an acute +observer might notice an appreciable approximation +of the two peoples towards one another in all these +respects. The inhabitant of France would still be a +Frenchman and the inhabitant of England an Englishman +to all outward seeming, save that the physical +appearance of the two peoples would be transposed.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">{25}</a></span> +And we may go even further and assert that the same +would hold good if a similar exchange of infants were +effected between the English and any other less +closely allied nation, say the Turks or the Japanese.<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a></p></blockquote> + +<p>The products of human capacity are the material of +which civilization is built; these products constitute +the inheritance which one generation receives from +another. Whether this inheritance be large or small, +simple or complex, it is the chief determinant which +shapes the personality of each individual. What each +has by biological heredity is a given structure, that is, +capacity. But the direction of that capacity, the command +it enables one to acquire over his environment, +is in turn determined by the society into which he +happens to be born.</p> + +<p>It has already been said that the materials of civilization, +whether they be tools, or institutions, or inventions, +or discoveries, or religious or ethical teachings, +are facts that can be directly described as psychological. +An institution—the Church, the Crown, the +Magistracy—is not transmitted as a building or as so +many sheets of paper, but as an idea or as a set of +ideas. A piece of machinery is, in the same way, a +mental fact, and is a physical one in only a subordinate +sense. And if this be admitted, we reach the +further truth that the environment to which man has +to adapt himself is essentially, so far as it is a social +environment, psychological. Not alone are the outward +marks of social life—the houses in which man +lives, the machines he uses to do his bidding—products +of his mental activity, but the more important features +of his environment, to which he must adapt himself, +and which so largely shape his character and determine +his conduct, are of a wholly psychological character.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">{26}</a></span> +In any society that is at all distinct from the animal, +there exist a number of beliefs, ideas and institutions, +traditions, and, in a later stage, a literature which play +a very important part in determining the direction of +man's mind. With increasing civilization, and the +development of better means of intercourse, any single +society finds itself brought into touch and under the +influence of other social groups. The whole of these +influences constitute a force which, surrounding an +individual at birth, inevitably shapes character in this +or that direction. They dominate the physical aspect +of life, and represent the determining forces of social +growth. Eliminate the psychological forces of life +and you eliminate all that can be properly called +civilization. It is wholly the transforming power of +mind on the environment that creates civilization, and +it is only by a steady grasp of this fact that civilization +can be properly understood.</p> + +<p>I have pointed out a distinction between biological +and social, or psychological, heredity. But there is +one instance in which the two agree. This is that +we can only understand a thing by its history. We +may catalogue the existing peculiarities of an animal +form with no other material than that of the organism +before us, but thoroughly to understand it we must +know its history. Similarly, existing institutions may +have their justification in the present, but the causes +of their existence lie buried in the past. A king may +to-day be honoured on account of his personal worth, +but the reason why there is a king to be honoured +carries us back to that state of culture in which the +primitive priest and magic worker inspires fear and +awe. When we ring bells to call people to church we +perpetuate the fact that our ancestors rang them to +drive away evil spirits. We wear black at a funeral +because our primitive ancestors wished to hide them<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">{27}</a></span>selves +from the dead man's ghost. We strew flowers +on a grave because food and other things were once +buried with the dead so that their spirits might +accompany the dead to the next world. In short, with +all human customs we are forced, if we wish to know +the reason for their present existence, to seek it in the +ideas that have dominated the minds of previous +generations.<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a></p> + +<p>No one who has studied, in even a cursory manner, +the development of our social institutions can avoid +recognition of the profound influence exerted by the +primitive conceptions of life, death, and of the character +of natural forces. Every one of our social institutions +was born in the shadow of superstition, and +superstition acts as a powerful force in determining +the form they assume. Sir Henry Maine has shown to +what a large extent the laws of inheritance are bound +up with ancestor worship.<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> Spencer has done the same +service for nearly all our institutions,<a name="FNanchor_6_6" id="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> and Mr. Elton +says that "the oldest customs of inheritance in +England and Germany were, in their beginnings, con<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">{28}</a></span>nected +with a domestic religion, and based upon a worship +of ancestral spirits of which the hearthplace was +essentially the altar."<a name="FNanchor_7_7" id="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> The same truth meets us in +the study of almost any institution. In fact, it is not +long before one who <em>thinks</em> evolution, instead of +merely knowing its formulę, begins to realize the +truth of the saying by a German sociologist that in +dealing with social institutions we are concerned with +the "mental creations of aggregates." They are dependent +upon the persistence of a set of ideas, and so +long as these ideas are unshaken they are substantially +indestructible. To remove them the ideas upon which +they rest must be shaken and robbed of their authority. +That is the reason why at all times the fight for reform +so largely resolves itself into a contest of ideas. +Motives of self-interest may enter into the defence of +an institution, and in some case may be responsible +for the attempt to plant an institution where it does +not already exist, but in the main institutions persist +because of their harmony with a frame of mind that is +favourable to their being.</p> + +<p>A great deal of criticism has been directed against +the conclusion of Buckle that improvement in the state +of mankind has chiefly resulted from an improvement +in the intellectual outlook. And yet when stated with +the necessary qualifications the generalization is as +sound as it can well be. Certainly, the belief held in +some quarters, and stated with an air of scientific precision, +that the material environment is the active force +which is ever urging to new mental development will +not fit the facts; for, as we have seen, the environment +to which human nature must adapt itself is mainly +mental in character, that is, it is made up in an increasing +measure of the products of man's own mental<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">{29}</a></span> +activity. The theory of the sentimental religionist +that the evil in the world results from the wickedness +of man, or, as he is fond of putting it, from the hardness +of man's heart, is grotesque in its ineffectiveness. +Soft heads have far more to do with the evil in the +world than have hard hearts. Indeed, one of the standing +difficulties of the orthodox moralist is, not to explain +the deeds of evil men, which explain themselves, +but to account for the harm done by "good" men, +and often as a consequence of their goodness. The +moral monster is a rarity, and evil is rarely the outcome +of a clear perception of its nature and a deliberate +resolve to pursue it. Paradoxical as it may sound, +it demands a measure of moral strength to do wrong, +consciously and deliberately, which the average man +or woman does not possess. And the world has never +found it a matter of great difficulty to deal with its +"bad" characters; it is the "good" ones that +present it with a constant problem.</p> + +<p>The point is worth stressing, and we may do it from +more than one point of view. We may take, first of +all, the familiar illustration of religious persecution, +as exemplified in the quarrels of Catholics and Protestants. +On the ground of moral distinction no line could +be drawn between the two parties. Each shuddered +at the persecution inflicted by the other, and each regarded +the teachings of the other with the same degree +of moral aversion. And it has often been noted that +the men who administered so infamous an institution +as the Inquisition were not, in even the majority of +cases, bad men.<a name="FNanchor_8_8" id="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> A few may have had interested<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">{30}</a></span> +motives, but it would have been impossible to have +maintained so brutal an institution in the absence of a +general conviction of its rightness. In private life +those who could deliver men, women, and even children +over to torture were not worse husbands or parents +than others. Such differences as existed cannot be +attributed to a lack of moral endeavour, or to a difference +of "moral temperament." It was a difference +of intellectual outlook, and given certain religious +convictions persecution became a religious necessity. +The moral output was poor because the intellectual +standpoint was a wrong one.</p> + +<p>If we could once get over the delusion of thinking of +human nature as being fundamentally different five +hundred years ago from what it is to-day, we should +escape a great many fallacies that are prevalent. The +changes that have taken place in human nature during +the historic period are so slight as to be practically +negligible. The motives that animate men and women +to-day are the motives that animated men and women +a thousand or two thousand years ago. The change is +in the direction and form of their manifestation only, +and it is in the light of the human nature around us +that we must study and interpret the human nature +that has gone before us. From that point of view +we may safely conclude that bad institutions were kept<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">{31}</a></span> +in being in the past for the same reason that they are +kept alive to-day. The majority must be blind to their +badness; and in any case it is a general perception of +their badness which leads to their destruction.</p> + +<p>The subject of crime illustrates the same point. +Against crime as such, society is as set as ever. But +our attitude toward the causation and cure of crime, +and, above all, to the treatment of the criminal, has +undergone a profound alteration. And the change +that has taken place here has been away from the +Christian conception which brutalized the world for so +long, towards the point of view taken up by the +ancient Greeks, that wrong doing is the outcome of +ignorance. Expressed in the modern manner we should +say that crime is the result of an undeveloped nature, +or of a pathological one, or of a reversion to an earlier +predatory type, or the result of any or all of these +factors in combination with defective social conditions. +But this is only another way of saying that we have +exchanged the old, brutal, and ineffective methods for +more humane and effective ones because we look at the +problem of crime from a different intellectual angle. +A more exact knowledge of the causation of crime has +led us to a more sensible and a more humane treatment +of the criminal. And this, not alone in his own behalf, +but in the interests of the society in which he lives. +We may put it broadly that improvement comes from +an enlightened way of looking at things. Common +observation shows that people will go on tolerating +forms of brutality, year after year, without the least +sense of their wrongness. Familiarity, and the absence +of any impetus to examine current practice from a new +point of view seem to account for this. In the seventeenth +century the same people who could watch, +without any apparent hostility, the torture of an old +woman on the fantastic charge of intercourse with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">{32}</a></span> +Satan, had their feelings outraged by hearing a +secular song on Sunday. Imprisonment for "blasphemy," +once regarded as a duty, has now become +ridiculous to all reasonable people. At one and the +same time, a little more than a hundred years ago in +this country, the same people who could denounce +cock-fighting on account of its brutality, could watch +unmoved the murdering of little children in the +factories of Lancashire. Not so long ago men in this +country fought duels under a sense of moral compulsion, +and the practice was only abandoned when a +changed point of view made people realize the absurdity +of trying to settle the justice of a cause by determining +which of two people were the most proficient with +sword or pistol. We have a continuation of the same +absurdity in those larger duels fought by nations +where the old verbal absurdities still retain their full +force, and where we actually add another absurdity +by retaining a number of professional duellists who +must be ready to embark on a duel whether they have +any personal feeling in the matter or not. And it seems +fairly safe to say that when it is realized that the duel +between nations as a means of settling differences is +not a bit more intellectually respectable than was the +ancient duello we shall not be far removed from seeing +the end of one of the greatest dangers to which modern +society is exposed.</p> + +<p>Examples might be multiplied indefinitely, but +enough has been said to show what small reason there +is for assuming that changes in institutions are brought +about by the operation of some occult moral sense. It +is the enlightenment of the moral sense by the growth +of new ideas, by the impact of new knowledge leading +to a revaluation of things that is mainly responsible for +the change. The question of whether a man should or +should not be burned for a difference in religious belief<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">{33}</a></span> +was never one that could be settled by weighing up the +moral qualities of the two parties in the dispute. All +the moral judgment that has ever existed, even if +combined in the person of a single individual could +never decide that issue. It was entirely a question of +acquiring a new point of view from which to examine +the subject. Until that was done the whole force of the +moral sense was on the side of the persecutor. To +put the matter paradoxically, the better the man the +worse persecutor he became. It was mental enlightenment +that was needed, not moral enthusiasm.</p> + +<p>The question of progress thus becomes, in all directions, +one of the impact of new ideas, in an environment +suitable to their reception and growth. A society +shut in on itself is always comparatively unprogressive, +and but for the movement of classes within it +would be completely so. The more closely the history +of civilization is studied the more clearly does that +fact emerge. Civilization is a synthetic movement, and +there can be no synthesis in the absence of dissolution +and resolution.</p> + +<p>A fight of old ideas against new ones, a contest of +clashing culture levels, a struggle to get old things +looked at from a new point of view, these are the +features that characterize all efforts after reform. It +was said by some of the eighteenth century philosophers +that society was held together by agreement in a bond. +That is not quite correct. The truth is that society is +held together, as is any phase of social life, by a bond +of agreement. The agreement is not of the conscious, +documentary order, but it is there, and it consists in +sharing a common life created and maintained by +having a common tradition, and a common stock of +ideas and ideals. It is this that makes a man a member +of one social group rather than of another—Chinese, +American, French, German, or Choctaw. There is no<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">{34}</a></span> +discriminating feature in what is called the economic +needs of people. The economic needs of human beings—food, +clothing, and shelter, are of the same order the +world over. And certainly the fact of a Chinaman +sharing in the economic life of Britain, or an Englishman +sharing in the economic life of China, would not +entitle either to be called genuine members of the +group in which he happened to be living. Membership +only begins to be when those belonging to a group share +in a common mental outfit. Even within a society, +and in relation to certain social groups, one can see +illustrations of the same principle. A man is not really +a member of a society of artists, lawyers, or doctors +merely by payment of an annual subscription. He is +that only when he becomes a participant in the +mental life of the group.<a name="FNanchor_9_9" id="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> It is this common stock of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">{35}</a></span> +mental facts which lies at the root of all collective +ideas—an army, a Church, or a nation. And ever the +fight is by way of attack and defence of the psychologic +fact.<a name="FNanchor_10_10" id="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a></p> + +<p>To do the Churches and other vested interests justice, +they have never lost sight of this truth, and it would<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">{36}</a></span> +have been better for the race had others been equally +alive to its importance. The Churches have never +ceased to fight for the control of those public organs +that make for the formation of opinion. Their +struggle to control the press, the platform, and the +school means just this. Whatever they may have +taught, self-interest forced upon them recognition of +the truth that it was what men thought about things +that mattered. They have always opposed the introduction +of new ideas, and have fought for the retention +of old ones. It was a necessity of their existence. It +was also an admission of the truth that in order for +reform to become a fact the power of traditional ideas +must be broken. Man is what he thinks, is far nearer +the truth than the once famous saying, "Man is what +he eats." As a member of a social group man is +dominated by his ideas of things, and any movement +of reform must take cognisance of that fact if it is to +cherish reasonable hopes of success.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">{37}</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_III" id="CHAPTER_III"></a>CHAPTER III.<br /> +WHAT IS FREETHOUGHT?</h2> + +<p>Freedom of thought and freedom of speech stand to +each other as the two halves of a pair of scissors. Without +freedom of speech freedom of thought is robbed of +the better part of its utility, even if its existence is not +threatened. The one reacts on the other. As thought +provides the material for speech, so, in turn, it +deteriorates when it is denied expression. Speech is, +in fact, one of the great factors in human progress. It +is that which enables one generation to hand on to +another the discoveries made, the inventions produced, +the thoughts achieved, and so gives a degree of fixity +to the progress attained. For progress, while expressed +through the individual, is achieved by the race. +Individually, the man of to-day is not strikingly +superior in form or capacity to the man of five or ten +thousand years ago. But he knows more, can achieve +more, and is in that sense stronger than was his +ancestors. He is the heir of the ages, not as a figure of +speech, but as the most sober of facts. He inherits +what previous generations have acquired; the schoolboy +of to-day starts with a capital of inherited knowledge +that would have been an outfit for a philosopher +a few thousand years ago.</p> + +<p>It is this that makes speech of so great importance +to the fact of progress. Without speech, written or +verbal, it would be impossible to conserve the products +of human achievement. Each generation would have<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">{38}</a></span> +to start where its predecessor commenced, and it would +finish at about the same point. It would be the fable +of Sisyphus illustrated in the passing of each generation +of human beings.</p> + +<p>But speech implies communication. There is not +very much pleasure in speaking to oneself. Even the +man who apologised for the practice on the ground that +he liked to address a sensible assembly would soon grow +tired of so restricted an audience. The function of +speech is to transmit ideas, and it follows, therefore, +that every embargo on the free exchange of ideas, +every obstacle to complete freedom of speech, is a +direct threat to the well-being of civilisation. As +Milton could say that a good book "is the precious +life-blood of a master spirit, embalmed and treasured +up to a life beyond life," and that "he who destroys +a good book kills reason itself," so we may say that +he who strikes at freedom of thought and speech is +aiming a blow at the very heart of human betterment.</p> + +<p>In theory, the truth of what has been said would be +readily admitted, but in practice it has met, and still +meets, with a vigorous opposition. Governments +have exhausted their powers to prevent freedom of +intercourse between peoples, and every Church and +chapel has used its best endeavours to the same end. +Even to-day, when all are ready to pay lip-homage to +freedom of thought, the obstacles in the way of a +genuine freedom are still very great. Under the best +possible conditions there will probably always be some +coercion of opinion, if only of that unconscious kind +which society as a whole exerts upon its individual +members. But to this we have to add the coercion that +is consciously exerted to secure the formation of particular +opinions, and which has the dual effect of inducing +dissimulation in some and impotency in others. +Quite ignorantly parents commence the work when<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">{39}</a></span> +they force upon children their own views of religion +and inculcate an exaggerated respect for authority. +They create an initial bias that is in only too many +cases fatal to real independence of thought. Social +pressure continues what a mistaken early training has +commenced. When opinions are made the test of +"good form," and one's social standing partly determined +by the kind of opinions that one holds, there is +developed on the one side hypocrisy, and on the other, +because certain opinions are banned, thought in general +is unhealthily freed from the sobering influence of enlightened +criticism.<a name="FNanchor_11_11" id="FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a></p> + +<p>To-day the legal prohibition of religious dissent is +practically ineffective, and is certainly far less demoralizing +than the pressure that is exerted socially +and unofficially. In all probability this has always +been the case. For legal persecution must be open. +Part of its purpose is publicity, and that in itself is apt +to rouse hostility. Against open, legal persecution a +man will make a stand, or if he gives way to the force +arrayed against him may do so with no feeling of +personal degradation. But the conformity that is +secured by a threat of social boycott, the freedom of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">{40}</a></span> +speech that is prevented by choking the avenues of +intellectual intercourse, is far more deadly in its consequences, +and far more demoralizing in its influence +on character. To give way, as thousands do, not to +the open application of force, which carries no greater +personal reflection than does the soldier's surrender to +superior numbers, but to the dread of financial loss, to +the fear of losing a social status, that one may inwardly +despise even while in the act of securing it, or from +fear of offending those whom we may feel are not +worthy of our respect, these are the things that cannot +be done without eating into one's sense of self-respect, +and inflicting upon one's character an irreparable +injury.</p> + +<p>On this matter more will be said later. For the +present I am concerned with the sense in which we are +using the word "Freethought." Fortunately, little +time need be wasted in discussing the once popular +retort to the Freethinker that if the principle of determinism +be accepted "free" thought is impossible. +It is surprising that such an argument should ever have +secured a vogue, and is only now interesting as an +indication of the mentality of the defender of orthodox +religion. Certainly no one who properly understands +the meaning of the word would use such an +argument. At best it is taking a word from sociology, +a sphere in which the meaning is quite clear and intelligible, +and applying it in the region of physical +science where it has not, and is not intended to have, +any meaning at all. In physical science a thing is +what it does, and the business of science is to note the +doings of forces and masses, their actions and reactions, +and express them in terms of natural "law." From +the point of view of physical science a thing is neither +free nor unfree, and to discuss natural happenings in +terms of freedom or bondage is equal to discussing<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">{41}</a></span> +smell in terms of sight or colour in terms of smell. +But applied in a legitimate way the word "free" is +not only justifiable, it is indispensible. The confusion +arises when we take a word from a department +in which its meaning is quite clear and apply it in a +region where it has no application whatever.</p> + +<p>Applied to opinion "Free" has the same origin and +the same application as the expressions "a free man," +or a "free State," or "a free people." Taking either +of these expressions it is plain that they could have +originated only in a state of affairs where some people +are "free," and some are living in a state of bondage +or restraint. There is no need to trace the history of +this since so much is implied in the word itself. A +free State is one in which those belonging to it determine +their own laws without being coerced by an outside +power. A free man is one who is permitted to act +as his own nature prompts. The word "free" implies +nothing as to the nature of moral or mental causation, +that is a question of a wholly different order. The free +man exists over against the one who is not free, the +free State over against one that is held in some degree +of subjection to another State. There is no other +meaning to the word, and that meaning is quite clear +and definite.</p> + +<p>Now Freethought has a precisely similar significance. +It says nothing as to the nature of thought, +the origin of thought, or the laws of thought. With +none of these questions is it vitally concerned. It +simply asserts that there are conditions under which +thought is not "free," that is, where it is coerced to a +foregone conclusion, and that these conditions are +fatal to thought in its higher and more valuable +aspects. Freethought is that form of thinking that +proceeds along lines of its own determining, rather +than along lines that are laid down by authority. In<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">{42}</a></span> +actual practice it is immediately concerned with the +expression of opinion rather than with its formation, +since no authority can prevent the formation of +opinion in any mind that is at all independent in its +movements and forms opinions on the basis of observed +facts and adequate reasoning. But its chief and +primary significance lies in its repudiation of the right +of authority to say what form the expression of opinion +shall take. And it is also clear that such a term as +"Freethought" could only have come into general +use and prominence in a society in which the free +circulation of opinion was more or less impeded.</p> + +<p>It thus becomes specially significant that, merely as +a matter of history, the first active manifestation +of Freethought should have occurred in connection +with a revolt against religious teaching and authority. +This was no accident, but was rather a case of necessity. +For, in the first place, there is no other subject +in which pure authority plays so large a part as it +does in religion. All churches and all priesthoods, +ancient and modern, fall back upon the principle of +pure authority as a final method of enforcing their +hold upon the people. That, it may be noted in passing, +is one of the chief reasons why in all ages governments +have found religion one of the most serviceable +agencies in maintaining their sway. Secondly, there +seems to have been from the very earliest times a +radically different frame of mind in the approach to +secular and religious matters. So far as one can see +there appears to be, even in primitive societies, no +very strong opposition to the free discussion of matters +that are of a purely secular nature. Questions of +ways and means concerning these are freely debated +among savage tribes, and in all discussion differences +of opinion must be taken for granted. It is when we +approach religious subjects that a difference is seen.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">{43}</a></span> +Here the main concern is to determine the will of the +gods, and all reasoning is thus out of place, if not a +positive danger. The only thing is to discover "God's +will," and when we have his, or his will given in +"sacred" books the embargo on free thinking is +complete. This feature continues to the end. We do +not even to-day discuss religious matters in the same +open spirit in which secular matters are debated. +There is a bated breath, a timidity of criticism in discussing +religious subjects that does not appear when +we are discussing secular topics. With the thoroughly +religious man it is solely a question of what God +wishes him to do. In religion this affords the only +latitude for discussion, and even that disappears largely +when the will of God is placed before the people in the +shape of "revealed" writings. Fortunately for the +world "inspired" writings have never been so clearly +penned as to leave no room for doubt as to what they +actually meant. Clarity of meaning has never been +one of the qualities of divine authorship.</p> + +<p>In this connection it is significant that the first form +of democratic government of which we have any clear +record should have been in freethinking, sceptical +Greece. Equally notable is it that in both Rome and +Greece the measure of mental toleration was greater +than it has ever been in other countries before or since. +In Rome to the very end of the Pagan domination +there existed no legislation against opinions, as such. +The holders of certain opinions might find themselves +in uncomfortable positions now and then, but action +against them had to rest on some ground other than +that which was afterwards known as heresy. There +existed no law in the Roman Empire against freedom +of opinion, and those who are familiar with Mr. H. +C. Lea's classic, <cite>History of the Inquisition</cite>, will recall +his account of the various tactics adopted by the Chris<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">{44}</a></span>tian +Church to introduce measures that would accustom +the public mind to legislation which should +establish the principle of persecution for opinion.<a name="FNanchor_12_12" id="FNanchor_12_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> In<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">{45}</a></span> +the end the Church succeeded in effecting this, and its +success was registered in the almost unbelievable +degradation of the human intellect which was exhibited +in the Christian world for centuries. So +complete was this demoralization that more than a +thousand years later we find men announcing as a most +daring principle a demand for freedom of discussion +which in old Greece and Rome was never officially +questioned. Christianity not merely killed freedom +wherever it established itself, but it came very near +killing even the memory of it.</p> + +<p>It was, therefore, inevitable that in the western +world Freethought should come into prominence in +relation to the Christian religion and its claims. In the +Christian Church there existed an organization which +not alone worked with the avowed intention of determining +what men should think, but finally proceeded +to what was, perhaps, the logical conclusion, to say +what they should not think. No greater tyranny than +the Christian Church has ever existed. And this +applies, not to the Roman Church alone, but to every +Church within the limit of its opportunities. In the +name and in the interests of religion the Christian +Church took some of the worst passions of men and +consecrated them. The killing of heretics became one +of the most solemn duties and it was urged upon +secular rulers as such. The greatest instrument of +oppression ever formed, the Inquisition, was fashioned +for no other purpose than to root out opinions that +were obnoxious to the Church. It would have been +bad enough had the attempts of the Church to control +opinion been limited to religion. But that was not +the case. It aimed at taking under its control all<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">{46}</a></span> +sorts of teaching on all sorts of subjects. Nothing +would have surprised an inhabitant of ancient Rome +more, could he have revisited the earth some dozen +centuries after the establishment of Christianity, than +to have found men being punished for criticising doctrines +that were in his day openly laughed at. And +nothing could have given an ancient Athenian greater +cause for wonder than to have found men being imprisoned +and burned for teaching cosmical theories +that were being debated in the schools of Athens two +thousand years before. Well might they have wondered +what had happened to the world, and well might +they have come to the conclusion that it had been +overtaken by an attack of universal insanity. And +the explanation would not have been so very wide of +the truth.</p> + +<p>In this matter of suppression of freedom of thinking +there was little to choose between the Churches. +Each aimed at controlling the thought of mankind, +each was equally intolerant of any variation from the +set line, and each employed the same weapon of +coercion so far as circumstances permitted. At most +the Protestant Churches substituted a dead book for a +living Church, and in the end it may be questioned, +when all allowance is made for the changed circumstances +in which Protestantism operated, whether the +rule of the new Church was not more disastrous than +the older one. It had certainly less excuse for its intolerance. +The Roman Catholic Church might urge +that it never claimed to stand for freedom of opinion, +and whatever its sins it was so far free from the +offence of hypocrisy. But the Protestant Churches +could set up no such plea; they professed to stand on +freedom of conscience. And they thus added the +quality of inconsistency and hypocrisy to an offence +that was already grave enough in itself.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">{47}</a></span> +But whatever opinion one may have on that point, +it is certain that in practice the Protestant leaders were +as opposed to freedom of thought as were the Roman +Catholics. And Protestant bigotry left a mark on +European history that deserves special recognition. +For the first time it made the profession of Christianity +a definite part of the law of the secular State.<a name="FNanchor_13_13" id="FNanchor_13_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> +Hitherto there had been no law in any of the European +States which made a profession of Christianity necessary. +There had been plenty of persecutions of non-Christians, +and the consequences of a rejection of +Christianity, if one lived in a Christian State, were +serious enough. But when the secular State punished +the heretic it was a manifestation of good will towards +the Church and not the expression of a legal enactment. +It was the direct influence of the Church on +the State. Church and State were legally distinct +during the medięval period, however closely they may +have been allied in practice. With the arrival of +Protestantism and the backing of the reformed religion +given by certain of the Princes, the machinery of intolerance, +so to speak, was taken over by the State and +became one of its functions. It became as much the +duty of the secular officials to extirpate heresy, to secure +uniformity of religious belief as it was to the interest +of the Church to see that it was destroyed. Up to that +time it was the aim of the Church to make the State +one of its departments. It had never legally succeeded +in doing this, but it was not for the Roman Church to +sink to the subordinate position of becoming a department +of the State. It was left for Protestantism to make +the Church a branch of the State and to give religious +bigotry the full sanction of secular law.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">{48}</a></span> +Neither with Catholic nor Protestant could there +be, therefore, any relaxation in the opposition +offered to independent thinking. That still remained +the cardinal offence to the religious mind. In the name +of religion Protestants opposed the physics of Newton +as bitterly as Catholics opposed the physics of Galileo. +The geology of Hutton and Lyell, the chemistry of +Boyle and Dalton, the biology of Von Baer, Lamarck +and Darwin, with almost any other branch of science +that one cares to select, tell the same tale. And when +the desire for reform took a social turn there was the +same influence to be fought. For while the Roman +Catholic laid the chief insistence on obedience to the +Church, the Protestant laid as strong insistence on +obedience to the State, and made disobedience to its +orders a matter of almost religious revolt. The whole +force of religion was thus used to induce contentment +with the existing order, instead of to the creation +of an intelligent discontent which would lead to continuous +improvement. In view of these circumstances +it is not surprising that the word "Freethought" +should have lost in actual use its more general significance +of a denial of the place of mere authority in +matters of opinion, and have acquired a more definite +and precise connotation. It could not, of course, lose +its general meaning, but it gained a special application +and became properly associated with a definitely anti-theological +attitude. The growth in this direction was +gradual but inevitable. When the term first came into +general use, about the end of the seventeenth century, +it was mainly used with reference to those deists who +were then attacking Christianity. In that sense it continued +to be used for some time. But as Deism lost +ground, thanks partly to the Christian attack, the clear +and logical issue between Theism and Atheism became +apparent, with the result that the definite anti-<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">{49}</a></span>religious +character of "Freethought" became firmly +established. And to-day it is mere affectation or +timidity to pretend that the word has any other vital +significance. To say that a man is a Freethinker is to +give, to ninety-nine people out of a hundred, the impression +that he is anti-religious. And in this direction +the popular sense of the word discloses what has been +its important historic function. Historically, the chief +stronghold of mere authority has been religion. In +science and in sociology, as well as in connection with +supernaturalism proper, every movement in the direction +of the free exercise of the intellect has met with +the unceasing opposition of religion. That has always +been at once the symbol and the instrument of oppression. +To attack religion has been to attack the enemy +in his capital. All else has been matter of outpost +skirmishing.</p> + +<p>I have apparently gone a long way round to get at +the meaning of the word "Freethought," but it was +necessary. For it is of very little use, in the case of +an important word that has stood and stands for the +name of a movement, to go to a dictionary, or to appeal +to etymology. The latter has often a mere antiquarian +interest, and the former merely registers current meanings, +it does not make them. The use of a word +must ultimately be determined by the ideas it conveys +to those who hear it. And from what has been said the +meaning of this particular word should be fairly clear. +While standing historically for a reasoned protest +against the imposition of opinion by authority, and, +negatively, against such artificial conditions as prevent +the free circulation of opinion, it to-day stands +actually for a definitely anti-religious mental attitude. +And this is what one would naturally expect. Protests, +after all, are protests against something in the +concrete, even though they may embody the affirma<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">{50}</a></span>tion +of an abstract principle. And nowadays the +principle of pure authority has so few defenders that it +would be sheer waste of time, unless the protest +embodied a definite attitude with regard to specific +questions. We may, then, put it that to us "Freethought" +stands for a reasoned and definite opposition +to all forms of supernaturalism, it claims the right +to subject all religious beliefs to the test of reason, and +further claims that when so tested they break down +hopelessly. It is from this point of view that these +pages are written, and the warranty for so defining it +should be apparent from what has been said in this and +the preceding chapter.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">{51}</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IV" id="CHAPTER_IV"></a>CHAPTER IV.<br /> +REBELLION AND REFORM.</h2> + +<p>Rebellion and reform are not exactly twins, but they +are very closely related. For while all rebellion is not +reform, yet in the widest sense of the word, there is no +reform without rebellion. To fight for reform is to +rebel against the existing order and is part of the +eternal and fundamentally healthful struggle of the +new against the old, and of the living present against +the dead past. The rebel is thus at once a public +danger and a benefactor. He threatens the existing +order, but it is in the name of a larger and better +social life. And because of this it is his usual lot +to be crucified when living and deified when dead. So +it has always been, so in its main features will it +always be. If contemporaries were to recognize the +reformer as such, they would destroy his essential function +by making it useless. Improvement would become +an automatic process that would perfect itself +without opposition. As it is, the function of the rebel +is to act as an explosive force, and no society of average +human beings likes explosions. They are noisy, and +they are dangerous. For the reformer to complain at +not being hailed as a deliverer is for him to mistake +his part and place in social evolution.</p> + +<p>The rebel and the reformer is, again, always in +minority. That follows from what has already been +said. It follows, too, from what we know of development +in general. Darwinism rests on the supreme +importance of the minority. It is an odd variation +here and there that acts as the starting point for a new<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">{52}</a></span> +species—and it has against it the swamping influence +of the rest of its kind that treads the old biological +line. Nature's choicest variations are of necessity with +the few, and when that variation has established itself +and become normal another has to appear before a new +start can be made.</p> + +<p>Whether we take biology or psychology the same +condition appears. A new idea occurs to an individual +and it is as strictly a variation from the +normal as anything that occurs in the animal world. +The idea may form the starting point of a new theory, +or perhaps of a new social order. But to establish itself, +to become the characteristic property of the group, +it must run the gamut of persecution and the risk of +suppression. And suppressed it often is—for a time. +It is an idle maxim which teaches that truth always +conquers, if by that is implied that it does so at once. +That is not the truth. Lies have been victorious over +and over again. The Roman Catholic Church, one of +the greatest lies in the history of the human race, stood +the conqueror for many centuries. The teaching of the +rotundity of the earth and its revolution round the sun +was suppressed for hundreds of years until it was revived +in the 16th century. In the long run truth does +emerge, but a lie may have a terribly lengthy innings. +For the lie is accepted by the many, while the truth is +seen only by the few. But it is the few to whom we +turn when we look over the names of those who have +made the world what is it. All the benefits to society +come from the few, and society crucifies them to show +its gratitude. One may put it that society lives on the +usual, but flourishes on account of the exception.</p> + +<p>Now there is something extremely significant in the +Christian religion tracing all the disasters of mankind +to a primal act of disobedience. It is a fact which discloses +in a flash the chief social function of religion<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">{53}</a></span> +in general and of Christianity in particular. Man's +duty is summed up in the one word obedience, and the +function of the (religiously) good man is to obey the +commands of God, as that of the good citizen is to obey +the commands of government. The two commands +meet and supplement each other with the mutual +advantage which results from the adjustment of the +upper and lower jaws of a hyena. And it explains why +the powers that be have always favoured the claims +of religion. It enabled them to rally to their aid the +tremendous and stupefying aid of religion and to place +rebellion to their orders on the same level as rebellion +against God. In Christian theology Satan is the arch-rebel; +hell is full of rebellious angels and disobedient +men and women. Heaven is reserved for the timid, +the tame, the obedient, the sheep-like. When the +Christ of the Gospels divides the people into goats and +sheep, it is the former that go to hell, and the latter +to heaven. The Church has not a rebel in its calendar, +although it has not a few rogues and many fools. To +the Church rebellion is always a sin, save on those rare +occasions when revolt is ordered in the interests of +the Church itself. In Greek mythology Prometheus +steals fire from heaven for the benefit of man and +suffers in consequence. The myth symbolizes the fact. +Always the man has had to win knowledge and happiness +in the teeth of opposition from the gods. Always +the race has owed its progress to the daring of the +rebel or of the rebellious few.</p> + +<p>Often the Freethinker is denounced because he is +destructive or dangerous. What other is he expected +to be? And would he be of much use if he were otherwise?? +I would go further and say that he is the most +destructive of all agencies because he is so intimately +concerned with the handling of the most destructive +of weapons—ideas. We waste a good deal of time in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">{54}</a></span> +denouncing certain people as dangerous when they +are in reality comparatively harmless. A man throws +a bomb, or breaks into a house, or robs one of a purse, +and a judge solemnly denounces him as a most +"dangerous member of society." It is all wrong. +These are comparatively harmless individuals. One +man throws a bomb, kills a few people, damages some +property, and there the matter ends. Another man +comes along and drops instead of a bomb a few ideas, +and the whole country is in a state of eruption. +Charles Peace pursues a career of piety and crime, gets +himself comfortably and religiously hanged, and +society congratulates itself on having got rid of a +dangerous person, and then forgets all about it. Karl +Marx visits England, prowls round London studying +the life of rich and poor, and drops <cite>Das Kapital</cite> on us. +A quiet and outwardly inoffensive individual, one who +never gave the police a moment's anxiety, spends years +studying earthworms, and flowers, and horses and cats, +and all sorts of moving things and presents society with +<cite>The Origin of Species</cite>. Organized society found itself +able to easily guard itself against the attacks of men +such as Charles Peace, it may with impunity extend +its hospitality to the thrower of bombs, or robber of +houses, but by what means can it protect itself against +the "peaceful" Marx or the "harmless" Darwin? +No society can afford to ignore in its midst a score of +original or independent thinkers, or if society does +ignore them they will not for long ignore society. +The thinker is really destructive. He destroys because +he creates; he creates because he destroys. The one +is the obverse of the other.</p> + +<p>I am not making idle play with the word +"destruction." It is literally true that in human +society the most destructive and the most coercive +forces at work are ideas. They strike at established<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">{55}</a></span> +institutions and demand either their modification or +their removal. That is why the emergence of a new +idea is always an event of social significance. +Whether it be a good idea or a bad one will not affect +the truth of this statement. For over four years our +political mediocrities and muddle headed militarists +were acting as though the real problem before them +was to establish the superiority of one armed group +of men over another group. That was really a simple +matter. The important issue which society had to +face was the ideas that the shock of the war must +give rise to. Thinkers saw this; but thinkers do not +get the public ear either as politicians or militarists. +And now events are driving home the lesson. The +ideas of Bolshevism and Sinn Feinism proved far more +"dangerous" than the German armies. The Allied +forces could handle the one, but they were powerless +before the other. It is not a question of whether these +particular ideas are good or bad, or whether we approve +or disapprove of them, but entirely one that, being +ideas, they represent a far more "destructive" power +than either bomb or gun. They are at once the forces +that act as the cement of society and those that may +hurl it into chaotic fragments.</p> + +<p>Whether an idea will survive or not must, in the end, +be determined by circumstances, but in itself a new +idea may be taken as the mental analogue of the +variation which takes place in physical structures, and +which forms the raw material of natural selection. +And if that is so, it is evident that any attempt to +prevent the play of new ideas on old institutions is +striking at the very fact of progress. For if we are +to encourage variation we must permit it in all +directions, up as well as down, for evil as well as for +good. You cannot check variation in one direction +without checking it in all. You cannot prevent the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">{56}</a></span> +appearance of a new idea that you do not want without +threatening the appearance of a number of ideas +that you would eagerly welcome. It is, therefore, +always better to encourage the appearance of a bad +idea than it is to risk the suppression of a good one. +Besides, it is not always that force applied to the +suppression of ideas succeeds in its object. What it +often does is to cause the persecuted idea to assume a +more violent form, to ensure a more abrupt break with +the past than would otherwise occur, with the risk of +a period of reaction before orderly progress is resumed. +The only way to silence an idea is to answer it. You +cannot reply to a belief with bullets, or bayonet a +theory into silence. History contains many lessons, +but none that is plainer than this one, and none that +religious and secular tyrannies learn with greater +reluctance.</p> + +<p>The Churches admit by their practice the truth of +what has been said. They have always understood that +the right way to keep society in a stationary position +is to prevent the introduction of new ideas. It is +thought against which they have warred, the thinker +against whom they have directed their deadliest +weapons. The Christian Church has been tolerant towards +the criminal, and has always been intolerant towards +the heretic and the Freethinker. For the latter +the naming <i>auto da fé</i>, for the former the moderate +penance and the "go, and sin no more." The +worst of its tortures were neither created for +nor applied to the thief and the assassin, but +were specially designed for the unbeliever. In +this the Church acted with a sure instinct. The +thief threatens no institution, not even that of +private property. "Thou shalt not steal" is as much +the law of a thieves' kitchen as it is of Mayfair. +But Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, Lyell, Darwin,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">{57}</a></span> +these are the men who convey a threat in all they write, +who destroy and create with a splendour that smacks +of the power with which Christians have endowed +their mythical deity. No aggregation of criminals +has ever threatened the security of the Church, or +even disturbed its serenity. On the contrary, the +worse, morally, the time, the greater the influence of +Christianity. It flourishes on human weakness and +social vice as the bacilli of tuberculosis do in darkness +and dirt. It is when weakness gives place to +strength, and darkness to light that the Church finds +its power weakening. The Church could forgive +the men who instituted the black slave trade, she +could forgive those who were responsible for the +horrors of the English factory system, but she could +never forgive the writer of the <cite>Age of Reason</cite>. She has +always known how to distinguish her friends from her +foes.</p> + +<p>Right or wrong, then, the heretic, the Freethinker, +represents a figure of considerable social significance. +His social value does not lie wholly in the fact of his +opinions being sound or his judgment impeccable. +Mere revolt or heresy can never carry that assurance +with it. The important thing about the rebel is that +he represents a spirit, a temper, in the absence of +which society would stagnate. It is bad when people +revolt without cause, but it is infinitely better that a +people should revolt without cause than that they +should have cause for rebellion without possessing +the courage of a kick. That man should have the +courage to revolt against the thing which he believes +to be wrong is of infinitely greater consequence than +that he should be right in condemning the thing +against which he revolts. Whether the rebel is right +or wrong time and consequence alone can tell, but +nothing can make good the evil of a community re<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">{58}</a></span>duced +to sheep-like acquiescence in whatever may be +imposed upon them. The "Their's not to reason +why" attitude, however admirable in an army, is intolerable +and dangerous in social life. Replying to +those who shrieked about the "horrors" of the +French Revolution, and who preached the virtue of +patriotic obedience to established authority, Carlyle, +with an eye on Ireland, sarcastically admitted that the +"horrors" were very bad indeed, but he added:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>What if history somewhere on this planet were to +hear of a nation, the third soul of whom had not for +thirty weeks of each year as many third-rate potatoes +as would sustain him? History in that case, feels +bound to consider that starvation is starvation; that +starvation presupposes much; history ventures to +assert that the French Sansculotte of Nine-three, who +roused from a long death sleep, could rush at once +to the frontiers and die fighting for an immortal hope +and faith of deliverance for him and his, was but the +second miserablest of men.</p></blockquote> + +<p>And that same history, looking back through the ages, +is bound to confess that it is to the great rebels, from +Satan onward, that the world mainly owes whatever +of greatness or happiness it has achieved.</p> + +<p>One other quality of the rebel remains to be noted. +In his revolt against established authority, in his +determination to wreck cherished institutions for the +realization of an ideal, the rebel is not the representative +of an anti-social idea or of an anti-social force. +He is the true representative of the strongest of social +influences. The very revolt against the social institutions +that exist is in the name and for the realization +of a larger and a better social order that he hopes to +create. A man who is ready to sacrifice his life in the +pursuit of an ideal cannot, whatever else he may be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">{59}</a></span> +accused of, be reasonably accused of selfishness or of +a want of "social consciousness." He is a vital expression +of the centuries of social life which have gone +before and which have made us all what we are. Were +his social sense weaker he would risk less. Were he +selfish he would not trouble about the conversion of +his fellows. The spirit of revolt represents an important +factor in the process of social development, and +they who are most strenuous in their denunciation of +social control, are often, even though unconsciously, +the strongest evidence of its overpowering influence.</p> + +<p>Fed as we are with the mental food prepared by our +Churches and governments, to whose interests it is +that the rebel and the Freethinker should be decried +and denounced, we are all too apt to overlook the +significance of the rebel. Yet he is invariably the one +who voices what the many are afraid or unable to +express. The masses suffer dumbly, and the persistence +of their suffering breeds a sense of its inevitability. +It is only when these dumb masses find a +voice that they threaten the established order, and for +this the man of ideas is essential. That is why all +vested interests, religious and social, hate him so +heartily. They recognize that of all the forces with +which they deal an idea is the greatest and the most +untamable. Once in being it is the most difficult to +suppress. It is more explosive than dynamite and +more shattering in its effects. Physical force may destroy +a monarch, but it is only the force of an idea that +can destroy a monarchy. You may destroy a church +with cannon, but cannon are powerless against Church +doctrines. An idea comes as near realizing the +quality of indestructibility as anything we know. +You may quiet anything in the world with greater +ease than you may reduce a strong thinker to silence, +or subdue anything with greater facility than you may<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">{60}</a></span> +subdue the idea that is born of strenuous thought. +Fire may be extinguished and strife made to cease, +ambition may be killed and the lust for power grow +faint. The one thing that defies all and that finally +conquers is the truth which strong men see and for +which brave men fight.</p> + +<p>It is thus left for the philosophy of Freethought, +comprehensive here as elsewhere, to find a place for +the rebel and to recognize the part he plays in the +evolution of the race. For rebellion roots itself +ultimately in the spirit of mental independence. And +that whether a particular act of revolt may be justifiable +or not. It is bred of the past, but it looks forward +hopefully and fearlessly to the future, and it sees in +the present the material out of which that better future +may be carved. That the mass of people find in the +rebel someone whom it is moved to suppress is in no +wise surprising. New things are not at first always +pleasant, even though they may be necessary. But +the temper of mind from which rebellion springs is +one that society can only suppress at its peril.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">{61}</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_V" id="CHAPTER_V"></a>CHAPTER V.<br /> +THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CHILD.</h2> + +<p>If the truth of what has been said above be admitted, +it follows that civilization has two fundamental aspects. +On the one side there is the environment, made up—so +far as civilized humanity is concerned—of the ideas, +the beliefs, the customs, and the stored up knowledge +of preceding generations, and on the other side we +have an organism which in virtue of its education responds +to the environmental stimuli in a given manner. +Between the man of to-day and the man of an earlier +generation the vital distinction is not that the present +day one is, as an organism, better, that he has keener +sight, or stronger muscles, or a brain of greater +capacity, but that he has a truer perception of things, +and in virtue of his enlarged knowledge is able to +mould natural forces, including the impulses of his +own nature, in a more desirable manner. And he can +do this because, as I have already said, he inherits +what previous generations have acquired, and so reaps +the benefits of what they have done.</p> + +<p>We may illustrate this in a very simple manner. +One of the most striking differences between the man +of to-day and the man of the past is the attitude of the +two in relation to natural phenomena. To the people +of not so many generations ago an eclipse was a very +serious thing, fraught with the promise of disaster to +mankind. The appearance of a comet was no less<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">{62}</a></span> +ominous. John Knox saw in comets an indication of +the wrath of heaven, and in all countries the Churches +fought with all their might against the growth of the +scientific view. Away back in antiquity we meet with +the same view. There is, for example, the classic case +of the Greek general Nikias, who, when about to +extricate his army from a dangerous position before +Syracuse, was told that an eclipse of the sun indicated +that the gods wished him to stay where he was for +three times nine days. Nikias obeyed the oracles with +the result that his army was captured. Now it is +certain that no general to-day would act in that +manner, and if he did it is equally certain that he +would be court-martialled. Equally clear is it that +comets and eclipses have ceased to infect the modern +mind with terror, and are now only objects of study to +the learned, and of curiosity to the unlearned. But +the difference here is entirely one of knowledge. Our +ancestors reacted to the appearance of a comet or an +eclipse in a particular manner because their knowledge +of these things was of a certain kind. It was not at +all a case of feeling, or of degree of feeling, or of +having a better brain, but simply a matter of reacting +to an environmental influence in terms of an understanding +of certain things. Had we the same conception +of these things that our ancestors had we +should react in the same manner. We act differently +because our understanding of things is different. We +may put it briefly that the kind of reaction which we +make to the things around us is mainly determined by +our knowledge concerning their nature.</p> + +<p>There is one other fact that brings into prominence +the importance of the kind of reaction which we make +to environmental stimuli. Put briefly, we may say +that an important distinction between the animal and +man is that the animal passes its existence in a com<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">{63}</a></span>paratively +simple environment where the experiences +are few in kind and often repeated, whereas with man +the environment is very complex, the experiences are +varied in character, and may be only repeated after +long intervals. The consequence is that in order to +get through life an animal needs a few simple instincts +which automatically respond to frequently repeated +experiences, while on the other hand there must be +with man opportunity for the kind of response which +goes under the name of intelligent action. It is this +which gives us the reason, or the explanation, why of +all animals the human being is born the most helpless, +and why he remains helpless for a longer period than +does any other. The prolonged infancy is the opportunity +given to the human being to acquire the +benefits of education and so to reap the full advantage +of that social heritage which, as we have shown, raises +him so far above the level of past generations. Or we +may express the matter with the late Professor Fiske, +who was the first, I think, to dwell at length upon +this phenomenon, that the distinction between man +and the animal world is that in the one case we have +developed instincts with small capacity for education, +in the other few instincts with great capacity for +education.</p> + +<p>It is often said that the Churches have failed to pay +attention to education, or have not taken it seriously. +That is quite wrong. It may, indeed, be said that they +have never failed to attend to education, and have +always taken it seriously—with disastrous results to +education and to social life. Ever since the birth of +the modern movement for education the Church has +fought hard to maintain its control of schools, and +there is every reason why this should be so. Survival +in the animal world may be secured in two ways. On +the one side we may have a continuance of a special<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">{64}</a></span> +sort of environment to which a given structure is +properly adapted; on the other there may be a modification +of the animal to meet the demands of a changing +environment.</p> + +<p>Applying this principle to the question of the +Churches and education the moral is clear. The +human environment changes more than that of any +other animal. The mere amassing of experience and +its expression in the form of new institutions or in the +modification of already existing ones, is enough to +effect a change in the environment of successive generations. +The Christian Church, or for the matter of +that, any form of religion, has before it two possible +courses. Either it must maintain an environment that +is as little as possible unchanged, or it must modify its +body of teaching to meet the changed surroundings. +As a mere matter of fact both processes go on side +by side, but consciously the Churches have usually +followed the course of trying to maintain an unchanged +environment. This is the real significance of the +attempt of the more orthodox to boycott new, or +heretical literature, or lectures, or to produce a +"religious atmosphere" round the child. It is an +attempt to create an environment to which the child's +mind will respond in a manner that is favourable to the +claims and teachings of the Christian Church. The +Church dare not openly and plainly throw overboard +its body of doctrines to meet the needs of the modern +mind; and the only thing remaining is to keep the +modern mind as backward as possible in order that it +may rest content with a teaching that is reminiscent +of a past stage of civilization.</p> + +<p>In this connection it is interesting to note that the +struggle for the child is essentially a modern phrase. +So long as the teaching of religion is in, at least, a +working harmony with current knowledge and the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">{65}</a></span> +general body of the social forces the question of religious +instruction does not emerge. Life itself—social +life that is—to a very considerable extent enforces +religious teaching. At all events it does not +violently contradict it. But as, owing to the accumulation +of knowledge, views of the world and of man +develop that are not in harmony with accepted religious +teaching, the Churches are forced to attempt the +maintenance of an environment of a special religious +kind to which their teaching is adapted. Hence the +growing prominence of the division of secular and +sacred as things that have to do with religion and +things that have not. Hence, too, the importance to +the Churches of acquiring power over the child's mind +before it is brought completely under the influence of +an environment in which orthodox teachings can only +present themselves as a gross anachronism.</p> + +<p>Thus, one may say with absolute confidence that if +in a modern environment a child was left free with regard +to modern influences there is nothing that would +lead to an acceptance of religion. Our ancestors grew +up familiar with the idea of the miraculous and the +supernatural generally because there was nothing in +the existing knowledge of the world that contradicted +it. But what part is there in the general education of +the child in modern society that would lead to that +end? So far as it is taught anything about the world +it learns to regard it in terms of causation and of +positive knowledge. It finds itself surrounded with +machinery, and inventions, and with a thousand and +one mechanical and other inventions which do not in +the very remotest degree suggest the supernatural. In +other words, the response of a modern child in a +modern environment is of a strictly non-religious kind. +Left alone it would no more become religious in the +sense of believing in the religious teachings of any of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">{66}</a></span> +the Churches than it would pass through life looking +for miracles or accepting fairy tales as sober statements +of historic fact. It would no more express itself in +terms of religion than it would describe an eclipse in +the language of our ancestors of five hundred years +ago.</p> + +<p>In self defence the Churches are thus bound to make +a fight for the possession of the child. They cannot +wait, because that means allowing the child to grow to +maturity and then dealing with it when it is able to +examine religion with some regard to its historic +evolution, and with a due appreciation of the hopelessly +unscientific character of the conception of the supernatural. +They must, so far as they can, protect the +growing child from the influence of all those environmental +forces that make for the disintegration of +religious beliefs. The only way in which the Churches +can at all make sure of a supply of recruits is by impressing +them before they are old enough to resist. +As the Germany of the Kaiser is said to have militarized +the nation by commencing with the schools, so the +Churches hope to keep the nations religious by commencing +with the children. Apart from these considerations +there is no reason why religion could not +wait, as other subjects wait, till the child is old enough +to understand and appreciate it. But with the +Churches it is literally the child or nothing.</p> + +<p>From the point of view of citizenship the retention +of religion in State schools is a manifest injustice. +If ever religious instruction could be justified in any +circumstances it is when the religion taught represents +at least the professed beliefs of the whole of the people. +But that is clearly not the case to-day. Only a section +of the people can be called, even formally, Christian. +Large numbers are quite opposed to Christianity, and +large numbers deliberately reject all religion. How,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">{67}</a></span> +then, can the State undertake the teaching of a religion +without at the same time rousing resentment in and +inflicting an injustice on a large number of its +members? It cannot be done, and the crowning +absurdity is that the State acknowledges the non-essential +character of religion by permitting all who +will to go without. In secular subjects it permits no +such option. It says that all children shall receive +certain tuition in certain subjects for a given period. +It makes instruction in these subjects compulsory on +the definite and intelligible ground that the education +given is necessary to the intelligent discharge of the +duties of citizenship. It does not do that in the case +of religion, and it dare not do that. No government +to-day would have the impudence to say that discharge +of the duties of citizenship is dependent upon +acceptance of the Athanasian Creed, or upon the belief +in the Bible, or in an after life. And not being +able to say this it is driven to the absurd position of, on +the one hand saying to the people, that religion shall +be taught in the State schools, and on the other, if one +doesn't care to have it he may leave it alone without +suffering the slightest disqualification.</p> + +<p>Indeed, it is impossible for instruction in religion to +be genuinely called education at all. If I may be +allowed to repeat what I have said elsewhere on this +subject, one may well ask:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>What is it that the genuine educationalist aims at? +The imparting of knowledge is, of course, essential. +But, in the main, education consists in a wholesome +training of mind and body, in forming habits of +cleanliness, truthfulness, honesty, kindness, the development +of a sense of duty and of justice. Can it +be said in truth that what is called religious instruction +does these things, or that instruction in them is +actually inseparable from religion? Does the creation<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">{68}</a></span> +of a religious "atmosphere," the telling of stories of +God or Jesus or angels or devils—I omit hell—have +any influence in the direction of cultivating a sound +mind in a sound body? Will anyone contend that the +child has even a passing understanding of subjects +over which all adults are more or less mystified? To +confuse is not to instruct, to mystify is not to enlighten, +the repetition of meaningless phrases can +leave behind no healthy residuum in the mind. It is +the development of capacity along right lines that is +important, not the mere cramming of verbal formulę. +Above all, it is the function of the true teacher to +make his pupil independent of him. The aim of the +priest is to keep one eternally dependent upon his +ministrations. The final and fatal criticism upon religious +instruction is that it is not education at all.</p> + +<p>It may be argued that a policy of creating sentiments +in favour of certain things not wholly understood +by the child is followed in connection with +matters other than religion. We do not wait until a +child is old enough to appreciate the intellectual +justification of ethics to train it in morals. And in +many directions we seek to develop some tendencies +and to suppress others in accordance with an accepted +standard. All this may be admitted as quite true, +but it may be said in reply that these are things for +which an adequate reason <em>can</em> be given, and we are +sure of the child's approbation when it is old enough +to appreciate what has been done. But in the case of +religion the situation is altogether different. We are +here forcing upon the child as true, as of the same +admitted value as ordinary ethical teaching, certain +religious doctrines about which adults themselves +dispute with the greatest acrimony. And there is +clearly a wide and vital distinction between cultivating +in a child sentiments the validity of which may at +any time be demonstrated, or teachings upon the +truth of which practically all adults are agreed, and +impressing upon it teachings which all agree may be +false. We are exploiting the child in the interests of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">{69}</a></span> +a Church. Parents are allowing themselves to be made +the catspaws of priests; and it is not the least formidable +of the counts against the Church's influence +that it converts into active enemies of children those +who should stand as their chief protectors. It is +religion which makes it true that "a <em>child's</em> foes +shall be those of his own household."<a name="FNanchor_14_14" id="FNanchor_14_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a></p></blockquote> + +<p>Where the claim to force religion upon the child breaks +down on such grounds as those outlined above it is +quite certain that it cannot be made good upon any +other ground. Historically, it is also clear that we do +not find that conduct was better in those ages when the +Christian religion was held most unquestioningly, but +rather the reverse. The moralization of the world has, +as a matter of historic fact, kept pace with the +secularizing of life. This is true both as regards +theory and fact. The application of scientific methods +to ethical problems has taught us more of the nature of +morality in the short space of three or four generations +than Christian teaching did in a thousand years. And +it is not with an expansion of the power and influence +of religion that conduct has undergone an improvement, +but with the bringing of people together in terms +of secular relationships and reducing their religious +beliefs to the level of speculative ideas which men +may hold or reject as they think fit, so long as they do +not allow them to influence their relations to one +another.</p> + +<p>On all grounds it is urgent that the child should be +rescued from the clutches of the priest. It is unfair +to the child to so take advantage of its trust, its +innocence, and its ignorance, and to force upon it as +true teachings that which we must all admit may be +false, and which, in a growing number of cases, the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">{70}</a></span> +child when it grows up either rejects absolutely or considerably +modifies. It is unjust to the principle upon +which the modern State rests, because it is teaching +the speculative beliefs of a few with money raised from +the taxation of all. The whole tendency of life in the +modern State is in the direction of secularization—confining +the duties and activities of the State to those +actions which have their meaning and application to +this life. Every argument that is valid against the +State forcing religion upon the adult is valid also +against the State forcing religion upon the child. And, +on the other hand, it is really absurd to say that religion +must be forced upon the child, but we are outraging +the rights of the individual and perpetuating an +intolerable wrong if we force it upon the adult. Surely +the dawning and developing individuality of the child +has claims on the community that are not less urgent +than those of the adult.</p> + +<p>Finally, the resolve to rescue the child from the +clutches of the priest is in the interest of civilization +itself. All human experience shows that a civilization +that is under the control of a priesthood is doomed. +From the days of ancient Egypt there is no exception +to this rule. And sooner or later a people, if they are +to progress, are compelled to attempt to limit the control +of the priest over life. The whole of the struggle +of the Reformation was fundamentally for the control +of the secular power—whether life should or should +not be under the control of the Church. In that contest, +over a large part of Europe, the Roman Church +lost. But the victory was only a very partial one. It +was never complete. The old priest was driven out, +but the new Presbyter remained, and he was but the +old tyrant in another form. Ever since then the fight +has gone on, and ever since, the Protestant minister, +equally with the Catholic priest, has striven for the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">{71}</a></span> +control of education and so to dominate the mind of +the rising generation. The fight for the liberation of +the child is thus a fight for the control or the directing +of civilization. It is a question of whether we are +to permit the priest to hold the future to ransom by +permitting this control of the child, or whether we are +to leave religious beliefs, as we leave other beliefs of a +speculative character, to such a time as the child is old +enough to understand them. It is a fight for the future +of civilization.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">{72}</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VI" id="CHAPTER_VI"></a>CHAPTER VI.<br /> +THE NATURE OF RELIGION.</h2> + +<p>It is no mere paradox to say that religion is most interesting +to those who have ceased to believe in it. +The reason for this is not far to seek. Religious beliefs +play so large a part in the early history of society, +and are so influential in social history generally, that +it is impossible to leave religion alone without forfeiting +an adequate comprehension of a large part of +social evolution. Human development forms a continuous +record; our institutions, whatever be their +nature, have their roots in the far past, and often, even +when modified in form, retain their essential characteristics. +No student of social history can travel +far or dig deeply without finding himself in contact +with religion in some form. And the mass of mankind +are not yet so far removed from "primitive" +humanity as to give to the study of religion an exclusively +archęological interest.</p> + +<p>Where so much is discord it is well, if it be possible, +to start with a basis of agreement. And on one point, +at least, there is substantial unity among critics. +There is a general agreement among students of +folk lore, comparative mythology, and anthropology, +that religious ideas rest ultimately upon an interpretation +of nature that is now generally discarded. +Differing as they do on details, there is consent +upon this point. It is the world of the savage that +originates the religion of the savage, and upon that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">{73}</a></span> +rests the religions of civilized man as surely as his +physical structure goes back to the animal world for +its beginning. And in giving birth to a religious explanation +of his world the savage was only pursuing +the normal path of human development. Mankind +progresses through trial and error; doubtful and +erroneous theories are framed before more reliable +ones are established, and while truth may crown our +endeavours it seldom meets us at the outset. Religious +beliefs thus form man's earliest interpretation of +nature. On this there is, as I have said, general agreement, +and it is as well not to permit ourselves to lose +sight of that in the discussion of the various theories +that are put forward as to the exact nature of the +stages of religious development.</p> + +<p>In many directions the less accurate theories of +things are replaced gradually and smoothly by more +reliable explanations. But in religion this is not so. +For many reasons, with which we are not now +immediately concerned, religious beliefs are not outgrown +without considerable "growing pains." And +a long time after the point of view from which religious +beliefs sprang has been given up, the conclusions that +were based on that point of view are held to most +tenaciously. And yet if one accepts the scientific +story of the origins of religious ideas there seems no +justification whatever for this. Religion cannot transcend +its origin. Multiply nothing to infinity and the +result is still nothing. Illusion can beget nothing but +illusion, even though in its pursuit we may stumble +on reality. And no amount of ingenuity can extract +truth from falsehood.</p> + +<p>One's surprise at the perpetuation of this particular +delusion is diminished by the reflection that the period +during which we have possessed anything like an exact +knowledge of the character and operations of natural<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">{74}</a></span> +forces is, after all, but an infinitesimal portion of the +time the race has been in existence. Three or four +centuries at most cover the period during which such +knowledge has been at our command, and small as this +is in relation to the thousands of generations wherein +superstition has reigned unchallenged, a knowledge of +the laws of mental life belongs only to the latter +portion. And even then the knowledge available has +been till recently the possession of a class, while to-day, +large masses of the population are under the domination +of the crudest of superstitions. The belief that +thirteen is an unlucky number, that a horse-shoe brings +luck, the extent to which palmistry and astrology +flourishes, the cases of witchcraft that crop up every +now and again, all bear testimony to the vast mass of +superstition that is still with us. The primitive mind +is still alive and active, disguised though it may be by +a veneer of civilization and a terribly superficial +education. And when one reflects upon all the facts +there is cause for astonishment that in the face of so +great a dead weight of custom and tradition against a +rational interpretation of the universe so much has +been done and in so short a time.</p> + +<p>In discussing religion very much turns upon the +meaning of the word, and unfortunately "religion" +is to-day used in so many differing and conflicting +senses that without the most careful definition no one +is quite sure what is meant by it. The curious disinclination +of so many to avow themselves as being +without a religion must also be noted. To be without +a religion, or rather to be known as one who is without +a religion, would seem to mark one off as apart from +the rest of one's kind, and to infringe all the tribal +taboos at one sweep. And very few seem to have the +courage to stand alone. Mr. Augustine Birrell once +said, in introducing to the House of Commons an<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">{75}</a></span> +Education Bill, that children would rather be wicked +than singular. That is quite true, and it is almost as +true of adults as it is of children. There is no great +objection to having a religion different from that of +other people, because the religions of the world are +already of so varied a character that there is always +companionship in difference. But to be without a religion +altogether is a degree of isolation that few can +stand. The consequence is that although vast numbers +have given up everything that is really religious they +still cling to the name. They have left the service, +but they show a curious attachment to the uniform. +Thus it happens that we have a religion of Socialism, +a religion of Ethics, etc., and I should not be surprised +to find one day a religion of Atheism—if that has not +already appeared.</p> + +<p>But all this is a mistake, and a very serious mistake. +The Freethinker, or Socialist, who calls his theory of +life a religion is not causing the religionist to think +more highly of him, he is making his opponent think +more highly of his own opinions. Imitation becomes +in such a case not alone flattery, but confirmation. The +Goddite does not think more highly of Freethought because +it is labelled religion, he merely becomes the +more convinced of the supreme value of his own faith, +and still hopes for the Freethinker's return to the fold. +If Freethinkers are to command the respect of the +religious world they must show not only that they can +get along without religion, but that they can dispense +with the name also. If strength does not command +respect weakness will certainly fail to secure it. And +those of us who are genuinely anxious that the world +should be done with false ideas and mischievous +frames of mind ought to at least take care that our own +speech and thought are as free from ambiguity as is +possible.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">{76}</a></span> +There is another and deeper aspect of the matter. +As I have already said, language not alone expresses +thought, it also governs and directs it. Locke expressed +this truth when he said, "It is impossible that +men should ever truly seek, or certainly discover, the +disagreement of ideas themselves whilst their thoughts +flutter about, or stick only on sounds of doubtful and +uncertain significance." Quite a number of theological +and metaphysical conundrums would lose their +significance if it were only realized that the words used +are not alone of doubtful and uncertain significance, +but often of no possible significance whatever. They +are like counterfeit coins, which retain their value only +so long as they are not tested by a proper standard. +And the evil of these counterfeits is that they deceive +both those who tender and those who accept them. +For even though slovenliness of speech is not always +the product of slovenly thought, in the long run it +tends to induce it, and those who realize this need to +be specially on their guard against using language +which can only further confuse an already sufficiently +confused public opinion, and strengthen superstitions +that are already sufficiently strong without our clandestine +or unintended assistance.<a name="FNanchor_15_15" id="FNanchor_15_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a></p> + +<p>Unfortunately, it remains a favourite policy with +many writers to use and define the word religion, not +in accordance with a comprehensive survey of facts, +but in a way that will harmonize with existing pre-possessions. +To this class belongs Matthew Arnold's<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">{77}</a></span> +famous definition of religion as "Morality touched +with emotion," Professor Seeley's statement that we +are entitled to call religion "any habitual and permanent +admiration," or the common description of +religion as consisting in devotion to an ideal. All +such definitions may be set on one side as historically +worthless, and as not harmonizing with the facts. +Arnold's definition is in the highest degree superficial, +since there exists no morality that is not touched with +emotion, and on the other hand there exist phases of +religion that have not any connection with morality, +however slight. Professor Leuba properly rules definitions +of this class out of order in the comment that, +as it is "the function of words to delimitate, one defeats +the purpose of language by stretching the meaning +of a word until it has lost all precision and unity of +meaning."<a name="FNanchor_16_16" id="FNanchor_16_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> A definition that includes everything +may as well, for all the use it is, not cover anything.</p> + +<p>Equally faulty are those definitions that are based +upon an assumed conscious effort to explain the +mysteries of existence. No stranger lapse ever overtook +a great thinker than occurred to Herbert Spencer +when he described religion as consisting in a worship +of the unknowable, and as due to the desire to explain +a mystery ever pressing for interpretation. Granting +the existence of an Unknowable, the sense of its +presence belongs to the later stages of mental evolution, +not to the earlier ones. Metaphysical and +mystical theories of religion are indications of its disintegration, +not of its beginnings. Primitive man +began to believe in ghosts and gods for the same +reasons that he believed in other things; he worshipped +his gods for very concrete considerations. Even the +distinction between "spiritual" and material exist<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">{78}</a></span>ence +is quite foreign to his mind. Such distinctions +arise gradually with the progress of knowledge and its +disintegrating influence on inherited beliefs. If +primitive man may be credited with a philosophy, and +if one may use the word in a purely convenient sense, +then one may say that he is neither a dualist, nor a +pluralist, but a monist. The soul or double he believes +in is similar to the body he sees; the unseen +forces he credits with various activities are of the +same kind as those with which he is acquainted. To +read our conceptions into the mind of primitive man +because we use our words to explain his thoughts is a +procedure that is bound to end in confusion. Man's +earliest conception of things is vague and indefinite. +Later, he distinguishes differences, qualitative and +quantitative, his conception of things becomes more +definite, and distinctions are set up that lay the foundations +of science and philosophy, and which mark their +separation from religion.</p> + +<p>So far as one can see there are only two causes why +people should continue to use the word religion after +giving up all for which it properly stands. One is +sheer conservatism. When, for instance, Thomas +Paine said, "To do good is my religion," he had at +least the justification of believing in a deity, but apart +from this the only cause for his calling the desire to do +good a religion is that there had grown up the fashion +of calling one's rule of life a religion. The other cause +is the ill-repute that has been attached to those who +avow themselves as being without religion. Orthodoxy +saw to it that they were treated as pariahs without +social status, and, in many cases, legal rights. +Once upon a time it was useless unless one believed in +the <em>right</em> religion. Nowadays, any religion will do, or +anything that one cares to call a religion. But not to +have any religion at all still puts one outside the pale<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">{79}</a></span> +of respectability, and there seem to be few who can +stand that. And supernatural religion—the only +genuine article—being impossible with many, these +may still, if they care to, save their face by professing +to use the name, even if they have not the thing. +Orthodoxy is very accommodating nowadays.</p> + +<p>Leaving for a time the question of how religion +actually does arise, we may turn to those writers +who define religion in terms of ethics. It may be +admitted that so far as the later stages of religion are +concerned considerable emphasis is laid upon ethics. +But we can only make religion a part of ethics by +expanding the term morality so as to include +everything, or by contracting it so as to exclude all +the lower forms of religious belief. And any definition +of religion that does not embrace all its forms is +obviously inaccurate. It is not at all a question of +defining the higher in terms of the lower, or the lower +in terms of the higher, it is simply the need of so defining +religion that our definition will cover all +religions, high and low, and thus deal with their +essential characteristics.</p> + +<p>The only sense in which ethics may be said to be +included in religion lies in the fact that in primitive +times religion includes everything. The fear of unseen +intelligences is one of the most powerful factors +of which early humanity is conscious, and the necessity +for conciliating them is always present. The religious +ceremonies connected with eating and drinking, with +lying down and rising up, with sowing and reaping, +with disease, hunting, and almost every circumstance +of primitive life prove this. Differentiation and discrimination +arise very slowly, but one after another +the various departments of life do shake off the controlling +influence of religion. Ethics may, therefore, +be said to originate in the shadow of religion—as do<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">{80}</a></span> +most other things—but in no sense can morality be +said to owe its origin to religion. Its origin is deeper +and more fundamental than religion. As a matter of +practice morality is independent of religious belief and +moral theory, and as a matter of theory the formulation +of definite moral rules is substantially independent +of religion and is an assertion of its independence. Indeed, +the conflict between a growing moral sense and +religion is almost as large a fact in the social sphere as +the conflict between religion and science is in the +intellectual one.</p> + +<p>In all its earlier stages religion is at best non-moral. +It becomes otherwise later only because of the reaction +of a socialized morality on religious beliefs. Early +religion is never concerned with the morality of its +teaching, nor are the worshippers concerned with the +morality of their gods. The sole question is what the +gods desire and how best to satisfy them. We cannot +even conceive man ascribing ethical qualities to his +gods until he has first of all conceived them in regard +to his fellow men. The savage has no <em>moral</em> reverence +for his gods; they are magnified men, but not perfect +ones. He worships not because he admires, but because +he fears. Fear is, indeed, one of the root causes +of religious belief. Professor Leuba quite admits the +origin of religion is fear, but he reserves the possibility +of man being occasionally placed under such favourable +conditions that fear may be absent. We admit the +possibility, but at present it remains a possibility only. +At present all the evidence goes to prove the words of +Ribot that, "The religious sentiment is composed +first of all of the emotion of fear in its different degrees, +from profound terror to vague uneasiness, due to faith +in an unknown mysterious and impalpable power." +And if that be admitted, we can scarcely find here the +origin of morality.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">{81}</a></span> +What is here overlooked is the important fact that +while religion, as such, commences in a reasoned process, +morality is firmly established before mankind is +even aware of its existence. A formulated religion is +essentially of the nature of a theory set forth to explain +or to deal with certain experiences. Morality, on the +other hand, takes its rise in those feelings and instincts +that are developed in animal and human +societies under the pressure of natural selection. The +affection of the animal for its young, of the human +mother for its child, the attraction of male and female, +the sympathetic feelings that bind members of the +same species together, these do not depend upon +theory, or even upon an intellectual perception of their +value. Theory tries to account for their existence, +and reason justifies their being, but they are fundamentally +the product of associated life. And it is +precisely because morality is the inevitable condition +of associated life that it has upon religion the effect of +modifying it until it is at least not too great an outrage +upon the conditions of social well-being. All +along we can, if we will, see how the developing moral +sense forces a change in religious teaching. At one +time there is nothing revolting in the Christian doctrine +of election which dooms one to heaven and another to +hell without the slightest regard to personal merit. At +another the doctrine of eternal damnation is rejected +as a matter of course. Heresy hunting and heretic +burning, practised as a matter of course by one +generation become highly repulsive to another. In +every direction we see religious beliefs undergoing +a modification under the influence of moral and social +growth. It is always man who moralizes his gods; +never by any chance is it the gods who moralize man.</p> + +<p>If we are to arrive at a proper understanding of +religion we can, therefore, no more assume morals to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">{82}</a></span> +be an integral part of religion than we can assume +medicine or any of the special arts, all of which may be +associated with religion. It will not even do to define +religion with Mr. W. H. Mallock<a name="FNanchor_17_17" id="FNanchor_17_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> as a belief that the +world "has been made and is sustained by an intelligence +external to and essentially independent of it." +That may pass as a definition of Theism, but Theism is +only one of the phases of religion, and the idea of a +creator independent of the universe is one that is quite +alien to the earlier stages of religion. And to deny +the name of religion to primitive beliefs is to put oneself +on the level of the type of Christian who declines +to call any superstition but his own religion. It is for +this reason impossible to agree with Professor Leuba +when he says that "the idea of a creator must take +precedence of ghosts and nature beings in the making +of a religion." If by precedence the order of importance, +from the standpoint of later and comparatively +modern forms of religion, is intended, the statement +may pass. But if the precedence claimed is a time +order, the reply is that, instead of the idea of a creator +taking precedence of ghosts and nature beings, it is +from these that the idea of a creator is evolved. It is +quite true Professor Leuba holds that "belief in the +existence of unseen anthropopathic beings is not +religion. It is only when man enters into relation with +them that religion comes into existence," but so soon +as man believes in the existence of them he believes +himself to be in relation with them, and a large part of +his efforts is expended in making these relations of an +amicable and profitable character.</p> + +<p>A further definition of religion, first given, I think, +by the late Professor Fiske, but since widely used, as a +craving for "fulness of life," must be dismissed as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">{83}</a></span> +equally faulty. For if by fulness of life is meant the +desire to make it morally and intellectually richer, the +answer is that this desire is plainly the product of a +progressive social life, of which much that now passes +for religion is the adulterated expression. Apologetically, +it is an attempt so to state religion that it may +evade criticism of its essential character. From one +point of view this may be gratifying enough, but it is +no help to an understanding of the nature of religion. +And how little religion does help to a fuller life will be +seen by anyone who knows the part played by +organized religion in mental development and how +blindly obstructive it is to new ideas in all departments +of life. All these attempts to define religion in terms +of ethics, of metaphysics, or as the craving after an +ideal are wholly misleading. It is reading history +backwards, and attributing to primitive human nature +feelings and conceptions which it does not and cannot +possess.</p> + +<p>In another work<a name="FNanchor_18_18" id="FNanchor_18_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_18" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> I have traced the origin of the +belief in God to the mental state of primitive mankind, +and there is no need to go over the same ground here +at any length. Commencing with the indisputable +fact that religion is something that is acquired, an +examination of the state of mind in which primitive +mankind faced, and still faces, the world, led to the +conclusion that the idea of god begins in the personification +of natural forces by the savage. The growth of +the idea of God was there traced back to the ghost, not +to the exclusion of other methods of god making, but +certainly as one of its prominent causes. I must refer +readers to that work who desire a more extended treatment +of the god-idea.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">{84}</a></span> +What remains to be traced here, in order to understand +the other factor that is common to religions, is +the belief in a continued state of existence after death, +or at least of a soul.</p> + +<p>It has been shown to the point of demonstration by +writers such as Spencer, Tylor, and Frazer, that the +idea of a double is suggested to man by his experience +of dreams, swoons, and allied normal and abnormal +experiences. Even in the absence of evidence coming +to us from the beliefs of existing tribes of savages, the +fact that the ghost is always depicted as identical in +appearance with the living person would be enough to +suggest its dream origin. But there are other considerations +that carry the proof further. The savage +sees in his dreams the figures of dead men and assumes +that there is a double that can get out of the body +during sleep. But he also dreams of dead men, and +this is also proof that the dead man still exists. Death +does not, then, involve the death of the ghost, but only +its removal to some other sphere of existence. Further, +the likeness of sleep itself to death is so obvious and +so striking that it has formed one of the most insistent +features of human thought and speech. With primitive +man it is far more than a figure of speech. The +Melanesians put this point of view when they say, +"the soul goes out of the body in some dreams, and +if for some reason it does not come back the man is +found dead in the morning." Death and dreaming have, +therefore, this in common, they are both due to the +withdrawal of the double. Hence we find a whole +series of ceremonies designed to avert death or to +facilitate the return of the double. The lingering of +this practice is well illustrated by Sir Frederick Treves +in his book, <cite>The Other Side of the Lantern</cite>. He there +tells how he saw a Chinese mother, with the tears +streaming down her face, waving at the door of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">{85}</a></span> +house the clothing of a recently deceased child in order +to bring back the departed spirit.