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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes index 6833f05..d7b82bc 100644 --- a/.gitattributes +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ -* text=auto -*.txt text -*.md text +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf @@ -1,30 +1,4 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook of The History of the Peloponnesian War, by Thucydides - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you -will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before -using this eBook. - -Title: The History of the Peloponnesian War - -Author: Thucydides - -Translator: Richard Crawley - -Release Date: March 15, 2003 [eBook #7142] -[Most recently updated: September 7, 2021] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -Produced by: Albert Imrie and David Widger - -*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR *** - +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 7142 *** @@ -16556,7 +16530,7 @@ in the expedition, were sold. The total number of prisoners taken it would be difficult to state exactly, but it could not have been less than seven thousand. -This was the greatest Hellenic achievement of any in thig war, or, in +This was the greatest Hellenic achievement of any in this war, or, in my opinion, in Hellenic history; at once most glorious to the victors, and most calamitous to the conquered. They were beaten at all points and altogether; all that they suffered was great; they were destroyed, @@ -18833,353 +18807,4 @@ this war will be completed. ] THE END - - -*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR *** - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the -United States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online -at <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you -are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the -country where you are located before using this eBook. -</div> -<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Title: The History of the Peloponnesian War</div> -<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Author: Thucydides</div> -<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Translator: Richard Crawley</div> -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Release Date: March 15, 2003 [eBook #7142]<br /> -[Most recently updated: September 7, 2021]</div> -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Language: English</div> -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Character set encoding: UTF-8</div> -<div style='display:block; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Produced by: Albert Imrie and David Widger</div> -<div style='margin-top:2em; margin-bottom:4em'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR ***</div> +<div style='text-align:center'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 7142 ***</div> <h1>THE HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR</h1> @@ -90,22 +69,22 @@ country where you are located before using this eBook. <h3> Translated by Richard Crawley </h3> <p class="center"> -With Permission<br/> -to<br/> -CONNOP THIRLWALL<br/> -Historian of Greece<br/> -This Translation of the Work of His<br/> -Great Predecessor<br/> -is Respectfully Inscribed<br/> -by<br/> +With Permission<br> +to<br> +CONNOP THIRLWALL<br> +Historian of Greece<br> +This Translation of the Work of His<br> +Great Predecessor<br> +is Respectfully Inscribed<br> +by<br> —The Translator— </p> -<hr /> +<hr > <h2>CONTENTS</h2> -<table summary="" style=""> +<table> <tr> <td> <a href="#link2H_4_0001"><b>BOOK I</b></a></td> @@ -128,7 +107,7 @@ by<br/> </tr> <tr> -<td> <a href="#link2HCH0005">CHAPTER V</a><br/> <br/> </td> +<td> <a href="#link2HCH0005">CHAPTER V</a><br> <br> </td> </tr> <tr> @@ -144,7 +123,7 @@ by<br/> </tr> <tr> -<td> <a href="#link2HCH0008">CHAPTER VIII</a><br/> <br/> </td> +<td> <a href="#link2HCH0008">CHAPTER VIII</a><br> <br> </td> </tr> <tr> @@ -160,7 +139,7 @@ by<br/> </tr> <tr> -<td> <a href="#link2HCH0011">CHAPTER XI</a><br/> <br/> </td> +<td> <a href="#link2HCH0011">CHAPTER XI</a><br> <br> </td> </tr> <tr> @@ -176,7 +155,7 @@ by<br/> </tr> <tr> -<td> <a href="#link2HCH0014">CHAPTER XIV</a><br/> <br/> </td> +<td> <a href="#link2HCH0014">CHAPTER XIV</a><br> <br> </td> </tr> <tr> @@ -192,7 +171,7 @@ by<br/> </tr> <tr> -<td> <a href="#link2HCH0017">CHAPTER XVII</a><br/> <br/> </td> +<td> <a href="#link2HCH0017">CHAPTER XVII</a><br> <br> </td> </tr> <tr> @@ -208,7 +187,7 @@ by<br/> </tr> <tr> -<td> <a href="#link2HCH0020">CHAPTER XX</a><br/> <br/> </td> +<td> <a href="#link2HCH0020">CHAPTER XX</a><br> <br> </td> </tr> <tr> @@ -224,7 +203,7 @@ by<br/> </tr> <tr> -<td> <a href="#link2HCH0023">CHAPTER XXIII</a><br/> <br/> </td> +<td> <a href="#link2HCH0023">CHAPTER XXIII</a><br> <br> </td> </tr> <tr> @@ -245,18 +224,18 @@ by<br/> </table> -<hr /> +<hr > <div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="link2H_4_0001" id="link2H_4_0001"></a> +<h2><a id="link2H_4_0001"></a> BOOK I </h2> </div><!--end chapter--> <div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="link2HCH0001" id="link2HCH0001"></a> +<h2><a id="link2HCH0001"></a> CHAPTER I </h2> <p class="letter"> @@ -730,7 +709,7 @@ the breaking out of the war. <div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="link2HCH0002" id="link2HCH0002"></a> +<h2><a id="link2HCH0002"></a> CHAPTER II </h2> <p class="letter"> @@ -1504,7 +1483,7 @@ ravaging Chalcidice and Bottica: some of the towns also were taken by him. <div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="link2HCH0003" id="link2HCH0003"></a> +<h2><a id="link2HCH0003"></a> CHAPTER III </h2> <p class="letter"> @@ -1995,7 +1974,7 @@ most of Hellas already subject to them. <div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="link2HCH0004" id="link2HCH0004"></a> +<h2><a id="link2HCH0004"></a> CHAPTER IV </h2> <p class="letter"> @@ -2506,7 +2485,7 @@ subject as before. <div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="link2HCH0005" id="link2HCH0005"></a> +<h2><a id="link2HCH0005"></a> CHAPTER V </h2> <p class="letter"> @@ -2823,7 +2802,7 @@ the first-fruits of the spoil of the Medes, the following couplet: </p> <p class="poem"> -The Mede defeated, great Pausanias raised<br/> +The Mede defeated, great Pausanias raised<br> This monument, that Phœbus might be praised. </p> @@ -3191,14 +3170,14 @@ which were equivalent to a breach of the treaty and matter for war. <div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="link2H_4_0007" id="link2H_4_0007"></a> +<h2><a id="link2H_4_0007"></a> BOOK II </h2> </div><!--end chapter--> <div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="link2HCH0006" id="link2HCH0006"></a> +<h2><a id="link2HCH0006"></a> CHAPTER VI </h2> <p class="letter"> @@ -4143,7 +4122,7 @@ relatives, you may depart.” <div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="link2HCH0007" id="link2HCH0007"></a> +<h2><a id="link2HCH0007"></a> CHAPTER VII </h2> <p class="letter"> @@ -4689,7 +4668,7 @@ historian. <div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="link2HCH0008" id="link2HCH0008"></a> +<h2><a id="link2HCH0008"></a> CHAPTER VIII </h2> <p class="letter"> @@ -5484,14 +5463,14 @@ third year of this war, of which Thucydides was the historian. <div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="link2H_4_0011" id="link2H_4_0011"></a> +<h2><a id="link2H_4_0011"></a> BOOK III </h2> </div><!--end chapter--> <div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="link2HCH0009" id="link2HCH0009"></a> +<h2><a id="link2HCH0009"></a> CHAPTER IX </h2> <p class="letter"> @@ -6459,7 +6438,7 @@ Athens. Such were the events that took place at Lesbos. <div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="link2HCH0010" id="link2HCH0010"></a> +<h2><a id="link2HCH0010"></a> CHAPTER X </h2> <p class="letter"> @@ -7197,7 +7176,7 @@ in concert with their allies. <div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="link2HCH0011" id="link2HCH0011"></a> +<h2><a id="link2HCH0011"></a> CHAPTER XI </h2> <p class="letter"> @@ -7534,11 +7513,11 @@ Homer, taken from a hymn to Apollo: </p> <p class="poem"> -Phœbus, wherever thou strayest, far or near,<br/> -Delos was still of all thy haunts most dear.<br/> -Thither the robed Ionians take their way<br/> -With wife and child to keep thy holiday,<br/> -Invoke thy favour on each manly game,<br/> +Phœbus, wherever thou strayest, far or near,<br> +Delos was still of all thy haunts most dear.<br> +Thither the robed Ionians take their way<br> +With wife and child to keep thy holiday,<br> +Invoke thy favour on each manly game,<br> And dance and sing in honour of thy name. </p> @@ -7550,13 +7529,13 @@ which he also alludes to himself: </p> <p class="poem"> -Well, may Apollo keep you all! and so,<br/> -Sweethearts, good-bye—yet tell me not I go<br/> -Out from your hearts; and if in after hours<br/> -Some other wanderer in this world of ours<br/> -Touch at your shores, and ask your maidens here<br/> -Who sings the songs the sweetest to your ear,<br/> -Think of me then, and answer with a smile,<br/> +Well, may Apollo keep you all! and so,<br> +Sweethearts, good-bye—yet tell me not I go<br> +Out from your hearts; and if in after hours<br> +Some other wanderer in this world of ours<br> +Touch at your shores, and ask your maidens here<br> +Who sings the songs the sweetest to your ear,<br> +Think of me then, and answer with a smile,<br> ‘A blind old man of Scio’s rocky isle.’ </p> @@ -7805,14 +7784,14 @@ it ended the sixth year of this war, of which Thucydides was the historian. <div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="link2H_4_0015" id="link2H_4_0015"></a> +<h2><a id="link2H_4_0015"></a> BOOK IV </h2> </div><!--end chapter--> <div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="link2HCH0012" id="link2HCH0012"></a> +<h2><a id="link2HCH0012"></a> CHAPTER XII </h2> <p class="letter"> @@ -8672,7 +8651,7 @@ affair of Pylos. <div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="link2HCH0013" id="link2HCH0013"></a> +<h2><a id="link2HCH0013"></a> CHAPTER XIII </h2> <p class="letter"> @@ -9306,7 +9285,7 @@ very long while, although effected by a very few partisans. <div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="link2HCH0014" id="link2HCH0014"></a> +<h2><a id="link2HCH0014"></a> CHAPTER XIV </h2> <p class="letter"> @@ -10561,14 +10540,14 @@ which Thucydides is the historian. <div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="link2H_4_0019" id="link2H_4_0019"></a> +<h2><a id="link2H_4_0019"></a> BOOK V </h2> </div><!--end chapter--> <div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="link2HCH0015" id="link2HCH0015"></a> +<h2><a id="link2HCH0015"></a> CHAPTER XV </h2> <p class="letter"> @@ -11122,7 +11101,7 @@ whole of the ten years previously. <div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="link2HCH0016" id="link2HCH0016"></a> +<h2><a id="link2HCH0016"></a> CHAPTER XVI </h2> <p class="letter"> @@ -12428,7 +12407,7 @@ it. <div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="link2HCH0017" id="link2HCH0017"></a> +<h2><a id="link2HCH0017"></a> CHAPTER XVII </h2> <p class="letter"> @@ -12776,14 +12755,14 @@ colonists and inhabited the place themselves. <div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="link2H_4_0023" id="link2H_4_0023"></a> +<h2><a id="link2H_4_0023"></a> BOOK VI </h2> </div><!--end chapter--> <div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="link2HCH0018" id="link2HCH0018"></a> +<h2><a id="link2HCH0018"></a> CHAPTER XVIII </h2> <p class="letter"> @@ -13476,7 +13455,7 @@ were also assembling. <div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="link2HCH0019" id="link2HCH0019"></a> +<h2><a id="link2HCH0019"></a> CHAPTER XIX </h2> <p class="letter"> @@ -14108,7 +14087,7 @@ upon him and those in his company. <div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="link2HCH0020" id="link2HCH0020"></a> +<h2><a id="link2HCH0020"></a> CHAPTER XX </h2> <p class="letter"> @@ -15058,14 +15037,14 @@ ravaging their land and killing some of the inhabitants. <div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="link2H_4_0027" id="link2H_4_0027"></a> +<h2><a id="link2H_4_0027"></a> BOOK VII </h2> </div><!--end chapter--> <div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="link2HCH0021" id="link2HCH0021"></a> +<h2><a id="link2HCH0021"></a> CHAPTER XXI </h2> <p class="letter"> @@ -15937,7 +15916,7 @@ no means despairing of equal success by land. <div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="link2HCH0022" id="link2HCH0022"></a> +<h2><a id="link2HCH0022"></a> CHAPTER XXII </h2> <p class="letter"> @@ -16160,7 +16139,7 @@ further information to make him so positive. <div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="link2HCH0023" id="link2HCH0023"></a> +<h2><a id="link2HCH0023"></a> CHAPTER XXIII </h2> <p class="letter"> @@ -17021,7 +17000,7 @@ not have been less than seven thousand. </p> <p> -This was the greatest Hellenic achievement of any in thig war, or, in my +This was the greatest Hellenic achievement of any in this war, or, in my opinion, in Hellenic history; at once most glorious to the victors, and most calamitous to the conquered. They were beaten at all points and altogether; all that they suffered was great; they were destroyed, as the saying is, with a @@ -17033,14 +17012,14 @@ out of many returned home. Such were the events in Sicily. <div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="link2H_4_0031" id="link2H_4_0031"></a> +<h2><a id="link2H_4_0031"></a> BOOK VIII </h2> </div><!--end chapter--> <div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="link2HCH0024" id="link2HCH0024"></a> +<h2><a id="link2HCH0024"></a> CHAPTER XXIV </h2> <p class="letter"> @@ -17886,7 +17865,7 @@ rage without settling anything. <div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="link2HCH0025" id="link2HCH0025"></a> +<h2><a id="link2HCH0025"></a> CHAPTER XXV </h2> <p class="letter"> @@ -18656,7 +18635,7 @@ Samos. <div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="link2HCH0026" id="link2HCH0026"></a> +<h2><a id="link2HCH0026"></a> CHAPTER XXVI </h2> <p class="letter"> @@ -19353,448 +19332,6 @@ THE END </div><!--end chapter--> -<div style='display:block; margin-top:4em'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR ***</div> -<div style='text-align:left'> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will -be renamed. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize -this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +this book outside of the United States should confirm copyright status under the laws that apply to them. @@ -1,2 +1,2 @@ Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for -eBook #7142 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/7142) +book #7142 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/7142) diff --git a/old/7142.txt b/old/7142.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 05bfeec..0000000 --- a/old/7142.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,18994 +0,0 @@ -Project Gutenberg's The History of the Peloponnesian War, by Thucydides - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - - -Title: The History of the Peloponnesian War - -Author: Thucydides - -Translator: Richard Crawley - -Release Date: December, 2004 [EBook #7142] -Posting Date: May 1, 2009 - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ASCII - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PELOPONNESIAN WAR *** - - - - -Produced by Albert Imrie - - - - - - - - -THE HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR - -By Thucydides 431 BC - -Translated by Richard Crawley - - - - - With Permission - to - CONNOP THIRLWALL - Historian of Greece - This Translation of the Work of His - Great Predecessor - is Respectfully Inscribed - by --The Translator-- - - - - -CONTENTS - - - BOOK I - - CHAPTER I - The state of Greece from the earliest Times to the - Commencement of the Peloponnesian War - - CHAPTER II - Causes of the War--The Affair of Epidamnus-- - The Affair of Potidaea - - CHAPTER III - Congress of the Peloponnesian Confederacy at - Lacedaemon - - CHAPTER IV - From the End of the Persian to the Beginning of - the Peloponnesian War--The Progress from - Supremacy to Empire - - CHAPTER V - Second Congress at Lacedaemon--Preparations for - War and Diplomatic Skirmishes--Cylon-- - Pausanias--Themistocles - - - BOOK II - - CHAPTER VI - Beginning of the Peloponnesian War--First - Invasion of Attica--Funeral Oration of Pericles - - CHAPTER VII - Second Year of the War--The Plague of Athens-- - Position and Policy of Pericles--Fall of Potidaea - - CHAPTER VIII - Third Year of the War--Investment of Plataea-- - Naval Victories of Phormio--Thracian Irruption - into Macedonia under Sitalces - - - BOOK III - - CHAPTER IX - Fourth and Fifth Years of the War--Revolt of - Mitylene - - CHAPTER X - Fifth Year of the War--Trial and Execution of the - Plataeans--Corcyraean Revolution - - CHAPTER XI - Sixth Year of the War--Campaigns of Demosthenes - in Western Greece--Ruin of Ambracia - - - BOOK IV - - CHAPTER XII - Seventh Year of the War--Occupation of pylos-- - Surrender of the Spartan Army in Sphacteria - - CHAPTER XIII - Seventh and Eighth Years of the War--End of - Corcyraean Revolution--Peace of Gela-- - Capture of Nisaea - - CHAPTER XIV - Eighth and Ninth Years of the War--Invasion of - Boeotia--Fall of Amphipolis--Brilliant Successes - of Brasidas - - - BOOK V - - CHAPTER XV - Tenth Year of the War--Death of Cleon and - Brasidas--Peace of Nicias - - CHAPTER XVI - Feeling against Sparta in Peloponnese--League - of the Mantineans, Eleans, Argives, and - Athenians--Battle of Mantinea and breaking up of - the League - - CHAPTER XVII - Sixteenth Year of the War--The Melian - Conference--Fate of Melos - - - BOOK VI - - CHAPTER XVIII - Seventeenth Year of the War--The Sicilian - Campaign--Affair of the Hermae--Departure of the - Expedition - - CHAPTER XIX - Seventeenth Year of the War--Parties at Syracuse-- - Story of Harmodius and Aristogiton-- - Disgrace of Alcibiades - - CHAPTER XX - Seventeenth and Eighteenth Years of the War-- - Inaction of the Athenian Army--Alcibiades at - Sparta--Investment of Syracuse - - - BOOK VII - - CHAPTER XXI - Eighteenth and Nineteenth Years of the War-- - Arrival of Gylippus at Syracuse--Fortification - of Decelea--Successes of the Syracusans - - CHAPTER XXII - Nineteenth Year of the War--Arrival of - Demosthenes--Defeat of the Athenians at Epipolae-- - Folly and Obstinacy of Nicias - - CHAPTER XXIII - Nineteenth Year of the War--Battles in the Great - Harbour--Retreat and Annihilation of the - Athenian Army - - - BOOK VIII - - CHAPTER XXIV - Nineteenth and Twentieth Years of the War-- - Revolt of Ionia--Intervention of Persia--The - War in Ionia - - CHAPTER XXV - Twentieth and Twenty-first Years of the War-- - Intrigues of Alcibiades--Withdrawal of the - Persian Subsidies--Oligarchical Coup d'Etat - at Athens--Patriotism of the Army at Samos - - CHAPTER XXVI - Twenty first Year of the War--Recall of - Alcibiades to Samos--Revolt of Euboea and - Downfall of the Four Hundred--Battle of Cynossema - - - - - -BOOK I - - - -CHAPTER I - -_The State of Greece from the earliest Times to the Commencement of the -Peloponnesian War_ - -Thucydides, an Athenian, wrote the history of the war between the -Peloponnesians and the Athenians, beginning at the moment that it broke -out, and believing that it would be a great war and more worthy of -relation than any that had preceded it. This belief was not without -its grounds. The preparations of both the combatants were in every -department in the last state of perfection; and he could see the rest of -the Hellenic race taking sides in the quarrel; those who delayed doing -so at once having it in contemplation. Indeed this was the greatest -movement yet known in history, not only of the Hellenes, but of a large -part of the barbarian world--I had almost said of mankind. For though -the events of remote antiquity, and even those that more immediately -preceded the war, could not from lapse of time be clearly ascertained, -yet the evidences which an inquiry carried as far back as was -practicable leads me to trust, all point to the conclusion that there -was nothing on a great scale, either in war or in other matters. - -For instance, it is evident that the country now called Hellas had in -ancient times no settled population; on the contrary, migrations were of -frequent occurrence, the several tribes readily abandoning their homes -under the pressure of superior numbers. Without commerce, without -freedom of communication either by land or sea, cultivating no more -of their territory than the exigencies of life required, destitute of -capital, never planting their land (for they could not tell when an -invader might not come and take it all away, and when he did come -they had no walls to stop him), thinking that the necessities of daily -sustenance could be supplied at one place as well as another, they cared -little for shifting their habitation, and consequently neither built -large cities nor attained to any other form of greatness. The richest -soils were always most subject to this change of masters; such as the -district now called Thessaly, Boeotia, most of the Peloponnese, Arcadia -excepted, and the most fertile parts of the rest of Hellas. The goodness -of the land favoured the aggrandizement of particular individuals, and -thus created faction which proved a fertile source of ruin. It also -invited invasion. Accordingly Attica, from the poverty of its soil -enjoying from a very remote period freedom from faction, never changed -its inhabitants. And here is no inconsiderable exemplification of -my assertion that the migrations were the cause of there being no -correspondent growth in other parts. The most powerful victims of war or -faction from the rest of Hellas took refuge with the Athenians as a -safe retreat; and at an early period, becoming naturalized, swelled the -already large population of the city to such a height that Attica became -at last too small to hold them, and they had to send out colonies to -Ionia. - -There is also another circumstance that contributes not a little to my -conviction of the weakness of ancient times. Before the Trojan war -there is no indication of any common action in Hellas, nor indeed of the -universal prevalence of the name; on the contrary, before the time of -Hellen, son of Deucalion, no such appellation existed, but the country -went by the names of the different tribes, in particular of the -Pelasgian. It was not till Hellen and his sons grew strong in Phthiotis, -and were invited as allies into the other cities, that one by one they -gradually acquired from the connection the name of Hellenes; though a -long time elapsed before that name could fasten itself upon all. The -best proof of this is furnished by Homer. Born long after the Trojan -War, he nowhere calls all of them by that name, nor indeed any of them -except the followers of Achilles from Phthiotis, who were the original -Hellenes: in his poems they are called Danaans, Argives, and Achaeans. -He does not even use the term barbarian, probably because the -Hellenes had not yet been marked off from the rest of the world by one -distinctive appellation. It appears therefore that the several Hellenic -communities, comprising not only those who first acquired the name, -city by city, as they came to understand each other, but also those who -assumed it afterwards as the name of the whole people, were before the -Trojan war prevented by their want of strength and the absence of mutual -intercourse from displaying any collective action. - -Indeed, they could not unite for this expedition till they had gained -increased familiarity with the sea. And the first person known to us by -tradition as having established a navy is Minos. He made himself master -of what is now called the Hellenic sea, and ruled over the Cyclades, -into most of which he sent the first colonies, expelling the Carians -and appointing his own sons governors; and thus did his best to put down -piracy in those waters, a necessary step to secure the revenues for his -own use. - -For in early times the Hellenes and the barbarians of the coast and -islands, as communication by sea became more common, were tempted to -turn pirates, under the conduct of their most powerful men; the motives -being to serve their own cupidity and to support the needy. They -would fall upon a town unprotected by walls, and consisting of a mere -collection of villages, and would plunder it; indeed, this came to be -the main source of their livelihood, no disgrace being yet attached to -such an achievement, but even some glory. An illustration of this -is furnished by the honour with which some of the inhabitants of the -continent still regard a successful marauder, and by the question we -find the old poets everywhere representing the people as asking of -voyagers--"Are they pirates?"--as if those who are asked the question -would have no idea of disclaiming the imputation, or their interrogators -of reproaching them for it. The same rapine prevailed also by land. - -And even at the present day many of Hellas still follow the old fashion, -the Ozolian Locrians for instance, the Aetolians, the Acarnanians, and -that region of the continent; and the custom of carrying arms is still -kept up among these continentals, from the old piratical habits. -The whole of Hellas used once to carry arms, their habitations being -unprotected and their communication with each other unsafe; indeed, -to wear arms was as much a part of everyday life with them as with the -barbarians. And the fact that the people in these parts of Hellas are -still living in the old way points to a time when the same mode of life -was once equally common to all. The Athenians were the first to lay -aside their weapons, and to adopt an easier and more luxurious mode of -life; indeed, it is only lately that their rich old men left off the -luxury of wearing undergarments of linen, and fastening a knot of their -hair with a tie of golden grasshoppers, a fashion which spread to -their Ionian kindred and long prevailed among the old men there. On the -contrary, a modest style of dressing, more in conformity with modern -ideas, was first adopted by the Lacedaemonians, the rich doing their -best to assimilate their way of life to that of the common people. -They also set the example of contending naked, publicly stripping and -anointing themselves with oil in their gymnastic exercises. Formerly, -even in the Olympic contests, the athletes who contended wore belts -across their middles; and it is but a few years since that the practice -ceased. To this day among some of the barbarians, especially in Asia, -when prizes for boxing and wrestling are offered, belts are worn by the -combatants. And there are many other points in which a likeness might be -shown between the life of the Hellenic world of old and the barbarian of -to-day. - -With respect to their towns, later on, at an era of increased facilities -of navigation and a greater supply of capital, we find the shores -becoming the site of walled towns, and the isthmuses being occupied for -the purposes of commerce and defence against a neighbour. But the old -towns, on account of the great prevalence of piracy, were built away -from the sea, whether on the islands or the continent, and still remain -in their old sites. For the pirates used to plunder one another, and -indeed all coast populations, whether seafaring or not. - -The islanders, too, were great pirates. These islanders were Carians and -Phoenicians, by whom most of the islands were colonized, as was proved -by the following fact. During the purification of Delos by Athens in -this war all the graves in the island were taken up, and it was found -that above half their inmates were Carians: they were identified by the -fashion of the arms buried with them, and by the method of interment, -which was the same as the Carians still follow. But as soon as Minos -had formed his navy, communication by sea became easier, as he colonized -most of the islands, and thus expelled the malefactors. The coast -population now began to apply themselves more closely to the acquisition -of wealth, and their life became more settled; some even began to build -themselves walls on the strength of their newly acquired riches. For the -love of gain would reconcile the weaker to the dominion of the stronger, -and the possession of capital enabled the more powerful to reduce the -smaller towns to subjection. And it was at a somewhat later stage of -this development that they went on the expedition against Troy. - -What enabled Agamemnon to raise the armament was more, in my opinion, -his superiority in strength, than the oaths of Tyndareus, which -bound the suitors to follow him. Indeed, the account given by those -Peloponnesians who have been the recipients of the most credible -tradition is this. First of all Pelops, arriving among a needy -population from Asia with vast wealth, acquired such power that, -stranger though he was, the country was called after him; and this power -fortune saw fit materially to increase in the hands of his descendants. -Eurystheus had been killed in Attica by the Heraclids. Atreus was his -mother's brother; and to the hands of his relation, who had left his -father on account of the death of Chrysippus, Eurystheus, when he set -out on his expedition, had committed Mycenae and the government. As time -went on and Eurystheus did not return, Atreus complied with the -wishes of the Mycenaeans, who were influenced by fear of the -Heraclids--besides, his power seemed considerable, and he had not -neglected to court the favour of the populace--and assumed the sceptre -of Mycenae and the rest of the dominions of Eurystheus. And so the -power of the descendants of Pelops came to be greater than that of the -descendants of Perseus. To all this Agamemnon succeeded. He had also a -navy far stronger than his contemporaries, so that, in my opinion, -fear was quite as strong an element as love in the formation of the -confederate expedition. The strength of his navy is shown by the fact -that his own was the largest contingent, and that of the Arcadians was -furnished by him; this at least is what Homer says, if his testimony is -deemed sufficient. Besides, in his account of the transmission of the -sceptre, he calls him - - Of many an isle, and of all Argos king. - -Now Agamemnon's was a continental power; and he could not have been -master of any except the adjacent islands (and these would not be many), -but through the possession of a fleet. - -And from this expedition we may infer the character of earlier -enterprises. Now Mycenae may have been a small place, and many of the -towns of that age may appear comparatively insignificant, but no exact -observer would therefore feel justified in rejecting the estimate given -by the poets and by tradition of the magnitude of the armament. For I -suppose if Lacedaemon were to become desolate, and the temples and the -foundations of the public buildings were left, that as time went on -there would be a strong disposition with posterity to refuse to accept -her fame as a true exponent of her power. And yet they occupy two-fifths -of Peloponnese and lead the whole, not to speak of their numerous allies -without. Still, as the city is neither built in a compact form nor -adorned with magnificent temples and public edifices, but composed of -villages after the old fashion of Hellas, there would be an impression -of inadequacy. Whereas, if Athens were to suffer the same misfortune, -I suppose that any inference from the appearance presented to the eye -would make her power to have been twice as great as it is. We have -therefore no right to be sceptical, nor to content ourselves with an -inspection of a town to the exclusion of a consideration of its power; -but we may safely conclude that the armament in question surpassed -all before it, as it fell short of modern efforts; if we can here also -accept the testimony of Homer's poems, in which, without allowing for -the exaggeration which a poet would feel himself licensed to employ, we -can see that it was far from equalling ours. He has represented it as -consisting of twelve hundred vessels; the Boeotian complement of each -ship being a hundred and twenty men, that of the ships of Philoctetes -fifty. By this, I conceive, he meant to convey the maximum and the -minimum complement: at any rate, he does not specify the amount of any -others in his catalogue of the ships. That they were all rowers as well -as warriors we see from his account of the ships of Philoctetes, in -which all the men at the oar are bowmen. Now it is improbable that -many supernumeraries sailed, if we except the kings and high officers; -especially as they had to cross the open sea with munitions of war, -in ships, moreover, that had no decks, but were equipped in the old -piratical fashion. So that if we strike the average of the largest -and smallest ships, the number of those who sailed will appear -inconsiderable, representing, as they did, the whole force of Hellas. -And this was due not so much to scarcity of men as of money. Difficulty -of subsistence made the invaders reduce the numbers of the army to a -point at which it might live on the country during the prosecution of -the war. Even after the victory they obtained on their arrival--and a -victory there must have been, or the fortifications of the naval camp -could never have been built--there is no indication of their whole -force having been employed; on the contrary, they seem to have turned to -cultivation of the Chersonese and to piracy from want of supplies. This -was what really enabled the Trojans to keep the field for ten years -against them; the dispersion of the enemy making them always a match for -the detachment left behind. If they had brought plenty of supplies with -them, and had persevered in the war without scattering for piracy and -agriculture, they would have easily defeated the Trojans in the field, -since they could hold their own against them with the division on -service. In short, if they had stuck to the siege, the capture of Troy -would have cost them less time and less trouble. But as want of money -proved the weakness of earlier expeditions, so from the same cause -even the one in question, more famous than its predecessors, may be -pronounced on the evidence of what it effected to have been inferior to -its renown and to the current opinion about it formed under the tuition -of the poets. - -Even after the Trojan War, Hellas was still engaged in removing and -settling, and thus could not attain to the quiet which must precede -growth. The late return of the Hellenes from Ilium caused many -revolutions, and factions ensued almost everywhere; and it was the -citizens thus driven into exile who founded the cities. Sixty years -after the capture of Ilium, the modern Boeotians were driven out of -Arne by the Thessalians, and settled in the present Boeotia, the former -Cadmeis; though there was a division of them there before, some of whom -joined the expedition to Ilium. Twenty years later, the Dorians and the -Heraclids became masters of Peloponnese; so that much had to be done -and many years had to elapse before Hellas could attain to a durable -tranquillity undisturbed by removals, and could begin to send out -colonies, as Athens did to Ionia and most of the islands, and the -Peloponnesians to most of Italy and Sicily and some places in the rest -of Hellas. All these places were founded subsequently to the war with -Troy. - -But as the power of Hellas grew, and the acquisition of wealth became -more an object, the revenues of the states increasing, tyrannies were -by their means established almost everywhere--the old form of government -being hereditary monarchy with definite prerogatives--and Hellas began -to fit out fleets and apply herself more closely to the sea. It is said -that the Corinthians were the first to approach the modern style of -naval architecture, and that Corinth was the first place in Hellas where -galleys were built; and we have Ameinocles, a Corinthian shipwright, -making four ships for the Samians. Dating from the end of this war, it -is nearly three hundred years ago that Ameinocles went to Samos. Again, -the earliest sea-fight in history was between the Corinthians and -Corcyraeans; this was about two hundred and sixty years ago, dating from -the same time. Planted on an isthmus, Corinth had from time out of mind -been a commercial emporium; as formerly almost all communication between -the Hellenes within and without Peloponnese was carried on overland, and -the Corinthian territory was the highway through which it travelled. -She had consequently great money resources, as is shown by the epithet -"wealthy" bestowed by the old poets on the place, and this enabled her, -when traffic by sea became more common, to procure her navy and put down -piracy; and as she could offer a mart for both branches of the trade, -she acquired for herself all the power which a large revenue affords. -Subsequently the Ionians attained to great naval strength in the reign -of Cyrus, the first king of the Persians, and of his son Cambyses, and -while they were at war with the former commanded for a while the Ionian -sea. Polycrates also, the tyrant of Samos, had a powerful navy in the -reign of Cambyses, with which he reduced many of the islands, and among -them Rhenea, which he consecrated to the Delian Apollo. About this time -also the Phocaeans, while they were founding Marseilles, defeated the -Carthaginians in a sea-fight. These were the most powerful navies. And -even these, although so many generations had elapsed since the Trojan -war, seem to have been principally composed of the old fifty-oars and -long-boats, and to have counted few galleys among their ranks. Indeed it -was only shortly the Persian war, and the death of Darius the successor -of Cambyses, that the Sicilian tyrants and the Corcyraeans acquired any -large number of galleys. For after these there were no navies of any -account in Hellas till the expedition of Xerxes; Aegina, Athens, and -others may have possessed a few vessels, but they were principally -fifty-oars. It was quite at the end of this period that the war with -Aegina and the prospect of the barbarian invasion enabled Themistocles -to persuade the Athenians to build the fleet with which they fought at -Salamis; and even these vessels had not complete decks. - -The navies, then, of the Hellenes during the period we have traversed -were what I have described. All their insignificance did not prevent -their being an element of the greatest power to those who cultivated -them, alike in revenue and in dominion. They were the means by which the -islands were reached and reduced, those of the smallest area falling the -easiest prey. Wars by land there were none, none at least by which -power was acquired; we have the usual border contests, but of distant -expeditions with conquest for object we hear nothing among the Hellenes. -There was no union of subject cities round a great state, no spontaneous -combination of equals for confederate expeditions; what fighting there -was consisted merely of local warfare between rival neighbours. The -nearest approach to a coalition took place in the old war between -Chalcis and Eretria; this was a quarrel in which the rest of the -Hellenic name did to some extent take sides. - -Various, too, were the obstacles which the national growth encountered -in various localities. The power of the Ionians was advancing with rapid -strides, when it came into collision with Persia, under King Cyrus, who, -after having dethroned Croesus and overrun everything between the Halys -and the sea, stopped not till he had reduced the cities of the coast; -the islands being only left to be subdued by Darius and the Phoenician -navy. - -Again, wherever there were tyrants, their habit of providing simply -for themselves, of looking solely to their personal comfort and family -aggrandizement, made safety the great aim of their policy, and prevented -anything great proceeding from them; though they would each have their -affairs with their immediate neighbours. All this is only true of the -mother country, for in Sicily they attained to very great power. Thus -for a long time everywhere in Hellas do we find causes which make the -states alike incapable of combination for great and national ends, or of -any vigorous action of their own. - -But at last a time came when the tyrants of Athens and the far older -tyrannies of the rest of Hellas were, with the exception of those in -Sicily, once and for all put down by Lacedaemon; for this city, though -after the settlement of the Dorians, its present inhabitants, it -suffered from factions for an unparalleled length of time, still at a -very early period obtained good laws, and enjoyed a freedom from tyrants -which was unbroken; it has possessed the same form of government for -more than four hundred years, reckoning to the end of the late war, and -has thus been in a position to arrange the affairs of the other states. -Not many years after the deposition of the tyrants, the battle of -Marathon was fought between the Medes and the Athenians. Ten years -afterwards, the barbarian returned with the armada for the subjugation -of Hellas. In the face of this great danger, the command of the -confederate Hellenes was assumed by the Lacedaemonians in virtue of -their superior power; and the Athenians, having made up their minds to -abandon their city, broke up their homes, threw themselves into their -ships, and became a naval people. This coalition, after repulsing the -barbarian, soon afterwards split into two sections, which included the -Hellenes who had revolted from the King, as well as those who had aided -him in the war. At the end of the one stood Athens, at the head of the -other Lacedaemon, one the first naval, the other the first military -power in Hellas. For a short time the league held together, till the -Lacedaemonians and Athenians quarrelled and made war upon each other -with their allies, a duel into which all the Hellenes sooner or later -were drawn, though some might at first remain neutral. So that the whole -period from the Median war to this, with some peaceful intervals, was -spent by each power in war, either with its rival, or with its own -revolted allies, and consequently afforded them constant practice in -military matters, and that experience which is learnt in the school of -danger. - -The policy of Lacedaemon was not to exact tribute from her allies, but -merely to secure their subservience to her interests by establishing -oligarchies among them; Athens, on the contrary, had by degrees deprived -hers of their ships, and imposed instead contributions in money on -all except Chios and Lesbos. Both found their resources for this -war separately to exceed the sum of their strength when the alliance -flourished intact. - -Having now given the result of my inquiries into early times, I grant -that there will be a difficulty in believing every particular detail. -The way that most men deal with traditions, even traditions of their -own country, is to receive them all alike as they are delivered, without -applying any critical test whatever. The general Athenian public fancy -that Hipparchus was tyrant when he fell by the hands of Harmodius -and Aristogiton, not knowing that Hippias, the eldest of the sons of -Pisistratus, was really supreme, and that Hipparchus and