</p> + +<p>Death is thus the separation of the double from the +body; but if it may return, its return is not always a +matter of rejoicing, for we find customs that are +plainly intended to prevent the ghost recognizing the +living or to find its way back to its old haunts. Thus +Frazer has shown that the wearing of black is really +a form of disguise. It is a method taken to disguise the +living from the attentions of the dead. It is in order to +avoid recognition by spirits who wish to injure them +that the Tongans change their war costume at every +battle. The Chinese call their best beloved children +by worthless names in order to delude evil spirits. In +Egypt, too, the children who were most thought of +were the worst clad. In some places the corpse is +never carried out through the door, but by a hole in +the side of the hut, which is afterwards closed so that +the ghost may not find its way back.</p> + +<p>The ghost being conceived as at all points identical +with living beings, it demands attention after death. +It needs food, weapons, servants, wives. In this way +there originates a whole group of burial customs, performed +partly from fear of what the ghost may do if +its wants are neglected. The custom of burying food +and weapons with the dead thus receives a simple explanation. +These things are buried with the dead man +in order that their spirit may accompany his to the next +world and serve the same uses there that they did here. +The modern custom of scattering flowers over a grave +is unquestionably a survival of this primitive belief. +The killing of a wife on the husband's grave has the +same origin. Her spirit goes to attend the husband in +the ghost-land. In the case of a chief we have the +killing of servants for the same reason. When Leonidas +says, "Bury me on my shield, I will enter even<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">{86}</a></span> +Hades as a Lacedęmonian," he was exhibiting the +persistence of this belief in classical times. The +Chinese offer a further example by making little paper +houses, filling them with paper models of the things +used by the dead person, and burning them on the +grave. All over the world we have the same class of +customs developing from the same beliefs, and the +same beliefs projected by the human mind when +brought face to face with the same class of phenomena.</p> + +<p>As the ghost is pictured as like the physical man, so +the next world is more or less a replica of this. The +chief distinction is that there is a greater abundance of +desirable things. Hunting tribes have elysiums where +there is an abundance of game. The old Norse heaven +was a place where there was unlimited fighting. The +gold and diamonds and rubies of the Christian heaven +represent a stage of civilization where these things had +acquired a special value. Social distinctions, too, are +often maintained. The Caribs believe that every time +they secure an enemy's head they have gained a servant +in the next world. And all know the story of the +French aristocrat who, when threatened with hell, +replied, "God will think twice before damning a +person of my quality."</p> + +<p>Several other consequences of this service paid to +the dead may be noted. The ghost being drawn to the +place where the body is buried, the desire to preserve +the corpse probably led to the practice of embalming. +The grave becomes a place of sanctity, of pilgrimage, +and of religious observance, and it has been maintained +by many writers, notably by Mr. W. Simpson +in his <cite>Worship of Death</cite>, that the service round the +grave gives us the beginning of all temple worship.</p> + +<p>But from this brief view of the beginnings of religion +we are able to see how completely fallacious are all +those efforts to derive religion from an attempt to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">{87}</a></span> +achieve an ideal, from a desire to solve certain philosophical +problems, or from any of the other sources +that are paraded by modern apologists. The origin +and nature of religion is comparatively simple to understand, +once we have cleared our minds of all these +fallacies and carefully examine the facts. Religion is +no more than the explanation which the primitive mind +gives of the experiences which it has of the world. +And, therefore, the only definition that covers all the +facts, and which stresses the essence of all religions, +high and low, savage and civilized, is that given by +Tylor, namely, the belief in supernatural beings. It is +the one definition that expresses the feature common to +all religions, and with that definition before us we are +able to use language with a precision that is impossible +so long as we attempt to read into religion something +that is absent from all its earlier forms, and which is +only introduced when advanced thought makes the +belief in the supernatural more and more difficult to +retain its hold over the human mind.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">{88}</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VII" id="CHAPTER_VII"></a>CHAPTER VII.<br /> +THE UTILITY OF RELIGION.</h2> + +<p>The real nature of religion being as stated, it having +originated in an utterly erroneous view of things, +it would seem that nothing more can be needed to +justify its rejection. But the conclusion would not be +correct, at least so far as the mass of believers or +quasi-believers are concerned. Here the conviction +still obtains that religion, no matter what its origin, +still wields an enormous influence for good. The +curious thing is that when one enquires "what religion +is it that has exerted this beneficent influence?" the +replies effectually cancel one another. Each means by +religion his own religion, and each accuses the religion +of the other man of all the faults with which the Freethinker +accuses the whole. The avowed object of our +widespread missionary activity is to save the "heathen" +from the evil effects of their religion; and there is not +the least doubt that if the heathen had the brute force +at their command, and the impudence that we have, +they would cordially reciprocate. And the efforts of +the various Christian sects to convert each other is too +well known to need mention. So that the only logical +inference from all this is that, while all religions are, +when taken singly, injurious, taken in the bulk they +are sources of profound benefit.</p> + +<p>It is not alone the common or garden order of religionist +who takes up this curious position, nor is it +even the better educated believer; it is not uncommon +to find those who have rejected all the formal religions<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">{89}</a></span> +of the world yet seeking to discover some good that +religion has done or is doing. As an illustration of +this we may cite an example from Sir James Frazer, +than whom no one has done more to bring home to +students a knowledge of the real nature of religious +beliefs. It is the more surprising to find him putting +in a plea for the good done by religion, not in the +present, but in the past. And such an instance, if it +does nothing else, may at least serve to mitigate our +ferocity towards the common type of religionist.</p> + +<p>In an address delivered in 1909, entitled "Psyche's +Task: A discourse concerning the influence of superstition +on the growth of Institutions," he puts in a plea +for the consideration of superstition (religion) at +various stages of culture. Of its effects generally, he +says:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>That it has done much harm in the world cannot be +denied. It has sacrificed countless lives, wasted untold +treasures, embroiled nations, severed friends, +parted husbands and wives, parents and children, +putting swords and worse than swords between them; +it has filled gaols and madhouses with its deluded +victims; it has broken many hearts, embittered the +whole of many a life, and not content with persecuting +the living it has pursued the dead into the grave +and beyond it, gloating over the horrors which its +foul imagination has conjured up to appal and torture +the survivors. It has done all this and more.</p></blockquote> + +<p>Now this is a severe indictment, and one is a little +surprised to find following that a plea on behalf of this +same superstition to the effect that it has "among +certain races and at certain times strengthened the +respect for government, property, marriage, and +human life." In support of this proposition he cites a +large number of instances from various races of people,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">{90}</a></span> +all of which prove, not what Sir James sets out to +prove, but only that religious observances and beliefs +have been connected with certain institutions that are +in themselves admirable enough. And on this point +there is not, nor can there be, any serious dispute. +One can find many similar instances among ourselves +to-day. But the real question at issue is a deeper one +than that. It is not enough for the religionist to show +that religion has often been associated with good things +and has given them its sanction. The reply to this +would be that if it had been otherwise religion would +long since have disappeared. The essential question +here is, Have the institutions named a basis in secular +and social life, and would they have developed in the +absence of superstition as they have developed with +superstition in the field?</p> + +<p>Now I do not see that Sir James Frazer proves either +that these institutions have not a sufficient basis in +secular life—he would, I imagine, admit that they have; +or that they would not have developed as well in the +absence of superstition as they have done with it. In +fact, the whole plea that good has been done by superstition +seems to be destroyed in the statements that +although certain institutions "have been based partly +on superstitions, it by no means follows that even +among these races they have never been based on anything +else," and that whenever institutions have proved +themselves stable and permanent "there is a strong +presumption that they rest on something more solid +than superstition." So that, after all, it may well be +that superstition is all the time taking credit for the +working of forces that are not of its kind or nature.</p> + +<p>Let us take the example given of the respect for +human life as a crucial test. Admitting that religions +have taught that to take life was a sinful act, one +might well interpose with the query as to whether it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">{91}</a></span> +was ever necessary to teach man that homicide within +certain limits was a wrong thing. Pre-evolutionary +sociology, which sometimes taught that man originally +led an existence in which his hand was against every +other man, and who, therefore, fought the battle of +life strictly off his own bat, may have favoured that +assumption. But that we now know is quite wrong. +We know that man slowly emerged from a pre-human +gregarious stage, and that in all group life there is an +organic restraint on mutual slaughter. The essential +condition of group life is that the nature of the +individual shall be normally devoid of the desire for the +indiscriminate slaughter of his fellows. And if that +is true of animals, it is certainly true of man. Primitive +human society does not and cannot represent a +group of beings each of whom must be restrained by +direct coercion from murdering the other.</p> + +<p>In this case, therefore, we have to reckon with both +biological and sociological forces, and I do not see that +it needs more than this to explain all there is to explain. +Human life is always associated life, and this means +not alone a basis of mutual forbearance and co-operation, +but a development of the sympathetic feelings +which tends to increase as society develops, they being, +as a matter of fact, the conditions of its growth. And +whatever competition existed between tribes would +still further emphasize the value of those feelings that +led to effective co-operation.</p> + +<p>The question, then, whether the anti-homicidal +feeling is at all dependent upon religion is answered +in the negative by the fact that it ante-dates what we +may term the era of conscious social organization. +That of whether religion strengthens this feeling still +remains, although even that has been answered by +implication. And the first thing to be noted here is +that whatever may be the value of the superstitious<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">{92}</a></span> +safeguard against homicide it certainly has no value as +against people outside the tribe. In fact, when a +savage desires to kill an enemy he finds in superstition +a fancied source of strength, and often of encouragement. +Westermarck points out that "savages carefully +distinguish between an act of homicide committed +in their own community and one where the +victim is a stranger. Whilst the former is under +ordinary circumstances disapproved of, the latter is in +most cases allowed and often regarded as praiseworthy." +And Frazer himself points out that the belief in immortality +plays no small part in encouraging war +among primitive peoples,<a name="FNanchor_19_19" id="FNanchor_19_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> while if we add the facts +of the killing of children, of old men and women, +and wives, together with the practice of human sacrifice, +we shall see little cause to attribute the development +of the feeling against homicide to religious +beliefs.</p> + +<p>In one passage in his address Sir James does show +himself quite alive to the evil influence of the belief +in immortality. He says:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>It might with some show of reason be maintained +that no belief has done so much to retard the economic +and thereby the social progress of mankind as the +belief in the immortality of the soul; for this belief +has led race after race, generation after generation, +to sacrifice the real wants of the living to the +imaginary wants of the dead. The waste and destruc<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">{93}</a></span>tion +of life and property which this faith has entailed +has been enormous and incalculable. But I am not +here concerned with the disastrous and deplorable +consequences, the unspeakable follies and crimes and +miseries which have flowed in practice from the +theory of a future life. My business at present is +with the more cheerful side of a gloomy subject.</p></blockquote> + +<p>Every author has, of course, the fullest right to select +whichever aspect of a subject he thinks deserves treatment, +but all the same one may point out that it is this +dwelling on the "cheerful side" of these beliefs that +encourages the religionist to put forward claims on +behalf of present day religion that Sir James himself +would be the first to challenge. There is surely +greater need to emphasize the darker side of a creed +that has thousands of paid advocates presenting an +imaginary bright side to the public gaze.</p> + +<p>But what has been said of the relation of the feeling +against homicide applies with no more than a variation +of terms to the other instances given by Sir James +Frazer. Either these institutions have a basis in utility +or they have not. If they have not, then religion can +claim no social credit for their preservation. If +they have a basis in utility, then the reason for their +preservation is to be found in social selection, although +the precise local form in which an institution appears +may be determined by other circumstances. And +when Sir James says that the task of government has +been facilitated by the superstition that the governors +belonged to a superior class of beings, one may safely +assume that the statement holds good only of individual +governors, or of particular forms of government. It +may well be that when a people are led to believe that +a certain individual possesses supernatural powers, or +that a particular government enjoys the favour of +supernatural beings, there will be less inclination to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">{94}</a></span> +resentment against orders than there would be otherwise. +But government and governors, in other words, +a general body of rules for the government of the +tribe, and the admitted leadership of certain favoured +individuals, would remain natural facts in the absence +of superstition, and their development or suppression +would remain subject to the operation of social or +natural selection. So, again, with the desire for private +property. The desire to retain certain things as belonging +to oneself is not altogether unnoticeable among +animals. A dog will fight for its bone, monkeys +secrete things which they desire to retain for their own +use, etc., and so far as the custom possesses advantages, +we may certainly credit savages with enough +common-sense to be aware of the fact. But the curious +thing is that the institution of private property is not +nearly so powerful among primitive peoples as it is +among those more advanced. So that we are faced +with this curious comment upon Sir James's thesis. +Granting that the institution of private property has +been strengthened by superstition we have the strange +circumstance that that institution is weakest where +superstition is strongest and strongest where superstition +is weakest.</p> + +<p>The truth is that Sir James Frazer seems here to +have fallen into the same error as the late Walter +Bagehot, and to have formed the belief that primitive +man required breaking in to the "social yoke." The +truth is that the great need of primitive mankind is not +to be broken in but to acquire the courage and determination +to break out. This error may have originated +in the disinclination of the savage to obey <em>our</em> rules, +or it may have been a heritage from the eighteenth +century philosophy of the existence of an idyllic +primitive social state. The truth is, however, that +there is no one so fettered by custom as is the savage.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">{95}</a></span> +The restrictions set by a savage society on its members +would be positively intolerable to civilized beings. +And if it be said that these customs required formation, +the reply is that inheriting the imitability of the pre-human +gregarious animal, this would form the basis +on which the tyrannizing custom of primitive life is +built.</p> + +<p>There was, however, another generalization of Bagehot's +that was unquestionably sound. Assuming that +the first step necessary to primitive mankind was to +frame a custom as the means of his being "broken in," +the next step in progress was to break it, and that was +a far more difficult matter. Progress was impossible +until this was done, and how difficult it is to get this +step taken observation of the people living in civilized +countries will show. But it is in relation to this second +and all important step that one can clearly trace the +influence of religion. And its influence is completely +the reverse of being helpful. For of all the hindrances +to a change of custom there is none that act with such +force as does religion. This is the case with those +customs with which vested interest has no direct connection, +but it operates with tenfold force where this +exists. Once a custom is established in a primitive +community the conditions of social life surround it +with religious beliefs, and thereafter to break it means +a breach in the wall of religious observances with +which the savage is surrounded. And so soon as we +reach the stage of the establishment of a regular priesthood, +we have to reckon with the operation of a vested +interest that has always been keenly alive to anything +which affected its profit or prestige.</p> + +<p>It would not be right to dismiss the discussion of a +subject connected with so well-respected a name as +that of Sir James Frazer and leave the reader with the +impression that he is putting in a plea for current<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">{96}</a></span> +religion. He is not. He hints pretty plainly that his +argument that religion has been of some use to the +race applies to savage times only. We see this in such +sentences as the following: "More and more, as time +goes on, morality shifts its grounds from the sands of +superstition to the rock of reason, from the imaginary +to the real, from the supernatural to the natural.... The +State has found a better reason than these old wives' +fables for guarding with the flaming sword of justice +the approach to the tree of life," and also in saying +that, "If it can be proved that in certain races and at +certain times the institutions in question have been +based partly on superstition, it by no means follows +that even among these races they have never been +based on anything else. On the contrary ... there is +a strong presumption that they rest mainly on something +much more solid than superstition." In modern +times no such argument as the one I have been discussing +has the least claim to logical force. But that, +as we all know, does not prevent its being used by +full-blown religionists, and by those whose minds are +only partly liberated from a great historic superstition.</p> + +<p>It will be observed that the plea of Frazer's we have +been examining argues that the function of religion in +social life is of a conservative character. And so far +he is correct, he is only wrong in assuming it to have +been of a beneficial nature. The main function of religion +in sociology is conservative, not the wise conservatism +which supports an institution or a custom +because of its approved value, but of the kind that +sees in an established custom a reason for its continuance. +Urged, in the first instance, by the belief +that innumerable spirits are forever on the watch, +punishing the slightest infraction of their wishes, +opposition to reform or to new ideas receives definite +shape and increased strength by the rise of a priest<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">{97}</a></span>hood. +Henceforth economic interest goes hand in +hand with superstitious fears. Whichever way man +turns he finds artificial obstacles erected. Every +deviation from the prescribed path is threatened with +penalties in this world and the next. The history of +every race and of every science tells the same story, +and the amount of time and energy that mankind has +spent in fighting these ghosts of its own savage past +is the measure of the degree to which religion has kept +the race in a state of relative barbarism.</p> + +<p>This function of unreasoning conservatism is not, it +must be remembered, accidental. It belongs to the +very nature of religion. Dependent upon the maintenance +of certain primitive conceptions of the world +and of man, religion dare not encourage new ideas lest +it sap its own foundations. Spencer has reminded us +that religion is, under the conditions of its origin, +perfectly rational. That is quite true.<a name="FNanchor_20_20" id="FNanchor_20_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> Religion meets +science, when the stage of conflict arises, as an opposing +interpretation of certain classes of facts. The one +interpretation can only grow at the expense of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">{98}</a></span> +other. While religion is committed to the explanation +of the world in terms of vital force, science is +committed to that of non-conscious mechanism. +Opposition is thus present at the outset, and it must +continue to the end. The old cannot be maintained +without anathematizing the new; the new cannot be +established without displacing the old. The conflict +is inevitable; the antagonism is irreconcilable.</p> + +<p>It lies, therefore, in the very nature of the case that +religion, as religion, can give no real help to man in +the understanding of himself and the world. Whatever +good religion may appear to do is properly to be +attributed to the non-religious forces with which it is +associated. But religion, being properly concerned +with the relations between man and mythical supernatural +beings, can exert no real influence for good on +human affairs. Far from that being the case, it can +easily be shown to have had quite an opposite effect. +There is not merely the waste of energy in the direction +above indicated, but in many other ways. If we confine +ourselves to Christianity some conception of the +nature of its influence may be formed if we think what +the state of the world might have been to-day had the +work of enlightenment continued from the point it had +reached under the old Greek and Roman civilizations. +Bacon and Galileo in their prisons, Bruno and Vanini +at the stake are illustrations of the disservice that +Christianity has done the cause of civilization, and +the obstruction it has offered to human well-being.</p> + +<p>Again, consider the incubus placed on human progress +by the institution of a priesthood devoted to the +service of supernatural beings. In the fullest and +truest sense of the word a priesthood represents a parasitic +growth on the social body. I am not referring to +individual members of the priesthood in their capacity +as private citizens, but as priests, as agents or repre<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">{99}</a></span>sentatives +of the supernatural. And here the truth is +that of all the inventions and discoveries that have +helped to build up civilization not one of them is owing +to the priesthood, as such. One may confidently say +that if all the energies of all the priests in the whole +world were concentrated on a single community, and +all their prayers, formulę, and doctrines devoted to the +one end, the well-being of that community would not +be advanced thereby a single iota.</p> + +<p>Far and away, the priesthood is the greatest parasitic +class the world has known. All over the world, in both +savage and civilized times, we see the priesthoods of +the world enthroned, we see them enjoying a subsistence +wrung from toil through credulity, and from +wealth through self-interest. From the savage +medicine hut up to the modern cathedral we see the +earth covered with useless edifices devoted to the +foolish service of imaginary deities. We see the priesthood +endowed with special privileges, their buildings +relieved from the taxes which all citizens are compelled +to pay, and even special taxes levied upon the +public for their maintenance. The gods may no longer +demand the sacrifice of the first born, but they still +demand the sacrifice of time, energy, and money that +might well be applied elsewhere. And the people in +every country, out of their stupidity, continue to maintain +a large body of men who, by their whole training +and interest, are compelled to act as the enemies of +liberty and progress.</p> + +<p>It is useless arguing that the evils that follow religion +are not produced by it, that they are casual, and will +disappear with a truer understanding of what religion +is. It is not true, and the man who argues in that way +shows that he does not yet understand what religion is. +The evils that follow religion are deeply imbedded in +the nature of religion itself. All religion takes its rise<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">{100}</a></span> +in error, and vested error threatened with destruction +instinctively resorts to force, fraud, and imposture, in +self defence. The universality of the evils that accompany +religion would alone prove that there is more than +a mere accident in the association. The whole history +of religion is, on the purely intellectual side, the history +of a delusion. Happily this delusion is losing its hold +on the human mind. Year by year its intellectual and +moral worthlessness is being more generally recognized. +Religion explains nothing, and it does nothing that is +useful. Yet in its name millions of pounds are +annually squandered and many thousands of men withdrawn +from useful labour, and saddled on the rest of +the community for maintenance. But here, again, +economic and intellectual forces are combining for +the liberation of the race from its historic incubus. +Complete emancipation will not come in a day, but it +will come, and its arrival will mark the close of the +greatest revolution that has taken place in the history +of the race.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">{101}</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VIII" id="CHAPTER_VIII"></a>CHAPTER VIII.<br /> +FREETHOUGHT AND GOD.</h2> + +<p>Why do people believe in God? If one turns to the +pleas of professional theologians there is no lack of +answers to the question. These answers are both +numerous and elaborate, and if quantity and repetition +were enough, the Freethinker would find himself hopelessly +"snowed under." But on examination all these +replies suffer from one defect. They should ante-date +the belief, whereas they post-date it. They cannot be +the cause of belief for the reason that the belief was +here long before the arguments came into existence. +Neither singly nor collectively do these so-called +reasons correspond to the causes that have ever led a +single person, at any time or at any place, to believe +in a God. If they already believed, the arguments were +enough to provide them with sufficient justification to +go on believing. If they did not already believe, the +arguments were powerless. And never, by any chance, +do they describe the causes that led to the existence of +the belief in God, either historically or individually. +They are, in truth, no more than excuses for continuing +to believe. They are never the causes of belief.</p> + +<p>The evidence for the truth of this is at hand in the +person of all who believe. Let one consider, on the +one hand, the various arguments for the existence of +God—the argument from causation, from design, from +necessary existence, etc., then put on the other side the +age at which men and women began to believe in deity, +and their grasp of arguments of the kind mentioned.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">{102}</a></span> +There is clearly no relation between the two. Leaving +on one side the question of culture, it is at once +apparent that long before the individual is old enough +to appreciate in the slightest degree the nature of the +arguments advanced he is already a believer. And if +he is not a believer in his early years, he is never one +when he reaches maturity, certainly not in a civilized +society. And when we turn from the individual +Goddite to Goddites in the mass, the assumption that +they owe their belief to the philosophical arguments +advanced becomes grotesque in its absurdity. To +assume that the average Theist, whose philosophy is +taken from the daily newspaper and the weekly +sermon, derives his conviction from a series of abstruse +philosophical arguments is simply ridiculous. Those +who are honest to themselves will admit that they were +taught the belief long before they were old enough to +bring any real criticism to bear upon it. It was the +product of their early education, impressed upon them +by their parents, and all the "reasons" that are afterwards +alleged in justification are only pleas why they +should not be disturbed in their belief.</p> + +<p>Are we in any better position if we turn from the +individual to the race? Is the belief in God similar to, +say, the belief in gravitation, which, discovered by a +genius, and resting upon considerations which the +ordinary person finds too abstruse to thoroughly understand, +becomes a part of our education, and is accepted +upon well established authority? Again, the facts +are dead against such an assumption. It is with +the race as with the individual. Science and philosophy +do not precede the belief in God and provide the +foundation for it, they succeed it and lead to its modification +and rejection. We are, in this respect, upon +very solid ground. In some form or another the belief +in God, or gods, belongs to very early states of human<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">{103}</a></span> +society. Savages have it long before they have the +slightest inkling of what we moderns would call a +scientific conception of the world. And to assume that +the savage, as we know him, began to believe in his +gods because of a number of scientific reasons, such +as the belief in universal causation, or any of the other +profound speculations with which the modern theologian +beclouds the issue, is as absurd as to attribute +the belief of the Salvation Army preacher to philosophical +speculations. Added to which we may note +that the savage is a severely practical person. He is +not at all interested in metaphysics, and his contributions +to the discussions of a philosophical society would +be of a very meagre character. His problem is to deal +with the concrete difficulties of his everyday life, and +when he is able to do this he is content.</p> + +<p>But, on the other hand, we know that our own belief +in God is descended from his belief. We know that we +can trace it back without a break through generations +of social culture, until we reach the savage stage of +social existence. It is he who, so to speak, discovers +God, he establishes it as a part of the social institutions +that govern the lives of every member of the group; +we find it in our immaturity established as one of +those many thought-forms which determine so powerfully +our intellectual development. The belief in God +meets each newcomer into the social arena. It is impressed +upon each in a thousand and one different +ways, and it is only when the belief is challenged by an +opposing system of thought that philosophical theories +are elaborated in its defence.</p> + +<p>The possibility of deriving the idea of God from +scientific and philosophic thought being ruled out, +what remains? The enquiry from being philosophical +becomes historical. That is, instead of discussing +whether there are sufficient reasons for justifying the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">{104}</a></span> +belief in God, we are left with the question of determining +the causes that led people to ever regard the +belief as being solidly based upon fact. It is a +question of history, or rather, one may say, of anthropology +of the mental history of man. When we read of +some poor old woman who has been persecuted for +bewitching someone's cattle or children we no longer +settle down to discuss whether witchcraft rests upon +fact or not; we know it does not, and our sole concern +is to discover the conditions, mental and social, which +enabled so strange a belief to flourish. The examination +of evidence—the legal aspect—thus gives place to +the historical, and the historical finally resolves itself +into the psychological. For what we are really concerned +with in an examination of the idea of God is the +discovery and reconstruction of those states of mind +which gave the belief birth. And that search is far +easier and the results far more conclusive than many +imagine.</p> + +<p>In outlining this evidence it will only be necessary +to present its general features. This for two reasons. +First, because a multiplicity of detail is apt to hide +from the general reader many of the essential features +of the truth; secondly, the fact of a difference of +opinion concerning the time order of certain stages in +the history of the god-idea is likely to obscure the fact +of the unanimity which exists among all those qualified +to express an authoritative opinion as to the nature of +the conditions that have given the idea birth. The +various theories of the sequence of the different phases +of the religious idea should no more blind us to the +fact that there exists a substantial agreement that the +belief in gods has its roots in the fear and ignorance of +uncivilized mankind, than the circumstance that there +is going on among biologists a discussion as to the +machinery of evolution should overshadow the fact<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">{105}</a></span> +that evolution itself is a demonstrated truth which no +competent observer questions.</p> + +<p>In an earlier chapter we have already indicated the +essential conditions which lead to the origin of religious +beliefs, and there is no need again to go over that +ground. What is necessary at present is to sketch as +briefly as is consistent with lucidity those frames of +mind to which the belief in God owes its existence.</p> + +<p>To realize this no very recondite instrument of research +is required. We need nothing more elaborate +than the method by which we are hourly in the habit +of estimating each other's thoughts, and of gauging +one another's motives. When I see a man laugh I +assume that he is pleased; when he frowns I assume +that he is angry. There is here only an application of +the generally accepted maxim that when we see +identical results we are warranted in assuming +identical causes. In this way we can either argue from +causes to effects or from effects to causes. A further +statement of the same principle is that when we are +dealing with biological facts we may assume that +identical structures imply identical functions. The +structure of a dead animal will tell us what its functions +were when living as certainly as though we had the +living animal in front of us. We may relate function +to structure or structure to function. And in this we +are using nothing more uncommon than the accepted +principle of universal causation.</p> + +<p>Now, in all thinking there are two factors. There is +the animal or human brain, the organ of thought, and +there is the material for thought as represented by the +existing knowledge of the world. If we had an exact +knowledge of the kind of brain that functioned, and the +exact quantity and quality of the knowledge existing, +the question as to the ideas which would result would +be little more than a problem in mathematics. We<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">{106}</a></span> +could make the calculation with the same assurance +that an astronomer can estimate the position of a +planet a century hence. In the case of primitive mankind +we do not possess anything like the exact knowledge +one would wish, but we do know enough to say +in rather more than a general way the kind of thinking +of which our earliest ancestors were capable, and what +were its products. We can get at the machinery of the +primitive brain, and can estimate its actions, and that +without going further than we do when we assume that +primitive man was hungry and thirsty, was pleased +and angry, loved and feared. And, indeed, it was because +he experienced fear and pleasure and love and +hate that the gods came into existence.</p> + +<p>Of the factors which determine the kind of thinking +one does, we know enough to say that there were two +things certain of early mankind. We know the kind +of thinking of which he was capable, and we have a +general notion of the material existing for thinking. +Speaking of one of these early ancestors of ours, Professor +Arthur Keith says, "Piltdown man saw, heard, +felt, thought and dreamt much as we do," that is, +there was the same <em>kind</em> of brain at work that is at work +now. And that much we could be sure of by going +no farther back than the savages of to-day. But as +size of brain is not everything, we are warranted in +saying that the brain was of a relatively simple type, +while the knowledge of the world which existed, and +which gives us the material for thinking, was of a very +imperfect and elementary character. There was great +ignorance, and there was great fear. From these two +conditions, ignorance and fear, sprang the gods. Of +that there is no doubt whatever. There is scarcely a +work which deals with the life of primitive peoples to-day +that does not emphasize that fact. Consciously +or unconsciously it cannot avoid doing so. Long ago<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">{107}</a></span> +a Latin writer hit on this truth in the well-known +saying, "Fear made the gods," and Aristotle expressed +the same thing in a more comprehensive form +by saying that fear first set man philosophizing. The +undeveloped mind troubles little about things so long +as they are going smoothly and comfortably. It is +when something painful happens that concern is +awakened. And all the gods of primitive life bear this +primal stamp of fear. That is why religion, with its +persistent harking back to the primitive, with its +response to the "Call of the Wild" still dwells upon +the fear of the Lord as a means of arousing a due sense +of piety. The gods fatten on fear as a usurer does upon +the folly of his clients, and in both cases the interest +demanded far outweighs the value of the services +rendered. At a later stage man faces his gods in a +different spirit; he loses his fear and examines them; +and gods that are not feared are but poor things. They +exist mainly as indisputable records of their own +deterioration.</p> + +<p>Now to primitive man, struggling along in a world +of which he was so completely ignorant, the one certain +thing was that the world was alive. The wind +that roared, the thunder that growled, the disease that +left him so mysteriously stricken, were all so many +living things. The division of these living forces into +good and bad followed naturally from this first conception +of their nature. And whatever be the stages +of that process the main lines admit of no question, nor +is there any question as to the nature of the conditions +that brought the gods into existence. On any scientific +theory of religion the gods represent no more than the +personified ignorance and fear of primitive humanity. +However much anthropologists may differ as to +whether the god always originates from the ghost or +not, whether animism is first and the worship of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">{108}</a></span> +ghost secondary or not, there is agreement on that +point. Whichever theory we care to embrace, the +broad fact is generally admitted that the gods are the +products of ignorance and fear. Man fears the gods +as children and even animals fear the unknown and the +dangerous.</p> + +<p>And as the gods are born of conditions such as those +outlined, as man reads his own feelings and passions +and desires into nature, so we find that the early gods +are frankly, obtrusively, man-like. The gods are +copies of their worshippers, faithful reflections of +those who fear them. This, indeed, remains true to +the end. When the stage is reached that the idea +of God as a physical counterpart of man becomes repulsive, +it is still unable to shake off this anthropomorphic +element. To the modern worshipper God +must not possess a body, but he must have love, and +intelligence—as though the mental qualities of man are +less human than the bodily ones! They are as human +as arms or legs. And every reason that will justify the +rejection of the conception of the universe being ruled +over by a being who is like man in his physical aspects +is equally conclusive against believing the universe to +be ruled over by a being who resembles man in his +mental characteristics. The one belief is a survival of +the other; and the one would not now be accepted +had not the other been believed in beforehand.</p> + +<p>I have deliberately refrained from discussing the +various arguments put forward to justify the belief in +God in order that attention should not be diverted +from the main point, which is that the belief in deity +owes its existence to the ignorant interpretation of +natural happenings by early or uncivilized mankind. +Everything here turns logically on the question of +origin. If the belief in God began in the way I have outlined, +the question of veracity may be dismissed. The<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">{109}</a></span> +question is one of origin only. It is not a question of +man first seeing a thing but dimly and then getting a +clearer vision as his knowledge becomes more thorough. +It is a question of a radical misunderstanding of certain +experiences, the vogue of an altogether wrong interpretation, +and its displacement by an interpretation of +a quite different nature. The god of the savage was +in the nature of an inference drawn from the world of +the savage. There was the admitted premiss and there +was the obvious conclusion. But with us the premiss +no longer exists. We deliberately reject it as being +altogether unwarrantable. And we cannot reject the +premiss while retaining the conclusion. Logically, +the god of the savage goes with the world of the +savage; it should have no place in the mind of the +really civilized human being.</p> + +<p>It is for this reason that I am leaving on one side all +those semi-metaphysical and pseudo-philosophical +arguments that are put forward to justify the belief in +God. As I have already said, they are merely excuses +for continuing a belief that has no real warranty in +fact. No living man or woman believes in God because +of any such argument. We have the belief in +God with us to-day for the same reason that we have +in our bodies a number of rudimentary structures. As +the one is reminiscent of an earlier stage of existence +so is the other. To use the expressive phrase of Winwood +Reade's, we have tailed minds as well as tailed +bodies. The belief in God meets each newcomer to +the social sphere. It is forced upon them before they +are old enough to offer effective resistance in the shape +of acquired knowledge that would render its lodgement +in the mind impossible. Afterwards, the dice of +social power and prestige are loaded in its favour, while +the mental inertia of some, and the self-interest of +others, give force to the arguments which I have<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">{110}</a></span> +called mere mental subterfuges for perpetuating the +belief in God.</p> + +<p>Only one other remark need be made. In the beginning +the gods exist as the apotheosis of ignorance. +The reason the savage had for believing in God was +that he did not know the real causes of the phenomena +around him. And that remains the reason why people +believe in deity to-day. Under whatever guise the +belief is presented, analysis brings it ultimately to that. +The whole history of the human mind, in relation to +the idea of God, shows that so soon as man discovers +the natural causes of any phenomenon or group of +phenomena the idea of God dies out in connection +therewith. God is only conceived as a cause or as an +explanation so long as no other cause or explanation is +forthcoming. In common speech and in ordinary +thought we only bring in the name of God where uncertainty +exists, never where knowledge is obtainable. +We pray to God to cure a fever, but never to put on +again a severed limb. We associate God with the +production of a good harvest, but not with a better +coal output. We use "God only knows" as the +equivalent of our own ignorance, and call on God for +help only where our own helplessness is manifest. The +idea remains true to itself throughout. Born in ignorance +and cradled in fear, it makes its appeal to the +same elements to the end. And if it apes the language +of philosophy, it does so only as do those who purchase +a ready-made pedigree in order to hide the +obscurity of their origin.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">{111}</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IX" id="CHAPTER_IX"></a>CHAPTER IX.<br /> +FREETHOUGHT AND DEATH.</h2> + +<p>In the early months of the European war a mortally +wounded British soldier was picked up between the +lines, after lying there unattended for two days. He +died soon after he was brought in, and one of his last +requests was that a copy of Ruskin's <cite>Crown of Wild +Olive</cite> should be buried with him. He said the book +had been with him all the time he had been in France, +it had given him great comfort, and he wished it to be +buried with him. Needless to say, his wish was carried +out, and "somewhere in France" there lies a soldier +with a copy of the <cite>Crown of Wild Olive</cite> clasped to his +breast.</p> + +<p>There is another story, of a commoner character, +which, although different in form, is wholly similar in +substance. This tells of the soldier who in his last +moments asks to see a priest, accepts his ministrations +with thankfulness, and dies comforted with the repetition +of familiar formulę and customary prayers. In +the one case a Bible and a priest; in the other a volume +of lectures by one of the masters of English prose. +The difference is, at first, striking, but there is an +underlying agreement, and they may be used together +to illustrate a single psychological principle.</p> + +<p>Freethinker and Christian read the record of both +cases, but it is the Freethinker alone whose philosophy +of life is wide enough to explain both. The Freethinker +knows that the feeling of comfort and the fact +of truth are two distinct things. They may coalesce,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">{112}</a></span> +but they may be as far asunder as the poles. A +delusion may be as consoling as a reality provided it +be accepted as genuine. The soldier with his copy of +Ruskin does not prove the truth of the teachings of +the <cite>Crown of Wild Olive</cite>, does not prove that Ruskin +said the last word or even the truest word on the subjects +dealt with therein. Neither does the consolation +which religion gives some people prove the truth of its +teachings. The comfort which religion brings is a +product of the belief in religion. The consolation that +comes from reading a volume of essays is a product of +the conviction of the truth of the message delivered, +or a sense of the beauty of the language in which the +book is written. Both cases illustrate the power of +belief, and that no Freethinker was ever stupid enough +to question. The finest literature in the world would +bring small comfort to a man who was convinced that +he stood in deadly need of a priest, and the presence +of a priest would be quite useless to a man who believed +that all the religions of the world were so many +geographical absurdities. Comfort does not produce +conviction, it follows it. The truth and the social +value of convictions are quite distinct questions.</p> + +<p>There is here a confusion of values, and for this we +have to thank the influence of the Churches. Because +the service of the priest is sought by some we are asked +to believe that it is necessary to all. But the essential +value of a thing is shown, not by the number of people +who get on with it, but by the number that can get on +without it. The canon of agreement and difference is +applicable whether we are dealing with human nature +or conducting an ordinary scientific experiment. +Thus, the indispensability of meat-eating is not shown +by the number of people who swear that they cannot +work without it, but by noting how people fare in its +absence. The drinker does not confound the abstainer;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">{113}</a></span> +it is the other way about. In the same way there is +nothing of evidential value in the protests of those who +say that human nature cannot get along without +religion. We have to test the statement by the cases +where religion is absent. And here, it is not the Christian +that confounds the Freethinker, it is the Freethinker +who confounds the Christian. If the religious +view of life is correct the Freethinker should be a very +rare bird indeed; he should be clearly recognizable as +a departure from the normal type, and, in fact, he was +always so represented in religious literature until he +disproved the legend by multiplying himself with confusing +rapidity. Now it is the Freethinker who will +not fit into the Christian scheme of things. It is +puzzling to see what can be done with a man who repudiates +the religious idea in theory and fact, root and +branch, and yet appears to be getting on quite well in +its absence. That is the awkward fact that will not +fit in with the religious theory. And, other things +equal, one man without religion is greater evidential +value than five hundred with it. All the five hundred +prove at the most is that human nature can get on with +religion, but the one case proves that human nature can +get on without it, and that challenges the whole religious +position. And unless we take up the rather +absurd position that the non-religious man is a sheer +abnormality, this consideration at once reduces religion +from a necessity to a luxury or a dissipation.</p> + +<p>The bearing of this on our attitude towards such a +fact as death should be obvious. During the European +war death from being an ever-present fact became an +obtrusive one. Day after day we received news of the +death of friend or relative, and those who escaped that +degree of intimacy with the unpleasant visitor, met him +in the columns of the daily press. And the Christian +clergy would have been untrue to their traditions and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">{114}</a></span> +to their interests—and there is no corporate body more +alert in these directions—if they had not tried to exploit +the situation to the utmost. There was nothing new +in the tactics employed, it was the special circumstances +that gave them a little more force than was +usual. The following, for example, may be accepted +as typical:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>The weight of our sorrow is immensely lightened if +we can feel sure that one whom we have loved and +lost has but ascended to spheres of further development, +education, service, achievement, where, by and +by, we shall rejoin him.</p></blockquote> + +<p>Quite a common statement, and one which by long +usage has become almost immune from criticism. And +yet it has about as much relation to fact as have the +stories of death-bed conversions, or of people dying +and shrieking for Jesus to save them. One may, +indeed, apply a rough and ready test by an appeal to +facts. How many cases has the reader of these lines +come across in which religion has made people calmer +and more resigned in the presence of death than others +have been who were quite destitute of belief in religion? +Of course, religious folk will repeat religious phrases, +they will attend church, they will listen to the +ministrations of their favourite clergyman, and they +will say that their religion brings them comfort. But +if one gets below the stereotyped phraseology and puts +on one side also the sophisticated attitude in relation +to religion, one quite fails to detect any respect in +which the Freethinking parent differs from the Christian +one. Does the religious parent grieve less? Does +he bear the blow with greater fortitude? Is his grief +of shorter duration? To anyone who will open his +eyes the talk of the comfort of religion will appear to +be largely cant. There are differences due to char<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">{115}</a></span>acter, +to temperament, to training; there is a use of +traditional phrases in the one case that is absent in +the other, but the incidence of a deep sorrow only +serves to show how superficial are the vapourings of +religion to a civilized mind, and how each one of us is +thrown back upon those deeper feelings that are inseparable +from a common humanity. The thought of +an only son who is living with the angels brings no +real solace to a parent's mind. Whatever genuine comfort +is available must come from the thought of a +life that has been well lived, from the sympathetic +presence of friends, from the silent handclasp, which +on such occasions is so often more eloquent than +speech—in a word, from those healing currents that +are part and parcel of the life of the race. A Freethinker +can easily appreciate the readiness of a clergyman +to help a mind that is suffering from a great +sorrow, but it is the deliberate exploitation of human +grief in the name and in the interests of religion, the +manufacturing of cases of death-bed consolation and +repentance, the citation of evidence to which the experience +of all gives the lie, that fill one with a feeling +akin to disgust.</p> + +<p>The writer from whom I have quoted says:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>It is, indeed, possible for people who are Agnostic +or unbelieving with regard to immortality to give +themselves wholly to the pursuit of truth and to the +service of their fellowmen, in moral earnestness and +heroic endeavour; they may endure pain and sorrow +with calm resignation, and toil on in patience and +perseverance. The best of the ancient Stoics did so, +and many a modern Agnostic is doing so to-day.</p></blockquote> + +<p>The significance of such a statement is in no wise +diminished by the accompanying qualification that +Freethinkers are "missing a joy which would have<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">{116}</a></span> +been to them a well-spring of courage and strength." +That is a pure assumption. They who are without +religious belief are conscious of no lack of courage, +and they are oppressed by no feeling of despair. On +this their own statement must be taken as final. Moreover, +they are speaking as, in the main, those who are +fully acquainted with the Christian position, having +once occupied it. They are able to measure the relative +value of the two positions. The Christian has no such +experience to guide him. In the crises of life the behaviour +of the Freethinker is at least as calm and as +courageous as that of the Christian. And it may certainly +be argued that a serene resignation in the +presence of death is quite as valuable as the hectic +emotionalism of cultivated religious belief.</p> + +<p>What, after all, is there in the fact of natural death +that should breed irresolution, rob us of courage, or fill +us with fear? Experience proves there are many things +that people dread more than death, and will even seek +death rather than face, or, again, there are a +hundred and one things to obtain which men and +women will face death without fear. And this readiness +to face or seek death does not seem to be at all +determined by religious belief. The millions of men +who faced death during the war were not determined +in their attitude by their faith in religious dogmas. If +questioned they might, in the majority of cases, say +that they believed in a future life, and also that they +found it a source of strength, but it would need little +reflection to assess the reply at its true value. And as +a racial fact, the fear of death is a negative quality. +The positive aspect is the will to live, and that may be +seen in operation in the animal world as well as in the +world of man. But this has no reference, not even the +remotest, to a belief in a future life. There are no "Intimations +of Immortality" here. There is simply one<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">{117}</a></span> +of the conditions of animal survival, developed in man +to the point at which its further strengthening would +become a threat to the welfare of the species. The +desire to live is one of the conditions that secures the +struggle to live, and a species of animals in which this +did not exist would soon go under before a more virile +type. And it is one of the peculiarities of religious +reasoning that a will to live here should be taken as +clear proof of a desire to live somewhere else.</p> + +<p>The fear of death could never be a powerful factor in +life; existence would be next to impossible if it were. +It would rob the organism of its daring, its tenacity, +and ultimately divest life itself of value. Against that +danger we have an efficient guard in the operation of +natural selection. In the animal world there is no fear +of death, there is, in fact, no reason to assume that +there exists even a consciousness of death. And with +man, when reflection and knowledge give birth to that +consciousness, there arises a strong other regarding +instinct which effectively prevents it assuming a too +positive or a too dangerous form. Fear of death is, in +brief, part of the jargon of priestcraft. The priest has +taught it the people because it was to his interest to do +so. And the jargon retains a certain currency because +it is only the minority that rise above the parrot-like +capacity to repeat current phrases, or who ever make +an attempt to analyse their meaning and challenge +their veracity.</p> + +<p>The positive fear of death is largely an acquired +mental attitude. In its origin it is largely motived by +religion. Generally speaking there is no very great +fear of death among savages, and among the pagans of +old Greece and Rome there was none of that abject +fear of death that became so common with the establishment +of Christianity. To the pagan, death was a +natural fact, sad enough, but not of necessity terrible.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">{118}</a></span> +Of the Greek sculptures representing death Professor +Mahaffy says: "They are simple pictures of the grief +of parting, of the recollection of pleasant days of love +and friendship, of the gloom of an unknown future. +But there is no exaggeration in the picture." Throughout +Roman literature also there runs the conception of +death as the necessary complement of life. Pliny puts +this clearly in the following: "Unto all, the state of +being after the last day is the same as it was before the +first day of life; neither is there any more variation of +it in either body or soul after death than there was +before death." Among the uneducated there does +appear to have been some fear of death, and one may +assume that with some of even of the educated this was +not altogether absent. It may also be assumed that +it was to this type of mind that Christianity made its +first appeal, and upon which it rested its nightmare-like +conception of death and the after-life. On this +matter the modern mind can well appreciate the attitude +of Lucretius, who saw the great danger in front of the +race and sought to guard men against it by pointing +out the artificiality of the fear of death and the cleansing +effect of genuine knowledge.</p> + +<blockquote> +<p>So shalt thou feed on Death who feeds on men,<br /> +And Death once dead there's no more dying then.</p> +</blockquote> + +<p>The policy of Christianity was the belittling of this +life and an exaggeration of the life after death, with a +boundless exaggeration of the terrors that awaited the +unwary and the unfaithful. The state of knowledge +under Christian auspices made this task easy enough. +Of the medięval period Mr. Lionel Cust, in his <cite>History +of Engraving during the Fifteenth Century</cite>, says:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>The keys of knowledge, as of salvation, were entirely +in the hands of the Church, and the lay public,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">{119}</a></span> +both high and low, were, generally speaking, ignorant +and illiterate. One of the secrets of the great +power exercised by the Church lay in its ability to +represent the life of man as environed from the outset +by legions of horrible and insidious demons, who +beset his path throughout life at every stage up to +his very last breath, and are eminently active and +often triumphant when man's fortitude is undermined +by sickness, suffering, and the prospect of dissolution.</p></blockquote> + +<p>F. Parkes Weber also points out that, "It was in +medięval Europe, under the auspices of the Catholic +Church, that descriptions of hell began to take on their +most horrible aspects."<a name="FNanchor_21_21" id="FNanchor_21_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_21" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> So, again, we have Sir +James Frazer pointing out that the fear of death is not +common to the lower races, and "Among the causes +which thus tend to make us cowards may be numbered +the spread of luxury and the doctrines of a gloomy +theology, which by proclaiming the eternal damnation +and excruciating torments of the vast majority of mankind +has added incalculably to the dread and horror +of death."<a name="FNanchor_22_22" id="FNanchor_22_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a></p> + +<p>No religion has emphasized the terror of death as +Christianity has done, and in the truest sense, no religion +has so served to make men such cowards in its +presence. Upon that fear a large part of the power of +the Christian Church has been built, and men having +become so obsessed with the fear of death and what +lay beyond, it is not surprising that they should turn to +the Church for some measure of relief. The poisoner +thus did a lucrative trade by selling a doubtful remedy +for his own toxic preparation. More than anything +else the fear of death and hell laid the foundation of +the wealth and power of the Christian Church. If it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">{120}</a></span> +drew its authority from God, it derived its profit from +the devil. The two truths that emerge from a sober +and impartial study of Christian history are that the +power of the Church was rooted in death and that it +flourished in dishonour.</p> + +<p>It was Christianity, and Christianity alone that made +death so abiding a terror to the European mind. And +society once Christianized, the uneducated could find +no adequate corrective from the more educated. The +baser elements which existed in the Pagan world were +eagerly seized upon by the Christian writers and +developed to their fullest extent. Some of the Pagan +writers had speculated, in a more or less fanciful +spirit, on a hell of a thousand years. Christianity +stretched it to eternity. Pre-Christianity had reserved +the miseries of the after-life for adults. Christian +writers paved the floor of hell with infants, "scarce a +span long." Plutarch and other Pagan moralists had +poured discredit upon the popular notions of a future +life. Christianity reaffirmed them with all the exaggerations +of a diseased imagination. The Pagans held +that death was as normal and as natural as life. Christianity +returned to the conception current among +savages and depicted death as a penal infliction. The +Pagan art of living was superseded by the Christian art +of dying. Human ingenuity exhausted itself in depicting +the terrors of the future life, and when one +remembers the powers of the Church, and the murderous +manner in which it exercised them, there is small +wonder that under the auspices of the Church the fear +of death gained a strength it had never before attained.</p> + +<p>Small wonder, then, that we still have with us the +talk of the comfort that Christianity brings in the face +of death. Where the belief in the Christian after-life +really exists, the retention of a conviction of the +saving power of Christianity is a condition of sanity.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">{121}</a></span> +Where the belief does not really exist, we are fronted +with nothing but a parrot-like repetition of familiar +phrases. The Christian talk of comfort is thus, on +either count, no more than a product of Christian +education. Christianity does not make men brave in +the presence of death, that is no more than a popular +superstition. What it does is to cover a natural fact +with supernatural terrors, and then exploit a frame +of mind that it has created. The comfort is only +necessary so long as the special belief is present. +Remove that belief and death takes its place as one of +the inevitable facts of existence, surrounded with all +the sadness of a last farewell, but rid of all the terror +that has been created by religion.</p> + +<p>Our dying soldier, asking for a copy of the <cite>Crown of +Wild Olive</cite> to be buried with him, and the other who +calls for priestly ministrations, represent, ultimately, +two different educational results. The one is a product +of an educational process applied during the darkest +periods of European history, and perpetuated by a +training that has been mainly directed by the self-interest +of a class. The other represents an educational +product which stands as the triumph of the pressure of +life over artificial dogmas. The Freethinker, because +he is a Freethinker, needs none of those artificial +stimulants for which the Christian craves. And he +pays him the compliment—in spite of his protests—of +believing that without his religion the Christian would +display as much manliness in the face of death as he +does himself. He believes there is plenty of healthy +human nature in the average Christian, and the Freethinker +merely begs him to give it a chance of finding +expression. In this matter, it must be observed, the +Freethinker makes no claim to superiority over the +Christian; it is the Christian who forces that claim +upon him. The Freethinker does not assume that the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">{122}</a></span> +difference between himself and the Christian is nearly +so great as the latter would have him believe. He believes +that what is dispensable by the one, without loss, +is dispensable by the other. If Freethinkers can devote +themselves to "the pursuit of truth and the service of +their fellow men," if they can "endure pain and +sorrow with calm resignation," if they live with +honour and face death without fear, I see no reason +why the Christian should not be able to reach the +same level of development. It is paying the Freethinker +a "violent compliment," to use an expression +of John Wesley's, to place him upon a level of excellence +that is apparently so far above that of the +average Christian. As a Freethinker, I decline to +accept it. I believe that what the Freethinker is, the +Christian may well become. He, too, may learn to do +his duty without the fear of hell or the hope of heaven. +All that is required is that he shall give his healthier +instincts an opportunity for expression.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">{123}</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_X" id="CHAPTER_X"></a>CHAPTER X.<br /> +THIS WORLD AND THE NEXT.</h2> + +<p>In the preceding chapter I have only discussed the fact +of death in relation to a certain attitude of mind. The +question of the survival of the human personality after +death is a distinct question and calls for separate treatment. +Nor is the present work one in which that topic +can be treated at adequate length. The most that can +now be attempted is a bird's eye view of a large field +of controversy, although it may be possible in the +course of that survey to say something on the more +important aspects of the subject.</p> + +<p>And first we may notice the curious assumption that +the man who argues for immortality is taking a lofty +view of human nature, while he who argues against it +is taking a low one. In sober truth it is the other way +about. Consider the position. It is tacitly admitted +that if human motive, considered with reference to +this world alone, is adequate as an incentive to action, +and the consequences of actions, again considered with +reference to this world, are an adequate reward for +endeavour, then it is agreed that the main argument +for the belief in immortality breaks down. To support +or to establish the argument it is necessary to show that +life divorced from the conception of a future life can +never reach the highest possible level. Natural human +society is powerless in itself to realize its highest +possibilities. It remains barren of what it might be, +a thing that may frame ideals, but can never realize +them.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">{124}</a></span> +Now that is quite an intelligible, and, therefore, an +arguable proposition. But whether true or not, there +should be no question that it involves a lower view of +human nature than the one taken by the Freethinker. +He does at least pay human nature the compliment of +believing it capable, not alone of framing high ideals, +but also of realizing them. He says that by itself it is +capable of realizing all that may be legitimately demanded +from it. He does not believe that supernatural +hopes or fears are necessary to induce man to live +cleanly, or die serenely, or to carry out properly his +duties to his fellows. The religionist denies this, and +asserts that some form of supernaturalism is essential +to the moral health of men and women. If the Freethinker +is wrong, it is plain that his fault consists in +taking a too optimistic view of human nature. His +mistake consists in taking not a low view of human +nature, but a lofty one. Substantially, the difference +between the two positions is the difference between +the man who is honest from a conviction of the +value of honesty, and the one who refrains from stealing +because he feels certain of detection, or because he +is afraid of losing something that he might otherwise +gain. Thus, we are told by one writer that:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>If human life is but a by-product of the unconscious +play of physical force, like a candle flame soon +to be blown out or burnt out, what a paltry thing it is!</p></blockquote> + +<p>But the questions of where human life came from, or +where it will end, are quite apart from the question of +the value and capabilities of human life now. That +there are immense possibilities in this life none but a +fool will deny. The world is full of strange and +curious things, and its pleasures undoubtedly outweigh +its pains in the experience of normal man or woman.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">{125}</a></span> +But the relations between ourselves and others +remain completely unaffected by the termination of +existence at the grave, or its continuation beyond. It +is quite a defensible proposition that life is not worth +living. So is the reverse of the proposition. But it is +nonsense to say that life is a "paltry thing" merely +because it ends at the grave. It is unrestricted egotism +manifesting itself in the form of religious conviction. +One might as well argue that a sunset ceases to be +beautiful because it does not continue all night.</p> + +<p>If I cannot live for ever, then is the universe a +failure! That is really all that the religious argument +amounts to. And so to state it, to reduce it to plain +terms, and divest it of its disguising verbiage, almost +removes the need for further refutation. But it is +seldom stated in so plain and so unequivocal a manner. +It is accompanied with much talk of growth, of an +evolutionary purpose, of ruined lives made good, thus:</p> + +<blockquote><p>Seeing that man is the goal towards which everything +has tended from the beginning, seeing that the +same eternal and infinite Energy has laboured through +the ages at the production of man, and man is the +heir of the ages, nothing conceivable seems too great +or glorious to believe concerning his destiny.... If +there is no limit to human growth in knowledge and +wisdom, in love and constructive power, in beauty +and joy, we are invested with a magnificent worth +and dignity.</p></blockquote> + +<p>So fallacy and folly run on. What, for example, does +anyone mean by man as the goal towards which everything +has tended since the beginning? Whatever +truth there is in the statement applies to all things +without exception. It is as true of the microbe as it is +of man. If the "infinite and eternal Energy" +laboured to produce man, it laboured also to produce<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">{126}</a></span> +the microbe which destroys him. The one is here as +well as the other; and one can conceive a religious +microbe thanking an almighty one for having created +it, and declaring that unless it is to live for ever in +some microbic heaven, with a proper supply of human +beings for its nourishment, the whole scheme of +creation is a failure. It is quite a question of the +point of view. As a matter of fact there are no "ends" +in nature. There are only results, and each result becomes +a factor in some further result. It is human +folly and ignorance which makes an end of a consequence.</p> + +<p>After all, what reason is there for anyone assuming +that the survival of man beyond the grave is even +probably true? We do not know man as a "soul" +first and a body afterwards. Neither do we know him +as a detached "mind" which afterwards takes +possession of a body. Our knowledge of man commences +with him, as does our knowledge of any +animal, as a body possessing certain definite functions +of which we call one group mental. And the two +things are so indissolubly linked that we cannot even +think of them as separate. If anyone doubts this +let him try and picture to himself what a man is like +in the absence of a body. He will find the thing simply +inconceivable. In the absence of the material organism, +to which the mind unquestionably stands in the +relation of function to organ, what remains is a mere +blank. To the informed mind, that is. To the intelligence +of the savage, who is led, owing to his +erroneous conception of things, to think of something +inside the body which leaves it during sleep, wanders +about, and then returns on awakening, and who because +of this affiliates sleep to death, the case may be +different. But to a modern mind, one which is +acquainted with something of what science has to say<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">{127}</a></span> +on the subject, the conception of a mind existing apart +from organization is simply unthinkable. All our +knowledge is against it. The development of mind +side by side with the development of the brain and the +nervous system is one of the commonplaces of scientific +knowledge. The treatment of states of mind as functions +of the brain and the nervous system is a common-place +of medical practice. And the fact that diet, +temperature, health and disease, accidents and old +age, all have their effects on mental manifestations is +matter of everyday observation. The whole range of +positive science may safely be challenged to produce a +single indisputable fact in favour of the assumption +that there exists anything about man independent of +the material organism.</p> + +<p>All that can be urged in favour of such a belief is +that there are still many obscure facts which we are +not altogether able to explain on a purely mechanistic +theory. But that is a confession of ignorance, not an +affirmation of knowledge. At any rate, there does not +exist a single fact against the functional theory of +mind. All we <em>know</em> is decidedly in its favour, and a +theory must be tested by what we know and by what it +explains, not by what we do not know or by what it +cannot explain. And there is here the additional truth +that the only ground upon which the theory can be +opposed is upon certain metaphysical assumptions +which are made in order to bolster up an already existing +belief. If the belief in survival had not been +already in existence these assumptions would never +have been made. They are not suggested by the facts, +they are invented to support an already established +theory, which can no longer appeal to the circumstances +which gave it birth.</p> + +<p>And about those circumstance there is no longer the +slightest reason for justifiable doubt. We can trace<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">{128}</a></span> +the belief in survival after death until we see it commencing +in the savage belief in a double that takes its +origin in the phenomena of dreaming and unusual +mental states. It is from that starting point that the +belief in survival takes its place as an invariable +element in the religions of the world. And as we +trace the evolution of knowledge we see every fact +upon which was built the belief in a double that survived +death gradually losing its hold on the human intelligence, +owing to the fact that the experiences that +gave it birth are interpreted in a manner which allows +no room for the religious theory. The fatal fact about +the belief in survival is its history. That history shows +us how it began, as surely as the course of its evolution +indicates the way in which it will end.</p> + +<p>So, as with the idea of God, what we have left in +modern times are not the reasons why such a belief is +held, but only excuses why those who hold it should +not be disturbed. That and a number of arguments +which only present an air of plausibility because they +succeed in jumbling together things that have no connection +with each other. As an example of this we +may take the favourite modern plea that a future life +is required to permit the growth and development of +the individual. We find this expressed in the quotation +above given in the sentence "if there is no limit +to human growth, etc.," the inference being that unless +there is a future life there is a very sharp limit set +to human growth, and one that makes this life a +mockery. This plea is presented in so many forms that +it is worth while analysing it a little, if only to bring +out more clearly the distinction between the religious +and the Freethought view of life.</p> + +<p>What now is meant by there being no limit to human +growth? If by it is meant individual growth, the +reply is that there is actually a very sharp limit set to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">{129}</a></span> +growth, much sharper than the average person seems +to be aware of. It is quite clear that the individual is +not capable of unlimited growth in this world. There +are degrees of capacity in different individuals which +will determine what amount of development each is +capable of. Capacity is not an acquired thing, it is an +endowment, and the child born with the brain capacity +of a fool will remain a fool to the end, however much +his folly may be disguised or lost amid the folly of +others. And with each one, whether he be fool or +genius, acquisitions are made more easily and more +rapidly in youth, the power of mental adaptation is +much greater in early than in later life, while in old +age the capacities of adaptation and acquisition become +negligible quantities. And provided one lives +long enough, the last stage sees, not a promise of +further progress if life were continued, but a process +of degradation. The old saying that one can't put a +quart into a pint pot is strictly applicable here. Growth +assumes acquisition; acquisition is determined by +capacity, and this while an indefinite quantity (indefinite +here is strictly referable to our ignorance, not +to the actual fact) is certainly not an unlimited one. +Life, then, so far as the individual is concerned, does +not point to unlimited growth. It indicates, so far as +it indicates anything at all, that there is a limit to +growth as to all other things.</p> + +<p>Well, but suppose we say that man is capable of indefinite +growth, what do we mean? Let us also bear +in mind at this point that we are strictly concerned +with the individual. For if man survives death he +must do it as an individual. To merely survive as a +part of the chemical and other elements of the world, +or, to follow some mystical theologians, as an indistinguishable +part of a "world-soul," is not what +people mean when they talk of living beyond the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">{130}</a></span> +grave. Here, again, it will be found that we have confused +two quite distinct things, even though the one +thing borrows its meaning from the other.</p> + +<p>When we compare the individual, as such, with the +individual of three or four thousand years ago, can we +say with truth that the man of to-day is actually +superior to the man of the earlier date? To test the +question let us put it in this way. Does the man of +to-day do anything or think anything that is beyond +the capacity of an ancient Egyptian or an ancient +Greek, if it were possible to suddenly revive one and +to enable him to pass through the same education +that each one of us passes through? I do not think +that anyone will answer that question in the affirmative. +Reverse the process. Suppose that a modern +man, with exactly the same capacity that he now has +had lived in the days of the ancient Egyptians or the +ancient Greeks, can we say that his capacity is so much +greater than theirs, that he would have done better +than they did? I do not think that anyone will answer +that question in the affirmative either. Is the soldier +of to-day a better soldier, or the sailor a better sailor +than those who lived three thousand years ago? Once +more the answer will not be in the affirmative. And +yet there are certain things that are obvious. It is +plain that we all know more than did the people of +long ago, we can do more, we understand the past +better, and we can see farther into the future. A +schoolboy to-day carries in his head what would have +been a philosopher's outfit once upon a time. Our +soldiers and sailors utilize, single-handed, forces greater +than a whole army or navy wielded in the far-off days +of the Ptolemies. We call ourselves greater, we think +ourselves greater, and in a sense we are greater than +the people of old. What, then, is the explanation of +the apparent paradox?</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">{131}</a></span> +The explanation lies in the simple fact that progress +is not a phenomenon of individual life at all. It +is a phenomenon of social existence. If each generation +had to commence at the exact point at which its predecessors +started it would get no farther than they got. +It would be an eternal round, with each generation +starting from and reaching the same point, and progress +would be an inconceivable thing. But that we +know is not the case. Instead of each generation starting +from precisely the same point, one inherits at least +something of the labours and discoveries of its predecessors. +A thing discovered by the individual is +discovered for the race. A thought struck out by the +individual is a thought for the race. By language, by +tradition, and by institutions the advances of each +generation are conserved, handed on, and made part of +our racial possessions. The strength, the knowledge, +of the modern is thus due not to any innate superiority +over the ancient, but because one is modern and the +other ancient. If we could have surrounded the +ancient Assyrians with all the inventions, and given +them all the knowledge that we possess, they would +have used that knowledge and those inventions as +wisely, or as unwisely as we use them. Progress is +thus not a fact of individual but of racial life. The +individual inherits more than he creates, and it is in +virtue of this racial inheritance that he is what he is.</p> + +<p>It is a mere trick of the imagination that converts +this fact of social growth into an essential characteristic +of individual life. We speak of "man" without +clearly distinguishing between man as a biological unit +and man as a member of a social group developing in +correspondence with a true social medium. But if +that is so, it follows that this capacity for growth is, so +to speak, a function of the social medium. It is conditioned +by it, it has relevance only in relation to it.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">{132}</a></span> +Our feelings, our sentiments, even our desires, have +reference to this life, and in a far deeper sense than is +usually imagined. And removed from its relation to +this life human nature would be without meaning or +value.</p> + +<p>There is nothing in any of the functions of man, in +any of his capacities, or in any of his properly understood +desires that has the slightest reference to any life +but this. It is unthinkable that there should be. An +organ or an organism develops in relation to a special +medium, not in relation to one that—even though it +exists—is not also in relation with it. This is quite +an obvious truth in regard to structures, but it is not +always so clearly recognized, or so carefully borne in +mind, that it is equally true of every feeling and desire. +For these are developed in relation to their special +medium, in this case, the existence of fellow beings +with their actions and reactions on each other. And +man is not only a member of a social group, that much +is an obvious fact; but he is a product of the group in +the sense that all his characteristic human qualities +have resulted from the interactions of group life. Take +man out of relation to that fact, and he is an enigma, +presenting fit opportunities for the wild theorizing of +religious philosophers. Take him in connection with +it, and his whole nature becomes susceptible of understanding +in relation to the only existence he knows +and desires.</p> + +<p>The twin facts of growth and progress, upon which +so much of the argument for a future life turns nowadays, +have not the slightest possible reference to a +life beyond the grave. They are fundamentally not +even personal, but social. It is the race that grows, not +the individual, he becomes more powerful precisely because +the products of racial acquisition are inherited +by him. Remove, if only in thought, the individual<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">{133}</a></span> +from all association with his fellows, strip him of all +that he inherits from association with them, and he +loses all the qualities we indicate when we speak of +him as a civilized being. Remove him, in fact, from +that association, as when a man is marooned on a +desert island, and the more civilized qualities of his +character begin to weaken and in time disappear. +Man, as an individual, becomes more powerful with the +passing of each generation, precisely because he is +thus dependent upon the life of the race. The secret +of his weakness is at the same time the source of his +strength. We are what we are because of the generations +of men and women who lived and toiled and died +before we were born. We inherit the fruits of their +labours, as those who come after us will inherit the +fruits of our struggles and conquests. It is thus in the +life of the race that man achieves immortality. None +other is possible, or conceivable. And to those whose +minds are not distorted by religious teaching, and who +have taken the trouble to analyse and understand their +own mental states, it may be said that none other is +even desirable.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">{134}</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XI" id="CHAPTER_XI"></a>CHAPTER XI.<br /> +EVOLUTION.</h2> + +<p>Language, we have said above, is one of the prime +conditions of human greatness and progress. It is the +principal means by which man conserves his victories +over the forces of his environment, and transmits them +to his descendants. But it is, nevertheless, not without +its dangers, and may exert an influence fatal to exact +thought. There is a sense in which language necessarily +lags behind thought. For words are coined to +express the ideas of those who fashion them; and as the +knowledge of the next generation alters, and some +modification of existing conceptions is found necessary, +there is nothing but the existing array of words +in which to express them. The consequence is that +there are nearly always subtle shades of meaning in the +words used differing from the exact meaning which the +new thought is trying to express. Thought drives us to +seek new or improved verbal tools, but until we get +them we must go on using the old ones, with all their +old implications. And by the time the new words +arrive thought has made a still further advance, and +the general position remains. It is an eternal chase +in which the pursued is always being captured, but is +never caught.</p> + +<p>Another way in which language holds a danger is +that with many words, especially when they assume +the character of a formula, they tend to usurp the +place of thinking. The old lady who found so much +consolation in the "blessed" word Mesopotamia, is +not alone in using that method of consolation. It does +not meet us only in connection with religion, it is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">{135}</a></span> +encountered over the whole field of sociology, and even +of science. A conception in science or sociology is +established after a hard fight. It is accepted generally, +and thereafter takes its place as one of the many established +truths. And then the danger shows itself. It is +repeated as though it had some magical virtue in itself; +it means nothing to very many of those who use it, +they simply hand over their mental difficulties to its +care, much as the penitent in the confessional hands +over his moral troubles to the priest, and there the +matter ends. But in such cases the words used do not +express thought, they simply blind people to its +absence. And not only that, but in the name of these +sacred words, any number of foolish inferences are +drawn and receive general assent.</p> + +<p>A striking illustration of this is to be found in such +a word as "Evolution." One may say of it that while +it began as a formula, it continues as a fiat. Some invoke +it with all the expectancy of a medięval magician +commanding the attendance of his favourite spirits. +Others approach it with a hushed reverence that is +reminiscent of a Catholic devotee before his favourite +shrine. In a little more than half a century it has +acquired the characteristics of the Kismet of the +Mohammedan, the Beelzebub of the pious Christian, +and the power of a phrase that gives inspiration to a +born soldier. It is used as often to dispel doubt as it +is to awaken curiosity. It may express comprehension +or merely indicate vacuity. Decisions are pronounced +in its name with all the solemnity of a "Thus saith +the Lord." We are not sure that even to talk about +evolution in this way may not be considered wrong. +For there are crowds of folk who cannot distinguish +profundity from solemnity, and who mistake a long +face for the sure indication of a well-stored brain. The +truth here is that what a man understands thoroughly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">{136}</a></span> +he can deal with easily; and that he laughs at a difficulty +is not necessarily a sign that he fails to appreciate +it, he may laugh because he has taken its measure. +And why people do not laugh at such a thing +as religion is partly because they have not taken +its measure, partly from a perception that religion cannot +stand it. Everywhere the priest maintains his hold +as a consequence of the narcotizing influence of ill-understood +phrases, and in this he is matched by the +pseudo-philosopher whose pompous use of imperfectly +appreciated formulę disguises from the crowd the +mistiness of his understanding.</p> + +<p>A glance over the various uses to which the word +"Evolution" is put will well illustrate the truth of +what has been said. These make one wonder what, in +the opinion of some people, evolution stands for. One +of these uses of evolution is to give it a certain moral +implication to which it has not the slightest claim. A +certain school of Non-Theists are, in this matter, if not +the greatest offenders, certainly those with the least +excuse for committing the blunder. By these evolution +is identified with progress, or advancement, or a +gradual "levelling up" of society, and is even +acclaimed as presenting a more "moral" view of the +Universe than is the Theistic conception. Now, +primarily, this ascription of what one may call a moral +element to evolution is no more than a carrying over +into science of a frame of mind that properly belongs to +Theism. Quite naturally the Theist was driven to try +and find some moral purpose in the Universe, and to +prove that its working did not grate on our moral +sense. That was quite understandable, and even +legitimate. The world, from the point of view of the +Goddite, was God's world, he made it; and we are +ultimately compelled to judge the character of God +from his workmanship. An attack on the moral<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">{137}</a></span> +character of the world is, therefore, an attack on the +character of its maker. And the Theist proceeded to +find a moral justification for all that God had done.</p> + +<p>So far all is clear. But now comes a certain kind of +Non-Theist. And he, always rejecting a formal +Theism and substituting evolution, proceeds to claim +for his formula all that the Theist claimed for his. He +also strives to show that the idea of cosmic evolution +involves conceptions of nobility, justice, morality, etc. +There is no wonder that some Christians round on +him, and tell him that he still believes in a god. +Substantially he does. That is, he carries over into +his new camp the same anthropomorphic conception +of the workings of nature, and uses the same pseudo-scientific +reasoning that is characteristic of the Theist. +He has formally given up God, but he goes about +uncomfortably burdened with his ghost.</p> + +<p>Now, evolution is not a fiat, but a formula. It has +nothing whatever to do with progress, as such, nor with +morality, as such, nor with a levelling up, nor a +levelling down. It is really no more than a special +application of the principle of causation, and whether +the working out of that principle has a good effect or a +bad one, a moralizing, or a demoralizing, a progressive, +or a retrogressive consequence is not "given" in the +principle itself. Fundamentally, all cosmic phenomena +present us with two aspects—difference and change—and +that is so because it is the fundamental condition +of our knowing anything at all. But the law of +evolution is no more, is nothing more serious or more +profound than an attempt to express those movements +of change and difference in a more or less precise +formula. It aims at doing for phenomena in general +exactly what a particular scientific law aims at doing +for some special department. But it has no more a +moral implication, or a progressive implication than<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">{138}</a></span> +has the law of gravitation or of chemical affinity. The +sum of those changes that are expressed in the law of +evolution may result in one or the other; it has resulted +in one or the other. At one time we call its consequences +moral or progressive, at another time we call +them immoral or retrogressive, but these are some of +the distinctions which the human mind creates for its +own convenience, they have no validity in any other +sense. And when we mistake these quite legitimate +distinctions, made for our own convenience, and argue +as though they had an actual independent existence, +we are reproducing exactly the same mental confusion +that keeps Theism alive.</p> + +<p>The two aspects that difference and change resolve +themselves into when expressed in an evolutionary +formula are, in the inorganic world, equilibrium, and, +in the organic world, adaptation. Of course, equilibrium +also applies to the organic world, I merely put +it this way for the purpose of clarity. Now, if we confine +our attention to the world of animal forms, what +we have expressed, primarily, is the fact of adaptation. +If an animal is to live it must be adapted to its surroundings +to at least the extent of being able to overcome +or to neutralize the forces that threaten its +existence. That is quite a common-place, since all it +says is that to live an animal must be fit to live, but all +great truths are common-places—when one sees them. +Still, if there were only adaptations to consider, and if +the environment to which adaptation is to be secured, +remained constant, all we should have would be the +deaths of those not able to live, with the survival of +those more fortunately endowed. There would be +nothing that we could call, even to please ourselves, +either progress or its reverse. Movement up or down +(both human landmarks) occurs because the environment +itself undergoes a change. Either the material<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">{139}</a></span> +conditions change, or the pressure of numbers initiates +a contest for survival, although more commonly one +may imagine both causes in operation at the same time. +But the consequence is the introduction of a new +quality into the struggle for existence. It becomes a +question of a greater endowment of the qualities that +spell survival. And that paves the way to progress—or +the reverse. But one must bear in mind that, +whether the movement be in one direction or the other, +it is still the same process that is at work. Evolution +levels neither "up" nor "down." Up and down is +as relative in biology as it is in astronomy. In nature +there is neither better nor worse, neither high nor low, +neither good nor bad, there are only differences, and +if that had been properly appreciated by all, very few +of the apologies for Theism would ever have seen the +light.</p> + +<p>There is not the slightest warranty for speaking of +evolution as being a "progressive force," it is, indeed, +not a force at all, but only a descriptive term on all +fours with any other descriptive term as expressed in a +natural law. It neither, of necessity, levels up nor levels +down. In the animal world it illustrates adaptation +only, but whether that adaptation involves what we +choose to call progression or retrogression is a matter +of indifference. On the one hand we have aquatic life +giving rise to mammalian life, and on the other hand, +we have mammalian life reverting to an aquatic form of +existence. In one place we have a "lower" form of +life giving place to a "higher" form. In another +place we can see the reverse process taking place. And +the "lower" forms are often more persistent than the +"higher" ones, while, as the course of epidemical +and other diseases shows certain lowly forms of life +may make the existence of the higher forms impossible. +The Theistic attempt to disprove the mechanistic con<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">{140}</a></span>ception +of nature by insisting that evolution is a law +of progress, that it implies an end, and indicates a +goal, is wholly fallacious. From a scientific point of +view it is meaningless chatter. Science knows nothing +of a plan, or an end in nature, or even progress. All +these are conceptions which we humans create for our +own convenience. They are so many standards of +measurement, of exactly the same nature as our agreement +that a certain length of space shall be called a +yard, or a certain quantity of liquid shall be called a +pint. To think otherwise is pure anthropomorphism. +It is the ghost of God imported into science.</p> + +<p>So far, then, it is clear that the universal fact in +nature is change. The most general aspect of nature +which meets us is that expressed in the law of +evolution. And proceeding from the more general to +the less general, in the world of living beings this +change meets us in the form of adaptation to environment. +But what constitutes adaptation must be determined +by the nature of the environment. That will +determine what qualities are of value in the struggle +for existence, which is not necessarily a struggle +against other animals, but may be no more than the +animal's own endeavours to persist in being. It is, +however, in relation to the environment that we must +measure the value of qualities. Whatever be the nature +of the environment that principle remains true. Ideally, +one quality may be more desirable than another, but if +it does not secure a greater degree of adaptation to the +environment it brings no advantage to its possessor. +It may even bring a positive disadvantage. In a +thieves' kitchen the honest man is handicapped. In a +circle of upright men the dishonest man is at a discount. +In the existing political world a perfectly +truthful man would be a parliamentary failure. In the +pulpit a preacher who knew the truth about Chris<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">{141}</a></span>tianity +and preached it would soon be out of the +Church. Adaptation is not, as such, a question of +moral goodness or badness, it is simply adaptation.</p> + +<p>A precautionary word needs be said on the matter of +environment. If we conceive the environment as made +up only of the material surroundings we shall not be +long before we find ourselves falling into gross error. +For that conception of environment will only hold of +the very lowest organisms. A little higher, and the +nature of the organism begins to have a modifying +effect on the material environment, and when we come +to animals living in groups the environment of the +individual animal becomes partly the habits and +instincts of the other animals with which it lives. +Finally, when we reach man this transformation of the +nature of the environment becomes greatest. Here it is +not merely the existence of other members of the same +species, with all their developed feelings and ideas to +which each must become adapted to live, but in virtue +of what we have described above as the social medium, +certain "thought forms" such as institutions, conceptions +of right and wrong, ideals of duty, loyalty, +the relation of one human group to other human +groups, not merely those that are now living, but also +those that are dead, are all part of the environment to +which adjustment must be made. And in the higher +stages of social life these aspects of the environment +become of even greater consequence than the facts of a +climatic, geographic, or geologic nature. In other +words, the environment which exerts a predominating +influence on civilized mankind is an environment that +has been very largely created by social life and growth.</p> + +<p>If we keep these two considerations firmly in mind +we shall be well guarded against a whole host of +fallacies and false analogies that are placed before us +as though they were unquestioned and unquestionable<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">{142}</a></span> +truths. There is, for instance, the misreading of +evolution which asserts that inasmuch as what is called +moral progress takes place, therefore evolution involves +a moral purpose. We find this view put forward not +only by avowed Theists, but by those who, while +formally disavowing Theism, appear to have imported +into ethics all the false sentiment and fallacious reasoning +that formerly did duty in bolstering up the idea of +God. Evolution, as such, is no more concerned with +an ideal morality than it is concerned with the development +of an ideal apple dumpling. In the universal +process morality is no more than a special illustration +of the principle of adaptation. The morality of man is +a summary of the relations between human beings that +must be maintained if the two-fold end of racial +preservation and individual development are to be +secured. Fundamentally morality is the formulation +in either theory or practice of rules or actions that make +group-life possible. And the man who sees in the +existence or growth of morality proof of a "plan" or +an "end" is on all fours with the mentality of the +curate who saw the hand of Providence in the fact that +death came at the end of life instead of in the middle +of it. What we are dealing with here is the fact of +adaptation, although in the case of the human group +the traditions and customs and ideals of the group +form a very important part of the environment to which +adaptation must be made and have, therefore, a +distinct survival value. The moral mystery-monger +is only a shade less objectionable than the religious +mystery-monger, of whom he is the ethical equivalent.</p> + +<p>A right conception of the nature of environment and +the meaning of evolution will also protect us against +a fallacy that is met with in connection with social +growth. Human nature, we are often told, is always +the same. To secure a desired reform, we are assured,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">{143}</a></span> +you must first of all change human nature, and the +assumption is that as human nature cannot be changed +the proposed reform is quite impossible.</p> + +<p>Now there is a sense in which human nature is the +same, generation after generation. But there is another +sense in which human nature is undergoing constant +alteration, and, indeed, it is one of the outstanding +features of social life that it should be so. So far as +can be seen there exists no difference between the +fundamental capacities possessed by man during at +least the historic period. There are differences in +people between the relative strengths of the various +capacities, but that is all. An ancient Assyrian +possessed all the capacities of a modern Englishman, +and in the main one would feel inclined to say the same +of them in their quantitative aspect as well as in their +qualitative one. For when one looks at the matter +closely it is seen that the main difference between the +ancient and the modern man is in expression. Civilization +does not so much change the man so much as it +gives a new direction to the existing qualities. +Whether particular qualities are expressed in an +ideally good direction or the reverse depends upon the +environment to which they react.</p> + +<p>To take an example. The fundamental evil of war +in a modern state is that it expends energy in a harmful +direction. But war itself, the expression of the +war-like character, is the outcome of pugnacity and the +love of adventure without which human nature would +be decidedly the poorer, and would be comparatively +ineffective. It is fundamentally an expression of these +qualities that lead to the quite healthy taste for exploration, +discovery, and in intellectual pursuits to that +contest of ideas which lies at the root of most of our +progress. And what war means in the modern State +is that the love of competition and adventure, the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">{144}</a></span> +pugnacity which leads a man to fight in defence of a +right or to redress a wrong, and without which human +nature would be a poor thing, are expended in the way +of sheer destruction instead of through channels of +adventure and healthy intellectual contest. Sympathies +are narrowed instead of widened, and hatred of +the stranger and the outsider, of which a growing +number of people in a civilized country are becoming +ashamed, assumes the rank of a virtue. In other words, +a state of war creates an environment—fortunately +for only a brief period—which gives a survival value +to such expressions of human capacity as indicate a +reversion to a lower state of culture.</p> + +<p>We may put the matter thus. While conduct is a +function of the organism, and while the <em>kind</em> of reaction +is determined by structure, the <em>form</em> taken by +the reaction is a matter of response to environmental +influences. It is this fact which explains why the +capacities of man remain fairly constant, while there +is a continuous redirecting of these capacities into new +channels suitable to a developing social life.</p> + +<p>We are only outlining here a view of evolution that +would require a volume to discuss and illustrate +adequately, but enough has been said to indicate the +enormous importance of the educative power of the +environment. We cannot alter the capacities of the +individual for they are a natural endowment. But we +can, in virtue of an increased emphasis, determine +whether they shall be expressed in this or that +direction. The love of adventure may, for example, +be exhausted in the pursuit of some piratical enterprise, +or it may be guided into channels of some useful +form of social effort. It lies with society itself to see +that the environment is such as to exercise a determining +influence with regard to expressions of activity +that are beneficial to the whole of the group.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">{145}</a></span> +To sum up. Evolution is no more than a formula +that expresses the way in which a moving balance of +forces is brought about by purely mechanical means. +So far as animal life is concerned this balance is expressed +by the phrase "adaptation to environment." +But in human society the environment is in a growing +measure made up of ideas, customs, traditions, ideals, +and beliefs; in a word, of factors which are themselves +products of human activities. And it is for this reason +that the game of civilization is very largely in our own +hands. If we maintain an environment in which it is +either costly or dangerous to be honest and fearless in +the expression of opinion, we shall be doing our best +to develop mental cowardice and hypocrisy. If we +bring up the young with the successful soldier or +money-maker before them as examples, while we continue +to treat the scientist as a crank, and the reformer +as a dangerous criminal, we shall be continuing the +policy of forcing the expression of human capacity on +a lower level than would otherwise be the case. If +we encourage the dominance of a religion which while +making a profession of disinterested loftiness continues +to irradiate a narrow egotism and a pessimistic view of +life, we are doing our best to perpetuate an environment +which emphasizes only the poorer aspects of +human motive. Two centuries of ceaseless scientific +activity have taught us something of the rules of the +game which we are all playing with nature whether +we will or no. To-day we have a good many of the +winning cards in our hands, if we will only learn to +play them wisely. It is not correct to say that +evolution necessarily involves progress, but it does +indicate that wisdom and foresight may so control the +social forces as to turn that ceaseless change which is +indicated by the law of evolution into channels that +make for happiness and prosperity.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">{146}</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XII" id="CHAPTER_XII"></a>CHAPTER XII.<br /> +DARWINISM AND DESIGN.</h2> + +<p>The influence of the hypothesis of evolution on +religion was not long in making itself felt. Professor +Huxley explained the rapid success of Darwinism by +saying that the scientific world was ready for it. And +much the same thing may be said of the better +representatives of the intellectual world with regard +to the bearing of evolution on religion. In many +directions the cultivated mind had for more than half +a century been getting familiar with the general conception +of growth in human life and thought. Where +earlier generations had seen no more than a pattern to +unravel there had developed a conviction that there +was a history to trace and to understand. Distant +parts of the world had been brought together during +the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, readers +and students were getting familiarized with the mass +of customs and religious ideas that were possessed by +these peoples, and it was perceived that beneath the +bewildering variety of man's mental output there were +certain features which they had in common, and which +might hold in solution some common principle or +principles.</p> + +<p>This common principle was found in the conception +of evolution. It was the one thing which, if true, and +apart from the impossible idea of a revelation, nicely +graduated to the capacities of different races, offered +an explanation of the religions of the world in terms +more satisfactory than those of deliberate invention<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">{147}</a></span> +or imposture. Once it was accepted, if only as an instrument +of investigation, its use was soon justified. +And the thorough-going nature of the conquest +achieved is in no wise more clearly manifested than in +the fact that the conception of growth is, to-day, not +merely an accepted principle with scientific investigators, +it has sunk deeply into all our literature and +forms an unconscious part of popular thought.</p> + +<p>One aspect of the influence of evolution on religious +ideas has already been noted. It made the religious +idea but one of the many forms that were assumed by +man's attempt to reduce his experience of the world to +something like an orderly theory. But that carried +with it, for religion, the danger of reducing it to no +more than one of the many theories of things which +man forms, with the prospect of its rejection as a +better knowledge of the world develops. Evolution +certainly divested religion of any authority save such +as it might contain in itself, and that is a position a +religious mind can never contemplate with equanimity.</p> + +<p>But so far as the theory of Darwinism is concerned it +exerted a marked and rapid influence on the popular +religious theory of design in nature. This is one of +the oldest arguments in favour of a reasoned belief in +God, and it is the one which was, and is still in one +form or another, held in the greatest popular esteem. +To the popular mind—and religion in a civilized +country is not seriously concerned about its failing +grip on the cultured intelligence so long as it keeps +control of the ordinary man and woman—to the +popular mind the argument from design appealed with +peculiar force. Anyone is capable of admiring the +wonders of nature, and in the earlier developments of +popular science the marvels of plant and animal +structures served only to deepen the Theist's admiration +of the "divine wisdom." The examples of com<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">{148}</a></span>plexity +of structure, of the interdependence of parts, +and of the thousand and one cunning devices by which +animal life maintains itself in the face of a hostile +environment were there for all to see and admire. +And when man compared these with his own conscious +attempts to adapt means to ends, there seemed as +strong proof here as anywhere of some scheming intelligence +behind the natural process.</p> + +<p>But the strength of the case was more apparent than +real. It was weakest at the very point where it should +have been strongest. In the case of a human product +we know the purpose and can measure the extent of +its realization in the nature of the result. In the case +of a natural product we have no means of knowing +what the purpose was, or even if any purpose at all +lies behind the product. The important element in +the argument from design—that of purpose—is thus +pure assumption. In the case of human productions +we argue from purpose to production. In the case of +a natural object we are arguing from production to an +assumed purpose. The analogy breaks down just +where it should be strongest and clearest.</p> + +<p>Now it is undeniable that to a very large number of +the more thoughtful the old form of the argument +from design received its death blow from the Darwinian +doctrine of natural selection. In the light of this +theory there was no greater need to argue that intelligence +was necessary to produce animal adaptations +than there was to assume intelligence for the sifting of +sand by the wind. As the lighter grains are carried +farthest because they are lightest, so natural selection, +operating upon organic variations, favoured the better +adapted specimens by killing off the less favoured +ones. The fittest is not created, it survives. The +world is not what it is because the animal is what it is, +the animal is what it is because the world is as it is.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">{149}</a></span> +It cannot be any different and live—a truth demonstrated +by the destruction of myriads of animal forms, +and by the disappearance of whole species. The case +was so plain, the evidence so conclusive, that the +clearer headed religionists dropped the old form of the +argument from design as no longer tenable.</p> + +<p>But the gentleman who exchanged the errors of the +Church of Rome for those of the Church of England is +always with us. And the believer in deity having +dropped the argument from design in one form immediately +proceeded to revive it in another. This was, +perhaps, inevitable. After all, man lives in this world, +and if proof of the existence of deity is to be gathered +from his works, it must be derived from the world we +know. So design <em>must</em> be found somewhere, and it +must be found here. Only one chance was left. The +general hypothesis of evolution—either Darwinism +alone, or Darwinism plus other factors—explained the +development of animal life. But that was <em>within</em> the +natural process. What, then, of the process as a whole? +If the hand of God could not be seen in the particular +adaptations of animal life, might it not be that the +whole of the process, in virtue of which these particular +adaptations occurred, might be the expression +of the divine intelligence? God did not create the +particular parts directly, but may he not have created +the whole, leaving it for the forces he had set in +motion to work out his "plan." The suggestion was +attractive. It relieved religion from resting its case +in a region where proof and disproof are possible, and +removed it to a region where they are difficult, if not +impossible. So, as it was not possible to uphold the +old teleology, one began to hear a great deal of the +"wider teleology," which meant that the Theist was +thinking vaguely when he imagined he was thinking +comprehensively, and that, because he had reached a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">{150}</a></span> +region where the laws of logic could not be applied, he +concluded that he had achieved demonstration. And, +indeed, when one gets outside the region of verification +there is nothing to stop one theorizing—save a dose of +common-sense and a gracious gift of humour.</p> + +<p>In another work (<cite>Theism or Atheism</cite>) I have dealt +at length with the argument from design. At present +my aim is to take the presentation of this "wider +teleology" as given by a well-known writer on philosophical +subjects, Mr. F. C. S. Schiller, in a volume +published a few years ago entitled <cite>Humanism: Philosophical +Essays</cite>. And in doing so, it is certain that +the theologian will lose nothing by leaving himself in +the hands of so able a representative.</p> + +<p>Mr. Schiller naturally accepts Darwinism as at least +an important factor in organic evolution, but he does +not believe that it excludes design, and he does believe +that "our attitude towards life will be very +different, according as we believe it to be inspired and +guided by intelligence or hold it to be the fortuitous +product of blind mechanisms, whose working our helpless +human intelligence can observe, but cannot +control."</p> + +<p>Now within its scope Darwinism certainly does +exclude design, and even though the forces represented +by natural selection may be directed towards +the end produced, yet so far as the play of these forces +is concerned they are really self-directing, or self-contained. +The argument really seems to be just mere +theology masquerading as philosophy. Theories do +play some part in the determination of the individual +attitude towards life, but they do not play the important +part that Mr. Schiller assumes they play. It is +easily observable that the same theory of life held by +a Christian in England and by another Christian in +Asia Minor has, so far as it affects conduct, different<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">{151}</a></span> +results. And if it be said that even though the results +be different they are still there, the reply is that they +differ because the facts of life compel an adjustment +in terms of the general environment. Mr. Schiller +admits that the "prevalent conduct and that adapted +to the conditions of life must coincide," and the +admission is fatal to his position. The truth of the +matter is that the conditions of life being what they +are, and the consequences of conduct being also what +they are, speculative theories of life cannot, in the +nature of the case, affect life beyond a certain point; +that is, if life is to continue. That is why in the +history of belief religious teachings have sooner or +later to accommodate themselves to persistent facts.</p> + +<p>Mr. Schiller brings forward two arguments in +favour of reconciling Darwinism and Design, both of +them ingenious, but neither of them conclusive. With +both of these I will deal later; but it is first necessary +to notice one or two of his arguments against a non-Theistic +Darwinism. The denial of the argument from +design, he says, leads farther than most people +imagine:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>A complete denial of design in nature must deny +the efficacy of all intelligence as such. A consistently +mechanical view has to regard all intelligence as +otiose, as an "epi-phenomenal by-product" or fifth +wheel to the cart, in the absence of which the given +results would no less have occurred. And so, if this +view were the truth, we should have to renounce all +effort to direct our fated and ill-fated course down the +stream of time. Our consciousness would be an unmeaning +accident.</p></blockquote> + +<p>A complete reply to this would involve an examination +of the meaning that is and ought to be attached to +"intelligence," and that is too lengthy an enquiry<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">{152}</a></span> +to be attempted here. It is, perhaps, enough to point +out that Mr. Schiller's argument clearly moves on +the assumption that intelligence is a <em>thing</em> or a quality +which exists, so to speak, in its own right and which +interferes with the course of events as something from +without. It is quite probable that he would repudiate +this construction being placed on his words, but if he +does not mean that, then I fail to see what he does +mean, or what force there is in his argument. And it +is enough for my purpose to point out that "intelligence" +or mind is not a thing, but a relation. It +asserts of a certain class of actions exactly what +"gravitation" asserts of a certain class of motion, +and "thingness" is no more asserted in the one case +than it is in the other.</p> + +<p>Intelligence, as a name given to a special class of +facts or actions, remains, whatever view we take of its +nature, and it is puzzling to see why the denial of +extra natural intelligence—that is, intelligence +separated from all the conditions under which we +know the phenomenon of intelligence—should be +taken as involving the denial of the existence of +intelligence as we know it. Intelligence as connoting +purposive action remains as much a fact as gravity or +chemical attraction, and continues valid concerning +the phenomena it is intended to cover. All that the +evolutionist is committed to is the statement that it is +as much a product of evolution as is the shape or colouring +of animals. It is not at all a question of self-dependence. +Every force in nature must be taken +for what it is worth, intelligence among them. Why, +then, does the view that intelligence is both a product +of evolution and a cause of another phase of evolution +land us in self-contradiction, or make the existence of +itself meaningless? The truth is that intelligence +determines results exactly as every other force in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">{153}</a></span> +nature determines results, by acting as a link in an +unending sequential chain. And the question as to +what intelligence is <i>per se</i> is as meaningless as what +gravitation is <i>per se</i>. These are names which we give +to groups of phenomena displaying particular and +differential characteristics, and their purpose is served +when they enable us to cognize and recognize these +phenomena and to give them their place and describe +their function in the series of changes that make up +our world.</p> + +<p>Mr. Schiller's reply to this line of criticism is the +familiar one that it reduces human beings to automata. +He says:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>The ease with which the Darwinian argument dispenses +with intelligence as a factor in survival excites +suspicion. It is proving too much to show that +adaptation might equally well have arisen in automata. +For we ourselves are strongly persuaded that +we are not automata and strive hard to adapt ourselves. +In us at least, therefore, intelligence <em>is</em> a +source of adaptation.... Intelligence therefore is a +<i>vera causa</i> as a source of adaptations at least co-ordinate +with Natural Selection, and this can be +denied only if it is declared inefficacious <em>everywhere</em>; +if all living beings, including ourselves, are declared +to be automata.</p></blockquote> + +<p>One is compelled again to point out that Darwinism +does not dispense with intelligence as a factor in +survival, except so far as the intelligence which determines +survival is declared to be operating apart from +the organisms which survive. The conduct of one of +the lower animals which reacts only to the immediate +promptings of its environment is of one order, but the +response of another animal not merely to the immediate +promptings of the environment, but to remote<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">{154}</a></span> +conditions, as in the selection of food or the building of +a home of some sort, or to the fashioning of a tool, +does obviously give to the intelligence displayed a +distinct survival value. And that effectively replies +to the triumphant conclusion, "If intelligence has no +efficacy in promoting adaptations, <i>i.e.</i>, if it has no +survival value, how comes it to be developed at all?"</p> + +<p>Darwinism would never have been able to dispense +with intelligence in the way it did but for the fact that +the opposite theory never stood for more than a mere +collection of words. That species are or were produced +by the operations of "Divine Intelligence" is merely +a grandiloquent way of saying nothing at all. It is +absurd to pretend that such a formula ever had any +scientific value. It explains nothing. And it is quite +obvious that some adaptations do, so far as we know, +arise without intelligence, and are, therefore, to use +Mr. Schiller's expression, automata. (I do not like the +word, since it conveys too much the notion of someone +behind the scenes pulling strings.) And it is on his +theory that animals actually are automata. For if +there be a "Divine mind" which stands as the active +cause of the adaptations that meet us in the animal +world, and who arranges forces so that they shall work +to their pre-destined end, what is that but converting +the whole of the animal world into so many automata. +One does not escape determinism in this way; it is +only getting rid of it in one direction in order to reintroduce +it in another.</p> + +<p>And one would like to know what our conviction +that we are not automata has to do with it. Whether +the most rigid determinism is true or not is a matter +to be settled by an examination of the facts and a careful +reflection as to their real significance. No one +questions that there is a persuasion to the contrary; +if there were not there would be nothing around which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">{155}</a></span> +controversy could gather. But it is the conviction that +is challenged, and it is idle to reply to the challenge by +asserting a conviction to the contrary. The whole +history of human thought is the record of a challenge +and a reversal of such convictions. There never was a +conviction which was held more strenuously than that +the earth was flat. The experience of all men in every +hour of their lives seemed to prove it. And yet to-day +no one believes it. The affirmation that we are "free" +rests, as Spinoza said, ultimately on the fact that all +men know their actions and but few know the causes +thereof. A feather endowed with consciousness, falling +to the ground in a zigzag manner, might be equally +convinced that it determined the exact spot on which +it would rest, yet its persuasion would be of no more +value than the "vulgar" conviction that we independently +adapt ourselves to our environment.</p> + +<p>Mr. Schiller's positive arguments in favour of reconciling +Darwinism with design—one of them is +really negative;—are concerned with (1) the question +of variation, and (2) with the existence of progress. +On the first question it is pointed out that while +Natural Selection operates by way of favouring certain +variations, the origin or cause of these variations remains +unknown. And although Mr. Schiller does not +say so in as many words, there is the implication, if I +rightly discern his drift, that there is room here for a +directing intelligence, inasmuch as science is at present +quite unable to fully explain the causes of variations. +We are told that Darwin assumed for the purpose of +his theory that variations were indefinite both as to +character and extent, and it is upon these variations +that Natural Selection depends. This indefinite +variation Mr. Schiller asserts to be a methodological +device, that is, it is something assumed as the groundwork +of a theory, but without any subsequent verifica<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">{156}</a></span>tion, +and it is in virtue of this assumption that intelligence +is ruled out of evolution. And inasmuch as +Mr. Schiller sees no reason for believing that variations +are of this indefinite character, he asserts that there is +in evolution room for a teleological factor, in other +words, "a purposive direction of variations."</p> + +<p>Now it hardly needs pointing out to students of +Darwinism that indefinite variation is the equivalent +of "a variation to which no exact limits can be +placed," and in this sense the assumption is a perfectly +sound one. From one point of view the variations +must be definite, that is, they can only occur within +certain limits. An elephant will not vary in the +direction of wings, nor will a bird in the direction of a +rose bush. But so long as we cannot fix the exact +limits of variation we are quite warranted in speaking +of them as indefinite. That this is a methodological +device no one denies, but so are most of the other +distinctions that we frame. Scientific generalizations +consist of abstractions, and Mr. Schiller himself of +necessity employs the same device.</p> + +<p>Mr. Schiller argues, quite properly, that while +Natural Selection states the conditions under which +animal life evolves, it does not state any reason why it +should evolve. Selection may keep a species stationary +or it may even cause it to degenerate. Both are fairly +common phenomena in the animal and plant world. +Moreover, if there are an indefinite number of variations, +and if they tend in an indefinite number of +directions, then the variation in any one direction can +never be more than an infinitesimal portion of the +whole, and that this one should persist supplies a still +further reason for belief in "a purposive direction of +variations." Mr. Schiller overlooks an important +point here, but a very simple one. It is true that any +one variation is small in relation to the whole of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">{157}</a></span> +possible or actual number of variations. But it is not +in relation to quantity but quality that survival takes +place, and in proportion to the keenness of the struggle +the variation that gives its possessor an advantage need +only be of the smaller kind. In a struggle of endurance +between two athletes it is the one capable of holding +out for an extra minute who carries off the prize.</p> + +<p>Further, as Mr. Schiller afterwards admits, the very +smallness of the number of successful variations makes +against intelligence rather than for it, and he practically +surrenders his position in the statement, "the +teleological and anti-teleological interpretation of +events will ever decide their conflict by appealing to +the facts; for in the facts each finds what it wills and +comes prepared to see." After this lame conclusion it +is difficult to see what value there is in Mr. Schiller's +own examination of the "facts." Not that it is +strictly correct to say that the facts bear each view out +equally. They do not, and Mr. Schiller only justifies +his statement by converting the Darwinian position, +which is teleologically negative, into an affirmative. +The Darwinian, he says, denies intelligence as a cause +of evolution. What the Darwinian does is to deny the +validity of the evidence which the teleologist brings to +prove his case. The Theist asserts mind as a cause of +evolution. The Darwinian simply points out that the +facts may be explained in quite another way and without +the appeal to a quite unknown factor.</p> + +<p>And here one might reasonably ask, why, if there +is a directive mind at work, are there variations at all? +Why should the "directive intelligence" not get +earlier to work, and instead of waiting until a large +number of specimens have been produced and then +looking them over with a view to "directing" the +preservation of the better specimens, why should it not +set to work at the beginning and see that only the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">{158}</a></span> +desirable ones make their appearance? Certainly that +is what a mere human intelligence would do if it could. +But it is characteristic of the "Divine Intelligence" +of the Theist that it never seems to operate with a tenth +part of the intelligence of an ordinary human being.</p> + +<p>Moreover, Mr. Schiller writes quite ignoring the +fact that the "directive intelligence" does not direct the +preservation of the better specimens. What it does, if +it does anything at all, is to kill off the less favoured +ones. Natural Selection—the point is generally overlooked +by the Theistic sentimentality of most of our +writers—does not preserve anything. Its positive +action is not to keep alive but to kill. It does not take +the better ones in hand and help them. It seizes on all +it can and kills them. It is the difference between a +local council that tried to raise the standard of health +by a general improvement of the conditions of life, and +one that aimed at the same end by killing off all +children that failed to come up to a certain standard. +The actual preservation of a better type is, so far as +Natural Selection is concerned, quite accidental. So +far as Natural Selection operates it does so by elimination, +not by preservation.</p> + +<p>Mr. Schiller's other plea in favour of Design is concerned +with the conception of progress. He points +out that while degeneration and stagnation both occur +in nature, yet—</p> + +<blockquote><p>life has been on the whole progressive; but progress +and retrogression have both been effected under the +same law of Natural Selection. How, then, can the +credit of that result be ascribed to Natural Selection? +Natural Selection is equally ready to bring about +degeneration or to leave things unchanged. How, +then, can it be that which determines which of the +three possible (and actual) cases shall be realized?... It +cannot be Natural Selection that causes one<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">{159}</a></span> +species to remain stationary, another to degenerate, +a third to develop into a higher form.... Some +variable factor must be added to Natural Selection.</p></blockquote> + +<p>But why? Evolution, as we have pointed out in a +previous chapter, makes for adaptation in terms of +animal preservation. If the adaptation of an animal +to its environment is secured by "degenerating" or +"developing" or by remaining stationary, it will do +one of the three. That is the normal consequence of +Natural Selection, and it is surprising that Mr. +Schiller does not see this. He is actually accusing +Natural Selection of not being able to do what it does +on his own showing. The proof he himself gives of +this operation of Natural Selection in the examples he +cites of its ineffectiveness. If Natural Selection could +not make for degeneration or development, in what +way would it be able to establish an equilibrium between +an animal and its surroundings? Really, there +is nothing that so strengthens one's conviction of the +truth of the Freethought position so much as a study +of the arguments that are brought against it.</p> + +<p>Mr. Schiller is really misled, and so misleads his +readers by an unjustifiable use of the word "progress." +He says that evolution has been, on the whole, progressive, +and appeals to "progress" as though it were +some objective fact. But that is not the case. There +is no "progress" in the animal world, there is only +change. We have dealt with this in a previous chapter, +and there is no need to again labour the point. "Progress" +is a conception which we ourselves frame, and +we measure a movement towards or away from this +arbitrary standard of ours in terms of better or worse, +higher or lower. But nature knows nothing of a +higher or a lower, it knows only of changing forms +more or less fitted to live in the existing environment.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">{160}</a></span> +Scientifically, life has not progressed, it has persisted, +and a <i>sine qua non</i> of its persistence has been adaptation +to environment.</p> + +<p>Progress, then, is not a "natural" fact, but a +methodological one. It is a useful word and a +valuable ideal. I am not protesting against its use, +only against its misuse. It is one of the many +abstractions created by thinkers, and then worshipped +as a reality by those who forget the origin and purpose +of its existence. And in this we can see one of the +fatal legacies we have inherited from Theistic methods +of thinking. The belief that things are designed to be +as they are comes to us from those primitive methods +of thinking which personify and vitalize all natural +phenomena. We have outgrown the crude frame of +mind which saw direct volitional action in a storm or in +the movements of natural forces. The development +of civilized and scientific thinking has removed these +conceptions from the minds of educated men and +women, but it has left behind it as a residuum the +habit of looking for purpose where none exists, and +of reading into nature as objective facts our own +generalizations and abstractions. And so long as we +have not outgrown that habit we are retaining a fatal +bar to exact scientific thinking.</p> + +<p>Finally, and this consideration is fatal to any theory +of design such as Mr. Schiller champions, adaptation +is not a special quality of one form of existence, but a +universal quality of all. There is not a greater degree +of adaptation here and a less degree there, but the +same degree in every case. There is no other meaning +to adaptation except that of adjustment to surroundings. +But whether an animal lives or dies, +whether it is higher or lower, deformed or perfect, the +adjustment is the same. That is, every form of +existence represents the product of forces that have<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">{161}</a></span> +made it what it is, and the same forces could not have +produced anything different. Every body in existence, +organic or inorganic, constitutes in ultimate analysis a +balance of the forces represented by it. It is not +possible, therefore, for the Theist to say that design +is evidenced by adaptation in one case and its absence +in another. There is adaptation in every case, even +though it may not be the adaptation we should like to +see. It is not possible for the Theist to say that the +<em>degree</em> of adaptation is greater in the one case than in +the other, for <em>that</em> is the same in every case. What +needs to be done if design is to be established is to prove +that the forces we see at work could not have produced +the results that emerge without the introduction of a +factor not already given in our experience. Anything +else is mere waste of time.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">{162}</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XIII" id="CHAPTER_XIII"></a>CHAPTER XIII.<br /> +ANCIENT AND MODERN.</h2> + +<p>In the preceding chapters we have, without saying it +in so many words, been emphasizing the modern as +against the ancient point of view. The distinction may +not at first glance appear to be of great moment, and +yet reflection will prove it to be of vital significance. +It expresses, in a sentence, the essence of the distinction +between the Freethinker and the religionist. +Objectively, the world in which we are living is the +same as that in which our ancestors lived. The same +stars that looked down upon them look down upon us. +Natural forces affected them as they affect us. Even +the play of human passion and desire was the same +with them as with us. Hunger and thirst, love and +hatred, cowardice and courage, generosity and greed +operate now as always. The world remains the same +in all its essential features; what alters is our conception +of it—in other words, the point of view.</p> + +<p>The question thus resolves itself into one of interpretation. +Freethinker and religionist are each living +in the same world, they are each fed with the same +foods and killed with the same poisons. The same +feelings move both and the same problems face both. +Their differences are constituted by the canon of interpretation +applied. It is on this issue that the conflict +between religion and science arises. For religion is +not, as some have argued, something that is supplementary +or complementary to science, nor does it deal<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">{163}</a></span> +with matters on which science is incompetent to express +an opinion. Religion and science face each other +as rival interpretations of the same set of facts, precisely +as the Copernican and the Ptolemaic systems +once faced each other as rival interpretations of +astronomical phenomena. If the one is true the other +is false. You may reject the religious or the scientific +explanation of phenomena, but you cannot logically +accept both. As Dr. Johnson said, "Two contradictory +ideas may inhere in the same mind, but they +cannot both be correct."</p> + +<p>Now while it is true that in order to understand the +present we must know the past, and that because the +present is a product of the past, it is also true that a +condition of understanding is to interpret the past by +the present. In ordinary affairs this is not questioned. +When geologists set out to explain the causes of +changes in the earth's surface, they utilize the present-day +knowledge of existing forces, and by prolonging +their action backward explain the features of the +period they are studying. When historians seek to +explain the conduct of, say Henry the Eighth, they +take their knowledge of the motives animating existing +human nature, and by placing that in a sixteenth +century setting manage to present us with a picture of +the period. So, again, when the thirteenth century +monkish historian gravely informs us that a particular +epidemic was due to the anger of God against the +wickedness of the people, we put that interpretation +on one side and use our own knowledge to find in +defective social and sanitary conditions the cause of +what occurred. Illustrations to the same end may be +found in every direction. It is, indeed, not something +that one may accept or reject as one may take or leave +a political theory, it is an indispensible condition of +rational thinking on any subject whatsoever.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">{164}</a></span> +Accepted everywhere else, it is in connection with +religion that one finds this principle, not openly +challenged, for there are degrees of absurdity to which +even the most ardent religionist dare not go, but it is +quietly set on one side and a method adopted which is +its practical negation. Either the procedure is inverted +and the present is interpreted by the past, as +when it is assumed that because God did certain things +in the past therefore he will continue to do the same +things in the present, or it is assumed that the past +was unlike the present, and, therefore, the same +method of interpretation cannot be applied to both +cases. Both plans have the effect of landing us, if not +in lunacy, at least well on the way to it.</p> + +<p>It is indispensible to the religionist to ignore the +principle above laid down. For if it is admitted that +human nature is always and everywhere the same, and +that natural forces always and everywhere act in the +same manner, religious beliefs are brought to the test +of their conformity with present day knowledge of +things and all claim to objective validity must be +abandoned. Yet the principle is quite clear. The +claim of the prophets of old to be inspired must be +tested by what we know of the conditions of "inspiration" +to-day, and not by what unenlightened people +thought of its nature centuries ago. Whether the +story of the Virgin Birth is credible or not must be +settled by an appeal to what we know of the nature of +animal procreation, and not by whether our faith urges +us to accept the statement as true. To act otherwise is +to raise an altogether false issue, the question of +evidence is argued when what is really at issue is that +of credibility. It is not at all a matter of whether there +is evidence enough to establish the reality of a particular +recorded event, but whether our actual knowledge +of natural happenings is not enough for us to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">{165}</a></span> +rule it out as objectively untrue, and to describe the +conditions which led to its being accepted as true.</p> + +<p>Let us take as an illustration of this the general +question of miracles. The <cite>Oxford Dictionary</cite> defines a +miracle as "A marvellous event occurring within +human experience which cannot have been brought +about by human power or by the operation of any +natural agency, and must, therefore, be ascribed to the +special intervention of the deity or some supernatural +being." That is a good enough definition, and is +certainly what people have had in mind when they +have professed a belief in miracles. A miracle must +be something marvellous, that is, it must be unusual, +and it must not be even conceivably explainable in +terms of the operation of natural forces. If it is +admitted that what is claimed as a miracle might be +explained as the result of natural forces provided our +knowledge was extensive enough and exact enough, it +is confessed that miracle and ignorance are convertible +terms. And while that may be true enough as a matter +of fact, it would never suit the religious case to admit +it in so many words.</p> + +<p>Nor would it make the case any better to argue that +the alleged miracle has been brought about by some +superior being with a much greater knowledge of +nature than man possesses, but which the latter may +one day acquire. That is placing a miracle on the same +level as a performance given by a clever conjuror, +which puzzles the onlooker because he lacks the +technical knowledge requisite to understand the +methods employed. A miracle to be a miracle must not +be in accordance with natural laws, known or unknown, +it must contravene them or suspend their +operation.</p> + +<p>On the other hand, the demand made by some critics +of the miraculous, namely, that the alleged miracle<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">{166}</a></span> +shall be performed under test conditions, is absurd, +and shows that they have not grasped the essential +point at issue. The believer's reply to such a demand +is plain and obvious. He says, a miracle is by its +nature a rare event, it is performed under special circumstances +to serve a special purpose. Where, then, is +the reason in asking that this miracle shall be re-performed +in order to convince certain people that it has +already occurred? To arrange for the performance of +a miracle is an absurdity. For it to become common is +to destroy both its character as a miracle and the +justification for its existence. A miracle must carry +its own evidence or it fails of its purpose and ceases to +be a miracle at all. Discussion on these lines ends, at +best, in a stalemate.</p> + +<p>It is just as wide of the mark to discuss miracles as +though it were a question of evidence. What possible +evidence could there be, for example, that Jesus fed +five thousand people with a few loaves and fishes, and +had basketfuls left at the end of the repast? Suppose +it were possible to produce the sworn testimony of the +five thousand themselves that they had been so fed. +Would that produce conviction? Would it do any +more than prove that they believed the food had been +so expanded or multiplied that it was enough for them +all? It would be convincing, perhaps, as proof of an +act of belief. But would it prove any more than that? +Would it prove that these five thousand were not +the victims of some act of deception or of some +delusion? A belief in a miracle, whether the belief +dates from two thousand years since or from last week, +proves only—belief. And the testimony of a Salvation +Army convert as to the truth of the resurrection of +Jesus Christ is as good, as evidence, as though we had +the sworn testimony of the twelve apostles, with that +of the grave-diggers thrown in.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">{167}</a></span> +The truth is that the question of belief in the +miraculous has nothing whatever to do with evidence. +Miracles are never established by evidence, nor are +they disproved by evidence, that is, so long as we use +the term evidence with any regard to its judicial +significance. What amount or what kind of evidence +did the early Christians require to prove the miracles +of Christianity? Or what evidence did our ancestors +require to prove to them that old women flew through +the air on broomsticks, or bewitched cows, or raised +storms? Testimony in volumes was forthcoming, and +there is not the slightest reason for doubting its +genuineness. But what amount or kind of evidence +was required to establish the belief? Was it evidence +to which anyone to-day would pay the slightest regard? +The slightest study of the available records is +enough to show that the question of evidence had +nothing whatever to do with the production of the +belief.</p> + +<p>And, on the other hand, how many people have +given up the belief in miracles as a result of a careful +study of the evidence against them? I have never +heard of any such case, although once a man disbelieves +in miracles he may be ready enough to produce +reasons to justify his disbelief in them. The man who +begins to weigh evidence for and against miracles has +already begun to disbelieve them.</p> + +<p>The attitude of children in relation to the belief in +fairies may well be taken to illustrate the attitude of +the adult mind in face of the miraculous. No evidence +is produced to induce the belief in fairies, and none is +ever brought forward to induce them to give it up. +At one stage of life it is there, at another it is gone. It +is not reasoned out or evidenced out, it is simply outgrown. +In infancy the child's conception of life is so +inchoate that there is room for all kinds of fantastic<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">{168}</a></span> +beliefs. In more mature years certain beliefs are automatically +ruled out by the growth of a conception of +things which leaves no room for beliefs that during +childhood seemed perfectly reasonable.</p> + +<p>Now this is quite on all-fours with the question of +miracles. The issue is essentially one of psychology. +Belief or disbelief is here mainly determined by the +psychological medium in which one lives and moves. +Given a psychological medium which is, scientifically, +at its lowest, and the belief in the miraculous +flourishes. At the other extreme miracles languish +and decay. Tell a savage that the air is alive with good +and bad spirits and he will readily believe you. Tell it +to a man with a genuine scientific mind and he will +laugh at you. Tell a peasant in some parts of the +country that someone is a witch and he will at once +believe it. Tell it to a city dweller and it will provide +only occasion for ridicule. People who accept miracles +believe them before they happen. The expressed belief +merely registers the fact. Miracles never happen +to those who do not believe in them; as has been said, +they never occur to a critic. Those who reject +miracles do so because their acceptance would conflict +with their whole conception of nature. That is +the sum and substance of the matter.</p> + +<p>A further illustration may be offered in the case of +the once much debated question of the authenticity of +the books of the New Testament and the historicity of +the figure of Jesus. It appears to have been assumed +that if it could be shown that the books of the New +Testament were not contemporary records the case +against the divinity of Jesus was strengthened. On the +other hand it was assumed that if these writings represented +the narratives of contemporaries the case +for the truth of the narratives was practically proven. +In reality this was not the vital issue at all. It would<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">{169}</a></span> +be, of course, interesting if it could be shown that there +once existed an actual personage around whom these +stories gathered, but it would make as little difference +to the real question at issue as the demonstration of +the Baconian authorship of <cite>Hamlet</cite> would make in the +psychological value of the play.</p> + +<p>Suppose then it were proven that a person named +Jesus actually existed at a certain date in Judea, and +that this person is the Jesus of the New Testament. +Suppose it be further proven, or admitted, that the +followers whom this person gathered around him believed +that he was born of a virgin, performed a +number of miracles, was crucified, and then rose from +the dead, and that the New Testament represents their +written memoirs. Suppose all this to be proven or +granted, what has been established? Simply this. +That a number of people believed these things of someone +whom they had known. But no Freethinker need +seriously concern himself to disprove this. He may, +indeed, take it as the data of the problem which he +sets out to solve. The scientific enquirer is not really +concerned with the New Testament as a narrative of +fact any more than he is concerned with Cotton +Mather's <cite>Invisible World Displayed</cite> as a narrative of +actual fact. What he is concerned with is the frame of +mind to which these stories seemed true, and the social +medium which gave such a frame of mind a vogue. +It is not at all a question of historical evidence, but of +historical psychology. It is not a question of the +honesty of the witnesses, but of their ability, not +whether they wished to tell the truth, or intended to +tell the truth, but whether they were in a position to +know what the truth was. We have not to discuss +whether these events occurred, such a proposition is +an insult to a civilized intelligence, the matter for dis<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">{170}</a></span>cussion +is the conditions that bring such beliefs into +existence and the conditions that perpetuate them.</p> + +<p>The development of social life and of education thus +shifts the point of view from the past to the present. +To understand the past we do not ask what was it that +people believed concerning the events around them, +but what do we know of the causes which produce beliefs +of a certain kind. Thus, we do not really reject the +story of Jesus turning water into wine because we are +without legal evidence that he ever did anything of +the kind, but because, knowing the chemical constituents +of both water and wine we know that such a +thing is impossible. It is only possible to an uninstructed +mind to which water and wine differ only in +taste or appearance. We do not reject the story of the +demoniacs in the New Testament because we have no +evidence that these men were possessed of devils, or +that Jesus cast them out, but because we have exactly +the same phenomena with us to-day and know that it +comes within the province of the physician and not of +the miracle worker. It is not a matter of evidence +whether a man rose from the dead or not, or whether +he was born of a virgin or not, but solely a question of +examining these and similar stories in the light of +present day knowledge. The "evidence" offered is +proof only of belief, and no one ever questioned the +existence of that. And if the proof of belief is required +there is no need to go back a couple of thousand years +or to consult ancient records. The testimony of a +present day believer, and the account of a revival +meeting such as one may find in any religious newspaper +will serve equally well. As is so often the case, +the evidence offered is not merely inadequate, it is +absolutely irrelevant.</p> + +<p>Past events must be judged in the light of present +knowledge. That is the golden rule of guidance in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">{171}</a></span> +judging the world's religious legends. And that canon +is fatal to their pretensions. On the one hand we see +in the life of contemporary savages and in that of +semi-civilized peoples all the conditions and the beliefs +that meet us in the Bible and among the early Christians. +And with our wider and more exact knowledge +we are able to take exactly the same phenomena that +impressed those of an earlier generation and explain +them without the slightest reference to supernatural +powers or beings. The modern mind is really not +looking round for evidence to disprove the truth of +Christian legends. It knows they are not true. There +is no greater need to prove that the miracles of Christianity +never occurred, than there is to prove that an +old woman never raised a storm to wreck one of the +kings of England. The issue has been changed from +one of history to one of psychology. It is the present +that of necessity sits in judgment on the past, and it is +in the light of the knowledge of the present that the +religions of the past stand condemned.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">{172}</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XIV" id="CHAPTER_XIV"></a>CHAPTER XIV.<br /> +MORALITY WITHOUT GOD.</h2> + +<p>The mystery-monger flourishes almost as well in +ethics as he does in theology. Indeed, in some respects +he seems to have forsaken one field of exercise only to +find renewed scope in the other. He approaches the +consideration of moral questions with the same hushed +voice and "reverential" air that is so usual in theology, +and talks of the mystery of morality with the +same facility that he once talked about the mystery of +godliness—and with about an equal amount of enlightenment +to his hearers or readers.</p> + +<p>But the mystery of morality is nearly all of our own +making. Essentially there is no more mystery in +morality than there is in any other question that may +engage the attention of mankind. There are, of course, +problems in the moral world as there are in the +physical one, and he would be a fool who pretended +to the ability to satisfactorily solve them all. The +nature of morality, the causes that led to the development +of moral "laws," and still more to the development +of a sense of morality, all these are questions +upon which there is ample room for research and +speculation. But the talk of a mystery is misleading +and mystifying. It is the chatter of the charlatan, or +of the theologian, or of the partly liberated mind that +is still under the thraldom of theology. In ethics we +have exactly the same kind of problem that meets us +in any of the sciences. We have a fact, or a series of +facts, and we seek some explanation of them. We may<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">{173}</a></span> +fail in our search, but that is not evidence of a +"mystery," it is proof only of inadequate knowledge, +of limitations that we may hope the future will enable +us to overcome.</p> + +<p>For the sake of clarity it will be better to let the +meaning of morality emerge from the discussion rather +than to commence with it. And one of the first things +to help to clear the mind of confusion is to get rid of the +notion that there is any such thing as moral "laws" +which correspond in their nature to law as the term is +used in science. In one sense morality is not part of +physical nature at all. It is characteristic of that part +of nature which is covered by the human—at most by +the higher animal—world. Nature can only, therefore, +be said to be moral in the sense that the term +"Nature" includes all that is. In any other sense +nature is non-moral. The sense of values, which is, +as we shall see, of the essence of the conception of +morality, nature knows nothing of. To speak of +nature punishing us for <em>bad</em> actions or rewarding us +for <em>good</em> ones is absurd. Nature neither punishes nor +rewards. She meets actions with consequences, and is +quite indifferent to any moral consideration. If I am +weakly, and go out on a cold, wet night to help someone +in distress, nature does not act differently than it +would if I had gone out to commit a murder. I stand +exactly the same chances in either case of contracting +a deadly chill. It is not the moral value of an action +with which natural forces are concerned, but merely +with the action, and in that respect nature never discriminates +between the good man and the bad, between +the sinner and the saint.</p> + +<p>There is another sense in which moral laws differ +from natural laws. We can break the former but not +the latter. The expression so often used, "He broke +a law of nature," is absurd. You cannot break a law<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">{174}</a></span> +of nature. You do not break the law of gravitation +when you prevent a stone falling to the ground; the +force required to hold it in the air is an illustration of +the law. It is, indeed, one of the proofs that our +generalization does represent a law of nature that +it cannot be "broken." For broken is here only +another word for inoperative, and a law of nature that +is inoperative is non-existent. But in the moral +sphere we are in a different world. We not only can +break moral laws, we do break them; that is one of the +problems with which our teachers and moralisers have +constantly to deal. Every time we steal we break the +law "Thou shalt not steal." Every time we murder +we break the law "Thou shalt not kill." We may keep +moral laws, we ought to keep them, but we can, quite +clearly, break them. Between a moral law and a law +of nature there is plainly a very radical distinction. +The discovery of that distinction will, I think, bring +us to the heart of the subject.</p> + +<p>Considering man as merely a natural object, or as a +mere animal, there is only one quality that nature demands +of him. This is efficiency. Nature's sole law +is here "Be Strong." How that strength and efficiency +is secured and maintained is of no consequence whatever. +The heat he requires, the food he needs may be +stolen from others, but it will serve. The food will not +nourish the less, the fire will not warm the less. So +long as efficiency is acquired it is a matter of absolute +indifference how it is secured. Considered as a mere +animal object it is difficult to see that morality has any +meaning at all for man. It is when we come to regard +him in his relation to others that we begin to see the +meaning and significance of morality emerge.</p> + +<p>Now one of the first things that strike us in connection +with moral laws or rules is that they are all statements +of relation. Such moral commands as "Thou<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">{175}</a></span> +shalt not steal," "Thou shalt not kill," the commands +to be truthful, kind, dutiful, etc., all imply a relation +to others. Apart from this relation moral rules have +simply no meaning whatever. By himself a man could +neither steal, nor lie, nor do any of the things that we +habitually characterize as immoral. A man living by +himself on some island would be absolved from all +moral law; it would have no meaning whatever for +him. He would be neither moral nor immoral, he +would simply be without the conditions that make +morality possible. But once bring him into relations +with his kind and his behaviour begins to have a new +and peculiar significance, not alone to these others, +but also to himself. What he does affects them, and +also affects himself so far as they determine the character +of his relations to these others. He must, for +example, either work with them or apart from them. +He must either be on his guard against their securing +their own efficiency at his expense, or rest content that +a mutual forbearance and trust will govern their +association. To ignore them is an impossibility. He +must reckon with these others in a thousand and one +different ways, and this reckoning will have its effect +on the moulding of his nature and upon theirs.</p> + +<p>Morality, then, whatever else it may be, is primarily +the expression of a relation. And the laws of morality +are, consequently, a summary or description of those +relations. From this point of view they stand upon +exactly the same level as any of the arts or sciences. +Moral actions are the subject matter of observation, +and the determination of their essential quality or +character is by the same methods as we determine the +essential quality of the "facts" in chemistry or +biology. The task before the scientific enquirer is, +therefore, to determine the conditions which give to +moral rules or "laws" their meaning and validity.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">{176}</a></span> +One of the conditions of a moral action has already +been pointed out. This is that all moral rules imply a +relation to beings of a similar nature. A second feature +is that conduct represents a form of efficiency, it is a +special feature of the universal biological fact of +adaptation. And the question of why man has a +"moral sense" is really on all fours with, and presents +no greater mystery than is involved in, the question of +why man has digestive organs, and prefers some kinds +of food to others. Substantially, the question of why +man should prefer a diet of meat and potatoes to one of +prussic acid is exactly the question of why society +should discourage certain actions and encourage +others, or why man's moral taste should prefer some +forms of conduct to other forms. The answer to both +questions, while differing in form, is the same in +substance.</p> + +<p>Man as we know him is always found as a member +of a group, and his capacities, his feelings, and tastes +must always be considered in relation to that fact. But +considering man merely as an animal, and his conduct +as merely a form of adaptation to environment, the +plain consideration which emerges is that even as an +individual organism he is compelled, in order to live, +to avoid certain actions and to perform others, to +develop certain tastes and to form certain distastes. +To take our previous illustration it would be impossible +for man to develop a liking for life-destroying foods. +It is one of the conditions of living that he shall eat +only that food which sustains life, or that he shall +abstain from eating substances which destroy it. But +conduct at that stage is not of the kind which considers +the reasons for acting; indeed, life cannot be based +upon considered action, however much reason may +justify the actions taken. Further, as all conscious +action is prompted by the impulse to do what is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">{177}</a></span> +pleasant and to avoid what is unpleasant, it follows, as +Spencer pointed out, that the course of evolution sets +up a close relation between actions that are pleasurable +in the performance and actions that are life preserving. +It is one of the conditions of the maintenance of life +that the pleasurable and the beneficial shall in the +long run coincide.</p> + +<p>When we take man as a member of a group we have +the same principle in operation, even though the form +of its expression undergoes alteration. To begin with, +the mere fact of living in a group implies the growth +of a certain restraint in one's relations to, and of +reciprocity in dealing with, others. Men can no more +live together without some amount of trust and confidence +in each other, or without a crude sense of +justice in their dealings with each other, than an +individual man can maintain his life by eating deadly +poisons. There must be a respect for the rights of +others, of justice in dealing with others, and of confidence +in associating with others, at least to the extent +of not threatening the possibility of group life. There +are rules in the game of social life that must be +observed, and in its own defence society is bound to +suppress those of its members who exhibit strong anti-social +tendencies. No society can, for example, +tolerate homicide as an admitted practice. There is, +thus, from the earliest times, a certain form of +elimination of the anti-social character which results +in the gradual formation of an emotional and mental +disposition that habitually and instinctively falls into +line with the requirements of the social whole.</p> + +<p>To use an expression of Sir Leslie Stephen's, man as +a member of the group becomes a cell in the social +tissue, and his fitness to survive is dependent upon, +positively, his readiness to perform such actions as the +welfare of the group require, and, negatively, upon his<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">{178}</a></span> +refraining from doing those things that are inimical to +social welfare.<a name="FNanchor_23_23" id="FNanchor_23_23"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_23" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> Moreover, there is the additional fact +that the group itself is, as a whole, brought into contact +with other groups, and the survival of one group +as against another is determined by the quality and the +degree of cohesion of its units. From this point of +view, participation in the life of the group means more +than refraining from acts that are injurious to the +group, it involves some degree of positive contribution +to social welfare.</p> + +<p>But the main thing to note is that from the very +dawn of animal life the organism is more or less under +the pressure of a certain discipline that tends to establish +an identity between actions which there is a +tendency to perform and those that are beneficial to +the organism. In the social state we simply have this +principle expressed in another way, and it gives a degree +of conscious adaptation that is absent from the pre-social +or even the lower forms of the social state. It is +in the truly social state also that we get the full influence +of what may be called the characteristically +human environment, that is, the operation of ideas and +ideals. The importance of this psychological factor in +the life of man has been stressed in an earlier chapter. +It is enough now to point out that from the earliest +moment the young human being is, by a process of +training, imbued with certain ideals of truthfulness, +loyalty, duty, etc., all of which play their part in the +moulding of his character. However much these ideals<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">{179}</a></span> +may vary in different societies, the fact of the part +played by them in moulding character is plain. They +are the dominant forces in moulding the individual to +the social state, even while the expressions of the social +life may be in turn checked by the fact that social conduct +cannot persist if it threatens those conditions +upon which the persistence of life ultimately depends.</p> + +<p>There is one other consideration that must be noted. +One very pregnant fact in life is that nature seldom +creates a new organ. What it usually does is to refashion +an old one, or to devote an old one to new uses. +This principle may be seen clearly in operation in connection +with moral evolution. On the one hand the +various forces that play upon human nature drive the +moral feelings deeper into it. On the other hand it +develops them by their steady expansion over a wider +area. Whether it is an actual fact or not—I do not +stress it because the point is the subject of discussion—it +is at least possible that the earliest human group is +the family. And so long as that was the case such feelings +of right and wrong as then existed will have been +confined to the family. But when a group of families +combine and form the tribe, all those feelings of confidence, +justice, etc., which were formerly characteristic +of the smaller group are expanded to cover +the larger one. With the expansion of the tribe to the +nation we have a further development of the same +phenomenon. There is no new creation, there is +nothing more than expansion and development.</p> + +<p>The process does not and cannot, obviously, stop +here. From the tribe to the nation, from the nation to +the collection of nations which we call an empire, and +from the empire to the whole of humanity. That +seems the inevitable direction of the process, and there +does not require profound insight to see it already on +the way. Development of national life involves a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">{180}</a></span> +growing interdependence of the world of humankind. +Of hardly any nation can it be said to-day that it is +self-supporting or self-contained or independent. +There is nothing national or sectarian in science, and +it is to science that we have to look for our principal +help. All over the world we utilize each other's discoveries +and profit by each other's knowledge. Even +economic interdependence carries with it the same +lesson. The human environment gets gradually +broader and wider, and the feelings that have hitherto +been expanded over the narrower area have now to be +expanded over the wider one. It is the gradual +development of a human nature that is becoming +adapted to a conception of mankind as an organic unit. +Naturally, in the process of adaptation there is conflict +between the narrower ideals, conserved in our +educational influences, and the wider ones. There are +still large numbers of those who, unable to picture the +true nature of the evolutionary process owing to +their own defective education, yet think of the world +in terms of a few centuries ago, and still wave the flag +of a political nationalism as though that were the end +of social growth, instead of its being an early and +transient expression of it. But this conflict is inevitable, +and the persistence of that type can no more +ensure its permanent domination than the persistence +of the medicine man in the person of the existing +clergyman can give permanence to the religious idea.</p> + +<p>There is, then, no mystery about the fact of +morality. It is no more of a mystery than is the compilation +of the multiplication table, and it has no greater +need of a supernatural sanction than has the law of +gravitation. Morality is a natural fact, and its enforcement +and growth are brought about by natural means. +In its lower form, morality is no more than an expression +of those conditions under which social life is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">{181}</a></span> +possible, and in its higher one, an expression of those +ideal conditions under which corporate life is desirable. +In studying morality we are really studying the +physiology of associated life, and that study aims at the +determination of the conditions under which the best +form of living is possible. It is thus that here, as +elsewhere, man is thrown back upon himself for enlightenment +and help. And if the process is a slow +one we may at least console ourselves with the reflection +that the labours of each generation are making the +weapons which we bring to the fight keener and better +able to do their work.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">{182}</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XV" id="CHAPTER_XV"></a>CHAPTER XV.<br /> +MORALITY WITHOUT GOD.<br /> +(<i>Continued.</i>)</h2> + +<p>In the preceding chapter I have been concerned with +providing the most meagre of skeleton outlines of the +way in which our moral laws and our moral sense have +come into existence. To make this as clear as possible +the chapter was restricted to exposition. Controversial +points were avoided. And as a matter of fact there are +many religionists who might concede the truth of what +has been said concerning the way in which morality +has arisen, and the nature of the forces that have +assisted in its development. But they would proceed +to argue, as men like Mr. Balfour and Mr. Benjamin +Kidd, with others of the like, have argued, that a +natural morality lacks all coercive power. The Freethought +explanation of morality, they say, is plausible +enough, and may be correct, but in conduct we have to +deal not merely with the correctness of things but with +sanctions and motives that exercise a compulsive influence +on men and women. The religionist, it is +argued, has such a compulsive force in the belief in +God and in the effect on our future life of our obedience +or disobedience to his commands. But what kind of +coercion can a purely naturalistic system of morals +exert? If a man is content to obey the naturalistic +command to practise certain virtues and to abstain +from certain vices, well and good. But suppose he +chooses to disregard it. What then? Above all, +on what compulsion is a man to disregard his own in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">{183}</a></span>clinations +to act as seems desirable to himself, and not +in conformity with the general welfare? We disregard +the religious appeal as pure sentimentalism, or worse, +and we at once institute an ethical sentimentalism +which is, in practice, foredoomed to failure.</p> + +<p>Or to put the same point in another way. Each +individual, we say, should so act as to promote the +general welfare. Freethinker and religionist are in +agreement here. And so long as one's inclinations +jump with the advice no difficulty presents itself. But +suppose a man's inclinations do not run in the desired +direction? You tell him that he must act so as to +promote the general well-being, and he replies that he +is not concerned with the promotion of the public +welfare. You say that he <em>ought</em> to act differently, and +he replies, "My happiness must consist in what I regard +as such, not in other people's conception of what +it should be." You proceed to point out that by persisting +in his present line of conduct he is laying up +trouble for the future, and he retorts, "I am willing +to take the risk." What is to be done with him? Can +naturalism show that in acting in that way a man is +behaving unreasonably, that is, in the sense that he +can be shown to be really acting against his own +interests, and that if he knew better he would act +differently?</p> + +<p>Now before attempting a reply to this it is worth +while pointing out that whatever strength there may +be in this criticism when directed against naturalism, +it is equally strong when directed against supernaturalism. +We can see this at once if we merely +vary the terms. You tell a man to act in this or that +way "in the name of God." He replies, "I do not +believe in God," and your injunction loses all force. +Or, if he believes in God, and you threaten him with +the pains and penalties of a future life, he may reply,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">{184}</a></span> +"I am quite willing to risk a probable punishment +hereafter for a certain pleasure here." And it is +certain that many do take the risk, whether they express +their determination to do so in as many words +or not.</p> + +<p>What is a supernaturalist compelled to do in this +case? His method of procedure is bound to be something +like the following. First of all he will seek to +create assent to a particular proposition such as "God +exists, and also that a belief in his existence creates an +obligation to act in this or that manner in accordance +with what is believed to be his will." That proposition +once established, his next business will be to +bring the subject's inclinations into line with a prescribed +course of action. He is thus acting in precisely +the same manner as is the naturalist who starts from an +altogether different set of premises. And both are +resting their teaching of morals upon an intellectual +proposition to which assent is either implied or expressed. +And that lies at the basis of all ethical teaching—not +ethical practice, be it observed, but teaching. +The precise form in which this intellectual proposition +is cast matters little. It may be the existence of God, +or it may be a particular view of human nature or of +human evolution, but it is there, and in either case the +authoritative character of moral precepts exists for +such as accept it, and for none other. Moral practice +is rooted in life, but moral theory is a different matter.</p> + +<p>So far, then, it is clear that the complaint that Freethought +ethics has nothing about it of a compulsive or +authoritative character is either a begging of the +question or it is absurd.</p> + +<p>Naturalistic ethics really assert three things. The +first is that the continuance of life ensures the performance +of a certain level of conduct, conduct being merely +one of the means by which human beings react to the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">{185}</a></span> +necessities of their environment. Second, it asserts +that a proper understanding of the conditions of existence +will in the normally constituted mind strengthen +the development of a feeling of obligation to act in +such and such a manner; and that while all non-reasonable +conduct is not immoral, all immoral conduct is +fundamentally irrational. Third, there is the further +assumption that at bottom individual and general +welfare are not contradictory, but two aspects of the +same thing.</p> + +<p>Concerning the second point, Sir Leslie Stephen +warns us (<cite>Science of Ethics</cite>, p. 437) that every attempt +so to state the ethical principle that disobedience will +be "unreasonable" is "doomed to failure in a world +which is not made up of working syllogisms." And +for the other two points Professor Sorley (<cite>Ethics of +Naturalism</cite>, p. 42) tells us that "It is difficult ... to +offer any consideration fitted to convince the individual +that it is reasonable for him to seek the happiness of +the community rather than his own"; while Mr. +Benjamin Kidd asserts that "the interests of the individual +and those of the social organism are not either +identical or capable of being reconciled, as has been +necessarily assumed in all those systems of ethics +which have sought to establish a naturalistic basis of +conduct. The two are fundamentally and inherently +irreconcilable, and a large proportion of the existing +individuals at any time have ... no personal interest +whatever in the progress of the race, or in the social +development we are undergoing."</p> + +<p>It has already been said that however difficult it may +be to establish the precise relationship between reason +and ethical commands, such a connection must be +assumed, whether we base our ethics on naturalistic or +supernaturalistic considerations. And it cannot be +denied by anyone to-day that a causal relation must<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">{186}</a></span> +exist between actions and their consequences, whether +those causal consequences be of the natural and non-moral +kind, or of the more definitely moral order such +as exists in the shape of social approval and disapproval. +And if we once grant that, then it seems +quite allowable to assume that provided a man perceives +the reason underlying moral judgments, and +also the justification for the sense of approval and disapproval +expressed, we have as much reason for +calling his conduct reasonable or unreasonable as we +have for applying the same terms to a man's behaviour +in dressing in view of the variations of the temperature.</p> + +<p>Consequently, while I agree that <em>in the present state +of knowledge</em> it is impossible in all cases to demonstrate +that immoral conduct is irrational in the sense that it +would be unreasonable to refuse assent to a mathematical +proposition, there seems no justification for +regarding such a state of things as of necessity +permanent. If a scientific system of ethics consists in +formulating rules for the profitable guidance of life, +not only does their formulation presuppose a certain +constancy in the laws of human nature and of the world +in general, but the assumption is also involved that one +day it may be possible to give to moral laws the same +precision that now is attached to physiological laws +and to label departure from them as "unreasonable" +in a very real sense of the word.</p> + +<p>The other objection that it is impossible to establish +a "reasonable" relation between individual and social +well-being arises from a dual confusion as to what is +the proper sphere of ethics, and of the mutual relation +of the individual and society. To take an individual +and ask, "Why should he act so as to promote the +general welfare?" is to imply that ethical rules may +have an application to man out of relation with his +fellows. That, we have already seen, is quite wrong,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">{187}</a></span> +since moral rules fail to be intelligible once we +separate man from his fellows. Discussing ethics +while leaving out social life is like discussing the +functions of the lungs and leaving out of account the +existence of an atmosphere.</p> + +<p>If, then, instead of treating the individual and +society as two distinct things, either of which may +profit at the expense of the other, we treat them as +two sides of the same thing, each an abstraction when +treated alone, the problem is simplified, and the solution +becomes appreciably easier. For the essential +truth here is that just as there is no such thing as a +society in the absence of the individuals composing it, +so the individual, as we know him, disappears when we +strip him of all that he is in virtue of his being a part +of the social structure. Every one of the characteristic +human qualities has been developed in response to the +requirements of the social medium. It is in virtue of +this that morality has anything of an imperative nature +connected with it, for if man is, to use Sir Leslie +Stephen's phrase, a cell in the social tissue, receiving +injury as the body social is injured, and benefitting as +it is benefitted, then the refusal of a man to act so that +he may promote the general welfare can be shown to +be unreasonable, and also unprofitable to the individual +himself. In other words, our efficiency as an individual +must be measured in terms of our fitness to +form part of the social structure, and consequently the +antithesis between social and personal well-being is +only on the surface. Deeper knowledge and a more +exact understanding reveals them as two sides of the +same fact.</p> + +<p>It may be granted to Mr. Kidd that "a large proportion +of the existing individuals at any time" have +no <em>conscious</em> interest in "the progress of the race or in +the development we are undergoing," and that is only<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">{188}</a></span> +what one would expect, but it would be absurd to +therefore come to the conclusion that no such identity +of interest exists. Moličre's character, who all his life +had been talking prose without knowing it, is only a +type of the majority of folk who all their lives are acting +in accordance with principles of which they are +ignorant, and which they may even repudiate when +they are explained to them. From one point of view +the whole object of a scientific morality is to awaken a +conscious recognition of the principles underlying conduct, +and by this means to strengthen the disposition +to right action. We make explicit in language what +has hitherto been implicit in action, and thus bring +conscious effort to the aid of non-conscious or semi-conscious +behaviour.</p> + +<p>In the light of the above consideration the long and +wordy contest that has been waged between "Altruists" +and "Egoists" is seen to be very largely a +waste of time and a splutter of words. If it can be +shown on the one hand that all men are not animated +by the desire to benefit self, it is as easy to demonstrate +that so long as human nature is human nature, all conduct +must be an expression of individual character, +and that even the morality of self-sacrifice is self-regarding +viewed from the personal feelings of the agent. +And it being clear that the position of Egoist and +Altruist, while each expressing a truth, is neither expressing +the whole truth, and that each does in fact +embody a definite error, it seems probable that here, +as in so many other cases, the truth lies between the +two extremes, and that a reconciliation may be effected +along these lines.</p> + +<p>Taking animal life as a whole it is at least clear that +what are called the self-regarding feelings must come +first in order of development. Even with the lower +races of human beings there is less concern shown with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">{189}</a></span> +the feelings and welfare of others than is the case with +the higher races of men. Or, again, with children we +have these feelings strongest in childhood and undergoing +a gradual expansion as maturity is reached. +This is brought about, as was shown in the last chapter, +not by the destruction of existing feelings, but by their +extension to an ever widening area. There is a transformation, +or an elaboration of existing feelings under +the pressure of social growth. One may say that +ethical development does not proceed by the destruction +of the feeling of self-interest, so much as by its +extension to a wider field. Ethical growth is thus on +all fours with biological growth. In biology we are all +familiar with the truth that maintenance of life is +dependent upon the existence of harmonious relations +between an organism and its environment. Yet it is +not always recognized that this principle is as true of +the moral self as it is of the physical structure, nor +that in human evolution the existence of others becomes +of increasing importance and significance. For +not only do I have to adapt myself, mentally and +morally, to the society now existing, but also to +societies that have long since passed away and have +left their contribution to the building up of <em>my</em> environment +in the shape of institutions and beliefs and +literature.</p> + +<p>We have in this one more illustration that while the +environment of the animal is overwhelmingly physical +in character, that of man tends to become overwhelmingly +social or psychological. Desires are created that +can only be gratified by the presence and the labour of +others. Feelings arise that have direct reference to +others, and in numerous ways a body of "altruistic" +feeling is created. So by social growth first, and afterwards +by reflection, man is taught that the only life +that is enjoyable to himself is one that is lived in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">{190}</a></span> +companionship and by the co-operation of others. As +Professor Ziegler well puts the process:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>Not only on the one hand does it concern the +interests of the general welfare that every individual +should take care of himself outwardly and inwardly; +maintain his health; cultivate his faculties and +powers; sustain his position, honour, and worth, and +so his own welfare being secured, diffuse around him +happiness and comfort; but also, on the other hand, +it concerns the personal, well understood interests of +the individual himself that he should promote the +interests of others, contribute to their happiness, serve +their interests, and even make sacrifices for them. +Just as one forgoes a momentary pleasure in order to +secure a lasting and greater enjoyment, so the individual +willingly sacrifices his personal welfare and +comfort for the sake of society in order to share in the +welfare of this society; he buries his individual well-being +in order that he may see it rise in richer and +fuller abundance in the welfare and happiness of the +whole community (<cite>Social Ethics</cite>, pp. 59-60).</p></blockquote> + +<p>These motives are not of necessity conscious ones. +No one imagines that before performing a social action +each one sits down and goes through a more or less +elaborate calculation. All that has been written on this +head concerning a "Utilitarian calculus" is poor fun +and quite beside the mark. In this matter, as in so +many others, it is the evolutionary process which demands +consideration, and generations of social struggle, +by weeding out individuals whose inclinations +were of a pronounced anti-social kind, and tribes in +which the cohesion between its members was weak, +have resulted in bringing about more or less of an +identification between individual desires and the +general welfare. It is not a question of conscious +evolution so much as of our becoming conscious of an<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">{191}</a></span> +evolution that is taking place, and in discussing the +nature of morals one is bound to go beyond the expressed +reasons for conduct—more often wrong than +right—and discover the deeper and truer causes of instincts +and actions. When this is done it will be +found that while it is absolutely impossible to destroy +the connection between conduct and self-regarding +actions, there is proceeding a growing identity between +the gratification of desire and the well-being of the +whole. This will be, not because of some fantastical +or ascetic teaching of self-sacrifice, but because man +being an expression of social life is bound to find in +activities that have a social reference the beginning and +end of his conduct.</p> + +<p>The fears of a morality without God are, therefore, +quite unfounded. If what has been said be granted, it +follows that all ethical rules are primarily on the same +level as a generalization in any of the sciences. Just +as the "laws" of astronomy or of biology reduce to +order the apparently chaotic phenomena of their respective +departments, so ethical laws seek to reduce to +an intelligible order the conditions of individual and +social betterment. There can be no ultimate antithesis +between individual reason and the highest form of +social conduct, although there may exist an apparent +conflict between the two, chiefly owing to the fact that +we are often unable to trace the remote effects of conduct +on self and society. Nor can there be an +ultimate or permanent conflict between the true interests +of the individual and of society at large. That +such an opposition does exist in the minds of many is +true, but it is here worthy of note that the clearest and +most profound thinkers have always found in the field +of social effort the best sphere for the gratification of +their desires. And here again we may confidently hope +that an increased and more accurate appreciation of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">{192}</a></span> +the causes that determine human welfare will do much +to diminish this antagonism. At any rate it is clear +that human nature has been moulded in accordance +with the reactions of self and society in such a way +that even the self has become an expression of social +life, and with this dual aspect before us there is no +reason why emphasis should be laid on one factor +rather than on the other.</p> + +<p>To sum up. Eliminating the form of coercion that +is represented by a policeman, earthly or otherwise, +we may safely say that a naturalistic ethics has all +the coercive force that can be possessed by any +system. And it has this advantage over the coercive +force of the supernaturalist, that while the latter tends +to weaken with the advance of intelligence, the former +gains strength as men and women begin to more clearly +appreciate the true conditions of social life and development. +It is in this way that there is finally established +a connection between what is "reasonable" and what +is right. In this case it is the function of reason to +discover the forces that have made for the moralization—really +the socialization—of man, and so strengthen +man's moral nature by demonstrating the fundamental +identity between his own welfare and that of the group +to which he belongs. That the coercion may in some +cases be quite ineffective must be admitted. There +will always, one fancies, be cases where the personal +character refuses to adapt itself to the current social +state. That is a form of mal-adaptation which society +will always have to face, exactly as it has to face cases +of atavism in other directions. But the socializing and +moralizing process continues. And however much this +may be, in its earlier stages, entangled with conceptions +of the supernatural, it is certain that growth will +involve the disappearance of that factor here as it has +done elsewhere.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">{193}</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XVI" id="CHAPTER_XVI"></a>CHAPTER XVI.<br /> +CHRISTIANITY AND MORALITY.</h2> + +<p>The association of religion with morality is a very +ancient one. This is not because the one is impossible +without the other, we have already shown that this is +not the case. The reason is that unless religious beliefs +are associated with certain essential social +activities their continuance is almost impossible. Thus +it happens in the course of social evolution that just +in proportion as man learns to rely upon the purely +social activities to that extent religion is driven to +dwell more upon them and to claim kinship with them.</p> + +<p>While this is true of religions in general, it applies +with peculiar force to Christianity. And in the last +two or three centuries we have seen the emphasis +gradually shifted from a set of doctrines, upon the +acceptance of which man's eternal salvation depends, +to a number of ethical and social teachings with which +Christianity, as such, has no vital concern. The +present generation of Christian believers has had what +is called the moral aspect of Christianity so constantly +impressed upon them, and the essential and doctrinal +aspect so slurred over, that many of them have come to +accept the moral teaching associated with Christianity +as its most important aspect. More than that, they +have come to regard the immense superiority of Christianity +as one of those statements the truth of which +can be doubted by none but the most obtuse. To have +this alleged superiority of Christian ethical teaching +questioned appears to them proof of some lack of moral +development on the part of the questioner.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">{194}</a></span> +To this type of believer it will come with something +of a shock to be told quite plainly and without either +circumlocution or apology that his religion is of an intensely +selfish and egoistic character, and that its +ethical influence is of a kind that is far from admirable. +It will shock him because he has for so long been told +that his religion is the very quintessence of unselfishness, +he has for so long been telling it to others, and +he has been able for so many generations to make it +uncomfortable for all those who took an opposite view, +that he has camouflaged both the nature of his own +motives and the tendency of his religion.</p> + +<p>From one point of view this is part of the general +scheme in virtue of which the Christian Church has +given currency to the legend that the doctrines taught +by it represented a tremendous advance in the development +of the race. In sober truth it represented nothing +of the kind. That the elements of Christian religious +teaching existed long before Christianity as a religious +system was known to the world is now a commonplace +with all students of comparative religions, and is +admitted by most Christian writers of repute. Even in +form the Christian doctrines represented but a small +advance upon their pagan prototypes, but it is only +when one bears in mind the fact that the best minds +of antiquity were rapidly throwing off these superstitions +and leading the world to a more enlightened +view of things, we realize that in the main Christianity +represented a step backward in the intellectual +evolution of the race. What we then see is Christianity +reaffirming and re-establishing most of the old +superstitions in forms in which only the more ignorant +classes of antiquity accepted them. We have an +assertion of demonism in its crudest forms, an affirmation +of the miraculous that the educated in the Roman +world had learned to laugh at, and which is to-day<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">{195}</a></span> +found among the savage people of the earth, while +every form of scientific thought was looked upon as an +act of impiety. The scientific eclipse that overtook the +old pagan civilization was one of the inevitable consequences +of the triumph of Christianity. From the +point of view of general culture the retrogressive +nature of Christianity is unmistakable. It has yet to +be recognized that the same statement holds good in +relation even to religion. One day the world will +appreciate the fact that no greater disaster ever overtook +the world than the triumph of the Christian +Church.</p> + +<p>For the moment, however, we are only concerned with +the relation of Christianity to morality. And here my +thesis is that Christianity is an essentially selfish creed +masking its egoistic impulses under a cover of unselfishness +and self-sacrifice. To that it will probably +be said that the charge breaks down on the fact that +Christian teaching is full of the exhortation that this +world is of no moment, that we gain salvation by learning +to ignore its temptations and to forgo its pleasures, +and that it is, above all other faiths, the religion of +personal sacrifice. And that this teaching is there it +would be stupid to deny. But this does not disprove +what has been said, indeed, analysis only serves to +make the truth still plainer. That many Christians +have given up the prizes of the world is too plain to be +denied; that they have forsaken all that many struggle +to possess is also plain. But when this has been +admitted there still remains the truth that there is a +vital distinction in the consideration of whether a man +gives up the world in order to save his own soul, or +whether he saves his soul as a consequence of losing +the world. In this matter it is the aim that is important, +not only to the outsider who may be passing +judgment, but more importantly to the agent himself.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">{196}</a></span> +It is the effect of the motive on character with its subsequent +flowering in social life that must be considered.</p> + +<p>The first count in the indictment here is that the +Christian appeal is essentially a selfish one. The aim +is not the saving of others but of one's self. If other +people must be saved it is because their salvation is +believed to be essential to the saving of one's own soul. +That this involves, or may involve, a surrender of one's +worldly possessions or comfort, is of no moment. +Men will forgo many pleasures and give up much +when they have what they believe to be a greater purpose +in view. We see this in directions quite unconnected +with religion. Politics will show us examples +of men who have forsaken many of what are to others +the comforts of life in the hopes of gaining power and +fame. Others will deny themselves many pleasures in +the prospect of achieving some end which to them is of +far greater value than the things they are renouncing. +And it is the same principle that operates in the case of +religious devotees. There is no reason to doubt but +that when a young woman forsakes the world and +goes into a cloister she is surrendering much that +has considerable attractions for her. But what she +gives is to her of small importance to what she gains +in return. And if one believed in Christianity, in immortal +damnation, with the intensity of the great +Christian types of character, it would be foolish not to +surrender things of so little value for others of so great +and transcendent importance.