Thessalus were -his brothers; and that Harmodius and Aristogiton suspecting, on the very -day, nay at the very moment fixed on for the deed, that information had -been conveyed to Hippias by their accomplices, concluded that he had -been warned, and did not attack him, yet, not liking to be apprehended -and risk their lives for nothing, fell upon Hipparchus near the -temple of the daughters of Leos, and slew him as he was arranging the -Panathenaic procession. - -There are many other unfounded ideas current among the rest of the -Hellenes, even on matters of contemporary history, which have not -been obscured by time. For instance, there is the notion that the -Lacedaemonian kings have two votes each, the fact being that they have -only one; and that there is a company of Pitane, there being simply no -such thing. So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation -of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand. On the -whole, however, the conclusions I have drawn from the proofs quoted may, -I believe, safely be relied on. Assuredly they will not be disturbed -either by the lays of a poet displaying the exaggeration of his craft, -or by the compositions of the chroniclers that are attractive at truth's -expense; the subjects they treat of being out of the reach of evidence, -and time having robbed most of them of historical value by enthroning -them in the region of legend. Turning from these, we can rest satisfied -with having proceeded upon the clearest data, and having arrived at -conclusions as exact as can be expected in matters of such antiquity. -To come to this war: despite the known disposition of the actors in a -struggle to overrate its importance, and when it is over to return to -their admiration of earlier events, yet an examination of the facts will -show that it was much greater than the wars which preceded it. - -With reference to the speeches in this history, some were delivered -before the war began, others while it was going on; some I heard myself, -others I got from various quarters; it was in all cases difficult to -carry them word for word in one's memory, so my habit has been to make -the speakers say what was in my opinion demanded of them by the various -occasions, of course adhering as closely as possible to the general -sense of what they really said. And with reference to the narrative of -events, far from permitting myself to derive it from the first source -that came to hand, I did not even trust my own impressions, but it -rests partly on what I saw myself, partly on what others saw for me, -the accuracy of the report being always tried by the most severe and -detailed tests possible. My conclusions have cost me some labour from -the want of coincidence between accounts of the same occurrences by -different eye-witnesses, arising sometimes from imperfect memory, -sometimes from undue partiality for one side or the other. The absence -of romance in my history will, I fear, detract somewhat from its -interest; but if it be judged useful by those inquirers who desire -an exact knowledge of the past as an aid to the interpretation of the -future, which in the course of human things must resemble if it does not -reflect it, I shall be content. In fine, I have written my work, not as -an essay which is to win the applause of the moment, but as a possession -for all time. - -The Median War, the greatest achievement of past times, yet found a -speedy decision in two actions by sea and two by land. The Peloponnesian -War was prolonged to an immense length, and, long as it was, it was -short without parallel for the misfortunes that it brought upon Hellas. -Never had so many cities been taken and laid desolate, here by the -barbarians, here by the parties contending (the old inhabitants being -sometimes removed to make room for others); never was there so much -banishing and blood-shedding, now on the field of battle, now in the -strife of faction. Old stories of occurrences handed down by tradition, -but scantily confirmed by experience, suddenly ceased to be incredible; -there were earthquakes of unparalleled extent and violence; eclipses of -the sun occurred with a frequency unrecorded in previous history; there -were great droughts in sundry places and consequent famines, and that -most calamitous and awfully fatal visitation, the plague. All this -came upon them with the late war, which was begun by the Athenians and -Peloponnesians by the dissolution of the thirty years' truce made after -the conquest of Euboea. To the question why they broke the treaty, I -answer by placing first an account of their grounds of complaint and -points of difference, that no one may ever have to ask the immediate -cause which plunged the Hellenes into a war of such magnitude. The -real cause I consider to be the one which was formally most kept out -of sight. The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this -inspired in Lacedaemon, made war inevitable. Still it is well to give -the grounds alleged by either side which led to the dissolution of the -treaty and the breaking out of the war. - - - - -CHAPTER II - -_Causes of the War--The Affair of Epidamnus--The Affair of Potidaea_ - -The city of Epidamnus stands on the right of the entrance of the Ionic -Gulf. Its vicinity is inhabited by the Taulantians, an Illyrian -people. The place is a colony from Corcyra, founded by Phalius, son -of Eratocleides, of the family of the Heraclids, who had according to -ancient usage been summoned for the purpose from Corinth, the mother -country. The colonists were joined by some Corinthians, and others of -the Dorian race. Now, as time went on, the city of Epidamnus became -great and populous; but falling a prey to factions arising, it is -said, from a war with her neighbours the barbarians, she became much -enfeebled, and lost a considerable amount of her power. The last act -before the war was the expulsion of the nobles by the people. The exiled -party joined the barbarians, and proceeded to plunder those in the city -by sea and land; and the Epidamnians, finding themselves hard pressed, -sent ambassadors to Corcyra beseeching their mother country not to allow -them to perish, but to make up matters between them and the exiles, -and to rid them of the war with the barbarians. The ambassadors seated -themselves in the temple of Hera as suppliants, and made the above -requests to the Corcyraeans. But the Corcyraeans refused to accept their -supplication, and they were dismissed without having effected anything. - -When the Epidamnians found that no help could be expected from Corcyra, -they were in a strait what to do next. So they sent to Delphi and -inquired of the God whether they should deliver their city to the -Corinthians and endeavour to obtain some assistance from their founders. -The answer he gave them was to deliver the city and place themselves -under Corinthian protection. So the Epidamnians went to Corinth and -delivered over the colony in obedience to the commands of the oracle. -They showed that their founder came from Corinth, and revealed the -answer of the god; and they begged them not to allow them to perish, -but to assist them. This the Corinthians consented to do. Believing the -colony to belong as much to themselves as to the Corcyraeans, they felt -it to be a kind of duty to undertake their protection. Besides, they -hated the Corcyraeans for their contempt of the mother country. Instead -of meeting with the usual honours accorded to the parent city by every -other colony at public assemblies, such as precedence at sacrifices, -Corinth found herself treated with contempt by a power which in point of -wealth could stand comparison with any even of the richest communities -in Hellas, which possessed great military strength, and which sometimes -could not repress a pride in the high naval position of an island -whose nautical renown dated from the days of its old inhabitants, the -Phaeacians. This was one reason of the care that they lavished on their -fleet, which became very efficient; indeed they began the war with a -force of a hundred and twenty galleys. - -All these grievances made Corinth eager to send the promised aid to -Epidamnus. Advertisement was made for volunteer settlers, and a force of -Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Corinthians was dispatched. They marched by -land to Apollonia, a Corinthian colony, the route by sea being avoided -from fear of Corcyraean interruption. When the Corcyraeans heard of the -arrival of the settlers and troops in Epidamnus, and the surrender of -the colony to Corinth, they took fire. Instantly putting to sea with -five-and-twenty ships, which were quickly followed by others, they -insolently commanded the Epidamnians to receive back the banished -nobles--(it must be premised that the Epidamnian exiles had come to -Corcyra and, pointing to the sepulchres of their ancestors, had appealed -to their kindred to restore them)--and to dismiss the Corinthian -garrison and settlers. But to all this the Epidamnians turned a deaf -ear. Upon this the Corcyraeans commenced operations against them with -a fleet of forty sail. They took with them the exiles, with a view -to their restoration, and also secured the services of the Illyrians. -Sitting down before the city, they issued a proclamation to the effect -that any of the natives that chose, and the foreigners, might depart -unharmed, with the alternative of being treated as enemies. On their -refusal the Corcyraeans proceeded to besiege the city, which stands -on an isthmus; and the Corinthians, receiving intelligence of the -investment of Epidamnus, got together an armament and proclaimed a -colony to Epidamnus, perfect political equality being guaranteed to all -who chose to go. Any who were not prepared to sail at once might, by -paying down the sum of fifty Corinthian drachmae, have a share in the -colony without leaving Corinth. Great numbers took advantage of this -proclamation, some being ready to start directly, others paying the -requisite forfeit. In case of their passage being disputed by the -Corcyraeans, several cities were asked to lend them a convoy. Megara -prepared to accompany them with eight ships, Pale in Cephallonia with -four; Epidaurus furnished five, Hermione one, Troezen two, Leucas ten, -and Ambracia eight. The Thebans and Phliasians were asked for money, the -Eleans for hulls as well; while Corinth herself furnished thirty ships -and three thousand heavy infantry. - -When the Corcyraeans heard of their preparations they came to Corinth -with envoys from Lacedaemon and Sicyon, whom they persuaded to accompany -them, and bade her recall the garrison and settlers, as she had nothing -to do with Epidamnus. If, however, she had any claims to make, they were -willing to submit the matter to the arbitration of such of the cities in -Peloponnese as should be chosen by mutual agreement, and that the colony -should remain with the city to whom the arbitrators might assign it. -They were also willing to refer the matter to the oracle at Delphi. If, -in defiance of their protestations, war was appealed to, they should be -themselves compelled by this violence to seek friends in quarters where -they had no desire to seek them, and to make even old ties give way to -the necessity of assistance. The answer they got from Corinth was that, -if they would withdraw their fleet and the barbarians from Epidamnus, -negotiation might be possible; but, while the town was still being -besieged, going before arbitrators was out of the question. The -Corcyraeans retorted that if Corinth would withdraw her troops from -Epidamnus they would withdraw theirs, or they were ready to let both -parties remain in statu quo, an armistice being concluded till judgment -could be given. - -Turning a deaf ear to all these proposals, when their ships were manned -and their allies had come in, the Corinthians sent a herald before them -to declare war and, getting under way with seventy-five ships and two -thousand heavy infantry, sailed for Epidamnus to give battle to the -Corcyraeans. The fleet was under the command of Aristeus, son of -Pellichas, Callicrates, son of Callias, and Timanor, son of Timanthes; -the troops under that of Archetimus, son of Eurytimus, and Isarchidas, -son of Isarchus. When they had reached Actium in the territory of -Anactorium, at the mouth of the mouth of the Gulf of Ambracia, where -the temple of Apollo stands, the Corcyraeans sent on a herald in a light -boat to warn them not to sail against them. Meanwhile they proceeded -to man their ships, all of which had been equipped for action, the old -vessels being undergirded to make them seaworthy. On the return of the -herald without any peaceful answer from the Corinthians, their ships -being now manned, they put out to sea to meet the enemy with a fleet of -eighty sail (forty were engaged in the siege of Epidamnus), formed -line, and went into action, and gained a decisive victory, and destroyed -fifteen of the Corinthian vessels. The same day had seen Epidamnus -compelled by its besiegers to capitulate; the conditions being that the -foreigners should be sold, and the Corinthians kept as prisoners of war, -till their fate should be otherwise decided. - -After the engagement the Corcyraeans set up a trophy on Leukimme, a -headland of Corcyra, and slew all their captives except the Corinthians, -whom they kept as prisoners of war. Defeated at sea, the Corinthians and -their allies repaired home, and left the Corcyraeans masters of all -the sea about those parts. Sailing to Leucas, a Corinthian colony, they -ravaged their territory, and burnt Cyllene, the harbour of the Eleans, -because they had furnished ships and money to Corinth. For almost the -whole of the period that followed the battle they remained masters of -the sea, and the allies of Corinth were harassed by Corcyraean cruisers. -At last Corinth, roused by the sufferings of her allies, sent out ships -and troops in the fall of the summer, who formed an encampment at Actium -and about Chimerium, in Thesprotis, for the protection of Leucas and -the rest of the friendly cities. The Corcyraeans on their part formed a -similar station on Leukimme. Neither party made any movement, but they -remained confronting each other till the end of the summer, and winter -was at hand before either of them returned home. - -Corinth, exasperated by the war with the Corcyraeans, spent the whole of -the year after the engagement and that succeeding it in building ships, -and in straining every nerve to form an efficient fleet; rowers being -drawn from Peloponnese and the rest of Hellas by the inducement of large -bounties. The Corcyraeans, alarmed at the news of their preparations, -being without a single ally in Hellas (for they had not enrolled -themselves either in the Athenian or in the Lacedaemonian confederacy), -decided to repair to Athens in order to enter into alliance and to -endeavour to procure support from her. Corinth also, hearing of their -intentions, sent an embassy to Athens to prevent the Corcyraean navy -being joined by the Athenian, and her prospect of ordering the war -according to her wishes being thus impeded. An assembly was convoked, -and the rival advocates appeared: the Corcyraeans spoke as follows: - -"Athenians! when a people that have not rendered any important service -or support to their neighbours in times past, for which they might claim -to be repaid, appear before them as we now appear before you to solicit -their assistance, they may fairly be required to satisfy certain -preliminary conditions. They should show, first, that it is expedient -or at least safe to grant their request; next, that they will retain a -lasting sense of the kindness. But if they cannot clearly establish any -of these points, they must not be annoyed if they meet with a rebuff. -Now the Corcyraeans believe that with their petition for assistance they -can also give you a satisfactory answer on these points, and they have -therefore dispatched us hither. It has so happened that our policy as -regards you with respect to this request, turns out to be inconsistent, -and as regards our interests, to be at the present crisis inexpedient. -We say inconsistent, because a power which has never in the whole of her -past history been willing to ally herself with any of her neighbours, -is now found asking them to ally themselves with her. And we say -inexpedient, because in our present war with Corinth it has left us in -a position of entire isolation, and what once seemed the wise precaution -of refusing to involve ourselves in alliances with other powers, lest we -should also involve ourselves in risks of their choosing, has now proved -to be folly and weakness. It is true that in the late naval engagement -we drove back the Corinthians from our shores single-handed. But they -have now got together a still larger armament from Peloponnese and the -rest of Hellas; and we, seeing our utter inability to cope with them -without foreign aid, and the magnitude of the danger which subjection -to them implies, find it necessary to ask help from you and from every -other power. And we hope to be excused if we forswear our old principle -of complete political isolation, a principle which was not adopted with -any sinister intention, but was rather the consequence of an error in -judgment. - -"Now there are many reasons why in the event of your compliance you will -congratulate yourselves on this request having been made to you. First, -because your assistance will be rendered to a power which, herself -inoffensive, is a victim to the injustice of others. Secondly, because -all that we most value is at stake in the present contest, and your -welcome of us under these circumstances will be a proof of goodwill -which will ever keep alive the gratitude you will lay up in our hearts. -Thirdly, yourselves excepted, we are the greatest naval power in Hellas. -Moreover, can you conceive a stroke of good fortune more rare in -itself, or more disheartening to your enemies, than that the power whose -adhesion you would have valued above much material and moral strength -should present herself self-invited, should deliver herself into your -hands without danger and without expense, and should lastly put you -in the way of gaining a high character in the eyes of the world, the -gratitude of those whom you shall assist, and a great accession of -strength for yourselves? You may search all history without finding -many instances of a people gaining all these advantages at once, or -many instances of a power that comes in quest of assistance being in -a position to give to the people whose alliance she solicits as much -safety and honour as she will receive. But it will be urged that it -is only in the case of a war that we shall be found useful. To this -we answer that if any of you imagine that that war is far off, he is -grievously mistaken, and is blind to the fact that Lacedaemon regards -you with jealousy and desires war, and that Corinth is powerful -there--the same, remember, that is your enemy, and is even now trying -to subdue us as a preliminary to attacking you. And this she does to -prevent our becoming united by a common enmity, and her having us both -on her hands, and also to ensure getting the start of you in one of two -ways, either by crippling our power or by making its strength her own. -Now it is our policy to be beforehand with her--that is, for Corcyra to -make an offer of alliance and for you to accept it; in fact, we ought to -form plans against her instead of waiting to defeat the plans she forms -against us. - -"If she asserts that for you to receive a colony of hers into alliance -is not right, let her know that every colony that is well treated -honours its parent state, but becomes estranged from it by injustice. -For colonists are not sent forth on the understanding that they are to -be the slaves of those that remain behind, but that they are to be their -equals. And that Corinth was injuring us is clear. Invited to refer the -dispute about Epidamnus to arbitration, they chose to prosecute their -complaints war rather than by a fair trial. And let their conduct -towards us who are their kindred be a warning to you not to be misled -by their deceit, nor to yield to their direct requests; concessions to -adversaries only end in self-reproach, and the more strictly they are -avoided the greater will be the chance of security. - -"If it be urged that your reception of us will be a breach of the treaty -existing between you and Lacedaemon, the answer is that we are a neutral -state, and that one of the express provisions of that treaty is that -it shall be competent for any Hellenic state that is neutral to join -whichever side it pleases. And it is intolerable for Corinth to be -allowed to obtain men for her navy not only from her allies, but also -from the rest of Hellas, no small number being furnished by your own -subjects; while we are to be excluded both from the alliance left open -to us by treaty, and from any assistance that we might get from other -quarters, and you are to be accused of political immorality if you -comply with our request. On the other hand, we shall have much greater -cause to complain of you, if you do not comply with it; if we, who are -in peril and are no enemies of yours, meet with a repulse at your hands, -while Corinth, who is the aggressor and your enemy, not only meets with -no hindrance from you, but is even allowed to draw material for war from -your dependencies. This ought not to be, but you should either forbid -her enlisting men in your dominions, or you should lend us too what help -you may think advisable. - -"But your real policy is to afford us avowed countenance and support. -The advantages of this course, as we premised in the beginning of our -speech, are many. We mention one that is perhaps the chief. Could there -be a clearer guarantee of our good faith than is offered by the fact -that the power which is at enmity with you is also at enmity with us, -and that that power is fully able to punish defection? And there is a -wide difference between declining the alliance of an inland and of -a maritime power. For your first endeavour should be to prevent, if -possible, the existence of any naval power except your own; failing -this, to secure the friendship of the strongest that does exist. And if -any of you believe that what we urge is expedient, but fear to act upon -this belief, lest it should lead to a breach of the treaty, you must -remember that on the one hand, whatever your fears, your strength will -be formidable to your antagonists; on the other, whatever the confidence -you derive from refusing to receive us, your weakness will have no -terrors for a strong enemy. You must also remember that your decision -is for Athens no less than Corcyra, and that you are not making the -best provision for her interests, if at a time when you are anxiously -scanning the horizon that you may be in readiness for the breaking out -of the war which is all but upon you, you hesitate to attach to your -side a place whose adhesion or estrangement is alike pregnant with -the most vital consequences. For it lies conveniently for the -coast-navigation in the direction of Italy and Sicily, being able to bar -the passage of naval reinforcements from thence to Peloponnese, and -from Peloponnese thither; and it is in other respects a most desirable -station. To sum up as shortly as possible, embracing both general and -particular considerations, let this show you the folly of sacrificing -us. Remember that there are but three considerable naval powers in -Hellas--Athens, Corcyra, and Corinth--and that if you allow two of these -three to become one, and Corinth to secure us for herself, you will have -to hold the sea against the united fleets of Corcyra and Peloponnese. -But if you receive us, you will have our ships to reinforce you in the -struggle." - -Such were the words of the Corcyraeans. After they had finished, the -Corinthians spoke as follows: - -"These Corcyraeans in the speech we have just heard do not confine -themselves to the question of their reception into your alliance. They -also talk of our being guilty of injustice, and their being the victims -of an unjustifiable war. It becomes necessary for us to touch upon both -these points before we proceed to the rest of what we have to say, that -you may have a more correct idea of the grounds of our claim, and have -good cause to reject their petition. According to them, their old policy -of refusing all offers of alliance was a policy of moderation. It was in -fact adopted for bad ends, not for good; indeed their conduct is such -as to make them by no means desirous of having allies present to witness -it, or of having the shame of asking their concurrence. Besides, -their geographical situation makes them independent of others, and -consequently the decision in cases where they injure any lies not with -judges appointed by mutual agreement, but with themselves, because, -while they seldom make voyages to their neighbours, they are constantly -being visited by foreign vessels which are compelled to put in to -Corcyra. In short, the object that they propose to themselves, in their -specious policy of complete isolation, is not to avoid sharing in the -crimes of others, but to secure monopoly of crime to themselves--the -licence of outrage wherever they can compel, of fraud wherever they can -elude, and the enjoyment of their gains without shame. And yet if they -were the honest men they pretend to be, the less hold that others had -upon them, the stronger would be the light in which they might have put -their honesty by giving and taking what was just. - -"But such has not been their conduct either towards others or towards -us. The attitude of our colony towards us has always been one of -estrangement and is now one of hostility; for, say they: 'We were not -sent out to be ill-treated.' We rejoin that we did not found the colony -to be insulted by them, but to be their head and to be regarded with -a proper respect. At any rate our other colonies honour us, and we -are much beloved by our colonists; and clearly, if the majority are -satisfied with us, these can have no good reason for a dissatisfaction -in which they stand alone, and we are not acting improperly in making -war against them, nor are we making war against them without having -received signal provocation. Besides, if we were in the wrong, it would -be honourable in them to give way to our wishes, and disgraceful for us -to trample on their moderation; but in the pride and licence of wealth -they have sinned again and again against us, and never more deeply than -when Epidamnus, our dependency, which they took no steps to claim in its -distress upon our coming to relieve it, was by them seized, and is now -held by force of arms. - -"As to their allegation that they wished the question to be first -submitted to arbitration, it is obvious that a challenge coming from the -party who is safe in a commanding position cannot gain the credit due -only to him who, before appealing to arms, in deeds as well as words, -places himself on a level with his adversary. In their case, it was not -before they laid siege to the place, but after they at length understood -that we should not tamely suffer it, that they thought of the specious -word arbitration. And not satisfied with their own misconduct there, -they appear here now requiring you to join with them not in alliance but -in crime, and to receive them in spite of their being at enmity with us. -But it was when they stood firmest that they should have made overtures -to you, and not at a time when we have been wronged and they are in -peril; nor yet at a time when you will be admitting to a share in your -protection those who never admitted you to a share in their power, and -will be incurring an equal amount of blame from us with those in whose -offences you had no hand. No, they should have shared their power with -you before they asked you to share your fortunes with them. - -"So then the reality of the grievances we come to complain of, and the -violence and rapacity of our opponents, have both been proved. But that -you cannot equitably receive them, this you have still to learn. It may -be true that one of the provisions of the treaty is that it shall be -competent for any state, whose name was not down on the list, to join -whichever side it pleases. But this agreement is not meant for those -whose object in joining is the injury of other powers, but for those -whose need of support does not arise from the fact of defection, and -whose adhesion will not bring to the power that is mad enough to receive -them war instead of peace; which will be the case with you, if you -refuse to listen to us. For you cannot become their auxiliary and remain -our friend; if you join in their attack, you must share the punishment -which the defenders inflict on them. And yet you have the best possible -right to be neutral, or, failing this, you should on the contrary join -us against them. Corinth is at least in treaty with you; with Corcyra -you were never even in truce. But do not lay down the principle that -defection is to be patronized. Did we on the defection of the Samians -record our vote against you, when the rest of the Peloponnesian powers -were equally divided on the question whether they should assist them? -No, we told them to their face that every power has a right to punish -its own allies. Why, if you make it your policy to receive and assist -all offenders, you will find that just as many of your dependencies will -come over to us, and the principle that you establish will press less -heavily on us than on yourselves. - -"This then is what Hellenic law entitles us to demand as a right. But -we have also advice to offer and claims on your gratitude, which, since -there is no danger of our injuring you, as we are not enemies, and since -our friendship does not amount to very frequent intercourse, we say -ought to be liquidated at the present juncture. When you were in want -of ships of war for the war against the Aeginetans, before the Persian -invasion, Corinth supplied you with twenty vessels. That good turn, and -the line we took on the Samian question, when we were the cause of the -Peloponnesians refusing to assist them, enabled you to conquer Aegina -and to punish Samos. And we acted thus at crises when, if ever, men are -wont in their efforts against their enemies to forget everything for the -sake of victory, regarding him who assists them then as a friend, even -if thus far he has been a foe, and him who opposes them then as a foe, -even if he has thus far been a friend; indeed they allow their real -interests to suffer from their absorbing preoccupation in the struggle. - -"Weigh well these considerations, and let your youth learn what they are -from their elders, and let them determine to do unto us as we have done -unto you. And let them not acknowledge the justice of what we say, -but dispute its wisdom in the contingency of war. Not only is the -straightest path generally speaking the wisest; but the coming of the -war, which the Corcyraeans have used as a bugbear to persuade you to do -wrong, is still uncertain, and it is not worth while to be carried away -by it into gaining the instant and declared enmity of Corinth. It were, -rather, wise to try and counteract the unfavourable impression which -your conduct to Megara has created. For kindness opportunely shown has a -greater power of removing old grievances than the facts of the case -may warrant. And do not be seduced by the prospect of a great naval -alliance. Abstinence from all injustice to other first-rate powers is -a greater tower of strength than anything that can be gained by the -sacrifice of permanent tranquillity for an apparent temporary advantage. -It is now our turn to benefit by the principle that we laid down at -Lacedaemon, that every power has a right to punish her own allies. -We now claim to receive the same from you, and protest against your -rewarding us for benefiting you by our vote by injuring us by yours. -On the contrary, return us like for like, remembering that this is -that very crisis in which he who lends aid is most a friend, and he who -opposes is most a foe. And for these Corcyraeans--neither receive them -into alliance in our despite, nor be their abettors in crime. So do, and -you will act as we have a right to expect of you, and at the same time -best consult your own interests." - -Such were the words of the Corinthians. - -When the Athenians had heard both out, two assemblies were held. In the -first there was a manifest disposition to listen to the representations -of Corinth; in the second, public feeling had changed and an alliance -with Corcyra was decided on, with certain reservations. It was to be a -defensive, not an offensive alliance. It did not involve a breach of the -treaty with Peloponnese: Athens could not be required to join Corcyra in -any attack upon Corinth. But each of the contracting parties had a right -to the other's assistance against invasion, whether of his own territory -or that of an ally. For it began now to be felt that the coming of the -Peloponnesian war was only a question of time, and no one was willing -to see a naval power of such magnitude as Corcyra sacrificed to Corinth; -though if they could let them weaken each other by mutual conflict, it -would be no bad preparation for the struggle which Athens might one day -have to wage with Corinth and the other naval powers. At the same time -the island seemed to lie conveniently on the coasting passage to Italy -and Sicily. With these views, Athens received Corcyra into alliance and, -on the departure of the Corinthians not long afterwards, sent ten ships -to their assistance. They were commanded by Lacedaemonius, the son -of Cimon, Diotimus, the son of Strombichus, and Proteas, the son of -Epicles. Their instructions were to avoid collision with the Corinthian -fleet except under certain circumstances. If it sailed to Corcyra and -threatened a landing on her coast, or in any of her possessions, they -were to do their utmost to prevent it. These instructions were prompted -by an anxiety to avoid a breach of the treaty. - -Meanwhile the Corinthians completed their preparations, and sailed for -Corcyra with a hundred and fifty ships. Of these Elis furnished ten, -Megara twelve, Leucas ten, Ambracia twenty-seven, Anactorium one, and -Corinth herself ninety. Each of these contingents had its own admiral, -the Corinthian being under the command of Xenoclides, son of Euthycles, -with four colleagues. Sailing from Leucas, they made land at the part -of the continent opposite Corcyra. They anchored in the harbour of -Chimerium, in the territory of Thesprotis, above which, at some distance -from the sea, lies the city of Ephyre, in the Elean district. By this -city the Acherusian lake pours its waters into the sea. It gets its name -from the river Acheron, which flows through Thesprotis and falls into -the lake. There also the river Thyamis flows, forming the boundary -between Thesprotis and Kestrine; and between these rivers rises the -point of Chimerium. In this part of the continent the Corinthians now -came to anchor, and formed an encampment. When the Corcyraeans saw them -coming, they manned a hundred and ten ships, commanded by Meikiades, -Aisimides, and Eurybatus, and stationed themselves at one of the Sybota -isles; the ten Athenian ships being present. On Point Leukimme they -posted their land forces, and a thousand heavy infantry who had come -from Zacynthus to their assistance. Nor were the Corinthians on the -mainland without their allies. The barbarians flocked in large numbers -to their assistance, the inhabitants of this part of the continent being -old allies of theirs. - -When the Corinthian preparations were completed, they took three days' -provisions and put out from Chimerium by night, ready for action. -Sailing with the dawn, they sighted the Corcyraean fleet out at sea and -coming towards them. When they perceived each other, both sides formed -in order of battle. On the Corcyraean right wing lay the Athenian ships, -the rest of the line being occupied by their own vessels formed in three -squadrons, each of which was commanded by one of the three admirals. -Such was the Corcyraean formation. The Corinthian was as follows: on the -right wing lay the Megarian and Ambraciot ships, in the centre the rest -of the allies in order. But the left was composed of the best sailers -in the Corinthian navy, to encounter the Athenians and the right wing of -the Corcyraeans. As soon as the signals were raised on either side, they -joined battle. Both sides had a large number of heavy infantry on their -decks, and a large number of archers and darters, the old imperfect -armament still prevailing. The sea-fight was an obstinate one, though -not remarkable for its science; indeed it was more like a battle by -land. Whenever they charged each other, the multitude and crush of the -vessels made it by no means easy to get loose; besides, their hopes of -victory lay principally in the heavy infantry on the decks, who stood -and fought in order, the ships remaining stationary. The manoeuvre of -breaking the line was not tried; in short, strength and pluck had more -share in the fight than science. Everywhere tumult reigned, the battle -being one scene of confusion; meanwhile the Athenian ships, by coming -up to the Corcyraeans whenever they were pressed, served to alarm the -enemy, though their commanders could not join in the battle from fear of -their instructions. The right wing of the Corinthians suffered most. The -Corcyraeans routed it, and chased them in disorder to the continent with -twenty ships, sailed up to their camp, and burnt the tents which they -found empty, and plundered the stuff. So in this quarter the Corinthians -and their allies were defeated, and the Corcyraeans were victorious. -But where the Corinthians themselves were, on the left, they gained -a decided success; the scanty forces of the Corcyraeans being further -weakened by the want of the twenty ships absent on the pursuit. Seeing -the Corcyraeans hard pressed, the Athenians began at length to assist -them more unequivocally. At first, it is true, they refrained from -charging any ships; but when the rout was becoming patent, and the -Corinthians were pressing on, the time at last came when every one set -to, and all distinction was laid aside, and it came to this point, that -the Corinthians and Athenians raised their hands against each other. - -After the rout, the Corinthians, instead of employing themselves in -lashing fast and hauling after them the hulls of the vessels which they -had disabled, turned their attention to the men, whom they butchered as -they sailed through, not caring so much to make prisoners. Some even of -their own friends were slain by them, by mistake, in their ignorance of -the defeat of the right wing For the number of the ships on both sides, -and the distance to which they covered the sea, made it difficult, after -they had once joined, to distinguish between the conquering and the -conquered; this battle proving far greater than any before it, any at -least between Hellenes, for the number of vessels engaged. After the -Corinthians had chased the Corcyraeans to the land, they turned to the -wrecks and their dead, most of whom they succeeded in getting hold of -and conveying to Sybota, the rendezvous of the land forces furnished by -their barbarian allies. Sybota, it must be known, is a desert harbour of -Thesprotis. This task over, they mustered anew, and sailed against the -Corcyraeans, who on their part advanced to meet them with all their -ships that were fit for service and remaining to them, accompanied by -the Athenian vessels, fearing that they might attempt a landing in their -territory. It was by this time getting late, and the paean had been sung -for the attack, when the Corinthians suddenly began to back water. They -had observed twenty Athenian ships sailing up, which had been sent out -afterwards to reinforce the ten vessels by the Athenians, who feared, as -it turned out justly, the defeat of the Corcyraeans and the inability -of their handful of ships to protect them. These ships were thus seen -by the Corinthians first. They suspected that they were from Athens, and -that those which they saw were not all, but that there were more behind; -they accordingly began to retire. The Corcyraeans meanwhile had not -sighted them, as they were advancing from a point which they could not -so well see, and were wondering why the Corinthians were backing water, -when some caught sight of them, and cried out that there were ships in -sight ahead. Upon this they also retired; for it was now getting dark, -and the retreat of the Corinthians had suspended hostilities. Thus -they parted from each other, and the battle ceased with night. The -Corcyraeans were in their camp at Leukimme, when these twenty ships from -Athens, under the command of Glaucon, the son of Leagrus, and Andocides, -son of Leogoras, bore on through the corpses and the wrecks, and sailed -up to the camp, not long after they were sighted. It was now night, and -the Corcyraeans feared that they might be hostile vessels; but they soon -knew them, and the ships came to anchor. - -The next day the thirty Athenian vessels put out to sea, accompanied by -all the Corcyraean ships that were seaworthy, and sailed to the harbour -at Sybota, where the Corinthians lay, to see if they would engage. The -Corinthians put out from the land and formed a line in the open sea, but -beyond this made no further movement, having no intention of assuming -the offensive. For they saw reinforcements arrived fresh from Athens, -and themselves confronted by numerous difficulties, such as the -necessity of guarding the prisoners whom they had on board and the want -of all means of refitting their ships in a desert place. What they were -thinking more about was how their voyage home was to be effected; they -feared that the Athenians might consider that the treaty was dissolved -by the collision which had occurred, and forbid their departure. - -Accordingly they resolved to put some men on board a boat, and send them -without a herald's wand to the Athenians, as an experiment. Having done -so, they spoke as follows: "You do wrong, Athenians, to begin war and -break the treaty. Engaged in chastising our enemies, we find you placing -yourselves in our path in arms against us. Now if your intentions are to -prevent us sailing to Corcyra, or anywhere else that we may wish, and if -you are for breaking the treaty, first take us that are here and treat -us as enemies." Such was what they said, and all the Corcyraean armament -that were within hearing immediately called out to take them and kill -them. But the Athenians answered as follows: "Neither are we beginning -war, Peloponnesians, nor are we breaking the treaty; but these -Corcyraeans are our allies, and we are come to help them. So if you want -to sail anywhere else, we place no obstacle in your way; but if you are -going to sail against Corcyra, or any of her possessions, we shall do -our best to stop you." - -Receiving this answer from the Athenians, the Corinthians commenced -preparations for their voyage home, and set up a trophy in Sybota, on -the continent; while the Corcyraeans took up the wrecks and dead that -had been carried out to them by the current, and by a wind which rose in -the night and scattered them in all directions, and set up their trophy -in Sybota, on the island, as victors. The reasons each side had for -claiming the victory were these. The Corinthians had been victorious -in the sea-fight until night; and having thus been enabled to carry -off most wrecks and dead, they were in possession of no fewer than a -thousand prisoners of war, and had sunk close upon seventy vessels. The -Corcyraeans had destroyed about thirty ships, and after the arrival of -the Athenians had taken up the wrecks and dead on their side; they had -besides seen the Corinthians retire before them, backing water on sight -of the Athenian vessels, and upon the arrival of the Athenians refuse to -sail out against them from Sybota. Thus both sides claimed the victory. - -The Corinthians on the voyage home took Anactorium, which stands at the -mouth of the Ambracian gulf. The place was taken by treachery, being -common ground to the Corcyraeans and Corinthians. After establishing -Corinthian settlers there, they retired home. Eight hundred of the -Corcyraeans were slaves; these they sold; two hundred and fifty they -retained in captivity, and treated with great attention, in the hope -that they might bring over their country to Corinth on their return; -most of them being, as it happened, men of very high position in -Corcyra. In this way Corcyra maintained her political existence in the -war with Corinth, and the Athenian vessels left the island. This was -the first cause of the war that Corinth had against the Athenians, -viz., that they had fought against them with the Corcyraeans in time of -treaty. - -Almost immediately after this, fresh differences arose between the -Athenians and Peloponnesians, and contributed their share to the war. -Corinth was forming schemes for retaliation, and Athens suspected her -hostility. The Potidaeans, who inhabit the isthmus of Pallene, being a -Corinthian colony, but tributary allies of Athens, were ordered to -raze the wall looking towards Pallene, to give hostages, to dismiss the -Corinthian magistrates, and in future not to receive the persons sent -from Corinth annually to succeed them. It was feared that they might be -persuaded by Perdiccas and the Corinthians to revolt, and might draw the -rest of the allies in the direction of Thrace to revolt with them. -These precautions against the Potidaeans were taken by the Athenians -immediately after the battle at Corcyra. Not only was Corinth at -length openly hostile, but Perdiccas, son of Alexander, king of the -Macedonians, had from an old friend and ally been made an enemy. He -had been made an enemy by the Athenians entering into alliance with his -brother Philip and Derdas, who were in league against him. In his alarm -he had sent to Lacedaemon to try and involve the Athenians in a war with -the Peloponnesians, and was endeavouring to win over Corinth in order -to bring about the revolt of Potidaea. He also made overtures to the -Chalcidians in the direction of Thrace, and to the Bottiaeans, to -persuade them to join in the revolt; for he thought that if these places -on the border could be made his allies, it would be easier to carry -on the war with their co-operation. Alive to all this, and wishing to -anticipate the revolt of the cities, the Athenians acted as follows. -They were just then sending off thirty ships and a thousand heavy -infantry for his country under the command of Archestratus, son of -Lycomedes, with four colleagues. They instructed the captains to take -hostages of the Potidaeans, to raze the wall, and to be on their guard -against the revolt of the neighbouring cities. - -Meanwhile the Potidaeans sent envoys to Athens on the chance of -persuading them to take no new steps in their matters; they also went -to Lacedaemon with the Corinthians to secure support in case of need. -Failing after prolonged negotiation to obtain anything satisfactory -from the Athenians; being unable, for all they could say, to prevent the -vessels that were destined for Macedonia from also sailing against them; -and receiving from the Lacedaemonian government a promise to invade -Attica, if the Athenians should attack Potidaea, the Potidaeans, thus -favoured by the moment, at last entered into league with the Chalcidians -and Bottiaeans, and revolted. And Perdiccas induced the Chalcidians to -abandon and demolish their towns on the seaboard and, settling inland at -Olynthus, to make that one city a strong place: meanwhile to those who -followed his advice he gave a part of his territory in Mygdonia round -Lake Bolbe as a place of abode while the war against the Athenians -should last. They accordingly demolished their towns, removed inland and -prepared for war. The thirty ships of the Athenians, arriving before -the Thracian places, found Potidaea and the rest in revolt. Their -commanders, considering it to be quite impossible with their present -force to carry on war with Perdiccas and with the confederate towns -as well turned to Macedonia, their original destination, and, having -established themselves there, carried on war in co-operation with -Philip, and the brothers of Derdas, who had invaded the country from the -interior. - -Meanwhile the Corinthians, with Potidaea in revolt and the Athenian -ships on the coast of Macedonia, alarmed for the safety of the place -and thinking its danger theirs, sent volunteers from Corinth, and -mercenaries from the rest of Peloponnese, to the number of sixteen -hundred heavy infantry in all, and four hundred light troops. Aristeus, -son of Adimantus, who was always a steady friend to the Potidaeans, took -command of the expedition, and it was principally for love of him that -most of the men from Corinth volunteered. They arrived in Thrace forty -days after the revolt of Potidaea. - -The Athenians also immediately received the news of the revolt of the -cities. On being informed that Aristeus and his reinforcements were on -their way, they sent two thousand heavy infantry of their own citizens -and forty ships against the places in revolt, under the command -of Callias, son of Calliades, and four colleagues. They arrived in -Macedonia first, and found the force of a thousand men that had been -first sent out, just become masters of Therme and besieging Pydna. -Accordingly they also joined in the investment, and besieged Pydna for -a while. Subsequently they came to terms and concluded a forced alliance -with Perdiccas, hastened by the calls of Potidaea and by the arrival of -Aristeus at that place. They withdrew from Macedonia, going to Beroea -and thence to Strepsa, and, after a futile attempt on the latter place, -they pursued by land their march to Potidaea with three thousand heavy -infantry of their own citizens, besides a number of their allies, and -six hundred Macedonian horsemen, the followers of Philip and Pausanias. -With these sailed seventy ships along the coast. Advancing by short -marches, on the third day they arrived at Gigonus, where they encamped. - -Meanwhile the Potidaeans and the Peloponnesians with Aristeus were -encamped on the side looking towards Olynthus on the isthmus, in -expectation of the Athenians, and had established their market outside -the city. The allies had chosen Aristeus general of all the infantry; -while the command of the cavalry was given to Perdiccas, who had at -once left the alliance of the Athenians and gone back to that of the -Potidaeans, having deputed Iolaus as his general: The plan of Aristeus -was to keep his own force on the isthmus, and await the attack of the -Athenians; leaving the Chalcidians and the allies outside the isthmus, -and the two hundred cavalry from Perdiccas in Olynthus to act upon the -Athenian rear, on the occasion of their advancing against him; and thus -to place the enemy between two fires. While Callias the Athenian general -and his colleagues dispatched the Macedonian horse and a few of the -allies to Olynthus, to prevent any movement being made from that -quarter, the Athenians themselves broke up their camp and marched -against Potidaea. After they had arrived at the isthmus, and saw the -enemy preparing for battle, they formed against him, and soon afterwards -engaged. The wing of Aristeus, with the Corinthians and other picked -troops round him, routed the wing opposed to it, and followed for -a considerable distance in pursuit. But the rest of the army of the -Potidaeans and of the Peloponnesians was defeated by the Athenians, -and took refuge within the fortifications. Returning from the pursuit, -Aristeus perceived the defeat of the rest of the army. Being at a -loss which of the two risks to choose, whether to go to Olynthus or to -Potidaea, he at last determined to draw his men into as small a space -as possible, and force his way with a run into Potidaea. Not without -difficulty, through a storm of missiles, he passed along by the -breakwater through the sea, and brought off most of his men safe, -though a few were lost. Meanwhile the auxiliaries of the Potidaeans from -Olynthus, which is about seven miles off and in sight of Potidaea, when -the battle began and the signals were raised, advanced a little way -to render assistance; and the Macedonian horse formed against them to -prevent it. But on victory speedily declaring for the Athenians and the -signals being taken down, they retired back within the wall; and the -Macedonians returned to the Athenians. Thus there were no cavalry -present on either side. After the battle the Athenians set up a trophy, -and gave back their dead to the Potidaeans under truce. The Potidaeans -and their allies had close upon three hundred killed; the Athenians a -hundred and fifty of their own citizens, and Callias their general. - -The wall on the side of the isthmus had now works at once raised against -it, and manned by the Athenians. That on the side of Pallene had no -works raised against it. They did not think themselves strong enough at -once to keep a garrison in the isthmus and to cross over to Pallene and -raise works there; they were afraid that the Potidaeans and their allies -might take advantage of their division to attack them. Meanwhile the -Athenians at home learning that there were no works at Pallene, some -time afterwards sent off sixteen hundred heavy infantry of their own -citizens under the command of Phormio, son of Asopius. Arrived at -Pallene, he fixed his headquarters at Aphytis, and led his army against -Potidaea by short marches, ravaging the country as he advanced. No one -venturing to meet him in the field, he raised works against the wall -on the side of Pallene. So at length Potidaea was strongly invested on -either side, and from the sea by the ships co-operating in the blockade. -Aristeus, seeing its investment complete, and having no hope of its -salvation, except in the event of some movement from the Peloponnese, or -of some other improbable contingency, advised all except five hundred -to watch for a wind and sail out of the place, in order that their -provisions might last the longer. He was willing to be himself one of -those who remained. Unable to persuade them, and desirous of acting on -the next alternative, and of having things outside in the best posture -possible, he eluded the guardships of the Athenians and sailed out. -Remaining among the Chalcidians, he continued to carry on the war; in -particular he laid an ambuscade near the city of the Sermylians, and cut -off many of them; he also communicated with Peloponnese, and tried to -contrive some method by which help might be brought. Meanwhile, after -the completion of the investment of Potidaea, Phormio next employed -his sixteen hundred men in ravaging Chalcidice and Bottica: some of the -towns also were taken by him. - - - - -CHAPTER III - -_Congress of the Peloponnesian Confederacy at Lacedaemon_ - -The Athenians and Peloponnesians had these antecedent grounds of -complaint against each other: the complaint of Corinth was that her -colony of Potidaea, and Corinthian and Peloponnesian citizens within it, -were being besieged; that of Athens against the Peloponnesians that they -had incited a town of hers, a member of her alliance and a contributor -to her revenue, to revolt, and had come and were openly fighting against -her on the side of the Potidaeans. For all this, war had not yet -broken out: there was still truce for a while; for this was a private -enterprise on the part of Corinth. - -But the siege of Potidaea put an end to her inaction; she had men inside -it: besides, she feared for the place. Immediately summoning the allies -to Lacedaemon, she came and loudly accused Athens of breach of the -treaty and aggression on the rights of Peloponnese. With her, the -Aeginetans, formally unrepresented from fear of Athens, in secret proved -not the least urgent of the advocates for war, asserting that they had -not the independence guaranteed to them by the treaty. After extending -the summons to any of their allies and others who might have complaints -to make of Athenian aggression, the Lacedaemonians held their ordinary -assembly, and invited them to speak. There were many who came forward -and made their several accusations; among them the Megarians, in a -long list of grievances, called special attention to the fact of their -exclusion from the ports of the Athenian empire and the market of -Athens, in defiance of the treaty. Last of all the Corinthians -came forward, and having let those who preceded them inflame the -Lacedaemonians, now followed with a speech to this effect: - -"Lacedaemonians! the confidence which you feel in your constitution and -social order, inclines you to receive any reflections of ours on other -powers with a certain scepticism. Hence springs your moderation, but -hence also the rather limited knowledge which you betray in dealing with -foreign politics. Time after time was our voice raised to warn you of -the blows about to be dealt us by Athens, and time after time, instead -of taking the trouble to ascertain the worth of our communications, you -contented yourselves with suspecting the speakers of being inspired -by private interest. And so, instead of calling these allies together -before the blow fell, you have delayed to do so till we are smarting -under it; allies among whom we have not the worst title to speak, as -having the greatest complaints to make, complaints of Athenian outrage -and Lacedaemonian neglect. Now if these assaults on the rights of Hellas -had been made in the dark, you might be unacquainted with the facts, and -it would be our duty to enlighten you. As it is, long speeches are not -needed where you see servitude accomplished for some of us, meditated -for others--in particular for our allies--and prolonged preparations in -the aggressor against the hour of war. Or what, pray, is the meaning of -their reception of Corcyra by fraud, and their holding it against us -by force? what of the siege of Potidaea?--places one of which lies most -conveniently for any action against the Thracian towns; while the other -would have contributed a very large navy to the Peloponnesians? - -"For all this you are responsible. You it was who first allowed them -to fortify their city after the Median war, and afterwards to erect the -long walls--you who, then and now, are always depriving of freedom not -only those whom they have enslaved, but also those who have as yet been -your allies. For the true author of the subjugation of a people is not -so much the immediate agent, as the power which permits it having the -means to prevent it; particularly if that power aspires to the glory of -being the liberator of Hellas. We are at last assembled. It has not been -easy to assemble, nor even now are our objects defined. We ought not to -be still inquiring into the fact of our wrongs, but into the means of -our defence. For the aggressors with matured plans to oppose to our -indecision have cast threats aside and betaken themselves to action. And -we know what are the paths by which Athenian aggression travels, and how -insidious is its progress. A degree of confidence she may feel from the -idea that your bluntness of perception prevents your noticing her; but -it is nothing to the impulse which her advance will receive from -the knowledge that you see, but do not care to interfere. You, -Lacedaemonians, of all the Hellenes are alone inactive, and defend -yourselves not by doing anything but by looking as if you would do -something; you alone wait till the power of an enemy is becoming twice -its original size, instead of crushing it in its infancy. And yet the -world used to say that you were to be depended upon; but in your case, -we fear, it said more than the truth. The Mede, we ourselves know, had -time to come from the ends of the earth to Peloponnese, without any -force of yours worthy of the name advancing to meet him. But this was a -distant enemy. Well, Athens at all events is a near neighbour, and yet -Athens you utterly disregard; against Athens you prefer to act on the -defensive instead of on the offensive, and to make it an affair of -chances by deferring the struggle till she has grown far stronger than -at first. And yet you know that on the whole the rock on which the -barbarian was wrecked was himself, and that if our present enemy Athens -has not again and again annihilated us, we owe it more to her blunders -than to your protection; Indeed, expectations from you have before now -been the ruin of some, whose faith induced them to omit preparation. - -"We hope that none of you will consider these words of remonstrance to -be rather words of hostility; men remonstrate with friends who are -in error, accusations they reserve for enemies who have wronged them. -Besides, we consider that we have as good a right as any one to point -out a neighbour's faults, particularly when we contemplate the great -contrast between the two national characters; a contrast of which, -as far as we can see, you have little perception, having never yet -considered what sort of antagonists you will encounter in the Athenians, -how widely, how absolutely different from yourselves. The Athenians are -addicted to innovation, and their designs are characterized by swiftness -alike in conception and execution; you have a genius for keeping what -you have got, accompanied by a total want of invention, and when forced -to act you never go far enough. Again, they are adventurous beyond -their power, and daring beyond their judgment, and in danger they are -sanguine; your wont is to attempt less than is justified by your power, -to mistrust even what is sanctioned by your judgment, and to fancy that -from danger there is no release. Further, there is promptitude on their -side against procrastination on yours; they are never at home, you -are never from it: for they hope by their absence to extend their -acquisitions, you fear by your advance to endanger what you have left -behind. They are swift to follow up a success, and slow to recoil from a -reverse. Their bodies they spend ungrudgingly in their country's cause; -their intellect they jealously husband to be employed in her service. A -scheme unexecuted is with them a positive loss, a successful enterprise -a comparative failure. The deficiency created by the miscarriage of an -undertaking is soon filled up by fresh hopes; for they alone are enabled -to call a thing hoped for a thing got, by the speed with which they act -upon their resolutions. Thus they toil on in trouble and danger all the -days of their life, with little opportunity for enjoying, being ever -engaged in getting: their only idea of a holiday is to do what the -occasion demands, and to them laborious occupation is less of a -misfortune than the peace of a quiet life. To describe their character -in a word, one might truly say that they were born into the world to -take no rest themselves and to give none to others. - -"Such is Athens, your antagonist. And yet, Lacedaemonians, you still -delay, and fail to see that peace stays longest with those, who are not -more careful to use their power justly than to show their determination -not to submit to injustice. On the contrary, your ideal of fair dealing -is based on the principle that, if you do not injure others, you need -not risk your own fortunes in preventing others from injuring you. Now -you could scarcely have succeeded in such a policy even with a neighbour -like yourselves; but in the present instance, as we have just shown, -your habits are old-fashioned as compared with theirs. It is the law as -in art, so in politics, that improvements ever prevail; and though fixed -usages may be best for undisturbed communities, constant necessities of -action must be accompanied by the constant improvement of methods. Thus -it happens that the vast experience of Athens has carried her further -than you on the path of innovation. - -"Here, at least, let your procrastination end. For the present, assist -your allies and Potidaea in particular, as you promised, by a speedy -invasion of Attica, and do not sacrifice friends and kindred to their -bitterest enemies, and drive the rest of us in despair to some other -alliance. Such a step would not be condemned either by the Gods who -received our oaths, or by the men who witnessed them. The breach of a -treaty cannot be laid to the people whom desertion compels to seek new -relations, but to the power that fails to assist its confederate. But if -you will only act, we will stand by you; it would be unnatural for us to -change, and never should we meet with such a congenial ally. For these -reasons choose the right course, and endeavour not to let Peloponnese -under your supremacy degenerate from the prestige that it enjoyed under -that of your ancestors." - -Such were the words of the Corinthians. There happened to be Athenian -envoys present at Lacedaemon on other business. On hearing the speeches -they thought themselves called upon to come before the Lacedaemonians. -Their intention was not to offer a defence on any of the charges which -the cities brought against them, but to show on a comprehensive view -that it was not a matter to be hastily decided on, but one that demanded -further consideration. There was also a wish to call attention to -the great power of Athens, and to refresh the memory of the old and -enlighten the ignorance of the young, from a notion that their words -might have the effect of inducing them to prefer tranquillity to war. So -they came to the Lacedaemonians and said that they too, if there was no -objection, wished to speak to their assembly. They replied by inviting -them to come forward. The Athenians advanced, and spoke as follows: - -"The object of our mission here was not to argue with your allies, but -to attend to the matters on which our state dispatched us. However, the -vehemence of the outcry that we hear against us has prevailed on us to -come forward. It is not to combat the accusations of the cities (indeed -you are not the judges before whom either we or they can plead), but to -prevent your taking the wrong course on matters of great importance by -yielding too readily to the persuasions of your allies. We also wish to -show on a review of the whole indictment that we have a fair title to -our possessions, and that our country has claims to consideration. We -need not refer to remote antiquity: there we could appeal to the voice -of tradition, but not to the experience of our audience. But to the -Median War and contemporary history we must refer, although we are -rather tired of continually bringing this subject forward. In our action -during that war we ran great risk to obtain certain advantages: you had -your share in the solid results, do not try to rob us of all share in -the good that the glory may do us. However, the story shall be told not -so much to deprecate hostility as to testify against it, and to show, -if you are so ill advised as to enter into a struggle with Athens, what -sort of an antagonist she is likely to prove. We assert that at Marathon -we were at the front, and faced the barbarian single-handed. That when -he came the second time, unable to cope with him by land we went -on board our ships with all our people, and joined in the action at -Salamis. This prevented his taking the Peloponnesian states in detail, -and ravaging them with his fleet; when the multitude of his vessels -would have made any combination for self-defence impossible. The best -proof of this was furnished by the invader himself. Defeated at sea, he -considered his power to be no longer what it had been, and retired as -speedily as possible with the greater part of his army. - -"Such, then, was the result of the matter, and it was clearly proved -that it was on the fleet of Hellas that her cause depended. Well, to -this result we contributed three very useful elements, viz., the -largest number of ships, the ablest commander, and the most unhesitating -patriotism. Our contingent of ships was little less than two-thirds of -the whole four hundred; the commander was Themistocles, through -whom chiefly it was that the battle took place in the straits, the -acknowledged salvation of our cause. Indeed, this was the reason of -your receiving him with honours such as had never been accorded to any -foreign visitor. While for daring patriotism we had no competitors. -Receiving no reinforcements from behind, seeing everything in front of -us already subjugated, we had the spirit, after abandoning our city, -after sacrificing our property (instead of deserting the remainder of -the league or depriving them of our services by dispersing), to throw -ourselves into our ships and meet the danger, without a thought of -resenting your neglect to assist us. We assert, therefore, that we -conferred on you quite as much as we received. For you had a stake to -fight for; the cities which you had left were still filled with your -homes, and you had the prospect of enjoying them again; and your coming -was prompted quite as much by fear for yourselves as for us; at all -events, you never appeared till we had nothing left to lose. But we left -behind us a city that was a city no longer, and staked our lives for a -city that had an existence only in desperate hope, and so bore our full -share in your deliverance and in ours. But if we had copied others, and -allowed fears for our territory to make us give in our adhesion to the -Mede before you came, or if we had suffered our ruin to break our spirit -and prevent us embarking in our ships, your naval inferiority would have -made a sea-fight unnecessary, and his objects would have been peaceably -attained. - -"Surely, Lacedaemonians, neither by the patriotism that we displayed at -that crisis, nor by the wisdom of our counsels, do we merit our extreme -unpopularity with the Hellenes, not at least unpopularity for our -empire. That empire we acquired by no violent means, but because you -were unwilling to prosecute to its conclusion the war against the -barbarian, and because the allies attached themselves to us and -spontaneously asked us to assume the command. And the nature of the case -first compelled us to advance our empire to its present height; fear -being our principal motive, though honour and interest afterwards -came in. And at last, when almost all hated us, when some had already -revolted and had been subdued, when you had ceased to be the friends -that you once were, and had become objects of suspicion and dislike, -it appeared no longer safe to give up our empire; especially as all -who left us would fall to you. And no one can quarrel with a people for -making, in matters of tremendous risk, the best provision that it can -for its interest. - -"You, at all events, Lacedaemonians, have used your supremacy to settle -the states in Peloponnese as is agreeable to you. And if at the period -of which we were speaking you had persevered to the end of the matter, -and had incurred hatred in your command, we are sure that you would -have made yourselves just as galling to the allies, and would have been -forced to choose between a strong government and danger to yourselves. -It follows that it was not a very wonderful action, or contrary to the -common practice of mankind, if we did accept an empire that was offered -to us, and refused to give it up under the pressure of three of the -strongest motives, fear, honour, and interest. And it was not we who -set the example, for it has always been law that the weaker should be -subject to the stronger. Besides, we believed ourselves to be worthy -of our position, and so you thought us till now, when calculations of -interest have made you take up the cry of justice--a consideration which -no one ever yet brought forward to hinder his ambition when he had a -chance of gaining anything by might. And praise is due to all who, -if not so superior to human nature as to refuse dominion, yet respect -justice more than their position compels them to do. - -"We imagine that our moderation would be best demonstrated by the -conduct of others who should be placed in our position; but even our -equity has very unreasonably subjected us to condemnation instead of -approval. Our abatement of our rights in the contract trials with our -allies, and our causing them to be decided by impartial laws at Athens, -have gained us the character of being litigious. And none care to -inquire why this reproach is not brought against other imperial powers, -who treat their subjects with less moderation than we do; the secret -being that where force can be used, law is not needed. But our subjects -are so habituated to associate with us as equals that any defeat -whatever that clashes with their notions of justice, whether it proceeds -from a legal judgment or from the power which our empire gives us, makes -them forget to be grateful for being allowed to retain most of their -possessions, and more vexed at a part being taken, than if we had from -the first cast law aside and openly gratified our covetousness. If we -had done so, not even would they have disputed that the weaker must give -way to the stronger. Men's indignation, it seems, is more excited by -legal wrong than by violent wrong; the first looks like being cheated by -an equal, the second like being compelled by a superior. At all events -they contrived to put up with much worse treatment than this from the -Mede, yet they think our rule severe, and this is to be expected, for -the present always weighs heavy on the conquered. This at least is -certain. If you were to succeed in overthrowing us and in taking our -place, you would speedily lose the popularity with which fear of us -has invested you, if your policy of to-day is at all to tally with -the sample that you gave of it during the brief period of your command -against the Mede. Not only is your life at home regulated by rules and -institutions incompatible with those of others, but your citizens abroad -act neither on these rules nor on those which are recognized by the rest -of Hellas. - -"Take time then in forming your resolution, as the matter is of great -importance; and do not be persuaded by the opinions and complaints of -others to bring trouble on yourselves, but consider the vast influence -of accident in war, before you are engaged in it. As it continues, it -generally becomes an affair of chances, chances from which neither of -us is exempt, and whose event we must risk in the dark. It is a common -mistake in going to war to begin at the wrong end, to act first, and -wait for disaster to discuss the matter. But we are not yet by any means -so misguided, nor, so far as we can see, are you; accordingly, while it -is still open to us both to choose aright, we bid you not to dissolve -the treaty, or to break your oaths, but to have our differences settled -by arbitration according to our agreement. Or else we take the gods who -heard the oaths to witness, and if you begin hostilities, whatever line -of action you choose, we will try not to be behindhand in repelling -you." - -Such were the words of the Athenians. After the Lacedaemonians had heard -the complaints of the allies against the Athenians, and the observations -of the latter, they made all withdraw, and consulted by themselves on -the question before them. The opinions of the majority all led to the -same conclusion; the Athenians were open aggressors, and war must be -declared at once. But Archidamus, the Lacedaemonian king, came forward, -who had the reputation of being at once a wise and a moderate man, and -made the following speech: - -"I have not lived so long, Lacedaemonians, without having had the -experience of many wars, and I see those among you of the same age as -myself, who will not fall into the common misfortune of longing for -war from inexperience or from a belief in its advantage and its safety. -This, the war on which you are now debating, would be one of the -greatest magnitude, on a sober consideration of the matter. In a -struggle with Peloponnesians and neighbours our strength is of the same -character, and it is possible to move swiftly on the different points. -But a struggle with a people who live in a distant land, who have also -an extraordinary familiarity with the sea, and who are in the highest -state of preparation in every other department; with wealth private and -public, with ships, and horses, and heavy infantry, and a population -such as no one other Hellenic place can equal, and lastly a number -of tributary allies--what can justify us in rashly beginning such a -struggle? wherein is our trust that we should rush on it unprepared? Is -it in our ships? There we are inferior; while if we are to practise and -become a match for them, time must intervene. Is it in our money? There -we have a far greater deficiency. We neither have it in our treasury, -nor are we ready to contribute it from our private funds. Confidence -might possibly be felt in our superiority in heavy infantry and -population, which will enable us to invade and devastate their lands. -But the Athenians have plenty of other land in their empire, and -can import what they want by sea. Again, if we are to attempt an -insurrection of their allies, these will have to be supported with a -fleet, most of them being islanders. What then is to be our war? For -unless we can either beat them at sea, or deprive them of the revenues -which feed their navy, we shall meet with little but disaster. Meanwhile -our honour will be pledged to keeping on, particularly if it be the -opinion that we began the quarrel. For let us never be elated by the -fatal hope of the war being quickly ended by the devastation of their -lands. I fear rather that we may leave it as a legacy to our children; -so improbable is it that the Athenian spirit will be the slave of their -land, or Athenian experience be cowed by war. - -"Not that I would bid you be so unfeeling as to suffer them to injure -your allies, and to refrain from unmasking their intrigues; but I do bid -you not to take up arms at once, but to send and remonstrate with -them in a tone not too suggestive of war, nor again too suggestive -of submission, and to employ the interval in perfecting our own -preparations. The means will be, first, the acquisition of allies, -Hellenic or barbarian it matters not, so long as they are an accession -to our strength naval or pecuniary--I say Hellenic or barbarian, because -the odium of such an accession to all who like us are the objects of -the designs of the Athenians is taken away by the law of -self-preservation--and secondly the development of our home resources. -If they listen to our embassy, so much the better; but if not, after -the lapse of two or three years our position will have become materially -strengthened, and we can then attack them if we think proper. Perhaps -by that time the sight of our preparations, backed by language equally -significant, will have disposed them to submission, while their land -is still untouched, and while their counsels may be directed to the -retention of advantages as yet undestroyed. For the only light in which -you can view their land is that of a hostage in your hands, a hostage -the more valuable the better it is cultivated. This you ought to spare -as long as possible, and not make them desperate, and so increase the -difficulty of dealing with them. For if while still unprepared, hurried -away by the complaints of our allies, we are induced to lay it waste, -have a care that we do not bring deep disgrace and deep perplexity upon -Peloponnese. Complaints, whether of communities or individuals, it is -possible to adjust; but war undertaken by a coalition for sectional -interests, whose progress there is no means of foreseeing, does not -easily admit of creditable settlement. - -"And none need think it cowardice for a number of confederates to pause -before they attack a single city. The Athenians have allies as numerous -as our own, and allies that pay tribute, and war is a matter not so much -of arms as of money, which makes arms of use. And this is more than ever -true in a struggle between a continental and a maritime power. First, -then, let us provide money, and not allow ourselves to be carried away -by the talk of our allies before we have done so: as we shall have the -largest share of responsibility for the consequences be they good or -bad, we have also a right to a tranquil inquiry respecting them. - -"And the slowness and procrastination, the parts of our character that -are most assailed by their criticism, need not make you blush. If -we undertake the war without preparation, we should by hastening its -commencement only delay its conclusion: further, a free and a famous -city has through all time been ours. The quality which they condemn is -really nothing but a wise moderation; thanks to its possession, we -alone do not become insolent in success and give way less than others in -misfortune; we are not carried away by the pleasure of hearing ourselves -cheered on to risks which our judgment condemns; nor, if annoyed, are -we any the more convinced by attempts to exasperate us by accusation. -We are both warlike and wise, and it is our sense of order that makes -us so. We are warlike, because self-control contains honour as a -chief constituent, and honour bravery. And we are wise, because we are -educated with too little learning to despise the laws, and with too -severe a self-control to disobey them, and are brought up not to be -too knowing in useless matters--such as the knowledge which can give a -specious criticism of an enemy's plans in theory, but fails to assail -them with equal success in practice--but are taught to consider that -the schemes of our enemies are not dissimilar to our own, and that the -freaks of chance are not determinable by calculation. In practice we -always base our preparations against an enemy on the assumption that his -plans are good; indeed, it is right to rest our hopes not on a belief -in his blunders, but on the soundness of our provisions. Nor ought we to -believe that there is much difference between man and man, but to think -that the superiority lies with him who is reared in the severest school. -These practices, then, which our ancestors have delivered to us, and by -whose maintenance we have always profited, must not be given up. And -we must not be hurried into deciding in a day's brief space a question -which concerns many lives and fortunes and many cities, and in which -honour is deeply involved--but we must decide calmly. This our strength -peculiarly enables us to do. As for the Athenians, send to them on the -matter of Potidaea, send on the matter of the alleged wrongs of the -allies, particularly as they are prepared with legal satisfaction; and -to proceed against one who offers arbitration as against a wrongdoer, -law forbids. Meanwhile do not omit preparation for war. This decision -will be the best for yourselves, the most terrible to your opponents." - -Such were the words of Archidamus. Last came forward Sthenelaidas, one -of the ephors for that year, and spoke to the Lacedaemonians as follows: - -"The long speech of the Athenians I do not pretend to understand. They -said a good deal in praise of themselves, but nowhere denied that they -are injuring our allies and Peloponnese. And yet if they behaved well -against the Mede then, but ill towards us now, they deserve double -punishment for having ceased to be good and for having become bad. We -meanwhile are the same then and now, and shall not, if we are wise, -disregard the wrongs of our allies, or put off till to-morrow the duty -of assisting those who must suffer to-day. Others have much money and -ships and horses, but we have good allies whom we must not give up to -the Athenians, nor by lawsuits and words decide the matter, as it is -anything but in word that we are harmed, but render instant and powerful -help. And let us not be told that it is fitting for us to deliberate -under injustice; long deliberation is rather fitting for those who have -injustice in contemplation. Vote therefore, Lacedaemonians, for war, -as the honour of Sparta demands, and neither allow the further -aggrandizement of Athens, nor betray our allies to ruin, but with the -gods let us advance against the aggressors." - -With these words he, as ephor, himself put the question to the assembly -of the Lacedaemonians. He said that he could not determine which was -the loudest acclamation (their mode of decision is by acclamation not -by voting); the fact being that he wished to make them declare their -opinion openly and thus to increase their ardour for war. Accordingly -he said: "All Lacedaemonians who are of opinion that the treaty has -been broken, and that Athens is guilty, leave your seats and go there," -pointing out a certain place; "all who are of the opposite opinion, -there." They accordingly stood up and divided; and those who held that -the treaty had been broken were in a decided majority. Summoning the -allies, they told them that their opinion was that Athens had been -guilty of injustice, but that they wished to convoke all the allies and -put it to the vote; in order that they might make war, if they decided -to do so, on a common resolution. Having thus gained their point, the -delegates returned home at once; the Athenian envoys a little later, -when they had dispatched the objects of their mission. This decision of -the assembly, judging that the treaty had been broken, was made in the -fourteenth year of the thirty years' truce, which was entered into after -the affair of Euboea. - -The Lacedaemonians voted that the treaty had been broken, and that the -war must be declared, not so much because they were persuaded by the -arguments of the allies, as because they feared the growth of the power -of the Athenians, seeing most of Hellas already subject to them. - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -_From the end of the Persian to the beginning of the Peloponnesian -War--The Progress from Supremacy to Empire_ - -The way in which Athens came to be placed in the circumstances under -which her power grew was this. After the Medes had returned from Europe, -defeated by sea and land by the Hellenes, and after those of them who -had fled with their ships to Mycale had been destroyed, Leotychides, -king of the Lacedaemonians, the commander of the Hellenes at Mycale, -departed home with the allies from Peloponnese. But the Athenians and -the allies from Ionia and Hellespont, who had now revolted from the -King, remained and laid siege to Sestos, which was still held by the -Medes. After wintering before it, they became masters of