</p> + +<p>To do Christians justice they have not usually made +a secret of their aim. Right through Christian literature +there runs the teaching that it is the desire of +personal and immortal salvation that inspires them, +and they have affirmed over and over again that but for +the prospect of being paid back with tremendous interest +in the next world they could see no reason for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">{197}</a></span> +being good in this one. That is emphatically the +teaching of the New Testament and of the greatest of +Christian characters. You are to give in secret that +you may be rewarded openly, to cast your bread upon +the waters that it may be returned to you, and Paul's +counsel is that if there be no resurrection from the +dead then we may eat, drink, and be merry for death +only is before us. Thus, what you do is in the nature +of a deliberate and conscious investment on which you +will receive a handsome dividend in the next world. +And your readiness to invest will be exactly proportionate +to your conviction of the soundness of the +security. But there is in all this no perception of the +truly ethical basis of conduct, no indication of the +inevitable consequences of conduct on character. +What is good is determined by what it is believed will +save one's own soul and increase the dividend in the +next world. What is bad is anything that will imperil +the security. It is essentially an appeal to what is +grasping and selfish in human nature, and while you +may hide the true character of a thing by the lavish use +of attractive phrases, you cannot hinder it working +out its consequences in actual life. And the consequence +of this has been that while Christian teaching +has been lavish in the use of attractive phrases its +actual result has been to create a type of character +that has been not so much immoral as <em>a</em>moral. And +with that type the good that has been done on the one +side has been more than counterbalanced by the evil +done on the other.</p> + +<p>What the typical Christian character had in mind in +all that he did was neither the removal of suffering nor +of injustice, but the salvation of his own soul. That +justified everything so long as it was believed to contribute +to that end. The social consequences of what +was done simply did not count. And if, instead of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">{198}</a></span> +taking mere phrases from the principal Christian +writers, we carefully examine their meaning we shall +see that they were strangely devoid of what is now +understood by the expression "moral incentive." +The more impressive the outbreak of Christian +piety the clearer does this become. No one could have +illustrated the Christian ideal of self-sacrifice better +than did the saints and monks of the earlier Christian +centuries. Such a character as the famous St. Simon +Stylites, living for years on his pillar, filthy and +verminous, and yet the admired of Christendom, with +the lives of numerous other saints, whose sole claim to +be remembered is that they lived the lives of worse than +animals in the selfish endeavours to save their shrunken +souls, will well illustrate this point. If it entered the +diseased imagination of these men that the road to +salvation lay through attending to the sick and the +needy, they were quite ready to labour in that +direction; but of any desire to remove the horrible +social conditions that prevailed, or to remedy the injustice +of which their clients were the victims, there +is seldom a trace. And, on the other hand, if they +believed that their salvation involved getting away +from human society altogether and leading the life of +a hermit, they were as ready to do that. If it meant +the forsaking of husband or wife or parent or child, +these were left without compunction, and their +desertion was counted as proof of righteousness. The +lives of the saints are full of illustrations of this. +Professor William James well remarks, in his <cite>Varieties +of Religious Experience</cite>, that "In gentle characters, +where devoutness is intense and the intellect feeble, +we have an imaginative absorption in the love of God +to the exclusion of all practical human interests.... +When the love of God takes possession of such a mind +it expels all human loves and human uses." Of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">{199}</a></span> +Blessed St. Mary Alacoque, her biographer points out +that as she became absorbed in the love of Christ she +became increasingly useless to the practical life of the +convent. Of St. Teresa, James remarks that although +a woman of strong intellect his impression of her was +a feeling of pity that so much vitality of soul should +have found such poor employment. And of so famous +a character as St. Augustine a Christian writer, Mr. +A. C. Benson, remarks:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>I was much interested in reading St. Augustine's +<cite>Confessions</cite> lately to recognize how small a part, after +his conversion, any aspirations for the welfare of +humanity seem to play in his mind compared with +the consciousness of his own personal relations with +God. It was this which gave him his exuberant +sense of joy and peace, and his impulse was rather +the impulse of sharing a wonderful and beautiful +secret with others than an immediate desire for +their welfare, forced out of him, so to speak, by +his own exultation rather than drawn out of him by +compassion for the needs of others.</p></blockquote> + +<p>That is one of the most constant features which +emerges from a careful study of the character of +Christian types. St. Francis commenced his career +by leaving his parents. John Fox did the same. In +that Puritan classic, <cite>The Pilgrim's Progress</cite>, one of the +outstanding features is the striking absence of emphasis +on the value of the social and domestic virtues, and the +Rev. Principal Donaldson notes this as one of the +features of early Christian literature in general. +Christian preaching was for centuries full of contemptuous +references to "filthy rags of righteousness," +"mere morality," etc. The aim of the saints +was a purely selfish and personal one. It was not even +a refined or a metaphysical selfishness. It was a simple<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">{200}</a></span> +teaching that the one thing essential was to save one's +own soul, and that the main reason for doing good in +this world was to reap a benefit from it in the world to +come. If it can properly be called morality, it was +conduct placed out at the highest rate of interest. +Christianity may often have used a naturally lofty +character, it was next to impossible for it to create one.</p> + +<p>If one examines the attack made by Christians upon +Freethought morality, it is surprising how often the +truth of what has been said is implied. For the complaint +here is, in the main, not that naturalism fails to +give an adequate account of the nature and development +of morality, but that it will not satisfy mankind, +and so fails to act as an adequate motive to right conduct. +When we enquire precisely what is meant by +this, we learn that if there is no belief in God, and if +there is no expectation of a future state in which rewards +and punishments will be dispensed, there +remains no inducement to the average man or woman +to do right. It is the moral teaching of St. Paul over +again. We are in the region of morality as a deliberate +investment, and we have the threat that if the +interest is not high enough or certain enough to satisfy +the dividend hunting appetite of the true believer, +then the investment will be withdrawn. Really this is +a complaint, not that the morality which ignores Christianity +is too low but that it is too high. It is doubted +whether human nature, particularly Christian human +nature, can rise to such a level, and whether, unless +you can guarantee a Christian a suitable reward for +not starving his family or for not robbing his neighbour, +he will continue to place any value on decency or +honesty.</p> + +<p>So to state the case makes the absurdity of the +argument apparent, but unless that is what is meant it +is difficult to make it intelligible. To reply that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">{201}</a></span> +Christians do not require these inducements to behave +with a tolerable amount of decency is not a statement +that I should dispute; on the contrary, I would affirm +it. It is the Christian defender who makes himself +and his fellow believers worse than the Freethinker +believes them to be. For it is part of the case of the +Freethinker that the morality of the Christian has +really no connection with his religion, and that the +net influence of his creed is to confuse and distort his +moral sense instead of developing it. It is the argument +of the Christian that makes the Freethinker +superior to the Christian; it is the Freethinker who +declines the compliment and who asserts that the +social forces are adequate to guarantee the continuance +of morality in the complete absence of religious belief.</p> + +<p>How little the Christian religion appreciates the +nature of morality is seen by the favourite expression +of Christian apologists that the tendency of non-religion +is to remove all moral "restraints." The +use of the word is illuminating. To the Christian +morality is no more than a system of restraints which +aim at preventing a man gratifying his appetite in +certain directions. It forbids him certain enjoyments +here, and promises him as a reward for his abstention +a greater benefit hereafter. And on that assumption +he argues, quite naturally, that if there be no after life +then there seems no reason why man should undergo +the "restraints" which moral rules impose. On this +scheme man is a born criminal and God an almighty +policeman. That is the sum of orthodox Christian +morality. To assume that this conception of conduct +can have a really elevating effect on life is to misunderstand +the nature of the whole of the ethical and +social problem.</p> + +<p>What has been said may go some distance towards +suggesting an answer to the question so often asked<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">{202}</a></span> +as to the reason for the moral failure of Christianity. +For that it has been a moral failure no one can doubt. +Nay, it is an assertion made very generally by Christians +themselves. Right from New Testament times +the complaint that the conduct of believers has fallen +far short of what it should have been is constantly met +with. And there is not a single direction in which +Christians can claim a moral superiority over other +and non-Christian peoples. They are neither kinder, +more tolerant, more sober, more chaste, nor more +truthful than are non-Christian people. Nor is it quite +without significance that those nations that pride +themselves most upon their Christianity are what they +are. Their state reflects the ethical spirit I have been +trying to describe. For when we wipe out the disguising +phrases which we use to deceive ourselves—and +it is almost impossible to continually deceive others +unless we do manage to deceive ourselves—when we +put on one side the "rationalizing" phrases about +Imperial races, carrying civilization to the dark places +of the earth, bearing the white man's burden, peopling +the waste places of the earth, etc., we may well ask +what for centuries have the Christian nations of the +world been but so many gangs of freebooters engaged +in world-wide piracy? All over the world they have +gone, fighting, stealing, killing, lying, annexing, in a +steadily rising crescendo. To be possessed of natural +wealth, without the means of resisting aggression, has +for four centuries been to invite the depredations of +some one or more of the Christian powers. It is the +Christian powers that have militarized the world in the +name of the Prince of Peace, and made piracy a +national occupation in the name of civilization. Everywhere +they have done these things under the shelter of +their religion and with the sanction of their creed. +Christianity has offered no effective check to the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">{203}</a></span> +cupidity of man, its chief work has been to find an +outlet for it in a disguised form. To borrow a term +from the psycho-analysts, the task of Christianity has +been to "rationalize" certain ugly impulses, and so +provide the opportunity for their continuous expression. +The world of to-day is beginning to recognize +the intellectual weakness of Christianity; what it has +next to learn is that its moral bankruptcy is no less +assured.</p> + +<p>One of the great obstacles in the way of this is the +sentimentalism of many who have given up all +intellectual adherence to the Christian creed. The +power of the Christian Church has been so great, it has +for so long had control of the machinery of public +education and information, that many find it almost +impossible to conclude that the ethical spirit of Christianity +is as alien to real progress as are its cosmical +teachings. The very hugeness of this century-old +imposture blinds many to its inherent defects. And +yet the continuous and world-wide moral failure of +Christianity can only be accounted for on the ground +that it had a fatal moral defect from the start. I have +suggested above what is the nature of that defect. It +has never regarded morality as a natural social growth, +but only as something imposed upon man from without. +It has had no other reason for its existence than +the fear of punishment and the hope of reward. +Christian morality is the morality of the stock +exchange <em>plus</em> the intellectual outlook of the savage. +And with that in control of national destinies our +surprise should be, not that things are as they are, but +rather that with so great a handicap the world has +contrived to reach its present moderate degree of +development.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">{204}</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XVII" id="CHAPTER_XVII"></a>CHAPTER XVII.<br /> +RELIGION AND PERSECUTION.</h2> + +<p>Intolerance is one of the most general of what we may +call the mental vices. It is so general that few people +seem to look upon it as a fault, and not a few are prepared +to defend it as a virtue. When it assumes an +extreme form, and its consequences are unpleasantly +obvious, it may meet with condemnation, but usually +its nature is disguised under a show of earnestness and +sincere conviction. And, indeed, no one need feel +called upon to dispute the sincerity and the earnestness +of the bigot. As we have already pointed out, that +may easily be seen and admitted. All that one need +remark is that sincerity is no guarantee of accuracy, +and earnestness naturally goes with a conviction +strongly held, whether the conviction be grounded on +fact or fancy. The essential question is not whether a +man holds an opinion strongly, but whether he has +taken sufficient trouble to say that he has a right to +have that opinion. Has he taken the trouble to +acquaint himself with the facts upon which the expressed +opinion is professedly based? Has he made a +due allowance for possible error, and for the possibility +of others seeing the matter from another and a different +point of view? If these questions were frankly and +truthfully answered, it would be found that what we +have to face in the world is not so much opinion as +prejudice.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">{205}</a></span> +Some advance in human affairs is indicated when it +is found necessary to apologise for persecution, and a +still greater one when men and women feel ashamed +of it. It is some of these apologies at which we have +now to glance, and also to determine, if possible, the +probable causes of the change in opinion that has +occurred in relation to the subject of persecution.</p> + +<p>A favourite argument with the modern religionist is +that the element of persecution, which it is admitted, +has hitherto been found in association with religion, is +not due to religion as such, but results from its connection +with the secular power. Often, it is argued, +the State for its own purposes has seen fit to ally itself +with the Church, and when that has taken place the +representatives of the favoured Church have not been +strong enough to withstand the temptation to use +physical force in the maintenance of their position. +Hence the generalization that a State Church is always +a persecuting Church, with the corollary that a +Church, as such, has nothing to do with so secular a +thing as persecution.</p> + +<p>The generalization has all the attractiveness which +appeals to those who are not in the habit of looking +beneath the surface, and in particular to those whose +minds are still in thraldom to religious beliefs. It is +quite true that State Churches have always persecuted, +and it is equally true that persecution on a general +scale could not have been carried on without the +assistance of the State. On the other hand, it is just +as true that all Churches have persecuted within the +limits of their opportunity. There is no exception to +this rule in any age or country. On a wider survey it +is also clear that all forms of religious belief carry +with them a tendency to persecution more or less +marked. A close examination of the facts will show +that it is the tendency to toleration that is developed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">{206}</a></span> +by the secular power, and the opposite tendency manifested +by religion.</p> + +<p>It is also argued that intolerance is not a special +quality of religion; it is rather a fault of human nature. +There is more truth in this than in the previous plea, +but it slurs over the indictment rather than meets it. +At any rate, it is the same human nature that meets +us in religion that fronts us in other matters, and there +is no mistaking the fact that intolerance is far more pronounced +in relation to religion than to any other subject. +In secular matters—politics, science, literature, +or art—opinions may differ, feelings run high, and a +degree of intolerance be exhibited, but the right to differ +remains unquestioned. Moreover, the settlement of +opinion by discussion is recognized. In religion it is +the very right of difference that is challenged, it is the +right of discussion that is denied. And it is in connection +with religion alone that intolerance is raised to +the level of a virtue. Refusal to discuss the validity of +a religious opinion will be taken as the sign of a highly +developed spiritual nature, and a tolerance of diverging +opinions as an indication of unbelief. If a political +leader refused to stand upon the same platform with +political opponents, on non-political questions, nearly +everyone would say that such conduct was intolerable. +But how many religious people are there who would +see anything wrong in the Archbishop of Canterbury +refusing to stand upon the same platform as a well-known +Atheist?</p> + +<p>We are here approaching the very heart of the subject, +and in what follows I hope to make clear the +truth of the following propositions: (1) That the great +culture ground of intolerance is religion; (2) That the +natural tendency of secular affairs is to breed tolerance; +(3) That the alliance of religion with the State has +fostered persecution by the State, the restraining<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">{207}</a></span> +influences coming from the secular half of the partnership; +(4) That the decline of persecution is due to +causes that are quite unconnected with religious +beliefs.</p> + +<p>The first three points can really be taken together. +So far as can be seen there is no disinclination among +primitive peoples to discuss the pros and cons of +matters that are unconnected with religious beliefs. +So soon as we get people at a culture stage where the +course of events is seen to be decided by human +action, there goes on a tolerance of conflicting opinions +that is in striking contrast with what occurs with such +matters as are believed to directly involve the action of +deity. One could not expect things to be otherwise. +In the carrying on of warfare, as with many other +tribal activities, so many of the circumstances are of a +determinable character, and are clearly to be settled by +an appeal to judgment and experience, that very early +in social history they must have presented themselves +as a legitimate field for discussion, and to discussion, +as Bagehot says, nothing is sacred. And as a matter of +fact we have a survival of this to-day. However intolerant +the character, so long as we are dealing with +secular matters it is admitted that differences of +opinion must be tolerated, and are, indeed, necessary +if we are to arrive at the wisest conclusion. The most +autocratic of monarchs will call upon his advisers and +take their dissension from his own views as a matter of +course. But when we get to the field of religion, it is +no longer a question of the legitimacy of difference, +but of its wrongness. For a religious man to admit a +discussion as to whether his religious belief is founded +on fact or not is to imply a doubt, and no thoroughly +religious man ever encourages that. What we have is +prayers to be saved from doubt, and deliberate efforts +to keep away from such conditions and circumstances<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">{208}</a></span> +as may suggest the possibility of wrong. The ideal +religious character is the one who never doubts.</p> + +<p>It may also be noted, in passing, that in connection +with religion there is nothing to check intolerance at +any stage. In relation to secular matters an opinion +is avowedly based upon verifiable facts and has no +value apart from those facts. The facts are common +property, open to all, and may be examined by all. +In religion facts of a common and verifiable kind are +almost wanting. The facts of the religious life are +mainly of an esoteric character—visions, intuitions, +etc. And while on the secular side discussion is +justified because of the agreement which results from +it, on the religious side the value of discussion is discounted +because it never does lead to agreement. The +more people discuss religion the more pronounced the +disagreement. That is one reason why the world over +the only method by which people have been brought +to a state of agreement in religious doctrines is by +excluding all who disagreed. It is harmony in +isolation.</p> + +<p>Now if we turn to religion we can see that from the +very beginning the whole tendency here was to stifle +difference of opinion, and so establish intolerance as a +religious duty. The Biblical story of Jonah is a case +that well illustrates the point. God was not angry with +the rest of the ship's inhabitants, it was Jonah only +who had given offence. But to punish Jonah a storm +was sent and the whole crew was in danger of shipwreck. +In their own defence the sailors were driven +to throw Jonah overboard. Jonah's disobedience was +not, therefore, his concern alone. All with him were +involved; God was ready to punish the whole for the +offence of one.</p> + +<p>Now if for the ship we take a primitive tribe, and +for Jonah a primitive heretic, or one who for some<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">{209}</a></span> +reason or other has omitted a service to the gods, we +have an exact picture of what actually takes place. +In primitive societies rights are not so much individual +as they are social. Every member of the tribe is +responsible to the members of other tribes for any +injury that may have been done. And as with the +members of another tribe, so with the relation of the +tribe to the gods. If an individual offends them the +whole of the tribe may suffer. There is a splendid +impartiality about the whole arrangement, although +it lacks all that we moderns understand by Justice. +But the point here is that it makes the heretic not +merely a mistaken person, but a dangerous character. +His heresy involves treason to the tribe, and in its own +defence it is felt that the heretic must be suppressed. +How this feeling lingers in relation to religion is well +seen in the fact that there are still with us large +numbers of very pious people who are ready to see in +a bad harvest, a war, or an epidemic, a judgment of +God on the whole of the people for the sins of a few. +It is this element that has always given to religious +persecutions the air of a solemn duty. To suppress the +heretic is something that is done in the interests of the +whole of the people. Persecution becomes both a +religious and a social duty.</p> + +<p>The pedigree of religious persecution is thus clear. +It is inherent in religious belief, and to whatever extent +human nature is prone to intolerance, the tendency +has been fostered and raised to the status of a virtue by +religious teaching and practice. Religion has served +to confuse man's sense of right here as elsewhere.</p> + +<p>We have thus two currents at work. On the one +hand, there is the influence of the secular side of life, +which makes normally for a greater tolerance of +opinion, on the other side there is religion which can +only tolerate a difference of opinion to the extent that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210">{210}</a></span> +religious doctrines assume a position of comparative +unimportance. Instead of it being the case that the +Church has been encouraged to persecute by the State, +the truth is the other way about. I know all that may +be said as to the persecutions that have been set on foot +by vested interests and by governments, but putting on +one side the consideration that this begs the question +of how far it has been the consequence of the early +influence of religion, there are obvious limits beyond +which a secular persecution cannot go. A government +cannot destroy its subjects, or if it does the government +itself disappears. And the most thorough scheme of +exploitation must leave its victims enough on which to +live. There are numerous considerations which weigh +with a secular government and which have little +weight with a Church.</p> + +<p>It may safely be said, for example, that no government +in the world, in the absence of religious considerations +would have committed the suicidal act +which drove the Moors and the Jews from Spain.<a name="FNanchor_24_24" id="FNanchor_24_24"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_24" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> As +a matter of fact, the landed aristocracy of Spain resisted +suggestions for expulsions for nearly a century +because of the financial ruin they saw would follow. +It was the driving power of religious belief that finally +brought about the expulsion. Religion alone could +preach that it was better for the monarch to reign over +a wilderness than over a nation of Jews and unbelievers. +The same thing was repeated a century later in the +case of the expulsion of the Huguenots from France. +Here again the crown resisted the suggestions of the +Church, and for the same reason. And it is significant +that when governments have desired to persecute in +their own interests they have nearly always found it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211">{211}</a></span> +advantageous to do so under the guise of religion. So +far, and in these instances, it may be true that the +State has used religion for its own purpose of persecution, +but this does not touch the important fact that, +given the sanction of religion, intolerance and persecution +assume the status of virtues. And to the credit of +the State it must be pointed out that it has over and +over again had to exert a restraining influence in the +quarrels of sects. It will be questioned by few that +if the regulative influence of the State had not been +exerted the quarrels of the sects would have made a +settled and orderly life next to impossible.</p> + +<p>So far as Christianity is concerned it would puzzle +the most zealous of its defenders to indicate a single +direction in which it did anything to encourage the +slightest modification of the spirit of intolerance. +Mohammedans can at least point to a time when, while +their religion was dominant, a considerable amount of +religious freedom was allowed to those living under its +control. In the palmy days of the Mohammedan rule +in Spain both Jews and Christians were allowed to +practise their religion with only trifling inconveniences, +certainly without being exposed to the fiendish +punishments that characterized Christianity all over +the world. Moreover, it must never be overlooked +that in Europe all laws against heresy are of Christian +origin. In the old Roman Empire liberty of worship +was universal. So long as the State religion was +treated with a moderate amount of respect one might +worship whatever god one pleased, and the number +was sufficient to provide for the most varied tastes. +When Christians were proceeded against it was under +laws that did not aim primarily to shackle liberty of +worship or of opinion. The procedure was in every +case formal, the trial public, time was given for the +preparation of the defence, and many of the judges<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212">{212}</a></span> +showed their dislike to the prosecutions.<a name="FNanchor_25_25" id="FNanchor_25_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_25" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> But with +the Christians, instead of persecution being spasmodic +it was persistent. It was not taken up by the +authorities with reluctance, but with eagerness, +and it was counted as the most sacred of duties. +Nor was it directed against a sectarian movement +that threatened the welfare of the State. +The worst periods of Christian persecution were +those when the State had the least to fear from +internal dissension. The persecuted were not those +who were guilty of neglect of social duty. On the +contrary they were serving the State by the encouragement +of literature, science, philosophy, and commerce. +One of the Pagan Emperors, the great Trajan, had +advised the magistrates not to search for Christians, +and to treat anonymous accusations with contempt. +Christians carried the search for heresy into a man's +own household. It used the child to obtain evidence +against its own parents, the wife to secure evidence +against the husband; it tortured to provide dictated +confessions, and placed boxes at church doors to receive +anonymous accusations. It established an index +of forbidden books, an institution absolutely unknown +to the pagan world. The Roman trial was open, the +accused could hear the charge and cite witnesses for +the defence. The Christian trial was in secret; special +forms were used and no witnesses for the defence were +permitted. Persecution was raised to a fine art.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">{213}</a></span> +Under Christian auspices it assumed the most damnable +form known in the history of the world. "There +are no wild beasts so ferocious as Christians" was +the amazed comment of the Pagans on the behaviour +of Christians towards each other, and the subsequent +history of Christianity showed that the Pagans were +but amateurs in the art of punishing for a difference +of opinion.</p> + +<p>Up to a comparatively recent time there existed a +practically unanimous opinion among Christians as to +the desirability of forcibly suppressing heretical +opinions. Whatever the fortunes of Christianity, and +whatever the differences of opinion that gradually +developed among Christians there was complete +unanimity on this point. Whatever changes the Protestant +Reformation effected it left this matter untouched. +In his <cite>History of Rationalism</cite> Lecky has +brought forward a mass of evidence in support of this, +and I must refer to that work readers who are not +already acquainted with the details. Luther, in the +very act of pleading for toleration, excepted "such as +deny the common principles of the Christian religion, +and advised that the Jews should be confined as madmen, +their synagogues burned and their books +destroyed." The intolerance of Calvin has became a +byword; his very apology for the burning of Servetus, +entitled <cite>A Defence of the Orthodox Faith</cite>, bore upon +its title page the significant sentence "In which it is +proved that heretics may justly be coerced with the +sword." His follower, Knox, was only carrying out +the teaching of the master in declaring that "provoking +the people to idolatry ought not to be exempt from the +penalty of death," and that "magistrates and people are +bound to do so (inflict the death penalty) unless they +will provoke the wrath of God against themselves." +In every Protestant country laws against heresy were<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">{214}</a></span> +enacted. In Switzerland, Geneva, Sweden, England, +Germany, Scotland, nowhere could one differ from the +established faith without running the risk of torture +and death. Even in America, with the exception of +Maryland,<a name="FNanchor_26_26" id="FNanchor_26_26"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_26" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> the same state of things prevailed. In +some States Catholic priests were subject to imprisonment +for life, Quaker women were whipped through +the streets at the cart's tail, old men of the same denomination +were pressed to death between stones. At +a later date (about 1770) laws against heresy were +general. "Anyone," says Fiske,—</p> + +<blockquote><p>who should dare to speculate too freely about the +nature of Christ, or the philosophy of the plan of +salvation, or to express a doubt as to the plenary +inspiration of every word between the two covers of +the Bible, was subject to fine and imprisonment. +The tithing man still arrested the Sabbath-breakers, +and shut them up in the town cage in the market-place; +he stopped all unnecessary riding or driving +on Sunday, and haled people off to the meeting-house +whether they would or no.<a name="FNanchor_27_27" id="FNanchor_27_27"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_27" class="fnanchor">[27]</a></p></blockquote> + +<p>And we have to remember that the intolerance shown +in America was manifested by men who had left their +own country on the ostensible ground of freedom of +conscience. As a matter of fact, in Christian society +genuine freedom of conscience was practically unknown. +What was meant by the expression was the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">{215}</a></span> +right to express one's own religious opinions, with the +privilege of oppressing all with whom one happened +to disagree. The majority of Christians would have as +indignantly repudiated the assertion that they desired +to tolerate non-Christian or anti-Christian opinions as +they would the charge of themselves holding Atheistic +ones.</p> + +<p>How deeply ingrained was the principle that the +established religion was justified in suppressing all +others may be seen from a reading of such works as +Locke's <cite>Letters on Toleration</cite>, and Milton's <cite>Areopagitica</cite>, +which stand in the forefront of the world's +writings in favour of liberty of thought and speech. +Yet Locke was of opinion that "Those are not at all +to be tolerated who deny the being of a God. +Promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds +of human society, can have no hold upon an Atheist. +The taking away of God, though but even in thought, +dissolves all." And Milton, while holding that it was +more prudent and wholesome that many be tolerated +rather than all compelled, yet hastened to add "I mean +not tolerated popery and open superstition, which as it +extirpates all religious and civil supremacies so should +itself be extirpated." In short, intolerance had become +so established a part of a society saturated in +religion that not even the most liberal could conceive +a state of being in which all opinions should be placed +upon an equal footing.</p> + +<p>Yet a change was all the time taking place in men's +opinions on this matter, a change which has in recent +years culminated in the affirmation of the principle +that the coercion of opinion is of all things the least +desirable and the least beneficial to society at large. +And as in so many other cases, it was not the gradual +maturing of that principle that attracted attention so +much as its statement in something like a complete and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">{216}</a></span> +logical form. The tracing of the conditions which have +led to this tremendous revolution in public opinion will +complete our survey of the subject.</p> + +<p>It has already been pointed out that in primitive +societies a very important fact is that the relation of the +individual to the community is of a different nature +from that which exists in a later stage of culture. The +whole is responsible for the part in a very literal sense, +and especially so in regard to religious beliefs. Individual +rights and responsibilities have but a precarious +existence at best. The individual exists far more +for the benefit of the tribe than the tribe can be said to +exist for the benefit of the individual. The sense of +corporate responsibility is strong, and even in secular +affairs we see this constantly manifested. When a +member of one tribe inflicts an injury upon a member +of another tribe, retaliation on any one of the group to +which the offending person belongs will suffice. We +see the remnants of this primitive view of life in the +feuds of schoolboys, and it is also manifested in the +relations of nations, which move upon a lower ethical +level than do individuals. Most wars are ostensibly +waged because in some obscure way the nation is held +responsible for the offences of one or more individuals. +And an instance of the same feeling is seen in the now +obsolete practice of punishing the members of a man's +family when the parents happen to have committed +certain offences.</p> + +<p>In religion, as we have already pointed out, the +sense of corporate responsibility completely governs +primitive man's sense of his relation to the tribal gods. +In the development of the tribal chief into the tribal +god the ghost is credited with much the same powers +as the man, with the added terror of having more +subtle and terrible ways of inflicting punishment. The +man who offends the ghost or the god is a standing<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">{217}</a></span> +danger to the whole of the tribe. The whole of the +tribe becomes responsible for the offence committed, +and the tribe in self protection must not alone take +measures to punish the offender, but must also guard +itself against even the possibility of the offence being +perpetrated. The consequence is that there is not a +religion in which one can fail to trace the presence of +this primitive conception of personal and social +responsibility, and consequently, where we cannot find +persecution, more or less severe, and also more or less +organized, in the interest of what is believed to be +social welfare. In the case of the failure of the Spanish +Armada to effect the conquest of England, the +Spanish monarch was convinced that its non-success +was partly due to his not having weeded out the +heretics from his own dominion before troubling about +the heretics abroad. And right down to our own day +there has not been a national calamity the cause of +which has not been found by numbers of religious +people to lie in the fact that some members of the +suffering nation have offended God. The heretic becomes, +as we have already said, a social danger of the +gravest description. Society must be guarded against +his presence just as we learn to-day to protect ourselves +against the presence of a death-dealing germ. +The suppression of heresy thus becomes a social duty, +because it protects society from the anger of the gods. +The destruction of the heretic is substantially an act of +social sanitation. Given the primitive conception of +religion, affiliated to the existing conception of corporate +responsibility, and persecution becomes one of +the most important of social duties.</p> + +<p>This, I believe, is not alone the root of persecution, +but it serves to explain as nothing else can its persistence +in social life and the fact of its having became +almost a general mental characteristic. To realize this<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">{218}</a></span> +one need only bear in mind the overpowering part +played by religious conceptions in early communities. +There is nothing done that is not more or less under +the assumed control of supernatural agencies. Fear is +the dominant emotion in relation to the gods, and +experience daily proves that there is nothing that can +make men so brutal and so callous to the sufferings of +others as can religious belief. And while there has all +along been a growing liberation of the mind from the +control of religion, the process has been so slow that +this particular product of religious rule has had time to +root itself very deeply in human nature. And it is in +accordance with all that we know of the order of +development that the special qualities engendered by a +particular set of conditions should persist long after +the conditions themselves have passed away.</p> + +<p>The conditions that co-operate in the final breaking +down of the conviction of the morality of +persecution are many and various. Primarily, there is +the change from the social state in which the conception +of corporate responsibility is dominant to one +in which there is a more or less clearly marked line +between what concerns the individual alone and what +concerns society as a whole. This is illustrated in the +growth from what Spencer called the military type of +society to an industrial one. In the case of a militant +type of society, to which the religious organization is +so closely affiliated, a State is more self contained, and +the governing principle is, to use a generalization of +Sir Henry Maine's, status rather than contract. With +the growth of commerce and industrialism there is +developed a greater amount of individual initiative, a +growing consideration for personal responsibility, and +also the development of a sense of interdependence +between societies. And the social developments that +go on teach people, even though the lesson may be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">{219}</a></span> +unconsciously learned, to value each other in terms of +social utility rather than in terms of belief in expressed +dogmas. They are brought daily into contact +with men of widely differing forms of opinion; they +find themselves working in the same movements, and +participating in the same triumphs or sharing the same +defeats. Insensibly the standard of judgment alters; +the strength of the purely social feelings overpowers +the consciousness of theological differences, and thus +serves to weaken the frame of mind from which +persecution springs.</p> + +<p>The growing complexity of life leads to the same +end. Where the conditions of life are simple, and the +experiences through which people pass are often repeated, +and where, moreover, the amount of positive +knowledge current is small, conclusions are reached +rapidly, and the feeling of confidence in one's own +opinions is not checked by seeing others draw different +conclusions from the same premises. Under such conditions +an opinion once formed is not easily or quickly +changed. Experience which makes for wider knowledge +makes also for greater caution in forming +opinions and a greater readiness to tolerate conclusions +of an opposite character at which others may have +arrived.</p> + +<p>Finally, on the purely intellectual side one must +reckon with the growth of new ideas, and of knowledge +that is in itself quite inconsistent with the established +creed. If the primary reason for killing the heretic is +that he is a social danger, one who will draw down on +the tribe the vengeance of the gods, the strength of +that feeling against the heretic must be weakened by +every change that lessens men's belief in the power +of their deity. And one must assume that every time +a fresh piece of definite knowledge was acquired towards +the splendid structure that now meets us in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">{220}</a></span> +shape of modern science there was accomplished something +that involved an ultimate weakening of the belief +in the supremacy of the gods. The effect is cumulative, +and in time it is bound to make itself felt. Religious +opinion after religious opinion finds itself attacked and +its power weakened. Things that were thought to be +solely due to the action of the gods are found to occur +without their being invoked, while invocation does not +make the slightest difference to the production of given +results. Scientific generalizations in astronomy, in +physics, in biology, etc., follow one another, each +helping to enforce the lesson that it really does not +matter what opinions a man may hold about the gods +provided his opinions about the world in which he is +living and the forces with which he <em>must</em> deal are +sound and solidly based. In a world where opinion is +in a healthy state of flux it is impossible for even +religion to remain altogether unchanged. So we have +first a change in the rigidity of religious conceptions, +then a greater readiness to admit the possibility of +error, and, finally, the impossibility of preventing the +growth and expression of definitely non-religious and +anti-religious opinions in a community where all sorts +of opinions cannot but arise.</p> + +<p>With the social consequences of religious persecution, +and particularly of Christian persecution, I +have dealt elsewhere, and there is no need to repeat +the story here. I have been here concerned with +making plain the fact that persecution does not arise +with a misunderstanding of religion, or with a decline +of what is vaguely called "true religion," nor does it +originate in the alliance of some Church with the +secular State. It lies imbedded in the very nature of +religion itself. With polytheism there is a certain +measure of toleration to gods outside the tribe, because +here the admitted existence of a number of gods<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">{221}</a></span> +is part of the order of things. But this tendency to +toleration disappears when we come to the monotheistic +stage which inevitably treats the claim to +existence of other gods in the same spirit as an ardent +royalist treats the appearance of a pretender to the +throne. To tolerate such is a crime against the +legitimate ruler. And when we get the Christian +doctrine of eternal damnation and salvation tacked on +to the religious idea we have all the material necessary +to give the persecutor the feeling of moral obligation, +and to make him feel that he is playing the part of a +real saviour to society.</p> + +<p>At bottom that is one of the chief injuries that a +religion such as Christianity inflicts on the race; it +throws human feeling into some of the most objectionable +forms, and provides a religious and moral +justification for their expression. The very desire to +benefit one's fellows, normally and naturally healthy, +thus becomes under Christian influences an instrument +of oppression and racial degradation. The Christian +persecutor does not see himself for what he is, he +pictures himself as a saviour of men's souls by suppressing +the unbeliever who would corrupt them. +And if Christianity be true he is correct in thinking +himself such. I have no hesitation in saying that if +Christianity be true persecution becomes the most +important of duties. A community that is thoroughly +Christian is bound to persecute, and as a mere matter +of historic fact every wholly Christian community has +persecuted. The community which says that a man +may take any religion he pleases, or go without one +altogether if he so chooses, proclaims its disbelief in +the importance of religion. The measure of religious +freedom is also the measure of religious indifference.</p> + +<p>There are some experiences through which a human +being may pass the effects of which he never com<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">{222}</a></span>pletely +outgrows. Usually he may appear to have put +them quite out of his mind, but there are times when +he is lifted a little out of the normal, and then the recollection +of what he has passed through comes back +with terrifying force. And acute observers may also +be able to perceive that even in normal circumstances +what he has passed through manifests itself for the +worse in his everyday behaviour. So with religion and +the life history of the race. For thousands of generations +the race has been under the influence of a teaching +that social welfare depended upon a right belief +about the gods. The consequence of this has been that +persecution became deeply ingrained in human nature +and in the social traditions which play so large a part +in the character building of each new generation. We +have as yet hardly got beyond the tradition that lack of +religion robs a man of social rights and dispenses with +the necessity for courteous and considered treatment. +And there is, therefore, small cause for wonder that +the element of intolerance should still manifest itself +in connection with non-religious aspects of life. But +the certain thing is that throughout the whole of our +social history it is religion that has been responsible +for the maintenance of persecution as a social duty. +Something has been done in more recent times to +weaken its force, the growth of science, the rationalizing +of one institution after another—in a word, the +secularizing of life—is slowly creating more tolerant +relations between people. But the poison is deep in the +blood, and will not be eradicated in a generation. +Religion is still here, and so long as it remains it will +never cease—under the guise of an appeal to the higher +sentiments of man—to make its most effective appeals +to passions of which the best among us are most +heartily ashamed.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">{223}</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XVIII" id="CHAPTER_XVIII"></a>CHAPTER XVIII.<br /> +WHAT IS TO FOLLOW RELIGION?</h2> + +<p>Books on the future of religion are numerous, and to +one blessed with a sense of humour, full of entertainment. +They are also not without instruction of a +psychological kind. Reliable information as to what +the future will be like they certainly do not give, but +they do unlock the innermost desires of the writers +thereof. They express what the writers of the +prophecies would like the future to be. And they +create the future state on earth exactly as devout +believers have built up the character of their heaven +beyond the clouds. Every form of faith which they +disagree with is rejected as not possessing the element +of vitality, with the result that there is only their own +form left. And that, they triumphantly proclaim, is +the religion of the future.</p> + +<p>But the future has an old-fashioned and disconcerting +habit of disappointing expectations. The factors +that govern human nature are so many and so complex, +their transmutations and combinations are so numerous, +that it is as well to tread cautiously, and to a very +considerable extent leave the future to take care of itself. +At the utmost all that we can do with safety is +to detect tendencies, and to hasten or retard their +development as we think them good or bad. The +factors that make up a science of human nature are +not to-day so well-known and so well understood that +we can depict the state of society a century hence with +the same certainty that we can foretell the position of +the planet Venus in the year 2000.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">{224}</a></span> +My aim in this chapter is, therefore, not to describe +precisely what will be the state of society when religious +belief has ceased to exist. It is rather to offer a +general reply to those gloomy individuals who declare +that when the aims of the Freethinker are fully +realized we shall find that in destroying religion we +have destroyed pretty much all that makes human +life worth living. We have managed to empty the +baby out with the bath.</p> + +<p>The most general form of this fear is expressed in +calling Freethought a creed of negation, or a policy of +destruction, and assuring the world that mankind can +never rest content with such things. That may be +quite true, but we fail to see in what way it touches +Freethought. A Freethought that is wholly destructive, +that is a mere negation, is a creation of the pulpit, +and belongs to the same class of imaginative efforts as +the pietistic outbursts of famous unbelievers on their +death-beds. That such things could have obtained so +wide a currency, and be looked upon as quite natural +occurrences, offers demonstrative evidence of the +paralyzing power of Christian belief on the human +mind.</p> + +<p>As a matter of fact, neither reformers in general nor +Freethinkers in particular deserve the charge of being +mere destructionists. They are both far more interested +in building up than they are in pulling down, +and it is sheer lack of understanding that fixes the +eyes of so many on one aspect of the reformer's task +and so steadily ignores the other one. Of course, the +phenomenon is not an unusual one. In a revolution +it is the noise, the street fighting, the breaking of old +rules and the shattering of established institutions that +attract the most attention. The deeper aims of the +revolutionists, the hidden social forces of which the +revolution is the expression, the work of reconstruc<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">{225}</a></span>tion +that is attempted, escape notice. The old order +shrieks its loudest at the threat of dissolution, the new +can hardly make its voice heard. Carlyle's division of +the people into the shrieking thousands and the dumb +millions is eternally true. And even the millions are +impressed with the importance of the thousands because +of the noise they are able to make.</p> + +<p>Actually the charge to which reformers in general +are open is that of a too great zeal for reconstruction, +a belittling of the difficulties that stand in the way of a +radical change. They are apt to make too small an +allowance for the occurrence of the unexpected and the +incalculable, both of which are likely to interfere with +the fruition of the most logical of schemes. And they +are so obsessed with reconstruction that destruction +seems no more than an incident by the way. A little +less eagerness for reconstruction might easily result in +a greater concern for what is being pulled down. The +two greatest "destructive" movements of modern +times—the French revolution of 1789 and the Russian +revolution—both illustrate this point. In both movements +the leading figures were men who were obsessed +with the idea of building a new world. They saw this +new world so clearly that the old one was almost +ignored. And this is equally true of the literature that +precedes and is the mouthpiece of such movements. +The leading appeal is always to what is to be, what +existed is only used as a means of enforcing the +desirability of the new order. It is, in short, the +mania for reconstruction that is chiefly responsible for +the destruction which so horrifies those whose vision +can never see anything but the world to which they +have become accustomed.</p> + +<p>In parenthesis it may be remarked that it is a tactical +blunder to make one's attack upon an existing institution +or idea depend upon the attractiveness of the ideal<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">{226}</a></span> +state depicted. It enables critics to fix attention on the +precise value of the proposed remedy instead of discussing +whether the suggested reform is necessary. +The attacker is thus placed in the position of the +defender and the point at issue obscured. This is, +that a certain institution or idea has outgrown its usefulness +and its removal is necessary to healthy growth. +And it may well be that its removal is all that is +required to enable the social organism to function +naturally and healthily. The outworn institution is +often the grit in the machine that prevents it running +smoothly.</p> + +<p>This by the way. The fact remains that some of our +best teachers have shown themselves apt to stumble in +the matter. Without belief in religion they have too +often assumed that its removal would leave a serious +gap in life, and so would necessitate the creation of a +number of substitutes to "take the place of religion." +Thus, no less profound a thinker than Herbert Spencer +remarks in the preface to his <cite>Data of Ethics</cite>:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>Few things can happen more disastrous than the +death and decay of a regulative system no longer fit, +before another and a better regulative system has +grown up to replace it. Most of those who reject the +current creed appear to assume that the controlling +agency furnished by it may safely be thrown aside, +and the vacancy left unfilled by any other controlling +agency.</p></blockquote> + +<p>Had Spencer first of all set himself to answer the +question, "What is it that the Freethinker sets himself +to remove?" or even the question, "What is the +actual control exerted by religion?" one imagines +that the passage above given would either never have +been written or would have been differently worded.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">{227}</a></span> +And when a man such as Spencer permits himself to +put the matter in this form one need not be surprised +at the ordinary believer assuming that he has put an +unanswerable question to the Freethinker when he +asks what it is that we propose to put in the place of +religion, with the assumption that the question is on +all fours with the enquiry as to what substitutes we +have for soap and coal if we destroy all stocks of these +articles.</p> + +<p>The question assumes more than any scientific Freethinker +would ever grant. It takes for granted the +statement that religion does at present perform some +useful function in the State. And that is the very +statement that is challenged. Nor does the Freethinker +deny that some "controlling agency" is +desirable. What he does say is that in the modern +State, at least, religion exerts no control for good, that +its activities make for stagnation or retrogression, that +its removal will make for the healthier operation of +other agencies, and that to these other and non-religious +agencies belongs the credit which is at +present given to religion.</p> + +<p>Moreover, Spencer should not have needed reminding +that systems of thought while they have any vital +relation to life will successfully defy all attempts at +eradication. The main cause of the decay of religion +is not the attack made upon it by the forces of reasoned +unbelief. That attack is largely the conscious expression +of a revolt against a system that has long lost +all touch with reality, and so has ceased to derive +support from current life and thought. From this +point of view the reformer is what he is because he is +alive to the drift of events, susceptible to those social +influences which affect all more or less, and his +strength is derived from the thousand and one subtle +influences that extend from generation to generation<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228">{228}</a></span> +and express themselves in what we are pleased to call +the story of civilization.</p> + +<p>But the quotation given does represent a fairly +common point of view, and it is put in a form that is +most favourable to religious pretensions. For it +assumes that religion does really in our modern lives +perform a function so useful that it would be the height +of folly to remove it before we had something equally +useful to take its place. But something in the place of +religion is a thing that no scientific Freethinker desires. +It is not a new religion, or another religion that the +world needs, but the removal of religion from the +control of life, and a restatement of those social qualities +that have hitherto been expressed in a religious form +so that their real nature will be apparent to all. Then +we shall at last begin to make progress with small +chance of getting a serious set-back.</p> + +<p>This does not, of course, deny that there are many +things associated with religion for the absence of which +society would have cause for regret. It is part of the +Freethought case that this is so. And it may also be +admitted that large numbers of people honestly believe +that their religious beliefs serve as motives to the expression +of their better qualities. That, again, is part +of the delusion we are fighting. We cannot agree +that religion, as such, contains anything that is +essentially useful to the race. It has maintained its +power chiefly because of its association with serviceable +social qualities, and it is part of the work of Freethought +to distinguish between what properly belongs +to religion and what has become associated with it +during its long history. At present the confusion +exists and the fact need cause no surprise. At best +the instincts of man are deep-laid, the motives to conduct +are mostly of an obscure kind, and it would be +cause for surprise if, seeing how closely religion is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229">{229}</a></span> +associated with every phase of primitive life, and how +persistent are primitive modes of thinking, there were +not this confusion between the actual part played by +religion in life and the part assigned it by tradition.</p> + +<p>At any rate, it is idle to argue as though human +conduct was governed by a single idea—that of +religion. At the most religious beliefs represent no +more than a part of the vast mass of influences that +determine human effort. And when we see how +largely religious beliefs are dependent upon constant +stimulation and protection for their existence, it seems +extremely unlikely that they can hold a very vital +relation to life. The impotency of religion in matters +of conduct is, too, decisively shown in the fact that it +is quite impossible to arrange men and women in a +scale of values that shall correspond with the kind or +the fervency of their religious beliefs. A religious +person may be a useful member of society or he may +be a quite useless one. A profound religious conviction +may be accompanied by the loftiest of ideals or +by the meanest of aims. The unbeliever may be, and +often is, a better man than the believer. No business +man would ever think of making a man's religion the +condition of taking one into his service, or if he did +the general opinion would be that it indicated bigotry +and not shrewdness. We find it quite impossible to +determine the nature of religious belief by watching +the way people behave. In no stage of social life does +religion provide us with anything in the nature of a +differentiating factor.</p> + +<p>It was argued by the late Sir James Fitzjames +Stephen, himself a Freethinker, that as men have for a +long time been in the habit of associating moral feelings +with the belief in God, a severance of the two may +entail moral disaster. It is, of course, hard to say +what may not happen in certain cases, but it is quite<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230">{230}</a></span> +certain that such a consequence could not follow on any +general scale. One has only to bring a statement of +this kind down from the region of mere theory to that +of definite fact to see how idle the fear is. If, instead +of asserting in a vague way that the moral life is in +some way bound up with religious beliefs we ask what +moral action or moral disposition is so connected, we +realize the absurdity of the statement. Professor +Leuba well says:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>Our alleged essential dependence upon transcendental +beliefs is belied by the most common experiences +of daily life. Who does not feel the absurdity +of the opinion that the lavish care for a sick child by +a mother is given because of a belief in God and +immortality? Are love of father and mother on the +part of children, affection and serviceableness between +brothers and sisters, straightforwardness and +truthfulness between business men essentially dependent +upon these beliefs? What sort of person +would be the father who would announce divine +punishment or reward in order to obtain the love and +respect of his children? And if there are business +men preserved from unrighteousness by the fear of +future punishment, they are far more numerous who +are deterred by the threat of human law. Most of +them would take their chances with heaven a hundred +times before they would once with society, or perchance +with the imperative voice of humanity heard +in the conscience (<cite>The Belief in God and Immortality</cite>, +p. 323).</p></blockquote> + +<p>And in whatever degree the fear may be justified in +special cases, it applies to any attempt whatever that +may be made to disturb existing conventions. Luther +complained that some of his own converts were behaving +worse as Protestants than they behaved as +Catholics, and even in the New Testament we have<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231">{231}</a></span> +the same unfavourable comparison made of many of +Christ's followers when compared with the Pagans +around them. A transference of allegiance may easily +result in certain ill-balanced minds kicking over the +traces, but in the long run, and with the mass, the +deeper social needs are paramount. There was the +same fear expressed concerning man's political and +social duties when the relations of Church and State +were first challenged. Yet the connection between the +two has been quite severed in some countries, and very +much weakened in many more, without society in the +least suffering from the change. On the contrary, one +may say that man's duties towards the State have been +more intelligently perceived and more efficiently discharged +in proportion as those religious considerations +that once ruled have been set on one side.</p> + +<p>The reply of the Freethinker to the question of +"What is to follow religion?" may, therefore, easily be +seen. In effect it is, "Nothing at all." In any study of +social evolution the properly equipped student commences +his task with the full conviction that whatever +the future may be like its germs are already with us. +If nature does not "abhor a vacuum" it has at least +an intense dislike to absolute beginnings. The future +will be an elaboration of the present as the present is +an elaboration of the past. For good or evil that +principle remains unimpeachable.</p> + +<p>The essential question is not, What is to follow +religion? but rather what will the disappearance of +religion affect that is of real value to the world. The +moment the question is raised in this unambiguous +manner the answer suggests itself. For assume that +by some strange and unexpected happening there set +in a raging epidemic of common sense. Assume that +as a consequence of this the world was to awake with +its mind completely cleared of all belief in religion.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232">{232}</a></span> +What would be the effect of the transformation? It is +quite clear that it would not affect any of the fundamental +processes of life. The tragi-comedy of life +would still be performed, it would run through the +same number of acts, and it would end in the same +happy or unhappy manner. Human beings would +still get born, they would grow up, they would fall in +love, they would marry, they would beget their kind, +and they would in turn pass away to make room for +another generation. Birth and death, with all their +accompanying feelings, would remain. Human society +would continue, all the glories of art, the greatness of +science, all the marvels and wonders of the universe +would be there whether we believed in a God or not. +The only difference would be that we should no longer +associate these things with the existence of a God. +And in that respect we should be following the same +course of development that has been followed in many +other departments of life. We do not nowadays +associate the existence of spirits with a good or a bad +harvest, the anger of God with an epidemic, or the +good-will of deity with a spell of fine weather. Yet in +each case there was once the same assumed association +between these things, and the same fears of what would +happen if that association was discarded. We are only +carrying the process a step further; all that is required +is a little courage to take the step. In short, there is +not a single useful or worthy quality, intellectual or +moral, that can possibly suffer from the disappearance +of religion.</p> + +<p>On this point we may again quote from Professor +Leuba:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>The heroism of religious martyrs is often flaunted +as marvellous instances of the unique sustaining +strength derived from the belief in a personal God<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233">{233}</a></span> +and the anticipation of heaven. And yet for every +martyr of this sort there has been one or more heroes +who has risked his life for a noble cause, without the +comfort which transcendental beliefs may bring. The +very present offers almost countless instances of +martyrs to the cause of humanity, who are strangers +to the idea of God and immortality. How many men +and women in the past decade gladly offered and not +infrequently lost their lives in the cause of freedom, +or justice, or science? In the monstrous war we are +now witnessing, is there a less heroic defence of home +and nation, and less conscious self-renunciation +among the non-believers than among the professed +Christians? Have modern nations shown a more intense +or a purer patriotism than ancient Greece and +Rome, where men did not pretend to derive inspiration +for their deeds of devotion in the thoughts of +their gods.... The fruitful deeds of heroism are at +bottom inspired not by the thought of God or a +future life, but by innate tendencies or promptings +that have reference to humanity. Self sacrifice, +generosity, is rooted in nothing less superficial and +accidental than social instincts older than the human +race, for they are already present in a rudimentary +form in the higher animals.</p></blockquote> + +<p>These are quite familiar statements to all Freethinkers, +but to a great many Christians they may come with all +the force of a new revelation.</p> + +<p>In the earlier pages of this work I have given what I +conceive solid reasons for believing that every one of +the social and individual virtues is born of human +intercourse and can never be seriously deranged for +any length of time, so long as human society endures. +The scale of values may well undergo a change with +the decay of religion, but that is something which is +taking place all the time, provided society is not in a +state of absolute stagnation. There is not any change<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_234" id="Page_234">{234}</a></span> +that takes place in society that does not affect our +view of the relative value of particular qualities. The +value we place upon personal loyalty to a king is not +what it once was. At one stage a man is ready to place +the whole of his fortune at the disposal of a monarch +merely because he happens to be his "anointed" +king. To-day, the man who had no better reason for +doing that would be looked upon as an idiot. Unquestioning +obedience to established authority, which +once played so high a part in the education of children, +is now ranked very low by all who understand what +genuine education means. From generation to generation +we go on revising our estimate of the value of +particular qualities, and the world is the better for the +revision. And that is what we may assume will occur +with the decay of religious belief. We shall place a +higher value upon certain qualities than we do at +present and a lower value upon others. But there will +be no discarding the old qualities and creation of new +ones. Human nature will be the same then as now, +as it has been for thousands of years. The nature of +human qualities will be more directly conceived and +more intelligently applied, and that will be an undesirable +development only for those who live by +exploiting the ignorance and the folly of mankind.</p> + +<p>Thus, if one may venture upon a prophecy with regard +to the non-religious society of the future it may +be said with confidence that what are known as the +ascetic qualities are not likely to increase in value. +The cant of Christianity has always placed an excessive +value upon what is called self-sacrifice. But there +is no value in self-sacrifice, as such. At best it is only +of value in exceptional circumstances, as an end it +is worse than useless, and it may easily degenerate +from a virtue to a vice. It assumed high rank with +Christian teachers for various reasons. First, it was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_235" id="Page_235">{235}</a></span> +an expression of that asceticism which lies at the root +of Christianity, second, because Christianity pictured +this world as no more than a preparation for another, +and taught that the deprivations and sufferings of the +present life would be placed to a credit account in the +next one, and third, because it helped men and women +to tolerate injustice in this world and so helped the +political game that governments and the Christian +Church have together played. A really enlightened +society would rank comparatively low the virtue of +asceticism. Its principle would be not self-sacrifice +but self-development.</p> + +<p>What must result from this is an enlargement of +our conception of justice and also of social reform. +Both of these things occupy a very low place in the +Christian scale of virtues. Social reform it has never +bothered seriously about, and in its earlier years +simply ignored. A people who were looking for the +end of the world, whose teaching was that it was for +man's spiritual good to suffer, and who looked for all +help to supernatural intervention, could never have +had seriously in their minds what we understand by +social reform. And so with the conception of Justice. +There is much of this in pre-Christian literature, and +its entrance into the life and thought of modern +Europe can be traced directly back to Greek and +Roman sources. But the work of the Christian, while +it may have been to heal wounds, was not to prevent +their infliction. It was to minister to poverty, not to +remove those conditions that made poverty inevitable.</p> + +<p>A Spanish writer has put this point so well that I +cannot do better than quote him. He says:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>The notion of justice is as entirely foreign to the +spirit of Christianity as is that of intellectual honesty. +It lies wholly outside the field of its ethical vision.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236">{236}</a></span> +Christianity—I am not referring to interpretations disclaimed +as corruptions or applications which may be +set down to frailty and error, but to the most idealized +conceptions of its substance and the most exalted +manifestations of its spirit—Christianity has offered +consolation and comfort to men who suffered under +injustice, but of that injustice itself it has remained +absolutely incognizant. It has called upon the weary +and heavy laden, upon the suffering and the afflicted, +it has proclaimed to them the law of love, the duty of +mercy and forgiveness, the Fatherhood of God; but +in that torment of religious and ethical emotion which +has impressed men as the summit of the sublime, and +been held to transcend all other ethical ideals, common +justice, common honesty have no place. The ideal +Christian is seen in the saint who is seen descending +like an angel from heaven amid the welter of human +misery, among the victims of ruthless oppression and +injustice ... but the cause of that misery lies wholly +outside the range of his consciousness; no glimmer of +right or wrong enters into his view of it. It is the +established order of things, the divinely appointed +government of the world, the trial laid upon sinners +by divine ordinance. St. Vincent de Paul visits the +hell of the French galleys; he proclaims the message +of love and calls sinners to repentance; but to the +iniquity which creates and maintains that hell he +remains absolutely indifferent. He is appointed +Grand Almoner to his Most Christian Majesty. The +world might groan in misery under the despotism +of oppressors, men's lives and men's minds might be +enslaved, crushed and blighted; the spirit of Christianity +would go forth and <em>comfort</em> them, but it would +never occur to it to redress a single one of those +wrongs. It has remained unconscious of them. To +those wrongs, to men's right to be delivered from +them, it was by nature completely blind. In respect +to justice, to right and wrong, the spirit of Christianity +is not so much immoral as amoral. The +notion was as alien to it as the notion of truth. In<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_237" id="Page_237">{237}</a></span>cluded +in its code was, it might be controversially +alleged, an old formula, "the golden rule," a commonplace +of most literature, which was popular in +the East from China to Asia Minor; but that isolated +precept was never interpreted in the sense of justice. +It meant forgiveness, forbearing, kindness, but never +mere justice, common equity; those virtues were far +too unemotional in aspect to appeal to the religious +enthusiast. The renunciation of life and all its +vanities, the casting overboard of all sordid cares for +its maintenance, the suppression of desire, prodigal +almsgiving, the consecration of a life, the value of +which had disappeared in his eyes, to charity and love, +non-resistance, passive obedience, the turning of the +other cheek to an enemy, the whole riot of these +hyperbolic ethical emotions could fire the Christian +consciousness, while it remained utterly unmoved by +every form of wrong, iniquity and injustice (Dr. +Falta de Gracia. Cited by Dr. R. Briffault, <cite>The +Making of Humanity</cite>, pp. 334-5.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>That, we may assume, will be one of the most striking +consequences of the displacement of Christianity in the +social economy. There will be less time wasted on +what is called philanthropic work—which is often the +most harmful of all social labours—and more attention +to the removal of those conditions that have made the +display of philanthropy necessary. There will not be +less feeling for the distressed or the unfortunate, but +it will be emotion under the guidance of the intellect, +and the dominant feeling will be that of indignation +against the conditions that make human suffering and +degradation inevitable, rather than a mere gratification +of purely egoistic feeling which leaves the source of +the evil untouched.</p> + +<p>That will mean a rise in the scale of values of what +one may call the intellectual virtues—the duty of +truthseeking and truth speaking. Hitherto the type<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_238" id="Page_238">{238}</a></span> +of character held up for admiration by Christianity has +been that of the blind believer who allowed nothing to +stand in the way of his belief, who required no proofs +of its truth and allowed no disproofs to enter his mind. +A society in which religion does not hold a controlling +place is not likely to place a very high value upon such +precepts as "Blessed are those who have not seen and +yet have believed," or "Though he slay me yet will I +trust him." But a very high value will be placed upon +the duty of investigation and the right of criticism. +And one cannot easily over-estimate the consequences +of a generation or two brought up in an atmosphere +where such teachings obtain. It would mean a receptiveness +to new ideas, a readiness to overhaul old +institutions, a toleration of criticism such as would +rapidly transform the whole mental atmosphere and +with it enormously accentuate the capacity for, and the +rapidity of, social progress.</p> + +<p>There is also to be borne in mind the effect of the +liberation of the enormous amount of energy at present +expended in the service of religion. Stupid religious +controversialists often assume that it is part of the +Freethinker's case that religion enlists in its service +bad men, and much time is spent in proving that +religious people are mostly worthy ones. That could +hardly be otherwise in a society where the overwhelming +majority of men and women profess a religion of +some sort. But that is, indeed, not the Freethinker's +case at all, and if the badness of some religious people +is cited it is only in answer to the foolish argument that +religionists are better than others. The real complaint +against religion is of a different kind altogether. Just +as the worst thing that one can say about a clergyman +intellectually is, not that he does not believe in what +he preaches, but that he does, so the most serious indictment +of current religion is not that it enlists in its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_239" id="Page_239">{239}</a></span> +service bad characters, but that it dissipates the energy +of good men and women in a perfectly useless manner. +The dissipation of Christian belief means the liberating +of a store of energy for service that is at present being +expended on ends that are without the least social +value. A world without religion would thus be a world +in which the sole ends of endeavour would be those of +human betterment or human enlightenment, and probably +in the end the two are one. For there is no real +betterment without enlightenment, even though there +may come for a time enlightenment without betterment. +It would leave the world with all the means of +intellectual and ęsthetic and social enjoyment that +exist now, and one may reasonably hope that it will +lead to their cultivation and diffusion over the whole +of society.</p> + +<p id="end"><i>Printed and Published by</i><br /> +THE PIONEER PRESS<br /> +(<span class="smcap">G. W. Foote & Co., Ltd.</span>),<br /> +<i>61 Farringdon Street, London, E.C. 4</i>.</p> + +<h2 id="ads"><a name="adverts" id="adverts"></a>ANNOUNCEMENTS.</h2> + +<h3>THE SECULAR SOCIETY, Limited.</h3> + +<p class="center"><i>Registered Office</i>: 62 Farringdon Street, London, E.C. 4.</p> + +<p class="center"><i>Secretary</i>: Miss E. M. 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They have found him, as Lamb said of +some other writers, "damned good to steal from." His +series of volumes, <cite>Problems of Life and Mind</cite>, have been +borrowed from wholesale without the slightest thanks or +recognition.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> <cite>Study of Psychology</cite>, pp. 139, 161-5. So again, a more +recent writer says: "It is not man himself who thinks but +his social community; the source of his thoughts is in the +social medium in which he lives, the social atmosphere which +he breathes.... The influence of environment upon the human +mind has always been recognized by psychologists and philosophers, +but it has been considered a secondary factor. On +the contrary, the social medium which the child enters at +birth, in which he lives, moves and has his being, is fundamental. +Toward this environment the individual from childhood +to ripest old age is more or less receptive; rarely can +the maturest minds so far succeed in emancipating themselves +from this medium so far as to undertake independent +reflection, while complete emancipation is impossible, for all +the organs and modes of thought, all the organs for constructing +thoughts have been moulded or at least thoroughly +imbued by it" (L. Gumplowicz, <cite>Outlines of Sociology</cite>, p. 157).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> <cite>Social Psychology</cite>, pp. 330-1.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> "The tyranny exercised unconsciously on men's minds is +the only real tyranny, because it cannot be fought against. +Tiberius, Ghengis Khan, and Napoleon were assuredly redoubtable +tyrants, but from the depths of their graves Moses, +Buddha, Jesus, and Mahomet exerted on the human soul a +far profounder tyranny. A conspiracy may overthrow a +tyrant, but what can it avail against a firmly established +belief? In its violent struggle with Roman Catholicism it is +the French Revolution that has been vanquished, and this in +spite of the fact that the sympathy of the crowd was +apparently on its side, and in spite of recourse to destructive +measures as pitiless as those of the Inquisition. The only +real tyrants that humanity has known have always been the +memories of its dead, or the illusions it has forged for itself" +(Gustave Le Bon, <cite>The Crowd</cite>, p. 153).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> See <cite>Early History of Institutions</cite>, and <cite>Early Law and +Custom</cite>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_6_6" id="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> <cite>Principles of Sociology</cite>, Vol. I.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_7_7" id="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> <cite>Origins of English History</cite>, p. 261.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_8_8" id="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> Speaking of the Inquisition, Mr. H. C. Lea, in his classic +<cite>History of the Inquisition</cite>, says, "There is no doubt that the +people were as eager as their pastors to send the heretic to +the stake. There is no doubt that men of the kindliest +tempers, the profoundest aspirations, the purest zeal for +righteousness, professing a religion founded on love and +charity, were ruthless where heresy was concerned, and were +ready to trample it out at any cost. Dominic and Francis, +Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas, Innocent III. and St. +Louis, were types, in their several ways, of which humanity, +in any age, might feel proud, and yet they were as unsparing +of the heretic as Ezzelin di Romano was of his enemies. With +such men it was not hope of gain or lust of blood or pride of +opinion or wanton exercise of power, but sense of duty, and +they but represented what was universal public opinion from +the thirteenth to the seventeenth century." Vol. I., p. 234.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_9_9" id="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> This seems to me to give the real significance of Nationality. +It has been argued by some that nationality is a pure +myth, as unreal as the divinity of a king. The principal +ground for this denial of nationality appears to be that so-called +national characteristics are seen to undergo drastic +transformation when their possessors are subject to a new +set of influences. This may be quite true, but if nationality, +in the sense of being a product of biological heredity, is ruled +out, it does not follow that nationality is thereby destroyed. +The fact may remain but it demands a different interpretation. +And if what has been said above be true, it follows that +nationality is not a personal fact, but an extra or super-personal +one. It belongs to the group rather than to the +individual, and is created by the possession of a common +speech, a common literature, and a common group life. And +quite naturally, when the individual is lifted out of this +special social influence its power may well be weakened, and +in the case of his children may be non-existent, or replaced +by the special characteristics of the new group into which he +is born. The discussion of nationality ought not, therefore, +to move along the lines of acceptance or rejection of the conception +of nationality, but of how far specific national characteristics +admit of modification under the pressure of new +conditions.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_10_10" id="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_10"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> It would take too long to elaborate, but it may be here +noted that in the human group the impelling force is not so +much needs as desires, and that fact raises the whole +issue from the level of biology to that of psychology. So long +as life is at a certain level man shares with the animal the +mere need for food. But at another level there arises not +merely the need for food, but a desire for certain kind of +food, cooked in a particular manner, and served in a special +style. And provided that we do not by hunger reduce man to +the level of the beast again, the desire will be paramount +and will determine whether food shall be eaten or not. So, +again, with the fact of sex and marriage. At the animal +level we have the crude fact of sex, and this is, indeed, inescapable +at any stage. But the growth of civilization brings +about the fact that the need for the gratification of the +sexual appetite is regulated by the secondary qualities of +grace of form, or of disposition, which are the immediate determinants +of whether a particular man shall marry a particular +woman or not. Again, it is the <em>desire</em> for power and +distinction, not the <em>need</em> for money that impels men to spend +their lives in building up huge fortunes. And, finally, we have +the fact that a great many of our present needs are transformed +desires. The working man of to-day counts as needs, +as do we all more or less, a number of things that began as +pure desires. We say we need books, pictures, music, etc. +But none of these things can be really brought under the +category of things necessary to life. They are the creation +of man's mental cravings. Without them we say life would +not be worth living, and it is well that we should all feel so. +Professor Marshall rightly dwells upon this point by saying: +"Although it is man's wants in the early stages of development +that give rise to his activities, yet afterwards each new +step is to be regarded as the development of new activities +giving rise to new wants, rather than of new wants giving +rise to new activities."—(<cite>Principles of Economics</cite>, Vol. I., +p. 164.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_11_11" id="Footnote_11_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_11"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> It is a curious thing, as Philip Gilbert Hamerton points +out in one of his essays, that in England religious freedom +appears to exist in inverse proportion to rank. The king has +no freedom whatever in a choice of religion. His religion is +part of the position. An English nobleman, speaking generally, +has two religions from which to choose. He may be +either a member of the established Church or of the Roman +Catholic. In the middle classes there is the choice of all sorts +of religious sects, so long as they are Christian. Religious +dissent is permitted so long as it does not travel beyond the +limits of the chapel. And when we come to the better class +working man, he has the greatest freedom of all. His social +position does not depend upon his belonging to this or that +Church, and he may, to borrow a phrase from Heine, go to +hell in his own fashion.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_12_12" id="Footnote_12_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_12"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> See specially Vol. I., chapters 6, 7, and 8. One is sorely +tempted to engage in what would be a rather lengthy aside +on the mental freedom enjoyed by the people of ancient +Greece, but considerations of cogency advise a shorter comment +in this form. In the first place we have to note that +neither the Greeks nor the Romans possessed anything in +the shape of "sacred" books. That, as the history of Mohammedanism +and Christianity shows, is one of the most +disastrous things that can happen to any people. But apart +from this there were several circumstances connected with +the development of the Greek peoples that made for freedom +of opinion. There was no uniform theology to commence +with, and the configuration of the country, while enough to +maintain local independence, was not enough to prevent a +certain amount of intercourse. And it would certainly seem +that no people were ever so devoid of intolerance as were the +ancient Greeks. It is true that the history of Greece was not +without its examples of intolerance, but these were comparatively +few, and, as Professor Bury says, persecution was never +organized. The gods were criticized in both speeches and +plays. Theories of Materialism and Atheism were openly +taught and were made the topic of public discussion. There +was, indeed, a passion for the discussion of all sorts of subjects, +and to discussion nothing is sacred. The best thought +of Rome owed its impetus to Greece, and at a later date it +was the recovered thought of Greece which gave the impetus +to Mohammedan Spain in its cultivation of science and philosophy, +and so led to the partial recovery of Europe from the +disastrous control of the Christian Church. Nor need it be +assumed that the work of Greece was due to the possession +of a superior brain power. Of that there is not the slightest +vestige of proof. It is simply that the ancient Greek lived +in a freer mental atmosphere. The mind had less to hamper +it in its operations; it had no organized and powerful Church +that from the cradle to the grave pursued its work of preventing +free criticism and the play of enlightened opinion. +For several centuries the world has been seeking to recover +some of its lost liberties with only a very moderate success. +But if one thinks of what the Greeks were, and if one adds +to what they had achieved a possible two thousand years of +development, he will then have some notion of what the +triumph of the Christian Church meant to the world.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_13_13" id="Footnote_13_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_13"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> See on this point Heeren's <cite>Historical Treatises</cite>, 1836, pp. +61-70.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_14_14" id="Footnote_14_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_14"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> <cite>Religion and the Child</cite>, Pioneer Press.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_15_15" id="Footnote_15_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_15"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> Of the evil of an incautious use of current words we have +an example in the case of Darwin. Neither his expressions +of regret at having "truckled to public opinion" at having +used the term "creator," nor his explicit declaration that the +word was to him only a synonym of ignorance, prevented +religious apologists from citing him as a believer in deity on +the strength of his having used the word.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_16_16" id="Footnote_16_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_16"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> <cite>The Psychological Origin and Nature of Religion</cite>, p. 92.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_17_17" id="Footnote_17_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_17"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> <cite>Religion as a Credible Doctrine</cite>, p. 11.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_18_18" id="Footnote_18_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_18"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> <cite>Theism or Atheism</cite>, Chapter 2.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_19_19" id="Footnote_19_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_19"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> The state of war which normally exists between many, if +not most, neighbouring savage tribes, springs in large +measure directly from their belief in immortality; since one +of the commonest motives to hostility is a desire to appease +the angry ghosts of friends who are supposed to have perished +by baleful arts of sorcerers in another tribe, and who, if +vengeance is not inflicted on their real or imaginary +murderers, will wreak their fury on their undutiful fellow-tribesmen.—<cite>The +Belief in Immortality</cite>, Vol. I., p. 468.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_20_20" id="Footnote_20_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_20"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> It may with equal truth be said that all beliefs are with a +similar qualification quite rational. The attempt to divide +people into "Rationalists" and "Irrationalists" is quite +fallacious and is philosophically absurd. Reason is used in +the formation of religious as in the formation of non-religious +beliefs. The distinction between the man who is religious +and one who is not, or, if it be preferred, one who is superstitious +and one who is not, is not that the one reasons and +the other does not. Both reason. Indeed, the reasoning of the +superstitionist is often of the most elaborate kind. The +distinction is that of one having false premises, or drawing +unwarrantable conclusions from sound premises. The only +ultimate distinctions are those of religionist and non-religionist, +supernaturalist and non-supernaturalist, Theist or +Atheist. All else are mere matters of compromise, exhibitions +of timidity, or illustrations of that confused thinking which +itself gives rise to religion in all its forms.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_21_21" id="Footnote_21_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_21"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> <cite>Aspects of Death in Art and Epigram</cite>, p. 28.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_22_22" id="Footnote_22_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_22"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> <cite>Golden Bough</cite>, Vol. IV., p. 136.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_23_23" id="Footnote_23_23"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_23"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> The question of what are the things that are essential to +the welfare of the group, and the fact that individuals are +often suppressed for doing what they believe is beneficial to +the group, with the kindred fact that there may exist grave +differences of opinion on the matter, does not alter the +essential point, which is that there must exist sufficient conformity +between conduct and group welfare to secure survival.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_24_24" id="Footnote_24_24"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_24"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> For this, as well as for the general consequences of +persecution on racial welfare, see my pamphlet <cite>Creed and +Character</cite>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_25_25" id="Footnote_25_25"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_25"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> I am taking the story of the persecutions of the early +Christians for granted, although the whole question is surrounded +with the greatest suspicion. As a matter of fact the +accounts are grossly exaggerated, and some of the alleged +persecutions never occurred. The story of the persecutions is +so foreign to the temper of the Roman government as to +throw doubt on the whole account. The story of there being +ten persecutions is clearly false, the number being avowedly +based upon the legend of the ten plagues of Egypt.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_26_26" id="Footnote_26_26"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_26"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> The case of Maryland is peculiar. But the reason for the +toleration there seems to have been due to the desire to give +Catholics a measure of freedom they could not have elsewhere +in Protestant countries.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_27_27" id="Footnote_27_27"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_27"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> For a good sketch of the Puritan Sunday in New England +see <cite>The Sabbath in Puritan New England</cite>, by Alice Morse +Earle. For an account of religious intolerance see the account +of the Blue Laws of Connecticut as contained in Hart's +<cite>American History told by Contemporaries</cite>, Vol. I.</p></div> +</div> + +<div id="tn"> +<h2>Transcriber's Note:</h2> + +<p>Minor punctuation errors and letters printed upside down have been +corrected without note. Inconsistent hyphenation (e.g. common-place vs. +commonplace) has been retained. Variant and unusual spellings used +consistently (e.g. indispensible) have also been kept.</p> + +<p>The following corrections and changes were made to the text:</p> + +<p><a href="#Page_65">p. 65</a>: knowlelge to knowledge (accumulation of knowledge)</p> + +<p><a href="#Page_98">p. 98</a>: upder to under (under the old Greek)</p> + +<p><a href="#Page_102">p. 102</a>: extra "to" removed (owe their belief to the philosophical)</p> + +<p><a href="#Page_114">p. 114</a>: sterotyped to stereotyped (stereotyped phraseology)</p> + +<p><a href="#Page_132">p. 132</a>: developes to develops (organ or an organism develops)</p> + +<p><a href="#Page_157">p. 157</a>: it to is (After this lame conclusion it is difficult)</p> + +<p><a href="#Page_186">p. 186</a>: percieves to perceives (provided a man perceives)</p> + +<p><a href="#Page_190">p. 190</a>: Zeigler to Ziegler (Professor Ziegler)</p> + +<p><a href="#Page_215">p. 215</a>: mayority to majority (majority of Christians)</p> + +<p><a href="#Page_216">p. 216</a>: precariout to precarious (precarious existence at best)</p> + +<p><a href="#adverts">Advertisements</a>: entrace to entrance (an entrance fee of ten shillings)</p> +</div> + + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's A Grammar of Freethought, by Chapman Cohen + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A GRAMMAR OF FREETHOUGHT *** + +***** This file should be named 36882-h.htm or 36882-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/3/6/8/8/36882/ + +Produced by Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe, S.D., and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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Thus, we do not necessarily +keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. + + +Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: + + http://www.gutenberg.org + +This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, +including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary +Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to +subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. + + +</pre> + +</body> +</html> diff --git a/36882-h/images/cover.jpg b/36882-h/images/cover.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..e6abc7f --- /dev/null +++ b/36882-h/images/cover.jpg diff --git a/36882.txt b/36882.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..38cf2ba --- /dev/null +++ b/36882.txt @@ -0,0 +1,7544 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of A Grammar of Freethought, by Chapman Cohen + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: A Grammar of Freethought + +Author: Chapman Cohen + +Release Date: July 28, 2011 [EBook #36882] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A GRAMMAR OF FREETHOUGHT *** + + + + +Produced by Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe, S.D., and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net + + + + + + + + + + A Grammar of + Freethought. + + BY + CHAPMAN COHEN. + + (_Issued by the Secular Society, Ltd._) + + LONDON: + THE PIONEER PRESS, + 61 FARRINGDON STREET, E.C. 4. + + 1921. + + +_The Publishers wish to express their obligation to Mr. H. Cutner for +the very tasteful design which adorns the cover of this book._ + + + + +CONTENTS. + + + CHAPTER PAGE + + I.--OUTGROWING THE GODS 9 + + II.--LIFE AND MIND 18 + + III.--WHAT IS FREETHOUGHT? 37 + + IV.--REBELLION AND REFORM 51 + + V.--THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CHILD 61 + + VI.--THE NATURE OF RELIGION 72 + + VII.--THE UTILITY OF RELIGION 88 + + VIII.--FREETHOUGHT AND GOD 101 + + IX.--FREETHOUGHT AND DEATH 111 + + X.--THIS WORLD AND THE NEXT 123 + + XI.--EVOLUTION 134 + + XII.--DARWINISM AND DESIGN 146 + + XIII.--ANCIENT AND MODERN 162 + + XIV.--MORALITY WITHOUT GOD.--I. 172 + + XV.--MORALITY WITHOUT GOD.--II. 182 + + XVI.--CHRISTIANITY AND MORALITY 193 + + XVII.--RELIGION AND PERSECUTION 204 + + XVIII.--WHAT IS TO FOLLOW RELIGION? 223 + + + + +PREFACE. + + +It must be left for those who read the following pages to decide how far +this book lives up to its title. That it leaves many aspects of life +untouched is quite clear, but there must be a limit to everything, even +to the size and scope of a book; moreover, the work does not aim at +being an encyclopaedia, but only an outline of what may fairly be +regarded as the Freethought position. Freethought, again, is too fluid a +term to permit its teachings being summarized in a set creed, but it +does stand for a certain definite attitude of mind in relation to those +problems of life with which thoughtful men and women concern themselves. +It is that mental attitude which I aim at depicting. + +To those who are not directly concerned with the attack on +supernaturalism it may also be a matter of regret that so much of this +work is concerned with a criticism of religious beliefs. But that is an +accident of the situation. We have not yet reached that stage in affairs +when we can afford to let religion alone, and one may readily be excused +the suspicion that those who, without believing in it, profess to do so, +are more concerned with avoiding a difficult, if not dangerous, subject, +than they are with the problem of developing sane and sound methods of +thinking. And while some who stand forward as leaders of popular thought +fail to do their part in the work of attacking supernaturalistic +beliefs, others are perforce compelled to devote more time than they +would otherwise to the task. That, in brief, is my apology for +concerning myself so largely with religious topics, and leaving almost +untouched other fields where the Freethought attitude would prove +equally fruitful of results. + +After all, it is the mental attitude with which one approaches a problem +that really matters. The man or woman who has not learned to set mere +authority on one side in dealing with any question will never be more +than a mere echo, and what the world needs, now as ever, is not echoes +but voices. Information, knowledge, is essential to the helpful +consideration of any subject; but all the knowledge in the world will be +of very little real help if it is not under the control of a right +method. What is called scientific knowledge is, to-day, the commonest of +acquisitions, and what most people appear to understand by that is the +accumulation of a large number of positive facts which do, indeed, form +the raw material of science. But the getting of mere facts is like the +getting of money. The value of its accumulation depends upon the use +made thereof. It is the power of generalization, the perception and +application of principles that is all-important, and to this the grasp +of a right method of investigation, the existence of a right mental +attitude, is essential. + +The world needs knowledge, but still more imperatively it needs the +right use of the knowledge that is at its disposal. For this reason I +have been mainly concerned in these pages with indicating what I +consider to be the right mental attitude with which to approach certain +fundamental questions. For, in a world so distracted by conflicting +teachings as is ours, the value of a right method is almost +incalculable. Scepticism, said Buckle, is not the result, but the +condition of progress, and the same may be said of Freethought. The +condition of social development is the realization that no institution +and no teaching is beyond criticism. Criticism, rejection and +modification are the means by which social progress is achieved. It is +by criticism of existing ideas and institutions, by the rejection of +what is incapable of improvement, and by the modification of what +permits of betterment, that we show ourselves worthy of the better +traditions of the past, and profitable servants of the present and the +future. + + C. C. + + + + +A GRAMMAR OF FREETHOUGHT. + + + + +CHAPTER I. + +OUTGROWING THE GODS. + + +One of the largest facts in the history of man is religion. If it were +otherwise the justification for writing the following pages, and for +attempting the proof that, so far as man's history is concerned with +religion, it is little better than a colossal blunder, would not be +nearly so complete. Moreover, it is a generalization upon which +religionists of all classes love to dwell, or even to parade as one of +the strongest evidences in their favour; and it is always pleasant to be +able to give your opponent all for which he asks--feeling, meanwhile, +that you lose nothing in the giving. Universality of belief in religion +really proves no more than the universality of telling lies. "All men +are liars" is as true, or as false, as "All men are religious." For some +men are not liars, and some men are not religious. All the +generalization means is that some of both are found in every age and in +every country, and that is true whether we are dealing with the liar or +with the religious person. + +What is ignored is the consideration that while at one stage of culture +religious belief is the widest and most embracing of all beliefs it +subsequently weakens, not quite in direct proportion to the advance of +culture, but yet in such a way that one can say there is an actual +relation between a preponderance of the one and a weakening of the +other. In very primitive communities gods are born and flourish with all +the rank exuberance of a tropical vegetation. In less primitive times +their number diminishes, and their sphere of influence becomes more and +more sharply defined. The gods are still credited with the ability to do +certain things, but there are other things which do somehow get done +without them. How that discovery and that division are made need not +detain us for the moment, but the fact is patent. Advancing civilization +sees the process continued and quickened, nay, that is civilization; for +until nature is rid of her "haughty lords" and man realizes that there +are at least some natural forces that come within the control of his +intelligence, civilization cannot really be said to have commenced. +Continued advance sees the gods so diminished in power and so weakened +in numbers that their very impotency is apt to breed for them the kind +of pity that one feels for a millionaire who becomes a pauper, or for an +autocratic monarch reduced to the level of a voteless citizen. + +The truth is that all the gods, like their human creators, have in their +birth the promise of death. The nature of their birth gives them life, +but cannot promise them immortality. However much man commences by +worshipping gods, he sooner or later turns his back upon them. Like the +biblical deity he may look at his creation and declare it good, but he +also resembles this deity in presently feeling the impulse to destroy +what he has made. To the products of his mind man can no more give +immortality than he can to the work of his hands. In many cases the work +of his hands actually outlives that of his mind, for we have to-day the +remains of structures that were built in the honour of gods whose very +names are forgotten. And to bury his gods is, after all, the only real +apology that man can offer for having created them. + +This outgrowing of religion is no new thing in human history. Thoughtful +observers have always been struck by the mortality among the gods, +although their demise has usually been chronicled in terms of exultation +by rival worshippers. But here and there a keener observer has brought +to bear on the matter a breadth of thought which robbed the phenomenon +of its local character and gave it a universal application. Thus, in one +of his wonderfully modern dialogues Lucian depicts the Olympian deities +discussing, much in the spirit of a modern Church Congress, the +prevalence of unbelief among men. The gods are disturbed at finding that +men are reaching the stage of either not believing, or not troubling +about them. There is a great deal of talk, and finally one of the minor +deities treats them to a little plain truth--which appears to be as +rare, and as unwelcome in heaven as on earth. He says--I quote from +Froude's translation:-- + + What other conclusion could they arrive at when they saw the + confusion around them? Good men neglected, perishing in penury and + slavery, and profligate wretches wealthy, honoured and powerful. + Sacrilegious temple robbers undiscovered and unpunished; devotees + and saints beaten and crucified. With such phenomena before them, + of course men have doubted our existence.... We affect surprise + that men who are not fools decline to put their faith in us. We + ought rather to be pleased that there is a man left to say his + prayers. We are among ourselves with no strangers present. Tell us, + then, Zeus, have you ever really taken pains to distinguish between + good men and bad? Theseus, not you, destroyed the robbers in + Attica. As far as Providence was concerned, Sciron and + Pity-O-Campus might have murdered and plundered to the end of time. + If Eurystheus had not looked into matters, and sent Hercules upon + his labours little would you have troubled yourself with the Hydras + and Centaurs. Let us be candid. All that we have really cared for + has been a steady altar service. Everything else has been left to + chance. And now men are opening their eyes. They perceive that + whether they pray or don't pray, go to church or don't go to + church, makes no difference to them. And we are receiving our + deserts. + +The case could hardly be put more effectively. It is the appeal to +experience with a vengeance, a form of argument of which religionists in +general are very fond. Of course, the argument does not touch the +question of the mere existence of a god, but it does set forth the +revolt of awakened common sense against the worship of a "moral governor +of the universe." We can say of our day, as Lucian said of his, that men +are opening their eyes, and as a consequence the gods are receiving +their deserts. + +Generally speaking, it is not difficult to see the various steps by +which man outgrew the conception of the government of the world by +intelligent forces. From what we know of primitive thought we may say +that at first the gods dominated all. From the fall of a rain-drop to +the movement of a planet all was the work of gods. Merely to question +their power was the wildest of errors and the gravest of crimes. Bit by +bit this vast territory was reclaimed--a task at the side of which the +conquest of the fever-stricken tropics or the frozen north is mere +child's play. It is quite needless to enter into an elaborate +speculation as to the exact steps by which this process of +deanthropomorphization--to use a word of the late John Fiske's--was +accomplished, but one can picture the main line by what we see taking +place at later stages of development. And there is no exception to the +rule that so soon as any group of phenomena is brought within the +conception of law the notion of deity in connection with those phenomena +tends to die out. And the sum of the process is seen in the work of the +great law givers of science, Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, Newton, +Laplace, Lyell, Dalton, Darwin, etc., who between them have presented us +with a universe in which the conception of deity simply has no place. +Apologies apart, the idea of deity is foreign to the spirit and method +of modern science. + +In the region of the purely physical sciences this process may be +regarded as complete. In morals and sociology, purely on account of the +greater complexity of the subjects, mystical and semi-supernatural +conceptions still linger, but it is only a question of time for these +branches of knowledge to follow the same course as the physical +sciences. In morals we are able to trace, more or less completely, the +development of the moral sense from its first beginnings in the animal +world to its highest developments in man. What is called the "mystery of +morality" simply has no existence to anyone who is not a mystery-monger +by profession or inclination. And here, too, the gods have been +receiving their deserts. For it is now clear that instead of being a +help to morals there has been no greater obstacle to a healthy morality +than the play of religious ideas. In the name of God vices have been +declared virtues and virtues branded as vices. Belief in God has been an +unending source of moral perversion, and it lies upon the face of +historical development that an intelligent morality, one that is capable +of adapting itself to the changing circumstances of human nature, has +only become possible with the breaking down of religious authority. + +Exactly the same phenomenon faces us in connection with social life. We +have to go back but a little way in human history to come to a time +when the existence of a State without a religion would have seemed to +people impossible. Much as Christians have quarrelled about other +things, they have been in agreement on this point. The historic fight +between the established Church and the Nonconformists has never really +been for the disestablishment of all religion, and the confining of the +State to the discharge of purely secular functions, but mainly as to +_which_ religion the State shall uphold. To-day, the central issue is +whether the State shall teach any religion, whether that does not lie +right outside its legitimate functions. And this marks an enormous +advance. It is a plain recognition of the truth that the gods have +nothing to contribute of any value to the development of our social +life. It marks the beginning of the end, and registers the truth that +man must be his own saviour here as elsewhere. As in Lucian's day we are +beginning to realize that whether we pray or don't pray, go to church or +don't go to church, believe in the gods or don't believe in them, makes +no real or substantial difference to natural happenings. Now as then we +see good men punished and bad ones rewarded, and they who are not fools +and have the courage to look facts in the face, decline to put their +faith in a deity who is incapable of doing all things right or too +careless to exert his power. + +It is not that the fight is over, or that there is to-day little need to +fight the forces of superstition. If that were so, there would be no +need to write what is here written. Much as has been done, there is much +yet to do. The revolt against specific beliefs only serves to illustrate +a fight that is of much greater importance. For there is little real +social gain if one merely exchanges one superstition for another. And, +unfortunately, the gentleman who declared that he had given up the +errors of the Church of Rome in order to embrace those of the Church of +England represents a fairly common type. It is the prevalence of a +particular type of mind in society that constitutes a danger, and it is +against this that our aim is ultimately directed. Great as is the amount +of organized superstition that exists, the amount of unorganized +superstition is still greater, and probably more dangerous. One of the +revelations of the late war was the evidence it presented of the +tremendous amount of raw credulity, of the low type of intelligence that +was still current, and the small amount of critical ability the mass of +people bring to bear upon life. The legends that gained currency--the +army of Russians crossing England, the number of mutilated Belgian +babies that were seen, the story of the Germans boiling down their dead +to extract the fat, a story that for obscene stupidity beats everything +else, the Mons angels, the craze for mascots--all bore witness to the +prevalence of a frame of mind that bodes ill for progress. + +The truth is, as Sir James Frazer reminds us, that modern society is +honeycombed with superstitions that are not in themselves a whit more +intellectually respectable than those which dominate the minds of +savages. "The smooth surface of cultured society is sapped and mined by +superstition." Now and again these hidden mines explode noisily, but the +superstition is always there, to be exploited by those who have the wit +to use it. From this point of view Christianity is no more than a +symptom of a source of great social weakness, a manifestation of a +weakness that may find expression in strange and unexpected but always +more or less dangerous ways. It is against the prevalence of this type +of mind that the Freethinker is really fighting. Freethinkers +realize--apparently they are the only ones that do realize--that the +creation of a better type of society is finally dependent upon the +existence of a sanely educated intelligence, and that will never exist +while there are large bodies of people who can persuade themselves that +human welfare is in some way dependent upon, or furthered by, practices +and beliefs that are not a bit more intellectually respectable than +those of the cave men. If Christianity, as a mere system of beliefs, +were destroyed, we should only have cleared the way for the final fight. +Thousands of generations of superstitious beliefs and practices that +have embodied themselves in our laws, our customs, our language, and our +institutions, are not to be easily destroyed. It is comparatively simple +to destroy a particular manifestation of this disastrous heritage, but +the type of mind to which it has given birth is not so easily removed. + +The fight is not over, but it is being fought from a new vantage ground, +and with better weapons than have ever before been employed. History, +anthropology, and psychology have combined to place in the hands of the +modern Freethinker more deadly weapons than those of previous +generations were able to employ. Before these weapons the defences of +the faith crumble like wooden forts before modern artillery. It is no +longer a question of debating whether religious beliefs are true. So +long as we give a straightforward and honest meaning to those beliefs we +know that they are not true. It is, to-day, mainly a question of making +plain the nature of the forces which led men and women to regard them as +being true. We know that the history of religion is the history of a +delusion, and the task of the student is to recover those conditions +which gave to this delusion an appearance of truth and reality. That is +becoming more and more evident to all serious and informed students of +the subject. + +The challenge of Freethought to religion constitutes one of the oldest +struggles in human history. It must have had its beginning in the first +glimmer of doubt concerning a tribal deity which crossed the mind of +some more than usually thoughtful savage. Under various forms and in +many ways it has gone on ever since. It has had many variations of +fortune, often apparently completely crushed, only to rise again +stronger and more daring than ever. To-day, Freethought is the accepted +mental attitude of a growing number of men and women whose intelligence +admits of no question. It has taken a recognized place in the +intellectual world, and its hold on the educated intelligence is rapidly +increasing. It may well be that in one form or another the antagonism +between critical Freethought and accepted teaching, whether secular or +religious, will continue as one of the permanent aspects of social +conflict. But so far as supernaturalism is concerned the final issue can +be no longer in doubt. It is not by one voice or by one movement that +supernaturalism is condemned. Its condemnation is written in the best +forms of art, science and literature. And that is only another way of +saying that it is condemned by life. Freethought holds the future in +fee, and nothing but an entire reversal of the order of civilization can +force it to forego its claims. + + + + +CHAPTER II. + +LIFE AND MIND. + + +The outstanding feature of what may be called the natural history of +associated life is the way in which biologic processes are gradually +dominated by psychologic ones. Whatever be the nature of mind, a +question that in no way concerns us here, there is no denying the +importance of the phenomena that come within that category. To speak of +the first beginnings of mind is, in this connection, idle language. In +science there are no real beginnings. Things do not begin to be, they +simply emerge, and their emergence is as imperceptible as the +displacement of night by day, or the development of the chicken from the +egg. But whatever the nature of the beginning of mind, its appearance in +the evolutionary series marked an event of profound and revolutionary +importance. Life received a new impetus, and the struggle for existence +a new significance, the importance of which is not, even to-day, +generally recognized. The old formulae might still be used, but they had +given to them a new significance. The race was still to the swift and +the battle to the strong, but swiftness and strength were manifested in +new ways and by new means. Cunning and intelligence began to do what was +formerly done without their co-operation. A new force had appeared, +arising out of the older forces as chemistry develops from physics and +biology from both. And, as we should expect from analogy, we find the +new force dominating the older ones, and even bending them to its +needs. + +Associated life meets us very early in the story of animal existence, +and we may assume that it ranks as a genuine "survival quality." It +enables some animals to survive the attacks of others that are +individually stronger, and it may even be, as has been suggested, that +associated life is the normal form, and that solitary animals represent +a variation from the normal, or perhaps a case of degeneration. But one +result of associated life is that it paves the way for the emergence of +mind as an active force in social evolution. In his suggestive and +important work on _Mutual Aid_, Kropotkin has well shown how in the +animal world the purely biologic form of the struggle for existence is +checked and transformed by the factors of mutual aid, association and +protection. His illustrations cover a very wide field; they include a +great variety of animal forms, and he may fairly claim to have +established the proposition that "an instinct has been slowly developed +among animals and men in the course of an extremely long evolution ... +which has taught animals and men alike the force they can borrow from +mutual aid and support, and the joys they can find in social life." + +But there is, on the whole, a very sharp limit set to the development of +mind in the animal world. One cause of this is the absence of a true +"social medium," to use the admirable phrase of that versatile thinker, +George Henry Lewes. In the case of man, speech and writing enable him to +give to his advances and discoveries a cumulative force such as can +never exist in their absence. On that subject more will be said later. +At present we may note another very important consequence of the +development of mind in evolution. In pre-human, or sub-human society, +perfection in the struggle for existence takes the form of the creation +or the perfecting of an organic tool. Teeth or claws become stronger or +larger, a limb is modified, sight becomes keener, or there is a new +effect in coloration. The changes here, it will be observed, are all of +an organic kind, they are a part of the animal and are inseparable from +it, and they are only transmissible by biologic heredity. And the rate +of development is, of necessity, slow. + +When we turn to man and note the way in which he overcomes the +difficulties of his environment, we find them to be mainly of a +different order. His instruments are not personal, in the sense of being +a part of his organic structure. We may say they do not belong to him so +much as they do to the race; while they are certainly transmitted from +generation to generation irrespective of individuals. Instead of +achieving conquest of his environment by developing an organic +structure, man creates an inorganic tool. In a sense he subdues and +moulds the environment to his needs, rather than modifies his structure +in order to cope with the environment. Against extremes of temperature +he fashions clothing and builds habitations. He discovers fire, probably +the most important discovery ever made by mankind. He adds to his +strength in defence and attack by inventing weapons. He guards himself +from starvation by planting seeds, and so harnesses the productive +forces of nature to his needs. He tames animals and so secures living +engines of labour. Later, he compensates for his bodily weaknesses by +inventing instruments which aid sight, hearing, etc. Inventions are +multiplied, methods of locomotion and transportation are discovered, and +the difficulties of space and time are steadily minimized. The net +result of all this is that as a mere biologic phenomenon man's evolution +is checked. The biologic modifications that still go on are of +comparatively small importance, except, probably, in the case of +evolution against disease. The developments that take place are mainly +mental in form and are social in their incidence. + +Now if the substantial truth of what has been said be admitted, and I do +not see how it can be successfully challenged, there arise one or two +considerations of supreme importance. The first of these is that social +history becomes more and more a history of social psychology. In social +life we are watching the play of social mind expressed through the +medium of the individual. The story of civilization is the record of the +piling of idea on idea, and the transforming power of the whole on the +environment. For tools, from the flint chip of primitive man, down to +the finished instrument of the modern mechanic, are all so many products +of human mentality. From the primitive dug-out to the Atlantic liner, +from the stone spear-head to the modern rifle, in all the inventions of +civilized life we are observing the application of mind to the conquest +of time, space, and material conditions. Our art, our inventions, our +institutions, are all so many illustrations of the power of mind in +transforming the environment. A history of civilization, as +distinguished from a mere record of biologic growth, is necessarily a +history of the growing power of mind. It is the cumulative ideas of the +past expressed in inventions and institutions that form the driving +power behind the man of to-day. These ideas form the most valuable part +of man's heritage, make him what he is, and contain the promise of all +that he may become. + +So long as we confine ourselves to biologic evolution, the way in which +qualities are transmitted is plain. There is no need to go beyond the +organism itself. But this heritage of ideas, peculiarly human as it is, +requires a "carrier" of an equally unique kind. It is at this point that +the significance of what we have called the "social medium" emerges. +The full significance of this was first seen by G. H. Lewes.[1] Writing +so far back as 1879 he said:-- + + The distinguishing character of human psychology is that to the + three great factors, organism, external medium, and heredity; it + adds a fourth, namely, the relation to a social medium, with its + product, the general mind.... While the mental functions are + products of the individual organism, the product, mind, is more + than an individual product. Like its great instrument language, it + is at once individual and social. Each man speaks in virtue of the + functions of vocal expression, but also in virtue of the social + need of communication. The words spoken are not his creation, yet + he, too, must appropriate them by what may be called a creative + process before he can understand them. What his tribe speaks he + repeats; but he does not simply echo their words, he rethinks them. + In the same way he adopts their experiences when he assimilates + them to his own.... Further, the experiences come and go; they + correct, enlarge, and destroy one another, leaving behind them a + certain residual store, which condensed in intuitions and + formulated in principles, direct and modify all future + experiences.... Men living in groups co-operate like the organs in + an organism. Their actions have a common impulse to a common end. + Their desires and opinions bear the common stamp of an impersonal + direction. Much of their life is common to all. The roads, + market-places and temples are for each and all. Customs arise and + are formulated in laws, the restraint of all.... Each generation is + born in this social medium, and has to adapt itself to the + established forms.... A nation, a tribe, a sect is the medium of + the individual mind, as a sea, a river, or a pond, is the medium of + a fish.[2] + +[1] It will ease my feelings if I am permitted to here make a protest +against the shameless way in which this suggestive writer has been +pillaged by others without the slightest acknowledgement. They have +found him, as Lamb said of some other writers, "damned good to steal +from." His series of volumes, _Problems of Life and Mind_, have been +borrowed from wholesale without the slightest thanks or recognition. + +[2] _Study of Psychology_, pp. 139, 161-5. So again, a more recent +writer says: "It is not man himself who thinks but his social community; +the source of his thoughts is in the social medium in which he lives, +the social atmosphere which he breathes.... The influence of environment +upon the human mind has always been recognized by psychologists and +philosophers, but it has been considered a secondary factor. On the +contrary, the social medium which the child enters at birth, in which he +lives, moves and has his being, is fundamental. Toward this environment +the individual from childhood to ripest old age is more or less +receptive; rarely can the maturest minds so far succeed in emancipating +themselves from this medium so far as to undertake independent +reflection, while complete emancipation is impossible, for all the +organs and modes of thought, all the organs for constructing thoughts +have been moulded or at least thoroughly imbued by it" (L. Gumplowicz, +_Outlines of Sociology_, p. 157). + +Biologically, what man inherits is capacity for acquisition. But what he +shall acquire, the direction in which his native capacity shall express +itself, is a matter over which biologic forces have no control. This is +determined by society and social life. Given quite equal capacity in two +individuals, the output will be very different if one is brought up in a +remote Spanish village and the other in Paris or London. Whether a man +shouts long live King George or long live the Kaiser is mainly a +question of social surroundings, and but very little one of difference +in native capacity. The child of parents living in the highest civilized +society, if taken away while very young and brought up amid a people in +a very primitive state of culture, would, on reaching maturity, differ +but little from the people around him. He would think the thoughts that +were common to the society in which he was living as he would speak +their language and wear their dress. Had Shakespeare been born among +savages he could never have written _Hamlet_. For the work of the +genius, as for that of the average man, society must provide the +materials in the shape of language, ideas, institutions, and the +thousand and one other things that go to make up the life of a group, +and which may be seen reflected in the life of the individual. Suppose, +says Dr. McDougall:-- + + that throughout the period of half a century every child born to + English parents was at once exchanged (by the power of a magician's + wand) for an infant of the French, or other, European nation. Soon + after the close of this period the English nation would be composed + of individuals of French extraction, and the French of individuals + of English extraction. It is, I think, clear that, in spite of this + complete exchange of innate characters between the two nations, + there would be but little immediate change of national + characteristics. The French people would still speak French, and + the English would speak English, with all the local diversities to + which we are accustomed and without perceptible change of + pronunciation. The religion of the French would still be + predominantly Roman Catholic, and the English people would still + present the same diversity of Protestant creeds. The course of + political institutions would have suffered no profound change, the + customs and habits of the two peoples would exhibit only such + changes as might be attributed to the lapse of time, though an + acute observer might notice an appreciable approximation of the two + peoples towards one another in all these respects. The inhabitant + of France would still be a Frenchman and the inhabitant of England + an Englishman to all outward seeming, save that the physical + appearance of the two peoples would be transposed. And we may go + even further and assert that the same would hold good if a similar + exchange of infants were effected between the English and any other + less closely allied nation, say the Turks or the Japanese.[3] + +[3] _Social Psychology_, pp. 330-1. + +The products of human capacity are the material of which civilization is +built; these products constitute the inheritance which one generation +receives from another. Whether this inheritance be large or small, +simple or complex, it is the chief determinant which shapes the +personality of each individual. What each has by biological heredity is +a given structure, that is, capacity. But the direction of that +capacity, the command it enables one to acquire over his environment, is +in turn determined by the society into which he happens to be born. + +It has already been said that the materials of civilization, whether +they be tools, or institutions, or inventions, or discoveries, or +religious or ethical teachings, are facts that can be directly described +as psychological. An institution--the Church, the Crown, the +Magistracy--is not transmitted as a building or as so many sheets of +paper, but as an idea or as a set of ideas. A piece of machinery is, in +the same way, a mental fact, and is a physical one in only a subordinate +sense. And if this be admitted, we reach the further truth that the +environment to which man has to adapt himself is essentially, so far as +it is a social environment, psychological. Not alone are the outward +marks of social life--the houses in which man lives, the machines he +uses to do his bidding--products of his mental activity, but the more +important features of his environment, to which he must adapt himself, +and which so largely shape his character and determine his conduct, are +of a wholly psychological character. In any society that is at all +distinct from the animal, there exist a number of beliefs, ideas and +institutions, traditions, and, in a later stage, a literature which play +a very important part in determining the direction of man's mind. With +increasing civilization, and the development of better means of +intercourse, any single society finds itself brought into touch and +under the influence of other social groups. The whole of these +influences constitute a force which, surrounding an individual at birth, +inevitably shapes character in this or that direction. They dominate the +physical aspect of life, and represent the determining forces of social +growth. Eliminate the psychological forces of life and you eliminate all +that can be properly called civilization. It is wholly the transforming +power of mind on the environment that creates civilization, and it is +only by a steady grasp of this fact that civilization can be properly +understood. + +I have pointed out a distinction between biological and social, or +psychological, heredity. But there is one instance in which the two +agree. This is that we can only understand a thing by its history. We +may catalogue the existing peculiarities of an animal form with no other +material than that of the organism before us, but thoroughly to +understand it we must know its history. Similarly, existing institutions +may have their justification in the present, but the causes of their +existence lie buried in the past. A king may to-day be honoured on +account of his personal worth, but the reason why there is a king to be +honoured carries us back to that state of culture in which the primitive +priest and magic worker inspires fear and awe. When we ring bells to +call people to church we perpetuate the fact that our ancestors rang +them to drive away evil spirits. We wear black at a funeral because our +primitive ancestors wished to hide themselves from the dead man's +ghost. We strew flowers on a grave because food and other things were +once buried with the dead so that their spirits might accompany the dead +to the next world. In short, with all human customs we are forced, if we +wish to know the reason for their present existence, to seek it in the +ideas that have dominated the minds of previous generations.[4] + +[4] "The tyranny exercised unconsciously on men's minds is the only real +tyranny, because it cannot be fought against. Tiberius, Ghengis Khan, +and Napoleon were assuredly redoubtable tyrants, but from the depths of +their graves Moses, Buddha, Jesus, and Mahomet exerted on the human soul +a far profounder tyranny. A conspiracy may overthrow a tyrant, but what +can it avail against a firmly established belief? In its violent +struggle with Roman Catholicism it is the French Revolution that has +been vanquished, and this in spite of the fact that the sympathy of the +crowd was apparently on its side, and in spite of recourse to +destructive measures as pitiless as those of the Inquisition. The only +real tyrants that humanity has known have always been the memories of +its dead, or the illusions it has forged for itself" (Gustave Le Bon, +_The Crowd_, p. 153). + +No one who has studied, in even a cursory manner, the development of our +social institutions can avoid recognition of the profound influence +exerted by the primitive conceptions of life, death, and of the +character of natural forces. Every one of our social institutions was +born in the shadow of superstition, and superstition acts as a powerful +force in determining the form they assume. Sir Henry Maine has shown to +what a large extent the laws of inheritance are bound up with ancestor +worship.[5] Spencer has done the same service for nearly all our +institutions,[6] and Mr. Elton says that "the oldest customs of +inheritance in England and Germany were, in their beginnings, connected +with a domestic religion, and based upon a worship of ancestral spirits +of which the hearthplace was essentially the altar."[7] The same truth +meets us in the study of almost any institution. In fact, it is not long +before one who _thinks_ evolution, instead of merely knowing its +formulae, begins to realize the truth of the saying by a German +sociologist that in dealing with social institutions we are concerned +with the "mental creations of aggregates." They are dependent upon the +persistence of a set of ideas, and so long as these ideas are unshaken +they are substantially indestructible. To remove them the ideas upon +which they rest must be shaken and robbed of their authority. That is +the reason why at all times the fight for reform so largely resolves +itself into a contest of ideas. Motives of self-interest may enter into +the defence of an institution, and in some case may be responsible for +the attempt to plant an institution where it does not already exist, but +in the main institutions persist because of their harmony with a frame +of mind that is favourable to their being. + +[5] See _Early History of Institutions_, and _Early Law and Custom_. + +[6] _Principles of Sociology_, Vol. I. + +[7] _Origins of English History_, p. 261. + +A great deal of criticism has been directed against the conclusion of +Buckle that improvement in the state of mankind has chiefly resulted +from an improvement in the intellectual outlook. And yet when stated +with the necessary qualifications the generalization is as sound as it +can well be. Certainly, the belief held in some quarters, and stated +with an air of scientific precision, that the material environment is +the active force which is ever urging to new mental development will not +fit the facts; for, as we have seen, the environment to which human +nature must adapt itself is mainly mental in character, that is, it is +made up in an increasing measure of the products of man's own mental +activity. The theory of the sentimental religionist that the evil in the +world results from the wickedness of man, or, as he is fond of putting +it, from the hardness of man's heart, is grotesque in its +ineffectiveness. Soft heads have far more to do with the evil in the +world than have hard hearts. Indeed, one of the standing difficulties of +the orthodox moralist is, not to explain the deeds of evil men, which +explain themselves, but to account for the harm done by "good" men, and +often as a consequence of their goodness. The moral monster is a rarity, +and evil is rarely the outcome of a clear perception of its nature and a +deliberate resolve to pursue it. Paradoxical as it may sound, it demands +a measure of moral strength to do wrong, consciously and deliberately, +which the average man or woman does not possess. And the world has never +found it a matter of great difficulty to deal with its "bad" characters; +it is the "good" ones that present it with a constant problem. + +The point is worth stressing, and we may do it from more than one point +of view. We may take, first of all, the familiar illustration of +religious persecution, as exemplified in the quarrels of Catholics and +Protestants. On the ground of moral distinction no line could be drawn +between the two parties. Each shuddered at the persecution inflicted by +the other, and each regarded the teachings of the other with the same +degree of moral aversion. And it has often been noted that the men who +administered so infamous an institution as the Inquisition were not, in +even the majority of cases, bad men.[8] A few may have had interested +motives, but it would have been impossible to have maintained so brutal +an institution in the absence of a general conviction of its rightness. +In private life those who could deliver men, women, and even children +over to torture were not worse husbands or parents than others. Such +differences as existed cannot be attributed to a lack of moral +endeavour, or to a difference of "moral temperament." It was a +difference of intellectual outlook, and given certain religious +convictions persecution became a religious necessity. The moral output +was poor because the intellectual standpoint was a wrong one. + +[8] Speaking of the Inquisition, Mr. H. C. Lea, in his classic _History +of the Inquisition_, says, "There is no doubt that the people were as +eager as their pastors to send the heretic to the stake. There is no +doubt that men of the kindliest tempers, the profoundest aspirations, +the purest zeal for righteousness, professing a religion founded on love +and charity, were ruthless where heresy was concerned, and were ready to +trample it out at any cost. Dominic and Francis, Bonaventure and Thomas +Aquinas, Innocent III. and St. Louis, were types, in their several ways, +of which humanity, in any age, might feel proud, and yet they were as +unsparing of the heretic as Ezzelin di Romano was of his enemies. With +such men it was not hope of gain or lust of blood or pride of opinion or +wanton exercise of power, but sense of duty, and they but represented +what was universal public opinion from the thirteenth to the seventeenth +century." Vol. I., p. 234. + +If we could once get over the delusion of thinking of human nature as +being fundamentally different five hundred years ago from what it is +to-day, we should escape a great many fallacies that are prevalent. The +changes that have taken place in human nature during the historic period +are so slight as to be practically negligible. The motives that animate +men and women to-day are the motives that animated men and women a +thousand or two thousand years ago. The change is in the direction and +form of their manifestation only, and it is in the light of the human +nature around us that we must study and interpret the human nature that +has gone before us. From that point of view we may safely conclude that +bad institutions were kept in being in the past for the same reason +that they are kept alive to-day. The majority must be blind to their +badness; and in any case it is a general perception of their badness +which leads to their destruction. + +The subject of crime illustrates the same point. Against crime as such, +society is as set as ever. But our attitude toward the causation and +cure of crime, and, above all, to the treatment of the criminal, has +undergone a profound alteration. And the change that has taken place +here has been away from the Christian conception which brutalized the +world for so long, towards the point of view taken up by the ancient +Greeks, that wrong doing is the outcome of ignorance. Expressed in the +modern manner we should say that crime is the result of an undeveloped +nature, or of a pathological one, or of a reversion to an earlier +predatory type, or the result of any or all of these factors in +combination with defective social conditions. But this is only another +way of saying that we have exchanged the old, brutal, and ineffective +methods for more humane and effective ones because we look at the +problem of crime from a different intellectual angle. A more exact +knowledge of the causation of crime has led us to a more sensible and a +more humane treatment of the criminal. And this, not alone in his own +behalf, but in the interests of the society in which he lives. We may +put it broadly that improvement comes from an enlightened way of looking +at things. Common observation shows that people will go on tolerating +forms of brutality, year after year, without the least sense of their +wrongness. Familiarity, and the absence of any impetus to examine +current practice from a new point of view seem to account for this. In +the seventeenth century the same people who could watch, without any +apparent hostility, the torture of an old woman on the fantastic charge +of intercourse with Satan, had their feelings outraged by hearing a +secular song on Sunday. Imprisonment for "blasphemy," once regarded as a +duty, has now become ridiculous to all reasonable people. At one and the +same time, a little more than a hundred years ago in this country, the +same people who could denounce cock-fighting on account of its +brutality, could watch unmoved the murdering of little children in the +factories of Lancashire. Not so long ago men in this country fought +duels under a sense of moral compulsion, and the practice was only +abandoned when a changed point of view made people realize the absurdity +of trying to settle the justice of a cause by determining which of two +people were the most proficient with sword or pistol. We have a +continuation of the same absurdity in those larger duels fought by +nations where the old verbal absurdities still retain their full force, +and where we actually add another absurdity by retaining a number of +professional duellists who must be ready to embark on a duel whether +they have any personal feeling in the matter or not. And it seems fairly +safe to say that when it is realized that the duel between nations as a +means of settling differences is not a bit more intellectually +respectable than was the ancient duello we shall not be far removed from +seeing the end of one of the greatest dangers to which modern society is +exposed. + +Examples might be multiplied indefinitely, but enough has been said to +show what small reason there is for assuming that changes in +institutions are brought about by the operation of some occult moral +sense. It is the enlightenment of the moral sense by the growth of new +ideas, by the impact of new knowledge leading to a revaluation of things +that is mainly responsible for the change. The question of whether a man +should or should not be burned for a difference in religious belief was +never one that could be settled by weighing up the moral qualities of +the two parties in the dispute. All the moral judgment that has ever +existed, even if combined in the person of a single individual could +never decide that issue. It was entirely a question of acquiring a new +point of view from which to examine the subject. Until that was done the +whole force of the moral sense was on the side of the persecutor. To put +the matter paradoxically, the better the man the worse persecutor he +became. It was mental enlightenment that was needed, not moral +enthusiasm. + +The question of progress thus becomes, in all directions, one of the +impact of new ideas, in an environment suitable to their reception and +growth. A society shut in on itself is always comparatively +unprogressive, and but for the movement of classes within it would be +completely so. The more closely the history of civilization is studied +the more clearly does that fact emerge. Civilization is a synthetic +movement, and there can be no synthesis in the absence of dissolution +and resolution. + +A fight of old ideas against new ones, a contest of clashing culture +levels, a struggle to get old things looked at from a new point of view, +these are the features that characterize all efforts after reform. It +was said by some of the eighteenth century philosophers that society was +held together by agreement in a bond. That is not quite correct. The +truth is that society is held together, as is any phase of social life, +by a bond of agreement. The agreement is not of the conscious, +documentary order, but it is there, and it consists in sharing a common +life created and maintained by having a common tradition, and a common +stock of ideas and ideals. It is this that makes a man a member of one +social group rather than of another--Chinese, American, French, German, +or Choctaw. There is no discriminating feature in what is called the +economic needs of people. The economic needs of human beings--food, +clothing, and shelter, are of the same order the world over. And +certainly the fact of a Chinaman sharing in the economic life of +Britain, or an Englishman sharing in the economic life of China, would +not entitle either to be called genuine members of the group in which he +happened to be living. Membership only begins to be when those belonging +to a group share in a common mental outfit. Even within a society, and +in relation to certain social groups, one can see illustrations of the +same principle. A man is not really a member of a society of artists, +lawyers, or doctors merely by payment of an annual subscription. He is +that only when he becomes a participant in the mental life of the +group.[9] It is this common stock of mental facts which lies at the +root of all collective ideas--an army, a Church, or a nation. And ever +the fight is by way of attack and defence of the psychologic fact.[10] + +[9] This seems to me to give the real significance of Nationality. It +has been argued by some that nationality is a pure myth, as unreal as +the divinity of a king. The principal ground for this denial of +nationality appears to be that so-called national characteristics are +seen to undergo drastic transformation when their possessors are subject +to a new set of influences. This may be quite true, but if nationality, +in the sense of being a product of biological heredity, is ruled out, it +does not follow that nationality is thereby destroyed. The fact may +remain but it demands a different interpretation. And if what has been +said above be true, it follows that nationality is not a personal fact, +but an extra or super-personal one. It belongs to the group rather than +to the individual, and is created by the possession of a common speech, +a common literature, and a common group life. And quite naturally, when +the individual is lifted out of this special social influence its power +may well be weakened, and in the case of his children may be +non-existent, or replaced by the special characteristics of the new +group into which he is born. The discussion of nationality ought not, +therefore, to move along the lines of acceptance or rejection of the +conception of nationality, but of how far specific national +characteristics admit of modification under the pressure of new +conditions. + +[10] It would take too long to elaborate, but it may be here noted that +in the human group the impelling force is not so much needs as desires, +and that fact raises the whole issue from the level of biology to that +of psychology. So long as life is at a certain level man shares with the +animal the mere need for food. But at another level there arises not +merely the need for food, but a desire for certain kind of food, cooked +in a particular manner, and served in a special style. And provided that +we do not by hunger reduce man to the level of the beast again, the +desire will be paramount and will determine whether food shall be eaten +or not. So, again, with the fact of sex and marriage. At the animal +level we have the crude fact of sex, and this is, indeed, inescapable at +any stage. But the growth of civilization brings about the fact that the +need for the gratification of the sexual appetite is regulated by the +secondary qualities of grace of form, or of disposition, which are the +immediate determinants of whether a particular man shall marry a +particular woman or not. Again, it is the _desire_ for power and +distinction, not the _need_ for money that impels men to spend their +lives in building up huge fortunes. And, finally, we have the fact that +a great many of our present needs are transformed desires. The working +man of to-day counts as needs, as do we all more or less, a number of +things that began as pure desires. We say we need books, pictures, +music, etc. But none of these things can be really brought under the +category of things necessary to life. They are the creation of man's +mental cravings. Without them we say life would not be worth living, and +it is well that we should all feel so. Professor Marshall rightly dwells +upon this point by saying: "Although it is man's wants in the early +stages of development that give rise to his activities, yet afterwards +each new step is to be regarded as the development of new activities +giving rise to new wants, rather than of new wants giving rise to new +activities."--(_Principles of Economics_, Vol. I., p. 164.) + +To do the Churches and other vested interests justice, they have never +lost sight of this truth, and it would have been better for the race +had others been equally alive to its importance. The Churches have never +ceased to fight for the control of those public organs that make for the +formation of opinion. Their struggle to control the press, the platform, +and the school means just this. Whatever they may have taught, +self-interest forced upon them recognition of the truth that it was what +men thought about things that mattered. They have always opposed the +introduction of new ideas, and have fought for the retention of old +ones. It was a necessity of their existence. It was also an admission of +the truth that in order for reform to become a fact the power of +traditional ideas must be broken. Man is what he thinks, is far nearer +the truth than the once famous saying, "Man is what he eats." As a +member of a social group man is dominated by his ideas of things, and +any movement of reform must take cognisance of that fact if it is to +cherish reasonable hopes of success. + + + + +CHAPTER III. + +WHAT IS FREETHOUGHT? + + +Freedom of thought and freedom of speech stand to each other as the two +halves of a pair of scissors. Without freedom of speech freedom of +thought is robbed of the better part of its utility, even if its +existence is not threatened. The one reacts on the other. As thought +provides the material for speech, so, in turn, it deteriorates when it +is denied expression. Speech is, in fact, one of the great factors in +human progress. It is that which enables one generation to hand on to +another the discoveries made, the inventions produced, the thoughts +achieved, and so gives a degree of fixity to the progress attained. For +progress, while expressed through the individual, is achieved by the +race. Individually, the man of to-day is not strikingly superior in form +or capacity to the man of five or ten thousand years ago. But he knows +more, can achieve more, and is in that sense stronger than was his +ancestors. He is the heir of the ages, not as a figure of speech, but as +the most sober of facts. He inherits what previous generations have +acquired; the schoolboy of to-day starts with a capital of inherited +knowledge that would have been an outfit for a philosopher a few +thousand years ago. + +It is this that makes speech of so great importance to the fact of +progress. Without speech, written or verbal, it would be impossible to +conserve the products of human achievement. Each generation would have +to start where its predecessor commenced, and it would finish at about +the same point. It would be the fable of Sisyphus illustrated in the +passing of each generation of human beings. + +But speech implies communication. There is not very much pleasure in +speaking to oneself. Even the man who apologised for the practice on the +ground that he liked to address a sensible assembly would soon grow +tired of so restricted an audience. The function of speech is to +transmit ideas, and it follows, therefore, that every embargo on the +free exchange of ideas, every obstacle to complete freedom of speech, is +a direct threat to the well-being of civilisation. As Milton could say +that a good book "is the precious life-blood of a master spirit, +embalmed and treasured up to a life beyond life," and that "he who +destroys a good book kills reason itself," so we may say that he who +strikes at freedom of thought and speech is aiming a blow at the very +heart of human betterment. + +In theory, the truth of what has been said would be readily admitted, +but in practice it has met, and still meets, with a vigorous opposition. +Governments have exhausted their powers to prevent freedom of +intercourse between peoples, and every Church and chapel has used its +best endeavours to the same end. Even to-day, when all are ready to pay +lip-homage to freedom of thought, the obstacles in the way of a genuine +freedom are still very great. Under the best possible conditions there +will probably always be some coercion of opinion, if only of that +unconscious kind which society as a whole exerts upon its individual +members. But to this we have to add the coercion that is consciously +exerted to secure the formation of particular opinions, and which has +the dual effect of inducing dissimulation in some and impotency in +others. Quite ignorantly parents commence the work when they force upon +children their own views of religion and inculcate an exaggerated +respect for authority. They create an initial bias that is in only too +many cases fatal to real independence of thought. Social pressure +continues what a mistaken early training has commenced. When opinions +are made the test of "good form," and one's social standing partly +determined by the kind of opinions that one holds, there is developed on +the one side hypocrisy, and on the other, because certain opinions are +banned, thought in general is unhealthily freed from the sobering +influence of enlightened criticism.[11] + +[11] It is a curious thing, as Philip Gilbert Hamerton points out in one +of his essays, that in England religious freedom appears to exist in +inverse proportion to rank. The king has no freedom whatever in a choice +of religion. His religion is part of the position. An English nobleman, +speaking generally, has two religions from which to choose. He may be +either a member of the established Church or of the Roman Catholic. In +the middle classes there is the choice of all sorts of religious sects, +so long as they are Christian. Religious dissent is permitted so long as +it does not travel beyond the limits of the chapel. And when we come to +the better class working man, he has the greatest freedom of all. His +social position does not depend upon his belonging to this or that +Church, and he may, to borrow a phrase from Heine, go to hell in his own +fashion. + +To-day the legal prohibition of religious dissent is practically +ineffective, and is certainly far less demoralizing than the pressure +that is exerted socially and unofficially. In all probability this has +always been the case. For legal persecution must be open. Part of its +purpose is publicity, and that in itself is apt to rouse hostility. +Against open, legal persecution a man will make a stand, or if he gives +way to the force arrayed against him may do so with no feeling of +personal degradation. But the conformity that is secured by a threat of +social boycott, the freedom of speech that is prevented by choking the +avenues of intellectual intercourse, is far more deadly in its +consequences, and far more demoralizing in its influence on character. +To give way, as thousands do, not to the open application of force, +which carries no greater personal reflection than does the soldier's +surrender to superior numbers, but to the dread of financial loss, to +the fear of losing a social status, that one may inwardly despise even +while in the act of securing it, or from fear of offending those whom we +may feel are not worthy of our respect, these are the things that cannot +be done without eating into one's sense of self-respect, and inflicting +upon one's character an irreparable injury. + +On this matter more will be said later. For the present I am concerned +with the sense in which we are using the word "Freethought." +Fortunately, little time need be wasted in discussing the once popular +retort to the Freethinker that if the principle of determinism be +accepted "free" thought is impossible. It is surprising that such an +argument should ever have secured a vogue, and is only now interesting +as an indication of the mentality of the defender of orthodox religion. +Certainly no one who properly understands the meaning of the word would +use such an argument. At best it is taking a word from sociology, a +sphere in which the meaning is quite clear and intelligible, and +applying it in the region of physical science where it has not, and is +not intended to have, any meaning at all. In physical science a thing is +what it does, and the business of science is to note the doings of +forces and masses, their actions and reactions, and express them in +terms of natural "law." From the point of view of physical science a +thing is neither free nor unfree, and to discuss natural happenings in +terms of freedom or bondage is equal to discussing smell in terms of +sight or colour in terms of smell. But applied in a legitimate way the +word "free" is not only justifiable, it is indispensible. The confusion +arises when we take a word from a department in which its meaning is +quite clear and apply it in a region where it has no application +whatever. + +Applied to opinion "Free" has the same origin and the same application +as the expressions "a free man," or a "free State," or "a free people." +Taking either of these expressions it is plain that they could have +originated only in a state of affairs where some people are "free," and +some are living in a state of bondage or restraint. There is no need to +trace the history of this since so much is implied in the word itself. A +free State is one in which those belonging to it determine their own +laws without being coerced by an outside power. A free man is one who is +permitted to act as his own nature prompts. The word "free" implies +nothing as to the nature of moral or mental causation, that is a +question of a wholly different order. The free man exists over against +the one who is not free, the free State over against one that is held in +some degree of subjection to another State. There is no other meaning to +the word, and that meaning is quite clear and definite. + +Now Freethought has a precisely similar significance. It says nothing as +to the nature of thought, the origin of thought, or the laws of thought. +With none of these questions is it vitally concerned. It simply asserts +that there are conditions under which thought is not "free," that is, +where it is coerced to a foregone conclusion, and that these conditions +are fatal to thought in its higher and more valuable aspects. +Freethought is that form of thinking that proceeds along lines of its +own determining, rather than along lines that are laid down by +authority. In actual practice it is immediately concerned with the +expression of opinion rather than with its formation, since no authority +can prevent the formation of opinion in any mind that is at all +independent in its movements and forms opinions on the basis of observed +facts and adequate reasoning. But its chief and primary significance +lies in its repudiation of the right of authority to say what form the +expression of opinion shall take. And it is also clear that such a term +as "Freethought" could only have come into general use and prominence in +a society in which the free circulation of opinion was more or less +impeded. + +It thus becomes specially significant that, merely as a matter of +history, the first active manifestation of Freethought should have +occurred in connection with a revolt against religious teaching and +authority. This was no accident, but was rather a case of necessity. +For, in the first place, there is no other subject in which pure +authority plays so large a part as it does in religion. All churches and +all priesthoods, ancient and modern, fall back upon the principle of +pure authority as a final method of enforcing their hold upon the +people. That, it may be noted in passing, is one of the chief reasons +why in all ages governments have found religion one of the most +serviceable agencies in maintaining their sway. Secondly, there seems to +have been from the very earliest times a radically different frame of +mind in the approach to secular and religious matters. So far as one can +see there appears to be, even in primitive societies, no very strong +opposition to the free discussion of matters that are of a purely +secular nature. Questions of ways and means concerning these are freely +debated among savage tribes, and in all discussion differences of +opinion must be taken for granted. It is when we approach religious +subjects that a difference is seen. Here the main concern is to +determine the will of the gods, and all reasoning is thus out of place, +if not a positive danger. The only thing is to discover "God's will," +and when we have his, or his will given in "sacred" books the embargo on +free thinking is complete. This feature continues to the end. We do not +even to-day discuss religious matters in the same open spirit in which +secular matters are debated. There is a bated breath, a timidity of +criticism in discussing religious subjects that does not appear when we +are discussing secular topics. With the thoroughly religious man it is +solely a question of what God wishes him to do. In religion this affords +the only latitude for discussion, and even that disappears largely when +the will of God is placed before the people in the shape of "revealed" +writings. Fortunately for the world "inspired" writings have never been +so clearly penned as to leave no room for doubt as to what they actually +meant. Clarity of meaning has never been one of the qualities of divine +authorship. + +In this connection it is significant that the first form of democratic +government of which we have any clear record should have been in +freethinking, sceptical Greece. Equally notable is it that in both Rome +and Greece the measure of mental toleration was greater than it has ever +been in other countries before or since. In Rome to the very end of the +Pagan domination there existed no legislation against opinions, as such. +The holders of certain opinions might find themselves in uncomfortable +positions now and then, but action against them had to rest on some +ground other than that which was afterwards known as heresy. There +existed no law in the Roman Empire against freedom of opinion, and those +who are familiar with Mr. H. C. Lea's classic, _History of the +Inquisition_, will recall his account of the various tactics adopted by +the Christian Church to introduce measures that would accustom the +public mind to legislation which should establish the principle of +persecution for opinion.[12] In the end the Church succeeded in +effecting this, and its success was registered in the almost +unbelievable degradation of the human intellect which was exhibited in +the Christian world for centuries. So complete was this demoralization +that more than a thousand years later we find men announcing as a most +daring principle a demand for freedom of discussion which in old Greece +and Rome was never officially questioned. Christianity not merely killed +freedom wherever it established itself, but it came very near killing +even the memory of it. + +[12] See specially Vol. I., chapters 6, 7, and 8. One is sorely tempted +to engage in what would be a rather lengthy aside on the mental freedom +enjoyed by the people of ancient Greece, but considerations of cogency +advise a shorter comment in this form. In the first place we have to +note that neither the Greeks nor the Romans possessed anything in the +shape of "sacred" books. That, as the history of Mohammedanism and +Christianity shows, is one of the most disastrous things that can happen +to any people. But apart from this there were several circumstances +connected with the development of the Greek peoples that made for +freedom of opinion. There was no uniform theology to commence with, and +the configuration of the country, while enough to maintain local +independence, was not enough to prevent a certain amount of intercourse. +And it would certainly seem that no people were ever so devoid of +intolerance as were the ancient Greeks. It is true that the history of +Greece was not without its examples of intolerance, but these were +comparatively few, and, as Professor Bury says, persecution was never +organized. The gods were criticized in both speeches and plays. Theories +of Materialism and Atheism were openly taught and were made the topic of +public discussion. There was, indeed, a passion for the discussion of +all sorts of subjects, and to discussion nothing is sacred. The best +thought of Rome owed its impetus to Greece, and at a later date it was +the recovered thought of Greece which gave the impetus to Mohammedan +Spain in its cultivation of science and philosophy, and so led to the +partial recovery of Europe from the disastrous control of the Christian +Church. Nor need it be assumed that the work of Greece was due to the +possession of a superior brain power. Of that there is not the slightest +vestige of proof. It is simply that the ancient Greek lived in a freer +mental atmosphere. The mind had less to hamper it in its operations; it +had no organized and powerful Church that from the cradle to the grave +pursued its work of preventing free criticism and the play of +enlightened opinion. For several centuries the world has been seeking to +recover some of its lost liberties with only a very moderate success. +But if one thinks of what the Greeks were, and if one adds to what they +had achieved a possible two thousand years of development, he will then +have some notion of what the triumph of the Christian Church meant to +the world. + +It was, therefore, inevitable that in the western world Freethought +should come into prominence in relation to the Christian religion and +its claims. In the Christian Church there existed an organization which +not alone worked with the avowed intention of determining what men +should think, but finally proceeded to what was, perhaps, the logical +conclusion, to say what they should not think. No greater tyranny than +the Christian Church has ever existed. And this applies, not to the +Roman Church alone, but to every Church within the limit of its +opportunities. In the name and in the interests of religion the +Christian Church took some of the worst passions of men and consecrated +them. The killing of heretics became one of the most solemn duties and +it was urged upon secular rulers as such. The greatest instrument of +oppression ever formed, the Inquisition, was fashioned for no other +purpose than to root out opinions that were obnoxious to the Church. It +would have been bad enough had the attempts of the Church to control +opinion been limited to religion. But that was not the case. It aimed at +taking under its control all sorts of teaching on all sorts of +subjects. Nothing would have surprised an inhabitant of ancient Rome +more, could he have revisited the earth some dozen centuries after the +establishment of Christianity, than to have found men being punished for +criticising doctrines that were in his day openly laughed at. And +nothing could have given an ancient Athenian greater cause for wonder +than to have found men being imprisoned and burned for teaching cosmical +theories that were being debated in the schools of Athens two thousand +years before. Well might they have wondered what had happened to the +world, and well might they have come to the conclusion that it had been +overtaken by an attack of universal insanity. And the explanation would +not have been so very wide of the truth. + +In this matter of suppression of freedom of thinking there was little to +choose between the Churches. Each aimed at controlling the thought of +mankind, each was equally intolerant of any variation from the set line, +and each employed the same weapon of coercion so far as circumstances +permitted. At most the Protestant Churches substituted a dead book for a +living Church, and in the end it may be questioned, when all allowance +is made for the changed circumstances in which Protestantism operated, +whether the rule of the new Church was not more disastrous than the +older one. It had certainly less excuse for its intolerance. The Roman +Catholic Church might urge that it never claimed to stand for freedom of +opinion, and whatever its sins it was so far free from the offence of +hypocrisy. But the Protestant Churches could set up no such plea; they +professed to stand on freedom of conscience. And they thus added the +quality of inconsistency and hypocrisy to an offence that was already +grave enough in itself. + +But whatever opinion one may have on that point, it is certain that in +practice the Protestant leaders were as opposed to freedom of thought as +were the Roman Catholics. And Protestant bigotry left a mark on European +history that deserves special recognition. For the first time it made +the profession of Christianity a definite part of the law of the secular +State.[13] Hitherto there had been no law in any of the European States +which made a profession of Christianity necessary. There had been plenty +of persecutions of non-Christians, and the consequences of a rejection +of Christianity, if one lived in a Christian State, were serious enough. +But when the secular State punished the heretic it was a manifestation +of good will towards the Church and not the expression of a legal +enactment. It was the direct influence of the Church on the State. +Church and State were legally distinct during the mediaeval period, +however closely they may have been allied in practice. With the arrival +of Protestantism and the backing of the reformed religion given by +certain of the Princes, the machinery of intolerance, so to speak, was +taken over by the State and became one of its functions. It became as +much the duty of the secular officials to extirpate heresy, to secure +uniformity of religious belief as it was to the interest of the Church +to see that it was destroyed. Up to that time it was the aim of the +Church to make the State one of its departments. It had never legally +succeeded in doing this, but it was not for the Roman Church to sink to +the subordinate position of becoming a department of the State. It was +left for Protestantism to make the Church a branch of the State and to +give religious bigotry the full sanction of secular law. + +[13] See on this point Heeren's _Historical Treatises_, 1836, pp. +61-70. + +Neither with Catholic nor Protestant could there be, therefore, any +relaxation in the opposition offered to independent thinking. That still +remained the cardinal offence to the religious mind. In the name of +religion Protestants opposed the physics of Newton as bitterly as +Catholics opposed the physics of Galileo. The geology of Hutton and +Lyell, the chemistry of Boyle and Dalton, the biology of Von Baer, +Lamarck and Darwin, with almost any other branch of science that one +cares to select, tell the same tale. And when the desire for reform took +a social turn there was the same influence to be fought. For while the +Roman Catholic laid the chief insistence on obedience to the Church, the +Protestant laid as strong insistence on obedience to the State, and made +disobedience to its orders a matter of almost religious revolt. The +whole force of religion was thus used to induce contentment with the +existing order, instead of to the creation of an intelligent discontent +which would lead to continuous improvement. In view of these +circumstances it is not surprising that the word "Freethought" should +have lost in actual use its more general significance of a denial of the +place of mere authority in matters of opinion, and have acquired a more +definite and precise connotation. It could not, of course, lose its +general meaning, but it gained a special application and became properly +associated with a definitely anti-theological attitude. The growth in +this direction was gradual but inevitable. When the term first came into +general use, about the end of the seventeenth century, it was mainly +used with reference to those deists who were then attacking +Christianity. In that sense it continued to be used for some time. But +as Deism lost ground, thanks partly to the Christian attack, the clear +and logical issue between Theism and Atheism became apparent, with the +result that the definite anti-religious character of "Freethought" +became firmly established. And to-day it is mere affectation or timidity +to pretend that the word has any other vital significance. To say that a +man is a Freethinker is to give, to ninety-nine people out of a hundred, +the impression that he is anti-religious. And in this direction the +popular sense of the word discloses what has been its important historic +function. Historically, the chief stronghold of mere authority has been +religion. In science and in sociology, as well as in connection with +supernaturalism proper, every movement in the direction of the free +exercise of the intellect has met with the unceasing opposition of +religion. That has always been at once the symbol and the instrument of +oppression. To attack religion has been to attack the enemy in his +capital. All else has been matter of outpost skirmishing. + +I have apparently gone a long way round to get at the meaning of the +word "Freethought," but it was necessary. For it is of very little use, +in the case of an important word that has stood and stands for the name +of a movement, to go to a dictionary, or to appeal to etymology. The +latter has often a mere antiquarian interest, and the former merely +registers current meanings, it does not make them. The use of a word +must ultimately be determined by the ideas it conveys to those who hear +it. And from what has been said the meaning of this particular word +should be fairly clear. While standing historically for a reasoned +protest against the imposition of opinion by authority, and, negatively, +against such artificial conditions as prevent the free circulation of +opinion, it to-day stands actually for a definitely anti-religious +mental attitude. And this is what one would naturally expect. Protests, +after all, are protests against something in the concrete, even though +they may embody the affirmation of an abstract principle. And nowadays +the principle of pure authority has so few defenders that it would be +sheer waste of time, unless the protest embodied a definite attitude +with regard to specific questions. We may, then, put it that to us +"Freethought" stands for a reasoned and definite opposition to all forms +of supernaturalism, it claims the right to subject all religious beliefs +to the test of reason, and further claims that when so tested they break +down hopelessly. It is from this point of view that these pages are +written, and the warranty for so defining it should be apparent from +what has been said in this and the preceding chapter. + + + + +CHAPTER IV. + +REBELLION AND REFORM. + + +Rebellion and reform are not exactly twins, but they are very closely +related. For while all rebellion is not reform, yet in the widest sense +of the word, there is no reform without rebellion. To fight for reform +is to rebel against the existing order and is part of the eternal and +fundamentally healthful struggle of the new against the old, and of the +living present against the dead past. The rebel is thus at once a public +danger and a benefactor. He threatens the existing order, but it is in +the name of a larger and better social life. And because of this it is +his usual lot to be crucified when living and deified when dead. So it +has always been, so in its main features will it always be. If +contemporaries were to recognize the reformer as such, they would +destroy his essential function by making it useless. Improvement would +become an automatic process that would perfect itself without +opposition. As it is, the function of the rebel is to act as an +explosive force, and no society of average human beings likes +explosions. They are noisy, and they are dangerous. For the reformer to +complain at not being hailed as a deliverer is for him to mistake his +part and place in social evolution. + +The rebel and the reformer is, again, always in minority. That follows +from what has already been said. It follows, too, from what we know of +development in general. Darwinism rests on the supreme importance of the +minority. It is an odd variation here and there that acts as the +starting point for a new species--and it has against it the swamping +influence of the rest of its kind that treads the old biological line. +Nature's choicest variations are of necessity with the few, and when +that variation has established itself and become normal another has to +appear before a new start can be made. + +Whether we take biology or psychology the same condition appears. A new +idea occurs to an individual and it is as strictly a variation from the +normal as anything that occurs in the animal world. The idea may form +the starting point of a new theory, or perhaps of a new social order. +But to establish itself, to become the characteristic property of the +group, it must run the gamut of persecution and the risk of suppression. +And suppressed it often is--for a time. It is an idle maxim which +teaches that truth always conquers, if by that is implied that it does +so at once. That is not the truth. Lies have been victorious over and +over again. The Roman Catholic Church, one of the greatest lies in the +history of the human race, stood the conqueror for many centuries. The +teaching of the rotundity of the earth and its revolution round the sun +was suppressed for hundreds of years until it was revived in the 16th +century. In the long run truth does emerge, but a lie may have a +terribly lengthy innings. For the lie is accepted by the many, while the +truth is seen only by the few. But it is the few to whom we turn when we +look over the names of those who have made the world what is it. All the +benefits to society come from the few, and society crucifies them to +show its gratitude. One may put it that society lives on the usual, but +flourishes on account of the exception. + +Now there is something extremely significant in the Christian religion +tracing all the disasters of mankind to a primal act of disobedience. It +is a fact which discloses in a flash the chief social function of +religion in general and of Christianity in particular. Man's duty is +summed up in the one word obedience, and the function of the +(religiously) good man is to obey the commands of God, as that of the +good citizen is to obey the commands of government. The two commands +meet and supplement each other with the mutual advantage which results +from the adjustment of the upper and lower jaws of a hyena. And it +explains why the powers that be have always favoured the claims of +religion. It enabled them to rally to their aid the tremendous and +stupefying aid of religion and to place rebellion to their orders on the +same level as rebellion against God. In Christian theology Satan is the +arch-rebel; hell is full of rebellious angels and disobedient men and +women. Heaven is reserved for the timid, the tame, the obedient, the +sheep-like. When the Christ of the Gospels divides the people into goats +and sheep, it is the former that go to hell, and the latter to heaven. +The Church has not a rebel in its calendar, although it has not a few +rogues and many fools. To the Church rebellion is always a sin, save on +those rare occasions when revolt is ordered in the interests of the +Church itself. In Greek mythology Prometheus steals fire from heaven for +the benefit of man and suffers in consequence. The myth symbolizes the +fact. Always the man has had to win knowledge and happiness in the teeth +of opposition from the gods. Always the race has owed its progress to +the daring of the rebel or of the rebellious few. + +Often the Freethinker is denounced because he is destructive or +dangerous. What other is he expected to be? And would he be of much use +if he were otherwise?? I would go further and say that he is the most +destructive of all agencies because he is so intimately concerned with +the handling of the most destructive of weapons--ideas. We waste a good +deal of time in denouncing certain people as dangerous when they are in +reality comparatively harmless. A man throws a bomb, or breaks into a +house, or robs one of a purse, and a judge solemnly denounces him as a +most "dangerous member of society." It is all wrong. These are +comparatively harmless individuals. One man throws a bomb, kills a few +people, damages some property, and there the matter ends. Another man +comes along and drops instead of a bomb a few ideas, and the whole +country is in a state of eruption. Charles Peace pursues a career of +piety and crime, gets himself comfortably and religiously hanged, and +society congratulates itself on having got rid of a dangerous person, +and then forgets all about it. Karl Marx visits England, prowls round +London studying the life of rich and poor, and drops _Das Kapital_ on +us. A quiet and outwardly inoffensive individual, one who never gave the +police a moment's anxiety, spends years studying earthworms, and +flowers, and horses and cats, and all sorts of moving things and +presents society with _The Origin of Species_. Organized society found +itself able to easily guard itself against the attacks of men such as +Charles Peace, it may with impunity extend its hospitality to the +thrower of bombs, or robber of houses, but by what means can it protect +itself against the "peaceful" Marx or the "harmless" Darwin? No society +can afford to ignore in its midst a score of original or independent +thinkers, or if society does ignore them they will not for long ignore +society. The thinker is really destructive. He destroys because he +creates; he creates because he destroys. The one is the obverse of the +other. + +I am not making idle play with the word "destruction." It is literally +true that in human society the most destructive and the most coercive +forces at work are ideas. They strike at established institutions and +demand either their modification or their removal. That is why the +emergence of a new idea is always an event of social significance. +Whether it be a good idea or a bad one will not affect the truth of this +statement. For over four years our political mediocrities and muddle +headed militarists were acting as though the real problem before them +was to establish the superiority of one armed group of men over another +group. That was really a simple matter. The important issue which +society had to face was the ideas that the shock of the war must give +rise to. Thinkers saw this; but thinkers do not get the public ear +either as politicians or militarists. And now events are driving home +the lesson. The ideas of Bolshevism and Sinn Feinism proved far more +"dangerous" than the German armies. The Allied forces could handle the +one, but they were powerless before the other. It is not a question of +whether these particular ideas are good or bad, or whether we approve or +disapprove of them, but entirely one that, being ideas, they represent a +far more "destructive" power than either bomb or gun. They are at once +the forces that act as the cement of society and those that may hurl it +into chaotic fragments. + +Whether an idea will survive or not must, in the end, be determined by +circumstances, but in itself a new idea may be taken as the mental +analogue of the variation which takes place in physical structures, and +which forms the raw material of natural selection. And if that is so, it +is evident that any attempt to prevent the play of new ideas on old +institutions is striking at the very fact of progress. For if we are to +encourage variation we must permit it in all directions, up as well as +down, for evil as well as for good. You cannot check variation in one +direction without checking it in all. You cannot prevent the appearance +of a new idea that you do not want without threatening the appearance of +a number of ideas that you would eagerly welcome. It is, therefore, +always better to encourage the appearance of a bad idea than it is to +risk the suppression of a good one. Besides, it is not always that force +applied to the suppression of ideas succeeds in its object. What it +often does is to cause the persecuted idea to assume a more violent +form, to ensure a more abrupt break with the past than would otherwise +occur, with the risk of a period of reaction before orderly progress is +resumed. The only way to silence an idea is to answer it. You cannot +reply to a belief with bullets, or bayonet a theory into silence. +History contains many lessons, but none that is plainer than this one, +and none that religious and secular tyrannies learn with greater +reluctance. + +The Churches admit by their practice the truth of what has been said. +They have always understood that the right way to keep society in a +stationary position is to prevent the introduction of new ideas. It is +thought against which they have warred, the thinker against whom they +have directed their deadliest weapons. The Christian Church has been +tolerant towards the criminal, and has always been intolerant towards +the heretic and the Freethinker. For the latter the naming _auto da fe_, +for the former the moderate penance and the "go, and sin no more." The +worst of its tortures were neither created for nor applied to the thief +and the assassin, but were specially designed for the unbeliever. In +this the Church acted with a sure instinct. The thief threatens no +institution, not even that of private property. "Thou shalt not steal" +is as much the law of a thieves' kitchen as it is of Mayfair. But +Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, Lyell, Darwin, these are the men who +convey a threat in all they write, who destroy and create with a +splendour that smacks of the power with which Christians have endowed +their mythical deity. No aggregation of criminals has ever threatened +the security of the Church, or even disturbed its serenity. On the +contrary, the worse, morally, the time, the greater the influence of +Christianity. It flourishes on human weakness and social vice as the +bacilli of tuberculosis do in darkness and dirt. It is when weakness +gives place to strength, and darkness to light that the Church finds its +power weakening. The Church could forgive the men who instituted the +black slave trade, she could forgive those who were responsible for the +horrors of the English factory system, but she could never forgive the +writer of the _Age of Reason_. She has always known how to distinguish +her friends from her foes. + +Right or wrong, then, the heretic, the Freethinker, represents a figure +of considerable social significance. His social value does not lie +wholly in the fact of his opinions being sound or his judgment +impeccable. Mere revolt or heresy can never carry that assurance with +it. The important thing about the rebel is that he represents a spirit, +a temper, in the absence of which society would stagnate. It is bad when +people revolt without cause, but it is infinitely better that a people +should revolt without cause than that they should have cause for +rebellion without possessing the courage of a kick. That man should have +the courage to revolt against the thing which he believes to be wrong is +of infinitely greater consequence than that he should be right in +condemning the thing against which he revolts. Whether the rebel is +right or wrong time and consequence alone can tell, but nothing can make +good the evil of a community reduced to sheep-like acquiescence in +whatever may be imposed upon them. The "Their's not to reason why" +attitude, however admirable in an army, is intolerable and dangerous in +social life. Replying to those who shrieked about the "horrors" of the +French Revolution, and who preached the virtue of patriotic obedience to +established authority, Carlyle, with an eye on Ireland, sarcastically +admitted that the "horrors" were very bad indeed, but he added:-- + + What if history somewhere on this planet were to hear of a nation, + the third soul of whom had not for thirty weeks of each year as + many third-rate potatoes as would sustain him? History in that + case, feels bound to consider that starvation is starvation; that + starvation presupposes much; history ventures to assert that the + French Sansculotte of Nine-three, who roused from a long death + sleep, could rush at once to the frontiers and die fighting for an + immortal hope and faith of deliverance for him and his, was but the + second miserablest of men. + +And that same history, looking back through the ages, is bound to +confess that it is to the great rebels, from Satan onward, that the +world mainly owes whatever of greatness or happiness it has achieved. + +One other quality of the rebel remains to be noted. In his revolt +against established authority, in his determination to wreck cherished +institutions for the realization of an ideal, the rebel is not the +representative of an anti-social idea or of an anti-social force. He is +the true representative of the strongest of social influences. The very +revolt against the social institutions that exist is in the name and for +the realization of a larger and a better social order that he hopes to +create. A man who is ready to sacrifice his life in the pursuit of an +ideal cannot, whatever else he may be accused of, be reasonably accused +of selfishness or of a want of "social consciousness." He is a vital +expression of the centuries of social life which have gone before and +which have made us all what we are. Were his social sense weaker he +would risk less. Were he selfish he would not trouble about the +conversion of his fellows. The spirit of revolt represents an important +factor in the process of social development, and they who are most +strenuous in their denunciation of social control, are often, even +though unconsciously, the strongest evidence of its overpowering +influence. + +Fed as we are with the mental food prepared by our Churches and +governments, to whose interests it is that the rebel and the Freethinker +should be decried and denounced, we are all too apt to overlook the +significance of the rebel. Yet he is invariably the one who voices what +the many are afraid or unable to express. The masses suffer dumbly, and +the persistence of their suffering breeds a sense of its inevitability. +It is only when these dumb masses find a voice that they threaten the +established order, and for this the man of ideas is essential. That is +why all vested interests, religious and social, hate him so heartily. +They recognize that of all the forces with which they deal an idea is +the greatest and the most untamable. Once in being it is the most +difficult to suppress. It is more explosive than dynamite and more +shattering in its effects. Physical force may destroy a monarch, but it +is only the force of an idea that can destroy a monarchy. You may +destroy a church with cannon, but cannon are powerless against Church +doctrines. An idea comes as near realizing the quality of +indestructibility as anything we know. You may quiet anything in the +world with greater ease than you may reduce a strong thinker to silence, +or subdue anything with greater facility than you may subdue the idea +that is born of strenuous thought. Fire may be extinguished and strife +made to cease, ambition may be killed and the lust for power grow faint. +The one thing that defies all and that finally conquers is the truth +which strong men see and for which brave men fight. + +It is thus left for the philosophy of Freethought, comprehensive here as +elsewhere, to find a place for the rebel and to recognize the part he +plays in the evolution of the race. For rebellion roots itself +ultimately in the spirit of mental independence. And that whether a +particular act of revolt may be justifiable or not. It is bred of the +past, but it looks forward hopefully and fearlessly to the future, and +it sees in the present the material out of which that better future may +be carved. That the mass of people find in the rebel someone whom it is +moved to suppress is in no wise surprising. New things are not at first +always pleasant, even though they may be necessary. But the temper of +mind from which rebellion springs is one that society can only suppress +at its peril. + + + + +CHAPTER V. + +THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CHILD. + + +If the truth of what has been said above be admitted, it follows that +civilization has two fundamental aspects. On the one side there is the +environment, made up--so far as civilized humanity is concerned--of the +ideas, the beliefs, the customs, and the stored up knowledge of +preceding generations, and on the other side we have an organism which +in virtue of its education responds to the environmental stimuli in a +given manner. Between the man of to-day and the man of an earlier +generation the vital distinction is not that the present day one is, as +an organism, better, that he has keener sight, or stronger muscles, or a +brain of greater capacity, but that he has a truer perception of things, +and in virtue of his enlarged knowledge is able to mould natural forces, +including the impulses of his own nature, in a more desirable manner. +And he can do this because, as I have already said, he inherits what +previous generations have acquired, and so reaps the benefits of what +they have done. + +We may illustrate this in a very simple manner. One of the most striking +differences between the man of to-day and the man of the past is the +attitude of the two in relation to natural phenomena. To the people of +not so many generations ago an eclipse was a very serious thing, fraught +with the promise of disaster to mankind. The appearance of a comet was +no less ominous. John Knox saw in comets an indication of the wrath of +heaven, and in all countries the Churches fought with all their might +against the growth of the scientific view. Away back in antiquity we +meet with the same view. There is, for example, the classic case of the +Greek general Nikias, who, when about to extricate his army from a +dangerous position before Syracuse, was told that an eclipse of the sun +indicated that the gods wished him to stay where he was for three times +nine days. Nikias obeyed the oracles with the result that his army was +captured. Now it is certain that no general to-day would act in that +manner, and if he did it is equally certain that he would be +court-martialled. Equally clear is it that comets and eclipses have +ceased to infect the modern mind with terror, and are now only objects +of study to the learned, and of curiosity to the unlearned. But the +difference here is entirely one of knowledge. Our ancestors reacted to +the appearance of a comet or an eclipse in a particular manner because +their knowledge of these things was of a certain kind. It was not at all +a case of feeling, or of degree of feeling, or of having a better brain, +but simply a matter of reacting to an environmental influence in terms +of an understanding of certain things. Had we the same conception of +these things that our ancestors had we should react in the same manner. +We act differently because our understanding of things is different. We +may put it briefly that the kind of reaction which we make to the things +around us is mainly determined by our knowledge concerning their nature. + +There is one other fact that brings into prominence the importance of +the kind of reaction which we make to environmental stimuli. Put +briefly, we may say that an important distinction between the animal and +man is that the animal passes its existence in a comparatively simple +environment where the experiences are few in kind and often repeated, +whereas with man the environment is very complex, the experiences are +varied in character, and may be only repeated after long intervals. The +consequence is that in order to get through life an animal needs a few +simple instincts which automatically respond to frequently repeated +experiences, while on the other hand there must be with man opportunity +for the kind of response which goes under the name of intelligent +action. It is this which gives us the reason, or the explanation, why of +all animals the human being is born the most helpless, and why he +remains helpless for a longer period than does any other. The prolonged +infancy is the opportunity given to the human being to acquire the +benefits of education and so to reap the full advantage of that social +heritage which, as we have shown, raises him so far above the level of +past generations. Or we may express the matter with the late Professor +Fiske, who was the first, I think, to dwell at length upon this +phenomenon, that the distinction between man and the animal world is +that in the one case we have developed instincts with small capacity for +education, in the other few instincts with great capacity for education. + +It is often said that the Churches have failed to pay attention to +education, or have not taken it seriously. That is quite wrong. It may, +indeed, be said that they have never failed to attend to education, and +have always taken it seriously--with disastrous results to education and +to social life. Ever since the birth of the modern movement for +education the Church has fought hard to maintain its control of schools, +and there is every reason why this should be so. Survival in the animal +world may be secured in two ways. On the one side we may have a +continuance of a special sort of environment to which a given structure +is properly adapted; on the other there may be a modification of the +animal to meet the demands of a changing environment. + +Applying this principle to the question of the Churches and education +the moral is clear. The human environment changes more than that of any +other animal. The mere amassing of experience and its expression in the +form of new institutions or in the modification of already existing +ones, is enough to effect a change in the environment of successive +generations. The Christian Church, or for the matter of that, any form +of religion, has before it two possible courses. Either it must maintain +an environment that is as little as possible unchanged, or it must +modify its body of teaching to meet the changed surroundings. As a mere +matter of fact both processes go on side by side, but consciously the +Churches have usually followed the course of trying to maintain an +unchanged environment. This is the real significance of the attempt of +the more orthodox to boycott new, or heretical literature, or lectures, +or to produce a "religious atmosphere" round the child. It is an attempt +to create an environment to which the child's mind will respond in a +manner that is favourable to the claims and teachings of the Christian +Church. The Church dare not openly and plainly throw overboard its body +of doctrines to meet the needs of the modern mind; and the only thing +remaining is to keep the modern mind as backward as possible in order +that it may rest content with a teaching that is reminiscent of a past +stage of civilization. + +In this connection it is interesting to note that the struggle for the +child is essentially a modern phrase. So long as the teaching of +religion is in, at least, a working harmony with current knowledge and +the general body of the social forces the question of religious +instruction does not emerge. Life itself--social life that is--to a very +considerable extent enforces religious teaching. At all events it does +not violently contradict it. But as, owing to the accumulation of +knowledge, views of the world and of man develop that are not in harmony +with accepted religious teaching, the Churches are forced to attempt the +maintenance of an environment of a special religious kind to which their +teaching is adapted. Hence the growing prominence of the division of +secular and sacred as things that have to do with religion and things +that have not. Hence, too, the importance to the Churches of acquiring +power over the child's mind before it is brought completely under the +influence of an environment in which orthodox teachings can only present +themselves as a gross anachronism. + +Thus, one may say with absolute confidence that if in a modern +environment a child was left free with regard to modern influences there +is nothing that would lead to an acceptance of religion. Our ancestors +grew up familiar with the idea of the miraculous and the supernatural +generally because there was nothing in the existing knowledge of the +world that contradicted it. But what part is there in the general +education of the child in modern society that would lead to that end? So +far as it is taught anything about the world it learns to regard it in +terms of causation and of positive knowledge. It finds itself surrounded +with machinery, and inventions, and with a thousand and one mechanical +and other inventions which do not in the very remotest degree suggest +the supernatural. In other words, the response of a modern child in a +modern environment is of a strictly non-religious kind. Left alone it +would no more become religious in the sense of believing in the +religious teachings of any of the Churches than it would pass through +life looking for miracles or accepting fairy tales as sober statements +of historic fact. It would no more express itself in terms of religion +than it would describe an eclipse in the language of our ancestors of +five hundred years ago. + +In self defence the Churches are thus bound to make a fight for the +possession of the child. They cannot wait, because that means allowing +the child to grow to maturity and then dealing with it when it is able +to examine religion with some regard to its historic evolution, and with +a due appreciation of the hopelessly unscientific character of the +conception of the supernatural. They must, so far as they can, protect +the growing child from the influence of all those environmental forces +that make for the disintegration of religious beliefs. The only way in +which the Churches can at all make sure of a supply of recruits is by +impressing them before they are old enough to resist. As the Germany of +the Kaiser is said to have militarized the nation by commencing with the +schools, so the Churches hope to keep the nations religious by +commencing with the children. Apart from these considerations there is +no reason why religion could not wait, as other subjects wait, till the +child is old enough to understand and appreciate it. But with the +Churches it is literally the child or nothing. + +From the point of view of citizenship the retention of religion in State +schools is a manifest injustice. If ever religious instruction could be +justified in any circumstances it is when the religion taught represents +at least the professed beliefs of the whole of the people. But that is +clearly not the case to-day. Only a section of the people can be called, +even formally, Christian. Large numbers are quite opposed to +Christianity, and large numbers deliberately reject all religion. How, +then, can the State undertake the teaching of a religion without at the +same time rousing resentment in and inflicting an injustice on a large +number of its members? It cannot be done, and the crowning absurdity is +that the State acknowledges the non-essential character of religion by +permitting all who will to go without. In secular subjects it permits no +such option. It says that all children shall receive certain tuition in +certain subjects for a given period. It makes instruction in these +subjects compulsory on the definite and intelligible ground that the +education given is necessary to the intelligent discharge of the duties +of citizenship. It does not do that in the case of religion, and it dare +not do that. No government to-day would have the impudence to say that +discharge of the duties of citizenship is dependent upon acceptance of +the Athanasian Creed, or upon the belief in the Bible, or in an after +life. And not being able to say this it is driven to the absurd position +of, on the one hand saying to the people, that religion shall be taught +in the State schools, and on the other, if one doesn't care to have it +he may leave it alone without suffering the slightest disqualification. + +Indeed, it is impossible for instruction in religion to be genuinely +called education at all. If I may be allowed to repeat what I have said +elsewhere on this subject, one may well ask:-- + + What is it that the genuine educationalist aims at? The imparting + of knowledge is, of course, essential. But, in the main, education + consists in a wholesome training of mind and body, in forming + habits of cleanliness, truthfulness, honesty, kindness, the + development of a sense of duty and of justice. Can it be said in + truth that what is called religious instruction does these things, + or that instruction in them is actually inseparable from religion? + Does the creation of a religious "atmosphere," the telling of + stories of God or Jesus or angels or devils--I omit hell--have any + influence in the direction of cultivating a sound mind in a sound + body? Will anyone contend that the child has even a passing + understanding of subjects over which all adults are more or less + mystified? To confuse is not to instruct, to mystify is not to + enlighten, the repetition of meaningless phrases can leave behind + no healthy residuum in the mind. It is the development of capacity + along right lines that is important, not the mere cramming of + verbal formulae. Above all, it is the function of the true teacher + to make his pupil independent of him. The aim of the priest is to + keep one eternally dependent upon his ministrations. The final and + fatal criticism upon religious instruction is that it is not + education at all. + + It may be argued that a policy of creating sentiments in favour of + certain things not wholly understood by the child is followed in + connection with matters other than religion. We do not wait until a + child is old enough to appreciate the intellectual justification of + ethics to train it in morals. And in many directions we seek to + develop some tendencies and to suppress others in accordance with + an accepted standard. All this may be admitted as quite true, but + it may be said in reply that these are things for which an adequate + reason _can_ be given, and we are sure of the child's approbation + when it is old enough to appreciate what has been done. But in the + case of religion the situation is altogether different. We are here + forcing upon the child as true, as of the same admitted value as + ordinary ethical teaching, certain religious doctrines about which + adults themselves dispute with the greatest acrimony. And there is + clearly a wide and vital distinction between cultivating in a child + sentiments the validity of which may at any time be demonstrated, + or teachings upon the truth of which practically all adults are + agreed, and impressing upon it teachings which all agree may be + false. We are exploiting the child in the interests of a Church. + Parents are allowing themselves to be made the catspaws of priests; + and it is not the least formidable of the counts against the + Church's influence that it converts into active enemies of children + those who should stand as their chief protectors. It is religion + which makes it true that "a _child's_ foes shall be those of his + own household."