the place on -its evacuation by the barbarians; and after this they sailed away from -Hellespont to their respective cities. Meanwhile the Athenian people, -after the departure of the barbarian from their country, at once -proceeded to carry over their children and wives, and such property -as they had left, from the places where they had deposited them, and -prepared to rebuild their city and their walls. For only isolated -portions of the circumference had been left standing, and most of -the houses were in ruins; though a few remained, in which the Persian -grandees had taken up their quarters. - -Perceiving what they were going to do, the Lacedaemonians sent an -embassy to Athens. They would have themselves preferred to see neither -her nor any other city in possession of a wall; though here they acted -principally at the instigation of their allies, who were alarmed at -the strength of her newly acquired navy and the valour which she had -displayed in the war with the Medes. They begged her not only to abstain -from building walls for herself, but also to join them in throwing down -the walls that still held together of the ultra-Peloponnesian cities. -The real meaning of their advice, the suspicion that it contained -against the Athenians, was not proclaimed; it was urged that so the -barbarian, in the event of a third invasion, would not have any strong -place, such as he now had in Thebes, for his base of operations; and -that Peloponnese would suffice for all as a base both for retreat and -offence. After the Lacedaemonians had thus spoken, they were, on the -advice of Themistocles, immediately dismissed by the Athenians, with -the answer that ambassadors should be sent to Sparta to discuss the -question. Themistocles told the Athenians to send him off with all speed -to Lacedaemon, but not to dispatch his colleagues as soon as they had -selected them, but to wait until they had raised their wall to the -height from which defence was possible. Meanwhile the whole population -in the city was to labour at the wall, the Athenians, their wives, and -their children, sparing no edifice, private or public, which might be -of any use to the work, but throwing all down. After giving these -instructions, and adding that he would be responsible for all other -matters there, he departed. Arrived at Lacedaemon he did not seek an -audience with the authorities, but tried to gain time and made excuses. -When any of the government asked him why he did not appear in the -assembly, he would say that he was waiting for his colleagues, who had -been detained in Athens by some engagement; however, that he expected -their speedy arrival, and wondered that they were not yet there. At -first the Lacedaemonians trusted the words of Themistocles, through -their friendship for him; but when others arrived, all distinctly -declaring that the work was going on and already attaining some -elevation, they did not know how to disbelieve it. Aware of this, he -told them that rumours are deceptive, and should not be trusted; they -should send some reputable persons from Sparta to inspect, whose report -might be trusted. They dispatched them accordingly. Concerning these -Themistocles secretly sent word to the Athenians to detain them as far -as possible without putting them under open constraint, and not to let -them go until they had themselves returned. For his colleagues had -now joined him, Abronichus, son of Lysicles, and Aristides, son of -Lysimachus, with the news that the wall was sufficiently advanced; -and he feared that when the Lacedaemonians heard the facts, they might -refuse to let them go. So the Athenians detained the envoys according to -his message, and Themistocles had an audience with the Lacedaemonians, -and at last openly told them that Athens was now fortified sufficiently -to protect its inhabitants; that any embassy which the Lacedaemonians or -their allies might wish to send to them should in future proceed on -the assumption that the people to whom they were going was able to -distinguish both its own and the general interests. That when the -Athenians thought fit to abandon their city and to embark in their -ships, they ventured on that perilous step without consulting them; -and that on the other hand, wherever they had deliberated with the -Lacedaemonians, they had proved themselves to be in judgment second to -none. That they now thought it fit that their city should have a wall, -and that this would be more for the advantage of both the citizens of -Athens and the Hellenic confederacy; for without equal military strength -it was impossible to contribute equal or fair counsel to the common -interest. It followed, he observed, either that all the members of the -confederacy should be without walls, or that the present step should be -considered a right one. - -The Lacedaemonians did not betray any open signs of anger against the -Athenians at what they heard. The embassy, it seems, was prompted not -by a desire to obstruct, but to guide the counsels of their government: -besides, Spartan feeling was at that time very friendly towards Athens -on account of the patriotism which she had displayed in the struggle -with the Mede. Still the defeat of their wishes could not but cause -them secret annoyance. The envoys of each state departed home without -complaint. - -In this way the Athenians walled their city in a little while. To -this day the building shows signs of the haste of its execution; the -foundations are laid of stones of all kinds, and in some places not -wrought or fitted, but placed just in the order in which they were -brought by the different hands; and many columns, too, from tombs, and -sculptured stones were put in with the rest. For the bounds of the city -were extended at every point of the circumference; and so they laid -hands on everything without exception in their haste. Themistocles also -persuaded them to finish the walls of Piraeus, which had been begun -before, in his year of office as archon; being influenced alike by the -fineness of a locality that has three natural harbours, and by the great -start which the Athenians would gain in the acquisition of power by -becoming a naval people. For he first ventured to tell them to stick to -the sea and forthwith began to lay the foundations of the empire. It was -by his advice, too, that they built the walls of that thickness which -can still be discerned round Piraeus, the stones being brought up by -two wagons meeting each other. Between the walls thus formed there -was neither rubble nor mortar, but great stones hewn square and fitted -together, cramped to each other on the outside with iron and lead. About -half the height that he intended was finished. His idea was by their -size and thickness to keep off the attacks of an enemy; he thought that -they might be adequately defended by a small garrison of invalids, and -the rest be freed for service in the fleet. For the fleet claimed most -of his attention. He saw, as I think, that the approach by sea was -easier for the king's army than that by land: he also thought Piraeus -more valuable than the upper city; indeed, he was always advising the -Athenians, if a day should come when they were hard pressed by land, -to go down into Piraeus, and defy the world with their fleet. Thus, -therefore, the Athenians completed their wall, and commenced their other -buildings immediately after the retreat of the Mede. - -Meanwhile Pausanias, son of Cleombrotus, was sent out from Lacedaemon as -commander-in-chief of the Hellenes, with twenty ships from Peloponnese. -With him sailed the Athenians with thirty ships, and a number of the -other allies. They made an expedition against Cyprus and subdued most of -the island, and afterwards against Byzantium, which was in the hands of -the Medes, and compelled it to surrender. This event took place while -the Spartans were still supreme. But the violence of Pausanias had -already begun to be disagreeable to the Hellenes, particularly to the -Ionians and the newly liberated populations. These resorted to the -Athenians and requested them as their kinsmen to become their leaders, -and to stop any attempt at violence on the part of Pausanias. The -Athenians accepted their overtures, and determined to put down any -attempt of the kind and to settle everything else as their interests -might seem to demand. In the meantime the Lacedaemonians recalled -Pausanias for an investigation of the reports which had reached them. -Manifold and grave accusations had been brought against him by Hellenes -arriving in Sparta; and, to all appearance, there had been in him more -of the mimicry of a despot than of the attitude of a general. As it -happened, his recall came just at the time when the hatred which he -had inspired had induced the allies to desert him, the soldiers from -Peloponnese excepted, and to range themselves by the side of the -Athenians. On his arrival at Lacedaemon, he was censured for his -private acts of oppression, but was acquitted on the heaviest counts and -pronounced not guilty; it must be known that the charge of Medism formed -one of the principal, and to all appearance one of the best founded, -articles against him. The Lacedaemonians did not, however, restore him -to his command, but sent out Dorkis and certain others with a small -force; who found the allies no longer inclined to concede to them the -supremacy. Perceiving this they departed, and the Lacedaemonians did -not send out any to succeed them. They feared for those who went out -a deterioration similar to that observable in Pausanias; besides, -they desired to be rid of the Median War, and were satisfied of the -competency of the Athenians for the position, and of their friendship at -the time towards themselves. - -The Athenians, having thus succeeded to the supremacy by the voluntary -act of the allies through their hatred of Pausanias, fixed which cities -were to contribute money against the barbarian, which ships; their -professed object being to retaliate for their sufferings by ravaging -the King's country. Now was the time that the office of "Treasurers for -Hellas" was first instituted by the Athenians. These officers received -the tribute, as the money contributed was called. The tribute was first -fixed at four hundred and sixty talents. The common treasury was at -Delos, and the congresses were held in the temple. Their supremacy -commenced with independent allies who acted on the resolutions of a -common congress. It was marked by the following undertakings in war and -in administration during the interval between the Median and the present -war, against the barbarian, against their own rebel allies, and against -the Peloponnesian powers which would come in contact with them on -various occasions. My excuse for relating these events, and for -venturing on this digression, is that this passage of history has been -omitted by all my predecessors, who have confined themselves either -to Hellenic history before the Median War, or the Median War itself. -Hellanicus, it is true, did touch on these events in his Athenian -history; but he is somewhat concise and not accurate in his dates. -Besides, the history of these events contains an explanation of the -growth of the Athenian empire. - -First the Athenians besieged and captured Eion on the Strymon from the -Medes, and made slaves of the inhabitants, being under the command of -Cimon, son of Miltiades. Next they enslaved Scyros, the island in the -Aegean, containing a Dolopian population, and colonized it themselves. -This was followed by a war against Carystus, in which the rest of Euboea -remained neutral, and which was ended by surrender on conditions. After -this Naxos left the confederacy, and a war ensued, and she had to return -after a siege; this was the first instance of the engagement being -broken by the subjugation of an allied city, a precedent which -was followed by that of the rest in the order which circumstances -prescribed. Of all the causes of defection, that connected with arrears -of tribute and vessels, and with failure of service, was the chief; -for the Athenians were very severe and exacting, and made themselves -offensive by applying the screw of necessity to men who were not used -to and in fact not disposed for any continuous labour. In some other -respects the Athenians were not the old popular rulers they had been -at first; and if they had more than their fair share of service, it -was correspondingly easy for them to reduce any that tried to leave the -confederacy. For this the allies had themselves to blame; the wish to -get off service making most of them arrange to pay their share of the -expense in money instead of in ships, and so to avoid having to leave -their homes. Thus while Athens was increasing her navy with the funds -which they contributed, a revolt always found them without resources or -experience for war. - -Next we come to the actions by land and by sea at the river Eurymedon, -between the Athenians with their allies, and the Medes, when the -Athenians won both battles on the same day under the conduct of Cimon, -son of Miltiades, and captured and destroyed the whole Phoenician fleet, -consisting of two hundred vessels. Some time afterwards occurred the -defection of the Thasians, caused by disagreements about the marts on -the opposite coast of Thrace, and about the mine in their possession. -Sailing with a fleet to Thasos, the Athenians defeated them at sea and -effected a landing on the island. About the same time they sent ten -thousand settlers of their own citizens and the allies to settle -the place then called Ennea Hodoi or Nine Ways, now Amphipolis. They -succeeded in gaining possession of Ennea Hodoi from the Edonians, but on -advancing into the interior of Thrace were cut off in Drabescus, a town -of the Edonians, by the assembled Thracians, who regarded the settlement -of the place Ennea Hodoi as an act of hostility. Meanwhile the Thasians -being defeated in the field and suffering siege, appealed to Lacedaemon, -and desired her to assist them by an invasion of Attica. Without -informing Athens, she promised and intended to do so, but was prevented -by the occurrence of the earthquake, accompanied by the secession of the -Helots and the Thuriats and Aethaeans of the Perioeci to Ithome. Most of -the Helots were the descendants of the old Messenians that were enslaved -in the famous war; and so all of them came to be called Messenians. So -the Lacedaemonians being engaged in a war with the rebels in Ithome, -the Thasians in the third year of the siege obtained terms from -the Athenians by razing their walls, delivering up their ships, and -arranging to pay the moneys demanded at once, and tribute in future; -giving up their possessions on the continent together with the mine. - -The Lacedaemonians, meanwhile, finding the war against the rebels in -Ithome likely to last, invoked the aid of their allies, and especially -of the Athenians, who came in some force under the command of Cimon. -The reason for this pressing summons lay in their reputed skill in -siege operations; a long siege had taught the Lacedaemonians their own -deficiency in this art, else they would have taken the place by assault. -The first open quarrel between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians arose -out of this expedition. The Lacedaemonians, when assault failed to take -the place, apprehensive of the enterprising and revolutionary character -of the Athenians, and further looking upon them as of alien extraction, -began to fear that, if they remained, they might be tempted by the -besieged in Ithome to attempt some political changes. They accordingly -dismissed them alone of the allies, without declaring their suspicions, -but merely saying that they had now no need of them. But the Athenians, -aware that their dismissal did not proceed from the more honourable -reason of the two, but from suspicions which had been conceived, went -away deeply offended, and conscious of having done nothing to merit such -treatment from the Lacedaemonians; and the instant that they returned -home they broke off the alliance which had been made against the Mede, -and allied themselves with Sparta's enemy Argos; each of the contracting -parties taking the same oaths and making the same alliance with the -Thessalians. - -Meanwhile the rebels in Ithome, unable to prolong further a ten years' -resistance, surrendered to Lacedaemon; the conditions being that they -should depart from Peloponnese under safe conduct, and should never set -foot in it again: any one who might hereafter be found there was to be -the slave of his captor. It must be known that the Lacedaemonians had -an old oracle from Delphi, to the effect that they should let go the -suppliant of Zeus at Ithome. So they went forth with their children and -their wives, and being received by Athens from the hatred that she now -felt for the Lacedaemonians, were located at Naupactus, which she had -lately taken from the Ozolian Locrians. The Athenians received -another addition to their confederacy in the Megarians; who left the -Lacedaemonian alliance, annoyed by a war about boundaries forced on -them by Corinth. The Athenians occupied Megara and Pegae, and built the -Megarians their long walls from the city to Nisaea, in which they placed -an Athenian garrison. This was the principal cause of the Corinthians -conceiving such a deadly hatred against Athens. - -Meanwhile Inaros, son of Psammetichus, a Libyan king of the Libyans on -the Egyptian border, having his headquarters at Marea, the town -above Pharos, caused a revolt of almost the whole of Egypt from King -Artaxerxes and, placing himself at its head, invited the Athenians to -his assistance. Abandoning a Cyprian expedition upon which they happened -to be engaged with two hundred ships of their own and their allies, -they arrived in Egypt and sailed from the sea into the Nile, and making -themselves masters of the river and two-thirds of Memphis, addressed -themselves to the attack of the remaining third, which is called White -Castle. Within it were Persians and Medes who had taken refuge there, -and Egyptians who had not joined the rebellion. - -Meanwhile the Athenians, making a descent from their fleet upon -Haliae, were engaged by a force of Corinthians and Epidaurians; and -the Corinthians were victorious. Afterwards the Athenians engaged the -Peloponnesian fleet off Cecruphalia; and the Athenians were victorious. -Subsequently war broke out between Aegina and Athens, and there was a -great battle at sea off Aegina between the Athenians and Aeginetans, -each being aided by their allies; in which victory remained with the -Athenians, who took seventy of the enemy's ships, and landed in the -country and commenced a siege under the command of Leocrates, son -of Stroebus. Upon this the Peloponnesians, desirous of aiding the -Aeginetans, threw into Aegina a force of three hundred heavy infantry, -who had before been serving with the Corinthians and Epidaurians. -Meanwhile the Corinthians and their allies occupied the heights of -Geraneia, and marched down into the Megarid, in the belief that, with a -large force absent in Aegina and Egypt, Athens would be unable to help -the Megarians without raising the siege of Aegina. But the Athenians, -instead of moving the army of Aegina, raised a force of the old and -young men that had been left in the city, and marched into the -Megarid under the command of Myronides. After a drawn battle with the -Corinthians, the rival hosts parted, each with the impression that they -had gained the victory. The Athenians, however, if anything, had rather -the advantage, and on the departure of the Corinthians set up a trophy. -Urged by the taunts of the elders in their city, the Corinthians made -their preparations, and about twelve days afterwards came and set up -their trophy as victors. Sallying out from Megara, the Athenians cut -off the party that was employed in erecting the trophy, and engaged and -defeated the rest. In the retreat of the vanquished army, a considerable -division, pressed by the pursuers and mistaking the road, dashed into a -field on some private property, with a deep trench all round it, and -no way out. Being acquainted with the place, the Athenians hemmed their -front with heavy infantry and, placing the light troops round in a -circle, stoned all who had gone in. Corinth here suffered a severe blow. -The bulk of her army continued its retreat home. - -About this time the Athenians began to build the long walls to the sea, -that towards Phalerum and that towards Piraeus. Meanwhile the Phocians -made an expedition against Doris, the old home of the Lacedaemonians, -containing the towns of Boeum, Kitinium, and Erineum. They had taken -one of these towns, when the Lacedaemonians under Nicomedes, son of -Cleombrotus, commanding for King Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias, who was -still a minor, came to the aid of the Dorians with fifteen hundred -heavy infantry of their own, and ten thousand of their allies. After -compelling the Phocians to restore the town on conditions, they began -their retreat. The route by sea, across the Crissaean Gulf, exposed them -to the risk of being stopped by the Athenian fleet; that across Geraneia -seemed scarcely safe, the Athenians holding Megara and Pegae. For the -pass was a difficult one, and was always guarded by the Athenians; and, -in the present instance, the Lacedaemonians had information that they -meant to dispute their passage. So they resolved to remain in Boeotia, -and to consider which would be the safest line of march. They had also -another reason for this resolve. Secret encouragement had been given -them by a party in Athens, who hoped to put an end to the reign of -democracy and the building of the Long Walls. Meanwhile the Athenians -marched against them with their whole levy and a thousand Argives and -the respective contingents of the rest of their allies. Altogether they -were fourteen thousand strong. The march was prompted by the notion that -the Lacedaemonians were at a loss how to effect their passage, and also -by suspicions of an attempt to overthrow the democracy. Some cavalry -also joined the Athenians from their Thessalian allies; but these went -over to the Lacedaemonians during the battle. - -The battle was fought at Tanagra in Boeotia. After heavy loss on both -sides, victory declared for the Lacedaemonians and their allies. -After entering the Megarid and cutting down the fruit trees, the -Lacedaemonians returned home across Geraneia and the isthmus. Sixty-two -days after the battle the Athenians marched into Boeotia under the -command of Myronides, defeated the Boeotians in battle at Oenophyta, and -became masters of Boeotia and Phocis. They dismantled the walls of the -Tanagraeans, took a hundred of the richest men of the Opuntian Locrians -as hostages, and finished their own long walls. This was followed by the -surrender of the Aeginetans to Athens on conditions; they pulled down -their walls, gave up their ships, and agreed to pay tribute in future. -The Athenians sailed round Peloponnese under Tolmides, son of -Tolmaeus, burnt the arsenal of Lacedaemon, took Chalcis, a town of the -Corinthians, and in a descent upon Sicyon defeated the Sicyonians in -battle. - -Meanwhile the Athenians in Egypt and their allies were still there, -and encountered all the vicissitudes of war. First the Athenians were -masters of Egypt, and the King sent Megabazus a Persian to Lacedaemon -with money to bribe the Peloponnesians to invade Attica and so draw off -the Athenians from Egypt. Finding that the matter made no progress, and -that the money was only being wasted, he recalled Megabazus with the -remainder of the money, and sent Megabuzus, son of Zopyrus, a Persian, -with a large army to Egypt. Arriving by land he defeated the Egyptians -and their allies in a battle, and drove the Hellenes out of Memphis, and -at length shut them up in the island of Prosopitis, where he besieged -them for a year and six months. At last, draining the canal of its -waters, which he diverted into another channel, he left their ships high -and dry and joined most of the island to the mainland, and then marched -over on foot and captured it. Thus the enterprise of the Hellenes came -to ruin after six years of war. Of all that large host a few travelling -through Libya reached Cyrene in safety, but most of them perished. And -thus Egypt returned to its subjection to the King, except Amyrtaeus, the -king in the marshes, whom they were unable to capture from the extent -of the marsh; the marshmen being also the most warlike of the Egyptians. -Inaros, the Libyan king, the sole author of the Egyptian revolt, was -betrayed, taken, and crucified. Meanwhile a relieving squadron of fifty -vessels had sailed from Athens and the rest of the confederacy for -Egypt. They put in to shore at the Mendesian mouth of the Nile, in total -ignorance of what had occurred. Attacked on the land side by the -troops, and from the sea by the Phoenician navy, most of the ships were -destroyed; the few remaining being saved by retreat. Such was the end of -the great expedition of the Athenians and their allies to Egypt. - -Meanwhile Orestes, son of Echecratidas, the Thessalian king, being an -exile from Thessaly, persuaded the Athenians to restore him. Taking with -them the Boeotians and Phocians their allies, the Athenians marched to -Pharsalus in Thessaly. They became masters of the country, though only -in the immediate vicinity of the camp; beyond which they could not go -for fear of the Thessalian cavalry. But they failed to take the city -or to attain any of the other objects of their expedition, and returned -home with Orestes without having effected anything. Not long after this -a thousand of the Athenians embarked in the vessels that were at Pegae -(Pegae, it must be remembered, was now theirs), and sailed along the -coast to Sicyon under the command of Pericles, son of Xanthippus. -Landing in Sicyon and defeating the Sicyonians who engaged them, they -immediately took with them the Achaeans and, sailing across, marched -against and laid siege to Oeniadae in Acarnania. Failing however to take -it, they returned home. - -Three years afterwards a truce was made between the Peloponnesians and -Athenians for five years. Released from Hellenic war, the Athenians made -an expedition to Cyprus with two hundred vessels of their own and their -allies, under the command of Cimon. Sixty of these were detached to -Egypt at the instance of Amyrtaeus, the king in the marshes; the rest -laid siege to Kitium, from which, however, they were compelled to retire -by the death of Cimon and by scarcity of provisions. Sailing off Salamis -in Cyprus, they fought with the Phoenicians, Cyprians, and Cilicians by -land and sea, and, being victorious on both elements departed home, -and with them the returned squadron from Egypt. After this the -Lacedaemonians marched out on a sacred war, and, becoming masters of the -temple at Delphi, it in the hands of the Delphians. Immediately after -their retreat, the Athenians marched out, became masters of the temple, -and placed it in the hands of the Phocians. - -Some time after this, Orchomenus, Chaeronea, and some other places in -Boeotia being in the hands of the Boeotian exiles, the Athenians marched -against the above-mentioned hostile places with a thousand Athenian -heavy infantry and the allied contingents, under the command of -Tolmides, son of Tolmaeus. They took Chaeronea, and made slaves of the -inhabitants, and, leaving a garrison, commenced their return. On -their road they were attacked at Coronea by the Boeotian exiles from -Orchomenus, with some Locrians and Euboean exiles, and others who were -of the same way of thinking, were defeated in battle, and some killed, -others taken captive. The Athenians evacuated all Boeotia by a treaty -providing for the recovery of the men; and the exiled Boeotians -returned, and with all the rest regained their independence. - -This was soon afterwards followed by the revolt of Euboea from Athens. -Pericles had already crossed over with an army of Athenians to the -island, when news was brought to him that Megara had revolted, that -the Peloponnesians were on the point of invading Attica, and that the -Athenian garrison had been cut off by the Megarians, with the exception -of a few who had taken refuge in Nisaea. The Megarians had introduced -the Corinthians, Sicyonians, and Epidaurians into the town before they -revolted. Meanwhile Pericles brought his army back in all haste from -Euboea. After this the Peloponnesians marched into Attica as far as -Eleusis and Thrius, ravaging the country under the conduct of King -Pleistoanax, the son of Pausanias, and without advancing further -returned home. The Athenians then crossed over again to Euboea under -the command of Pericles, and subdued the whole of the island: all but -Histiaea was settled by convention; the Histiaeans they expelled from -their homes, and occupied their territory themselves. - -Not long after their return from Euboea, they made a truce with the -Lacedaemonians and their allies for thirty years, giving up the posts -which they occupied in Peloponnese--Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaia. -In the sixth year of the truce, war broke out between the Samians and -Milesians about Priene. Worsted in the war, the Milesians came to Athens -with loud complaints against the Samians. In this they were joined by -certain private persons from Samos itself, who wished to revolutionize -the government. Accordingly the Athenians sailed to Samos with forty -ships and set up a democracy; took hostages from the Samians, fifty boys -and as many men, lodged them in Lemnos, and after leaving a garrison in -the island returned home. But some of the Samians had not remained in -the island, but had fled to the continent. Making an agreement with the -most powerful of those in the city, and an alliance with Pissuthnes, son -of Hystaspes, the then satrap of Sardis, they got together a force of -seven hundred mercenaries, and under cover of night crossed over to -Samos. Their first step was to rise on the commons, most of whom they -secured; their next to steal their hostages from Lemnos; after which -they revolted, gave up the Athenian garrison left with them and its -commanders to Pissuthnes, and instantly prepared for an expedition -against Miletus. The Byzantines also revolted with them. - -As soon as the Athenians heard the news, they sailed with sixty ships -against Samos. Sixteen of these went to Caria to look out for the -Phoenician fleet, and to Chios and Lesbos carrying round orders for -reinforcements, and so never engaged; but forty-four ships under the -command of Pericles with nine colleagues gave battle, off the island of -Tragia, to seventy Samian vessels, of which twenty were transports, as -they were sailing from Miletus. Victory remained with the Athenians. -Reinforced afterwards by forty ships from Athens, and twenty-five Chian -and Lesbian vessels, the Athenians landed, and having the superiority by -land invested the city with three walls; it was also invested from the -sea. Meanwhile Pericles took sixty ships from the blockading squadron, -and departed in haste for Caunus and Caria, intelligence having been -brought in of the approach of the Phoenician fleet to the aid of the -Samians; indeed Stesagoras and others had left the island with five -ships to bring them. But in the meantime the Samians made a sudden -sally, and fell on the camp, which they found unfortified. Destroying -the look-out vessels, and engaging and defeating such as were being -launched to meet them, they remained masters of their own seas for -fourteen days, and carried in and carried out what they pleased. But -on the arrival of Pericles, they were once more shut up. Fresh -reinforcements afterwards arrived--forty ships from Athens with -Thucydides, Hagnon, and Phormio; twenty with Tlepolemus and Anticles, -and thirty vessels from Chios and Lesbos. After a brief attempt at -fighting, the Samians, unable to hold out, were reduced after a nine -months' siege and surrendered on conditions; they razed their walls, -gave hostages, delivered up their ships, and arranged to pay the -expenses of the war by instalments. The Byzantines also agreed to be -subject as before. - - - - -CHAPTER V - -_Second Congress at Lacedaemon--Preparations for War and Diplomatic -Skirmishes--Cylon--Pausanias--Themistocles_ - -After this, though not many years later, we at length come to what -has been already related, the affairs of Corcyra and Potidaea, and the -events that served as a pretext for the present war. All these actions -of the Hellenes against each other and the barbarian occurred in the -fifty years' interval between the retreat of Xerxes and the beginning of -the present war. During this interval the Athenians succeeded in placing -their empire on a firmer basis, and advanced their own home power to a -very great height. The Lacedaemonians, though fully aware of it, opposed -it only for a little while, but remained inactive during most of the -period, being of old slow to go to war except under the pressure of -necessity, and in the present instance being hampered by wars at home; -until the growth of the Athenian power could be no longer ignored, and -their own confederacy became the object of its encroachments. They then -felt that they could endure it no longer, but that the time had come -for them to throw themselves heart and soul upon the hostile power, and -break it, if they could, by commencing the present war. And though the -Lacedaemonians had made up their own minds on the fact of the breach of -the treaty and the guilt of the Athenians, yet they sent to Delphi and -inquired of the God whether it would be well with them if they went to -war; and, as it is reported, received from him the answer that if they -put their whole strength into the war, victory would be theirs, and -the promise that he himself would be with them, whether invoked or -uninvoked. Still they wished to summon their allies again, and to take -their vote on the propriety of making war. After the ambassadors from -the confederates had arrived and a congress had been convened, they all -spoke their minds, most of them denouncing the Athenians and demanding -that the war should begin. In particular the Corinthians. They had -before on their own account canvassed the cities in detail to induce -them to vote for the war, in the fear that it might come too late to -save Potidaea; they were present also on this occasion, and came forward -the last, and made the following speech: - -"Fellow allies, we can no longer accuse the Lacedaemonians of having -failed in their duty: they have not only voted for war themselves, -but have assembled us here for that purpose. We say their duty, for -supremacy has its duties. Besides equitably administering private -interests, leaders are required to show a special care for the common -welfare in return for the special honours accorded to them by all in -other ways. For ourselves, all who have already had dealings with the -Athenians require no warning to be on their guard against them. The -states more inland and out of the highway of communication should -understand that, if they omit to support the coast powers, the result -will be to injure the transit of their produce for exportation and the -reception in exchange of their imports from the sea; and they must not -be careless judges of what is now said, as if it had nothing to do with -them, but must expect that the sacrifice of the powers on the coast will -one day be followed by the extension of the danger to the interior, -and must recognize that their own interests are deeply involved in this -discussion. For these reasons they should not hesitate to exchange peace -for war. If wise men remain quiet, while they are not injured, brave -men abandon peace for war when they are injured, returning to an -understanding on a favourable opportunity: in fact, they are neither -intoxicated by their success in war, nor disposed to take an injury for -the sake of the delightful tranquillity of peace. Indeed, to falter for -the sake of such delights is, if you remain inactive, the quickest way -of losing the sweets of repose to which you cling; while to conceive -extravagant pretensions from success in war is to forget how hollow is -the confidence by which you are elated. For if many ill-conceived plans -have succeeded through the still greater fatuity of an opponent, many -more, apparently well laid, have on the contrary ended in disgrace. The -confidence with which we form our schemes is never completely justified -in their execution; speculation is carried on in safety, but, when it -comes to action, fear causes failure. - -"To apply these rules to ourselves, if we are now kindling war it is -under the pressure of injury, with adequate grounds of complaint; and -after we have chastised the Athenians we will in season desist. We have -many reasons to expect success--first, superiority in numbers and in -military experience, and secondly our general and unvarying obedience in -the execution of orders. The naval strength which they possess shall -be raised by us from our respective antecedent resources, and from the -moneys at Olympia and Delphi. A loan from these enables us to seduce -their foreign sailors by the offer of higher pay. For the power of -Athens is more mercenary than national; while ours will not be exposed -to the same risk, as its strength lies more in men than in money. A -single defeat at sea is in all likelihood their ruin: should they -hold out, in that case there will be the more time for us to exercise -ourselves in naval matters; and as soon as we have arrived at an -equality in science, we need scarcely ask whether we shall be their -superiors in courage. For the advantages that we have by nature they -cannot acquire by education; while their superiority in science must be -removed by our practice. The money required for these objects shall be -provided by our contributions: nothing indeed could be more monstrous -than the suggestion that, while their allies never tire of contributing -for their own servitude, we should refuse to spend for vengeance and -self-preservation the treasure which by such refusal we shall forfeit to -Athenian rapacity and see employed for our own ruin. - -"We have also other ways of carrying on the war, such as revolt of their -allies, the surest method of depriving them of their revenues, which are -the source of their strength, and establishment of fortified positions -in their country, and various operations which cannot be foreseen at -present. For war of all things proceeds least upon definite rules, but -draws principally upon itself for contrivances to meet an emergency; and -in such cases the party who faces the struggle and keeps his temper -best meets with most security, and he who loses his temper about it -with correspondent disaster. Let us also reflect that if it was merely -a number of disputes of territory between rival neighbours, it might be -borne; but here we have an enemy in Athens that is a match for our whole -coalition, and more than a match for any of its members; so that unless -as a body and as individual nationalities and individual cities we make -an unanimous stand against her, she will easily conquer us divided and -in detail. That conquest, terrible as it may sound, would, it must be -known, have no other end than slavery pure and simple; a word which -Peloponnese cannot even hear whispered without disgrace, or without -disgrace see so many states abused by one. Meanwhile the opinion would -be either that we were justly so used, or that we put up with it from -cowardice, and were proving degenerate sons in not even securing for -ourselves the freedom which our fathers gave to Hellas; and in allowing -the establishment in Hellas of a tyrant state, though in individual -states we think it our duty to put down sole rulers. And we do not know -how this conduct can be held free from three of the gravest failings, -want of sense, of courage, or of vigilance. For we do not suppose that -you have taken refuge in that contempt of an enemy which has proved so -fatal in so many instances--a feeling which from the numbers that it has -ruined has come to be called not contemptuous but contemptible. - -"There is, however, no advantage in reflections on the past further -than may be of service to the present. For the future we must provide by -maintaining what the present gives us and redoubling our efforts; it is -hereditary to us to win virtue as the fruit of labour, and you must -not change the habit, even though you should have a slight advantage -in wealth and resources; for it is not right that what was won in want -should be lost in plenty; no, we must boldly advance to the war for many -reasons; the god has commanded it and promised to be with us, and the -rest of Hellas will all join in the struggle, part from fear, part from -interest. You will be the first to break a treaty which the god, in -advising us to go to war, judges to be violated already, but rather to -support a treaty that has been outraged: indeed, treaties are broken not -by resistance but by aggression. - -"Your position, therefore, from whatever quarter you may view it, will -amply justify you in going to war; and this step we recommend in the -interests of all, bearing in mind that identity of interest is the -surest of bonds, whether between states or individuals. Delay not, -therefore, to assist Potidaea, a Dorian city besieged by Ionians, which -is quite a reversal of the order of things; nor to assert the freedom -of the rest. It is impossible for us to wait any longer when waiting -can only mean immediate disaster for some of us, and, if it comes to be -known that we have conferred but do not venture to protect ourselves, -like disaster in the near future for the rest. Delay not, fellow allies, -but, convinced of the necessity of the crisis and the wisdom of this -counsel, vote for the war, undeterred by its immediate terrors, but -looking beyond to the lasting peace by which it will be succeeded. Out -of war peace gains fresh stability, but to refuse to abandon repose for -war is not so sure a method of avoiding danger. We must believe that -the tyrant city that has been established in Hellas has been established -against all alike, with a programme of universal empire, part fulfilled, -part in contemplation; let us then attack and reduce it, and win -future security for ourselves and freedom for the Hellenes who are now -enslaved." - -Such were the words of the Corinthians. The Lacedaemonians, having now -heard all, give their opinion, took the vote of all the allied states -present in order, great and small alike; and the majority voted for war. -This decided, it was still impossible for them to commence at once, from -their want of preparation; but it was resolved that the means requisite -were to be procured by the different states, and that there was to be -no delay. And indeed, in spite of the time occupied with the necessary -arrangements, less than a year elapsed before Attica was invaded, and -the war openly begun. - -This interval was spent in sending embassies to Athens charged with -complaints, in order to obtain as good a pretext for war as possible, -in the event of her paying no attention to them. The first Lacedaemonian -embassy was to order the Athenians to drive out the curse of the -goddess; the