[14] + +[14] _Religion and the Child_, Pioneer Press. + +Where the claim to force religion upon the child breaks down on such +grounds as those outlined above it is quite certain that it cannot be +made good upon any other ground. Historically, it is also clear that we +do not find that conduct was better in those ages when the Christian +religion was held most unquestioningly, but rather the reverse. The +moralization of the world has, as a matter of historic fact, kept pace +with the secularizing of life. This is true both as regards theory and +fact. The application of scientific methods to ethical problems has +taught us more of the nature of morality in the short space of three or +four generations than Christian teaching did in a thousand years. And it +is not with an expansion of the power and influence of religion that +conduct has undergone an improvement, but with the bringing of people +together in terms of secular relationships and reducing their religious +beliefs to the level of speculative ideas which men may hold or reject +as they think fit, so long as they do not allow them to influence their +relations to one another. + +On all grounds it is urgent that the child should be rescued from the +clutches of the priest. It is unfair to the child to so take advantage +of its trust, its innocence, and its ignorance, and to force upon it as +true teachings that which we must all admit may be false, and which, in +a growing number of cases, the child when it grows up either rejects +absolutely or considerably modifies. It is unjust to the principle upon +which the modern State rests, because it is teaching the speculative +beliefs of a few with money raised from the taxation of all. The whole +tendency of life in the modern State is in the direction of +secularization--confining the duties and activities of the State to +those actions which have their meaning and application to this life. +Every argument that is valid against the State forcing religion upon the +adult is valid also against the State forcing religion upon the child. +And, on the other hand, it is really absurd to say that religion must be +forced upon the child, but we are outraging the rights of the individual +and perpetuating an intolerable wrong if we force it upon the adult. +Surely the dawning and developing individuality of the child has claims +on the community that are not less urgent than those of the adult. + +Finally, the resolve to rescue the child from the clutches of the priest +is in the interest of civilization itself. All human experience shows +that a civilization that is under the control of a priesthood is doomed. +From the days of ancient Egypt there is no exception to this rule. And +sooner or later a people, if they are to progress, are compelled to +attempt to limit the control of the priest over life. The whole of the +struggle of the Reformation was fundamentally for the control of the +secular power--whether life should or should not be under the control of +the Church. In that contest, over a large part of Europe, the Roman +Church lost. But the victory was only a very partial one. It was never +complete. The old priest was driven out, but the new Presbyter remained, +and he was but the old tyrant in another form. Ever since then the fight +has gone on, and ever since, the Protestant minister, equally with the +Catholic priest, has striven for the control of education and so to +dominate the mind of the rising generation. The fight for the liberation +of the child is thus a fight for the control or the directing of +civilization. It is a question of whether we are to permit the priest to +hold the future to ransom by permitting this control of the child, or +whether we are to leave religious beliefs, as we leave other beliefs of +a speculative character, to such a time as the child is old enough to +understand them. It is a fight for the future of civilization. + + + + +CHAPTER VI. + +THE NATURE OF RELIGION. + + +It is no mere paradox to say that religion is most interesting to those +who have ceased to believe in it. The reason for this is not far to +seek. Religious beliefs play so large a part in the early history of +society, and are so influential in social history generally, that it is +impossible to leave religion alone without forfeiting an adequate +comprehension of a large part of social evolution. Human development +forms a continuous record; our institutions, whatever be their nature, +have their roots in the far past, and often, even when modified in form, +retain their essential characteristics. No student of social history can +travel far or dig deeply without finding himself in contact with +religion in some form. And the mass of mankind are not yet so far +removed from "primitive" humanity as to give to the study of religion an +exclusively archaeological interest. + +Where so much is discord it is well, if it be possible, to start with a +basis of agreement. And on one point, at least, there is substantial +unity among critics. There is a general agreement among students of folk +lore, comparative mythology, and anthropology, that religious ideas rest +ultimately upon an interpretation of nature that is now generally +discarded. Differing as they do on details, there is consent upon this +point. It is the world of the savage that originates the religion of the +savage, and upon that rests the religions of civilized man as surely as +his physical structure goes back to the animal world for its beginning. +And in giving birth to a religious explanation of his world the savage +was only pursuing the normal path of human development. Mankind +progresses through trial and error; doubtful and erroneous theories are +framed before more reliable ones are established, and while truth may +crown our endeavours it seldom meets us at the outset. Religious beliefs +thus form man's earliest interpretation of nature. On this there is, as +I have said, general agreement, and it is as well not to permit +ourselves to lose sight of that in the discussion of the various +theories that are put forward as to the exact nature of the stages of +religious development. + +In many directions the less accurate theories of things are replaced +gradually and smoothly by more reliable explanations. But in religion +this is not so. For many reasons, with which we are not now immediately +concerned, religious beliefs are not outgrown without considerable +"growing pains." And a long time after the point of view from which +religious beliefs sprang has been given up, the conclusions that were +based on that point of view are held to most tenaciously. And yet if one +accepts the scientific story of the origins of religious ideas there +seems no justification whatever for this. Religion cannot transcend its +origin. Multiply nothing to infinity and the result is still nothing. +Illusion can beget nothing but illusion, even though in its pursuit we +may stumble on reality. And no amount of ingenuity can extract truth +from falsehood. + +One's surprise at the perpetuation of this particular delusion is +diminished by the reflection that the period during which we have +possessed anything like an exact knowledge of the character and +operations of natural forces is, after all, but an infinitesimal +portion of the time the race has been in existence. Three or four +centuries at most cover the period during which such knowledge has been +at our command, and small as this is in relation to the thousands of +generations wherein superstition has reigned unchallenged, a knowledge +of the laws of mental life belongs only to the latter portion. And even +then the knowledge available has been till recently the possession of a +class, while to-day, large masses of the population are under the +domination of the crudest of superstitions. The belief that thirteen is +an unlucky number, that a horse-shoe brings luck, the extent to which +palmistry and astrology flourishes, the cases of witchcraft that crop up +every now and again, all bear testimony to the vast mass of superstition +that is still with us. The primitive mind is still alive and active, +disguised though it may be by a veneer of civilization and a terribly +superficial education. And when one reflects upon all the facts there is +cause for astonishment that in the face of so great a dead weight of +custom and tradition against a rational interpretation of the universe +so much has been done and in so short a time. + +In discussing religion very much turns upon the meaning of the word, and +unfortunately "religion" is to-day used in so many differing and +conflicting senses that without the most careful definition no one is +quite sure what is meant by it. The curious disinclination of so many to +avow themselves as being without a religion must also be noted. To be +without a religion, or rather to be known as one who is without a +religion, would seem to mark one off as apart from the rest of one's +kind, and to infringe all the tribal taboos at one sweep. And very few +seem to have the courage to stand alone. Mr. Augustine Birrell once +said, in introducing to the House of Commons an Education Bill, that +children would rather be wicked than singular. That is quite true, and +it is almost as true of adults as it is of children. There is no great +objection to having a religion different from that of other people, +because the religions of the world are already of so varied a character +that there is always companionship in difference. But to be without a +religion altogether is a degree of isolation that few can stand. The +consequence is that although vast numbers have given up everything that +is really religious they still cling to the name. They have left the +service, but they show a curious attachment to the uniform. Thus it +happens that we have a religion of Socialism, a religion of Ethics, +etc., and I should not be surprised to find one day a religion of +Atheism--if that has not already appeared. + +But all this is a mistake, and a very serious mistake. The Freethinker, +or Socialist, who calls his theory of life a religion is not causing the +religionist to think more highly of him, he is making his opponent think +more highly of his own opinions. Imitation becomes in such a case not +alone flattery, but confirmation. The Goddite does not think more highly +of Freethought because it is labelled religion, he merely becomes the +more convinced of the supreme value of his own faith, and still hopes +for the Freethinker's return to the fold. If Freethinkers are to command +the respect of the religious world they must show not only that they can +get along without religion, but that they can dispense with the name +also. If strength does not command respect weakness will certainly fail +to secure it. And those of us who are genuinely anxious that the world +should be done with false ideas and mischievous frames of mind ought to +at least take care that our own speech and thought are as free from +ambiguity as is possible. + +There is another and deeper aspect of the matter. As I have already +said, language not alone expresses thought, it also governs and directs +it. Locke expressed this truth when he said, "It is impossible that men +should ever truly seek, or certainly discover, the disagreement of ideas +themselves whilst their thoughts flutter about, or stick only on sounds +of doubtful and uncertain significance." Quite a number of theological +and metaphysical conundrums would lose their significance if it were +only realized that the words used are not alone of doubtful and +uncertain significance, but often of no possible significance whatever. +They are like counterfeit coins, which retain their value only so long +as they are not tested by a proper standard. And the evil of these +counterfeits is that they deceive both those who tender and those who +accept them. For even though slovenliness of speech is not always the +product of slovenly thought, in the long run it tends to induce it, and +those who realize this need to be specially on their guard against using +language which can only further confuse an already sufficiently confused +public opinion, and strengthen superstitions that are already +sufficiently strong without our clandestine or unintended assistance.[15] + +[15] Of the evil of an incautious use of current words we have an +example in the case of Darwin. Neither his expressions of regret at +having "truckled to public opinion" at having used the term "creator," +nor his explicit declaration that the word was to him only a synonym of +ignorance, prevented religious apologists from citing him as a believer +in deity on the strength of his having used the word. + +Unfortunately, it remains a favourite policy with many writers to use +and define the word religion, not in accordance with a comprehensive +survey of facts, but in a way that will harmonize with existing +pre-possessions. To this class belongs Matthew Arnold's famous +definition of religion as "Morality touched with emotion," Professor +Seeley's statement that we are entitled to call religion "any habitual +and permanent admiration," or the common description of religion as +consisting in devotion to an ideal. All such definitions may be set on +one side as historically worthless, and as not harmonizing with the +facts. Arnold's definition is in the highest degree superficial, since +there exists no morality that is not touched with emotion, and on the +other hand there exist phases of religion that have not any connection +with morality, however slight. Professor Leuba properly rules +definitions of this class out of order in the comment that, as it is +"the function of words to delimitate, one defeats the purpose of +language by stretching the meaning of a word until it has lost all +precision and unity of meaning."[16] A definition that includes +everything may as well, for all the use it is, not cover anything. + +[16] _The Psychological Origin and Nature of Religion_, p. 92. + +Equally faulty are those definitions that are based upon an assumed +conscious effort to explain the mysteries of existence. No stranger +lapse ever overtook a great thinker than occurred to Herbert Spencer +when he described religion as consisting in a worship of the unknowable, +and as due to the desire to explain a mystery ever pressing for +interpretation. Granting the existence of an Unknowable, the sense of +its presence belongs to the later stages of mental evolution, not to the +earlier ones. Metaphysical and mystical theories of religion are +indications of its disintegration, not of its beginnings. Primitive man +began to believe in ghosts and gods for the same reasons that he +believed in other things; he worshipped his gods for very concrete +considerations. Even the distinction between "spiritual" and material +existence is quite foreign to his mind. Such distinctions arise +gradually with the progress of knowledge and its disintegrating +influence on inherited beliefs. If primitive man may be credited with a +philosophy, and if one may use the word in a purely convenient sense, +then one may say that he is neither a dualist, nor a pluralist, but a +monist. The soul or double he believes in is similar to the body he +sees; the unseen forces he credits with various activities are of the +same kind as those with which he is acquainted. To read our conceptions +into the mind of primitive man because we use our words to explain his +thoughts is a procedure that is bound to end in confusion. Man's +earliest conception of things is vague and indefinite. Later, he +distinguishes differences, qualitative and quantitative, his conception +of things becomes more definite, and distinctions are set up that lay +the foundations of science and philosophy, and which mark their +separation from religion. + +So far as one can see there are only two causes why people should +continue to use the word religion after giving up all for which it +properly stands. One is sheer conservatism. When, for instance, Thomas +Paine said, "To do good is my religion," he had at least the +justification of believing in a deity, but apart from this the only +cause for his calling the desire to do good a religion is that there had +grown up the fashion of calling one's rule of life a religion. The other +cause is the ill-repute that has been attached to those who avow +themselves as being without religion. Orthodoxy saw to it that they were +treated as pariahs without social status, and, in many cases, legal +rights. Once upon a time it was useless unless one believed in the +_right_ religion. Nowadays, any religion will do, or anything that one +cares to call a religion. But not to have any religion at all still puts +one outside the pale of respectability, and there seem to be few who +can stand that. And supernatural religion--the only genuine +article--being impossible with many, these may still, if they care to, +save their face by professing to use the name, even if they have not the +thing. Orthodoxy is very accommodating nowadays. + +Leaving for a time the question of how religion actually does arise, we +may turn to those writers who define religion in terms of ethics. It may +be admitted that so far as the later stages of religion are concerned +considerable emphasis is laid upon ethics. But we can only make religion +a part of ethics by expanding the term morality so as to include +everything, or by contracting it so as to exclude all the lower forms of +religious belief. And any definition of religion that does not embrace +all its forms is obviously inaccurate. It is not at all a question of +defining the higher in terms of the lower, or the lower in terms of the +higher, it is simply the need of so defining religion that our +definition will cover all religions, high and low, and thus deal with +their essential characteristics. + +The only sense in which ethics may be said to be included in religion +lies in the fact that in primitive times religion includes everything. +The fear of unseen intelligences is one of the most powerful factors of +which early humanity is conscious, and the necessity for conciliating +them is always present. The religious ceremonies connected with eating +and drinking, with lying down and rising up, with sowing and reaping, +with disease, hunting, and almost every circumstance of primitive life +prove this. Differentiation and discrimination arise very slowly, but +one after another the various departments of life do shake off the +controlling influence of religion. Ethics may, therefore, be said to +originate in the shadow of religion--as do most other things--but in no +sense can morality be said to owe its origin to religion. Its origin is +deeper and more fundamental than religion. As a matter of practice +morality is independent of religious belief and moral theory, and as a +matter of theory the formulation of definite moral rules is +substantially independent of religion and is an assertion of its +independence. Indeed, the conflict between a growing moral sense and +religion is almost as large a fact in the social sphere as the conflict +between religion and science is in the intellectual one. + +In all its earlier stages religion is at best non-moral. It becomes +otherwise later only because of the reaction of a socialized morality on +religious beliefs. Early religion is never concerned with the morality +of its teaching, nor are the worshippers concerned with the morality of +their gods. The sole question is what the gods desire and how best to +satisfy them. We cannot even conceive man ascribing ethical qualities to +his gods until he has first of all conceived them in regard to his +fellow men. The savage has no _moral_ reverence for his gods; they are +magnified men, but not perfect ones. He worships not because he admires, +but because he fears. Fear is, indeed, one of the root causes of +religious belief. Professor Leuba quite admits the origin of religion is +fear, but he reserves the possibility of man being occasionally placed +under such favourable conditions that fear may be absent. We admit the +possibility, but at present it remains a possibility only. At present +all the evidence goes to prove the words of Ribot that, "The religious +sentiment is composed first of all of the emotion of fear in its +different degrees, from profound terror to vague uneasiness, due to +faith in an unknown mysterious and impalpable power." And if that be +admitted, we can scarcely find here the origin of morality. + +What is here overlooked is the important fact that while religion, as +such, commences in a reasoned process, morality is firmly established +before mankind is even aware of its existence. A formulated religion is +essentially of the nature of a theory set forth to explain or to deal +with certain experiences. Morality, on the other hand, takes its rise in +those feelings and instincts that are developed in animal and human +societies under the pressure of natural selection. The affection of the +animal for its young, of the human mother for its child, the attraction +of male and female, the sympathetic feelings that bind members of the +same species together, these do not depend upon theory, or even upon an +intellectual perception of their value. Theory tries to account for +their existence, and reason justifies their being, but they are +fundamentally the product of associated life. And it is precisely +because morality is the inevitable condition of associated life that it +has upon religion the effect of modifying it until it is at least not +too great an outrage upon the conditions of social well-being. All along +we can, if we will, see how the developing moral sense forces a change +in religious teaching. At one time there is nothing revolting in the +Christian doctrine of election which dooms one to heaven and another to +hell without the slightest regard to personal merit. At another the +doctrine of eternal damnation is rejected as a matter of course. Heresy +hunting and heretic burning, practised as a matter of course by one +generation become highly repulsive to another. In every direction we see +religious beliefs undergoing a modification under the influence of moral +and social growth. It is always man who moralizes his gods; never by any +chance is it the gods who moralize man. + +If we are to arrive at a proper understanding of religion we can, +therefore, no more assume morals to be an integral part of religion +than we can assume medicine or any of the special arts, all of which may +be associated with religion. It will not even do to define religion with +Mr. W. H. Mallock[17] as a belief that the world "has been made and is +sustained by an intelligence external to and essentially independent of +it." That may pass as a definition of Theism, but Theism is only one of +the phases of religion, and the idea of a creator independent of the +universe is one that is quite alien to the earlier stages of religion. +And to deny the name of religion to primitive beliefs is to put oneself +on the level of the type of Christian who declines to call any +superstition but his own religion. It is for this reason impossible to +agree with Professor Leuba when he says that "the idea of a creator must +take precedence of ghosts and nature beings in the making of a +religion." If by precedence the order of importance, from the standpoint +of later and comparatively modern forms of religion, is intended, the +statement may pass. But if the precedence claimed is a time order, the +reply is that, instead of the idea of a creator taking precedence of +ghosts and nature beings, it is from these that the idea of a creator is +evolved. It is quite true Professor Leuba holds that "belief in the +existence of unseen anthropopathic beings is not religion. It is only +when man enters into relation with them that religion comes into +existence," but so soon as man believes in the existence of them he +believes himself to be in relation with them, and a large part of his +efforts is expended in making these relations of an amicable and +profitable character. + +[17] _Religion as a Credible Doctrine_, p. 11. + +A further definition of religion, first given, I think, by the late +Professor Fiske, but since widely used, as a craving for "fulness of +life," must be dismissed as equally faulty. For if by fulness of life +is meant the desire to make it morally and intellectually richer, the +answer is that this desire is plainly the product of a progressive +social life, of which much that now passes for religion is the +adulterated expression. Apologetically, it is an attempt so to state +religion that it may evade criticism of its essential character. From +one point of view this may be gratifying enough, but it is no help to an +understanding of the nature of religion. And how little religion does +help to a fuller life will be seen by anyone who knows the part played +by organized religion in mental development and how blindly obstructive +it is to new ideas in all departments of life. All these attempts to +define religion in terms of ethics, of metaphysics, or as the craving +after an ideal are wholly misleading. It is reading history backwards, +and attributing to primitive human nature feelings and conceptions which +it does not and cannot possess. + +In another work[18] I have traced the origin of the belief in God to the +mental state of primitive mankind, and there is no need to go over the +same ground here at any length. Commencing with the indisputable fact +that religion is something that is acquired, an examination of the state +of mind in which primitive mankind faced, and still faces, the world, +led to the conclusion that the idea of god begins in the personification +of natural forces by the savage. The growth of the idea of God was there +traced back to the ghost, not to the exclusion of other methods of god +making, but certainly as one of its prominent causes. I must refer +readers to that work who desire a more extended treatment of the +god-idea. + +[18] _Theism or Atheism_, Chapter 2. + +What remains to be traced here, in order to understand the other factor +that is common to religions, is the belief in a continued state of +existence after death, or at least of a soul. + +It has been shown to the point of demonstration by writers such as +Spencer, Tylor, and Frazer, that the idea of a double is suggested to +man by his experience of dreams, swoons, and allied normal and abnormal +experiences. Even in the absence of evidence coming to us from the +beliefs of existing tribes of savages, the fact that the ghost is always +depicted as identical in appearance with the living person would be +enough to suggest its dream origin. But there are other considerations +that carry the proof further. The savage sees in his dreams the figures +of dead men and assumes that there is a double that can get out of the +body during sleep. But he also dreams of dead men, and this is also +proof that the dead man still exists. Death does not, then, involve the +death of the ghost, but only its removal to some other sphere of +existence. Further, the likeness of sleep itself to death is so obvious +and so striking that it has formed one of the most insistent features of +human thought and speech. With primitive man it is far more than a +figure of speech. The Melanesians put this point of view when they say, +"the soul goes out of the body in some dreams, and if for some reason it +does not come back the man is found dead in the morning." Death and +dreaming have, therefore, this in common, they are both due to the +withdrawal of the double. Hence we find a whole series of ceremonies +designed to avert death or to facilitate the return of the double. The +lingering of this practice is well illustrated by Sir Frederick Treves +in his book, _The Other Side of the Lantern_. He there tells how he saw +a Chinese mother, with the tears streaming down her face, waving at the +door of the house the clothing of a recently deceased child in order to +bring back the departed spirit. + +Death is thus the separation of the double from the body; but if it may +return, its return is not always a matter of rejoicing, for we find +customs that are plainly intended to prevent the ghost recognizing the +living or to find its way back to its old haunts. Thus Frazer has shown +that the wearing of black is really a form of disguise. It is a method +taken to disguise the living from the attentions of the dead. It is in +order to avoid recognition by spirits who wish to injure them that the +Tongans change their war costume at every battle. The Chinese call their +best beloved children by worthless names in order to delude evil +spirits. In Egypt, too, the children who were most thought of were the +worst clad. In some places the corpse is never carried out through the +door, but by a hole in the side of the hut, which is afterwards closed +so that the ghost may not find its way back. + +The ghost being conceived as at all points identical with living beings, +it demands attention after death. It needs food, weapons, servants, +wives. In this way there originates a whole group of burial customs, +performed partly from fear of what the ghost may do if its wants are +neglected. The custom of burying food and weapons with the dead thus +receives a simple explanation. These things are buried with the dead man +in order that their spirit may accompany his to the next world and serve +the same uses there that they did here. The modern custom of scattering +flowers over a grave is unquestionably a survival of this primitive +belief. The killing of a wife on the husband's grave has the same +origin. Her spirit goes to attend the husband in the ghost-land. In the +case of a chief we have the killing of servants for the same reason. +When Leonidas says, "Bury me on my shield, I will enter even Hades as a +Lacedaemonian," he was exhibiting the persistence of this belief in +classical times. The Chinese offer a further example by making little +paper houses, filling them with paper models of the things used by the +dead person, and burning them on the grave. All over the world we have +the same class of customs developing from the same beliefs, and the same +beliefs projected by the human mind when brought face to face with the +same class of phenomena. + +As the ghost is pictured as like the physical man, so the next world is +more or less a replica of this. The chief distinction is that there is a +greater abundance of desirable things. Hunting tribes have elysiums +where there is an abundance of game. The old Norse heaven was a place +where there was unlimited fighting. The gold and diamonds and rubies of +the Christian heaven represent a stage of civilization where these +things had acquired a special value. Social distinctions, too, are often +maintained. The Caribs believe that every time they secure an enemy's +head they have gained a servant in the next world. And all know the +story of the French aristocrat who, when threatened with hell, replied, +"God will think twice before damning a person of my quality." + +Several other consequences of this service paid to the dead may be +noted. The ghost being drawn to the place where the body is buried, the +desire to preserve the corpse probably led to the practice of embalming. +The grave becomes a place of sanctity, of pilgrimage, and of religious +observance, and it has been maintained by many writers, notably by Mr. +W. Simpson in his _Worship of Death_, that the service round the grave +gives us the beginning of all temple worship. + +But from this brief view of the beginnings of religion we are able to +see how completely fallacious are all those efforts to derive religion +from an attempt to achieve an ideal, from a desire to solve certain +philosophical problems, or from any of the other sources that are +paraded by modern apologists. The origin and nature of religion is +comparatively simple to understand, once we have cleared our minds of +all these fallacies and carefully examine the facts. Religion is no more +than the explanation which the primitive mind gives of the experiences +which it has of the world. And, therefore, the only definition that +covers all the facts, and which stresses the essence of all religions, +high and low, savage and civilized, is that given by Tylor, namely, the +belief in supernatural beings. It is the one definition that expresses +the feature common to all religions, and with that definition before us +we are able to use language with a precision that is impossible so long +as we attempt to read into religion something that is absent from all +its earlier forms, and which is only introduced when advanced thought +makes the belief in the supernatural more and more difficult to retain +its hold over the human mind. + + + + +CHAPTER VII. + +THE UTILITY OF RELIGION. + + +The real nature of religion being as stated, it having originated in an +utterly erroneous view of things, it would seem that nothing more can be +needed to justify its rejection. But the conclusion would not be +correct, at least so far as the mass of believers or quasi-believers are +concerned. Here the conviction still obtains that religion, no matter +what its origin, still wields an enormous influence for good. The +curious thing is that when one enquires "what religion is it that has +exerted this beneficent influence?" the replies effectually cancel one +another. Each means by religion his own religion, and each accuses the +religion of the other man of all the faults with which the Freethinker +accuses the whole. The avowed object of our widespread missionary +activity is to save the "heathen" from the evil effects of their +religion; and there is not the least doubt that if the heathen had the +brute force at their command, and the impudence that we have, they would +cordially reciprocate. And the efforts of the various Christian sects to +convert each other is too well known to need mention. So that the only +logical inference from all this is that, while all religions are, when +taken singly, injurious, taken in the bulk they are sources of profound +benefit. + +It is not alone the common or garden order of religionist who takes up +this curious position, nor is it even the better educated believer; it +is not uncommon to find those who have rejected all the formal +religions of the world yet seeking to discover some good that religion +has done or is doing. As an illustration of this we may cite an example +from Sir James Frazer, than whom no one has done more to bring home to +students a knowledge of the real nature of religious beliefs. It is the +more surprising to find him putting in a plea for the good done by +religion, not in the present, but in the past. And such an instance, if +it does nothing else, may at least serve to mitigate our ferocity +towards the common type of religionist. + +In an address delivered in 1909, entitled "Psyche's Task: A discourse +concerning the influence of superstition on the growth of Institutions," +he puts in a plea for the consideration of superstition (religion) at +various stages of culture. Of its effects generally, he says:-- + + That it has done much harm in the world cannot be denied. It has + sacrificed countless lives, wasted untold treasures, embroiled + nations, severed friends, parted husbands and wives, parents and + children, putting swords and worse than swords between them; it has + filled gaols and madhouses with its deluded victims; it has broken + many hearts, embittered the whole of many a life, and not content + with persecuting the living it has pursued the dead into the grave + and beyond it, gloating over the horrors which its foul imagination + has conjured up to appal and torture the survivors. It has done all + this and more. + +Now this is a severe indictment, and one is a little surprised to find +following that a plea on behalf of this same superstition to the effect +that it has "among certain races and at certain times strengthened the +respect for government, property, marriage, and human life." In support +of this proposition he cites a large number of instances from various +races of people, all of which prove, not what Sir James sets out to +prove, but only that religious observances and beliefs have been +connected with certain institutions that are in themselves admirable +enough. And on this point there is not, nor can there be, any serious +dispute. One can find many similar instances among ourselves to-day. But +the real question at issue is a deeper one than that. It is not enough +for the religionist to show that religion has often been associated with +good things and has given them its sanction. The reply to this would be +that if it had been otherwise religion would long since have +disappeared. The essential question here is, Have the institutions named +a basis in secular and social life, and would they have developed in the +absence of superstition as they have developed with superstition in the +field? + +Now I do not see that Sir James Frazer proves either that these +institutions have not a sufficient basis in secular life--he would, I +imagine, admit that they have; or that they would not have developed as +well in the absence of superstition as they have done with it. In fact, +the whole plea that good has been done by superstition seems to be +destroyed in the statements that although certain institutions "have +been based partly on superstitions, it by no means follows that even +among these races they have never been based on anything else," and that +whenever institutions have proved themselves stable and permanent "there +is a strong presumption that they rest on something more solid than +superstition." So that, after all, it may well be that superstition is +all the time taking credit for the working of forces that are not of its +kind or nature. + +Let us take the example given of the respect for human life as a crucial +test. Admitting that religions have taught that to take life was a +sinful act, one might well interpose with the query as to whether it +was ever necessary to teach man that homicide within certain limits was +a wrong thing. Pre-evolutionary sociology, which sometimes taught that +man originally led an existence in which his hand was against every +other man, and who, therefore, fought the battle of life strictly off +his own bat, may have favoured that assumption. But that we now know is +quite wrong. We know that man slowly emerged from a pre-human gregarious +stage, and that in all group life there is an organic restraint on +mutual slaughter. The essential condition of group life is that the +nature of the individual shall be normally devoid of the desire for the +indiscriminate slaughter of his fellows. And if that is true of animals, +it is certainly true of man. Primitive human society does not and cannot +represent a group of beings each of whom must be restrained by direct +coercion from murdering the other. + +In this case, therefore, we have to reckon with both biological and +sociological forces, and I do not see that it needs more than this to +explain all there is to explain. Human life is always associated life, +and this means not alone a basis of mutual forbearance and co-operation, +but a development of the sympathetic feelings which tends to increase as +society develops, they being, as a matter of fact, the conditions of its +growth. And whatever competition existed between tribes would still +further emphasize the value of those feelings that led to effective +co-operation. + +The question, then, whether the anti-homicidal feeling is at all +dependent upon religion is answered in the negative by the fact that it +ante-dates what we may term the era of conscious social organization. +That of whether religion strengthens this feeling still remains, +although even that has been answered by implication. And the first thing +to be noted here is that whatever may be the value of the superstitious +safeguard against homicide it certainly has no value as against people +outside the tribe. In fact, when a savage desires to kill an enemy he +finds in superstition a fancied source of strength, and often of +encouragement. Westermarck points out that "savages carefully +distinguish between an act of homicide committed in their own community +and one where the victim is a stranger. Whilst the former is under +ordinary circumstances disapproved of, the latter is in most cases +allowed and often regarded as praiseworthy." And Frazer himself points +out that the belief in immortality plays no small part in encouraging +war among primitive peoples,[19] while if we add the facts of the killing +of children, of old men and women, and wives, together with the practice +of human sacrifice, we shall see little cause to attribute the +development of the feeling against homicide to religious beliefs. + +[19] The state of war which normally exists between many, if not most, +neighbouring savage tribes, springs in large measure directly from their +belief in immortality; since one of the commonest motives to hostility +is a desire to appease the angry ghosts of friends who are supposed to +have perished by baleful arts of sorcerers in another tribe, and who, if +vengeance is not inflicted on their real or imaginary murderers, will +wreak their fury on their undutiful fellow-tribesmen.--_The Belief in +Immortality_, Vol. I., p. 468. + +In one passage in his address Sir James does show himself quite alive to +the evil influence of the belief in immortality. He says:-- + + It might with some show of reason be maintained that no belief has + done so much to retard the economic and thereby the social progress + of mankind as the belief in the immortality of the soul; for this + belief has led race after race, generation after generation, to + sacrifice the real wants of the living to the imaginary wants of + the dead. The waste and destruction of life and property which + this faith has entailed has been enormous and incalculable. But I + am not here concerned with the disastrous and deplorable + consequences, the unspeakable follies and crimes and miseries which + have flowed in practice from the theory of a future life. My + business at present is with the more cheerful side of a gloomy + subject. + +Every author has, of course, the fullest right to select whichever +aspect of a subject he thinks deserves treatment, but all the same one +may point out that it is this dwelling on the "cheerful side" of these +beliefs that encourages the religionist to put forward claims on behalf +of present day religion that Sir James himself would be the first to +challenge. There is surely greater need to emphasize the darker side of +a creed that has thousands of paid advocates presenting an imaginary +bright side to the public gaze. + +But what has been said of the relation of the feeling against homicide +applies with no more than a variation of terms to the other instances +given by Sir James Frazer. Either these institutions have a basis in +utility or they have not. If they have not, then religion can claim no +social credit for their preservation. If they have a basis in utility, +then the reason for their preservation is to be found in social +selection, although the precise local form in which an institution +appears may be determined by other circumstances. And when Sir James +says that the task of government has been facilitated by the +superstition that the governors belonged to a superior class of beings, +one may safely assume that the statement holds good only of individual +governors, or of particular forms of government. It may well be that +when a people are led to believe that a certain individual possesses +supernatural powers, or that a particular government enjoys the favour +of supernatural beings, there will be less inclination to resentment +against orders than there would be otherwise. But government and +governors, in other words, a general body of rules for the government of +the tribe, and the admitted leadership of certain favoured individuals, +would remain natural facts in the absence of superstition, and their +development or suppression would remain subject to the operation of +social or natural selection. So, again, with the desire for private +property. The desire to retain certain things as belonging to oneself is +not altogether unnoticeable among animals. A dog will fight for its +bone, monkeys secrete things which they desire to retain for their own +use, etc., and so far as the custom possesses advantages, we may +certainly credit savages with enough common-sense to be aware of the +fact. But the curious thing is that the institution of private property +is not nearly so powerful among primitive peoples as it is among those +more advanced. So that we are faced with this curious comment upon Sir +James's thesis. Granting that the institution of private property has +been strengthened by superstition we have the strange circumstance that +that institution is weakest where superstition is strongest and +strongest where superstition is weakest. + +The truth is that Sir James Frazer seems here to have fallen into the +same error as the late Walter Bagehot, and to have formed the belief +that primitive man required breaking in to the "social yoke." The truth +is that the great need of primitive mankind is not to be broken in but +to acquire the courage and determination to break out. This error may +have originated in the disinclination of the savage to obey _our_ rules, +or it may have been a heritage from the eighteenth century philosophy of +the existence of an idyllic primitive social state. The truth is, +however, that there is no one so fettered by custom as is the savage. +The restrictions set by a savage society on its members would be +positively intolerable to civilized beings. And if it be said that these +customs required formation, the reply is that inheriting the imitability +of the pre-human gregarious animal, this would form the basis on which +the tyrannizing custom of primitive life is built. + +There was, however, another generalization of Bagehot's that was +unquestionably sound. Assuming that the first step necessary to +primitive mankind was to frame a custom as the means of his being +"broken in," the next step in progress was to break it, and that was a +far more difficult matter. Progress was impossible until this was done, +and how difficult it is to get this step taken observation of the people +living in civilized countries will show. But it is in relation to this +second and all important step that one can clearly trace the influence +of religion. And its influence is completely the reverse of being +helpful. For of all the hindrances to a change of custom there is none +that act with such force as does religion. This is the case with those +customs with which vested interest has no direct connection, but it +operates with tenfold force where this exists. Once a custom is +established in a primitive community the conditions of social life +surround it with religious beliefs, and thereafter to break it means a +breach in the wall of religious observances with which the savage is +surrounded. And so soon as we reach the stage of the establishment of a +regular priesthood, we have to reckon with the operation of a vested +interest that has always been keenly alive to anything which affected +its profit or prestige. + +It would not be right to dismiss the discussion of a subject connected +with so well-respected a name as that of Sir James Frazer and leave the +reader with the impression that he is putting in a plea for current +religion. He is not. He hints pretty plainly that his argument that +religion has been of some use to the race applies to savage times only. +We see this in such sentences as the following: "More and more, as time +goes on, morality shifts its grounds from the sands of superstition to +the rock of reason, from the imaginary to the real, from the +supernatural to the natural.... The State has found a better reason than +these old wives' fables for guarding with the flaming sword of justice +the approach to the tree of life," and also in saying that, "If it can +be proved that in certain races and at certain times the institutions in +question have been based partly on superstition, it by no means follows +that even among these races they have never been based on anything else. +On the contrary ... there is a strong presumption that they rest mainly +on something much more solid than superstition." In modern times no such +argument as the one I have been discussing has the least claim to +logical force. But that, as we all know, does not prevent its being used +by full-blown religionists, and by those whose minds are only partly +liberated from a great historic superstition. + +It will be observed that the plea of Frazer's we have been examining +argues that the function of religion in social life is of a conservative +character. And so far he is correct, he is only wrong in assuming it to +have been of a beneficial nature. The main function of religion in +sociology is conservative, not the wise conservatism which supports an +institution or a custom because of its approved value, but of the kind +that sees in an established custom a reason for its continuance. Urged, +in the first instance, by the belief that innumerable spirits are +forever on the watch, punishing the slightest infraction of their +wishes, opposition to reform or to new ideas receives definite shape and +increased strength by the rise of a priesthood. Henceforth economic +interest goes hand in hand with superstitious fears. Whichever way man +turns he finds artificial obstacles erected. Every deviation from the +prescribed path is threatened with penalties in this world and the next. +The history of every race and of every science tells the same story, and +the amount of time and energy that mankind has spent in fighting these +ghosts of its own savage past is the measure of the degree to which +religion has kept the race in a state of relative barbarism. + +This function of unreasoning conservatism is not, it must be remembered, +accidental. It belongs to the very nature of religion. Dependent upon +the maintenance of certain primitive conceptions of the world and of +man, religion dare not encourage new ideas lest it sap its own +foundations. Spencer has reminded us that religion is, under the +conditions of its origin, perfectly rational. That is quite true.[20] +Religion meets science, when the stage of conflict arises, as an +opposing interpretation of certain classes of facts. The one +interpretation can only grow at the expense of the other. While +religion is committed to the explanation of the world in terms of vital +force, science is committed to that of non-conscious mechanism. +Opposition is thus present at the outset, and it must continue to the +end. The old cannot be maintained without anathematizing the new; the +new cannot be established without displacing the old. The conflict is +inevitable; the antagonism is irreconcilable. + +[20] It may with equal truth be said that all beliefs are with a similar +qualification quite rational. The attempt to divide people into +"Rationalists" and "Irrationalists" is quite fallacious and is +philosophically absurd. Reason is used in the formation of religious as +in the formation of non-religious beliefs. The distinction between the +man who is religious and one who is not, or, if it be preferred, one who +is superstitious and one who is not, is not that the one reasons and the +other does not. Both reason. Indeed, the reasoning of the superstitionist +is often of the most elaborate kind. The distinction is that of one +having false premises, or drawing unwarrantable conclusions from sound +premises. The only ultimate distinctions are those of religionist and +non-religionist, supernaturalist and non-supernaturalist, Theist or +Atheist. All else are mere matters of compromise, exhibitions of +timidity, or illustrations of that confused thinking which itself gives +rise to religion in all its forms. + +It lies, therefore, in the very nature of the case that religion, as +religion, can give no real help to man in the understanding of himself +and the world. Whatever good religion may appear to do is properly to be +attributed to the non-religious forces with which it is associated. But +religion, being properly concerned with the relations between man and +mythical supernatural beings, can exert no real influence for good on +human affairs. Far from that being the case, it can easily be shown to +have had quite an opposite effect. There is not merely the waste of +energy in the direction above indicated, but in many other ways. If we +confine ourselves to Christianity some conception of the nature of its +influence may be formed if we think what the state of the world might +have been to-day had the work of enlightenment continued from the point +it had reached under the old Greek and Roman civilizations. Bacon and +Galileo in their prisons, Bruno and Vanini at the stake are +illustrations of the disservice that Christianity has done the cause of +civilization, and the obstruction it has offered to human well-being. + +Again, consider the incubus placed on human progress by the institution +of a priesthood devoted to the service of supernatural beings. In the +fullest and truest sense of the word a priesthood represents a parasitic +growth on the social body. I am not referring to individual members of +the priesthood in their capacity as private citizens, but as priests, as +agents or representatives of the supernatural. And here the truth is +that of all the inventions and discoveries that have helped to build up +civilization not one of them is owing to the priesthood, as such. One +may confidently say that if all the energies of all the priests in the +whole world were concentrated on a single community, and all their +prayers, formulae, and doctrines devoted to the one end, the well-being +of that community would not be advanced thereby a single iota. + +Far and away, the priesthood is the greatest parasitic class the world +has known. All over the world, in both savage and civilized times, we +see the priesthoods of the world enthroned, we see them enjoying a +subsistence wrung from toil through credulity, and from wealth through +self-interest. From the savage medicine hut up to the modern cathedral +we see the earth covered with useless edifices devoted to the foolish +service of imaginary deities. We see the priesthood endowed with special +privileges, their buildings relieved from the taxes which all citizens +are compelled to pay, and even special taxes levied upon the public for +their maintenance. The gods may no longer demand the sacrifice of the +first born, but they still demand the sacrifice of time, energy, and +money that might well be applied elsewhere. And the people in every +country, out of their stupidity, continue to maintain a large body of +men who, by their whole training and interest, are compelled to act as +the enemies of liberty and progress. + +It is useless arguing that the evils that follow religion are not +produced by it, that they are casual, and will disappear with a truer +understanding of what religion is. It is not true, and the man who +argues in that way shows that he does not yet understand what religion +is. The evils that follow religion are deeply imbedded in the nature of +religion itself. All religion takes its rise in error, and vested error +threatened with destruction instinctively resorts to force, fraud, and +imposture, in self defence. The universality of the evils that accompany +religion would alone prove that there is more than a mere accident in +the association. The whole history of religion is, on the purely +intellectual side, the history of a delusion. Happily this delusion is +losing its hold on the human mind. Year by year its intellectual and +moral worthlessness is being more generally recognized. Religion +explains nothing, and it does nothing that is useful. Yet in its name +millions of pounds are annually squandered and many thousands of men +withdrawn from useful labour, and saddled on the rest of the community +for maintenance. But here, again, economic and intellectual forces are +combining for the liberation of the race from its historic incubus. +Complete emancipation will not come in a day, but it will come, and its +arrival will mark the close of the greatest revolution that has taken +place in the history of the race. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII. + +FREETHOUGHT AND GOD. + + +Why do people believe in God? If one turns to the pleas of professional +theologians there is no lack of answers to the question. These answers +are both numerous and elaborate, and if quantity and repetition were +enough, the Freethinker would find himself hopelessly "snowed under." +But on examination all these replies suffer from one defect. They should +ante-date the belief, whereas they post-date it. They cannot be the +cause of belief for the reason that the belief was here long before the +arguments came into existence. Neither singly nor collectively do these +so-called reasons correspond to the causes that have ever led a single +person, at any time or at any place, to believe in a God. If they +already believed, the arguments were enough to provide them with +sufficient justification to go on believing. If they did not already +believe, the arguments were powerless. And never, by any chance, do they +describe the causes that led to the existence of the belief in God, +either historically or individually. They are, in truth, no more than +excuses for continuing to believe. They are never the causes of belief. + +The evidence for the truth of this is at hand in the person of all who +believe. Let one consider, on the one hand, the various arguments for +the existence of God--the argument from causation, from design, from +necessary existence, etc., then put on the other side the age at which +men and women began to believe in deity, and their grasp of arguments of +the kind mentioned. There is clearly no relation between the two. +Leaving on one side the question of culture, it is at once apparent that +long before the individual is old enough to appreciate in the slightest +degree the nature of the arguments advanced he is already a believer. +And if he is not a believer in his early years, he is never one when he +reaches maturity, certainly not in a civilized society. And when we turn +from the individual Goddite to Goddites in the mass, the assumption that +they owe their belief to the philosophical arguments advanced becomes +grotesque in its absurdity. To assume that the average Theist, whose +philosophy is taken from the daily newspaper and the weekly sermon, +derives his conviction from a series of abstruse philosophical arguments +is simply ridiculous. Those who are honest to themselves will admit that +they were taught the belief long before they were old enough to bring +any real criticism to bear upon it. It was the product of their early +education, impressed upon them by their parents, and all the "reasons" +that are afterwards alleged in justification are only pleas why they +should not be disturbed in their belief. + +Are we in any better position if we turn from the individual to the +race? Is the belief in God similar to, say, the belief in gravitation, +which, discovered by a genius, and resting upon considerations which the +ordinary person finds too abstruse to thoroughly understand, becomes a +part of our education, and is accepted upon well established authority? +Again, the facts are dead against such an assumption. It is with the +race as with the individual. Science and philosophy do not precede the +belief in God and provide the foundation for it, they succeed it and +lead to its modification and rejection. We are, in this respect, upon +very solid ground. In some form or another the belief in God, or gods, +belongs to very early states of human society. Savages have it long +before they have the slightest inkling of what we moderns would call a +scientific conception of the world. And to assume that the savage, as we +know him, began to believe in his gods because of a number of scientific +reasons, such as the belief in universal causation, or any of the other +profound speculations with which the modern theologian beclouds the +issue, is as absurd as to attribute the belief of the Salvation Army +preacher to philosophical speculations. Added to which we may note that +the savage is a severely practical person. He is not at all interested +in metaphysics, and his contributions to the discussions of a +philosophical society would be of a very meagre character. His problem +is to deal with the concrete difficulties of his everyday life, and when +he is able to do this he is content. + +But, on the other hand, we know that our own belief in God is descended +from his belief. We know that we can trace it back without a break +through generations of social culture, until we reach the savage stage +of social existence. It is he who, so to speak, discovers God, he +establishes it as a part of the social institutions that govern the +lives of every member of the group; we find it in our immaturity +established as one of those many thought-forms which determine so +powerfully our intellectual development. The belief in God meets each +newcomer into the social arena. It is impressed upon each in a thousand +and one different ways, and it is only when the belief is challenged by +an opposing system of thought that philosophical theories are elaborated +in its defence. + +The possibility of deriving the idea of God from scientific and +philosophic thought being ruled out, what remains? The enquiry from +being philosophical becomes historical. That is, instead of discussing +whether there are sufficient reasons for justifying the belief in God, +we are left with the question of determining the causes that led people +to ever regard the belief as being solidly based upon fact. It is a +question of history, or rather, one may say, of anthropology of the +mental history of man. When we read of some poor old woman who has been +persecuted for bewitching someone's cattle or children we no longer +settle down to discuss whether witchcraft rests upon fact or not; we +know it does not, and our sole concern is to discover the conditions, +mental and social, which enabled so strange a belief to flourish. The +examination of evidence--the legal aspect--thus gives place to the +historical, and the historical finally resolves itself into the +psychological. For what we are really concerned with in an examination +of the idea of God is the discovery and reconstruction of those states +of mind which gave the belief birth. And that search is far easier and +the results far more conclusive than many imagine. + +In outlining this evidence it will only be necessary to present its +general features. This for two reasons. First, because a multiplicity of +detail is apt to hide from the general reader many of the essential +features of the truth; secondly, the fact of a difference of opinion +concerning the time order of certain stages in the history of the +god-idea is likely to obscure the fact of the unanimity which exists +among all those qualified to express an authoritative opinion as to the +nature of the conditions that have given the idea birth. The various +theories of the sequence of the different phases of the religious idea +should no more blind us to the fact that there exists a substantial +agreement that the belief in gods has its roots in the fear and +ignorance of uncivilized mankind, than the circumstance that there is +going on among biologists a discussion as to the machinery of evolution +should overshadow the fact that evolution itself is a demonstrated +truth which no competent observer questions. + +In an earlier chapter we have already indicated the essential conditions +which lead to the origin of religious beliefs, and there is no need +again to go over that ground. What is necessary at present is to sketch +as briefly as is consistent with lucidity those frames of mind to which +the belief in God owes its existence. + +To realize this no very recondite instrument of research is required. We +need nothing more elaborate than the method by which we are hourly in +the habit of estimating each other's thoughts, and of gauging one +another's motives. When I see a man laugh I assume that he is pleased; +when he frowns I assume that he is angry. There is here only an +application of the generally accepted maxim that when we see identical +results we are warranted in assuming identical causes. In this way we +can either argue from causes to effects or from effects to causes. A +further statement of the same principle is that when we are dealing with +biological facts we may assume that identical structures imply identical +functions. The structure of a dead animal will tell us what its +functions were when living as certainly as though we had the living +animal in front of us. We may relate function to structure or structure +to function. And in this we are using nothing more uncommon than the +accepted principle of universal causation. + +Now, in all thinking there are two factors. There is the animal or human +brain, the organ of thought, and there is the material for thought as +represented by the existing knowledge of the world. If we had an exact +knowledge of the kind of brain that functioned, and the exact quantity +and quality of the knowledge existing, the question as to the ideas +which would result would be little more than a problem in mathematics. +We could make the calculation with the same assurance that an +astronomer can estimate the position of a planet a century hence. In the +case of primitive mankind we do not possess anything like the exact +knowledge one would wish, but we do know enough to say in rather more +than a general way the kind of thinking of which our earliest ancestors +were capable, and what were its products. We can get at the machinery of +the primitive brain, and can estimate its actions, and that without +going further than we do when we assume that primitive man was hungry +and thirsty, was pleased and angry, loved and feared. And, indeed, it +was because he experienced fear and pleasure and love and hate that the +gods came into existence. + +Of the factors which determine the kind of thinking one does, we know +enough to say that there were two things certain of early mankind. We +know the kind of thinking of which he was capable, and we have a general +notion of the material existing for thinking. Speaking of one of these +early ancestors of ours, Professor Arthur Keith says, "Piltdown man saw, +heard, felt, thought and dreamt much as we do," that is, there was the +same _kind_ of brain at work that is at work now. And that much we could +be sure of by going no farther back than the savages of to-day. But as +size of brain is not everything, we are warranted in saying that the +brain was of a relatively simple type, while the knowledge of the world +which existed, and which gives us the material for thinking, was of a +very imperfect and elementary character. There was great ignorance, and +there was great fear. From these two conditions, ignorance and fear, +sprang the gods. Of that there is no doubt whatever. There is scarcely a +work which deals with the life of primitive peoples to-day that does not +emphasize that fact. Consciously or unconsciously it cannot avoid doing +so. Long ago a Latin writer hit on this truth in the well-known saying, +"Fear made the gods," and Aristotle expressed the same thing in a more +comprehensive form by saying that fear first set man philosophizing. The +undeveloped mind troubles little about things so long as they are going +smoothly and comfortably. It is when something painful happens that +concern is awakened. And all the gods of primitive life bear this primal +stamp of fear. That is why religion, with its persistent harking back to +the primitive, with its response to the "Call of the Wild" still dwells +upon the fear of the Lord as a means of arousing a due sense of piety. +The gods fatten on fear as a usurer does upon the folly of his clients, +and in both cases the interest demanded far outweighs the value of the +services rendered. At a later stage man faces his gods in a different +spirit; he loses his fear and examines them; and gods that are not +feared are but poor things. They exist mainly as indisputable records of +their own deterioration. + +Now to primitive man, struggling along in a world of which he was so +completely ignorant, the one certain thing was that the world was alive. +The wind that roared, the thunder that growled, the disease that left +him so mysteriously stricken, were all so many living things. The +division of these living forces into good and bad followed naturally +from this first conception of their nature. And whatever be the stages +of that process the main lines admit of no question, nor is there any +question as to the nature of the conditions that brought the gods into +existence. On any scientific theory of religion the gods represent no +more than the personified ignorance and fear of primitive humanity. +However much anthropologists may differ as to whether the god always +originates from the ghost or not, whether animism is first and the +worship of the ghost secondary or not, there is agreement on that +point. Whichever theory we care to embrace, the broad fact is generally +admitted that the gods are the products of ignorance and fear. Man fears +the gods as children and even animals fear the unknown and the +dangerous. + +And as the gods are born of conditions such as those outlined, as man +reads his own feelings and passions and desires into nature, so we find +that the early gods are frankly, obtrusively, man-like. The gods are +copies of their worshippers, faithful reflections of those who fear +them. This, indeed, remains true to the end. When the stage is reached +that the idea of God as a physical counterpart of man becomes repulsive, +it is still unable to shake off this anthropomorphic element. To the +modern worshipper God must not possess a body, but he must have love, +and intelligence--as though the mental qualities of man are less human +than the bodily ones! They are as human as arms or legs. And every +reason that will justify the rejection of the conception of the universe +being ruled over by a being who is like man in his physical aspects is +equally conclusive against believing the universe to be ruled over by a +being who resembles man in his mental characteristics. The one belief is +a survival of the other; and the one would not now be accepted had not +the other been believed in beforehand. + +I have deliberately refrained from discussing the various arguments put +forward to justify the belief in God in order that attention should not +be diverted from the main point, which is that the belief in deity owes +its existence to the ignorant interpretation of natural happenings by +early or uncivilized mankind. Everything here turns logically on the +question of origin. If the belief in God began in the way I have +outlined, the question of veracity may be dismissed. The question is +one of origin only. It is not a question of man first seeing a thing but +dimly and then getting a clearer vision as his knowledge becomes more +thorough. It is a question of a radical misunderstanding of certain +experiences, the vogue of an altogether wrong interpretation, and its +displacement by an interpretation of a quite different nature. The god +of the savage was in the nature of an inference drawn from the world of +the savage. There was the admitted premiss and there was the obvious +conclusion. But with us the premiss no longer exists. We deliberately +reject it as being altogether unwarrantable. And we cannot reject the +premiss while retaining the conclusion. Logically, the god of the savage +goes with the world of the savage; it should have no place in the mind +of the really civilized human being. + +It is for this reason that I am leaving on one side all those +semi-metaphysical and pseudo-philosophical arguments that are put +forward to justify the belief in God. As I have already said, they are +merely excuses for continuing a belief that has no real warranty in +fact. No living man or woman believes in God because of any such +argument. We have the belief in God with us to-day for the same reason +that we have in our bodies a number of rudimentary structures. As the +one is reminiscent of an earlier stage of existence so is the other. To +use the expressive phrase of Winwood Reade's, we have tailed minds as +well as tailed bodies. The belief in God meets each newcomer to the +social sphere. It is forced upon them before they are old enough to +offer effective resistance in the shape of acquired knowledge that would +render its lodgement in the mind impossible. Afterwards, the dice of +social power and prestige are loaded in its favour, while the mental +inertia of some, and the self-interest of others, give force to the +arguments which I have called mere mental subterfuges for perpetuating +the belief in God. + +Only one other remark need be made. In the beginning the gods exist as +the apotheosis of ignorance. The reason the savage had for believing in +God was that he did not know the real causes of the phenomena around +him. And that remains the reason why people believe in deity to-day. +Under whatever guise the belief is presented, analysis brings it +ultimately to that. The whole history of the human mind, in relation to +the idea of God, shows that so soon as man discovers the natural causes +of any phenomenon or group of phenomena the idea of God dies out in +connection therewith. God is only conceived as a cause or as an +explanation so long as no other cause or explanation is forthcoming. In +common speech and in ordinary thought we only bring in the name of God +where uncertainty exists, never where knowledge is obtainable. We pray +to God to cure a fever, but never to put on again a severed limb. We +associate God with the production of a good harvest, but not with a +better coal output. We use "God only knows" as the equivalent of our own +ignorance, and call on God for help only where our own helplessness is +manifest. The idea remains true to itself throughout. Born in ignorance +and cradled in fear, it makes its appeal to the same elements to the +end. And if it apes the language of philosophy, it does so only as do +those who purchase a ready-made pedigree in order to hide the obscurity +of their origin. + + + + +CHAPTER IX. + +FREETHOUGHT AND DEATH. + + +In the early months of the European war a mortally wounded British +soldier was picked up between the lines, after lying there unattended +for two days. He died soon after he was brought in, and one of his last +requests was that a copy of Ruskin's _Crown of Wild Olive_ should be +buried with him. He said the book had been with him all the time he had +been in France, it had given him great comfort, and he wished it to be +buried with him. Needless to say, his wish was carried out, and +"somewhere in France" there lies a soldier with a copy of the _Crown of +Wild Olive_ clasped to his breast. + +There is another story, of a commoner character, which, although +different in form, is wholly similar in substance. This tells of the +soldier who in his last moments asks to see a priest, accepts his +ministrations with thankfulness, and dies comforted with the repetition +of familiar formulae and customary prayers. In the one case a Bible and +a priest; in the other a volume of lectures by one of the masters of +English prose. The difference is, at first, striking, but there is an +underlying agreement, and they may be used together to illustrate a +single psychological principle. + +Freethinker and Christian read the record of both cases, but it is the +Freethinker alone whose philosophy of life is wide enough to explain +both. The Freethinker knows that the feeling of comfort and the fact of +truth are two distinct things. They may coalesce, but they may be as +far asunder as the poles. A delusion may be as consoling as a reality +provided it be accepted as genuine. The soldier with his copy of Ruskin +does not prove the truth of the teachings of the _Crown of Wild Olive_, +does not prove that Ruskin said the last word or even the truest word on +the subjects dealt with therein. Neither does the consolation which +religion gives some people prove the truth of its teachings. The comfort +which religion brings is a product of the belief in religion. The +consolation that comes from reading a volume of essays is a product of +the conviction of the truth of the message delivered, or a sense of the +beauty of the language in which the book is written. Both cases +illustrate the power of belief, and that no Freethinker was ever stupid +enough to question. The finest literature in the world would bring small +comfort to a man who was convinced that he stood in deadly need of a +priest, and the presence of a priest would be quite useless to a man who +believed that all the religions of the world were so many geographical +absurdities. Comfort does not produce conviction, it follows it. The +truth and the social value of convictions are quite distinct questions. + +There is here a confusion of values, and for this we have to thank the +influence of the Churches. Because the service of the priest is sought +by some we are asked to believe that it is necessary to all. But the +essential value of a thing is shown, not by the number of people who get +on with it, but by the number that can get on without it. The canon of +agreement and difference is applicable whether we are dealing with human +nature or conducting an ordinary scientific experiment. Thus, the +indispensability of meat-eating is not shown by the number of people who +swear that they cannot work without it, but by noting how people fare in +its absence. The drinker does not confound the abstainer; it is the +other way about. In the same way there is nothing of evidential value in +the protests of those who say that human nature cannot get along without +religion. We have to test the statement by the cases where religion is +absent. And here, it is not the Christian that confounds the +Freethinker, it is the Freethinker who confounds the Christian. If the +religious view of life is correct the Freethinker should be a very rare +bird indeed; he should be clearly recognizable as a departure from the +normal type, and, in fact, he was always so represented in religious +literature until he disproved the legend by multiplying himself with +confusing rapidity. Now it is the Freethinker who will not fit into the +Christian scheme of things. It is puzzling to see what can be done with +a man who repudiates the religious idea in theory and fact, root and +branch, and yet appears to be getting on quite well in its absence. That +is the awkward fact that will not fit in with the religious theory. And, +other things equal, one man without religion is greater evidential value +than five hundred with it. All the five hundred prove at the most is +that human nature can get on with religion, but the one case proves that +human nature can get on without it, and that challenges the whole +religious position. And unless we take up the rather absurd position +that the non-religious man is a sheer abnormality, this consideration at +once reduces religion from a necessity to a luxury or a dissipation. + +The bearing of this on our attitude towards such a fact as death should +be obvious. During the European war death from being an ever-present +fact became an obtrusive one. Day after day we received news of the +death of friend or relative, and those who escaped that degree of +intimacy with the unpleasant visitor, met him in the columns of the +daily press. And the Christian clergy would have been untrue to their +traditions and to their interests--and there is no corporate body more +alert in these directions--if they had not tried to exploit the +situation to the utmost. There was nothing new in the tactics employed, +it was the special circumstances that gave them a little more force than +was usual. The following, for example, may be accepted as typical:-- + + The weight of our sorrow is immensely lightened if we can feel sure + that one whom we have loved and lost has but ascended to spheres of + further development, education, service, achievement, where, by and + by, we shall rejoin him. + +Quite a common statement, and one which by long usage has become almost +immune from criticism. And yet it has about as much relation to fact as +have the stories of death-bed conversions, or of people dying and +shrieking for Jesus to save them. One may, indeed, apply a rough and +ready test by an appeal to facts. How many cases has the reader of these +lines come across in which religion has made people calmer and more +resigned in the presence of death than others have been who were quite +destitute of belief in religion? Of course, religious folk will repeat +religious phrases, they will attend church, they will listen to the +ministrations of their favourite clergyman, and they will say that their +religion brings them comfort. But if one gets below the stereotyped +phraseology and puts on one side also the sophisticated attitude in +relation to religion, one quite fails to detect any respect in which the +Freethinking parent differs from the Christian one. Does the religious +parent grieve less? Does he bear the blow with greater fortitude? Is his +grief of shorter duration? To anyone who will open his eyes the talk of +the comfort of religion will appear to be largely cant. There are +differences due to character, to temperament, to training; there is a +use of traditional phrases in the one case that is absent in the other, +but the incidence of a deep sorrow only serves to show how superficial +are the vapourings of religion to a civilized mind, and how each one of +us is thrown back upon those deeper feelings that are inseparable from a +common humanity. The thought of an only son who is living with the +angels brings no real solace to a parent's mind. Whatever genuine +comfort is available must come from the thought of a life that has been +well lived, from the sympathetic presence of friends, from the silent +handclasp, which on such occasions is so often more eloquent than +speech--in a word, from those healing currents that are part and parcel +of the life of the race. A Freethinker can easily appreciate the +readiness of a clergyman to help a mind that is suffering from a great +sorrow, but it is the deliberate exploitation of human grief in the name +and in the interests of religion, the manufacturing of cases of +death-bed consolation and repentance, the citation of evidence to which +the experience of all gives the lie, that fill one with a feeling akin +to disgust. + +The writer from whom I have quoted says:-- + + It is, indeed, possible for people who are Agnostic or unbelieving + with regard to immortality to give themselves wholly to the pursuit + of truth and to the service of their fellowmen, in moral + earnestness and heroic endeavour; they may endure pain and sorrow + with calm resignation, and toil on in patience and perseverance. + The best of the ancient Stoics did so, and many a modern Agnostic + is doing so to-day. + +The significance of such a statement is in no wise diminished by the +accompanying qualification that Freethinkers are "missing a joy which +would have been to them a well-spring of courage and strength." That is +a pure assumption. They who are without religious belief are conscious +of no lack of courage, and they are oppressed by no feeling of despair. +On this their own statement must be taken as final. Moreover, they are +speaking as, in the main, those who are fully acquainted with the +Christian position, having once occupied it. They are able to measure +the relative value of the two positions. The Christian has no such +experience to guide him. In the crises of life the behaviour of the +Freethinker is at least as calm and as courageous as that of the +Christian. And it may certainly be argued that a serene resignation in +the presence of death is quite as valuable as the hectic emotionalism of +cultivated religious belief. + +What, after all, is there in the fact of natural death that should breed +irresolution, rob us of courage, or fill us with fear? Experience proves +there are many things that people dread more than death, and will even +seek death rather than face, or, again, there are a hundred and one +things to obtain which men and women will face death without fear. And +this readiness to face or seek death does not seem to be at all +determined by religious belief. The millions of men who faced death +during the war were not determined in their attitude by their faith in +religious dogmas. If questioned they might, in the majority of cases, +say that they believed in a future life, and also that they found it a +source of strength, but it would need little reflection to assess the +reply at its true value. And as a racial fact, the fear of death is a +negative quality. The positive aspect is the will to live, and that may +be seen in operation in the animal world as well as in the world of man. +But this has no reference, not even the remotest, to a belief in a +future life. There are no "Intimations of Immortality" here. There is +simply one of the conditions of animal survival, developed in man to +the point at which its further strengthening would become a threat to +the welfare of the species. The desire to live is one of the conditions +that secures the struggle to live, and a species of animals in which +this did not exist would soon go under before a more virile type. And it +is one of the peculiarities of religious reasoning that a will to live +here should be taken as clear proof of a desire to live somewhere else. + +The fear of death could never be a powerful factor in life; existence +would be next to impossible if it were. It would rob the organism of its +daring, its tenacity, and ultimately divest life itself of value. +Against that danger we have an efficient guard in the operation of +natural selection. In the animal world there is no fear of death, there +is, in fact, no reason to assume that there exists even a consciousness +of death. And with man, when reflection and knowledge give birth to that +consciousness, there arises a strong other regarding instinct which +effectively prevents it assuming a too positive or a too dangerous form. +Fear of death is, in brief, part of the jargon of priestcraft. The +priest has taught it the people because it was to his interest to do so. +And the jargon retains a certain currency because it is only the +minority that rise above the parrot-like capacity to repeat current +phrases, or who ever make an attempt to analyse their meaning and +challenge their veracity. + +The positive fear of death is largely an acquired mental attitude. In +its origin it is largely motived by religion. Generally speaking there +is no very great fear of death among savages, and among the pagans of +old Greece and Rome there was none of that abject fear of death that +became so common with the establishment of Christianity. To the pagan, +death was a natural fact, sad enough, but not of necessity terrible. Of +the Greek sculptures representing death Professor Mahaffy says: "They +are simple pictures of the grief of parting, of the recollection of +pleasant days of love and friendship, of the gloom of an unknown future. +But there is no exaggeration in the picture." Throughout Roman +literature also there runs the conception of death as the necessary +complement of life. Pliny puts this clearly in the following: "Unto all, +the state of being after the last day is the same as it was before the +first day of life; neither is there any more variation of it in either +body or soul after death than there was before death." Among the +uneducated there does appear to have been some fear of death, and one +may assume that with some of even of the educated this was not +altogether absent. It may also be assumed that it was to this type of +mind that Christianity made its first appeal, and upon which it rested +its nightmare-like conception of death and the after-life. On this +matter the modern mind can well appreciate the attitude of Lucretius, +who saw the great danger in front of the race and sought to guard men +against it by pointing out the artificiality of the fear of death and +the cleansing effect of genuine knowledge. + + So shalt thou feed on Death who feeds on men, + And Death once dead there's no more dying then. + +The policy of Christianity was the belittling of this life and an +exaggeration of the life after death, with a boundless exaggeration of +the terrors that awaited the unwary and the unfaithful. The state of +knowledge under Christian auspices made this task easy enough. Of the +mediaeval period Mr. Lionel Cust, in his _History of Engraving during +the Fifteenth Century_, says:-- + + The keys of knowledge, as of salvation, were entirely in the hands + of the Church, and the lay public, both high and low, were, + generally speaking, ignorant and illiterate. One of the secrets of + the great power exercised by the Church lay in its ability to + represent the life of man as environed from the outset by legions + of horrible and insidious demons, who beset his path throughout + life at every stage up to his very last breath, and are eminently + active and often triumphant when man's fortitude is undermined by + sickness, suffering, and the prospect of dissolution. + +F. Parkes Weber also points out that, "It was in mediaeval Europe, under +the auspices of the Catholic Church, that descriptions of hell began to +take on their most horrible aspects."[21] So, again, we have Sir James +Frazer pointing out that the fear of death is not common to the lower +races, and "Among the causes which thus tend to make us cowards may be +numbered the spread of luxury and the doctrines of a gloomy theology, +which by proclaiming the eternal damnation and excruciating torments of +the vast majority of mankind has added incalculably to the dread and +horror of death."[22] + +[21] _Aspects of Death in Art and Epigram_, p. 28. + +[22] _Golden Bough_, Vol. IV., p. 136. + +No religion has emphasized the terror of death as Christianity has done, +and in the truest sense, no religion has so served to make men such +cowards in its presence. Upon that fear a large part of the power of the +Christian Church has been built, and men having become so obsessed with +the fear of death and what lay beyond, it is not surprising that they +should turn to the Church for some measure of relief. The poisoner thus +did a lucrative trade by selling a doubtful remedy for his own toxic +preparation. More than anything else the fear of death and hell laid the +foundation of the wealth and power of the Christian Church. If it drew +its authority from God, it derived its profit from the devil. The two +truths that emerge from a sober and impartial study of Christian history +are that the power of the Church was rooted in death and that it +flourished in dishonour. + +It was Christianity, and Christianity alone that made death so abiding a +terror to the European mind. And society once Christianized, the +uneducated could find no adequate corrective from the more educated. The +baser elements which existed in the Pagan world were eagerly seized upon +by the Christian writers and developed to their fullest extent. Some of +the Pagan writers had speculated, in a more or less fanciful spirit, on +a hell of a thousand years. Christianity stretched it to eternity. +Pre-Christianity had reserved the miseries of the after-life for adults. +Christian writers paved the floor of hell with infants, "scarce a span +long." Plutarch and other Pagan moralists had poured discredit upon the +popular notions of a future life. Christianity reaffirmed them with all +the exaggerations of a diseased imagination. The Pagans held that death +was as normal and as natural as life. Christianity returned to the +conception current among savages and depicted death as a penal +infliction. The Pagan art of living was superseded by the Christian art +of dying. Human ingenuity exhausted itself in depicting the terrors of +the future life, and when one remembers the powers of the Church, and +the murderous manner in which it exercised them, there is small wonder +that under the auspices of the Church the fear of death gained a +strength it had never before attained. + +Small wonder, then, that we still have with us the talk of the comfort +that Christianity brings in the face of death. Where the belief in the +Christian after-life really exists, the retention of a conviction of the +saving power of Christianity is a condition of sanity. Where the belief +does not really exist, we are fronted with nothing but a parrot-like +repetition of familiar phrases. The Christian talk of comfort is thus, +on either count, no more than a product of Christian education. +Christianity does not make men brave in the presence of death, that is +no more than a popular superstition. What it does is to cover a natural +fact with supernatural terrors, and then exploit a frame of mind that it +has created. The comfort is only necessary so long as the special belief +is present. Remove that belief and death takes its place as one of the +inevitable facts of existence, surrounded with all the sadness of a last +farewell, but rid of all the terror that has been created by religion. + +Our dying soldier, asking for a copy of the _Crown of Wild Olive_ to be +buried with him, and the other who calls for priestly ministrations, +represent, ultimately, two different educational results. The one is a +product of an educational process applied during the darkest periods of +European history, and perpetuated by a training that has been mainly +directed by the self-interest of a class. The other represents an +educational product which stands as the triumph of the pressure of life +over artificial dogmas. The Freethinker, because he is a Freethinker, +needs none of those artificial stimulants for which the Christian +craves. And he pays him the compliment--in spite of his protests--of +believing that without his religion the Christian would display as much +manliness in the face of death as he does himself. He believes there is +plenty of healthy human nature in the average Christian, and the +Freethinker merely begs him to give it a chance of finding expression. +In this matter, it must be observed, the Freethinker makes no claim to +superiority over the Christian; it is the Christian who forces that +claim upon him. The Freethinker does not assume that the difference +between himself and the Christian is nearly so great as the latter would +have him believe. He believes that what is dispensable by the one, +without loss, is dispensable by the other. If Freethinkers can devote +themselves to "the pursuit of truth and the service of their fellow +men," if they can "endure pain and sorrow with calm resignation," if +they live with honour and face death without fear, I see no reason why +the Christian should not be able to reach the same level of development. +It is paying the Freethinker a "violent compliment," to use an +expression of John Wesley's, to place him upon a level of excellence +that is apparently so far above that of the average Christian. As a +Freethinker, I decline to accept it. I believe that what the Freethinker +is, the Christian may well become. He, too, may learn to do his duty +without the fear of hell or the hope of heaven. All that is required is +that he shall give his healthier instincts an opportunity for +expression. + + + + +CHAPTER X. + +THIS WORLD AND THE NEXT. + + +In the preceding chapter I have only discussed the fact of death in +relation to a certain attitude of mind. The question of the survival of +the human personality after death is a distinct question and calls for +separate treatment. Nor is the present work one in which that topic can +be treated at adequate length. The most that can now be attempted is a +bird's eye view of a large field of controversy, although it may be +possible in the course of that survey to say something on the more +important aspects of the subject. + +And first we may notice the curious assumption that the man who argues +for immortality is taking a lofty view of human nature, while he who +argues against it is taking a low one. In sober truth it is the other +way about. Consider the position. It is tacitly admitted that if human +motive, considered with reference to this world alone, is adequate as an +incentive to action, and the consequences of actions, again considered +with reference to this world, are an adequate reward for endeavour, then +it is agreed that the main argument for the belief in immortality breaks +down. To support or to establish the argument it is necessary to show +that life divorced from the conception of a future life can never reach +the highest possible level. Natural human society is powerless in itself +to realize its highest possibilities. It remains barren of what it might +be, a thing that may frame ideals, but can never realize them. + +Now that is quite an intelligible, and, therefore, an arguable +proposition. But whether true or not, there should be no question that +it involves a lower view of human nature than the one taken by the +Freethinker. He does at least pay human nature the compliment of +believing it capable, not alone of framing high ideals, but also of +realizing them. He says that by itself it is capable of realizing all +that may be legitimately demanded from it. He does not believe that +supernatural hopes or fears are necessary to induce man to live cleanly, +or die serenely, or to carry out properly his duties to his fellows. The +religionist denies this, and asserts that some form of supernaturalism +is essential to the moral health of men and women. If the Freethinker is +wrong, it is plain that his fault consists in taking a too optimistic +view of human nature. His mistake consists in taking not a low view of +human nature, but a lofty one. Substantially, the difference between the +two positions is the difference between the man who is honest from a +conviction of the value of honesty, and the one who refrains from +stealing because he feels certain of detection, or because he is afraid +of losing something that he might otherwise gain. Thus, we are told by +one writer that:-- + + If human life is but a by-product of the unconscious play of + physical force, like a candle flame soon to be blown out or burnt + out, what a paltry thing it is! + +But the questions of where human life came from, or where it will end, +are quite apart from the question of the value and capabilities of human +life now. That there are immense possibilities in this life none but a +fool will deny. The world is full of strange and curious things, and its +pleasures undoubtedly outweigh its pains in the experience of normal man +or woman. But the relations between ourselves and others remain +completely unaffected by the termination of existence at the grave, or +its continuation beyond. It is quite a defensible proposition that life +is not worth living. So is the reverse of the proposition. But it is +nonsense to say that life is a "paltry thing" merely because it ends at +the grave. It is unrestricted egotism manifesting itself in the form of +religious conviction. One might as well argue that a sunset ceases to be +beautiful because it does not continue all night. + +If I cannot live for ever, then is the universe a failure! That is +really all that the religious argument amounts to. And so to state it, +to reduce it to plain terms, and divest it of its disguising verbiage, +almost removes the need for further refutation. But it is seldom stated +in so plain and so unequivocal a manner. It is accompanied with much +talk of growth, of an evolutionary purpose, of ruined lives made good, +thus: + + Seeing that man is the goal towards which everything has tended + from the beginning, seeing that the same eternal and infinite + Energy has laboured through the ages at the production of man, and + man is the heir of the ages, nothing conceivable seems too great or + glorious to believe concerning his destiny.... If there is no limit + to human growth in knowledge and wisdom, in love and constructive + power, in beauty and joy, we are invested with a magnificent worth + and dignity. + +So fallacy and folly run on. What, for example, does anyone mean by man +as the goal towards which everything has tended since the beginning? +Whatever truth there is in the statement applies to all things without +exception. It is as true of the microbe as it is of man. If the +"infinite and eternal Energy" laboured to produce man, it laboured also +to produce the microbe which destroys him. The one is here as well as +the other; and one can conceive a religious microbe thanking an almighty +one for having created it, and declaring that unless it is to live for +ever in some microbic heaven, with a proper supply of human beings for +its nourishment, the whole scheme of creation is a failure. It is quite +a question of the point of view. As a matter of fact there are no "ends" +in nature. There are only results, and each result becomes a factor in +some further result. It is human folly and ignorance which makes an end +of a consequence. + +After all, what reason is there for anyone assuming that the survival of +man beyond the grave is even probably true? We do not know man as a +"soul" first and a body afterwards. Neither do we know him as a detached +"mind" which afterwards takes possession of a body. Our knowledge of man +commences with him, as does our knowledge of any animal, as a body +possessing certain definite functions of which we call one group mental. +And the two things are so indissolubly linked that we cannot even think +of them as separate. If anyone doubts this let him try and picture to +himself what a man is like in the absence of a body. He will find the +thing simply inconceivable. In the absence of the material organism, to +which the mind unquestionably stands in the relation of function to +organ, what remains is a mere blank. To the informed mind, that is. To +the intelligence of the savage, who is led, owing to his erroneous +conception of things, to think of something inside the body which leaves +it during sleep, wanders about, and then returns on awakening, and who +because of this affiliates sleep to death, the case may be different. +But to a modern mind, one which is acquainted with something of what +science has to say on the subject, the conception of a mind existing +apart from organization is simply unthinkable. All our knowledge is +against it. The development of mind side by side with the development of +the brain and the nervous system is one of the commonplaces of +scientific knowledge. The treatment of states of mind as functions of +the brain and the nervous system is a common-place of medical practice. +And the fact that diet, temperature, health and disease, accidents and +old age, all have their effects on mental manifestations is matter of +everyday observation. The whole range of positive science may safely be +challenged to produce a single indisputable fact in favour of the +assumption that there exists anything about man independent of the +material organism. + +All that can be urged in favour of such a belief is that there are still +many obscure facts which we are not altogether able to explain on a +purely mechanistic theory. But that is a confession of ignorance, not an +affirmation of knowledge. At any rate, there does not exist a single +fact against the functional theory of mind. All we _know_ is decidedly +in its favour, and a theory must be tested by what we know and by what +it explains, not by what we do not know or by what it cannot explain. +And there is here the additional truth that the only ground upon which +the theory can be opposed is upon certain metaphysical assumptions which +are made in order to bolster up an already existing belief. If the +belief in survival had not been already in existence these assumptions +would never have been made. They are not suggested by the facts, they +are invented to support an already established theory, which can no +longer appeal to the circumstances which gave it birth. + +And about those circumstance there is no longer the slightest reason for +justifiable doubt. We can trace the belief in survival after death +until we see it commencing in the savage belief in a double that takes +its origin in the phenomena of dreaming and unusual mental states. It is +from that starting point that the belief in survival takes its place as +an invariable element in the religions of the world. And as we trace the +evolution of knowledge we see every fact upon which was built the belief +in a double that survived death gradually losing its hold on the human +intelligence, owing to the fact that the experiences that gave it birth +are interpreted in a manner which allows no room for the religious +theory. The fatal fact about the belief in survival is its history. That +history shows us how it began, as surely as the course of its evolution +indicates the way in which it will end. + +So, as with the idea of God, what we have left in modern times are not +the reasons why such a belief is held, but only excuses why those who +hold it should not be disturbed. That and a number of arguments which +only present an air of plausibility because they succeed in jumbling +together things that have no connection with each other. As an example +of this we may take the favourite modern plea that a future life is +required to permit the growth and development of the individual. We find +this expressed in the quotation above given in the sentence "if there is +no limit to human growth, etc.," the inference being that unless there +is a future life there is a very sharp limit set to human growth, and +one that makes this life a mockery. This plea is presented in so many +forms that it is worth while analysing it a little, if only to bring out +more clearly the distinction between the religious and the Freethought +view of life. + +What now is meant by there being no limit to human growth? If by it is +meant individual growth, the reply is that there is actually a very +sharp limit set to growth, much sharper than the average person seems +to be aware of. It is quite clear that the individual is not capable of +unlimited growth in this world. There are degrees of capacity in +different individuals which will determine what amount of development +each is capable of. Capacity is not an acquired thing, it is an +endowment, and the child born with the brain capacity of a fool will +remain a fool to the end, however much his folly may be disguised or +lost amid the folly of others. And with each one, whether he be fool or +genius, acquisitions are made more easily and more rapidly in youth, the +power of mental adaptation is much greater in early than in later life, +while in old age the capacities of adaptation and acquisition become +negligible quantities. And provided one lives long enough, the last +stage sees, not a promise of further progress if life were continued, +but a process of degradation. The old saying that one can't put a quart +into a pint pot is strictly applicable here. Growth assumes acquisition; +acquisition is determined by capacity, and this while an indefinite +quantity (indefinite here is strictly referable to our ignorance, not to +the actual fact) is certainly not an unlimited one. Life, then, so far +as the individual is concerned, does not point to unlimited growth. It +indicates, so far as it indicates anything at all, that there is a limit +to growth as to all other things. + +Well, but suppose we say that man is capable of indefinite growth, what +do we mean? Let us also bear in mind at this point that we are strictly +concerned with the individual. For if man survives death he must do it +as an individual. To merely survive as a part of the chemical and other +elements of the world, or, to follow some mystical theologians, as an +indistinguishable part of a "world-soul," is not what people mean when +they talk of living beyond the grave. Here, again, it will be found +that we have confused two quite distinct things, even though the one +thing borrows its meaning from the other. + +When we compare the individual, as such, with the individual of three or +four thousand years ago, can we say with truth that the man of to-day is +actually superior to the man of the earlier date? To test the question +let us put it in this way. Does the man of to-day do anything or think +anything that is beyond the capacity of an ancient Egyptian or an +ancient Greek, if it were possible to suddenly revive one and to enable +him to pass through the same education that each one of us passes +through? I do not think that anyone will answer that question in the +affirmative. Reverse the process. Suppose that a modern man, with +exactly the same capacity that he now has had lived in the days of the +ancient Egyptians or the ancient Greeks, can we say that his capacity is +so much greater than theirs, that he would have done better than they +did? I do not think that anyone will answer that question in the +affirmative either. Is the soldier of to-day a better soldier, or the +sailor a better sailor than those who lived three thousand years ago? +Once more the answer will not be in the affirmative. And yet there are +certain things that are obvious. It is plain that we all know more than +did the people of long ago, we can do more, we understand the past +better, and we can see farther into the future. A schoolboy to-day +carries in his head what would have been a philosopher's outfit once +upon a time. Our soldiers and sailors utilize, single-handed, forces +greater than a whole army or navy wielded in the far-off days of the +Ptolemies. We call ourselves greater, we think ourselves greater, and in +a sense we are greater than the people of old. What, then, is the +explanation of the apparent paradox? + +The explanation lies in the simple fact that progress is not a +phenomenon of individual life at all. It is a phenomenon of social +existence. If each generation had to commence at the exact point at +which its predecessors started it would get no farther than they got. It +would be an eternal round, with each generation starting from and +reaching the same point, and progress would be an inconceivable thing. +But that we know is not the case. Instead of each generation starting +from precisely the same point, one inherits at least something of the +labours and discoveries of its predecessors. A thing discovered by the +individual is discovered for the race. A thought struck out by the +individual is a thought for the race. By language, by tradition, and by +institutions the advances of each generation are conserved, handed on, +and made part of our racial possessions. The strength, the knowledge, of +the modern is thus due not to any innate superiority over the ancient, +but because one is modern and the other ancient. If we could have +surrounded the ancient Assyrians with all the inventions, and given them +all the knowledge that we possess, they would have used that knowledge +and those inventions as wisely, or as unwisely as we use them. Progress +is thus not a fact of individual but of racial life. The individual +inherits more than he creates, and it is in virtue of this racial +inheritance that he is what he is. + +It is a mere trick of the imagination that converts this fact of social +growth into an essential characteristic of individual life. We speak of +"man" without clearly distinguishing between man as a biological unit +and man as a member of a social group developing in correspondence with +a true social medium. But if that is so, it follows that this capacity +for growth is, so to speak, a function of the social medium. It is +conditioned by it, it has relevance only in relation to it. Our +feelings, our sentiments, even our desires, have reference to this life, +and in a far deeper sense than is usually imagined. And removed from its +relation to this life human nature would be without meaning or value. + +There is nothing in any of the functions of man, in any of his +capacities, or in any of his properly understood desires that has the +slightest reference to any life but this. It is unthinkable that there +should be. An organ or an organism develops in relation to a special +medium, not in relation to one that--even though it exists--is not also +in relation with it. This is quite an obvious truth in regard to +structures, but it is not always so clearly recognized, or so carefully +borne in mind, that it is equally true of every feeling and desire. For +these are developed in relation to their special medium, in this case, +the existence of fellow beings with their actions and reactions on each +other. And man is not only a member of a social group, that much is an +obvious fact; but he is a product of the group in the sense that all his +characteristic human qualities have resulted from the interactions of +group life. Take man out of relation to that fact, and he is an enigma, +presenting fit opportunities for the wild theorizing of religious +philosophers. Take him in connection with it, and his whole nature +becomes susceptible of understanding in relation to the only existence +he knows and desires. + +The twin facts of growth and progress, upon which so much of the +argument for a future life turns nowadays, have not the slightest +possible reference to a life beyond the grave. They are fundamentally +not even personal, but social. It is the race that grows, not the +individual, he becomes more powerful precisely because the products of +racial acquisition are inherited by him. Remove, if only in thought, the +individual from all association with his fellows, strip him of all that +he inherits from association with them, and he loses all the qualities +we indicate when we speak of him as a civilized being. Remove him, in +fact, from that association, as when a man is marooned on a desert +island, and the more civilized qualities of his character begin to +weaken and in time disappear. Man, as an individual, becomes more +powerful with the passing of each generation, precisely because he is +thus dependent upon the life of the race. The secret of his weakness is +at the same time the source of his strength. We are what we are because +of the generations of men and women who lived and toiled and died before +we were born. We inherit the fruits of their labours, as those who come +after us will inherit the fruits of our struggles and conquests. It is +thus in the life of the race that man achieves immortality. None other +is possible, or conceivable. And to those whose minds are not distorted +by religious teaching, and who have taken the trouble to analyse and +understand their own mental states, it may be said that none other is +even desirable. + + + + +CHAPTER XI. + +EVOLUTION. + + +Language, we have said above, is one of the prime conditions of human +greatness and progress. It is the principal means by which man conserves +his victories over the forces of his environment, and transmits them to +his descendants. But it is, nevertheless, not without its dangers, and +may exert an influence fatal to exact thought. There is a sense in which +language necessarily lags behind thought. For words are coined to +express the ideas of those who fashion them; and as the knowledge of the +next generation alters, and some modification of existing conceptions is +found necessary, there is nothing but the existing array of words in +which to express them. The consequence is that there are nearly always +subtle shades of meaning in the words used differing from the exact +meaning which the new thought is trying to express. Thought drives us to +seek new or improved verbal tools, but until we get them we must go on +using the old ones, with all their old implications. And by the time the +new words arrive thought has made a still further advance, and the +general position remains. It is an eternal chase in which the pursued is +always being captured, but is never caught. + +Another way in which language holds a danger is that with many words, +especially when they assume the character of a formula, they tend to +usurp the place of thinking. The old lady who found so much consolation +in the "blessed" word Mesopotamia, is not alone in using that method of +consolation. It does not meet us only in connection with religion, it +is encountered over the whole field of sociology, and even of science. +A conception in science or sociology is established after a hard fight. +It is accepted generally, and thereafter takes its place as one of the +many established truths. And then the danger shows itself. It is +repeated as though it had some magical virtue in itself; it means +nothing to very many of those who use it, they simply hand over their +mental difficulties to its care, much as the penitent in the +confessional hands over his moral troubles to the priest, and there the +matter ends. But in such cases the words used do not express thought, +they simply blind people to its absence. And not only that, but in the +name of these sacred words, any number of foolish inferences are drawn +and receive general assent. + +A striking illustration of this is to be found in such a word as +"Evolution." One may say of it that while it began as a formula, it +continues as a fiat. Some invoke it with all the expectancy of a +mediaeval magician commanding the attendance of his favourite spirits. +Others approach it with a hushed reverence that is reminiscent of a +Catholic devotee before his favourite shrine. In a little more than half +a century it has acquired the characteristics of the Kismet of the +Mohammedan, the Beelzebub of the pious Christian, and the power of a +phrase that gives inspiration to a born soldier. It is used as often to +dispel doubt as it is to awaken curiosity. It may express comprehension +or merely indicate vacuity. Decisions are pronounced in its name with +all the solemnity of a "Thus saith the Lord." We are not sure that even +to talk about evolution in this way may not be considered wrong. For +there are crowds of folk who cannot distinguish profundity from +solemnity, and who mistake a long face for the sure indication of a +well-stored brain. The truth here is that what a man understands +thoroughly he can deal with easily; and that he laughs at a difficulty +is not necessarily a sign that he fails to appreciate it, he may laugh +because he has taken its measure. And why people do not laugh at such a +thing as religion is partly because they have not taken its measure, +partly from a perception that religion cannot stand it. Everywhere the +priest maintains his hold as a consequence of the narcotizing influence +of ill-understood phrases, and in this he is matched by the +pseudo-philosopher whose pompous use of imperfectly appreciated formulae +disguises from the crowd the mistiness of his understanding. + +A glance over the various uses to which the word "Evolution" is put will +well illustrate the truth of what has been said. These make one wonder +what, in the opinion of some people, evolution stands for. One of these +uses of evolution is to give it a certain moral implication to which it +has not the slightest claim. A certain school of Non-Theists are, in +this matter, if not the greatest offenders, certainly those with the +least excuse for committing the blunder. By these evolution is +identified with progress, or advancement, or a gradual "levelling up" of +society, and is even acclaimed as presenting a more "moral" view of the +Universe than is the Theistic conception. Now, primarily, this +ascription of what one may call a moral element to evolution is no more +than a carrying over into science of a frame of mind that properly +belongs to Theism. Quite naturally the Theist was driven to try and find +some moral purpose in the Universe, and to prove that its working did +not grate on our moral sense. That was quite understandable, and even +legitimate. The world, from the point of view of the Goddite, was God's +world, he made it; and we are ultimately compelled to judge the +character of God from his workmanship. An attack on the moral character +of the world is, therefore, an attack on the character of its maker. And +the Theist proceeded to find a moral justification for all that God had +done. + +So far all is clear. But now comes a certain kind of Non-Theist. And he, +always rejecting a formal Theism and substituting evolution, proceeds to +claim for his formula all that the Theist claimed for his. He also +strives to show that the idea of cosmic evolution involves conceptions +of nobility, justice, morality, etc. There is no wonder that some +Christians round on him, and tell him that he still believes in a god. +Substantially he does. That is, he carries over into his new camp the +same anthropomorphic conception of the workings of nature, and uses the +same pseudo-scientific reasoning that is characteristic of the Theist. +He has formally given up God, but he goes about uncomfortably burdened +with his ghost. + +Now, evolution is not a fiat, but a formula. It has nothing whatever to +do with progress, as such, nor with morality, as such, nor with a +levelling up, nor a levelling down. It is really no more than a special +application of the principle of causation, and whether the working out +of that principle has a good effect or a bad one, a moralizing, or a +demoralizing, a progressive, or a retrogressive consequence is not +"given" in the principle itself. Fundamentally, all cosmic phenomena +present us with two aspects--difference and change--and that is so +because it is the fundamental condition of our knowing anything at all. +But the law of evolution is no more, is nothing more serious or more +profound than an attempt to express those movements of change and +difference in a more or less precise formula. It aims at doing for +phenomena in general exactly what a particular scientific law aims at +doing for some special department. But it has no more a moral +implication, or a progressive implication than has the law of +gravitation or of chemical affinity. The sum of those changes that are +expressed in the law of evolution may result in one or the other; it has +resulted in one or the other. At one time we call its consequences moral +or progressive, at another time we call them immoral or retrogressive, +but these are some of the distinctions which the human mind creates for +its own convenience, they have no validity in any other sense. And when +we mistake these quite legitimate distinctions, made for our own +convenience, and argue as though they had an actual independent +existence, we are reproducing exactly the same mental confusion that +keeps Theism alive. + +The two aspects that difference and change resolve themselves into when +expressed in an evolutionary formula are, in the inorganic world, +equilibrium, and, in the organic world, adaptation. Of course, +equilibrium also applies to the organic world, I merely put it this way +for the purpose of clarity. Now, if we confine our attention to the +world of animal forms, what we have expressed, primarily, is the fact of +adaptation. If an animal is to live it must be adapted to its +surroundings to at least the extent of being able to overcome or to +neutralize the forces that threaten its existence. That is quite a +common-place, since all it says is that to live an animal must be fit to +live, but all great truths are common-places--when one sees them. Still, +if there were only adaptations to consider, and if the environment to +which adaptation is to be secured, remained constant, all we should have +would be the deaths of those not able to live, with the survival of +those more fortunately endowed. There would be nothing that we could +call, even to please ourselves, either progress or its reverse. Movement +up or down (both human landmarks) occurs because the environment itself +undergoes a change. Either the material conditions change, or the +pressure of numbers initiates a contest for survival, although more +commonly one may imagine both causes in operation at the same time. But +the consequence is the introduction of a new quality into the struggle +for existence. It becomes a question of a greater endowment of the +qualities that spell survival. And that paves the way to progress--or +the reverse. But one must bear in mind that, whether the movement be in +one direction or the other, it is still the same process that is at +work. Evolution levels neither "up" nor "down." Up and down is as +relative in biology as it is in astronomy. In nature there is neither +better nor worse, neither high nor low, neither good nor bad, there are +only differences, and if that had been properly appreciated by all, very +few of the apologies for Theism would ever have seen the light. + +There is not the slightest warranty for speaking of evolution as being a +"progressive force," it is, indeed, not a force at all, but only a +descriptive term on all fours with any other descriptive term as +expressed in a natural law. It neither, of necessity, levels up nor +levels down. In the animal world it illustrates adaptation only, but +whether that adaptation involves what we choose to call progression or +retrogression is a matter of indifference. On the one hand we have +aquatic life giving rise to mammalian life, and on the other hand, we +have mammalian life reverting to an aquatic form of existence. In one +place we have a "lower" form of life giving place to a "higher" form. In +another place we can see the reverse process taking place. And the +"lower" forms are often more persistent than the "higher" ones, while, +as the course of epidemical and other diseases shows certain lowly forms +of life may make the existence of the higher forms impossible. The +Theistic attempt to disprove the mechanistic conception of nature by +insisting that evolution is a law of progress, that it implies an end, +and indicates a goal, is wholly fallacious. From a scientific point of +view it is meaningless chatter. Science knows nothing of a plan, or an +end in nature, or even progress. All these are conceptions which we +humans create for our own convenience. They are so many standards of +measurement, of exactly the same nature as our agreement that a certain +length of space shall be called a yard, or a certain quantity of liquid +shall be called a pint. To think otherwise is pure anthropomorphism. It +is the ghost of God imported into science. + +So far, then, it is clear that the universal fact in nature is change. +The most general aspect of nature which meets us is that expressed in +the law of evolution. And proceeding from the more general to the less +general, in the world of living beings this change meets us in the form +of adaptation to environment. But what constitutes adaptation must be +determined by the nature of the environment. That will determine what +qualities are of value in the struggle for existence, which is not +necessarily a struggle against other animals, but may be no more than +the animal's own endeavours to persist in being. It is, however, in +relation to the environment that we must measure the value of qualities. +Whatever be the nature of the environment that principle remains true. +Ideally, one quality may be more desirable than another, but if it does +not secure a greater degree of adaptation to the environment it brings +no advantage to its possessor. It may even bring a positive +disadvantage. In a thieves' kitchen the honest man is handicapped. In a +circle of upright men the dishonest man is at a discount. In the +existing political world a perfectly truthful man would be a +parliamentary failure. In the pulpit a preacher who knew the truth about +Christianity and preached it would soon be out of the Church. +Adaptation is not, as such, a question of moral goodness or badness, it +is simply adaptation. + +A precautionary word needs be said on the matter of environment. If we +conceive the environment as made up only of the material surroundings we +shall not be long before we find ourselves falling into gross error. For +that conception of environment will only hold of the very lowest +organisms. A little higher, and the nature of the organism begins to +have a modifying effect on the material environment, and when we come to +animals living in groups the environment of the individual animal +becomes partly the habits and instincts of the other animals with which +it lives. Finally, when we reach man this transformation of the nature +of the environment becomes greatest. Here it is not merely the existence +of other members of the same species, with all their developed feelings +and ideas to which each must become adapted to live, but in virtue of +what we have described above as the social medium, certain "thought +forms" such as institutions, conceptions of right and wrong, ideals of +duty, loyalty, the relation of one human group to other human groups, +not merely those that are now living, but also those that are dead, are +all part of the environment to which adjustment must be made. And in the +higher stages of social life these aspects of the environment become of +even greater consequence than the facts of a climatic, geographic, or +geologic nature. In other words, the environment which exerts a +predominating influence on civilized mankind is an environment that has +been very largely created by social life and growth. + +If we keep these two considerations firmly in mind we shall be well +guarded against a whole host of fallacies and false analogies that are +placed before us as though they were unquestioned and unquestionable +truths. There is, for instance, the misreading of evolution which +asserts that inasmuch as what is called moral progress takes place, +therefore evolution involves a moral purpose. We find this view put +forward not only by avowed Theists, but by those who, while formally +disavowing Theism, appear to have imported into ethics all the false +sentiment and fallacious reasoning that formerly did duty in bolstering +up the idea of God. Evolution, as such, is no more concerned with an +ideal morality than it is concerned with the development of an ideal +apple dumpling. In the universal process morality is no more than a +special illustration of the principle of adaptation. The morality of man +is a summary of the relations between human beings that must be +maintained if the two-fold end of racial preservation and individual +development are to be secured. Fundamentally morality is the formulation +in either theory or practice of rules or actions that make group-life +possible. And the man who sees in the existence or growth of morality +proof of a "plan" or an "end" is on all fours with the mentality of the +curate who saw the hand of Providence in the fact that death came at the +end of life instead of in the middle of it. What we are dealing with +here is the fact of adaptation, although in the case of the human group +the traditions and customs and ideals of the group form a very important +part of the environment to which adaptation must be made and have, +therefore, a distinct survival value. The moral mystery-monger is only a +shade less objectionable than the religious mystery-monger, of whom he +is the ethical equivalent. + +A right conception of the nature of environment and the meaning of +evolution will also protect us against a fallacy that is met with in +connection with social growth. Human nature, we are often told, is +always the same. To secure a desired reform, we are assured, you must +first of all change human nature, and the assumption is that as human +nature cannot be changed the proposed reform is quite impossible. + +Now there is a sense in which human nature is the same, generation after +generation. But there is another sense in which human nature is +undergoing constant alteration, and, indeed, it is one of the +outstanding features of social life that it should be so. So far as can +be seen there exists no difference between the fundamental capacities +possessed by man during at least the historic period. There are +differences in people between the relative strengths of the various +capacities, but that is all. An ancient Assyrian possessed all the +capacities of a modern Englishman, and in the main one would feel +inclined to say the same of them in their quantitative aspect as well as +in their qualitative one. For when one looks at the matter closely it is +seen that the main difference between the ancient and the modern man is +in expression. Civilization does not so much change the man so much as +it gives a new direction to the existing qualities. Whether particular +qualities are expressed in an ideally good direction or the reverse +depends upon the environment to which they react. + +To take an example. The fundamental evil of war in a modern state is +that it expends energy in a harmful direction. But war itself, the +expression of the war-like character, is the outcome of pugnacity and +the love of adventure without which human nature would be decidedly the +poorer, and would be comparatively ineffective. It is fundamentally an +expression of these qualities that lead to the quite healthy taste for +exploration, discovery, and in intellectual pursuits to that contest of +ideas which lies at the root of most of our progress. And what war means +in the modern State is that the love of competition and adventure, the +pugnacity which leads a man to fight in defence of a right or to redress +a wrong, and without which human nature would be a poor thing, are +expended in the way of sheer destruction instead of through channels of +adventure and healthy intellectual contest. Sympathies are narrowed +instead of widened, and hatred of the stranger and the outsider, of +which a growing number of people in a civilized country are becoming +ashamed, assumes the rank of a virtue. In other words, a state of war +creates an environment--fortunately for only a brief period--which gives +a survival value to such expressions of human capacity as indicate a +reversion to a lower state of culture. + +We may put the matter thus. While conduct is a function of the organism, +and while the _kind_ of reaction is determined by structure, the _form_ +taken by the reaction is a matter of response to environmental +influences. It is this fact which explains why the capacities of man +remain fairly constant, while there is a continuous redirecting of these +capacities into new channels suitable to a developing social life. + +We are only outlining here a view of evolution that would require a +volume to discuss and illustrate adequately, but enough has been said to +indicate the enormous importance of the educative power of the +environment. We cannot alter the capacities of the individual for they +are a natural endowment. But we can, in virtue of an increased emphasis, +determine whether they shall be expressed in this or that direction. The +love of adventure may, for example, be exhausted in the pursuit of some +piratical enterprise, or it may be guided into channels of some useful +form of social effort. It lies with society itself to see that the +environment is such as to exercise a determining influence with regard +to expressions of activity that are beneficial to the whole of the +group. + +To sum up. Evolution is no more than a formula that expresses the way in +which a moving balance of forces is brought about by purely mechanical +means. So far as animal life is concerned this balance is expressed by +the phrase "adaptation to environment." But in human society the +environment is in a growing measure made up of ideas, customs, +traditions, ideals, and beliefs; in a word, of factors which are +themselves products of human activities. And it is for this reason that +the game of civilization is very largely in our own hands. If we +maintain an environment in which it is either costly or dangerous to be +honest and fearless in the expression of opinion, we shall be doing our +best to develop mental cowardice and hypocrisy. If we bring up the young +with the successful soldier or money-maker before them as examples, +while we continue to treat the scientist as a crank, and the reformer as +a dangerous criminal, we shall be continuing the policy of forcing the +expression of human capacity on a lower level than would otherwise be +the case. If we encourage the dominance of a religion which while making +a profession of disinterested loftiness continues to irradiate a narrow +egotism and a pessimistic view of life, we are doing our best to +perpetuate an environment which emphasizes only the poorer aspects of +human motive. Two centuries of ceaseless scientific activity have taught +us something of the rules of the game which we are all playing with +nature whether we will or no. To-day we have a good many of the winning +cards in our hands, if we will only learn to play them wisely. It is not +correct to say that evolution necessarily involves progress, but it does +indicate that wisdom and foresight may so control the social forces as +to turn that ceaseless change which is indicated by the law of evolution +into channels that make for happiness and prosperity. + + + + +CHAPTER XII. + +DARWINISM AND DESIGN. + + +The influence of the hypothesis of evolution on religion was not long in +making itself felt. Professor Huxley explained the rapid success of +Darwinism by saying that the scientific world was ready for it. And much +the same thing may be said of the better representatives of the +intellectual world with regard to the bearing of evolution on religion. +In many directions the cultivated mind had for more than half a century +been getting familiar with the general conception of growth in human +life and thought. Where earlier generations had seen no more than a +pattern to unravel there had developed a conviction that there was a +history to trace and to understand. Distant parts of the world had been +brought together during the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, +readers and students were getting familiarized with the mass of customs +and religious ideas that were possessed by these peoples, and it was +perceived that beneath the bewildering variety of man's mental output +there were certain features which they had in common, and which might +hold in solution some common principle or principles. + +This common principle was found in the conception of evolution. It was +the one thing which, if true, and apart from the impossible idea of a +revelation, nicely graduated to the capacities of different races, +offered an explanation of the religions of the world in terms more +satisfactory than those of deliberate invention or imposture. Once it +was accepted, if only as an instrument of investigation, its use was +soon justified. And the thorough-going nature of the conquest achieved +is in no wise more clearly manifested than in the fact that the +conception of growth is, to-day, not merely an accepted principle with +scientific investigators, it has sunk deeply into all our literature and +forms an unconscious part of popular thought. + +One aspect of the influence of evolution on religious ideas has already +been noted. It made the religious idea but one of the many forms that +were assumed by man's attempt to reduce his experience of the world to +something like an orderly theory. But that carried with it, for +religion, the danger of reducing it to no more than one of the many +theories of things which man forms, with the prospect of its rejection +as a better knowledge of the world develops. Evolution certainly +divested religion of any authority save such as it might contain in +itself, and that is a position a religious mind can never contemplate +with equanimity. + +But so far as the theory of Darwinism is concerned it exerted a marked +and rapid influence on the popular religious theory of design in nature. +This is one of the oldest arguments in favour of a reasoned belief in +God, and it is the one which was, and is still in one form or another, +held in the greatest popular esteem. To the popular mind--and religion +in a civilized country is not seriously concerned about its failing grip +on the cultured intelligence so long as it keeps control of the ordinary +man and woman--to the popular mind the argument from design appealed +with peculiar force. Anyone is capable of admiring the wonders of +nature, and in the earlier developments of popular science the marvels +of plant and animal structures served only to deepen the Theist's +admiration of the "divine wisdom." The examples of complexity of +structure, of the interdependence of parts, and of the thousand and one +cunning devices by which animal life maintains itself in the face of a +hostile environment were there for all to see and admire. And when man +compared these with his own conscious attempts to adapt means to ends, +there seemed as strong proof here as anywhere of some scheming +intelligence behind the natural process. + +But the strength of the case was more apparent than real. It was weakest +at the very point where it should have been strongest. In the case of a +human product we know the purpose and can measure the extent of its +realization in the nature of the result. In the case of a natural +product we have no means of knowing what the purpose was, or even if any +purpose at all lies behind the product. The important element in the +argument from design--that of purpose--is thus pure assumption. In the +case of human productions we argue from purpose to production. In the +case of a natural object we are arguing from production to an assumed +purpose. The analogy breaks down just where it should be strongest and +clearest. + +Now it is undeniable that to a very large number of the more thoughtful +the old form of the argument from design received its death blow from +the Darwinian doctrine of natural selection. In the light of this theory +there was no greater need to argue that intelligence was necessary to +produce animal adaptations than there was to assume intelligence for the +sifting of sand by the wind. As the lighter grains are carried farthest +because they are lightest, so natural selection, operating upon organic +variations, favoured the better adapted specimens by killing off the +less favoured ones. The fittest is not created, it survives. The world +is not what it is because the animal is what it is, the animal is what +it is because the world is as it is. It cannot be any different and +live--a truth demonstrated by the destruction of myriads of animal +forms, and by the disappearance of whole species. The case was so plain, +the evidence so conclusive, that the clearer headed religionists dropped +the old form of the argument from design as no longer tenable. + +But the gentleman who exchanged the errors of the Church of Rome for +those of the Church of England is always with us. And the believer in +deity having dropped the argument from design in one form immediately +proceeded to revive it in another. This was, perhaps, inevitable. After +all, man lives in this world, and if proof of the existence of deity is +to be gathered from his works, it must be derived from the world we +know. So design _must_ be found somewhere, and it must be found here. +Only one chance was left. The general hypothesis of evolution--either +Darwinism alone, or Darwinism plus other factors--explained the +development of animal life. But that was _within_ the natural process. +What, then, of the process as a whole? If the hand of God could not be +seen in the particular adaptations of animal life, might it not be that +the whole of the process, in virtue of which these particular +adaptations occurred, might be the expression of the divine +intelligence? God did not create the particular parts directly, but may +he not have created the whole, leaving it for the forces he had set in +motion to work out his "plan." The suggestion was attractive. It +relieved religion from resting its case in a region where proof and +disproof are possible, and removed it to a region where they are +difficult, if not impossible. So, as it was not possible to uphold the +old teleology, one began to hear a great deal of the "wider teleology," +which meant that the Theist was thinking vaguely when he imagined he was +thinking comprehensively, and that, because he had reached a region +where the laws of logic could not be applied, he concluded that he had +achieved demonstration. And, indeed, when one gets outside the region of +verification there is nothing to stop one theorizing--save a dose of +common-sense and a gracious gift of humour. + +In another work (_Theism or Atheism_) I have dealt at length with the +argument from design. At present my aim is to take the presentation of +this "wider teleology" as given by a well-known writer on philosophical +subjects, Mr. F. C. S. Schiller, in a volume published a few years ago +entitled _Humanism: Philosophical Essays_. And in doing so, it is +certain that the theologian will lose nothing by leaving himself in the +hands of so able a representative. + +Mr. Schiller naturally accepts Darwinism as at least an important factor +in organic evolution, but he does not believe that it excludes design, +and he does believe that "our attitude towards life will be very +different, according as we believe it to be inspired and guided by +intelligence or hold it to be the fortuitous product of blind +mechanisms, whose working our helpless human intelligence can observe, +but cannot control." + +Now within its scope Darwinism certainly does exclude design, and even +though the forces represented by natural selection may be directed +towards the end produced, yet so far as the play of these forces is +concerned they are really self-directing, or self-contained. The +argument really seems to be just mere theology masquerading as +philosophy. Theories do play some part in the determination of the +individual attitude towards life, but they do not play the important +part that Mr. Schiller assumes they play. It is easily observable that +the same theory of life held by a Christian in England and by another +Christian in Asia Minor has, so far as it affects conduct, different +results. And if it be said that even though the results be different +they are still there, the reply is that they differ because the facts of +life compel an adjustment in terms of the general environment. Mr. +Schiller admits that the "prevalent conduct and that adapted to the +conditions of life must coincide," and the admission is fatal to his +position. The truth of the matter is that the conditions of life being +what they are, and the consequences of conduct being also what they are, +speculative theories of life cannot, in the nature of the case, affect +life beyond a certain point; that is, if life is to continue. That is +why in the history of belief religious teachings have sooner or later to +accommodate themselves to persistent facts. + +Mr. Schiller brings forward two arguments in favour of reconciling +Darwinism and Design, both of them ingenious, but neither of them +conclusive. With both of these I will deal later; but it is first +necessary to notice one or two of his arguments against a non-Theistic +Darwinism. The denial of the argument from design, he says, leads +farther than most people imagine:-- + + A complete denial of design in nature must deny the efficacy of all + intelligence as such. A consistently mechanical view has to regard + all intelligence as otiose, as an "epi-phenomenal by-product" or + fifth wheel to the cart, in the absence of which the given results + would no less have occurred. And so, if this view were the truth, + we should have to renounce all effort to direct our fated and + ill-fated course down the stream of time. Our consciousness would + be an unmeaning accident. + +A complete reply to this would involve an examination of the meaning +that is and ought to be attached to "intelligence," and that is too +lengthy an enquiry to be attempted here. It is, perhaps, enough to +point out that Mr. Schiller's argument clearly moves on the assumption +that intelligence is a _thing_ or a quality which exists, so to speak, +in its own right and which interferes with the course of events as +something from without. It is quite probable that he would repudiate +this construction being placed on his words, but if he does not mean +that, then I fail to see what he does mean, or what force there is in +his argument. And it is enough for my purpose to point out that +"intelligence" or mind is not a thing, but a relation. It asserts of a +certain class of actions exactly what "gravitation" asserts of a certain +class of motion, and "thingness" is no more asserted in the one case +than it is in the other. + +Intelligence, as a name given to a special class of facts or actions, +remains, whatever view we take of its nature, and it is puzzling to see +why the denial of extra natural intelligence--that is, intelligence +separated from all the conditions under which we know the phenomenon of +intelligence--should be taken as involving the denial of the existence +of intelligence as we know it. Intelligence as connoting purposive +action remains as much a fact as gravity or chemical attraction, and +continues valid concerning the phenomena it is intended to cover. All +that the evolutionist is committed to is the statement that it is as +much a product of evolution as is the shape or colouring of animals. It +is not at all a question of self-dependence. Every force in nature must +be taken for what it is worth, intelligence among them. Why, then, does +the view that intelligence is both a product of evolution and a cause of +another phase of evolution land us in self-contradiction, or make the +existence of itself meaningless? The truth is that intelligence +determines results exactly as every other force in nature determines +results, by acting as a link in an unending sequential chain. And the +question as to what intelligence is _per se_ is as meaningless as what +gravitation is _per se_. These are names which we give to groups of +phenomena displaying particular and differential characteristics, and +their purpose is served when they enable us to cognize and recognize +these phenomena and to give them their place and describe their function +in the series of changes that make up our world. + +Mr. Schiller's reply to this line of criticism is the familiar one that +it reduces human beings to automata. He says:-- + + The ease with which the Darwinian argument dispenses with + intelligence as a factor in survival excites suspicion. It is + proving too much to show that adaptation might equally well have + arisen in automata. For we ourselves are strongly persuaded that we + are not automata and strive hard to adapt ourselves. In us at + least, therefore, intelligence _is_ a source of adaptation.... + Intelligence therefore is a _vera causa_ as a source of adaptations + at least co-ordinate with Natural Selection, and this can be denied + only if it is declared inefficacious _everywhere_; if all living + beings, including ourselves, are declared to be automata. + +One is compelled again to point out that Darwinism does not dispense +with intelligence as a factor in survival, except so far as the +intelligence which determines survival is declared to be operating apart +from the organisms which survive. The conduct of one of the lower +animals which reacts only to the immediate promptings of its environment +is of one order, but the response of another animal not merely to the +immediate promptings of the environment, but to remote conditions, as +in the selection of food or the building of a home of some sort, or to +the fashioning of a tool, does obviously give to the intelligence +displayed a distinct survival value. And that effectively replies to the +triumphant conclusion, "If intelligence has no efficacy in promoting +adaptations, _i.e._, if it has no survival value, how comes it to be +developed at all?" + +Darwinism would never have been able to dispense with intelligence in +the way it did but for the fact that the opposite theory never stood for +more than a mere collection of words. That species are or were produced +by the operations of "Divine Intelligence" is merely a grandiloquent way +of saying nothing at all. It is absurd to pretend that such a formula +ever had any scientific value. It explains nothing. And it is quite +obvious that some adaptations do, so far as we know, arise without +intelligence, and are, therefore, to use Mr. Schiller's expression, +automata. (I do not like the word, since it conveys too much the notion +of someone behind the scenes pulling strings.) And it is on his theory +that animals actually are automata. For if there be a "Divine mind" +which stands as the active cause of the adaptations that meet us in the +animal world, and who arranges forces so that they shall work to their +pre-destined end, what is that but converting the whole of the animal +world into so many automata. One does not escape determinism in this +way; it is only getting rid of it in one direction in order to +reintroduce it in another. + +And one would like to know what our conviction that we are not automata +has to do with it. Whether the most rigid determinism is true or not is +a matter to be settled by an examination of the facts and a careful +reflection as to their real significance. No one questions that there is +a persuasion to the contrary; if there were not there would be nothing +around which controversy could gather. But it is the conviction that is +challenged, and it is idle to reply to the challenge by asserting a +conviction to the contrary. The whole history of human thought is the +record of a challenge and a reversal of such convictions. There never +was a conviction which was held more strenuously than that the earth was +flat. The experience of all men in every hour of their lives seemed to +prove it. And yet to-day no one believes it. The affirmation that we are +"free" rests, as Spinoza said, ultimately on the fact that all men know +their actions and but few know the causes thereof. A feather endowed +with consciousness, falling to the ground in a zigzag manner, might be +equally convinced that it determined the exact spot on which it would +rest, yet its persuasion would be of no more value than the "vulgar" +conviction that we independently adapt ourselves to our environment. + +Mr. Schiller's positive arguments in favour of reconciling Darwinism +with design--one of them is really negative;--are concerned with (1) the +question of variation, and (2) with the existence of progress. On the +first question it is pointed out that while Natural Selection operates +by way of favouring certain variations, the origin or cause of these +variations remains unknown. And although Mr. Schiller does not say so in +as many words, there is the implication, if I rightly discern his drift, +that there is room here for a directing intelligence, inasmuch as +science is at present quite unable to fully explain the causes of +variations. We are told that Darwin assumed for the purpose of his +theory that variations were indefinite both as to character and extent, +and it is upon these variations that Natural Selection depends. This +indefinite variation Mr. Schiller asserts to be a methodological device, +that is, it is something assumed as the groundwork of a theory, but +without any subsequent verification, and it is in virtue of this +assumption that intelligence is ruled out of evolution. And inasmuch as +Mr. Schiller sees no reason for believing that variations are of this +indefinite character, he asserts that there is in evolution room for a +teleological factor, in other words, "a purposive direction of +variations." + +Now it hardly needs pointing out to students of Darwinism that +indefinite variation is the equivalent of "a variation to which no exact +limits can be placed," and in this sense the assumption is a perfectly +sound one. From one point of view the variations must be definite, that +is, they can only occur within certain limits. An elephant will not vary +in the direction of wings, nor will a bird in the direction of a rose +bush. But so long as we cannot fix the exact limits of variation we are +quite warranted in speaking of them as indefinite. That this is a +methodological device no one denies, but so are most of the other +distinctions that we frame. Scientific generalizations consist of +abstractions, and Mr. Schiller himself of necessity employs the same +device. + +Mr. Schiller argues, quite properly, that while Natural Selection states +the conditions under which animal life evolves, it does not state any +reason why it should evolve. Selection may keep a species stationary or +it may even cause it to degenerate. Both are fairly common phenomena in +the animal and plant world. Moreover, if there are an indefinite number +of variations, and if they tend in an indefinite number of directions, +then the variation in any one direction can never be more than an +infinitesimal portion of the whole, and that this one should persist +supplies a still further reason for belief in "a purposive direction of +variations." Mr. Schiller overlooks an important point here, but a very +simple one. It is true that any one variation is small in relation to +the whole of the possible or actual number of variations. But it is not +in relation to quantity but quality that survival takes place, and in +proportion to the keenness of the struggle the variation that gives its +possessor an advantage need only be of the smaller kind. In a struggle +of endurance between two athletes it is the one capable of holding out +for an extra minute who carries off the prize. + +Further, as Mr. Schiller afterwards admits, the very smallness of the +number of successful variations makes against intelligence rather than +for it, and he practically surrenders his position in the statement, +"the teleological and anti-teleological interpretation of events will +ever decide their conflict by appealing to the facts; for in the facts +each finds what it wills and comes prepared to see." After this lame +conclusion it is difficult to see what value there is in Mr. Schiller's +own examination of the "facts." Not that it is strictly correct to say +that the facts bear each view out equally. They do not, and Mr. Schiller +only justifies his statement by converting the Darwinian position, which +is teleologically negative, into an affirmative. The Darwinian, he says, +denies intelligence as a cause of evolution. What the Darwinian does is +to deny the validity of the evidence which the teleologist brings to +prove his case. The Theist asserts mind as a cause of evolution. The +Darwinian simply points out that the facts may be explained in quite +another way and without the appeal to a quite unknown factor. + +And here one might reasonably ask, why, if there is a directive mind at +work, are there variations at all? Why should the "directive +intelligence" not get earlier to work, and instead of waiting until a +large number of specimens have been produced and then looking them over +with a view to "directing" the preservation of the better specimens, why +should it not set to work at the beginning and see that only the +desirable ones make their appearance? Certainly that is what a mere +human intelligence would do if it could. But it is characteristic of the +"Divine Intelligence" of the Theist that it never seems to operate with +a tenth part of the intelligence of an ordinary human being. + +Moreover, Mr. Schiller writes quite ignoring the fact that the +"directive intelligence" does not direct the preservation of the better +specimens. What it does, if it does anything at all, is to kill off the +less favoured ones. Natural Selection--the point is generally overlooked +by the Theistic sentimentality of most of our writers--does not preserve +anything. Its positive action is not to keep alive but to kill. It does +not take the better ones in hand and help them. It seizes on all it can +and kills them. It is the difference between a local council that tried +to raise the standard of health by a general improvement of the +conditions of life, and one that aimed at the same end by killing off +all children that failed to come up to a certain standard. The actual +preservation of a better type is, so far as Natural Selection is +concerned, quite accidental. So far as Natural Selection operates it +does so by elimination, not by preservation. + +Mr. Schiller's other plea in favour of Design is concerned with the +conception of progress. He points out that while degeneration and +stagnation both occur in nature, yet-- + + life has been on the whole progressive; but progress and + retrogression have both been effected under the same law of Natural + Selection. How, then, can the credit of that result be ascribed to + Natural Selection? Natural Selection is equally ready to bring + about degeneration or to leave things unchanged. How, then, can it + be that which determines which of the three possible (and actual) + cases shall be realized?... It cannot be Natural Selection that + causes one species to remain stationary, another to degenerate, a + third to develop into a higher form.... Some variable factor must + be added to Natural Selection. + +But why? Evolution, as we have pointed out in a previous chapter, makes +for adaptation in terms of animal preservation. If the adaptation of an +animal to its environment is secured by "degenerating" or "developing" +or by remaining stationary, it will do one of the three. That is the +normal consequence of Natural Selection, and it is surprising that Mr. +Schiller does not see this. He is actually accusing Natural Selection of +not being able to do what it does on his own showing. The proof he +himself gives of this operation of Natural Selection in the examples he +cites of its ineffectiveness. If Natural Selection could not make for +degeneration or development, in what way would it be able to establish +an equilibrium between an animal and its surroundings? Really, there is +nothing that so strengthens one's conviction of the truth of the +Freethought position so much as a study of the arguments that are +brought against it. + +Mr. Schiller is really misled, and so misleads his readers by an +unjustifiable use of the word "progress." He says that evolution has +been, on the whole, progressive, and appeals to "progress" as though it +were some objective fact. But that is not the case. There is no +"progress" in the animal world, there is only change. We have dealt with +this in a previous chapter, and there is no need to again labour the +point. "Progress" is a conception which we ourselves frame, and we +measure a movement towards or away from this arbitrary standard of ours +in terms of better or worse, higher or lower. But nature knows nothing +of a higher or a lower, it knows only of changing forms more or less +fitted to live in the existing environment. Scientifically, life has +not progressed, it has persisted, and a _sine qua non_ of its +persistence has been adaptation to environment. + +Progress, then, is not a "natural" fact, but a methodological one. It is +a useful word and a valuable ideal. I am not protesting against its use, +only against its misuse. It is one of the many abstractions created by +thinkers, and then worshipped as a reality by those who forget the +origin and purpose of its existence. And in this we can see one of the +fatal legacies we have inherited from Theistic methods of thinking. The +belief that things are designed to be as they are comes to us from those +primitive methods of thinking which personify and vitalize all natural +phenomena. We have outgrown the crude frame of mind which saw direct +volitional action in a storm or in the movements of natural forces. The +development of civilized and scientific thinking has removed these +conceptions from the minds of educated men and women, but it has left +behind it as a residuum the habit of looking for purpose where none +exists, and of reading into nature as objective facts our own +generalizations and abstractions. And so long as we have not outgrown +that habit we are retaining a fatal bar to exact scientific thinking. + +Finally, and this consideration is fatal to any theory of design such as +Mr. Schiller champions, adaptation is not a special quality of one form +of existence, but a universal quality of all. There is not a greater +degree of adaptation here and a less degree there, but the same degree +in every case. There is no other meaning to adaptation except that of +adjustment to surroundings. But whether an animal lives or dies, whether +it is higher or lower, deformed or perfect, the adjustment is the same. +That is, every form of existence represents the product of forces that +have made it what it is, and the same forces could not have produced +anything different. Every body in existence, organic or inorganic, +constitutes in ultimate analysis a balance of the forces represented by +it. It is not possible, therefore, for the Theist to say that design is +evidenced by adaptation in one case and its absence in another. There is +adaptation in every case, even though it may not be the adaptation we +should like to see. It is not possible for the Theist to say that the +_degree_ of adaptation is greater in the one case than in the other, for +_that_ is the same in every case. What needs to be done if design is to +be established is to prove that the forces we see at work could not have +produced the results that emerge without the introduction of a factor +not already given in our experience. Anything else is mere waste of +time. + + + + +CHAPTER XIII. + +ANCIENT AND MODERN. + + +In the preceding chapters we have, without saying it in so many words, +been emphasizing the modern as against the ancient point of view. The +distinction may not at first glance appear to be of great moment, and +yet reflection will prove it to be of vital significance. It expresses, +in a sentence, the essence of the distinction between the Freethinker +and the religionist. Objectively, the world in which we are living is +the same as that in which our ancestors lived. The same stars that +looked down upon them look down upon us. Natural forces affected them as +they affect us. Even the play of human passion and desire was the same +with them as with us. Hunger and thirst, love and hatred, cowardice and +courage, generosity and greed operate now as always. The world remains +the same in all its essential features; what alters is our conception of +it--in other words, the point of view. + +The question thus resolves itself into one of interpretation. +Freethinker and religionist are each living in the same world, they are +each fed with the same foods and killed with the same poisons. The same +feelings move both and the same problems face both. Their differences +are constituted by the canon of interpretation applied. It is on this +issue that the conflict between religion and science arises. For +religion is not, as some have argued, something that is supplementary or +complementary to science, nor does it deal with matters on which +science is incompetent to express an opinion. Religion and science face +each other as rival interpretations of the same set of facts, precisely +as the Copernican and the Ptolemaic systems once faced each other as +rival interpretations of astronomical phenomena. If the one is true the +other is false. You may reject the religious or the scientific +explanation of phenomena, but you cannot logically accept both. As Dr. +Johnson said, "Two contradictory ideas may inhere in the same mind, but +they cannot both be correct." + +Now while it is true that in order to understand the present we must +know the past, and that because the present is a product of the past, it +is also true that a condition of understanding is to interpret the past +by the present. In ordinary affairs this is not questioned. When +geologists set out to explain the causes of changes in the earth's +surface, they utilize the present-day knowledge of existing forces, and +by prolonging their action backward explain the features of the period +they are studying. When historians seek to explain the conduct of, say +Henry the Eighth, they take their knowledge of the motives animating +existing human nature, and by placing that in a sixteenth century +setting manage to present us with a picture of the period. So, again, +when the thirteenth century monkish historian gravely informs us that a +particular epidemic was due to the anger of God against the wickedness +of the people, we put that interpretation on one side and use our own +knowledge to find in defective social and sanitary conditions the cause +of what occurred. Illustrations to the same end may be found in every +direction. It is, indeed, not something that one may accept or reject as +one may take or leave a political theory, it is an indispensible +condition of rational thinking on any subject whatsoever. + +Accepted everywhere else, it is in connection with religion that one +finds this principle, not openly challenged, for there are degrees of +absurdity to which even the most ardent religionist dare not go, but it +is quietly set on one side and a method adopted which is its practical +negation. Either the procedure is inverted and the present is +interpreted by the past, as when it is assumed that because God did +certain things in the past therefore he will continue to do the same +things in the present, or it is assumed that the past was unlike the +present, and, therefore, the same method of interpretation cannot be +applied to both cases. Both plans have the effect of landing us, if not +in lunacy, at least well on the way to it. + +It is indispensible to the religionist to ignore the principle above +laid down. For if it is admitted that human nature is always and +everywhere the same, and that natural forces always and everywhere act +in the same manner, religious beliefs are brought to the test of their +conformity with present day knowledge of things and all claim to +objective validity must be abandoned. Yet the principle is quite clear. +The claim of the prophets of old to be inspired must be tested by what +we know of the conditions of "inspiration" to-day, and not by what +unenlightened people thought of its nature centuries ago. Whether the +story of the Virgin Birth is credible or not must be settled by an +appeal to what we know of the nature of animal procreation, and not by +whether our faith urges us to accept the statement as true. To act +otherwise is to raise an altogether false issue, the question of +evidence is argued when what is really at issue is that of credibility. +It is not at all a matter of whether there is evidence enough to +establish the reality of a particular recorded event, but whether our +actual knowledge of natural happenings is not enough for us to rule it +out as objectively untrue, and to describe the conditions which led to +its being accepted as true. + +Let us take as an illustration of this the general question of miracles. +The _Oxford Dictionary_ defines a miracle as "A marvellous event +occurring within human experience which cannot have been brought about +by human power or by the operation of any natural agency, and must, +therefore, be ascribed to the special intervention of the deity or some +supernatural being." That is a good enough definition, and is certainly +what people have had in mind when they have professed a belief in +miracles. A miracle must be something marvellous, that is, it must be +unusual, and it must not be even conceivably explainable in terms of the +operation of natural forces. If it is admitted that what is claimed as a +miracle might be explained as the result of natural forces provided our +knowledge was extensive enough and exact enough, it is confessed that +miracle and ignorance are convertible terms. And while that may be true +enough as a matter of fact, it would never suit the religious case to +admit it in so many words. + +Nor would it make the case any better to argue that the alleged miracle +has been brought about by some superior being with a much greater +knowledge of nature than man possesses, but which the latter may one day +acquire. That is placing a miracle on the same level as a performance +given by a clever conjuror, which puzzles the onlooker because he lacks +the technical knowledge requisite to understand the methods employed. A +miracle to be a miracle must not be in accordance with natural laws, +known or unknown, it must contravene them or suspend their operation. + +On the other hand, the demand made by some critics of the miraculous, +namely, that the alleged miracle shall be performed under test +conditions, is absurd, and shows that they have not grasped the +essential point at issue. The believer's reply to such a demand is plain +and obvious. He says, a miracle is by its nature a rare event, it is +performed under special circumstances to serve a special purpose. Where, +then, is the reason in asking that this miracle shall be re-performed in +order to convince certain people that it has already occurred? To +arrange for the performance of a miracle is an absurdity. For it to +become common is to destroy both its character as a miracle and the +justification for its existence. A miracle must carry its own evidence +or it fails of its purpose and ceases to be a miracle at all. Discussion +on these lines ends, at best, in a stalemate. + +It is just as wide of the mark to discuss miracles as though it were a +question of evidence. What possible evidence could there be, for +example, that Jesus fed five thousand people with a few loaves and +fishes, and had basketfuls left at the end of the repast? Suppose it +were possible to produce the sworn testimony of the five thousand +themselves that they had been so fed. Would that produce conviction? +Would it do any more than prove that they believed the food had been so +expanded or multiplied that it was enough for them all? It would be +convincing, perhaps, as proof of an act of belief. But would it prove +any more than that? Would it prove that these five thousand were not the +victims of some act of deception or of some delusion? A belief in a +miracle, whether the belief dates from two thousand years since or from +last week, proves only--belief. And the testimony of a Salvation Army +convert as to the truth of the resurrection of Jesus Christ is as good, +as evidence, as though we had the sworn testimony of the twelve +apostles, with that of the grave-diggers thrown in. + +The truth is that the question of belief in the miraculous has nothing +whatever to do with evidence. Miracles are never established by +evidence, nor are they disproved by evidence, that is, so long as we use +the term evidence with any regard to its judicial significance. What +amount or what kind of evidence did the early Christians require to +prove the miracles of Christianity? Or what evidence did our ancestors +require to prove to them that old women flew through the air on +broomsticks, or bewitched cows, or raised storms? Testimony in volumes +was forthcoming, and there is not the slightest reason for doubting its +genuineness. But what amount or kind of evidence was required to +establish the belief? Was it evidence to which anyone to-day would pay +the slightest regard? The slightest study of the available records is +enough to show that the question of evidence had nothing whatever to do +with the production of the belief. + +And, on the other hand, how many people have given up the belief in +miracles as a result of a careful study of the evidence against them? I +have never heard of any such case, although once a man disbelieves in +miracles he may be ready enough to produce reasons to justify his +disbelief in them. The man who begins to weigh evidence for and against +miracles has already begun to disbelieve them. + +The attitude of children in relation to the belief in fairies may well +be taken to illustrate the attitude of the adult mind in face of the +miraculous. No evidence is produced to induce the belief in fairies, and +none is ever brought forward to induce them to give it up. At one stage +of life it is there, at another it is gone. It is not reasoned out or +evidenced out, it is simply outgrown. In infancy the child's conception +of life is so inchoate that there is room for all kinds of fantastic +beliefs. In more mature years certain beliefs are automatically ruled +out by the growth of a conception of things which leaves no room for +beliefs that during childhood seemed perfectly reasonable. + +Now this is quite on all-fours with the question of miracles. The issue +is essentially one of psychology. Belief or disbelief is here mainly +determined by the psychological medium in which one lives and moves. +Given a psychological medium which is, scientifically, at its lowest, +and the belief in the miraculous flourishes. At the other extreme +miracles languish and decay. Tell a savage that the air is alive with +good and bad spirits and he will readily believe you. Tell it to a man +with a genuine scientific mind and he will laugh at you. Tell a peasant +in some parts of the country that someone is a witch and he will at once +believe it. Tell it to a city dweller and it will provide only occasion +for ridicule. People who accept miracles believe them before they +happen. The expressed belief merely registers the fact. Miracles never +happen to those who do not believe in them; as has been said, they never +occur to a critic. Those who reject miracles do so because their +acceptance would conflict with their whole conception of nature. That is +the sum and substance of the matter. + +A further illustration may be offered in the case of the once much +debated question of the authenticity of the books of the New Testament +and the historicity of the figure of Jesus. It appears to have been +assumed that if it could be shown that the books of the New Testament +were not contemporary records the case against the divinity of Jesus was +strengthened. On the other hand it was assumed that if these writings +represented the narratives of contemporaries the case for the truth of +the narratives was practically proven. In reality this was not the vital +issue at all. It would be, of course, interesting if it could be shown +that there once existed an actual personage around whom these stories +gathered, but it would make as little difference to the real question at +issue as the demonstration of the Baconian authorship of _Hamlet_ would +make in the psychological value of the play. + +Suppose then it were proven that a person named Jesus actually existed +at a certain date in Judea, and that this person is the Jesus of the New +Testament. Suppose it be further proven, or admitted, that the followers +whom this person gathered around him believed that he was born of a +virgin, performed a number of miracles, was crucified, and then rose +from the dead, and that the New Testament represents their written +memoirs. Suppose all this to be proven or granted, what has been +established? Simply this. That a number of people believed these things +of someone whom they had known. But no Freethinker need seriously +concern himself to disprove this. He may, indeed, take it as the data of +the problem which he sets out to solve. The scientific enquirer is not +really concerned with the New Testament as a narrative of fact any more +than he is concerned with Cotton Mather's _Invisible World Displayed_ as +a narrative of actual fact. What he is concerned with is the frame of +mind to which these stories seemed true, and the social medium which +gave such a frame of mind a vogue. It is not at all a question of +historical evidence, but of historical psychology. It is not a question +of the honesty of the witnesses, but of their ability, not whether they +wished to tell the truth, or intended to tell the truth, but whether +they were in a position to know what the truth was. We have not to +discuss whether these events occurred, such a proposition is an insult +to a civilized intelligence, the matter for discussion is the +conditions that bring such beliefs into existence and the conditions +that perpetuate them. + +The development of social life and of education thus shifts the point of +view from the past to the present. To understand the past we do not ask +what was it that people believed concerning the events around them, but +what do we know of the causes which produce beliefs of a certain kind. +Thus, we do not really reject the story of Jesus turning water into wine +because we are without legal evidence that he ever did anything of the +kind, but because, knowing the chemical constituents of both water and +wine we know that such a thing is impossible. It is only possible to an +uninstructed mind to which water and wine differ only in taste or +appearance. We do not reject the story of the demoniacs in the New +Testament because we have no evidence that these men were possessed of +devils, or that Jesus cast them out, but because we have exactly the +same phenomena with us to-day and know that it comes within the province +of the physician and not of the miracle worker. It is not a matter of +evidence whether a man rose from the dead or not, or whether he was born +of a virgin or not, but solely a question of examining these and similar +stories in the light of present day knowledge. The "evidence" offered is +proof only of belief, and no one ever questioned the existence of that. +And if the proof of belief is required there is no need to go back a +couple of thousand years or to consult ancient records. The testimony of +a present day believer, and the account of a revival meeting such as one +may find in any religious newspaper will serve equally well. As is so +often the case, the evidence offered is not merely inadequate, it is +absolutely irrelevant. + +Past events must be judged in the light of present knowledge. That is +the golden rule of guidance in judging the world's religious legends. +And that canon is fatal to their pretensions. On the one hand we see in +the life of contemporary savages and in that of semi-civilized peoples +all the conditions and the beliefs that meet us in the Bible and among +the early Christians. And with our wider and more exact knowledge we are +able to take exactly the same phenomena that impressed those of an +earlier generation and explain them without the slightest reference to +supernatural powers or beings. The modern mind is really not looking +round for evidence to disprove the truth of Christian legends. It knows +they are not true. There is no greater need to prove that the miracles +of Christianity never occurred, than there is to prove that an old woman +never raised a storm to wreck one of the kings of England. The issue has +been changed from one of history to one of psychology. It is the present +that of necessity sits in judgment on the past, and it is in the light +of the knowledge of the present that the religions of the past stand +condemned. + + + + +CHAPTER XIV. + +MORALITY WITHOUT GOD. + + +The mystery-monger flourishes almost as well in ethics as he does in +theology. Indeed, in some respects he seems to have forsaken one field +of exercise only to find renewed scope in the other. He approaches the +consideration of moral questions with the same hushed voice and +"reverential" air that is so usual in theology, and talks of the mystery +of morality with the same facility that he once talked about the mystery +of godliness--and with about an equal amount of enlightenment to his +hearers or readers. + +But the mystery of morality is nearly all of our own making. Essentially +there is no more mystery in morality than there is in any other question +that may engage the attention of mankind. There are, of course, problems +in the moral world as there are in the physical one, and he would be a +fool who pretended to the ability to satisfactorily solve them all. The +nature of morality, the causes that led to the development of moral +"laws," and still more to the development of a sense of morality, all +these are questions upon which there is ample room for research and +speculation. But the talk of a mystery is misleading and mystifying. It +is the chatter of the charlatan, or of the theologian, or of the partly +liberated mind that is still under the thraldom of theology. In ethics +we have exactly the same kind of problem that meets us in any of the +sciences. We have a fact, or a series of facts, and we seek some +explanation of them. We may fail in our search, but that is not +evidence of a "mystery," it is proof only of inadequate knowledge, of +limitations that we may hope the future will enable us to overcome. + +For the sake of clarity it will be better to let the meaning of morality +emerge from the discussion rather than to commence with it. And one of +the first things to help to clear the mind of confusion is to get rid of +the notion that there is any such thing as moral "laws" which correspond +in their nature to law as the term is used in science. In one sense +morality is not part of physical nature at all. It is characteristic of +that part of nature which is covered by the human--at most by the higher +animal--world. Nature can only, therefore, be said to be moral in the +sense that the term "Nature" includes all that is. In any other sense +nature is non-moral. The sense of values, which is, as we shall see, of +the essence of the conception of morality, nature knows nothing of. To +speak of nature punishing us for _bad_ actions or rewarding us for +_good_ ones is absurd. Nature neither punishes nor rewards. She meets +actions with consequences, and is quite indifferent to any moral +consideration. If I am weakly, and go out on a cold, wet night to help +someone in distress, nature does not act differently than it would if I +had gone out to commit a murder. I stand exactly the same chances in +either case of contracting a deadly chill. It is not the moral value of +an action with which natural forces are concerned, but merely with the +action, and in that respect nature never discriminates between the good +man and the bad, between the sinner and the saint. + +There is another sense in which moral laws differ from natural laws. We +can break the former but not the latter. The expression so often used, +"He broke a law of nature," is absurd. You cannot break a law of +nature. You do not break the law of gravitation when you prevent a stone +falling to the ground; the force required to hold it in the air is an +illustration of the law. It is, indeed, one of the proofs that our +generalization does represent a law of nature that it cannot be +"broken." For broken is here only another word for inoperative, and a +law of nature that is inoperative is non-existent. But in the moral +sphere we are in a different world. We not only can break moral laws, we +do break them; that is one of the problems with which our teachers and +moralisers have constantly to deal. Every time we steal we break the law +"Thou shalt not steal." Every time we murder we break the law "Thou +shalt not kill." We may keep moral laws, we ought to keep them, but we +can, quite clearly, break them. Between a moral law and a law of nature +there is plainly a very radical distinction. The discovery of that +distinction will, I think, bring us to the heart of the subject. + +Considering man as merely a natural object, or as a mere animal, there +is only one quality that nature demands of him. This is efficiency. +Nature's sole law is here "Be Strong." How that strength and efficiency +is secured and maintained is of no consequence whatever. The heat he +requires, the food he needs may be stolen from others, but it will +serve. The food will not nourish the less, the fire will not warm the +less. So long as efficiency is acquired it is a matter of absolute +indifference how it is secured. Considered as a mere animal object it is +difficult to see that morality has any meaning at all for man. It is +when we come to regard him in his relation to others that we begin to +see the meaning and significance of morality emerge. + +Now one of the first things that strike us in connection with moral laws +or rules is that they are all statements of relation. Such moral +commands as "Thou shalt not steal," "Thou shalt not kill," the commands +to be truthful, kind, dutiful, etc., all imply a relation to others. +Apart from this relation moral rules have simply no meaning whatever. By +himself a man could neither steal, nor lie, nor do any of the things +that we habitually characterize as immoral. A man living by himself on +some island would be absolved from all moral law; it would have no +meaning whatever for him. He would be neither moral nor immoral, he +would simply be without the conditions that make morality possible. But +once bring him into relations with his kind and his behaviour begins to +have a new and peculiar significance, not alone to these others, but +also to himself. What he does affects them, and also affects himself so +far as they determine the character of his relations to these others. He +must, for example, either work with them or apart from them. He must +either be on his guard against their securing their own efficiency at +his expense, or rest content that a mutual forbearance and trust will +govern their association. To ignore them is an impossibility. He must +reckon with these others in a thousand and one different ways, and this +reckoning will have its effect on the moulding of his nature and upon +theirs. + +Morality, then, whatever else it may be, is primarily the expression of +a relation. And the laws of morality are, consequently, a summary or +description of those relations. From this point of view they stand upon +exactly the same level as any of the arts or sciences. Moral actions are +the subject matter of observation, and the determination of their +essential quality or character is by the same methods as we determine +the essential quality of the "facts" in chemistry or biology. The task +before the scientific enquirer is, therefore, to determine the +conditions which give to moral rules or "laws" their meaning and +validity. + +One of the conditions of a moral action has already been pointed out. +This is that all moral rules imply a relation to beings of a similar +nature. A second feature is that conduct represents a form of +efficiency, it is a special feature of the universal biological fact of +adaptation. And the question of why man has a "moral sense" is really on +all fours with, and presents no greater mystery than is involved in, the +question of why man has digestive organs, and prefers some kinds of food +to others. Substantially, the question of why man should prefer a diet +of meat and potatoes to one of prussic acid is exactly the question of +why society should discourage certain actions and encourage others, or +why man's moral taste should prefer some forms of conduct to other +forms. The answer to both questions, while differing in form, is the +same in substance. + +Man as we know him is always found as a member of a group, and his +capacities, his feelings, and tastes must always be considered in +relation to that fact. But considering man merely as an animal, and his +conduct as merely a form of adaptation to environment, the plain +consideration which emerges is that even as an individual organism he is +compelled, in order to live, to avoid certain actions and to perform +others, to develop certain tastes and to form certain distastes. To take +our previous illustration it would be impossible for man to develop a +liking for life-destroying foods. It is one of the conditions of living +that he shall eat only that food which sustains life, or that he shall +abstain from eating substances which destroy it. But conduct at that +stage is not of the kind which considers the reasons for acting; indeed, +life cannot be based upon considered action, however much reason may +justify the actions taken. Further, as all conscious action is prompted +by the impulse to do what is pleasant and to avoid what is unpleasant, +it follows, as Spencer pointed out, that the course of evolution sets up +a close relation between actions that are pleasurable in the performance +and actions that are life preserving. It is one of the conditions of the +maintenance of life that the pleasurable and the beneficial shall in the +long run coincide. + +When we take man as a member of a group we have the same principle in +operation, even though the form of its expression undergoes alteration. +To begin with, the mere fact of living in a group implies the growth of +a certain restraint in one's relations to, and of reciprocity in dealing +with, others. Men can no more live together without some amount of trust +and confidence in each other, or without a crude sense of justice in +their dealings with each other, than an individual man can maintain his +life by eating deadly poisons. There must be a respect for the rights of +others, of justice in dealing with others, and of confidence in +associating with others, at least to the extent of not threatening the +possibility of group life. There are rules in the game of social life +that must be observed, and in its own defence society is bound to +suppress those of its members who exhibit strong anti-social tendencies. +No society can, for example, tolerate homicide as an admitted practice. +There is, thus, from the earliest times, a certain form of elimination +of the anti-social character which results in the gradual formation of +an emotional and mental disposition that habitually and instinctively +falls into line with the requirements of the social whole. + +To use an expression of Sir Leslie Stephen's, man as a member of the +group becomes a cell in the social tissue, and his fitness to survive is +dependent upon, positively, his readiness to perform such actions as the +welfare of the group require, and, negatively, upon his refraining from +doing those things that are inimical to social welfare.