history of which is as follows. In former generations there -was an Athenian of the name of Cylon, a victor at the Olympic games, -of good birth and powerful position, who had married a daughter of -Theagenes, a Megarian, at that time tyrant of Megara. Now this Cylon was -inquiring at Delphi; when he was told by the god to seize the Acropolis -of Athens on the grand festival of Zeus. Accordingly, procuring a force -from Theagenes and persuading his friends to join him, when the -Olympic festival in Peloponnese came, he seized the Acropolis, with the -intention of making himself tyrant, thinking that this was the grand -festival of Zeus, and also an occasion appropriate for a victor at the -Olympic games. Whether the grand festival that was meant was in Attica -or elsewhere was a question which he never thought of, and which the -oracle did not offer to solve. For the Athenians also have a festival -which is called the grand festival of Zeus Meilichios or Gracious, viz., -the Diasia. It is celebrated outside the city, and the whole people -sacrifice not real victims but a number of bloodless offerings peculiar -to the country. However, fancying he had chosen the right time, he made -the attempt. As soon as the Athenians perceived it, they flocked in, one -and all, from the country, and sat down, and laid siege to the citadel. -But as time went on, weary of the labour of blockade, most of them -departed; the responsibility of keeping guard being left to the nine -archons, with plenary powers to arrange everything according to their -good judgment. It must be known that at that time most political -functions were discharged by the nine archons. Meanwhile Cylon and -his besieged companions were distressed for want of food and water. -Accordingly Cylon and his brother made their escape; but the rest -being hard pressed, and some even dying of famine, seated themselves as -suppliants at the altar in the Acropolis. The Athenians who were charged -with the duty of keeping guard, when they saw them at the point of death -in the temple, raised them up on the understanding that no harm should -be done to them, led them out, and slew them. Some who as they passed by -took refuge at the altars of the awful goddesses were dispatched on the -spot. From this deed the men who killed them were called accursed and -guilty against the goddess, they and their descendants. Accordingly -these cursed ones were driven out by the Athenians, driven out again by -Cleomenes of Lacedaemon and an Athenian faction; the living were driven -out, and the bones of the dead were taken up; thus they were cast out. -For all that, they came back afterwards, and their descendants are still -in the city. - -This, then was the curse that the Lacedaemonians ordered them to drive -out. They were actuated primarily, as they pretended, by a care for the -honour of the gods; but they also know that Pericles, son of Xanthippus, -was connected with the curse on his mother's side, and they thought that -his banishment would materially advance their designs on Athens. Not -that they really hoped to succeed in procuring this; they rather thought -to create a prejudice against him in the eyes of his countrymen from the -feeling that the war would be partly caused by his misfortune. For being -the most powerful man of his time, and the leading Athenian statesman, -he opposed the Lacedaemonians in everything, and would have no -concessions, but ever urged the Athenians on to war. - -The Athenians retorted by ordering the Lacedaemonians to drive out the -curse of Taenarus. The Lacedaemonians had once raised up some Helot -suppliants from the temple of Poseidon at Taenarus, led them away and -slain them; for which they believe the great earthquake at Sparta to -have been a retribution. The Athenians also ordered them to drive out -the curse of the goddess of the Brazen House; the history of which is -as follows. After Pausanias the Lacedaemonian had been recalled by the -Spartans from his command in the Hellespont (this is his first recall), -and had been tried by them and acquitted, not being again sent out in a -public capacity, he took a galley of Hermione on his own responsibility, -without the authority of the Lacedaemonians, and arrived as a private -person in the Hellespont. He came ostensibly for the Hellenic war, -really to carry on his intrigues with the King, which he had begun -before his recall, being ambitious of reigning over Hellas. The -circumstance which first enabled him to lay the King under an -obligation, and to make a beginning of the whole design, was this. Some -connections and kinsmen of the King had been taken in Byzantium, on its -capture from the Medes, when he was first there, after the return from -Cyprus. These captives he sent off to the King without the knowledge -of the rest of the allies, the account being that they had escaped from -him. He managed this with the help of Gongylus, an Eretrian, whom he had -placed in charge of Byzantium and the prisoners. He also gave Gongylus -a letter for the King, the contents of which were as follows, as was -afterwards discovered: "Pausanias, the general of Sparta, anxious to do -you a favour, sends you these his prisoners of war. I propose also, with -your approval, to marry your daughter, and to make Sparta and the rest -of Hellas subject to you. I may say that I think I am able to do this, -with your co-operation. Accordingly if any of this please you, send -a safe man to the sea through whom we may in future conduct our -correspondence." - -This was all that was revealed in the writing, and Xerxes was pleased -with the letter. He sent off Artabazus, son of Pharnaces, to the sea -with orders to supersede Megabates, the previous governor in the satrapy -of Daskylion, and to send over as quickly as possible to Pausanias at -Byzantium a letter which he entrusted to him; to show him the royal -signet, and to execute any commission which he might receive from -Pausanias on the King's matters with all care and fidelity. Artabazus -on his arrival carried the King's orders into effect, and sent over the -letter, which contained the following answer: "Thus saith King Xerxes -to Pausanias. For the men whom you have saved for me across sea from -Byzantium, an obligation is laid up for you in our house, recorded for -ever; and with your proposals I am well pleased. Let neither night nor -day stop you from diligently performing any of your promises to me; -neither for cost of gold nor of silver let them be hindered, nor yet for -number of troops, wherever it may be that their presence is needed; but -with Artabazus, an honourable man whom I send you, boldly advance my -objects and yours, as may be most for the honour and interest of us -both." - -Before held in high honour by the Hellenes as the hero of Plataea, -Pausanias, after the receipt of this letter, became prouder than ever, -and could no longer live in the usual style, but went out of Byzantium -in a Median dress, was attended on his march through Thrace by a -bodyguard of Medes and Egyptians, kept a Persian table, and was quite -unable to contain his intentions, but betrayed by his conduct in trifles -what his ambition looked one day to enact on a grander scale. He also -made himself difficult of access, and displayed so violent a temper to -every one without exception that no one could come near him. Indeed, -this was the principal reason why the confederacy went over to the -Athenians. - -The above-mentioned conduct, coming to the ears of the Lacedaemonians, -occasioned his first recall. And after his second voyage out in the ship -of Hermione, without their orders, he gave proofs of similar behaviour. -Besieged and expelled from Byzantium by the Athenians, he did not return -to Sparta; but news came that he had settled at Colonae in the Troad, -and was intriguing with the barbarians, and that his stay there was for -no good purpose; and the ephors, now no longer hesitating, sent him a -herald and a scytale with orders to accompany the herald or be declared -a public enemy. Anxious above everything to avoid suspicion, and -confident that he could quash the charge by means of money, he returned -a second time to Sparta. At first thrown into prison by the ephors -(whose powers enable them to do this to the King), soon compromised -the matter and came out again, and offered himself for trial to any who -wished to institute an inquiry concerning him. - -Now the Spartans had no tangible proof against him--neither his enemies -nor the nation--of that indubitable kind required for the punishment -of a member of the royal family, and at that moment in high office; he -being regent for his first cousin King Pleistarchus, Leonidas's son, who -was still a minor. But by his contempt of the laws and imitation of the -barbarians, he gave grounds for much suspicion of his being discontented -with things established; all the occasions on which he had in any way -departed from the regular customs were passed in review, and it was -remembered that he had taken upon himself to have inscribed on -the tripod at Delphi, which was dedicated by the Hellenes as the -first-fruits of the spoil of the Medes, the following couplet: - - The Mede defeated, great Pausanias raised - This monument, that Phoebus might be praised. - -At the time the Lacedaemonians had at once erased the couplet, and -inscribed the names of the cities that had aided in the overthrow of -the barbarian and dedicated the offering. Yet it was considered that -Pausanias had here been guilty of a grave offence, which, interpreted -by the light of the attitude which he had since assumed, gained a -new significance, and seemed to be quite in keeping with his present -schemes. Besides, they were informed that he was even intriguing with -the Helots; and such indeed was the fact, for he promised them freedom -and citizenship if they would join him in insurrection and would -help him to carry out his plans to the end. Even now, mistrusting the -evidence even of the Helots themselves, the ephors would not consent -to take any decided step against him; in accordance with their regular -custom towards themselves, namely, to be slow in taking any irrevocable -resolve in the matter of a Spartan citizen without indisputable proof. -At last, it is said, the person who was going to carry to Artabazus the -last letter for the King, a man of Argilus, once the favourite and most -trusty servant of Pausanias, turned informer. Alarmed by the reflection -that none of the previous messengers had ever returned, having -counterfeited the seal, in order that, if he found himself mistaken in -his surmises, or if Pausanias should ask to make some correction, he -might not be discovered, he undid the letter, and found the postscript -that he had suspected, viz. an order to put him to death. - -On being shown the letter, the ephors now felt more certain. Still, they -wished to hear Pausanias commit himself with their own ears. Accordingly -the man went by appointment to Taenarus as a suppliant, and there built -himself a hut divided into two by a partition; within which he concealed -some of the ephors and let them hear the whole matter plainly. For -Pausanias came to him and asked him the reason of his suppliant -position; and the man reproached him with the order that he had -written concerning him, and one by one declared all the rest of the -circumstances, how he who had never yet brought him into any danger, -while employed as agent between him and the King, was yet just like the -mass of his servants to be rewarded with death. Admitting all this, and -telling him not to be angry about the matter, Pausanias gave him the -pledge of raising him up from the temple, and begged him to set off as -quickly as possible, and not to hinder the business in hand. - -The ephors listened carefully, and then departed, taking no action for -the moment, but, having at last attained to certainty, were preparing -to arrest him in the city. It is reported that, as he was about to be -arrested in the street, he saw from the face of one of the ephors what -he was coming for; another, too, made him a secret signal, and betrayed -it to him from kindness. Setting off with a run for the temple of the -goddess of the Brazen House, the enclosure of which was near at hand, he -succeeded in taking sanctuary before they took him, and entering into a -small chamber, which formed part of the temple, to avoid being exposed -to the weather, lay still there. The ephors, for the moment distanced -in the pursuit, afterwards took off the roof of the chamber, and having -made sure that he was inside, shut him in, barricaded the doors, and -staying before the place, reduced him by starvation. When they found -that he was on the point of expiring, just as he was, in the chamber, -they brought him out of the temple, while the breath was still in him, -and as soon as he was brought out he died. They were going to throw -him into the Kaiadas, where they cast criminals, but finally decided to -inter him somewhere near. But the god at Delphi afterwards ordered the -Lacedaemonians to remove the tomb to the place of his death--where he -now lies in the consecrated ground, as an inscription on a monument -declares--and, as what had been done was a curse to them, to give back -two bodies instead of one to the goddess of the Brazen House. So they -had two brazen statues made, and dedicated them as a substitute for -Pausanias. The Athenians retorted by telling the Lacedaemonians to drive -out what the god himself had pronounced to be a curse. - -To return to the Medism of Pausanias. Matter was found in the course -of the inquiry to implicate Themistocles; and the Lacedaemonians -accordingly sent envoys to the Athenians and required them to punish him -as they had punished Pausanias. The Athenians consented to do so. But -he had, as it happened, been ostracized, and, with a residence at Argos, -was in the habit of visiting other parts of Peloponnese. So they sent -with the Lacedaemonians, who were ready to join in the pursuit, persons -with instructions to take him wherever they found him. But Themistocles -got scent of their intentions, and fled from Peloponnese to Corcyra, -which was under obligations towards him. But the Corcyraeans alleged -that they could not venture to shelter him at the cost of offending -Athens and Lacedaemon, and they conveyed him over to the continent -opposite. Pursued by the officers who hung on the report of his -movements, at a loss where to turn, he was compelled to stop at the -house of Admetus, the Molossian king, though they were not on friendly -terms. Admetus happened not to be indoors, but his wife, to whom he made -himself a suppliant, instructed him to take their child in his arms -and sit down by the hearth. Soon afterwards Admetus came in, and -Themistocles told him who he was, and begged him not to revenge on -Themistocles in exile any opposition which his requests might have -experienced from Themistocles at Athens. Indeed, he was now far too -low for his revenge; retaliation was only honourable between equals. -Besides, his opposition to the king had only affected the success of a -request, not the safety of his person; if the king were to give him up -to the pursuers that he mentioned, and the fate which they intended for -him, he would just be consigning him to certain death. - -The King listened to him and raised him up with his son, as he was -sitting with him in his arms after the most effectual method of -supplication, and on the arrival of the Lacedaemonians not long -afterwards, refused to give him up for anything they could say, but sent -him off by land to the other sea to Pydna in Alexander's dominions, as -he wished to go to the Persian king. There he met with a merchantman -on the point of starting for Ionia. Going on board, he was carried by -a storm to the Athenian squadron which was blockading Naxos. In his -alarm--he was luckily unknown to the people in the vessel--he told -the master who he was and what he was flying for, and said that, if -he refused to save him, he would declare that he was taking him for a -bribe. Meanwhile their safety consisted in letting no one leave the ship -until a favourable time for sailing should arise. If he complied with -his wishes, he promised him a proper recompense. The master acted as he -desired, and, after lying to for a day and a night out of reach of the -squadron, at length arrived at Ephesus. - -After having rewarded him with a present of money, as soon as he -received some from his friends at Athens and from his secret hoards at -Argos, Themistocles started inland with one of the coast Persians, and -sent a letter to King Artaxerxes, Xerxes's son, who had just come to the -throne. Its contents were as follows: "I, Themistocles, am come to -you, who did your house more harm than any of the Hellenes, when I -was compelled to defend myself against your father's invasion--harm, -however, far surpassed by the good that I did him during his retreat, -which brought no danger for me but much for him. For the past, you are a -good turn in my debt"--here he mentioned the warning sent to Xerxes from -Salamis to retreat, as well as his finding the bridges unbroken, which, -as he falsely pretended, was due to him--"for the present, able to do -you great service, I am here, pursued by the Hellenes for my friendship -for you. However, I desire a year's grace, when I shall be able to -declare in person the objects of my coming." - -It is said that the King approved his intention, and told him to do as -he said. He employed the interval in making what progress he could in -the study of the Persian tongue, and of the customs of the country. -Arrived at court at the end of the year, he attained to very high -consideration there, such as no Hellene has ever possessed before or -since; partly from his splendid antecedents, partly from the hopes -which he held out of effecting for him the subjugation of Hellas, but -principally by the proof which experience daily gave of his capacity. -For Themistocles was a man who exhibited the most indubitable signs -of genius; indeed, in this particular he has a claim on our admiration -quite extraordinary and unparalleled. By his own native capacity, alike -unformed and unsupplemented by study, he was at once the best judge in -those sudden crises which admit of little or of no deliberation, and the -best prophet of the future, even to its most distant possibilities. An -able theoretical expositor of all that came within the sphere of his -practice, he was not without the power of passing an adequate judgment -in matters in which he had no experience. He could also excellently -divine the good and evil which lay hid in the unseen future. In fine, -whether we consider the extent of his natural powers, or the slightness -of his application, this extraordinary man must be allowed to have -surpassed all others in the faculty of intuitively meeting an emergency. -Disease was the real cause of his death; though there is a story of his -having ended his life by poison, on finding himself unable to fulfil his -promises to the king. However this may be, there is a monument to him -in the marketplace of Asiatic Magnesia. He was governor of the district, -the King having given him Magnesia, which brought in fifty talents a -year, for bread, Lampsacus, which was considered to be the richest wine -country, for wine, and Myos for other provisions. His bones, it is said, -were conveyed home by his relatives in accordance with his wishes, and -interred in Attic ground. This was done without the knowledge of the -Athenians; as it is against the law to bury in Attica an outlaw -for treason. So ends the history of Pausanias and Themistocles, the -Lacedaemonian and the Athenian, the most famous men of their time in -Hellas. - -To return to the Lacedaemonians. The history of their first embassy, -the injunctions which it conveyed, and the rejoinder which it provoked, -concerning the expulsion of the accursed persons, have been related -already. It was followed by a second, which ordered Athens to raise the -siege of Potidaea, and to respect the independence of Aegina. Above all, -it gave her most distinctly to understand that war might be prevented -by the revocation of the Megara decree, excluding the Megarians from the -use of Athenian harbours and of the market of Athens. But Athens was -not inclined either to revoke the decree, or to entertain their other -proposals; she accused the Megarians of pushing their cultivation into -the consecrated ground and the unenclosed land on the border, and of -harbouring her runaway slaves. At last an embassy arrived with the -Lacedaemonian ultimatum. The ambassadors were Ramphias, Melesippus, and -Agesander. Not a word was said on any of the old subjects; there was -simply this: "Lacedaemon wishes the peace to continue, and there is no -reason why it should not, if you would leave the Hellenes independent." -Upon this the Athenians held an assembly, and laid the matter before -their consideration. It was resolved to deliberate once for all on all -their demands, and to give them an answer. There were many speakers who -came forward and gave their support to one side or the other, urging -the necessity of war, or the revocation of the decree and the folly -of allowing it to stand in the way of peace. Among them came forward -Pericles, son of Xanthippus, the first man of his time at Athens, ablest -alike in counsel and in action, and gave the following advice: - -"There is one principle, Athenians, which I hold to through everything, -and that is the principle of no concession to the Peloponnesians. I know -that the spirit which inspires men while they are being persuaded to -make war is not always retained in action; that as circumstances change, -resolutions change. Yet I see that now as before the same, almost -literally the same, counsel is demanded of me; and I put it to those of -you who are allowing yourselves to be persuaded, to support the national -resolves even in the case of reverses, or to forfeit all credit for -their wisdom in the event of success. For sometimes the course of things -is as arbitrary as the plans of man; indeed this is why we usually blame -chance for whatever does not happen as we expected. Now it was clear -before that Lacedaemon entertained designs against us; it is still -more clear now. The treaty provides that we shall mutually submit our -differences to legal settlement, and that we shall meanwhile each keep -what we have. Yet the Lacedaemonians never yet made us any such offer, -never yet would accept from us any such offer; on the contrary, they -wish complaints to be settled by war instead of by negotiation; and -in the end we find them here dropping the tone of expostulation and -adopting that of command. They order us to raise the siege of Potidaea, -to let Aegina be independent, to revoke the Megara decree; and they -conclude with an ultimatum warning us to leave the Hellenes independent. -I hope that you will none of you think that we shall be going to war -for a trifle if we refuse to revoke the Megara decree, which appears -in front of their complaints, and the revocation of which is to save us -from war, or let any feeling of self-reproach linger in your minds, as -if you went to war for slight cause. Why, this trifle contains the whole -seal and trial of your resolution. If you give way, you will instantly -have to meet some greater demand, as having been frightened into -obedience in the first instance; while a firm refusal will make them -clearly understand that they must treat you more as equals. Make your -decision therefore at once, either to submit before you are harmed, or -if we are to go to war, as I for one think we ought, to do so without -caring whether the ostensible cause be great or small, resolved -against making concessions or consenting to a precarious tenure of our -possessions. For all claims from an equal, urged upon a neighbour as -commands before any attempt at legal settlement, be they great or be -they small, have only one meaning, and that is slavery. - -"As to the war and the resources of either party, a detailed comparison -will not show you the inferiority of Athens. Personally engaged in the -cultivation of their land, without funds either private or public, the -Peloponnesians are also without experience in long wars across sea, from -the strict limit which poverty imposes on their attacks upon each other. -Powers of this description are quite incapable of often manning a fleet -or often sending out an army: they cannot afford the absence from their -homes, the expenditure from their own funds; and besides, they have not -command of the sea. Capital, it must be remembered, maintains a war more -than forced contributions. Farmers are a class of men that are always -more ready to serve in person than in purse. Confident that the former -will survive the dangers, they are by no means so sure that the latter -will not be prematurely exhausted, especially if the war last longer -than they expect, which it very likely will. In a single battle the -Peloponnesians and their allies may be able to defy all Hellas, but they -are incapacitated from carrying on a war against a power different in -character from their own, by the want of the single council-chamber -requisite to prompt and vigorous action, and the substitution of a diet -composed of various races, in which every state possesses an equal vote, -and each presses its own ends, a condition of things which generally -results in no action at all. The great wish of some is to avenge -themselves on some particular enemy, the great wish of others to save -their own pocket. Slow in assembling, they devote a very small fraction -of the time to the consideration of any public object, most of it to the -prosecution of their own objects. Meanwhile each fancies that no harm -will come of his neglect, that it is the business of somebody else -to look after this or that for him; and so, by the same notion being -entertained by all separately, the common cause imperceptibly decays. - -"But the principal point is the hindrance that they will experience from -want of money. The slowness with which it comes in will cause delay; but -the opportunities of war wait for no man. Again, we need not be alarmed -either at the possibility of their raising fortifications in Attica, or -at their navy. It would be difficult for any system of fortifications to -establish a rival city, even in time of peace, much more, surely, in -an enemy's country, with Athens just as much fortified against it as it -against Athens; while a mere post might be able to do some harm to the -country by incursions and by the facilities which it would afford for -desertion, but can never prevent our sailing into their country and -raising fortifications there, and making reprisals with our powerful -fleet. For our naval skill is of more use to us for service on land, -than their military skill for service at sea. Familiarity with the sea -they will not find an easy acquisition. If you who have been practising -at it ever since the Median invasion have not yet brought it to -perfection, is there any chance of anything considerable being effected -by an agricultural, unseafaring population, who will besides be -prevented from practising by the constant presence of strong squadrons -of observation from Athens? With a small squadron they might hazard an -engagement, encouraging their ignorance by numbers; but the restraint of -a strong force will prevent their moving, and through want of practice -they will grow more clumsy, and consequently more timid. It must be kept -in mind that seamanship, just like anything else, is a matter of art, -and will not admit of being taken up occasionally as an occupation for -times of leisure; on the contrary, it is so exacting as to leave leisure -for nothing else. - -"Even if they were to touch the moneys at Olympia or Delphi, and try to -seduce our foreign sailors by the temptation of higher pay, that would -only be a serious danger if we could not still be a match for them by -embarking our own citizens and the aliens resident among us. But in fact -by this means we are always a match for them; and, best of all, we have -a larger and higher class of native coxswains and sailors among our own -citizens than all the rest of Hellas. And to say nothing of the danger -of such a step, none of our foreign sailors would consent to become an -outlaw from his country, and to take service with them and their hopes, -for the sake of a few days' high pay. - -"This, I think, is a tolerably fair account of the position of the -Peloponnesians; that of Athens is free from the defects that I have -criticized in them, and has other advantages of its own, which they can -show nothing to equal. If they march against our country we will sail -against theirs, and it will then be found that the desolation of -the whole of Attica is not the same as that of even a fraction of -Peloponnese; for they will not be able to supply the deficiency except -by a battle, while we have plenty of land both on the islands and the -continent. The rule of the sea is indeed a great matter. Consider for -a moment. Suppose that we were islanders; can you conceive a more -impregnable position? Well, this in future should, as far as possible, -be our conception of our position. Dismissing all thought of our land -and houses, we must vigilantly guard the sea and the city. No irritation -that we may feel for the former must provoke us to a battle with the -numerical superiority of the Peloponnesians. A victory would only be -succeeded by another battle against the same superiority: a reverse -involves the loss of our allies, the source of our strength, who will -not remain quiet a day after we become unable to march against them. We -must cry not over the loss of houses and land but of men's lives; since -houses and land do not gain men, but men them. And if I had thought that -I could persuade you, I would have bid you go out and lay them waste -with your own hands, and show the Peloponnesians that this at any rate -will not make you submit. - -"I have many other reasons to hope for a favourable issue, if you can -consent not to combine schemes of fresh conquest with the conduct of -the war, and will abstain from wilfully involving yourselves in other -dangers; indeed, I am more afraid of our own blunders than of the -enemy's devices. But these matters shall be explained in another speech, -as events require; for the present dismiss these men with the answer -that we will allow Megara the use of our market and harbours, when the -Lacedaemonians suspend their alien acts in favour of us and our allies, -there being nothing in the treaty to prevent either one or the other: -that we will leave the cities independent, if independent we found them -when we made the treaty, and when the Lacedaemonians grant to their -cities an independence not involving subservience to Lacedaemonian -interests, but such as each severally may desire: that we are willing -to give the legal satisfaction which our agreements specify, and that we -shall not commence hostilities, but shall resist those who do commence -them. This is an answer agreeable at once to the rights and the dignity -of Athens. It must be thoroughly understood that war is a necessity; but -that the more readily we accept it, the less will be the ardour of -our opponents, and that out of the greatest dangers communities and -individuals acquire the greatest glory. Did not our fathers resist the -Medes not only with resources far different from ours, but even when -those resources had been abandoned; and more by wisdom than by fortune, -more by daring than by strength, did not they beat off the barbarian and -advance their affairs to their present height? We must not fall behind -them, but must resist our enemies in any way and in every way, and -attempt to hand down our power to our posterity unimpaired." - -Such were the words of Pericles. The Athenians, persuaded of the wisdom -of his advice, voted as he desired, and answered the Lacedaemonians as -he recommended, both on the separate points and in the general; they -would do nothing on dictation, but were ready to have the complaints -settled in a fair and impartial manner by the legal method, which the -terms of the truce prescribed. So the envoys departed home and did not -return again. - -These were the charges and differences existing between the rival powers -before the war, arising immediately from the affair at Epidamnus and -Corcyra. Still intercourse continued in spite of them, and mutual -communication. It was carried on without heralds, but not without -suspicion, as events were occurring which were equivalent to a breach of -the treaty and matter for war. - - - - -BOOK II - -CHAPTER VI - -_Beginning of the Peloponnesian War--First Invasion of Attica--Funeral -Oration of Pericles_ - -The war between the Athenians and Peloponnesians and the allies on -either side now really begins. For now all intercourse except through -the medium of heralds ceased, and hostilities were commenced and -prosecuted without intermission. The history follows the chronological -order of events by summers and winters. - -The thirty years' truce which was entered into after the conquest of -Euboea lasted fourteen years. In the fifteenth, in the forty-eighth year -of the priestess-ship of Chrysis at Argos, in the ephorate of Aenesias -at Sparta, in the last month but two of the archonship of Pythodorus -at Athens, and six months after the battle of Potidaea, just at the -beginning of spring, a Theban force a little over three hundred strong, -under the command of their Boeotarchs, Pythangelus, son of Phyleides, -and Diemporus, son of Onetorides, about the first watch of the night, -made an armed entry into Plataea, a town of Boeotia in alliance with -Athens. The gates were opened to them by a Plataean called Naucleides, -who, with his party, had invited them in, meaning to put to death the -citizens of the opposite party, bring over the city to Thebes, and thus -obtain power for themselves. This was arranged through Eurymachus, son -of Leontiades, a person of great influence at Thebes. For Plataea had -always been at variance with Thebes; and the latter, foreseeing that war -was at hand, wished to surprise her old enemy in time of peace, before -hostilities had actually broken out. Indeed this was how they got in so -easily without being observed, as no guard had been posted. After the -soldiers had grounded arms in the market-place, those who had invited -them in wished them to set to work at once and go to their enemies' -houses. This, however, the Thebans refused to do, but determined to -make a conciliatory proclamation, and if possible to come to a friendly -understanding with the citizens. Their herald accordingly invited -any who wished to resume their old place in the confederacy of their -countrymen to ground arms with them, for they thought that in this way -the city would readily join them. - -On becoming aware of the presence of the Thebans within their gates, and -of the sudden occupation of the town, the Plataeans concluded in -their alarm that more had entered than was really the case, the night -preventing their seeing them. They accordingly came to terms and, -accepting the proposal, made no movement; especially as the Thebans -offered none of them any violence. But somehow or other, during the -negotiations, they discovered the scanty numbers of the Thebans, and -decided that they could easily attack and overpower them; the mass of -the Plataeans being averse to revolting from Athens. At all events they -resolved to attempt it. Digging through the party walls of the houses, -they thus managed to join each other without being seen going through -the streets, in which they placed wagons without the beasts in them, to -serve as a barricade, and arranged everything else as seemed convenient -for the occasion. When everything had been done that circumstances -permitted, they watched their opportunity and went out of their houses -against the enemy. It was still night, though daybreak was at hand: in -daylight it was thought that their attack would be met by men full of -courage and on equal terms with their assailants, while in darkness -it would fall upon panic-stricken troops, who would also be at a -disadvantage from their enemy's knowledge of the locality. So they made -their assault at once, and came to close quarters as quickly as they -could. - -The Thebans, finding themselves outwitted, immediately closed up to -repel all attacks made upon them. Twice or thrice they beat back their -assailants. But the men shouted and charged them, the women and slaves -screamed and yelled from the houses and pelted them with stones and -tiles; besides, it had been raining hard all night; and so at last their -courage gave way, and they turned and fled through the town. Most of the -fugitives were quite ignorant of the right ways out, and this, with the -mud, and the darkness caused by the moon being in her last quarter, and -the fact that their pursuers knew their way about and could easily stop -their escape, proved fatal to many. The only gate open was the one -by which they had entered, and this was shut by one of the Plataeans -driving the spike of a javelin into the bar instead of the bolt; so that -even here there was no longer any means of exit. They were now chased -all over the town. Some got on the wall and threw themselves over, in -most cases with a fatal result. One party managed to find a deserted -gate, and obtaining an axe from a woman, cut through the bar; but as -they were soon observed only a few succeeded in getting out. Others were -cut off in detail in different parts of the city. The most numerous and -compact body rushed into a large building next to the city wall: the -doors on the side of the street happened to be open, and the Thebans -fancied that they were the gates of the town, and that there was a -passage right through to the outside. The Plataeans, seeing their -enemies in a trap, now consulted whether they should set fire to the -building and burn them just as they were, or whether there was anything -else that they could do with them; until at length these and the rest -of the Theban survivors found wandering about the town agreed to an -unconditional surrender of themselves and their arms to the Plataeans. - -While such was the fate of the party in Plataea, the rest of the Thebans -who were to have joined them with all their forces before daybreak, in -case of anything miscarrying with the body that had entered, received -the news of the affair on the road, and pressed forward to their -succour. Now Plataea is nearly eight miles from Thebes, and their march -delayed by the rain that had fallen in the night, for the river Asopus -had risen and was not easy of passage; and so, having to march in the -rain, and being hindered in crossing the river, they arrived too late, -and found the whole party either slain or captive. When they learned -what had happened, they at once formed a design against the Plataeans -outside the city. As the attack had been made in time of peace, and was -perfectly unexpected, there were of course men and stock in the fields; -and the Thebans wished if possible to have some prisoners to exchange -against their countrymen in the town, should any chance to have been -taken alive. Such was their plan. But the Plataeans suspected their -intention almost before it was formed, and becoming alarmed for -their fellow citizens outside the town, sent a herald to the Thebans, -reproaching them for their unscrupulous attempt to seize their city in -time of peace, and warning them against any outrage on those outside. -Should the warning be disregarded, they threatened to put to death the -men they had in their hands, but added that, on the Thebans retiring -from their territory, they would surrender the prisoners to their -friends. This is the Theban account of the matter, and they say that -they had an oath given them. The Plataeans, on the other hand, do not -admit any promise of an immediate surrender, but make it contingent upon -subsequent negotiation: the oath they deny altogether. Be this as it -may, upon the Thebans retiring from their territory without committing -any injury, the Plataeans hastily got in whatever they had in the -country and immediately put the men to death. The prisoners were a -hundred and eighty in number; Eurymachus, the person with whom the -traitors had negotiated, being one. - -This done, the Plataeans sent a messenger to Athens, gave back the dead -to the Thebans under a truce, and arranged things in the city as seemed -best to meet the present emergency. The Athenians meanwhile, having -had word of the affair sent them immediately after its occurrence, had -instantly seized all the Boeotians in Attica, and sent a herald to the -Plataeans to forbid their proceeding to extremities with their Theban -prisoners without instructions from Athens. The news of the men's death -had of course not arrived; the first messenger having left Plataea just -when the Thebans entered it, the second just after their defeat and -capture; so there was no later news. Thus the Athenians sent orders -in ignorance of the facts; and the herald on his arrival found the -men slain. After this the Athenians marched to Plataea and brought in -provisions, and left a garrison in the place, also taking away the women -and children and such of the men as were least efficient. - -After the affair at Plataea, the treaty had been broken by an overt -act, and Athens at once prepared for war, as did also Lacedaemon and her -allies. They resolved to send embassies to the King and to such other of -the barbarian powers as either party could look to for assistance, -and tried to ally themselves with the independent states at home. -Lacedaemon, in addition to the existing marine, gave orders to the -states that had declared for her in Italy and Sicily to build vessels -up to a grand total of five hundred, the quota of each city being -determined by its size, and also to provide a specified sum of money. -Till these were ready they were to remain neutral and to admit single -Athenian ships into their harbours. Athens on her part reviewed her -existing confederacy, and sent embassies to the places more -immediately round Peloponnese--Corcyra, Cephallenia, Acarnania, and -Zacynthus--perceiving that if these could be relied on she could carry -the war all round Peloponnese. - -And if both sides nourished the boldest hopes and put forth their utmost -strength for the war, this was only natural. Zeal is always at its -height at the commencement of an undertaking; and on this particular -occasion Peloponnese and Athens were both full of young men whose -inexperience made them eager to take up arms, while the rest of Hellas -stood straining with excitement at the conflict of its leading cities. -Everywhere predictions were being recited and oracles being chanted -by such persons as collect them, and this not only in the contending -cities. Further, some while before this, there was an earthquake at -Delos, for the first time in the memory of the Hellenes. This was said -and thought to be ominous of the events impending; indeed, nothing of -the kind that happened was allowed to pass without remark. The good -wishes of men made greatly for the Lacedaemonians, especially as they -proclaimed themselves the liberators of Hellas. No private or public -effort that could help them in speech or action