[23] Moreover, +there is the additional fact that the group itself is, as a whole, +brought into contact with other groups, and the survival of one group as +against another is determined by the quality and the degree of cohesion +of its units. From this point of view, participation in the life of the +group means more than refraining from acts that are injurious to the +group, it involves some degree of positive contribution to social +welfare. + +[23] The question of what are the things that are essential to the +welfare of the group, and the fact that individuals are often suppressed +for doing what they believe is beneficial to the group, with the kindred +fact that there may exist grave differences of opinion on the matter, +does not alter the essential point, which is that there must exist +sufficient conformity between conduct and group welfare to secure +survival. + +But the main thing to note is that from the very dawn of animal life the +organism is more or less under the pressure of a certain discipline that +tends to establish an identity between actions which there is a tendency +to perform and those that are beneficial to the organism. In the social +state we simply have this principle expressed in another way, and it +gives a degree of conscious adaptation that is absent from the +pre-social or even the lower forms of the social state. It is in the +truly social state also that we get the full influence of what may be +called the characteristically human environment, that is, the operation +of ideas and ideals. The importance of this psychological factor in the +life of man has been stressed in an earlier chapter. It is enough now to +point out that from the earliest moment the young human being is, by a +process of training, imbued with certain ideals of truthfulness, +loyalty, duty, etc., all of which play their part in the moulding of his +character. However much these ideals may vary in different societies, +the fact of the part played by them in moulding character is plain. They +are the dominant forces in moulding the individual to the social state, +even while the expressions of the social life may be in turn checked by +the fact that social conduct cannot persist if it threatens those +conditions upon which the persistence of life ultimately depends. + +There is one other consideration that must be noted. One very pregnant +fact in life is that nature seldom creates a new organ. What it usually +does is to refashion an old one, or to devote an old one to new uses. +This principle may be seen clearly in operation in connection with moral +evolution. On the one hand the various forces that play upon human +nature drive the moral feelings deeper into it. On the other hand it +develops them by their steady expansion over a wider area. Whether it is +an actual fact or not--I do not stress it because the point is the +subject of discussion--it is at least possible that the earliest human +group is the family. And so long as that was the case such feelings of +right and wrong as then existed will have been confined to the family. +But when a group of families combine and form the tribe, all those +feelings of confidence, justice, etc., which were formerly +characteristic of the smaller group are expanded to cover the larger +one. With the expansion of the tribe to the nation we have a further +development of the same phenomenon. There is no new creation, there is +nothing more than expansion and development. + +The process does not and cannot, obviously, stop here. From the tribe to +the nation, from the nation to the collection of nations which we call +an empire, and from the empire to the whole of humanity. That seems the +inevitable direction of the process, and there does not require profound +insight to see it already on the way. Development of national life +involves a growing interdependence of the world of humankind. Of hardly +any nation can it be said to-day that it is self-supporting or +self-contained or independent. There is nothing national or sectarian in +science, and it is to science that we have to look for our principal +help. All over the world we utilize each other's discoveries and profit +by each other's knowledge. Even economic interdependence carries with it +the same lesson. The human environment gets gradually broader and wider, +and the feelings that have hitherto been expanded over the narrower area +have now to be expanded over the wider one. It is the gradual +development of a human nature that is becoming adapted to a conception +of mankind as an organic unit. Naturally, in the process of adaptation +there is conflict between the narrower ideals, conserved in our +educational influences, and the wider ones. There are still large +numbers of those who, unable to picture the true nature of the +evolutionary process owing to their own defective education, yet think +of the world in terms of a few centuries ago, and still wave the flag of +a political nationalism as though that were the end of social growth, +instead of its being an early and transient expression of it. But this +conflict is inevitable, and the persistence of that type can no more +ensure its permanent domination than the persistence of the medicine man +in the person of the existing clergyman can give permanence to the +religious idea. + +There is, then, no mystery about the fact of morality. It is no more of +a mystery than is the compilation of the multiplication table, and it +has no greater need of a supernatural sanction than has the law of +gravitation. Morality is a natural fact, and its enforcement and growth +are brought about by natural means. In its lower form, morality is no +more than an expression of those conditions under which social life is +possible, and in its higher one, an expression of those ideal conditions +under which corporate life is desirable. In studying morality we are +really studying the physiology of associated life, and that study aims +at the determination of the conditions under which the best form of +living is possible. It is thus that here, as elsewhere, man is thrown +back upon himself for enlightenment and help. And if the process is a +slow one we may at least console ourselves with the reflection that the +labours of each generation are making the weapons which we bring to the +fight keener and better able to do their work. + + + + +CHAPTER XV. + +MORALITY WITHOUT GOD. + +(_Continued._) + + +In the preceding chapter I have been concerned with providing the most +meagre of skeleton outlines of the way in which our moral laws and our +moral sense have come into existence. To make this as clear as possible +the chapter was restricted to exposition. Controversial points were +avoided. And as a matter of fact there are many religionists who might +concede the truth of what has been said concerning the way in which +morality has arisen, and the nature of the forces that have assisted in +its development. But they would proceed to argue, as men like Mr. +Balfour and Mr. Benjamin Kidd, with others of the like, have argued, +that a natural morality lacks all coercive power. The Freethought +explanation of morality, they say, is plausible enough, and may be +correct, but in conduct we have to deal not merely with the correctness +of things but with sanctions and motives that exercise a compulsive +influence on men and women. The religionist, it is argued, has such a +compulsive force in the belief in God and in the effect on our future +life of our obedience or disobedience to his commands. But what kind of +coercion can a purely naturalistic system of morals exert? If a man is +content to obey the naturalistic command to practise certain virtues and +to abstain from certain vices, well and good. But suppose he chooses to +disregard it. What then? Above all, on what compulsion is a man to +disregard his own inclinations to act as seems desirable to himself, +and not in conformity with the general welfare? We disregard the +religious appeal as pure sentimentalism, or worse, and we at once +institute an ethical sentimentalism which is, in practice, foredoomed to +failure. + +Or to put the same point in another way. Each individual, we say, should +so act as to promote the general welfare. Freethinker and religionist +are in agreement here. And so long as one's inclinations jump with the +advice no difficulty presents itself. But suppose a man's inclinations +do not run in the desired direction? You tell him that he must act so as +to promote the general well-being, and he replies that he is not +concerned with the promotion of the public welfare. You say that he +_ought_ to act differently, and he replies, "My happiness must consist +in what I regard as such, not in other people's conception of what it +should be." You proceed to point out that by persisting in his present +line of conduct he is laying up trouble for the future, and he retorts, +"I am willing to take the risk." What is to be done with him? Can +naturalism show that in acting in that way a man is behaving +unreasonably, that is, in the sense that he can be shown to be really +acting against his own interests, and that if he knew better he would +act differently? + +Now before attempting a reply to this it is worth while pointing out +that whatever strength there may be in this criticism when directed +against naturalism, it is equally strong when directed against +supernaturalism. We can see this at once if we merely vary the terms. +You tell a man to act in this or that way "in the name of God." He +replies, "I do not believe in God," and your injunction loses all force. +Or, if he believes in God, and you threaten him with the pains and +penalties of a future life, he may reply, "I am quite willing to risk a +probable punishment hereafter for a certain pleasure here." And it is +certain that many do take the risk, whether they express their +determination to do so in as many words or not. + +What is a supernaturalist compelled to do in this case? His method of +procedure is bound to be something like the following. First of all he +will seek to create assent to a particular proposition such as "God +exists, and also that a belief in his existence creates an obligation to +act in this or that manner in accordance with what is believed to be his +will." That proposition once established, his next business will be to +bring the subject's inclinations into line with a prescribed course of +action. He is thus acting in precisely the same manner as is the +naturalist who starts from an altogether different set of premises. And +both are resting their teaching of morals upon an intellectual +proposition to which assent is either implied or expressed. And that +lies at the basis of all ethical teaching--not ethical practice, be it +observed, but teaching. The precise form in which this intellectual +proposition is cast matters little. It may be the existence of God, or +it may be a particular view of human nature or of human evolution, but +it is there, and in either case the authoritative character of moral +precepts exists for such as accept it, and for none other. Moral +practice is rooted in life, but moral theory is a different matter. + +So far, then, it is clear that the complaint that Freethought ethics has +nothing about it of a compulsive or authoritative character is either a +begging of the question or it is absurd. + +Naturalistic ethics really assert three things. The first is that the +continuance of life ensures the performance of a certain level of +conduct, conduct being merely one of the means by which human beings +react to the necessities of their environment. Second, it asserts that +a proper understanding of the conditions of existence will in the +normally constituted mind strengthen the development of a feeling of +obligation to act in such and such a manner; and that while all +non-reasonable conduct is not immoral, all immoral conduct is +fundamentally irrational. Third, there is the further assumption that at +bottom individual and general welfare are not contradictory, but two +aspects of the same thing. + +Concerning the second point, Sir Leslie Stephen warns us (_Science of +Ethics_, p. 437) that every attempt so to state the ethical principle +that disobedience will be "unreasonable" is "doomed to failure in a +world which is not made up of working syllogisms." And for the other two +points Professor Sorley (_Ethics of Naturalism_, p. 42) tells us that +"It is difficult ... to offer any consideration fitted to convince the +individual that it is reasonable for him to seek the happiness of the +community rather than his own"; while Mr. Benjamin Kidd asserts that +"the interests of the individual and those of the social organism are +not either identical or capable of being reconciled, as has been +necessarily assumed in all those systems of ethics which have sought to +establish a naturalistic basis of conduct. The two are fundamentally and +inherently irreconcilable, and a large proportion of the existing +individuals at any time have ... no personal interest whatever in the +progress of the race, or in the social development we are undergoing." + +It has already been said that however difficult it may be to establish +the precise relationship between reason and ethical commands, such a +connection must be assumed, whether we base our ethics on naturalistic +or supernaturalistic considerations. And it cannot be denied by anyone +to-day that a causal relation must exist between actions and their +consequences, whether those causal consequences be of the natural and +non-moral kind, or of the more definitely moral order such as exists in +the shape of social approval and disapproval. And if we once grant that, +then it seems quite allowable to assume that provided a man perceives +the reason underlying moral judgments, and also the justification for +the sense of approval and disapproval expressed, we have as much reason +for calling his conduct reasonable or unreasonable as we have for +applying the same terms to a man's behaviour in dressing in view of the +variations of the temperature. + +Consequently, while I agree that _in the present state of knowledge_ it +is impossible in all cases to demonstrate that immoral conduct is +irrational in the sense that it would be unreasonable to refuse assent +to a mathematical proposition, there seems no justification for +regarding such a state of things as of necessity permanent. If a +scientific system of ethics consists in formulating rules for the +profitable guidance of life, not only does their formulation presuppose +a certain constancy in the laws of human nature and of the world in +general, but the assumption is also involved that one day it may be +possible to give to moral laws the same precision that now is attached +to physiological laws and to label departure from them as "unreasonable" +in a very real sense of the word. + +The other objection that it is impossible to establish a "reasonable" +relation between individual and social well-being arises from a dual +confusion as to what is the proper sphere of ethics, and of the mutual +relation of the individual and society. To take an individual and ask, +"Why should he act so as to promote the general welfare?" is to imply +that ethical rules may have an application to man out of relation with +his fellows. That, we have already seen, is quite wrong, since moral +rules fail to be intelligible once we separate man from his fellows. +Discussing ethics while leaving out social life is like discussing the +functions of the lungs and leaving out of account the existence of an +atmosphere. + +If, then, instead of treating the individual and society as two distinct +things, either of which may profit at the expense of the other, we treat +them as two sides of the same thing, each an abstraction when treated +alone, the problem is simplified, and the solution becomes appreciably +easier. For the essential truth here is that just as there is no such +thing as a society in the absence of the individuals composing it, so +the individual, as we know him, disappears when we strip him of all that +he is in virtue of his being a part of the social structure. Every one +of the characteristic human qualities has been developed in response to +the requirements of the social medium. It is in virtue of this that +morality has anything of an imperative nature connected with it, for if +man is, to use Sir Leslie Stephen's phrase, a cell in the social tissue, +receiving injury as the body social is injured, and benefitting as it is +benefitted, then the refusal of a man to act so that he may promote the +general welfare can be shown to be unreasonable, and also unprofitable +to the individual himself. In other words, our efficiency as an +individual must be measured in terms of our fitness to form part of the +social structure, and consequently the antithesis between social and +personal well-being is only on the surface. Deeper knowledge and a more +exact understanding reveals them as two sides of the same fact. + +It may be granted to Mr. Kidd that "a large proportion of the existing +individuals at any time" have no _conscious_ interest in "the progress +of the race or in the development we are undergoing," and that is only +what one would expect, but it would be absurd to therefore come to the +conclusion that no such identity of interest exists. Moliere's +character, who all his life had been talking prose without knowing it, +is only a type of the majority of folk who all their lives are acting in +accordance with principles of which they are ignorant, and which they +may even repudiate when they are explained to them. From one point of +view the whole object of a scientific morality is to awaken a conscious +recognition of the principles underlying conduct, and by this means to +strengthen the disposition to right action. We make explicit in language +what has hitherto been implicit in action, and thus bring conscious +effort to the aid of non-conscious or semi-conscious behaviour. + +In the light of the above consideration the long and wordy contest that +has been waged between "Altruists" and "Egoists" is seen to be very +largely a waste of time and a splutter of words. If it can be shown on +the one hand that all men are not animated by the desire to benefit +self, it is as easy to demonstrate that so long as human nature is human +nature, all conduct must be an expression of individual character, and +that even the morality of self-sacrifice is self-regarding viewed from +the personal feelings of the agent. And it being clear that the position +of Egoist and Altruist, while each expressing a truth, is neither +expressing the whole truth, and that each does in fact embody a definite +error, it seems probable that here, as in so many other cases, the truth +lies between the two extremes, and that a reconciliation may be effected +along these lines. + +Taking animal life as a whole it is at least clear that what are called +the self-regarding feelings must come first in order of development. +Even with the lower races of human beings there is less concern shown +with the feelings and welfare of others than is the case with the +higher races of men. Or, again, with children we have these feelings +strongest in childhood and undergoing a gradual expansion as maturity is +reached. This is brought about, as was shown in the last chapter, not by +the destruction of existing feelings, but by their extension to an ever +widening area. There is a transformation, or an elaboration of existing +feelings under the pressure of social growth. One may say that ethical +development does not proceed by the destruction of the feeling of +self-interest, so much as by its extension to a wider field. Ethical +growth is thus on all fours with biological growth. In biology we are +all familiar with the truth that maintenance of life is dependent upon +the existence of harmonious relations between an organism and its +environment. Yet it is not always recognized that this principle is as +true of the moral self as it is of the physical structure, nor that in +human evolution the existence of others becomes of increasing importance +and significance. For not only do I have to adapt myself, mentally and +morally, to the society now existing, but also to societies that have +long since passed away and have left their contribution to the building +up of _my_ environment in the shape of institutions and beliefs and +literature. + +We have in this one more illustration that while the environment of the +animal is overwhelmingly physical in character, that of man tends to +become overwhelmingly social or psychological. Desires are created that +can only be gratified by the presence and the labour of others. Feelings +arise that have direct reference to others, and in numerous ways a body +of "altruistic" feeling is created. So by social growth first, and +afterwards by reflection, man is taught that the only life that is +enjoyable to himself is one that is lived in the companionship and by +the co-operation of others. As Professor Ziegler well puts the +process:-- + + Not only on the one hand does it concern the interests of the + general welfare that every individual should take care of himself + outwardly and inwardly; maintain his health; cultivate his + faculties and powers; sustain his position, honour, and worth, and + so his own welfare being secured, diffuse around him happiness and + comfort; but also, on the other hand, it concerns the personal, + well understood interests of the individual himself that he should + promote the interests of others, contribute to their happiness, + serve their interests, and even make sacrifices for them. Just as + one forgoes a momentary pleasure in order to secure a lasting and + greater enjoyment, so the individual willingly sacrifices his + personal welfare and comfort for the sake of society in order to + share in the welfare of this society; he buries his individual + well-being in order that he may see it rise in richer and fuller + abundance in the welfare and happiness of the whole community + (_Social Ethics_, pp. 59-60). + +These motives are not of necessity conscious ones. No one imagines that +before performing a social action each one sits down and goes through a +more or less elaborate calculation. All that has been written on this +head concerning a "Utilitarian calculus" is poor fun and quite beside +the mark. In this matter, as in so many others, it is the evolutionary +process which demands consideration, and generations of social struggle, +by weeding out individuals whose inclinations were of a pronounced +anti-social kind, and tribes in which the cohesion between its members +was weak, have resulted in bringing about more or less of an +identification between individual desires and the general welfare. It is +not a question of conscious evolution so much as of our becoming +conscious of an evolution that is taking place, and in discussing the +nature of morals one is bound to go beyond the expressed reasons for +conduct--more often wrong than right--and discover the deeper and truer +causes of instincts and actions. When this is done it will be found that +while it is absolutely impossible to destroy the connection between +conduct and self-regarding actions, there is proceeding a growing +identity between the gratification of desire and the well-being of the +whole. This will be, not because of some fantastical or ascetic teaching +of self-sacrifice, but because man being an expression of social life is +bound to find in activities that have a social reference the beginning +and end of his conduct. + +The fears of a morality without God are, therefore, quite unfounded. If +what has been said be granted, it follows that all ethical rules are +primarily on the same level as a generalization in any of the sciences. +Just as the "laws" of astronomy or of biology reduce to order the +apparently chaotic phenomena of their respective departments, so ethical +laws seek to reduce to an intelligible order the conditions of +individual and social betterment. There can be no ultimate antithesis +between individual reason and the highest form of social conduct, +although there may exist an apparent conflict between the two, chiefly +owing to the fact that we are often unable to trace the remote effects +of conduct on self and society. Nor can there be an ultimate or +permanent conflict between the true interests of the individual and of +society at large. That such an opposition does exist in the minds of +many is true, but it is here worthy of note that the clearest and most +profound thinkers have always found in the field of social effort the +best sphere for the gratification of their desires. And here again we +may confidently hope that an increased and more accurate appreciation +of the causes that determine human welfare will do much to diminish +this antagonism. At any rate it is clear that human nature has been +moulded in accordance with the reactions of self and society in such a +way that even the self has become an expression of social life, and with +this dual aspect before us there is no reason why emphasis should be +laid on one factor rather than on the other. + +To sum up. Eliminating the form of coercion that is represented by a +policeman, earthly or otherwise, we may safely say that a naturalistic +ethics has all the coercive force that can be possessed by any system. +And it has this advantage over the coercive force of the +supernaturalist, that while the latter tends to weaken with the advance +of intelligence, the former gains strength as men and women begin to +more clearly appreciate the true conditions of social life and +development. It is in this way that there is finally established a +connection between what is "reasonable" and what is right. In this case +it is the function of reason to discover the forces that have made for +the moralization--really the socialization--of man, and so strengthen +man's moral nature by demonstrating the fundamental identity between his +own welfare and that of the group to which he belongs. That the coercion +may in some cases be quite ineffective must be admitted. There will +always, one fancies, be cases where the personal character refuses to +adapt itself to the current social state. That is a form of +mal-adaptation which society will always have to face, exactly as it has +to face cases of atavism in other directions. But the socializing and +moralizing process continues. And however much this may be, in its +earlier stages, entangled with conceptions of the supernatural, it is +certain that growth will involve the disappearance of that factor here +as it has done elsewhere. + + + + +CHAPTER XVI. + +CHRISTIANITY AND MORALITY. + + +The association of religion with morality is a very ancient one. This is +not because the one is impossible without the other, we have already +shown that this is not the case. The reason is that unless religious +beliefs are associated with certain essential social activities their +continuance is almost impossible. Thus it happens in the course of +social evolution that just in proportion as man learns to rely upon the +purely social activities to that extent religion is driven to dwell more +upon them and to claim kinship with them. + +While this is true of religions in general, it applies with peculiar +force to Christianity. And in the last two or three centuries we have +seen the emphasis gradually shifted from a set of doctrines, upon the +acceptance of which man's eternal salvation depends, to a number of +ethical and social teachings with which Christianity, as such, has no +vital concern. The present generation of Christian believers has had +what is called the moral aspect of Christianity so constantly impressed +upon them, and the essential and doctrinal aspect so slurred over, that +many of them have come to accept the moral teaching associated with +Christianity as its most important aspect. More than that, they have +come to regard the immense superiority of Christianity as one of those +statements the truth of which can be doubted by none but the most +obtuse. To have this alleged superiority of Christian ethical teaching +questioned appears to them proof of some lack of moral development on +the part of the questioner. + +To this type of believer it will come with something of a shock to be +told quite plainly and without either circumlocution or apology that his +religion is of an intensely selfish and egoistic character, and that its +ethical influence is of a kind that is far from admirable. It will shock +him because he has for so long been told that his religion is the very +quintessence of unselfishness, he has for so long been telling it to +others, and he has been able for so many generations to make it +uncomfortable for all those who took an opposite view, that he has +camouflaged both the nature of his own motives and the tendency of his +religion. + +From one point of view this is part of the general scheme in virtue of +which the Christian Church has given currency to the legend that the +doctrines taught by it represented a tremendous advance in the +development of the race. In sober truth it represented nothing of the +kind. That the elements of Christian religious teaching existed long +before Christianity as a religious system was known to the world is now +a commonplace with all students of comparative religions, and is +admitted by most Christian writers of repute. Even in form the Christian +doctrines represented but a small advance upon their pagan prototypes, +but it is only when one bears in mind the fact that the best minds of +antiquity were rapidly throwing off these superstitions and leading the +world to a more enlightened view of things, we realize that in the main +Christianity represented a step backward in the intellectual evolution +of the race. What we then see is Christianity reaffirming and +re-establishing most of the old superstitions in forms in which only the +more ignorant classes of antiquity accepted them. We have an assertion +of demonism in its crudest forms, an affirmation of the miraculous that +the educated in the Roman world had learned to laugh at, and which is +to-day found among the savage people of the earth, while every form of +scientific thought was looked upon as an act of impiety. The scientific +eclipse that overtook the old pagan civilization was one of the +inevitable consequences of the triumph of Christianity. From the point +of view of general culture the retrogressive nature of Christianity is +unmistakable. It has yet to be recognized that the same statement holds +good in relation even to religion. One day the world will appreciate the +fact that no greater disaster ever overtook the world than the triumph +of the Christian Church. + +For the moment, however, we are only concerned with the relation of +Christianity to morality. And here my thesis is that Christianity is an +essentially selfish creed masking its egoistic impulses under a cover of +unselfishness and self-sacrifice. To that it will probably be said that +the charge breaks down on the fact that Christian teaching is full of +the exhortation that this world is of no moment, that we gain salvation +by learning to ignore its temptations and to forgo its pleasures, and +that it is, above all other faiths, the religion of personal sacrifice. +And that this teaching is there it would be stupid to deny. But this +does not disprove what has been said, indeed, analysis only serves to +make the truth still plainer. That many Christians have given up the +prizes of the world is too plain to be denied; that they have forsaken +all that many struggle to possess is also plain. But when this has been +admitted there still remains the truth that there is a vital distinction +in the consideration of whether a man gives up the world in order to +save his own soul, or whether he saves his soul as a consequence of +losing the world. In this matter it is the aim that is important, not +only to the outsider who may be passing judgment, but more importantly +to the agent himself. It is the effect of the motive on character with +its subsequent flowering in social life that must be considered. + +The first count in the indictment here is that the Christian appeal is +essentially a selfish one. The aim is not the saving of others but of +one's self. If other people must be saved it is because their salvation +is believed to be essential to the saving of one's own soul. That this +involves, or may involve, a surrender of one's worldly possessions or +comfort, is of no moment. Men will forgo many pleasures and give up much +when they have what they believe to be a greater purpose in view. We see +this in directions quite unconnected with religion. Politics will show +us examples of men who have forsaken many of what are to others the +comforts of life in the hopes of gaining power and fame. Others will +deny themselves many pleasures in the prospect of achieving some end +which to them is of far greater value than the things they are +renouncing. And it is the same principle that operates in the case of +religious devotees. There is no reason to doubt but that when a young +woman forsakes the world and goes into a cloister she is surrendering +much that has considerable attractions for her. But what she gives is to +her of small importance to what she gains in return. And if one believed +in Christianity, in immortal damnation, with the intensity of the great +Christian types of character, it would be foolish not to surrender +things of so little value for others of so great and transcendent +importance. + +To do Christians justice they have not usually made a secret of their +aim. Right through Christian literature there runs the teaching that it +is the desire of personal and immortal salvation that inspires them, and +they have affirmed over and over again that but for the prospect of +being paid back with tremendous interest in the next world they could +see no reason for being good in this one. That is emphatically the +teaching of the New Testament and of the greatest of Christian +characters. You are to give in secret that you may be rewarded openly, +to cast your bread upon the waters that it may be returned to you, and +Paul's counsel is that if there be no resurrection from the dead then we +may eat, drink, and be merry for death only is before us. Thus, what you +do is in the nature of a deliberate and conscious investment on which +you will receive a handsome dividend in the next world. And your +readiness to invest will be exactly proportionate to your conviction of +the soundness of the security. But there is in all this no perception of +the truly ethical basis of conduct, no indication of the inevitable +consequences of conduct on character. What is good is determined by what +it is believed will save one's own soul and increase the dividend in the +next world. What is bad is anything that will imperil the security. It +is essentially an appeal to what is grasping and selfish in human +nature, and while you may hide the true character of a thing by the +lavish use of attractive phrases, you cannot hinder it working out its +consequences in actual life. And the consequence of this has been that +while Christian teaching has been lavish in the use of attractive +phrases its actual result has been to create a type of character that +has been not so much immoral as _a_moral. And with that type the good +that has been done on the one side has been more than counterbalanced by +the evil done on the other. + +What the typical Christian character had in mind in all that he did was +neither the removal of suffering nor of injustice, but the salvation of +his own soul. That justified everything so long as it was believed to +contribute to that end. The social consequences of what was done simply +did not count. And if, instead of taking mere phrases from the +principal Christian writers, we carefully examine their meaning we shall +see that they were strangely devoid of what is now understood by the +expression "moral incentive." The more impressive the outbreak of +Christian piety the clearer does this become. No one could have +illustrated the Christian ideal of self-sacrifice better than did the +saints and monks of the earlier Christian centuries. Such a character as +the famous St. Simon Stylites, living for years on his pillar, filthy +and verminous, and yet the admired of Christendom, with the lives of +numerous other saints, whose sole claim to be remembered is that they +lived the lives of worse than animals in the selfish endeavours to save +their shrunken souls, will well illustrate this point. If it entered the +diseased imagination of these men that the road to salvation lay through +attending to the sick and the needy, they were quite ready to labour in +that direction; but of any desire to remove the horrible social +conditions that prevailed, or to remedy the injustice of which their +clients were the victims, there is seldom a trace. And, on the other +hand, if they believed that their salvation involved getting away from +human society altogether and leading the life of a hermit, they were as +ready to do that. If it meant the forsaking of husband or wife or parent +or child, these were left without compunction, and their desertion was +counted as proof of righteousness. The lives of the saints are full of +illustrations of this. Professor William James well remarks, in his +_Varieties of Religious Experience_, that "In gentle characters, where +devoutness is intense and the intellect feeble, we have an imaginative +absorption in the love of God to the exclusion of all practical human +interests.... When the love of God takes possession of such a mind it +expels all human loves and human uses." Of the Blessed St. Mary +Alacoque, her biographer points out that as she became absorbed in the +love of Christ she became increasingly useless to the practical life of +the convent. Of St. Teresa, James remarks that although a woman of +strong intellect his impression of her was a feeling of pity that so +much vitality of soul should have found such poor employment. And of so +famous a character as St. Augustine a Christian writer, Mr. A. C. +Benson, remarks:-- + + I was much interested in reading St. Augustine's _Confessions_ + lately to recognize how small a part, after his conversion, any + aspirations for the welfare of humanity seem to play in his mind + compared with the consciousness of his own personal relations with + God. It was this which gave him his exuberant sense of joy and + peace, and his impulse was rather the impulse of sharing a + wonderful and beautiful secret with others than an immediate desire + for their welfare, forced out of him, so to speak, by his own + exultation rather than drawn out of him by compassion for the needs + of others. + +That is one of the most constant features which emerges from a careful +study of the character of Christian types. St. Francis commenced his +career by leaving his parents. John Fox did the same. In that Puritan +classic, _The Pilgrim's Progress_, one of the outstanding features is +the striking absence of emphasis on the value of the social and domestic +virtues, and the Rev. Principal Donaldson notes this as one of the +features of early Christian literature in general. Christian preaching +was for centuries full of contemptuous references to "filthy rags of +righteousness," "mere morality," etc. The aim of the saints was a purely +selfish and personal one. It was not even a refined or a metaphysical +selfishness. It was a simple teaching that the one thing essential was +to save one's own soul, and that the main reason for doing good in this +world was to reap a benefit from it in the world to come. If it can +properly be called morality, it was conduct placed out at the highest +rate of interest. Christianity may often have used a naturally lofty +character, it was next to impossible for it to create one. + +If one examines the attack made by Christians upon Freethought morality, +it is surprising how often the truth of what has been said is implied. +For the complaint here is, in the main, not that naturalism fails to +give an adequate account of the nature and development of morality, but +that it will not satisfy mankind, and so fails to act as an adequate +motive to right conduct. When we enquire precisely what is meant by +this, we learn that if there is no belief in God, and if there is no +expectation of a future state in which rewards and punishments will be +dispensed, there remains no inducement to the average man or woman to do +right. It is the moral teaching of St. Paul over again. We are in the +region of morality as a deliberate investment, and we have the threat +that if the interest is not high enough or certain enough to satisfy the +dividend hunting appetite of the true believer, then the investment will +be withdrawn. Really this is a complaint, not that the morality which +ignores Christianity is too low but that it is too high. It is doubted +whether human nature, particularly Christian human nature, can rise to +such a level, and whether, unless you can guarantee a Christian a +suitable reward for not starving his family or for not robbing his +neighbour, he will continue to place any value on decency or honesty. + +So to state the case makes the absurdity of the argument apparent, but +unless that is what is meant it is difficult to make it intelligible. To +reply that Christians do not require these inducements to behave with a +tolerable amount of decency is not a statement that I should dispute; on +the contrary, I would affirm it. It is the Christian defender who makes +himself and his fellow believers worse than the Freethinker believes +them to be. For it is part of the case of the Freethinker that the +morality of the Christian has really no connection with his religion, +and that the net influence of his creed is to confuse and distort his +moral sense instead of developing it. It is the argument of the +Christian that makes the Freethinker superior to the Christian; it is +the Freethinker who declines the compliment and who asserts that the +social forces are adequate to guarantee the continuance of morality in +the complete absence of religious belief. + +How little the Christian religion appreciates the nature of morality is +seen by the favourite expression of Christian apologists that the +tendency of non-religion is to remove all moral "restraints." The use of +the word is illuminating. To the Christian morality is no more than a +system of restraints which aim at preventing a man gratifying his +appetite in certain directions. It forbids him certain enjoyments here, +and promises him as a reward for his abstention a greater benefit +hereafter. And on that assumption he argues, quite naturally, that if +there be no after life then there seems no reason why man should undergo +the "restraints" which moral rules impose. On this scheme man is a born +criminal and God an almighty policeman. That is the sum of orthodox +Christian morality. To assume that this conception of conduct can have a +really elevating effect on life is to misunderstand the nature of the +whole of the ethical and social problem. + +What has been said may go some distance towards suggesting an answer to +the question so often asked as to the reason for the moral failure of +Christianity. For that it has been a moral failure no one can doubt. +Nay, it is an assertion made very generally by Christians themselves. +Right from New Testament times the complaint that the conduct of +believers has fallen far short of what it should have been is constantly +met with. And there is not a single direction in which Christians can +claim a moral superiority over other and non-Christian peoples. They are +neither kinder, more tolerant, more sober, more chaste, nor more +truthful than are non-Christian people. Nor is it quite without +significance that those nations that pride themselves most upon their +Christianity are what they are. Their state reflects the ethical spirit +I have been trying to describe. For when we wipe out the disguising +phrases which we use to deceive ourselves--and it is almost impossible +to continually deceive others unless we do manage to deceive +ourselves--when we put on one side the "rationalizing" phrases about +Imperial races, carrying civilization to the dark places of the earth, +bearing the white man's burden, peopling the waste places of the earth, +etc., we may well ask what for centuries have the Christian nations of +the world been but so many gangs of freebooters engaged in world-wide +piracy? All over the world they have gone, fighting, stealing, killing, +lying, annexing, in a steadily rising crescendo. To be possessed of +natural wealth, without the means of resisting aggression, has for four +centuries been to invite the depredations of some one or more of the +Christian powers. It is the Christian powers that have militarized the +world in the name of the Prince of Peace, and made piracy a national +occupation in the name of civilization. Everywhere they have done these +things under the shelter of their religion and with the sanction of +their creed. Christianity has offered no effective check to the +cupidity of man, its chief work has been to find an outlet for it in a +disguised form. To borrow a term from the psycho-analysts, the task of +Christianity has been to "rationalize" certain ugly impulses, and so +provide the opportunity for their continuous expression. The world of +to-day is beginning to recognize the intellectual weakness of +Christianity; what it has next to learn is that its moral bankruptcy is +no less assured. + +One of the great obstacles in the way of this is the sentimentalism of +many who have given up all intellectual adherence to the Christian +creed. The power of the Christian Church has been so great, it has for +so long had control of the machinery of public education and +information, that many find it almost impossible to conclude that the +ethical spirit of Christianity is as alien to real progress as are its +cosmical teachings. The very hugeness of this century-old imposture +blinds many to its inherent defects. And yet the continuous and +world-wide moral failure of Christianity can only be accounted for on +the ground that it had a fatal moral defect from the start. I have +suggested above what is the nature of that defect. It has never regarded +morality as a natural social growth, but only as something imposed upon +man from without. It has had no other reason for its existence than the +fear of punishment and the hope of reward. Christian morality is the +morality of the stock exchange _plus_ the intellectual outlook of the +savage. And with that in control of national destinies our surprise +should be, not that things are as they are, but rather that with so +great a handicap the world has contrived to reach its present moderate +degree of development. + + + + +CHAPTER XVII. + +RELIGION AND PERSECUTION. + + +Intolerance is one of the most general of what we may call the mental +vices. It is so general that few people seem to look upon it as a fault, +and not a few are prepared to defend it as a virtue. When it assumes an +extreme form, and its consequences are unpleasantly obvious, it may meet +with condemnation, but usually its nature is disguised under a show of +earnestness and sincere conviction. And, indeed, no one need feel called +upon to dispute the sincerity and the earnestness of the bigot. As we +have already pointed out, that may easily be seen and admitted. All that +one need remark is that sincerity is no guarantee of accuracy, and +earnestness naturally goes with a conviction strongly held, whether the +conviction be grounded on fact or fancy. The essential question is not +whether a man holds an opinion strongly, but whether he has taken +sufficient trouble to say that he has a right to have that opinion. Has +he taken the trouble to acquaint himself with the facts upon which the +expressed opinion is professedly based? Has he made a due allowance for +possible error, and for the possibility of others seeing the matter from +another and a different point of view? If these questions were frankly +and truthfully answered, it would be found that what we have to face in +the world is not so much opinion as prejudice. + +Some advance in human affairs is indicated when it is found necessary to +apologise for persecution, and a still greater one when men and women +feel ashamed of it. It is some of these apologies at which we have now +to glance, and also to determine, if possible, the probable causes of +the change in opinion that has occurred in relation to the subject of +persecution. + +A favourite argument with the modern religionist is that the element of +persecution, which it is admitted, has hitherto been found in +association with religion, is not due to religion as such, but results +from its connection with the secular power. Often, it is argued, the +State for its own purposes has seen fit to ally itself with the Church, +and when that has taken place the representatives of the favoured Church +have not been strong enough to withstand the temptation to use physical +force in the maintenance of their position. Hence the generalization +that a State Church is always a persecuting Church, with the corollary +that a Church, as such, has nothing to do with so secular a thing as +persecution. + +The generalization has all the attractiveness which appeals to those who +are not in the habit of looking beneath the surface, and in particular +to those whose minds are still in thraldom to religious beliefs. It is +quite true that State Churches have always persecuted, and it is equally +true that persecution on a general scale could not have been carried on +without the assistance of the State. On the other hand, it is just as +true that all Churches have persecuted within the limits of their +opportunity. There is no exception to this rule in any age or country. +On a wider survey it is also clear that all forms of religious belief +carry with them a tendency to persecution more or less marked. A close +examination of the facts will show that it is the tendency to toleration +that is developed by the secular power, and the opposite tendency +manifested by religion. + +It is also argued that intolerance is not a special quality of religion; +it is rather a fault of human nature. There is more truth in this than +in the previous plea, but it slurs over the indictment rather than meets +it. At any rate, it is the same human nature that meets us in religion +that fronts us in other matters, and there is no mistaking the fact that +intolerance is far more pronounced in relation to religion than to any +other subject. In secular matters--politics, science, literature, or +art--opinions may differ, feelings run high, and a degree of intolerance +be exhibited, but the right to differ remains unquestioned. Moreover, +the settlement of opinion by discussion is recognized. In religion it is +the very right of difference that is challenged, it is the right of +discussion that is denied. And it is in connection with religion alone +that intolerance is raised to the level of a virtue. Refusal to discuss +the validity of a religious opinion will be taken as the sign of a +highly developed spiritual nature, and a tolerance of diverging opinions +as an indication of unbelief. If a political leader refused to stand +upon the same platform with political opponents, on non-political +questions, nearly everyone would say that such conduct was intolerable. +But how many religious people are there who would see anything wrong in +the Archbishop of Canterbury refusing to stand upon the same platform as +a well-known Atheist? + +We are here approaching the very heart of the subject, and in what +follows I hope to make clear the truth of the following propositions: +(1) That the great culture ground of intolerance is religion; (2) That +the natural tendency of secular affairs is to breed tolerance; (3) That +the alliance of religion with the State has fostered persecution by the +State, the restraining influences coming from the secular half of the +partnership; (4) That the decline of persecution is due to causes that +are quite unconnected with religious beliefs. + +The first three points can really be taken together. So far as can be +seen there is no disinclination among primitive peoples to discuss the +pros and cons of matters that are unconnected with religious beliefs. So +soon as we get people at a culture stage where the course of events is +seen to be decided by human action, there goes on a tolerance of +conflicting opinions that is in striking contrast with what occurs with +such matters as are believed to directly involve the action of deity. +One could not expect things to be otherwise. In the carrying on of +warfare, as with many other tribal activities, so many of the +circumstances are of a determinable character, and are clearly to be +settled by an appeal to judgment and experience, that very early in +social history they must have presented themselves as a legitimate field +for discussion, and to discussion, as Bagehot says, nothing is sacred. +And as a matter of fact we have a survival of this to-day. However +intolerant the character, so long as we are dealing with secular matters +it is admitted that differences of opinion must be tolerated, and are, +indeed, necessary if we are to arrive at the wisest conclusion. The most +autocratic of monarchs will call upon his advisers and take their +dissension from his own views as a matter of course. But when we get to +the field of religion, it is no longer a question of the legitimacy of +difference, but of its wrongness. For a religious man to admit a +discussion as to whether his religious belief is founded on fact or not +is to imply a doubt, and no thoroughly religious man ever encourages +that. What we have is prayers to be saved from doubt, and deliberate +efforts to keep away from such conditions and circumstances as may +suggest the possibility of wrong. The ideal religious character is the +one who never doubts. + +It may also be noted, in passing, that in connection with religion there +is nothing to check intolerance at any stage. In relation to secular +matters an opinion is avowedly based upon verifiable facts and has no +value apart from those facts. The facts are common property, open to +all, and may be examined by all. In religion facts of a common and +verifiable kind are almost wanting. The facts of the religious life are +mainly of an esoteric character--visions, intuitions, etc. And while on +the secular side discussion is justified because of the agreement which +results from it, on the religious side the value of discussion is +discounted because it never does lead to agreement. The more people +discuss religion the more pronounced the disagreement. That is one +reason why the world over the only method by which people have been +brought to a state of agreement in religious doctrines is by excluding +all who disagreed. It is harmony in isolation. + +Now if we turn to religion we can see that from the very beginning the +whole tendency here was to stifle difference of opinion, and so +establish intolerance as a religious duty. The Biblical story of Jonah +is a case that well illustrates the point. God was not angry with the +rest of the ship's inhabitants, it was Jonah only who had given offence. +But to punish Jonah a storm was sent and the whole crew was in danger of +shipwreck. In their own defence the sailors were driven to throw Jonah +overboard. Jonah's disobedience was not, therefore, his concern alone. +All with him were involved; God was ready to punish the whole for the +offence of one. + +Now if for the ship we take a primitive tribe, and for Jonah a primitive +heretic, or one who for some reason or other has omitted a service to +the gods, we have an exact picture of what actually takes place. In +primitive societies rights are not so much individual as they are +social. Every member of the tribe is responsible to the members of other +tribes for any injury that may have been done. And as with the members +of another tribe, so with the relation of the tribe to the gods. If an +individual offends them the whole of the tribe may suffer. There is a +splendid impartiality about the whole arrangement, although it lacks all +that we moderns understand by Justice. But the point here is that it +makes the heretic not merely a mistaken person, but a dangerous +character. His heresy involves treason to the tribe, and in its own +defence it is felt that the heretic must be suppressed. How this feeling +lingers in relation to religion is well seen in the fact that there are +still with us large numbers of very pious people who are ready to see in +a bad harvest, a war, or an epidemic, a judgment of God on the whole of +the people for the sins of a few. It is this element that has always +given to religious persecutions the air of a solemn duty. To suppress +the heretic is something that is done in the interests of the whole of +the people. Persecution becomes both a religious and a social duty. + +The pedigree of religious persecution is thus clear. It is inherent in +religious belief, and to whatever extent human nature is prone to +intolerance, the tendency has been fostered and raised to the status of +a virtue by religious teaching and practice. Religion has served to +confuse man's sense of right here as elsewhere. + +We have thus two currents at work. On the one hand, there is the +influence of the secular side of life, which makes normally for a +greater tolerance of opinion, on the other side there is religion which +can only tolerate a difference of opinion to the extent that religious +doctrines assume a position of comparative unimportance. Instead of it +being the case that the Church has been encouraged to persecute by the +State, the truth is the other way about. I know all that may be said as +to the persecutions that have been set on foot by vested interests and +by governments, but putting on one side the consideration that this begs +the question of how far it has been the consequence of the early +influence of religion, there are obvious limits beyond which a secular +persecution cannot go. A government cannot destroy its subjects, or if +it does the government itself disappears. And the most thorough scheme +of exploitation must leave its victims enough on which to live. There +are numerous considerations which weigh with a secular government and +which have little weight with a Church. + +It may safely be said, for example, that no government in the world, in +the absence of religious considerations would have committed the +suicidal act which drove the Moors and the Jews from Spain.[24] As a +matter of fact, the landed aristocracy of Spain resisted suggestions for +expulsions for nearly a century because of the financial ruin they saw +would follow. It was the driving power of religious belief that finally +brought about the expulsion. Religion alone could preach that it was +better for the monarch to reign over a wilderness than over a nation of +Jews and unbelievers. The same thing was repeated a century later in the +case of the expulsion of the Huguenots from France. Here again the crown +resisted the suggestions of the Church, and for the same reason. And it +is significant that when governments have desired to persecute in their +own interests they have nearly always found it advantageous to do so +under the guise of religion. So far, and in these instances, it may be +true that the State has used religion for its own purpose of +persecution, but this does not touch the important fact that, given the +sanction of religion, intolerance and persecution assume the status of +virtues. And to the credit of the State it must be pointed out that it +has over and over again had to exert a restraining influence in the +quarrels of sects. It will be questioned by few that if the regulative +influence of the State had not been exerted the quarrels of the sects +would have made a settled and orderly life next to impossible. + +[24] For this, as well as for the general consequences of persecution on +racial welfare, see my pamphlet _Creed and Character_. + +So far as Christianity is concerned it would puzzle the most zealous of +its defenders to indicate a single direction in which it did anything to +encourage the slightest modification of the spirit of intolerance. +Mohammedans can at least point to a time when, while their religion was +dominant, a considerable amount of religious freedom was allowed to +those living under its control. In the palmy days of the Mohammedan rule +in Spain both Jews and Christians were allowed to practise their +religion with only trifling inconveniences, certainly without being +exposed to the fiendish punishments that characterized Christianity all +over the world. Moreover, it must never be overlooked that in Europe all +laws against heresy are of Christian origin. In the old Roman Empire +liberty of worship was universal. So long as the State religion was +treated with a moderate amount of respect one might worship whatever god +one pleased, and the number was sufficient to provide for the most +varied tastes. When Christians were proceeded against it was under laws +that did not aim primarily to shackle liberty of worship or of opinion. +The procedure was in every case formal, the trial public, time was given +for the preparation of the defence, and many of the judges showed their +dislike to the prosecutions.[25] But with the Christians, instead of +persecution being spasmodic it was persistent. It was not taken up by +the authorities with reluctance, but with eagerness, and it was counted +as the most sacred of duties. Nor was it directed against a sectarian +movement that threatened the welfare of the State. The worst periods of +Christian persecution were those when the State had the least to fear +from internal dissension. The persecuted were not those who were guilty +of neglect of social duty. On the contrary they were serving the State +by the encouragement of literature, science, philosophy, and commerce. +One of the Pagan Emperors, the great Trajan, had advised the magistrates +not to search for Christians, and to treat anonymous accusations with +contempt. Christians carried the search for heresy into a man's own +household. It used the child to obtain evidence against its own parents, +the wife to secure evidence against the husband; it tortured to provide +dictated confessions, and placed boxes at church doors to receive +anonymous accusations. It established an index of forbidden books, an +institution absolutely unknown to the pagan world. The Roman trial was +open, the accused could hear the charge and cite witnesses for the +defence. The Christian trial was in secret; special forms were used and +no witnesses for the defence were permitted. Persecution was raised to a +fine art. Under Christian auspices it assumed the most damnable form +known in the history of the world. "There are no wild beasts so +ferocious as Christians" was the amazed comment of the Pagans on the +behaviour of Christians towards each other, and the subsequent history +of Christianity showed that the Pagans were but amateurs in the art of +punishing for a difference of opinion. + +[25] I am taking the story of the persecutions of the early Christians +for granted, although the whole question is surrounded with the greatest +suspicion. As a matter of fact the accounts are grossly exaggerated, and +some of the alleged persecutions never occurred. The story of the +persecutions is so foreign to the temper of the Roman government as to +throw doubt on the whole account. The story of there being ten +persecutions is clearly false, the number being avowedly based upon the +legend of the ten plagues of Egypt. + +Up to a comparatively recent time there existed a practically unanimous +opinion among Christians as to the desirability of forcibly suppressing +heretical opinions. Whatever the fortunes of Christianity, and whatever +the differences of opinion that gradually developed among Christians +there was complete unanimity on this point. Whatever changes the +Protestant Reformation effected it left this matter untouched. In his +_History of Rationalism_ Lecky has brought forward a mass of evidence in +support of this, and I must refer to that work readers who are not +already acquainted with the details. Luther, in the very act of pleading +for toleration, excepted "such as deny the common principles of the +Christian religion, and advised that the Jews should be confined as +madmen, their synagogues burned and their books destroyed." The +intolerance of Calvin has became a byword; his very apology for the +burning of Servetus, entitled _A Defence of the Orthodox Faith_, bore +upon its title page the significant sentence "In which it is proved that +heretics may justly be coerced with the sword." His follower, Knox, was +only carrying out the teaching of the master in declaring that +"provoking the people to idolatry ought not to be exempt from the +penalty of death," and that "magistrates and people are bound to do so +(inflict the death penalty) unless they will provoke the wrath of God +against themselves." In every Protestant country laws against heresy +were enacted. In Switzerland, Geneva, Sweden, England, Germany, +Scotland, nowhere could one differ from the established faith without +running the risk of torture and death. Even in America, with the +exception of Maryland,[26] the same state of things prevailed. In some +States Catholic priests were subject to imprisonment for life, Quaker +women were whipped through the streets at the cart's tail, old men of +the same denomination were pressed to death between stones. At a later +date (about 1770) laws against heresy were general. "Anyone," says +Fiske,-- + + who should dare to speculate too freely about the nature of Christ, + or the philosophy of the plan of salvation, or to express a doubt + as to the plenary inspiration of every word between the two covers + of the Bible, was subject to fine and imprisonment. The tithing man + still arrested the Sabbath-breakers, and shut them up in the town + cage in the market-place; he stopped all unnecessary riding or + driving on Sunday, and haled people off to the meeting-house + whether they would or no.[27] + +[26] The case of Maryland is peculiar. But the reason for the toleration +there seems to have been due to the desire to give Catholics a measure +of freedom they could not have elsewhere in Protestant countries. + +[27] For a good sketch of the Puritan Sunday in New England see _The +Sabbath in Puritan New England_, by Alice Morse Earle. For an account of +religious intolerance see the account of the Blue Laws of Connecticut as +contained in Hart's _American History told by Contemporaries_, Vol. I. + +And we have to remember that the intolerance shown in America was +manifested by men who had left their own country on the ostensible +ground of freedom of conscience. As a matter of fact, in Christian +society genuine freedom of conscience was practically unknown. What was +meant by the expression was the right to express one's own religious +opinions, with the privilege of oppressing all with whom one happened to +disagree. The majority of Christians would have as indignantly +repudiated the assertion that they desired to tolerate non-Christian or +anti-Christian opinions as they would the charge of themselves holding +Atheistic ones. + +How deeply ingrained was the principle that the established religion was +justified in suppressing all others may be seen from a reading of such +works as Locke's _Letters on Toleration_, and Milton's _Areopagitica_, +which stand in the forefront of the world's writings in favour of +liberty of thought and speech. Yet Locke was of opinion that "Those are +not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of a God. Promises, +covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no +hold upon an Atheist. The taking away of God, though but even in +thought, dissolves all." And Milton, while holding that it was more +prudent and wholesome that many be tolerated rather than all compelled, +yet hastened to add "I mean not tolerated popery and open superstition, +which as it extirpates all religious and civil supremacies so should +itself be extirpated." In short, intolerance had become so established a +part of a society saturated in religion that not even the most liberal +could conceive a state of being in which all opinions should be placed +upon an equal footing. + +Yet a change was all the time taking place in men's opinions on this +matter, a change which has in recent years culminated in the affirmation +of the principle that the coercion of opinion is of all things the least +desirable and the least beneficial to society at large. And as in so +many other cases, it was not the gradual maturing of that principle that +attracted attention so much as its statement in something like a +complete and logical form. The tracing of the conditions which have led +to this tremendous revolution in public opinion will complete our survey +of the subject. + +It has already been pointed out that in primitive societies a very +important fact is that the relation of the individual to the community +is of a different nature from that which exists in a later stage of +culture. The whole is responsible for the part in a very literal sense, +and especially so in regard to religious beliefs. Individual rights and +responsibilities have but a precarious existence at best. The individual +exists far more for the benefit of the tribe than the tribe can be said +to exist for the benefit of the individual. The sense of corporate +responsibility is strong, and even in secular affairs we see this +constantly manifested. When a member of one tribe inflicts an injury +upon a member of another tribe, retaliation on any one of the group to +which the offending person belongs will suffice. We see the remnants of +this primitive view of life in the feuds of schoolboys, and it is also +manifested in the relations of nations, which move upon a lower ethical +level than do individuals. Most wars are ostensibly waged because in +some obscure way the nation is held responsible for the offences of one +or more individuals. And an instance of the same feeling is seen in the +now obsolete practice of punishing the members of a man's family when +the parents happen to have committed certain offences. + +In religion, as we have already pointed out, the sense of corporate +responsibility completely governs primitive man's sense of his relation +to the tribal gods. In the development of the tribal chief into the +tribal god the ghost is credited with much the same powers as the man, +with the added terror of having more subtle and terrible ways of +inflicting punishment. The man who offends the ghost or the god is a +standing danger to the whole of the tribe. The whole of the tribe +becomes responsible for the offence committed, and the tribe in self +protection must not alone take measures to punish the offender, but must +also guard itself against even the possibility of the offence being +perpetrated. The consequence is that there is not a religion in which +one can fail to trace the presence of this primitive conception of +personal and social responsibility, and consequently, where we cannot +find persecution, more or less severe, and also more or less organized, +in the interest of what is believed to be social welfare. In the case of +the failure of the Spanish Armada to effect the conquest of England, the +Spanish monarch was convinced that its non-success was partly due to his +not having weeded out the heretics from his own dominion before +troubling about the heretics abroad. And right down to our own day there +has not been a national calamity the cause of which has not been found +by numbers of religious people to lie in the fact that some members of +the suffering nation have offended God. The heretic becomes, as we have +already said, a social danger of the gravest description. Society must +be guarded against his presence just as we learn to-day to protect +ourselves against the presence of a death-dealing germ. The suppression +of heresy thus becomes a social duty, because it protects society from +the anger of the gods. The destruction of the heretic is substantially +an act of social sanitation. Given the primitive conception of religion, +affiliated to the existing conception of corporate responsibility, and +persecution becomes one of the most important of social duties. + +This, I believe, is not alone the root of persecution, but it serves to +explain as nothing else can its persistence in social life and the fact +of its having became almost a general mental characteristic. To realize +this one need only bear in mind the overpowering part played by +religious conceptions in early communities. There is nothing done that +is not more or less under the assumed control of supernatural agencies. +Fear is the dominant emotion in relation to the gods, and experience +daily proves that there is nothing that can make men so brutal and so +callous to the sufferings of others as can religious belief. And while +there has all along been a growing liberation of the mind from the +control of religion, the process has been so slow that this particular +product of religious rule has had time to root itself very deeply in +human nature. And it is in accordance with all that we know of the order +of development that the special qualities engendered by a particular set +of conditions should persist long after the conditions themselves have +passed away. + +The conditions that co-operate in the final breaking down of the +conviction of the morality of persecution are many and various. +Primarily, there is the change from the social state in which the +conception of corporate responsibility is dominant to one in which there +is a more or less clearly marked line between what concerns the +individual alone and what concerns society as a whole. This is +illustrated in the growth from what Spencer called the military type of +society to an industrial one. In the case of a militant type of society, +to which the religious organization is so closely affiliated, a State is +more self contained, and the governing principle is, to use a +generalization of Sir Henry Maine's, status rather than contract. With +the growth of commerce and industrialism there is developed a greater +amount of individual initiative, a growing consideration for personal +responsibility, and also the development of a sense of interdependence +between societies. And the social developments that go on teach people, +even though the lesson may be unconsciously learned, to value each +other in terms of social utility rather than in terms of belief in +expressed dogmas. They are brought daily into contact with men of widely +differing forms of opinion; they find themselves working in the same +movements, and participating in the same triumphs or sharing the same +defeats. Insensibly the standard of judgment alters; the strength of the +purely social feelings overpowers the consciousness of theological +differences, and thus serves to weaken the frame of mind from which +persecution springs. + +The growing complexity of life leads to the same end. Where the +conditions of life are simple, and the experiences through which people +pass are often repeated, and where, moreover, the amount of positive +knowledge current is small, conclusions are reached rapidly, and the +feeling of confidence in one's own opinions is not checked by seeing +others draw different conclusions from the same premises. Under such +conditions an opinion once formed is not easily or quickly changed. +Experience which makes for wider knowledge makes also for greater +caution in forming opinions and a greater readiness to tolerate +conclusions of an opposite character at which others may have arrived. + +Finally, on the purely intellectual side one must reckon with the growth +of new ideas, and of knowledge that is in itself quite inconsistent with +the established creed. If the primary reason for killing the heretic is +that he is a social danger, one who will draw down on the tribe the +vengeance of the gods, the strength of that feeling against the heretic +must be weakened by every change that lessens men's belief in the power +of their deity. And one must assume that every time a fresh piece of +definite knowledge was acquired towards the splendid structure that now +meets us in the shape of modern science there was accomplished +something that involved an ultimate weakening of the belief in the +supremacy of the gods. The effect is cumulative, and in time it is bound +to make itself felt. Religious opinion after religious opinion finds +itself attacked and its power weakened. Things that were thought to be +solely due to the action of the gods are found to occur without their +being invoked, while invocation does not make the slightest difference +to the production of given results. Scientific generalizations in +astronomy, in physics, in biology, etc., follow one another, each +helping to enforce the lesson that it really does not matter what +opinions a man may hold about the gods provided his opinions about the +world in which he is living and the forces with which he _must_ deal are +sound and solidly based. In a world where opinion is in a healthy state +of flux it is impossible for even religion to remain altogether +unchanged. So we have first a change in the rigidity of religious +conceptions, then a greater readiness to admit the possibility of error, +and, finally, the impossibility of preventing the growth and expression +of definitely non-religious and anti-religious opinions in a community +where all sorts of opinions cannot but arise. + +With the social consequences of religious persecution, and particularly +of Christian persecution, I have dealt elsewhere, and there is no need +to repeat the story here. I have been here concerned with making plain +the fact that persecution does not arise with a misunderstanding of +religion, or with a decline of what is vaguely called "true religion," +nor does it originate in the alliance of some Church with the secular +State. It lies imbedded in the very nature of religion itself. With +polytheism there is a certain measure of toleration to gods outside the +tribe, because here the admitted existence of a number of gods is part +of the order of things. But this tendency to toleration disappears when +we come to the monotheistic stage which inevitably treats the claim to +existence of other gods in the same spirit as an ardent royalist treats +the appearance of a pretender to the throne. To tolerate such is a crime +against the legitimate ruler. And when we get the Christian doctrine of +eternal damnation and salvation tacked on to the religious idea we have +all the material necessary to give the persecutor the feeling of moral +obligation, and to make him feel that he is playing the part of a real +saviour to society. + +At bottom that is one of the chief injuries that a religion such as +Christianity inflicts on the race; it throws human feeling into some of +the most objectionable forms, and provides a religious and moral +justification for their expression. The very desire to benefit one's +fellows, normally and naturally healthy, thus becomes under Christian +influences an instrument of oppression and racial degradation. The +Christian persecutor does not see himself for what he is, he pictures +himself as a saviour of men's souls by suppressing the unbeliever who +would corrupt them. And if Christianity be true he is correct in +thinking himself such. I have no hesitation in saying that if +Christianity be true persecution becomes the most important of duties. A +community that is thoroughly Christian is bound to persecute, and as a +mere matter of historic fact every wholly Christian community has +persecuted. The community which says that a man may take any religion he +pleases, or go without one altogether if he so chooses, proclaims its +disbelief in the importance of religion. The measure of religious +freedom is also the measure of religious indifference. + +There are some experiences through which a human being may pass the +effects of which he never completely outgrows. Usually he may appear to +have put them quite out of his mind, but there are times when he is +lifted a little out of the normal, and then the recollection of what he +has passed through comes back with terrifying force. And acute observers +may also be able to perceive that even in normal circumstances what he +has passed through manifests itself for the worse in his everyday +behaviour. So with religion and the life history of the race. For +thousands of generations the race has been under the influence of a +teaching that social welfare depended upon a right belief about the +gods. The consequence of this has been that persecution became deeply +ingrained in human nature and in the social traditions which play so +large a part in the character building of each new generation. We have +as yet hardly got beyond the tradition that lack of religion robs a man +of social rights and dispenses with the necessity for courteous and +considered treatment. And there is, therefore, small cause for wonder +that the element of intolerance should still manifest itself in +connection with non-religious aspects of life. But the certain thing is +that throughout the whole of our social history it is religion that has +been responsible for the maintenance of persecution as a social duty. +Something has been done in more recent times to weaken its force, the +growth of science, the rationalizing of one institution after +another--in a word, the secularizing of life--is slowly creating more +tolerant relations between people. But the poison is deep in the blood, +and will not be eradicated in a generation. Religion is still here, and +so long as it remains it will never cease--under the guise of an appeal +to the higher sentiments of man--to make its most effective appeals to +passions of which the best among us are most heartily ashamed. + + + + +CHAPTER XVIII. + +WHAT IS TO FOLLOW RELIGION? + + +Books on the future of religion are numerous, and to one blessed with a +sense of humour, full of entertainment. They are also not without +instruction of a psychological kind. Reliable information as to what the +future will be like they certainly do not give, but they do unlock the +innermost desires of the writers thereof. They express what the writers +of the prophecies would like the future to be. And they create the +future state on earth exactly as devout believers have built up the +character of their heaven beyond the clouds. Every form of faith which +they disagree with is rejected as not possessing the element of +vitality, with the result that there is only their own form left. And +that, they triumphantly proclaim, is the religion of the future. + +But the future has an old-fashioned and disconcerting habit of +disappointing expectations. The factors that govern human nature are so +many and so complex, their transmutations and combinations are so +numerous, that it is as well to tread cautiously, and to a very +considerable extent leave the future to take care of itself. At the +utmost all that we can do with safety is to detect tendencies, and to +hasten or retard their development as we think them good or bad. The +factors that make up a science of human nature are not to-day so +well-known and so well understood that we can depict the state of +society a century hence with the same certainty that we can foretell the +position of the planet Venus in the year 2000. + +My aim in this chapter is, therefore, not to describe precisely what +will be the state of society when religious belief has ceased to exist. +It is rather to offer a general reply to those gloomy individuals who +declare that when the aims of the Freethinker are fully realized we +shall find that in destroying religion we have destroyed pretty much all +that makes human life worth living. We have managed to empty the baby +out with the bath. + +The most general form of this fear is expressed in calling Freethought a +creed of negation, or a policy of destruction, and assuring the world +that mankind can never rest content with such things. That may be quite +true, but we fail to see in what way it touches Freethought. A +Freethought that is wholly destructive, that is a mere negation, is a +creation of the pulpit, and belongs to the same class of imaginative +efforts as the pietistic outbursts of famous unbelievers on their +death-beds. That such things could have obtained so wide a currency, and +be looked upon as quite natural occurrences, offers demonstrative +evidence of the paralyzing power of Christian belief on the human mind. + +As a matter of fact, neither reformers in general nor Freethinkers in +particular deserve the charge of being mere destructionists. They are +both far more interested in building up than they are in pulling down, +and it is sheer lack of understanding that fixes the eyes of so many on +one aspect of the reformer's task and so steadily ignores the other one. +Of course, the phenomenon is not an unusual one. In a revolution it is +the noise, the street fighting, the breaking of old rules and the +shattering of established institutions that attract the most attention. +The deeper aims of the revolutionists, the hidden social forces of which +the revolution is the expression, the work of reconstruction that is +attempted, escape notice. The old order shrieks its loudest at the +threat of dissolution, the new can hardly make its voice heard. +Carlyle's division of the people into the shrieking thousands and the +dumb millions is eternally true. And even the millions are impressed +with the importance of the thousands because of the noise they are able +to make. + +Actually the charge to which reformers in general are open is that of a +too great zeal for reconstruction, a belittling of the difficulties that +stand in the way of a radical change. They are apt to make too small an +allowance for the occurrence of the unexpected and the incalculable, +both of which are likely to interfere with the fruition of the most +logical of schemes. And they are so obsessed with reconstruction that +destruction seems no more than an incident by the way. A little less +eagerness for reconstruction might easily result in a greater concern +for what is being pulled down. The two greatest "destructive" movements +of modern times--the French revolution of 1789 and the Russian +revolution--both illustrate this point. In both movements the leading +figures were men who were obsessed with the idea of building a new +world. They saw this new world so clearly that the old one was almost +ignored. And this is equally true of the literature that precedes and is +the mouthpiece of such movements. The leading appeal is always to what +is to be, what existed is only used as a means of enforcing the +desirability of the new order. It is, in short, the mania for +reconstruction that is chiefly responsible for the destruction which so +horrifies those whose vision can never see anything but the world to +which they have become accustomed. + +In parenthesis it may be remarked that it is a tactical blunder to make +one's attack upon an existing institution or idea depend upon the +attractiveness of the ideal state depicted. It enables critics to fix +attention on the precise value of the proposed remedy instead of +discussing whether the suggested reform is necessary. The attacker is +thus placed in the position of the defender and the point at issue +obscured. This is, that a certain institution or idea has outgrown its +usefulness and its removal is necessary to healthy growth. And it may +well be that its removal is all that is required to enable the social +organism to function naturally and healthily. The outworn institution is +often the grit in the machine that prevents it running smoothly. + +This by the way. The fact remains that some of our best teachers have +shown themselves apt to stumble in the matter. Without belief in +religion they have too often assumed that its removal would leave a +serious gap in life, and so would necessitate the creation of a number +of substitutes to "take the place of religion." Thus, no less profound a +thinker than Herbert Spencer remarks in the preface to his _Data of +Ethics_:-- + + Few things can happen more disastrous than the death and decay of a + regulative system no longer fit, before another and a better + regulative system has grown up to replace it. Most of those who + reject the current creed appear to assume that the controlling + agency furnished by it may safely be thrown aside, and the vacancy + left unfilled by any other controlling agency. + +Had Spencer first of all set himself to answer the question, "What is it +that the Freethinker sets himself to remove?" or even the question, +"What is the actual control exerted by religion?" one imagines that the +passage above given would either never have been written or would have +been differently worded. And when a man such as Spencer permits himself +to put the matter in this form one need not be surprised at the ordinary +believer assuming that he has put an unanswerable question to the +Freethinker when he asks what it is that we propose to put in the place +of religion, with the assumption that the question is on all fours with +the enquiry as to what substitutes we have for soap and coal if we +destroy all stocks of these articles. + +The question assumes more than any scientific Freethinker would ever +grant. It takes for granted the statement that religion does at present +perform some useful function in the State. And that is the very +statement that is challenged. Nor does the Freethinker deny that some +"controlling agency" is desirable. What he does say is that in the +modern State, at least, religion exerts no control for good, that its +activities make for stagnation or retrogression, that its removal will +make for the healthier operation of other agencies, and that to these +other and non-religious agencies belongs the credit which is at present +given to religion. + +Moreover, Spencer should not have needed reminding that systems of +thought while they have any vital relation to life will successfully +defy all attempts at eradication. The main cause of the decay of +religion is not the attack made upon it by the forces of reasoned +unbelief. That attack is largely the conscious expression of a revolt +against a system that has long lost all touch with reality, and so has +ceased to derive support from current life and thought. From this point +of view the reformer is what he is because he is alive to the drift of +events, susceptible to those social influences which affect all more or +less, and his strength is derived from the thousand and one subtle +influences that extend from generation to generation and express +themselves in what we are pleased to call the story of civilization. + +But the quotation given does represent a fairly common point of view, +and it is put in a form that is most favourable to religious +pretensions. For it assumes that religion does really in our modern +lives perform a function so useful that it would be the height of folly +to remove it before we had something equally useful to take its place. +But something in the place of religion is a thing that no scientific +Freethinker desires. It is not a new religion, or another religion that +the world needs, but the removal of religion from the control of life, +and a restatement of those social qualities that have hitherto been +expressed in a religious form so that their real nature will be apparent +to all. Then we shall at last begin to make progress with small chance +of getting a serious set-back. + +This does not, of course, deny that there are many things associated +with religion for the absence of which society would have cause for +regret. It is part of the Freethought case that this is so. And it may +also be admitted that large numbers of people honestly believe that +their religious beliefs serve as motives to the expression of their +better qualities. That, again, is part of the delusion we are fighting. +We cannot agree that religion, as such, contains anything that is +essentially useful to the race. It has maintained its power chiefly +because of its association with serviceable social qualities, and it is +part of the work of Freethought to distinguish between what properly +belongs to religion and what has become associated with it during its +long history. At present the confusion exists and the fact need cause no +surprise. At best the instincts of man are deep-laid, the motives to +conduct are mostly of an obscure kind, and it would be cause for +surprise if, seeing how closely religion is associated with every phase +of primitive life, and how persistent are primitive modes of thinking, +there were not this confusion between the actual part played by religion +in life and the part assigned it by tradition. + +At any rate, it is idle to argue as though human conduct was governed by +a single idea--that of religion. At the most religious beliefs represent +no more than a part of the vast mass of influences that determine human +effort. And when we see how largely religious beliefs are dependent upon +constant stimulation and protection for their existence, it seems +extremely unlikely that they can hold a very vital relation to life. The +impotency of religion in matters of conduct is, too, decisively shown in +the fact that it is quite impossible to arrange men and women in a scale +of values that shall correspond with the kind or the fervency of their +religious beliefs. A religious person may be a useful member of society +or he may be a quite useless one. A profound religious conviction may be +accompanied by the loftiest of ideals or by the meanest of aims. The +unbeliever may be, and often is, a better man than the believer. No +business man would ever think of making a man's religion the condition +of taking one into his service, or if he did the general opinion would +be that it indicated bigotry and not shrewdness. We find it quite +impossible to determine the nature of religious belief by watching the +way people behave. In no stage of social life does religion provide us +with anything in the nature of a differentiating factor. + +It was argued by the late Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, himself a +Freethinker, that as men have for a long time been in the habit of +associating moral feelings with the belief in God, a severance of the +two may entail moral disaster. It is, of course, hard to say what may +not happen in certain cases, but it is quite certain that such a +consequence could not follow on any general scale. One has only to bring +a statement of this kind down from the region of mere theory to that of +definite fact to see how idle the fear is. If, instead of asserting in a +vague way that the moral life is in some way bound up with religious +beliefs we ask what moral action or moral disposition is so connected, +we realize the absurdity of the statement. Professor Leuba well says:-- + + Our alleged essential dependence upon transcendental beliefs is + belied by the most common experiences of daily life. Who does not + feel the absurdity of the opinion that the lavish care for a sick + child by a mother is given because of a belief in God and + immortality? Are love of father and mother on the part of children, + affection and serviceableness between brothers and sisters, + straightforwardness and truthfulness between business men + essentially dependent upon these beliefs? What sort of person would + be the father who would announce divine punishment or reward in + order to obtain the love and respect of his children? And if there + are business men preserved from unrighteousness by the fear of + future punishment, they are far more numerous who are deterred by + the threat of human law. Most of them would take their chances with + heaven a hundred times before they would once with society, or + perchance with the imperative voice of humanity heard in the + conscience (_The Belief in God and Immortality_, p. 323). + +And in whatever degree the fear may be justified in special cases, it +applies to any attempt whatever that may be made to disturb existing +conventions. Luther complained that some of his own converts were +behaving worse as Protestants than they behaved as Catholics, and even +in the New Testament we have the same unfavourable comparison made of +many of Christ's followers when compared with the Pagans around them. A +transference of allegiance may easily result in certain ill-balanced +minds kicking over the traces, but in the long run, and with the mass, +the deeper social needs are paramount. There was the same fear expressed +concerning man's political and social duties when the relations of +Church and State were first challenged. Yet the connection between the +two has been quite severed in some countries, and very much weakened in +many more, without society in the least suffering from the change. On +the contrary, one may say that man's duties towards the State have been +more intelligently perceived and more efficiently discharged in +proportion as those religious considerations that once ruled have been +set on one side. + +The reply of the Freethinker to the question of "What is to follow +religion?" may, therefore, easily be seen. In effect it is, "Nothing at +all." In any study of social evolution the properly equipped student +commences his task with the full conviction that whatever the future may +be like its germs are already with us. If nature does not "abhor a +vacuum" it has at least an intense dislike to absolute beginnings. The +future will be an elaboration of the present as the present is an +elaboration of the past. For good or evil that principle remains +unimpeachable. + +The essential question is not, What is to follow religion? but rather +what will the disappearance of religion affect that is of real value to +the world. The moment the question is raised in this unambiguous manner +the answer suggests itself. For assume that by some strange and +unexpected happening there set in a raging epidemic of common sense. +Assume that as a consequence of this the world was to awake with its +mind completely cleared of all belief in religion. What would be the +effect of the transformation? It is quite clear that it would not affect +any of the fundamental processes of life. The tragi-comedy of life would +still be performed, it would run through the same number of acts, and it +would end in the same happy or unhappy manner. Human beings would still +get born, they would grow up, they would fall in love, they would marry, +they would beget their kind, and they would in turn pass away to make +room for another generation. Birth and death, with all their +accompanying feelings, would remain. Human society would continue, all +the glories of art, the greatness of science, all the marvels and +wonders of the universe would be there whether we believed in a God or +not. The only difference would be that we should no longer associate +these things with the existence of a God. And in that respect we should +be following the same course of development that has been followed in +many other departments of life. We do not nowadays associate the +existence of spirits with a good or a bad harvest, the anger of God with +an epidemic, or the good-will of deity with a spell of fine weather. Yet +in each case there was once the same assumed association between these +things, and the same fears of what would happen if that association was +discarded. We are only carrying the process a step further; all that is +required is a little courage to take the step. In short, there is not a +single useful or worthy quality, intellectual or moral, that can +possibly suffer from the disappearance of religion. + +On this point we may again quote from Professor Leuba:-- + + The heroism of religious martyrs is often flaunted as marvellous + instances of the unique sustaining strength derived from the belief + in a personal God and the anticipation of heaven. And yet for + every martyr of this sort there has been one or more heroes who has + risked his life for a noble cause, without the comfort which + transcendental beliefs may bring. The very present offers almost + countless instances of martyrs to the cause of humanity, who are + strangers to the idea of God and immortality. How many men and + women in the past decade gladly offered and not infrequently lost + their lives in the cause of freedom, or justice, or science? In the + monstrous war we are now witnessing, is there a less heroic defence + of home and nation, and less conscious self-renunciation among the + non-believers than among the professed Christians? Have modern + nations shown a more intense or a purer patriotism than ancient + Greece and Rome, where men did not pretend to derive inspiration + for their deeds of devotion in the thoughts of their gods.... The + fruitful deeds of heroism are at bottom inspired not by the thought + of God or a future life, but by innate tendencies or promptings + that have reference to humanity. Self sacrifice, generosity, is + rooted in nothing less superficial and accidental than social + instincts older than the human race, for they are already present + in a rudimentary form in the higher animals. + +These are quite familiar statements to all Freethinkers, but to a great +many Christians they may come with all the force of a new revelation. + +In the earlier pages of this work I have given what I conceive solid +reasons for believing that every one of the social and individual +virtues is born of human intercourse and can never be seriously deranged +for any length of time, so long as human society endures. The scale of +values may well undergo a change with the decay of religion, but that is +something which is taking place all the time, provided society is not in +a state of absolute stagnation. There is not any change that takes +place in society that does not affect our view of the relative value of +particular qualities. The value we place upon personal loyalty to a king +is not what it once was. At one stage a man is ready to place the whole +of his fortune at the disposal of a monarch merely because he happens to +be his "anointed" king. To-day, the man who had no better reason for +doing that would be looked upon as an idiot. Unquestioning obedience to +established authority, which once played so high a part in the education +of children, is now ranked very low by all who understand what genuine +education means. From generation to generation we go on revising our +estimate of the value of particular qualities, and the world is the +better for the revision. And that is what we may assume will occur with +the decay of religious belief. We shall place a higher value upon +certain qualities than we do at present and a lower value upon others. +But there will be no discarding the old qualities and creation of new +ones. Human nature will be the same then as now, as it has been for +thousands of years. The nature of human qualities will be more directly +conceived and more intelligently applied, and that will be an +undesirable development only for those who live by exploiting the +ignorance and the folly of mankind. + +Thus, if one may venture upon a prophecy with regard to the +non-religious society of the future it may be said with confidence that +what are known as the ascetic qualities are not likely to increase in +value. The cant of Christianity has always placed an excessive value +upon what is called self-sacrifice. But there is no value in +self-sacrifice, as such. At best it is only of value in exceptional +circumstances, as an end it is worse than useless, and it may easily +degenerate from a virtue to a vice. It assumed high rank with Christian +teachers for various reasons. First, it was an expression of that +asceticism which lies at the root of Christianity, second, because +Christianity pictured this world as no more than a preparation for +another, and taught that the deprivations and sufferings of the present +life would be placed to a credit account in the next one, and third, +because it helped men and women to tolerate injustice in this world and +so helped the political game that governments and the Christian Church +have together played. A really enlightened society would rank +comparatively low the virtue of asceticism. Its principle would be not +self-sacrifice but self-development. + +What must result from this is an enlargement of our conception of +justice and also of social reform. Both of these things occupy a very +low place in the Christian scale of virtues. Social reform it has never +bothered seriously about, and in its earlier years simply ignored. A +people who were looking for the end of the world, whose teaching was +that it was for man's spiritual good to suffer, and who looked for all +help to supernatural intervention, could never have had seriously in +their minds what we understand by social reform. And so with the +conception of Justice. There is much of this in pre-Christian +literature, and its entrance into the life and thought of modern Europe +can be traced directly back to Greek and Roman sources. But the work of +the Christian, while it may have been to heal wounds, was not to prevent +their infliction. It was to minister to poverty, not to remove those +conditions that made poverty inevitable. + +A Spanish writer has put this point so well that I cannot do better than +quote him. He says:-- + + The notion of justice is as entirely foreign to the spirit of + Christianity as is that of intellectual honesty. It lies wholly + outside the field of its ethical vision. Christianity--I am not + referring to interpretations disclaimed as corruptions or + applications which may be set down to frailty and error, but to the + most idealized conceptions of its substance and the most exalted + manifestations of its spirit--Christianity has offered consolation + and comfort to men who suffered under injustice, but of that + injustice itself it has remained absolutely incognizant. It has + called upon the weary and heavy laden, upon the suffering and the + afflicted, it has proclaimed to them the law of love, the duty of + mercy and forgiveness, the Fatherhood of God; but in that torment + of religious and ethical emotion which has impressed men as the + summit of the sublime, and been held to transcend all other ethical + ideals, common justice, common honesty have no place. The ideal + Christian is seen in the saint who is seen descending like an angel + from heaven amid the welter of human misery, among the victims of + ruthless oppression and injustice ... but the cause of that misery + lies wholly outside the range of his consciousness; no glimmer of + right or wrong enters into his view of it. It is the established + order of things, the divinely appointed government of the world, + the trial laid upon sinners by divine ordinance. St. Vincent de + Paul visits the hell of the French galleys; he proclaims the + message of love and calls sinners to repentance; but to the + iniquity which creates and maintains that hell he remains + absolutely indifferent. He is appointed Grand Almoner to his Most + Christian Majesty. The world might groan in misery under the + despotism of oppressors, men's lives and men's minds might be + enslaved, crushed and blighted; the spirit of Christianity would go + forth and _comfort_ them, but it would never occur to it to redress + a single one of those wrongs. It has remained unconscious of them. + To those wrongs, to men's right to be delivered from them, it was + by nature completely blind. In respect to justice, to right and + wrong, the spirit of Christianity is not so much immoral as amoral. + The notion was as alien to it as the notion of truth. Included in + its code was, it might be controversially alleged, an old formula, + "the golden rule," a commonplace of most literature, which was + popular in the East from China to Asia Minor; but that isolated + precept was never interpreted in the sense of justice. It meant + forgiveness, forbearing, kindness, but never mere justice, common + equity; those virtues were far too unemotional in aspect to appeal + to the religious enthusiast. The renunciation of life and all its + vanities, the casting overboard of all sordid cares for its + maintenance, the suppression of desire, prodigal almsgiving, the + consecration of a life, the value of which had disappeared in his + eyes, to charity and love, non-resistance, passive obedience, the + turning of the other cheek to an enemy, the whole riot of these + hyperbolic ethical emotions could fire the Christian consciousness, + while it remained utterly unmoved by every form of wrong, iniquity + and injustice (Dr. Falta de Gracia. Cited by Dr. R. Briffault, _The + Making of Humanity_, pp. 334-5.) + +That, we may assume, will be one of the most striking consequences of +the displacement of Christianity in the social economy. There will be +less time wasted on what is called philanthropic work--which is often +the most harmful of all social labours--and more attention to the +removal of those conditions that have made the display of philanthropy +necessary. There will not be less feeling for the distressed or the +unfortunate, but it will be emotion under the guidance of the intellect, +and the dominant feeling will be that of indignation against the +conditions that make human suffering and degradation inevitable, rather +than a mere gratification of purely egoistic feeling which leaves the +source of the evil untouched. + +That will mean a rise in the scale of values of what one may call the +intellectual virtues--the duty of truthseeking and truth speaking. +Hitherto the type of character held up for admiration by Christianity +has been that of the blind believer who allowed nothing to stand in the +way of his belief, who required no proofs of its truth and allowed no +disproofs to enter his mind. A society in which religion does not hold a +controlling place is not likely to place a very high value upon such +precepts as "Blessed are those who have not seen and yet have believed," +or "Though he slay me yet will I trust him." But a very high value will +be placed upon the duty of investigation and the right of criticism. And +one cannot easily over-estimate the consequences of a generation or two +brought up in an atmosphere where such teachings obtain. It would mean a +receptiveness to new ideas, a readiness to overhaul old institutions, a +toleration of criticism such as would rapidly transform the whole mental +atmosphere and with it enormously accentuate the capacity for, and the +rapidity of, social progress. + +There is also to be borne in mind the effect of the liberation of the +enormous amount of energy at present expended in the service of +religion. Stupid religious controversialists often assume that it is +part of the Freethinker's case that religion enlists in its service bad +men, and much time is spent in proving that religious people are mostly +worthy ones. That could hardly be otherwise in a society where the +overwhelming majority of men and women profess a religion of some sort. +But that is, indeed, not the Freethinker's case at all, and if the +badness of some religious people is cited it is only in answer to the +foolish argument that religionists are better than others. The real +complaint against religion is of a different kind altogether. Just as +the worst thing that one can say about a clergyman intellectually is, +not that he does not believe in what he preaches, but that he does, so +the most serious indictment of current religion is not that it enlists +in its service bad characters, but that it dissipates the energy of +good men and women in a perfectly useless manner. The dissipation of +Christian belief means the liberating of a store of energy for service +that is at present being expended on ends that are without the least +social value. A world without religion would thus be a world in which +the sole ends of endeavour would be those of human betterment or human +enlightenment, and probably in the end the two are one. For there is no +real betterment without enlightenment, even though there may come for a +time enlightenment without betterment. It would leave the world with all +the means of intellectual and aesthetic and social enjoyment that exist +now, and one may reasonably hope that it will lead to their cultivation +and diffusion over the whole of society. + + + _Printed and Published by_ + THE PIONEER PRESS + (G. W. FOOTE & CO., LTD.), + _61 Farringdon Street, London, E.C. 4_. + + + + +ANNOUNCEMENTS. + + +THE SECULAR SOCIETY, Limited. + +_Registered Office_: 62 Farringdon Street, London, E.C. 4. + +_Secretary_: Miss E. M. 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Price 1s. 6d. per + 100, postage 3d. + + DYING FREETHINKERS. By CHAPMAN COHEN. Price 1s. 6d. per 100, postage + 3d. + + THE BELIEFS OF UNBELIEVERS. By CHAPMAN COHEN. Price 1s. 6d. per 100, + postage 3d. + + ARE CHRISTIANS INFERIOR TO FREETHINKERS? By CHAPMAN COHEN. Price 1s. + 6d., per 100, postage 3d. + + DOES MAN DESIRE GOD? By CHAPMAN COHEN. Price 1s. 6d. per 100, postage + 3d. + +THE PIONEER PRESS, 61 Farringdon Street, E.C. 4. + + + READ + + THE FREETHINKER + + EDITED BY + CHAPMAN COHEN. + + Brilliant Articles by Capable Writers on + Religion, Literature, and Life. + + One of the Liveliest and Most Outspoken + Journals in Great Britain. + + _PUBLISHED EVERY THURSDAY._ + + PRICE THREEPENCE. + + Of all Newsagents, or direct from the Publishing Office, + 61 FARRINGDON STREET, LONDON, E.C. 4. + + _SPECIMEN COPY POST FREE._ + + + + +Transcriber's Note: + + +Minor punctuation errors and letters printed upside down have been +corrected without note. Inconsistent hyphenation (e.g. common-place vs. +commonplace) has been retained. Variant and unusual spellings used +consistently (e.g. indispensible) have also been kept. + +The following corrections and changes were made to the text: + +p. 65: knowlelge to knowledge (accumulation of knowledge) + +p. 98: upder to under (under the old Greek) + +p. 102: extra "to" removed (owe their belief to the philosophical) + +p. 114: sterotyped to stereotyped (stereotyped phraseology) + +p. 132: developes to develops (organ or an organism develops) + +p. 157: it to is (After this lame conclusion it is difficult) + +p. 186: percieves to perceives (provided a man perceives) + +p. 190: Zeigler to Ziegler (Professor Ziegler) + +p. 215: mayority to majority (majority of Christians) + +p. 216: precariout to precarious (precarious existence at best) + +Advertisements: entrace to entrance (an entrance fee of ten shillings) + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's A Grammar of Freethought, by Chapman Cohen + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A GRAMMAR OF FREETHOUGHT *** + +***** This file should be named 36882.txt or 36882.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/3/6/8/8/36882/ + +Produced by Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe, S.D., and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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