was omitted; each -thinking that the cause suffered wherever he could not himself see to -it. So general was the indignation felt against Athens, whether by those -who wished to escape from her empire, or were apprehensive of being -absorbed by it. Such were the preparations and such the feelings with -which the contest opened. - -The allies of the two belligerents were the following. These were the -allies of Lacedaemon: all the Peloponnesians within the Isthmus except -the Argives and Achaeans, who were neutral; Pellene being the only -Achaean city that first joined in the war, though her example was -afterwards followed by the rest. Outside Peloponnese the Megarians, -Locrians, Boeotians, Phocians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians. -Of these, ships were furnished by the Corinthians, Megarians, -Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, and Leucadians; and -cavalry by the Boeotians, Phocians, and Locrians. The other states -sent infantry. This was the Lacedaemonian confederacy. That of Athens -comprised the Chians, Lesbians, Plataeans, the Messenians in Naupactus, -most of the Acarnanians, the Corcyraeans, Zacynthians, and some -tributary cities in the following countries, viz., Caria upon the sea -with her Dorian neighbours, Ionia, the Hellespont, the Thracian towns, -the islands lying between Peloponnese and Crete towards the east, and -all the Cyclades except Melos and Thera. Of these, ships were furnished -by Chios, Lesbos, and Corcyra, infantry and money by the rest. Such were -the allies of either party and their resources for the war. - -Immediately after the affair at Plataea, Lacedaemon sent round orders -to the cities in Peloponnese and the rest of her confederacy to prepare -troops and the provisions requisite for a foreign campaign, in order to -invade Attica. The several states were ready at the time appointed and -assembled at the Isthmus: the contingent of each city being two-thirds -of its whole force. After the whole army had mustered, the Lacedaemonian -king, Archidamus, the leader of the expedition, called together the -generals of all the states and the principal persons and officers, and -exhorted them as follows: - -"Peloponnesians and allies, our fathers made many campaigns both within -and without Peloponnese, and the elder men among us here are not without -experience in war. Yet we have never set out with a larger force than -the present; and if our numbers and efficiency are remarkable, so also -is the power of the state against which we march. We ought not then -to show ourselves inferior to our ancestors, or unequal to our own -reputation. For the hopes and attention of all Hellas are bent upon the -present effort, and its sympathy is with the enemy of the hated Athens. -Therefore, numerous as the invading army may appear to be, and certain -as some may think it that our adversary will not meet us in the field, -this is no sort of justification for the least negligence upon the -march; but the officers and men of each particular city should always be -prepared for the advent of danger in their own quarters. The course of -war cannot be foreseen, and its attacks are generally dictated by -the impulse of the moment; and where overweening self-confidence has -despised preparation, a wise apprehension often been able to make head -against superior numbers. Not that confidence is out of place in an army -of invasion, but in an enemy's country it should also be accompanied by -the precautions of apprehension: troops will by this combination be best -inspired for dealing a blow, and best secured against receiving one. -In the present instance, the city against which we are going, far from -being so impotent for defence, is on the contrary most excellently -equipped at all points; so that we have every reason to expect that -they will take the field against us, and that if they have not set out -already before we are there, they will certainly do so when they see us -in their territory wasting and destroying their property. For men -are always exasperated at suffering injuries to which they are not -accustomed, and on seeing them inflicted before their very eyes; and -where least inclined for reflection, rush with the greatest heat to -action. The Athenians are the very people of all others to do this, as -they aspire to rule the rest of the world, and are more in the habit of -invading and ravaging their neighbours' territory, than of seeing their -own treated in the like fashion. Considering, therefore, the power -of the state against which we are marching, and the greatness of the -reputation which, according to the event, we shall win or lose for our -ancestors and ourselves, remember as you follow where you may be led to -regard discipline and vigilance as of the first importance, and to obey -with alacrity the orders transmitted to you; as nothing contributes so -much to the credit and safety of an army as the union of large bodies by -a single discipline." - -With this brief speech dismissing the assembly, Archidamus first sent -off Melesippus, son of Diacritus, a Spartan, to Athens, in case she -should be more inclined to submit on seeing the Peloponnesians actually -on the march. But the Athenians did not admit into the city or to their -assembly, Pericles having already carried a motion against admitting -either herald or embassy from the Lacedaemonians after they had once -marched out. - -The herald was accordingly sent away without an audience, and ordered to -be beyond the frontier that same day; in future, if those who sent -him had a proposition to make, they must retire to their own territory -before they dispatched embassies to Athens. An escort was sent with -Melesippus to prevent his holding communication with any one. When he -reached the frontier and was just going to be dismissed, he departed -with these words: "This day will be the beginning of great misfortunes -to the Hellenes." As soon as he arrived at the camp, and Archidamus -learnt that the Athenians had still no thoughts of submitting, he at -length began his march, and advanced with his army into their territory. -Meanwhile the Boeotians, sending their contingent and cavalry to join -the Peloponnesian expedition, went to Plataea with the remainder and -laid waste the country. - -While the Peloponnesians were still mustering at the Isthmus, or on the -march before they invaded Attica, Pericles, son of Xanthippus, one of -the ten generals of the Athenians, finding that the invasion was to -take place, conceived the idea that Archidamus, who happened to be his -friend, might possibly pass by his estate without ravaging it. This he -might do, either from a personal wish to oblige him, or acting under -instructions from Lacedaemon for the purpose of creating a prejudice -against him, as had been before attempted in the demand for the -expulsion of the accursed family. He accordingly took the precaution of -announcing to the Athenians in the assembly that, although Archidamus -was his friend, yet this friendship should not extend to the detriment -of the state, and that in case the enemy should make his houses and -lands an exception to the rest and not pillage them, he at once gave -them up to be public property, so that they should not bring him into -suspicion. He also gave the citizens some advice on their present -affairs in the same strain as before. They were to prepare for the war, -and to carry in their property from the country. They were not to go out -to battle, but to come into the city and guard it, and get ready their -fleet, in which their real strength lay. They were also to keep a tight -rein on their allies--the strength of Athens being derived from the -money brought in by their payments, and success in war depending -principally upon conduct and capital, had no reason to despond. Apart -from other sources of income, an average revenue of six hundred talents -of silver was drawn from the tribute of the allies; and there were still -six thousand talents of coined silver in the Acropolis, out of nine -thousand seven hundred that had once been there, from which the -money had been taken for the porch of the Acropolis, the other public -buildings, and for Potidaea. This did not include the uncoined gold -and silver in public and private offerings, the sacred vessels for the -processions and games, the Median spoils, and similar resources to the -amount of five hundred talents. To this he added the treasures of the -other temples. These were by no means inconsiderable, and might fairly -be used. Nay, if they were ever absolutely driven to it, they might -take even the gold ornaments of Athene herself; for the statue contained -forty talents of pure gold and it was all removable. This might be used -for self-preservation, and must every penny of it be restored. Such was -their financial position--surely a satisfactory one. Then they had an -army of thirteen thousand heavy infantry, besides sixteen thousand -more in the garrisons and on home duty at Athens. This was at first the -number of men on guard in the event of an invasion: it was composed of -the oldest and youngest levies and the resident aliens who had heavy -armour. The Phaleric wall ran for four miles, before it joined that -round the city; and of this last nearly five had a guard, although part -of it was left without one, viz., that between the Long Wall and the -Phaleric. Then there were the Long Walls to Piraeus, a distance of -some four miles and a half, the outer of which was manned. Lastly, the -circumference of Piraeus with Munychia was nearly seven miles and a -half; only half of this, however, was guarded. Pericles also showed -them that they had twelve hundred horse including mounted archers, with -sixteen hundred archers unmounted, and three hundred galleys fit for -service. Such were the resources of Athens in the different departments -when the Peloponnesian invasion was impending and hostilities were -being commenced. Pericles also urged his usual arguments for expecting a -favourable issue to the war. - -The Athenians listened to his advice, and began to carry in their wives -and children from the country, and all their household furniture, even -to the woodwork of their houses which they took down. Their sheep and -cattle they sent over to Euboea and the adjacent islands. But they found -it hard to move, as most of them had been always used to live in the -country. - -From very early times this had been more the case with the Athenians -than with others. Under Cecrops and the first kings, down to the reign -of Theseus, Attica had always consisted of a number of independent -townships, each with its own town hall and magistrates. Except in times -of danger the king at Athens was not consulted; in ordinary seasons -they carried on their government and settled their affairs without his -interference; sometimes even they waged war against him, as in the -case of the Eleusinians with Eumolpus against Erechtheus. In Theseus, -however, they had a king of equal intelligence and power; and one of -the chief features in his organization of the country was to abolish the -council-chambers and magistrates of the petty cities, and to merge them -in the single council-chamber and town hall of the present capital. -Individuals might still enjoy their private property just as before, but -they were henceforth compelled to have only one political centre, viz., -Athens; which thus counted all the inhabitants of Attica among her -citizens, so that when Theseus died he left a great state behind him. -Indeed, from him dates the Synoecia, or Feast of Union; which is paid -for by the state, and which the Athenians still keep in honour of the -goddess. Before this the city consisted of the present citadel and the -district beneath it looking rather towards the south. This is shown by -the fact that the temples of the other deities, besides that of Athene, -are in the citadel; and even those that are outside it are mostly -situated in this quarter of the city, as that of the Olympian Zeus, of -the Pythian Apollo, of Earth, and of Dionysus in the Marshes, the same -in whose honour the older Dionysia are to this day celebrated in the -month of Anthesterion not only by the Athenians but also by their Ionian -descendants. There are also other ancient temples in this quarter. The -fountain too, which, since the alteration made by the tyrants, has been -called Enneacrounos, or Nine Pipes, but which, when the spring was open, -went by the name of Callirhoe, or Fairwater, was in those days, from -being so near, used for the most important offices. Indeed, the old -fashion of using the water before marriage and for other sacred purposes -is still kept up. Again, from their old residence in that quarter, the -citadel is still known among Athenians as the city. - -The Athenians thus long lived scattered over Attica in independent -townships. Even after the centralization of Theseus, old habit still -prevailed; and from the early times down to the present war most -Athenians still lived in the country with their families and households, -and were consequently not at all inclined to move now, especially -as they had only just restored their establishments after the Median -invasion. Deep was their trouble and discontent at abandoning their -houses and the hereditary temples of the ancient constitution, and at -having to change their habits of life and to bid farewell to what each -regarded as his native city. - -When they arrived at Athens, though a few had houses of their own to -go to, or could find an asylum with friends or relatives, by far the -greater number had to take up their dwelling in the parts of the city -that were not built over and in the temples and chapels of the heroes, -except the Acropolis and the temple of the Eleusinian Demeter and such -other Places as were always kept closed. The occupation of the plot of -ground lying below the citadel called the Pelasgian had been forbidden -by a curse; and there was also an ominous fragment of a Pythian oracle -which said: - -Leave the Pelasgian parcel desolate, Woe worth the day that men inhabit -it! - -Yet this too was now built over in the necessity of the moment. And in -my opinion, if the oracle proved true, it was in the opposite sense to -what was expected. For the misfortunes of the state did not arise from -the unlawful occupation, but the necessity of the occupation from the -war; and though the god did not mention this, he foresaw that it would -be an evil day for Athens in which the plot came to be inhabited. Many -also took up their quarters in the towers of the walls or wherever else -they could. For when they were all come in, the city proved too small -to hold them; though afterwards they divided the Long Walls and a -great part of Piraeus into lots and settled there. All this while great -attention was being given to the war; the allies were being mustered, -and an armament of a hundred ships equipped for Peloponnese. Such was -the state of preparation at Athens. - -Meanwhile the army of the Peloponnesians was advancing. The first town -they came to in Attica was Oenoe, where they to enter the country. -Sitting down before it, they prepared to assault the wall with engines -and otherwise. Oenoe, standing upon the Athenian and Boeotian border, -was of course a walled town, and was used as a fortress by the Athenians -in time of war. So the Peloponnesians prepared for their assault, and -wasted some valuable time before the place. This delay brought the -gravest censure upon Archidamus. Even during the levying of the war he -had credit for weakness and Athenian sympathies by the half measures he -had advocated; and after the army had assembled he had further injured -himself in public estimation by his loitering at the Isthmus and the -slowness with which the rest of the march had been conducted. But all -this was as nothing to the delay at Oenoe. During this interval the -Athenians were carrying in their property; and it was the belief of the -Peloponnesians that a quick advance would have found everything still -out, had it not been for his procrastination. Such was the feeling -of the army towards Archidamus during the siege. But he, it is said, -expected that the Athenians would shrink from letting their land be -wasted, and would make their submission while it was still uninjured; -and this was why he waited. - -But after he had assaulted Oenoe, and every possible attempt to take it -had failed, as no herald came from Athens, he at last broke up his camp -and invaded Attica. This was about eighty days after the Theban attempt -upon Plataea, just in the middle of summer, when the corn was ripe, and -Archidamus, son of Zeuxis, king of Lacedaemon, was in command. Encamping -in Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, they began their ravages, and -putting to flight some Athenian horse at a place called Rheiti, or -the Brooks, they then advanced, keeping Mount Aegaleus on their right, -through Cropia, until they reached Acharnae, the largest of the Athenian -demes or townships. Sitting down before it, they formed a camp there, -and continued their ravages for a long while. - -The reason why Archidamus remained in order of battle at Acharnae during -this incursion, instead of descending into the plain, is said to have -been this. He hoped that the Athenians might possibly be tempted by -the multitude of their youth and the unprecedented efficiency of their -service to come out to battle and attempt to stop the devastation -of their lands. Accordingly, as they had met him at Eleusis or the -Thriasian plain, he tried if they could be provoked to a sally by the -spectacle of a camp at Acharnae. He thought the place itself a good -position for encamping; and it seemed likely that such an important -part of the state as the three thousand heavy infantry of the Acharnians -would refuse to submit to the ruin of their property, and would force -a battle on the rest of the citizens. On the other hand, should the -Athenians not take the field during this incursion, he could then -fearlessly ravage the plain in future invasions, and extend his advance -up to the very walls of Athens. After the Acharnians had lost their own -property they would be less willing to risk themselves for that of their -neighbours; and so there would be division in the Athenian counsels. -These were the motives of Archidamus for remaining at Acharnae. - -In the meanwhile, as long as the army was at Eleusis and the Thriasian -plain, hopes were still entertained of its not advancing any nearer. It -was remembered that Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias, king of Lacedaemon, -had invaded Attica with a Peloponnesian army fourteen years before, but -had retreated without advancing farther than Eleusis and Thria, which -indeed proved the cause of his exile from Sparta, as it was thought -he had been bribed to retreat. But when they saw the army at Acharnae, -barely seven miles from Athens, they lost all patience. The territory of -Athens was being ravaged before the very eyes of the Athenians, a sight -which the young men had never seen before and the old only in the -Median wars; and it was naturally thought a grievous insult, and the -determination was universal, especially among the young men, to sally -forth and stop it. Knots were formed in the streets and engaged in hot -discussion; for if the proposed sally was warmly recommended, it was -also in some cases opposed. Oracles of the most various import were -recited by the collectors, and found eager listeners in one or other of -the disputants. Foremost in pressing for the sally were the Acharnians, -as constituting no small part of the army of the state, and as it was -their land that was being ravaged. In short, the whole city was in a -most excited state; Pericles was the object of general indignation; his -previous counsels were totally forgotten; he was abused for not leading -out the army which he commanded, and was made responsible for the whole -of the public suffering. - -He, meanwhile, seeing anger and infatuation just now in the ascendant, -and of his wisdom in refusing a sally, would not call either assembly or -meeting of the people, fearing the fatal results of a debate inspired -by passion and not by prudence. Accordingly he addressed himself to -the defence of the city, and kept it as quiet as possible, though he -constantly sent out cavalry to prevent raids on the lands near the city -from flying parties of the enemy. There was a trifling affair at Phrygia -between a squadron of the Athenian horse with the Thessalians and the -Boeotian cavalry; in which the former had rather the best of it, until -the heavy infantry advanced to the support of the Boeotians, when the -Thessalians and Athenians were routed and lost a few men, whose bodies, -however, were recovered the same day without a truce. The next day the -Peloponnesians set up a trophy. Ancient alliance brought the Thessalians -to the aid of Athens; those who came being the Larisaeans, Pharsalians, -Cranonians, Pyrasians, Gyrtonians, and Pheraeans. The Larisaean -commanders were Polymedes and Aristonus, two party leaders in Larisa; -the Pharsalian general was Menon; each of the other cities had also its -own commander. - -In the meantime the Peloponnesians, as the Athenians did not come out -to engage them, broke up from Acharnae and ravaged some of the demes -between Mount Parnes and Brilessus. While they were in Attica the -Athenians sent off the hundred ships which they had been preparing round -Peloponnese, with a thousand heavy infantry and four hundred archers on -board, under the command of Carcinus, son of Xenotimus, Proteas, son of -Epicles, and Socrates, son of Antigenes. This armament weighed anchor -and started on its cruise, and the Peloponnesians, after remaining in -Attica as long as their provisions lasted, retired through Boeotia by a -different road to that by which they had entered. As they passed Oropus -they ravaged the territory of Graea, which is held by the Oropians from -Athens, and reaching Peloponnese broke up to their respective cities. - -After they had retired the Athenians set guards by land and sea at the -points at which they intended to have regular stations during the war. -They also resolved to set apart a special fund of a thousand talents -from the moneys in the Acropolis. This was not to be spent, but the -current expenses of the war were to be otherwise provided for. If any -one should move or put to the vote a proposition for using the money for -any purpose whatever except that of defending the city in the event -of the enemy bringing a fleet to make an attack by sea, it should be a -capital offence. With this sum of money they also set aside a special -fleet of one hundred galleys, the best ships of each year, with their -captains. None of these were to be used except with the money and -against the same peril, should such peril arise. - -Meanwhile the Athenians in the hundred ships round Peloponnese, -reinforced by a Corcyraean squadron of fifty vessels and some others -of the allies in those parts, cruised about the coasts and ravaged the -country. Among other places they landed in Laconia and made an assault -upon Methone; there being no garrison in the place, and the wall being -weak. But it so happened that Brasidas, son of Tellis, a Spartan, was -in command of a guard for the defence of the district. Hearing of the -attack, he hurried with a hundred heavy infantry to the assistance of -the besieged, and dashing through the army of the Athenians, which was -scattered over the country and had its attention turned to the wall, -threw himself into Methone. He lost a few men in making good his -entrance, but saved the place and won the thanks of Sparta by his -exploit, being thus the first officer who obtained this notice during -the war. The Athenians at once weighed anchor and continued their -cruise. Touching at Pheia in Elis, they ravaged the country for two days -and defeated a picked force of three hundred men that had come from the -vale of Elis and the immediate neighbourhood to the rescue. But a stiff -squall came down upon them, and, not liking to face it in a place -where there was no harbour, most of them got on board their ships, and -doubling Point Ichthys sailed into the port of Pheia. In the meantime -the Messenians, and some others who could not get on board, marched over -by land and took Pheia. The fleet afterwards sailed round and picked -them up and then put to sea; Pheia being evacuated, as the main army of -the Eleans had now come up. The Athenians continued their cruise, and -ravaged other places on the coast. - -About the same time the Athenians sent thirty ships to cruise round -Locris and also to guard Euboea; Cleopompus, son of Clinias, being in -command. Making descents from the fleet he ravaged certain places on -the sea-coast, and captured Thronium and took hostages from it. He also -defeated at Alope the Locrians that had assembled to resist him. - -During the summer the Athenians also expelled the Aeginetans with their -wives and children from Aegina, on the ground of their having been the -chief agents in bringing the war upon them. Besides, Aegina lies so near -Peloponnese that it seemed safer to send colonists of their own to hold -it, and shortly afterwards the settlers were sent out. The banished -Aeginetans found an asylum in Thyrea, which was given to them by -Lacedaemon, not only on account of her quarrel with Athens, but also -because the Aeginetans had laid her under obligations at the time of the -earthquake and the revolt of the Helots. The territory of Thyrea is on -the frontier of Argolis and Laconia, reaching down to the sea. Those of -the Aeginetans who did not settle here were scattered over the rest of -Hellas. - -The same summer, at the beginning of a new lunar month, the only time by -the way at which it appears possible, the sun was eclipsed after noon. -After it had assumed the form of a crescent and some of the stars had -come out, it returned to its natural shape. - -During the same summer Nymphodorus, son of Pythes, an Abderite, whose -sister Sitalces had married, was made their proxenus by the Athenians -and sent for to Athens. They had hitherto considered him their enemy; -but he had great influence with Sitalces, and they wished this prince -to become their ally. Sitalces was the son of Teres and King of the -Thracians. Teres, the father of Sitalces, was the first to establish the -great kingdom of the Odrysians on a scale quite unknown to the rest of -Thrace, a large portion of the Thracians being independent. This Teres -is in no way related to Tereus who married Pandion's daughter Procne -from Athens; nor indeed did they belong to the same part of Thrace. -Tereus lived in Daulis, part of what is now called Phocis, but which at -that time was inhabited by Thracians. It was in this land that the -women perpetrated the outrage upon Itys; and many of the poets when they -mention the nightingale call it the Daulian bird. Besides, Pandion in -contracting an alliance for his daughter would consider the advantages -of mutual assistance, and would naturally prefer a match at the above -moderate distance to the journey of many days which separates Athens -from the Odrysians. Again the names are different; and this Teres was -king of the Odrysians, the first by the way who attained to any power. -Sitalces, his son, was now sought as an ally by the Athenians, who -desired his aid in the reduction of the Thracian towns and of Perdiccas. -Coming to Athens, Nymphodorus concluded the alliance with Sitalces and -made his son Sadocus an Athenian citizen, and promised to finish the -war in Thrace by persuading Sitalces to send the Athenians a force of -Thracian horse and targeteers. He also reconciled them with Perdiccas, -and induced them to restore Therme to him; upon which Perdiccas at -once joined the Athenians and Phormio in an expedition against the -Chalcidians. Thus Sitalces, son of Teres, King of the Thracians, and -Perdiccas, son of Alexander, King of the Macedonians, became allies of -Athens. - -Meanwhile the Athenians in the hundred vessels were still cruising round -Peloponnese. After taking Sollium, a town belonging to Corinth, and -presenting the city and territory to the Acarnanians of Palaira, they -stormed Astacus, expelled its tyrant Evarchus, and gained the place for -their confederacy. Next they sailed to the island of Cephallenia and -brought it over without using force. Cephallenia lies off Acarnania and -Leucas, and consists of four states, the Paleans, Cranians, Samaeans, -and Pronaeans. Not long afterwards the fleet returned to Athens. Towards -the autumn of this year the Athenians invaded the Megarid with their -whole levy, resident aliens included, under the command of Pericles, son -of Xanthippus. The Athenians in the hundred ships round Peloponnese -on their journey home had just reached Aegina, and hearing that the -citizens at home were in full force at Megara, now sailed over and -joined them. This was without doubt the largest army of Athenians ever -assembled, the state being still in the flower of her strength and yet -unvisited by the plague. Full ten thousand heavy infantry were in -the field, all Athenian citizens, besides the three thousand before -Potidaea. Then the resident aliens who joined in the incursion were -at least three thousand strong; besides which there was a multitude of -light troops. They ravaged the greater part of the territory, and then -retired. Other incursions into the Megarid were afterwards made by -the Athenians annually during the war, sometimes only with cavalry, -sometimes with all their forces. This went on until the capture of -Nisaea. Atalanta also, the desert island off the Opuntian coast, was -towards the end of this summer converted into a fortified post by the -Athenians, in order to prevent privateers issuing from Opus and the rest -of Locris and plundering Euboea. Such were the events of this summer -after the return of the Peloponnesians from Attica. - -In the ensuing winter the Acarnanian Evarchus, wishing to return to -Astacus, persuaded the Corinthians to sail over with forty ships and -fifteen hundred heavy infantry and restore him; himself also hiring -some mercenaries. In command of the force were Euphamidas, son of -Aristonymus, Timoxenus, son of Timocrates, and Eumachus, son of Chrysis, -who sailed over and restored him and, after failing in an attempt on -some places on the Acarnanian coast which they were desirous of -gaining, began their voyage home. Coasting along shore they touched at -Cephallenia and made a descent on the Cranian territory, and losing some -men by the treachery of the Cranians, who fell suddenly upon them after -having agreed to treat, put to sea somewhat hurriedly and returned home. - -In the same winter the Athenians gave a funeral at the public cost -to those who had first fallen in this war. It was a custom of their -ancestors, and the manner of it is as follows. Three days before the -ceremony, the bones of the dead are laid out in a tent which has been -erected; and their friends bring to their relatives such offerings as -they please. In the funeral procession cypress coffins are borne in -cars, one for each tribe; the bones of the deceased being placed in the -coffin of their tribe. Among these is carried one empty bier decked for -the missing, that is, for those whose bodies could not be recovered. Any -citizen or stranger who pleases, joins in the procession: and the female -relatives are there to wail at the burial. The dead are laid in the -public sepulchre in the Beautiful suburb of the city, in which those -who fall in war are always buried; with the exception of those slain at -Marathon, who for their singular and extraordinary valour were interred -on the spot where they fell. After the bodies have been laid in the -earth, a man chosen by the state, of approved wisdom and eminent -reputation, pronounces over them an appropriate panegyric; after which -all retire. Such is the manner of the burying; and throughout the whole -of the war, whenever the occasion arose, the established custom was -observed. Meanwhile these were the first that had fallen, and Pericles, -son of Xanthippus, was chosen to pronounce their eulogium. When the -proper time arrived, he advanced from the sepulchre to an elevated -platform in order to be heard by as many of the crowd as possible, and -spoke as follows: - -"Most of my predecessors in this place have commended him who made this -speech part of the law, telling us that it is well that it should be -delivered at the burial of those who fall in battle. For myself, I -should have thought that the worth which had displayed itself in deeds -would be sufficiently rewarded by honours also shown by deeds; such as -you now see in this funeral prepared at the people's cost. And I could -have wished that the reputations of many brave men were not to be -imperilled in the mouth of a single individual, to stand or fall -according as he spoke well or ill. For it is hard to speak properly upon -a subject where it is even difficult to convince your hearers that you -are speaking the truth. On the one hand, the friend who is familiar with -every fact of the story may think that some point has not been set -forth with that fullness which he wishes and knows it to deserve; on the -other, he who is a stranger to the matter may be led by envy to suspect -exaggeration if he hears anything above his own nature. For men can -endure to hear others praised only so long as they can severally -persuade themselves of their own ability to equal the actions recounted: -when this point is passed, envy comes in and with it incredulity. -However, since our ancestors have stamped this custom with their -approval, it becomes my duty to obey the law and to try to satisfy your -several wishes and opinions as best I may. - -"I shall begin with our ancestors: it is both just and proper that they -should have the honour of the first mention on an occasion like the -present. They dwelt in the country without break in the succession from -generation to generation, and handed it down free to the present time by -their valour. And if our more remote ancestors deserve praise, much more -do our own fathers, who added to their inheritance the empire which we -now possess, and spared no pains to be able to leave their acquisitions -to us of the present generation. Lastly, there are few parts of our -dominions that have not been augmented by those of us here, who are -still more or less in the vigour of life; while the mother country has -been furnished by us with everything that can enable her to depend on -her own resources whether for war or for peace. That part of our history -which tells of the military achievements which gave us our several -possessions, or of the ready valour with which either we or our fathers -stemmed the tide of Hellenic or foreign aggression, is a theme too -familiar to my hearers for me to dilate on, and I shall therefore pass -it by. But what was the road by which we reached our position, what the -form of government under which our greatness grew, what the national -habits out of which it sprang; these are questions which I may try to -solve before I proceed to my panegyric upon these men; since I think -this to be a subject upon which on the present occasion a speaker may -properly dwell, and to which the whole assemblage, whether citizens or -foreigners, may listen with advantage. - -"Our constitution does not copy the laws of neighbouring states; we are -rather a pattern to others than imitators ourselves. Its administration -favours the many instead of the few; this is why it is called a -democracy. If we look to the laws, they afford equal justice to all in -their private differences; if no social standing, advancement in public -life falls to reputation for capacity, class considerations not being -allowed to interfere with merit; nor again does poverty bar the way, if -a man is able to serve the state, he is not hindered by the obscurity of -his condition. The freedom which we enjoy in our government extends also -to our ordinary life. There, far from exercising a jealous surveillance -over each other, we do not feel called upon to be angry with our -neighbour for doing what he likes, or even to indulge in those injurious -looks which cannot fail to be offensive, although they inflict no -positive penalty. But all this ease in our private relations does not -make us lawless as citizens. Against this fear is our chief safeguard, -teaching us to obey the magistrates and the laws, particularly such as -regard the protection of the injured, whether they are actually on the -statute book, or belong to that code which, although unwritten, yet -cannot be broken without acknowledged disgrace. - -"Further, we provide plenty of means for the mind to refresh itself from -business. We celebrate games and sacrifices all the year round, and the -elegance of our private establishments forms a daily source of pleasure -and helps to banish the spleen; while the magnitude of our city draws -the produce of the world into our harbour, so that to the Athenian the -fruits of other countries are as familiar a luxury as those of his own. - -"If we turn to our military policy, there also we differ from our -antagonists. We throw open our city to the world, and never by alien -acts exclude foreigners from any opportunity of learning or observing, -although the eyes of an enemy may occasionally profit by our liberality; -trusting less in system and policy than to the native spirit of our -citizens; while in education, where our rivals from their very cradles -by a painful discipline seek after manliness, at Athens we live exactly -as we please, and yet are just as ready to encounter every legitimate -danger. In proof of this it may be noticed that the Lacedaemonians -do not invade our country alone, but bring with them all their -confederates; while we Athenians advance unsupported into the territory -of a neighbour, and fighting upon a foreign soil usually vanquish with -ease men who are defending their homes. Our united force was never -yet encountered by any enemy, because we have at once to attend to our -marine and to dispatch our citizens by land upon a hundred different -services; so that, wherever they engage with some such fraction of our -strength, a success against a detachment is magnified into a victory -over the nation, and a defeat into a reverse suffered at the hands of -our entire people. And yet if with habits not of labour but of ease, -and courage not of art but of nature, we are still willing to encounter -danger, we have the double advantage of escaping the experience of -hardships in anticipation and of facing them in the hour of need as -fearlessly as those who are never free from them. - -"Nor are these the only points in which our city is worthy of -admiration. We cultivate refinement without extravagance and knowledge -without effeminacy; wealth we employ more for use than for show, and -place the real disgrace of poverty not in owning to the fact but -in declining the struggle against it. Our public men have, besides -politics, their private affairs to attend to, and our ordinary citizens, -though occupied with the pursuits of industry, are still fair judges of -public matters; for, unlike any other nation, regarding him who takes no -part in these duties not as unambitious but as useless, we Athenians -are able to judge at all events if we cannot originate, and, instead -of looking on discussion as a stumbling-block in the way of action, we -think it an indispensable preliminary to any wise action at all. Again, -in our enterprises we present the singular spectacle of daring and -deliberation, each carried to its highest point, and both united in -the same persons; although usually decision is the fruit of ignorance, -hesitation of reflection. But the palm of courage will surely be -adjudged most justly to those, who best know the difference between -hardship and pleasure and yet are never tempted to shrink from danger. -In generosity we are equally singular, acquiring our friends by -conferring, not by receiving, favours. Yet, of course, the doer of the -favour is the firmer friend of the two, in order by continued kindness -to keep the recipient in his debt; while the debtor feels less keenly -from the very consciousness that the return he makes will be a payment, -not a free gift. And it is only the Athenians, who, fearless of -consequences, confer their benefits not from calculations of expediency, -but in the confidence of liberality. - -"In short, I say that as a city we are the school of Hellas, while I -doubt if the world can produce a man who, where he has only himself to -depend upon, is equal to so many emergencies, and graced by so happy a -versatility, as the Athenian. And that this is no mere boast thrown -out for the occasion, but plain matter of fact, the power of the state -acquired by these habits proves. For Athens alone of her contemporaries -is found when tested to be greater than her reputation, and alone gives -no occasion to her assailants to blush at the antagonist by whom they -have been worsted, or to her subjects to question her title by merit to -rule. Rather, the admiration of the present and succeeding ages will be -ours, since we have not left our power without witness, but have shown -it by mighty proofs; and far from needing a Homer for our panegyrist, or -other of his craft whose verses might charm for the moment only for the -impression which they gave to melt at the touch of fact, we have forced -every sea and land to be the highway of our daring, and everywhere, -whether for evil or for good, have left imperishable monuments behind -us. Such is the Athens for which these men, in the assertion of their -resolve not to lose her, nobly fought and died; and well may every one -of their survivors be ready to suffer in her cause. - -"Indeed if I have dwelt at some length upon the character of our -country, it has been to show that our stake in the struggle is not the -same as theirs who have no such blessings to lose, and also that the -panegyric of the men over whom I am now speaking might be by definite -proofs established. That panegyric is now in a great measure complete; -for the Athens that I have celebrated is only what the heroism of -these and their like have made her, men whose fame, unlike that of most -Hellenes, will be found to be only commensurate with their deserts. And -if a test of worth be wanted, it is to be found in their closing scene, -and this not only in cases in which it set the final seal upon their -merit, but also in those in which it gave the first intimation of their -having any. For there is justice in the claim that steadfastness in -his country's battles should be as a cloak to cover a man's other -imperfections; since the good action has blotted out the bad, and his -merit as a citizen more than outweighed his demerits as an individual. -But none of these allowed either wealth with its prospect of future -enjoyment to unnerve his spirit, or poverty with its hope of a day of -freedom and riches to tempt him to shrink from danger. No, holding that -vengeance upon their enemies was more to be desired than any personal -blessings, and reckoning this to be the most glorious of hazards, they -joyfully determined to accept the risk, to make sure of their vengeance, -and to let their wishes wait; and while committing to hope the -uncertainty of final success, in the business before them they thought -fit to act boldly and trust in themselves. Thus choosing to die -resisting, rather than to live submitting, they fled only from -dishonour, but met danger face to face, and after one brief moment, -while at the summit of their fortune, escaped, not from their fear, but -from their glory. - -"So died these men as became Athenians. You, their survivors, must -determine to have as unfaltering a resolution in the field, though you -may pray that it may have a happier issue. And not contented with ideas -derived only from words of the advantages which are bound up with the -defence of your country, though these would furnish a valuable text to -a speaker even before an audience so alive to them as the present, you -must yourselves realize the power of Athens, and feed your eyes upon her -from day to day, till love of her fills your hearts; and then, when -all her greatness shall break upon you, you must reflect that it was by -courage, sense of duty, and a keen feeling of honour in action that -men were enabled to win all this, and that no personal failure in an -enterprise could make them consent to deprive their country of their -valour, but they laid it at her feet as the most glorious contribution -that they could offer. For this offering of their lives made in common -by them all they each of them individually received that renown which -never grows old, and for a sepulchre, not so much that in which their -bones have been deposited, but that noblest of shrines wherein their -glory is laid up to be eternally remembered upon every occasion on which -deed or story shall call for its commemoration. For heroes have the -whole earth for their tomb; and in lands far from their own, where the -column with its epitaph declares it, there is enshrined in every breast -a record unwritten with no tablet to preserve it, except that of the -heart. These take as your model and, judging happiness to be the fruit -of freedom and freedom of valour, never decline the dangers of war. For -it is not the miserable that would most justly be unsparing of their -lives; these have nothing to hope for: it is rather they to whom -continued life may bring reverses as yet unknown, and to whom a fall, if -it came, would be most tremendous in its consequences. And surely, to -a man of spirit, the degradation of cowardice must be immeasurably more -grievous than the unfelt death which strikes him in the midst of his -strength and patriotism! - -"Comfort, therefore, not condolence, is what I have to offer to the -parents of the dead who may be here. Numberless are the chances to -which, as they know, the life of man is subject; but fortunate indeed -are they who draw for their lot a death so glorious as that which has -caused your mourning, and to whom life has been so exactly measured as -to terminate in the happiness in which it has been passed. Still I know -that this is a hard saying, especially when those are in question of -whom you will constantly be reminded by seeing in the homes of others -blessings of which once you also boasted: for grief is felt not so much -for the want of what we have never known, as for the loss of that to -which we have been long accustomed. Yet you who are still of an age to -beget children must bear up in the hope of having others in their stead; -not only will they help you to forget those whom you have lost, but will -be to the state at once a reinforcement and a security; for never can -a fair or just policy be expected of the citizen who does not, like -his fellows, bring to the decision the interests and apprehensions of a -father. While those of you who have passed your prime must congratulate -yourselves with the thought that the best part of your life was -fortunate, and that the brief span that remains will be cheered by the -fame of the departed. For it is only the love of honour that never grows -old; and honour it is, not gain, as some would have it, that rejoices -the heart of age and helplessness. - -"Turning to the sons or brothers of the dead, I see an arduous struggle -before you. When a man is gone, all are wont to praise him, and should -your merit be ever so transcendent, you will still find it difficult not -merely to overtake, but even to approach their renown. The living have -envy to contend with, while those who are no longer in our path are -honoured with a goodwill into which rivalry does not enter. On the other -hand, if I must say anything on the subject of female excellence to -those of you who will now be in widowhood, it will be all comprised in -this brief exhortation. Great will be your glory in not falling short of -your natural character; and greatest will be hers who is least talked of -among the men, whether for good or for bad. - -"My task is now finished. I have performed it to the best of my ability, -and in word, at least, the requirements of the law are now satisfied. If -deeds be in question, those who are here interred have received part of -their honours already, and for the rest, their children will be brought -up till manhood at the public expense: the state thus offers a valuable -prize, as the garland of victory in this race of valour, for the reward -both of those who have fallen and their survivors. And where the rewards -for merit are greatest, there are found the best citizens. - -"And now that you have brought to a close your lamentations for your -relatives, you may depart." - - - - -CHAPTER VII - -_Second Year of the War--The Plague of Athens--Position and Policy of -Pericles--Fall of Potidaea_ - -Such was the funeral that took place during this winter, with which the -first year of the war came to an end. In the first days of summer the -Lacedaemonians and their allies, with two-thirds of their forces -as before, invaded Attica, under the command of Archidamus, son of -Zeuxidamus, King of Lacedaemon, and sat down and laid waste the country. -Not many days after their arrival in Attica the plague first began to -show itself among the Athenians. It was said that it had broken out in -many places previously in the neighbourhood of Lemnos and elsewhere; -but a pestilence of such extent and mortality was nowhere remembered. -Neither were the physicians at first of any service, ignorant as they -were of the proper way to treat it, but they died themselves the most -thickly, as they visited the sick most often; nor did any human art -succeed any better. Supplications in the temples, divinations, and so -forth were found equally futile, till the overwhelming nature of the -disaster at last put a stop to them altogether. - -It first began, it is said, in the parts of Ethiopia above Egypt, -and thence descended into Egypt and Libya and into most of the King's -country. Suddenly falling upon Athens, it first attacked the -population in Piraeus--which was the occasion of their saying that the -Peloponnesians had poisoned the reservoirs, there being as yet no wells -there--and afterwards appeared in the upper city, when the deaths became -much more frequent. All speculation as to its origin and its causes, if -causes can be found adequate to produce so great a disturbance, I leave -to other writers, whether lay or professional; for myself, I shall -simply set down its nature, and explain the symptoms by which perhaps -it may be recognized by the student, if it should ever break out again. -This I can the better do, as I had the disease myself, and watched its -operation in the case of others. - -That year then is admitted to have been otherwise unprecedentedly free -from sickness; and such few cases as occurred all determined in this. -As a rule, however, there was no ostensible cause; but people in good -health were all of a sudden attacked by violent heats in the head, and -redness and inflammation in the eyes, the inward parts, such as the -throat or tongue, becoming bloody and emitting an unnatural and fetid -breath. These symptoms were followed by sneezing and hoarseness, after -which the pain soon reached the chest, and produced a hard cough. When -it fixed in the stomach, it upset it; and discharges of bile of every -kind named by physicians ensued, accompanied by very great distress. -In most cases also an ineffectual retching followed, producing violent -spasms, which in some cases ceased soon after, in others much later. -Externally the body was not very hot to the touch, nor pale in its -appearance, but reddish, livid, and breaking out into small pustules and -ulcers. But internally it burned so that the patient could not bear to -have on him clothing or linen even of the very lightest description; or -indeed to be otherwise than stark naked. What they would have liked best -would have been to throw themselves into cold water; as indeed was done -by some of the neglected sick, who plunged into the rain-tanks in their -agonies of unquenchable thirst; though it made no difference whether -they drank little or much. Besides this, the miserable feeling of not -being able to rest or sleep never ceased to torment them. The body -meanwhile did not waste away so long as the distemper was at its -height, but held out to a marvel against its ravages; so that when -they succumbed, as in most cases, on the seventh or eighth day to the -internal inflammation, they had still some strength in them. But if they -passed this stage, and the disease descended further into the bowels, -inducing a violent ulceration there accompanied by severe diarrhoea, -this brought on a weakness which was generally fatal. For the disorder -first settled in the head, ran its course from thence through the whole -of the body, and, even where it did not prove mortal, it still left its -mark on the extremities; for it settled in the privy parts, the fingers -and the toes, and many escaped with the loss of these, some too with -that of their eyes. Others again were seized with an entire loss of -memory on their first recovery, and did not know either themselves or -their friends. - -But while the nature of the distemper was such as to baffle all -description, and its attacks almost too grievous for human nature to -endure, it was still in the following circumstance that its difference -from all ordinary disorders was most clearly shown. All the birds and -beasts that prey upon human bodies, either abstained from touching them -(though there were many lying unburied), or died after tasting them. -In proof of this, it was noticed that birds of this kind actually -disappeared; they were not about the bodies, or indeed to be seen at -all. But of course the effects which I have mentioned could best be -studied in a domestic animal like the dog. - -Such then, if we pass over the varieties of particular cases which were -many and peculiar, were the general features of the distemper. Meanwhile -the town enjoyed an immunity from all the ordinary disorders; or if any -case occurred, it ended in this. Some died in neglect, others in the -midst of every attention. No remedy was found that could be used as a -specific; for what did good in one case, did harm in another. Strong -and weak constitutions proved equally incapable of resistance, all alike -being swept away, although dieted with the utmost precaution. By far the -most terrible feature in the malady was the dejection which ensued -when any one felt himself sickening, for the despair into which they -instantly fell took away their power of resistance, and left them a -much easier prey to the disorder; besides which, there was the awful -spectacle of men dying like sheep, through having caught the infection -in nursing each other. This caused the greatest mortality. On the -one hand, if they were afraid to visit each other, they perished from -neglect; indeed many houses were emptied of their inmates for want of -a nurse: on the other, if they ventured to do so, death was the -consequence. This was especially the case with such as made any -pretensions to goodness: honour made them unsparing of themselves in -their attendance in their friends' houses, where even the members of the -family were at last worn out by the moans of the dying, and succumbed to -the force of the disaster. Yet it was with those who had recovered from -the disease that the sick and the dying found most compassion. These -knew what it was from experience, and had now no fear for themselves; -for the same man was never attacked twice--never at least fatally. -And such persons not only received the congratulations of others, but -themselves also, in the elation of the moment, half entertained the vain -hope that they were for the future safe from any disease whatsoever. - -An aggravation of the existing calamity was the influx from the country -into the city, and this was especially felt by the new arrivals. As -there were no houses to receive them, they had to be lodged at the hot -season of the year in stifling cabins, where the mortality raged without -restraint. The bodies of dying men lay one upon another, and half-dead -creatures reeled about the streets and gathered round all the fountains -in their longing for water. The sacred places also in which they had -quartered themselves were full of corpses of persons that had died -there, just as they were; for as the disaster passed all bounds, men, -not knowing what was to become of them, became utterly careless of -everything, whether sacred or profane. All the burial rites before in -use were entirely upset, and they buried the bodies as best they could. -Many from want of the proper appliances, through so many of their -friends having died already, had recourse to the most shameless -sepultures: sometimes getting the start of those who had raised a pile, -they threw their own dead body upon the stranger's pyre and ignited it; -sometimes they tossed the corpse which they were carrying on the top of -another that was burning, and so went off. - -Nor was this the only form of lawless extravagance which owed its origin -to the plague. Men now coolly ventured on what they had formerly done -in a corner, and not just as they pleased, seeing the rapid transitions -produced by persons in prosperity suddenly dying and those who before -had nothing succeeding to their property. So they resolved to spend -quickly and enjoy themselves, regarding their lives and riches as alike -things of a day. Perseverance in what men called honour was popular with -none, it was so uncertain whether they would be spared to attain -the object; but it was settled that present enjoyment, and all that -contributed to it, was both honourable and useful. Fear of gods or law -of man there was none to restrain them. As for the first, they judged it -to be just the same whether they worshipped them or not, as they saw all -alike perishing; and for the last, no one expected to live to be brought -to trial for his offences, but each felt that a far severer sentence had -been already passed upon them all and hung ever over their heads, and -before this fell it was only reasonable to enjoy life a little. - -Such was the nature of the calamity, and heavily did it weigh on the -Athenians; death raging within the city and devastation without. -Among other things which they remembered in their distress was, very -naturally, the following verse which the old men said had long ago been -uttered: - - A Dorian war shall come and with it death. - -So a dispute arose as to whether dearth and not death had not been the -word in the verse; but at the present juncture, it was of course decided -in favour of the latter; for the people made their recollection fit -in with their sufferings. I fancy, however, that if another Dorian -war should ever afterwards come upon us, and a dearth should happen to -accompany it, the verse will probably be read accordingly. The oracle -also which had been given to the Lacedaemonians was now remembered by -those who knew of it. When the god was asked whether they should go to -war, he answered that if they put their might into it, victory would be -theirs, and that he would himself be with them. With this oracle -events were supposed to tally. For the plague broke out as soon as the -Peloponnesians invaded Attica, and never entering Peloponnese (not -at least to an extent worth noticing), committed its worst ravages at -Athens, and next to Athens, at the most populous of the other towns. -Such was the history of the plague. - -After ravaging the plain, the Peloponnesians advanced into the Paralian -region as far as Laurium, where the Athenian silver mines are, and first -laid waste the side looking towards Peloponnese, next that which faces -Euboea and Andros. But Pericles, who was still general, held the same -opinion as in the former invasion, and would not let the Athenians march -out against them. - -However, while they were still in the plain, and had not yet entered -the Paralian land, he had prepared an armament of a hundred ships for -Peloponnese, and when all was ready put out to sea. On board the ships -he took four thousand Athenian heavy infantry, and three hundred -cavalry in horse transports, and then for the first time made out of old -galleys; fifty Chian and Lesbian vessels also joining in the expedition. -When this Athenian armament put out to sea, they left the Peloponnesians -in Attica in the Paralian region. Arriving at Epidaurus in Peloponnese -they ravaged most of the territory, and even had hopes of taking the -town by an assault: in this however they were not successful. Putting -out from Epidaurus, they laid waste the territory of Troezen, Halieis, -and Hermione, all towns on the coast of Peloponnese, and thence sailing -to Prasiai, a maritime town in Laconia, ravaged part of its territory, -and took and sacked the place itself; after which they returned home, -but found the Peloponnesians gone and no longer in Attica. - -During the whole time that the Peloponnesians were in Attica and the -Athenians on the expedition in their ships, men kept dying of the plague -both in the armament and in Athens. Indeed it was actually asserted -that the departure of the Peloponnesians was hastened by fear of the -disorder; as they heard from deserters that it was in the city, and -also could see the burials going on. Yet in this invasion they remained -longer than in any other, and ravaged the whole country, for they were -about forty days in Attica. - -The same summer Hagnon, son of Nicias, and Cleopompus, son of Clinias, -the colleagues of Pericles, took the armament of which he had lately -made use, and went off upon an expedition against the Chalcidians in the -direction of Thrace and Potidaea, which was still under siege. As soon -as they arrived, they brought up their engines against Potidaea and -tried every means of taking it, but did not succeed either in capturing -the city or in doing anything else worthy of their preparations. For the -plague attacked them here also, and committed such havoc as to cripple -them completely, even the previously healthy soldiers of the former -expedition catching the infection from Hagnon's troops; while Phormio -and the sixteen hundred men whom he commanded only escaped by being no -longer in the neighbourhood of the Chalcidians. The end of it was that -Hagnon returned with his ships to Athens, having lost one thousand and -fifty out of four thousand heavy infantry in about forty days; though -the soldiers stationed there before remained in the country and carried -on the siege of Potidaea. - -After the second invasion of the Peloponnesians a change came over the -spirit of the Athenians. Their land had now been twice laid waste; and -war and pestilence at once pressed heavy upon them. They began to find -fault with Pericles, as the author of the war and the cause of all their -misfortunes, and became eager to come to terms with Lacedaemon, and -actually sent ambassadors thither, who did not however succeed in their -mission. Their despair was now complete and all vented itself upon -Pericles. When he saw them exasperated at the present turn of affairs -and acting exactly as he had anticipated, he called an assembly, -being (it must be remembered) still general, with the double object of -restoring confidence and of leading them from these angry feelings to a -calmer and more hopeful state of mind. He accordingly came forward and -spoke as follows: - -"I was not unprepared for the indignation of which I have been the -object, as I know its causes; and I have called an assembly for the -purpose of reminding you upon certain points, and of protesting against -your being unreasonably irritated with me, or cowed by your sufferings. -I am of opinion that national greatness is more for the advantage of -private citizens, than any individual well-being coupled with public -humiliation. A man may be personally ever so well off, and yet if his -country be ruined he must be ruined with it; whereas a flourishing -commonwealth always affords chances of salvation to unfortunate -individuals. Since then a state can support the misfortunes of private -citizens, while they cannot support hers, it is surely the duty of every -one to be forward in her defence, and not like you to be so confounded -with your domestic afflictions as to give up all thoughts of the common -safety, and to blame me for having counselled war and yourselves for -having voted it. And yet if you are angry with me, it is with one who, -as I believe, is second to no man either in knowledge of the proper -policy, or in the ability to expound it, and who is moreover not only a -patriot but an honest one. A man possessing that knowledge without that -faculty of exposition might as well have no idea at all on the matter: -if he had both these gifts, but no love for his country, he would be but -a cold advocate for her interests; while were his patriotism not proof -against bribery, everything would go for a price. So that if you thought -that I was even moderately distinguished for these qualities when you -took my advice and went to war, there is certainly no reason now why I -should be charged with having done wrong. - -"For those of course who have a free choice in the matter and whose -fortunes are not at stake, war is the greatest of follies. But if the -only choice was between submission with loss of independence, and danger -with the hope of preserving that independence, in such a case it is he -who will not accept the risk that deserves blame, not he who will. I am -the same man and do not alter, it is you who change, since in fact you -took my advice while unhurt, and waited for misfortune to repent of -it; and the apparent error of my policy lies in the infirmity of your -resolution, since the suffering that it entails is being felt by every -one among you, while its advantage is still remote and obscure to all, -and a great and sudden reverse having befallen you, your mind is too -much depressed to persevere in your resolves. For before what is sudden, -unexpected, and least within calculation, the spirit quails; and putting -all else aside, the plague has certainly been an emergency of this kind. -Born, however, as you are, citizens of a great state, and brought up, as -you have been, with habits equal to your birth, you should be ready to -face the greatest disasters and still to keep unimpaired the lustre of -your name. For the judgment of mankind is as relentless to the weakness -that falls short of a recognized renown, as it is jealous of the -arrogance that aspires higher than its due. Cease then to grieve for -your private afflictions, and address yourselves instead to the safety -of the commonwealth. - -"If you shrink before the exertions which the war makes necessary, -and fear that after all they may not have a happy result, you know the -reasons by which I have often demonstrated to you the groundlessness -of your apprehensions. If those are not enough, I will now reveal an -advantage arising from the greatness of your dominion, which I think -has never yet suggested itself to you, which I never mentioned in my -previous speeches, and which has so bold a sound that I should scarce -adventure it now, were it not for the unnatural depression which I see -around me. You perhaps think that your empire extends only over your -allies; I will declare to you the truth. The visible field of action has -two parts, land and sea. In the whole of one of these you are completely -supreme, not merely as far as you use it at present, but also to what -further extent you may think fit: in fine, your naval resources are -such that your vessels may go where they please, without the King or any -other nation on earth being able to stop them. So that although you -may think it a great privation to lose the use of your land and houses, -still you must see that this power is something widely different; and -instead of fretting on their account, you should really regard them in -the light of the gardens and other accessories that embellish a great -fortune, and as, in comparison, of little moment. You should know too -that liberty preserved by your efforts will easily recover for us what -we have lost, while, the knee once bowed, even what you have will pass -from you. Your fathers receiving these possessions not from others, but -from themselves, did not let slip what their labour had acquired, but -delivered them safe to you; and in this respect at least you must prove -yourselves their equals, remembering that to lose what one has got is -more disgraceful than to be balked in getting, and you must confront -your enemies not merely with spirit but with disdain. Confidence indeed -a blissful ignorance can impart, ay, even to a coward's breast, but -disdain is the privilege of those who, like us, have been assured -by reflection of their superiority to their adversary. And where the -chances are the same, knowledge fortifies courage by the contempt which -is its consequence, its trust being placed, not in hope, which is -the prop of the desperate, but in a judgment grounded upon existing -resources, whose anticipations are more to be depended upon. - -"Again, your country has a right to your services in sustaining the -glories of her position. These are a common source of pride to you all, -and you cannot decline the burdens of empire and still expect to share -its honours. You should remember also that what you are fighting against -is not merely slavery as an exchange for independence, but also loss -of empire and danger from the animosities incurred in its exercise. -Besides, to recede is no longer possible, if indeed any of you in the -alarm of the moment has become enamoured of the honesty of such an -unambitious part. For what you hold is, to speak somewhat plainly, a -tyranny; to take it perhaps was wrong, but to let it go is unsafe. And -men of these retiring views, making converts of others, would quickly -ruin a state; indeed the result would be the same if they could live -independent by themselves; for the retiring and unambitious are -never secure without vigorous protectors at their side; in fine, such -qualities are useless to an imperial city, though they may help a -dependency to an unmolested servitude. - -"But you must not be seduced by citizens like these or angry with -me--who, if I voted for war, only did as you did yourselves--in spite of -the enemy having invaded your country and done what you could be -certain that he would do, if you refused to comply with his demands; and -although besides what we counted for, the plague has come upon us--the -only point indeed at which our calculation has been at fault. It is -this, I know, that has had a large share in making me more unpopular -than I should otherwise have been--quite undeservedly, unless you are -also prepared to give me the credit of any success with which chance may -present you. Besides, the hand of heaven must be borne with resignation, -that of the enemy with fortitude; this was the old way at Athens, and do -not you prevent it being so still. Remember, too, that if your country -has the greatest name in all the world, it is because she never bent -before disaster; because she has expended more life and effort in war -than any other city, and has won for herself a power greater than -any hitherto known, the memory of which will descend to the latest -posterity; even if now, in obedience to the general law of decay, we -should ever be forced to yield, still it will be remembered that we held -rule over more Hellenes than any other Hellenic state, that we sustained -the greatest wars against their united or separate powers, and inhabited -a city unrivalled by any other in resources or magnitude. These glories -may incur the censure of the slow and unambitious; but in the breast of -energy they will awake emulation, and in those who must remain without -them an envious regret. Hatred and unpopularity at the moment have -fallen to the lot of all who have aspired to rule others; but where -odium must be incurred, true wisdom incurs it for the highest objects. -Hatred also is short-lived; but that which makes the splendour of the -present and the glory of the future remains for ever unforgotten. Make -your decision, therefore, for glory then and honour now, and attain -both objects by instant and zealous effort: do not send heralds to -Lacedaemon, and do not betray any sign of being oppressed by your -present sufferings, since they whose minds are least sensitive to -calamity, and whose hands are most quick to meet it, are the greatest -men and the greatest communities." - -Such were the arguments by which Pericles tried to cure the Athenians -of their anger against him and to divert their thoughts from their -immediate afflictions. As a community he succeeded in convincing them; -they not only gave up all idea of sending to Lacedaemon, but applied -themselves with increased energy to the war; still as private -individuals they could not help smarting under their sufferings, -the common people having been deprived of the little that they were -possessed, while the higher orders had lost fine properties with costly -establishments and buildings in the country, and, worst of all, had -war instead of peace. In fact, the public feeling against him did not -subside until he had been fined. Not long afterwards, however, according -to the way of the multitude, they again elected him general and -committed all their affairs to his hands, having now become less -sensitive to their private and domestic afflictions, and understanding -that he was the best man of all for the public necessities. For as -long as he was at the head of the state during the peace, he pursued a -moderate and conservative policy; and in his time its greatness was at -its height. When the war broke out, here also he seems to have rightly -gauged the power of his country. He outlived its commencement two years -and six months, and the correctness of his previsions respecting it -became better known by his death. He told them to wait quietly, to pay -attention to their marine, to attempt no new conquests, and to expose -the city to no hazards during the war, and doing this, promised them a -favourable result. What they did was the very contrary, allowing private -ambitions and private interests, in matters apparently quite foreign -to the war, to lead them into projects unjust both to themselves and to -their allies--projects whose success would only conduce to the honour -and advantage of private persons, and whose failure entailed certain -disaster on the country in the war. The causes of this are not far to -seek. Pericles indeed, by his rank, ability, and known integrity, was -enabled to exercise an independent control over the multitude--in short, -to lead them instead of being led by them; for as he never sought power -by improper means, he was never compelled to flatter them, but, on the -contrary, enjoyed so high an estimation that he could afford to anger -them by contradiction. Whenever he saw them unseasonably and insolently -elated, he would with a word reduce them to alarm; on the other hand, -if they fell victims to a panic, he could at once restore them to -confidence. In short, what was nominally a democracy became in his hands -government by the first citizen. With his successors it was different. -More on a level with one another, and each grasping at supremacy, they -ended by committing even the conduct of state affairs to the whims -of the multitude. This, as might have been expected in a great and -sovereign state, produced a host of blunders, and amongst them -the Sicilian expedition; though this failed not so much through a -miscalculation of the power of those against whom it was sent, -as through a fault in the senders in not taking the best measures -afterwards to assist those who had gone out, but choosing rather to -occupy themselves with private cabals for the leadership of the commons, -by which they not only paralysed operations in the field, but also first -introduced civil discord at home. Yet after losing most of their fleet -besides other forces in Sicily, and with faction already dominant in the -city, they could still for three years make head against their original -adversaries, joined not only by the Sicilians, but also by their own -allies nearly all in revolt, and at last by the King's son, Cyrus, who -furnished the funds for the Peloponnesian navy. Nor did they finally -succumb till they fell the victims of their own intestine disorders. -So superfluously abundant were the resources from which the genius of -Pericles foresaw an easy triumph in the war over the unaided forces of -the Peloponnesians. - -During the same summer the Lacedaemonians and their allies made an -expedition with a hundred ships against Zacynthus, an island lying off -the coast of Elis, peopled by a colony of Achaeans from Peloponnese, -and in alliance with Athens. There were a thousand Lacedaemonian heavy -infantry on board, and Cnemus, a Spartan, as admiral. They made a -descent from their ships, and ravaged most of the country; but as the -inhabitants would not submit, they sailed back home. - -At the end of the same summer the Corinthian Aristeus, Aneristus, -Nicolaus, and Stratodemus, envoys from Lacedaemon, Timagoras, a Tegean, -and a private individual named Pollis from Argos, on their way to -Asia to persuade the King to supply funds and join in the war, came -to Sitalces, son of Teres in Thrace, with the idea of inducing him, if -possible, to forsake the alliance of Athens and to march on Potidaea -then besieged by an Athenian force, and also of getting conveyed by his -means to their destination across the Hellespont to Pharnabazus, who was -to send them up the country to the King. But there chanced to be with -Sitalces some Athenian ambassadors--Learchus, son of Callimachus, and -Ameiniades, son of Philemon--who persuaded Sitalces' son, Sadocus, the -new Athenian citizen, to put the men into their hands and thus prevent -their crossing over to the King and doing their part to injure the -country of his choice. He accordingly had them seized, as they were -travelling through Thrace to the vessel in which they were to cross the -Hellespont, by a party whom he had sent on with Learchus and Ameiniades, -and gave orders for their delivery to the Athenian ambassadors, by whom -they were brought to Athens. On their arrival, the Athenians, afraid -that Aristeus, who had been notably the prime mover in the previous -affairs of Potidaea and their Thracian possessions, might live to do -them still more mischief if he escaped, slew them all the same day, -without giving them a trial or hearing the defence which they wished to -offer, and cast their bodies into a pit; thinking themselves -justified in using in retaliation the same mode of warfare which the -Lacedaemonians had begun, when they slew and cast into pits all the -Athenian and allied traders whom they caught on board the merchantmen -round Peloponnese. Indeed, at the outset of the war, the Lacedaemonians -butchered as enemies all whom they took on the sea, whether allies of -Athens or neutrals. - -About the same time towards the close of the summer, the Ambraciot -forces, with a number of barbarians that they had raised, marched -against the Amphilochian Argos and the rest of that country. The origin -of their enmity against the Argives was this. This Argos and the rest -of Amphilochia were colonized by Amphilochus, son of Amphiaraus. -Dissatisfied with the state of affairs at home on his return thither -after the Trojan War, he built this city in the Ambracian Gulf, and -named it Argos after his own country. This was the largest town in -Amphilochia, and its inhabitants the most powerful. Under the -pressure of misfortune many generations afterwards, they called in the -Ambraciots, their neighbours on the Amphilochian border, to join their -colony; and it was by this union with the Ambraciots that they learnt -their present Hellenic speech, the rest of the Amphilochians being -barbarians. After a time the Ambraciots expelled the Argives and held -the city themselves. Upon this the Amphilochians gave themselves over -to the Acarnanians; and the two together called the Athenians, who sent -them Phormio as general and thirty ships; upon whose arrival they took -Argos by storm, and made slaves of the Ambraciots; and the Amphilochians -and Acarnanians inhabited the town in common. After this began the -alliance between the Athenians and Acarnanians. The enmity of the -Ambraciots against the Argives thus commenced with the enslavement -of their citizens; and afterwards during the war they collected -this armament among themselves and the Chaonians, and other of the -neighbouring barbarians. Arrived before Argos, they became masters of -the country; but not being successful in their attacks upon the town, -returned home and dispersed among their different peoples. - -Such were the events of the summer. The ensuing winter the Athenians -sent twenty ships round Peloponnese, under the command of Phormio, who -stationed himself at Naupactus and kept watch against any one sailing in -or out of Corinth and the Crissaean Gulf. Six others went to Caria and -Lycia under Melesander, to collect tribute in those parts, and also to -prevent the Peloponnesian privateers from taking up their station in -those waters and molesting the passage of the merchantmen from Phaselis -and Phoenicia and the adjoining continent. However, Melesander, going up -the country into Lycia with a force of Athenians from the ships and the -allies, was defeated and killed in battle, with the loss of a number of -his troops. - -The same winter the Potidaeans at length found themselves no longer able -to hold out against their besiegers. The inroads of the Peloponnesians -into Attica had not had the desired effect of making the Athenians raise -the siege. Provisions there were none left; and so far had distress for -food gone in Potidaea that, besides a number of other horrors, instances -had even occurred of the people having eaten one another. In this -extremity they at last made proposals for capitulating to the -Athenian generals in command against them--Xenophon, son of Euripides, -Hestiodorus, son of Aristocleides, and Phanomachus, son of Callimachus. -The generals accepted their proposals, seeing the sufferings of the army -in so exposed a position; besides which the state had already spent two -thousand talents upon the siege. The terms of the capitulation were as -follows: a free passage out for themselves, their children, wives and -auxiliaries, with one garment apiece, the women with two, and a fixed -sum of money for their journey. Under this treaty they went out -to Chalcidice and other places, according as was their power. The -Athenians, however, blamed the generals for granting terms without -instructions from home, being of opinion that the place would have had -to surrender at discretion. They afterwards sent settlers of their own -to Potidaea, and colonized it. Such were the events of the winter, -and so ended the second year of this war of which Thucydides was the -historian. - - - -CHAPTER VIII - -_Third Year of the War--Investment of Plataea--Naval Victories of -Phormio--Thracian Irruption into Macedonia under Sitalces_ - -The next summer the Peloponnesians and their allies, instead of invading -Attica, marched against Plataea, under the command of Archidamus, son of -Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. He had encamped his army and -was about to lay waste the country, when the Plataeans hastened to send -envoys to him, and spoke as follows: "Archidamus and Lacedaemonians, -in invading the Plataean territory, you do what is wrong in itself, -and worthy neither of yourselves nor of the fathers who begot you. -Pausanias, son of Cleombrotus, your countryman, after freeing Hellas -from the Medes with the help of those Hellenes who were willing to -undertake the risk of the battle fought near our city, offered sacrifice -to Zeus the Liberator in the marketplace of Plataea, and calling all the -allies together restored to the Plataeans their city and territory, and -declared it independent and inviolate against aggression or conquest. -Should any such be attempted, the allies present were to help according -to their power. Your fathers rewarded us thus for the courage and -patriotism that we displayed at that perilous epoch; but you do just the -contrary, coming with our bitterest enemies, the Thebans, to enslave us. -We appeal, therefore, to the gods to whom the oaths were then made, to -the gods of your ancestors, and lastly to those of our country, and call -upon you to refrain from violating our territory or transgressing the -oaths, and to let us live independent, as Pausanias decreed." - -The Plataeans had got thus far when they were cut short by Archidamus -saying: "There is justice, Plataeans, in what you say, if you act up -to your words. According, to the grant of Pausanias, continue to -be independent yourselves, and join in freeing those of your fellow -countrymen who, after sharing in the perils of that period, joined in -the oaths to you, and are now subject to the Athenians; for it is to -free them and the rest that all this provision and war has been made. -I could wish that you would share our labours and abide by the oaths -yourselves; if this is impossible, do what we have already required of -you--remain neutral, enjoying your own; join neither side, but receive -both as friends, neither as allies for the war. With this we shall be -satisfied." Such were the words of Archidamus. The Plataeans, after -hearing what he had to say, went into the city and acquainted the people -with what had passed, and presently returned for answer that it was -impossible for them to do what he proposed without consulting the -Athenians, with whom their children and wives now were; besides which -they had their fears for the town. After his departure, what was to -prevent the Athenians from coming and taking it out of their hands, or -the Thebans, who would be included in the oaths, from taking advantage -of the proposed neutrality to make a second attempt to seize the city? -Upon these points he tried to reassure them by saying: "You have only to -deliver over the city and houses to us Lacedaemonians, to point out the -boundaries of your land, the number of your fruit-trees, and whatever -else can be numerically stated, and yourselves to withdraw wherever you -like as long as the war shall last. When it is over we will restore to -you whatever we received, and in the interim hold it in trust and keep -it in cultivation, paying you a sufficient allowance." - -When they had heard what he had to say, they re-entered the city, and -after consulting with the people said that they wished first to acquaint -the Athenians with this proposal, and in the event of their approving to -accede to it; in the meantime they asked him to grant them a truce and -not to lay waste their territory. He accordingly granted a truce for the -number of days requisite for the journey, and meanwhile abstained -from ravaging their territory. The Plataean envoys went to Athens, and -consulted with the Athenians, and returned with the following message -to those in the city: "The Athenians say, Plataeans, that they never -hitherto, since we became their allies, on any occasion abandoned us to -an enemy, nor will they now neglect us, but will help us according -to their ability; and they adjure you by the oaths which your fathers -swore, to keep the alliance unaltered." - -On the delivery of this message by the envoys, the Plataeans resolved -not to be unfaithful to the Athenians but to endure, if it must be, -seeing their lands laid waste and any other trials that might come to -them, and not to send out again, but to answer from the wall that it was -impossible for them to do as the Lacedaemonians proposed. As soon as -he had received this answer, King Archidamus proceeded first to make a -solemn appeal to the gods and heroes of the country in words following: -"Ye gods and heroes of the Plataean territory, be my witnesses that not -as aggressors originally, nor until these had first departed from the -common oath, did we invade this land, in which our fathers offered you -their prayers before defeating the Medes, and which you made auspicious -to the Hellenic arms; nor shall we be aggressors in the measures to -which we may now resort, since we have made many fair proposals but have -not been successful. Graciously accord that those who were the first -to offend may be punished for it, and that vengeance may be attained by -those who would righteously inflict it." - -After this appeal to the gods Archidamus put his army in motion. First -he enclosed the town with a palisade formed of the fruit-trees which -they cut down, to prevent further egress from Plataea; next they threw -up a mound against the city, hoping that the largeness of the -force employed would ensure the speedy reduction of the place. They -accordingly cut down timber from Cithaeron, and built it up on either -side, laying it like lattice-work to serve as a wall to keep the mound -from spreading abroad, and carried to it wood and stones and earth and -whatever other material might help to complete it. They continued to -work at the mound for seventy days and nights without intermission, -being divided into relief parties to allow of some being employed in -carrying while others took sleep and refreshment; the Lacedaemonian -officer attached to each contingent keeping the men to the work. But the -Plataeans, observing the progress of the mound, constructed a wall of -wood and fixed it upon that part of the city wall against which the -mound was being erected, and built up bricks inside it which they took -from the neighbouring houses. The timbers served to bind the building -together, and to prevent its becoming weak as it advanced in height; -it had also a covering of skins and hides, which protected the woodwork -against the attacks of burning missiles and allowed the men to work -in safety. Thus the wall was raised to a great height, and the mound -opposite made no less rapid progress. The Plataeans also thought of -another expedient; they pulled out part of the wall upon which the mound -abutted, and carried the earth into the city. - -Discovering this the Peloponnesians twisted up clay in wattles of reed -and threw it into the breach formed in the mound, in order to give it -consistency and prevent its being carried away like the soil. Stopped -in this way the Plataeans changed their mode of operation, and digging -a mine from the town calculated their way under the mound, and began to -carry off its material as before. This went on for a long while without -the enemy outside finding it out, so that for all they threw on the -top their mound made no progress in proportion, being carried away from -beneath and constantly settling down in the vacuum. But the Plataeans, -fearing that even thus they might not be able to hold out against the -superior numbers of the enemy, had yet another invention. They stopped -working at the large building in front of the mound, and starting at -either end of it inside from the old low wall, built a new one in the -form of a crescent running in towards the town; in order that in the -event of the great wall being taken this might remain, and the enemy -have to throw up a fresh mound against it, and as they advanced within -might not only have their trouble over again, but also be exposed to -missiles on their flanks. While raising the mound the Peloponnesians -also brought up engines against the city, one of which was brought up -upon the mound against the great building and shook down a good piece of -it, to the no small alarm of the Plataeans. Others were advanced -against different parts of the wall but were lassoed and broken by the -Plataeans; who also hung up great beams by long iron chains from either -extremity of two poles laid on the wall and projecting over it, and drew -them up at an angle whenever any point was threatened by the engine, -and loosing their hold let the beam go with its chains slack, so that it -fell with a run and snapped off the nose of the battering ram. - -After this the Peloponnesians, finding that their engines effected -nothing, and that their mound was met by the counterwork, concluded that -their present means of offence were unequal to the taking of the city, -and prepared for its circumvallation. First, however, they determined to -try the effects of fire and see whether they could not, with the help of -a wind, burn the town, as it was not a large one; indeed they thought of -every possible expedient by which the place might be reduced without the -expense of a blockade. They accordingly brought faggots of brushwood and -threw them from the mound, first into the space between it and the wall; -and this soon becoming full from the number of hands at work, they next -heaped the faggots up as far into the town as they could reach from the -top, and then lighted the wood by setting fire to it with sulphur and -pitch. The consequence was a fire greater than any one had ever yet seen -produced by human agency, though it could not of course be compared to -the spontaneous conflagrations sometimes known to occur through the wind -rubbing the branches of a mountain forest together. And this fire was -not only remarkable for its magnitude, but was also, at the end of so -many perils, within an ace of proving fatal to the Plataeans; a great -part of the town became entirely inaccessible, and had a wind blown upon -it, in accordance with the hopes of the enemy, nothing could have saved -them. As it was, there is also a story of heavy rain and thunder having -come on by which the fire was put out and the danger averted. - -Failing in this last attempt the Peloponnesians left a portion of -their forces on the spot, dismissing the rest, and built a wall of -circumvallation round the town, dividing the ground among the various -cities present; a ditch being made within and without the lines, from -which they got their bricks. All being finished by about the rising -of Arcturus, they left men enough to man half the wall, the rest being -manned by the Boeotians, and drawing off their army dispersed to their -several cities. The Plataeans had before sent off their wives and -children and oldest men and the mass of the non-combatants to Athens; so -that the number of the besieged left in the place comprised four hundred -of their own citizens, eighty Athenians, and a hundred and ten women -to bake their bread. This was the sum total at the commencement of the -siege, and there was no one else within the walls, bond or free. Such -were the arrangements made for the blockade of Plataea. - -The same summer and simultaneously with the expedition against Plataea, -the Athenians marched with two thousand heavy infantry and two hundred -horse against the Chalcidians in the direction of Thrace and the -Bottiaeans, just as the corn was getting ripe, under the command -of Xenophon, son of Euripides, with two colleagues. Arriving before -Spartolus in Bottiaea, they destroyed the corn and had some hopes of the -city coming over through the intrigues of a faction within. But those -of a different way of thinking had sent to Olynthus; and a garrison of -heavy infantry and other troops arrived accordingly. These issuing -from Spartolus were engaged by the Athenians in front of the town: the -Chalcidian heavy infantry, and some auxiliaries with them, were beaten -and retreated into Spartolus; but the Chalcidian horse and light troops -defeated the horse and light troops of the Athenians. The Chalcidians -had already a few targeteers from Crusis, and presently after the battle -were joined by some others from Olynthus; upon seeing whom the light -troops from Spartolus, emboldened by this accession and by their -previous success, with the help of the Chalcidian horse and the -reinforcement just arrived again attacked the Athenians, who retired -upon the two divisions which they had left with their baggage. Whenever -the Athenians advanced, their adversary gave way, pressing them with -missiles the instant they began to retire. The Chalcidian horse also, -riding up and charging them just as they pleased, at last caused a -panic amongst them and routed and pursued them to a great distance. The -Athenians took refuge in Potidaea, and afterwards recovered their dead -under truce, and returned to Athens with the remnant of their army; -four hundred and thirty men and all the generals having fallen. The -Chalcidians and Bottiaeans set up a trophy, took up their dead, and -dispersed to their several cities. - -The same summer, not long after this, the Ambraciots and Chaonians, -being desirous of reducing the whole of Acarnania and detaching it -from Athens, persuaded the Lacedaemonians to equip a fleet from -their confederacy and send a thousand heavy infantry to Acarnania, -representing that, if a combined movement were made by land and sea, -the coast Acarnanians would be unable to march, and the conquest -of Zacynthus and Cephallenia easily following on the possession of -Acarnania, the cruise round Peloponnese would be no longer so convenient -for the Athenians. Besides which there was a hope of taking Naupactus. -The Lacedaemonians accordingly at once sent off a few vessels with -Cnemus, who was still high admiral, and the heavy infantry on board; and -sent round orders for the fleet to equip as quickly as possible and sail -to Leucas. The Corinthians were the most forward in the business; the -Ambraciots being a colony of theirs. While the ships from Corinth, -Sicyon, and the neighbourhood were getting ready, and those from Leucas, -Anactorium, and Ambracia, which had arrived before, were waiting for -them at Leucas, Cnemus and his thousand heavy infantry had run into the -gulf, giving the slip to Phormio, the commander of the Athenian squadron -stationed off Naupactus, and began at once to prepare for the land -expedition. The Hellenic troops with him consisted of the Ambraciots, -Leucadians, and Anactorians, and the thousand Peloponnesians with whom -he came; the barbarian of a thousand Chaonians, who, belonging to a -nation that has no king, were led by Photys and Nicanor, the two members -of the royal family to whom the chieftainship for that year had been -confided. With the Chaonians came also some Thesprotians, like them -without a king, some Molossians and Atintanians led by Sabylinthus, the -guardian of King Tharyps who was still a minor, and some Paravaeans, -under their king Oroedus, accompanied by a thousand Orestians, subjects -of King Antichus and placed by him under the command of Oroedus. There -were also a thousand Macedonians sent by Perdiccas without the knowledge -of the Athenians, but they arrived too late. With this force Cnemus set -out, without waiting for the fleet from Corinth. Passing through -the territory of Amphilochian Argos, and sacking the open village of -Limnaea, they advanced to Stratus the Acarnanian capital; this once -taken, the rest of the country, they felt convinced, would speedily -follow. - -The Acarnanians, finding themselves invaded by a large army by land, and -from the sea threatened by a hostile fleet, made no combined attempt -at resistance, but remained to defend their homes, and sent for help to -Phormio, who replied that, when a fleet was on the point of sailing from -Corinth, it was impossible for him to leave Naupactus unprotected. The -Peloponnesians meanwhile and their allies advanced upon Stratus in three -divisions, with the intention of encamping near it and attempting the -wall by force if they failed to succeed by negotiation. The order of -march was as follows: the centre was occupied by the Chaonians and the -rest of the barbarians, with the Leucadians and Anactorians and -their followers on the right, and Cnemus with the Peloponnesians and -Ambraciots on the left; each division being a long way off from, and -sometimes even out of sight of, the others. The Hellenes advanced in -good order, keeping a look-out till they encamped in a good position; -but the Chaonians, filled with self-confidence, and having the highest -character for courage among the tribes of that part of the continent, -without waiting to occupy their camp, rushed on with the rest of the -barbarians, in the idea that they should take the town by assault and -obtain the sole glory of the enterprise. While they were coming on, the -Stratians, becoming aware how things stood, and thinking that the defeat -of this division would considerably dishearten the Hellenes behind it, -occupied the environs of the town with ambuscades, and as soon as -they approached engaged them at close quarters from the city and the -ambuscades. A panic seizing the Chaonians, great numbers of them -were slain; and as soon as they were seen to give way the rest of the -barbarians turned and fled. Owing to the distance by which their allies -had preceded them, neither of the Hellenic divisions knew anything of -the battle, but fancied they were hastening on to encamp. However, when -the flying barbarians broke in upon them, they opened their ranks to -receive them, brought their divisions together, and stopped quiet where -they were for the day; the Stratians not offering to engage them, as the -rest of the Acarnanians had not yet arrived, but contenting themselves -with slinging at them from a distance, which distressed them greatly, as -there was no stirring without their armour. The Acarnanians would seem -to excel in this mode of warfare. - -As soon as night fell, Cnemus hastily drew off his army to the river -Anapus, about nine miles from Stratus, recovering his dead next day -under truce, and being there joined by the friendly Oeniadae, fell back -upon their city before the enemy's reinforcements came up. From hence -each returned home; and the Stratians set up a trophy for the battle -with the barbarians. - -Meanwhile the fleet from Corinth and the rest of the confederates in the -Crissaean Gulf, which was to have co-operated with Cnemus and prevented -the coast Acarnanians from joining their countrymen in the interior, -was disabled from doing so by being compelled about the same time as the -battle at Stratus to fight with Phormio and the twenty Athenian vessels -stationed at Naupactus. For they were watched, as they coasted along out -of the gulf, by Phormio, who wished to attack in the open sea. But the -Corinthians and allies had started for Acarnania without any idea of -fighting at sea, and with vessels more like transports for carrying -soldiers; besides which, they never dreamed of the twenty Athenian ships -venturing to engage their forty-seven. However, while they were coasting -along their own shore, there were the Athenians sailing along in line -with them; and when they tried to cross over from Patrae in Achaea to -the mainland on the other side, on their way to Acarnania, they saw them -again coming out from Chalcis and the river Evenus to meet them. They -slipped from their moorings in the night, but were observed, and were at -length compelled to fight in mid passage. Each state that contributed -to the armament had its own general; the Corinthian commanders were -Machaon, Isocrates, and Agatharchidas. The Peloponnesians ranged their -vessels in as large a circle as possible without leaving an opening, -with the prows outside and the sterns in; and placed within all the -small craft in company, and their five best sailers to issue out at a -moment's notice and strengthen any point threatened by the enemy. - -The Athenians, formed in line, sailed round and round them, and forced -them to contract their circle, by continually brushing past and making -as though they would attack at once, having been previously cautioned -by Phormio not to do so till he gave the signal. His hope was that the -Peloponnesians would not retain their order like a force on shore, but -that the ships would fall foul of one another and the small craft cause -confusion; and if the wind should blow from the gulf (in expectation -of which he kept sailing round them, and which usually rose towards -morning), they would not, he felt sure, remain steady an instant. He -also thought that it rested with him to attack when he pleased, as his -ships were better sailers, and that an attack timed by the coming of the -wind would tell best. When the wind came down, the enemy's ships were -now in a narrow space, and what with the wind and the small craft -dashing against them, at once fell into confusion: ship fell foul of -ship, while the crews were pushing them off with poles, and by their -shouting, swearing, and struggling with one another, made captains' -orders and boatswains' cries alike inaudible, and through being unable -for want of practice to clear their oars in the rough water, prevented -the vessels from obeying their helmsmen properly. At this moment Phormio -gave the signal, and the Athenians attacked. Sinking first one of -the admirals, they then disabled all they came across, so that no one -thought of resistance for the confusion, but fled for Patrae and Dyme in -Achaea. The Athenians gave chase and captured twelve ships, and taking -most of the men out of them sailed to Molycrium, and after setting up -a trophy on the promontory of Rhium and dedicating a ship to Poseidon, -returned to Naupactus. As for the Peloponnesians, they at once sailed -with their remaining ships along the coast from Dyme and Patrae to -Cyllene, the Eleian arsenal; where Cnemus, and the ships from Leucas -that were to have joined them, also arrived after the battle at Stratus. - -The Lacedaemonians now sent to the fleet to Cnemus three -commissioners--Timocrates, Bradidas, and Lycophron--with orders to -prepare to engage again with better fortune, and not to be driven from -the sea by a few vessels; for they could not at all account for their -discomfiture, the less so as it was their first attempt at sea; and -they fancied that it was not that their marine was so inferior, but that -there had been misconduct somewhere, not considering the long experience -of the Athenians as compared with the little practice which they had had -themselves. The commissioners were accordingly sent in anger. As soon -as they arrived they set to work with Cnemus to order ships from the -different states, and to put those which they already had in fighting -order. Meanwhile Phormio sent word to Athens of their preparations and -his own victory, and desired as many ships as possible to be speedily -sent to him, as he stood in daily expectation of a battle. Twenty were -accordingly sent, but instructions were given to their commander to go -first to Crete. For Nicias, a Cretan of Gortys, who was proxenus of -the Athenians, had persuaded them to sail against Cydonia, promising -to procure the reduction of that hostile town; his real wish being to -oblige the Polichnitans, neighbours of the Cydonians. He accordingly -went with the ships to Crete, and, accompanied by the Polichnitans, -laid waste the lands of the Cydonians; and, what with adverse winds and -stress of weather wasted no little time there. - -While the Athenians were thus detained in Crete, the Peloponnesians in -Cyllene got ready for battle, and coasted along to Panormus in Achaea, -where their land army had come to support them. Phormio also coasted -along to Molycrian Rhium, and anchored outside it with twenty ships, -the same as he had fought with before. This Rhium was friendly to the -Athenians. The other, in Peloponnese, lies opposite to it; the sea -between them is about three-quarters of a mile broad, and forms the -mouth of the Crissaean gulf. At this, the Achaean Rhium, not far off -Panormus, where their army lay, the Peloponnesians now cast anchor with -seventy-seven ships, when they saw the Athenians do so. For six or seven -days they remained opposite each other, practising and preparing for the -battle; the one resolved not to sail out of the Rhia into the open sea, -for fear of the disaster which had already happened to them, the other -not to sail into the straits, thinking it advantageous to the enemy, to -fight in the narrows. At last Cnemus and Brasidas and the rest of the -Peloponnesian commanders, being desirous of bringing on a battle as -soon as possible, before reinforcements should arrive from Athens, and -noticing that the men were most of them cowed by the previous defeat and -out of heart for the business, first called them together and encouraged -them as follows: - -"Peloponnesians, the late engagement, which may have made some of you -afraid of the one now in prospect, really gives no just ground for -apprehension. Preparation for it, as you know, there was little enough; -and the object of our voyage was not so much to fight at sea as an -expedition by land. Besides this, the chances of war were largely -against us; and perhaps also inexperience had something to do with our -failure in our first naval action. It was not, therefore, cowardice that -produced our defeat, nor ought the determination which force has not -quelled, but which still has a word to say with its adversary, to lose -its edge from the result of an accident; but admitting the possibility -of a chance miscarriage, we should know that brave hearts must be always -brave, and while they remain so can never put forward inexperience as an -excuse for misconduct. Nor are you so behind the enemy in experience -as you are ahead of him in courage; and although the science of your -opponents would, if valour accompanied it, have also the presence of -mind to carry out at in emergency the lesson it has learnt, yet a faint -heart will make all art powerless in the face of danger. For fear takes -away presence of mind, and without valour art is useless. Against their -superior experience set your superior daring, and against the fear -induced by defeat the fact of your having been then unprepared; -remember, too, that you have always the advantage of superior numbers, -and of engaging off your own coast, supported by your heavy infantry; -and as a rule, numbers and equipment give victory. At no point, -therefore, is defeat likely; and as for our previous mistakes, the very -fact of their occurrence will teach us better for the future. Steersmen -and sailors may, therefore, confidently attend to their several duties, -none quitting the station assigned to them: as for ourselves, we -promise to prepare for the engagement at least as well as your previous -commanders, and to give no excuse for any one misconducting himself. -Should any insist on doing so, he shall meet with the punishment he -deserves, while the brave shall be honoured with the appropriate rewards -of valour." - -The Peloponnesian commanders encouraged their men after this fashion. -Phormio, meanwhile, being himself not without fears for the courage of -his men, and noticing that they were forming in groups among themselves -and were alarmed at the odds against them, desired to call them together -and give them confidence and counsel in the present emergency. He had -before continually told them, and had accustomed their minds to the -idea, that there was no numerical superiority that they could not face; -and the men themselves had long been persuaded that Athenians need never -retire before any quantity of Peloponnesian vessels. At the moment, -however, he saw that they were dispirited by the sight before them, and -wishing to refresh their confidence, called them together and spoke as -follows: - -"I see, my men, that you are frightened by the number of the enemy, and -I have accordingly called you together, not liking you to be afraid of -what is not really terrible. In the first place, the Peloponnesians, -already defeated, and not even themselves thinking that they are a match -for us, have not ventured to meet us on equal terms, but have equipped -this multitude of ships against us. Next, as to that upon which they -most rely, the courage which they suppose constitutional to them, their -confidence here only arises from the success which their experience in -land service usually gives them, and which they fancy will do the same -for them at sea. But this advantage will in all justice belong to us -on this element, if to them on that; as they are not superior to us -in courage, but we are each of us more confident, according to our -experience in our particular department. Besides, as the Lacedaemonians -use their supremacy over their allies to promote their own glory, they -are most of them being brought into danger against their will, or they -would never, after such a decided defeat, have ventured upon a fresh -engagement. You need not, therefore, be afraid of their dash. You, on -the contrary, inspire a much greater and better founded alarm, both -because of your late victory and also of their belief that we should not -face them unless about to do something worthy of a success so signal. -An adversary numerically superior, like the one before us, comes into -action trusting more to strength than to resolution; while he who -voluntarily confronts tremendous odds must have very great internal -resources to draw upon. For these reasons the Peloponnesians fear -our irrational audacity more than they would ever have done a more -commensurate preparation. Besides, many armaments have before now -succumbed to an inferior through want of skill or sometimes of courage; -neither of which defects certainly are ours. As to the battle, it shall -not be, if I can help it, in the strait, nor will I sail in there at -all; seeing that in a contest between a number of clumsily managed -vessels and a small, fast, well-handled squadron, want of sea room is -an undoubted disadvantage. One cannot run down an enemy properly without -having a sight of him a good way off, nor can one retire at need when -pressed; one can neither break the line nor return upon his rear, the -proper tactics for a fast sailer; but the naval action necessarily -becomes a land one, in which numbers must decide the matter. For all -this I will provide as far as can be. Do you stay at your posts by your -ships, and be sharp at catching the word of command, the more so as we -are observing one another from so short a distance; and in action think -order and silence all-important--qualities useful in war generally, and -in naval engagements in particular; and behave before the enemy in a -manner worthy of your past exploits. The issues you will fight for are -great--to destroy the naval hopes of the Peloponnesians or to bring -nearer to the Athenians their fears for the sea. And I may once more -remind you that you have defeated most of them already; and beaten men -do not face a danger twice with the same determination." - -Such was the exhortation of Phormio. The Peloponnesians finding that the -Athenians did not sail into the gulf and the narrows, in order to lead -them in whether they wished it or not, put out at dawn, and forming four -abreast, sailed inside the gulf in the direction of their own country, -the right wing leading as they had lain at anchor. In this wing were -placed twenty of their best sailers; so that in the event of Phormio -thinking that their object was Naupactus, and coasting along thither to -save the place, the Athenians might not be able to escape their onset -by getting outside their wing, but might be cut off by the vessels in -question. As they expected, Phormio, in alarm for the place at that -moment emptied of its garrison, as soon as he saw them put out, -reluctantly and hurriedly embarked and sailed along shore; the Messenian -land forces moving along also to support him. The Peloponnesians seeing -him coasting along with his ships in single file, and by this inside -the gulf and close inshore as they so much wished, at one signal tacked -suddenly and bore down in line at their best speed on the Athenians, -hoping to cut off the whole squadron. The eleven leading vessels, -however, escaped the Peloponnesian wing and its sudden movement, and -reached the more open water; but the rest were overtaken as they tried -to run through, driven ashore and disabled; such of the crews being -slain as had not swum out of them. Some of the ships the Peloponnesians -lashed to their own, and towed off empty; one they took with the men -in it; others were just being towed off, when they were saved by the -Messenians dashing into the sea with their armour and fighting from the -decks that they had boarded. - -Thus far victory was with the Peloponnesians, and the Athenian fleet -destroyed; the twenty ships in the right wing being meanwhile in chase -of the eleven Athenian vessels that had escaped their sudden movement -and reached the more open water. These, with the exception of one -ship, all outsailed them and got safe into Naupactus, and forming close -inshore opposite the temple of Apollo, with their prows facing the -enemy, prepared to defend themselves in case the Peloponnesians should -sail inshore against them. After a while the Peloponnesians came up, -chanting the paean for their victory as they sailed on; the single -Athenian ship remaining being chased by a Leucadian far ahead of the -rest. But there happened to be a merchantman lying at anchor in the -roadstead, which the Athenian ship found time to sail round, and struck -the Leucadian in chase amidships and sank her. An exploit so sudden and -unexpected produced a panic among the Peloponnesians; and having fallen -out of order in the excitement of victory, some of them dropped their -oars and stopped their way in order to let the main body come up--an -unsafe thing to do considering how near they were to the enemy's prows; -while others ran aground in the shallows, in their ignorance of the -localities. - -Elated at this incident, the Athenians at one word gave a cheer, and -dashed at the enemy, who, embarrassed by his mistakes and the disorder -in which he found himself, only stood for an instant, and then fled for -Panormus, whence he had put out. The Athenians following on his heels -took the six vessels nearest them, and recovered those of their own -which had been disabled close inshore and taken in tow at the beginning -of the action; they killed some of the crews and took some prisoners. -On board the Leucadian which went down off the merchantman, was the -Lacedaemonian Timocrates, who killed himself when the ship was sunk, and -was cast up in the harbour of Naupactus. The Athenians on their return -set up a trophy on the spot from which they had put out and turned the -day, and picking up the wrecks and dead that were on their shore, gave -back to the enemy their dead under truce. The Peloponnesians also set -up a trophy as victors for the defeat inflicted upon the ships they -had disabled in shore, and dedicated the vessel which they had taken at -Achaean Rhium, side by side with the trophy. After this, apprehensive of -the reinforcement expected from Athens, all except the Leucadians sailed -into the Crissaean Gulf for Corinth. Not long after their retreat, the -twenty Athenian ships, which were to have joined Phormio before the -battle, arrived at Naupactus. - -Thus the summer ended. Winter was now at hand; but dispersing the fleet, -which had retired to Corinth and the Crissaean Gulf, Cnemus, Brasidas, -and the other Peloponnesian captains allowed themselves to be persuaded -by the Megarians to make an attempt upon Piraeus, the port of Athens, -which from her decided superiority at sea had been naturally left -unguarded and open. Their plan was as follows: The men were each to take -their oar, cushion, and rowlock thong, and, going overland from Corinth -to the sea on the Athenian side, to get to Megara as quickly as they -could, and launching forty vessels, which happened to be in the docks at -Nisaea, to sail at once to Piraeus. There was no fleet on the look-out -in the harbour, and no one had the least idea of the enemy attempting -a surprise; while an open attack would, it was thought, never be -deliberately ventured on, or, if in contemplation, would be speedily -known at Athens. Their plan formed, the next step was to put it in -execution. Arriving by night and launching the vessels from Nisaea, they -sailed, not to Piraeus as they had originally intended, being afraid -of the risk, besides which there was some talk of a wind having stopped -them, but to the point of Salamis that looks towards Megara; where there -was a fort and a squadron of three ships to prevent anything sailing in -or out of Megara. This fort they assaulted, and towed off the galleys -empty, and surprising the inhabitants began to lay waste the rest of the -island. - -Meanwhile fire signals were raised to alarm Athens, and a panic ensued -there as serious as any that occurred during the war. The idea in the -city was that the enemy had already sailed into Piraeus: in Piraeus it -was thought that they had taken Salamis and might at any moment arrive -in the port; as indeed might easily have been done if their hearts had -been a little firmer: certainly no wind would have prevented them. As -soon as day broke, the Athenians assembled in full force, launched their -ships, and embarking in haste and uproar went with the fleet to Salamis, -while their soldiery mounted guard in Piraeus. The Peloponnesians, on -becoming aware of the coming relief, after they had overrun most of -Salamis, hastily sailed off with their plunder and captives and the -three ships from Fort Budorum to Nisaea; the state of their ships also -causing them some anxiety, as it was a long while since they had -been launched, and they were not water-tight. Arrived at Megara, they -returned back on foot to Corinth. The Athenians finding them no longer -at Salamis, sailed back themselves; and after this made arrangements for -guarding Piraeus more diligently in future, by closing the harbours, and -by other suitable precautions. - -About the same time, at the beginning of this winter, Sitalces, son -of Teres, the Odrysian king of Thrace, made an expedition against -Perdiccas, son of Alexander, king of Macedonia, and the Chalcidians in -the neighbourhood of Thrace; his object being to enforce one promise and -fulfil another. On the one hand Perdiccas had made him a promise, -when hard pressed at the commencement of the war, upon condition that -Sitalces should reconcile the Athenians to him and not attempt to -restore his brother and enemy, the pretender Philip, but had not offered -to fulfil his engagement; on the other he, Sitalces, on entering into -alliance with the Athenians, had agreed to put an end to the Chalcidian -war in Thrace. These were the two objects of his invasion. With him he -brought Amyntas, the son of Philip, whom he destined for the throne of -Macedonia, and some Athenian envoys then at his court on this business, -and Hagnon as general; for the Athenians were to join him against -the Chalcidians with a fleet and as many soldiers as they could get -together. - -Beginning with the Odrysians, he first called out the Thracian tribes -subject to him between Mounts Haemus and Rhodope and the Euxine and -Hellespont; next the Getae beyond Haemus, and the other hordes settled -south of the Danube in the neighbourhood of the Euxine, who, like the -Getae, border on the Scythians and are armed in the same manner, being -all mounted archers. Besides these he summoned many of the hill Thracian -independent swordsmen, called Dii and mostly inhabiting Mount Rhodope, -some of whom came as mercenaries, others as volunteers; also the -Agrianes and Laeaeans, and the rest of the Paeonian tribes in his -empire, at the confines of which these lay, extending up to the Laeaean -Paeonians and the river Strymon, which flows from Mount Scombrus through -the country of the Agrianes and Laeaeans; there the empire of Sitalces -ends and the territory of the independent Paeonians begins. Bordering -on the Triballi, also independent, were the Treres and Tilataeans, who -dwell to the north of Mount Scombrus and extend towards the setting sun -as far as the river Oskius. This river rises in the same mountains -as the Nestus and Hebrus, a wild and extensive range connected with -Rhodope. - -The empire of the Odrysians extended along the seaboard from Abdera to -the mouth of the Danube in the Euxine. The navigation of this coast by -the shortest route takes a merchantman four days and four nights with -a wind astern the whole way: by land an active man, travelling by the -shortest road, can get from Abdera to the Danube in eleven days. Such -was the length of its coast line. Inland from Byzantium to the Laeaeans -and the Strymon, the farthest limit of its extension into the interior, -it is a journey of thirteen days for an active man. The tribute from -all the barbarian districts and the Hellenic cities, taking what they -brought in under Seuthes, the successor of Sitalces, who raised it to -its greatest height, amounted to about four hundred talents in gold and -silver. There were also presents in gold and silver to a no less amount, -besides stuff, plain and embroidered, and other articles, made not only -for the king, but also for the Odrysian lords and nobles. For there was -here established a custom opposite to that prevailing in the Persian -kingdom, namely, of taking rather than giving; more disgrace being -attached to not giving when asked than to asking and being refused; -and although this prevailed elsewhere in Thrace, it was practised most -extensively among the powerful Odrysians, it being impossible to get -anything done without a present. It was thus a very powerful kingdom; -in revenue and general prosperity surpassing all in Europe between the -Ionian Gulf and the Euxine, and in numbers and military resources coming -decidedly next to the Scythians, with whom indeed no people in Europe -can bear comparison, there not being even in Asia any nation singly a -match for them if unanimous, though of course they are not on a level -with other races in general intelligence and the arts of civilized life. - -It was the master of this empire that now prepared to take the field. -When everything was ready, he set out on his march for Macedonia, first -through his own dominions, next over the desolate range of Cercine that -divides the Sintians and Paeonians, crossing by a road which he had made -by felling the timber on a former campaign against the latter people. -Passing over these mountains, with the Paeonians on his right and the -Sintians and Maedians on the left, he finally arrived at Doberus, -in Paeonia, losing none of his army on the march, except perhaps by -sickness, but receiving some augmentations, many of the independent -Thracians volunteering to join him in the hope of plunder; so that -the whole is said to have formed a grand total of a hundred and fifty -thousand. Most of this was infantry, though there was about a third -cavalry, furnished principally by the Odrysians themselves and next to -them by the Getae. The most warlike of the infantry were the independent -swordsmen who came down from Rhodope; the rest of the mixed multitude -that followed him being chiefly formidable by their numbers. - -Assembling in Doberus, they prepared for descending from the heights -upon Lower Macedonia, where the dominions of Perdiccas lay; for the -Lyncestae, Elimiots, and other tribes more inland, though Macedonians by -blood, and allies and dependants of their kindred, still have their -own separate governments. The country on the sea coast, now called -Macedonia, was first acquired by Alexander, the father of Perdiccas, and -his ancestors, originally Temenids from Argos. This was effected by the -expulsion from Pieria of the Pierians, who afterwards inhabited Phagres -and other places under Mount Pangaeus, beyond the Strymon (indeed the -country between Pangaeus and the sea is still called the Pierian Gulf); -of the Bottiaeans, at present neighbours of the Chalcidians, from -Bottia, and by the acquisition in Paeonia of a narrow strip along the -river Axius extending to Pella and the sea; the district of Mygdonia, -between the Axius and the Strymon, being also added by the expulsion of -the Edonians. From Eordia also were driven the Eordians, most of -whom perished, though a few of them still live round Physca, and -the Almopians from Almopia. These Macedonians also conquered places -belonging to the other tribes, which are still theirs--Anthemus, -Crestonia, Bisaltia, and much of Macedonia proper. The whole is -now called Macedonia, and at the time of the invasion of Sitalces, -Perdiccas, Alexander's son, was the reigning king. - -These Macedonians, unable to take the field against so numerous an -invader, shut themselves up in such strong places and fortresses as the -country possessed. Of these there was no great number, most of those now -found in the country having been erected subsequently by Archelaus, the -son of Perdiccas, on his accession, who also cut straight roads, and -otherwise put the kingdom on a better footing as regards horses, heavy -infantry, and other war material than had been done by all the eight -kings that preceded him. Advancing from Doberus, the Thracian host first -invaded what had been once Philip's government, and took Idomene by -assault, Gortynia, Atalanta, and some other places by negotiation, these -last coming over for love of Philip's son, Amyntas, then with Sitalces. -Laying siege to Europus, and failing to take it, he next advanced into -the rest of Macedonia to the left of Pella and Cyrrhus, not proceeding -beyond this into Bottiaea and Pieria, but staying to lay waste Mygdonia, -Crestonia, and Anthemus. - -The Macedonians never even thought of meeting him with infantry; but the -Thracian host was, as opportunity offered, attacked by handfuls of their -horse, which had been reinforced from their allies in the interior. -Armed with cuirasses, and excellent horsemen, wherever these charged -they overthrew all before them, but ran considerable risk in entangling -themselves in the masses of the enemy, and so finally desisted from -these efforts, deciding that they were not strong enough to venture -against numbers so superior. - -Meanwhile Sitalces opened negotiations with Perdiccas on the objects of -his expedition; and finding that the Athenians, not believing that he -would come, did not appear with their fleet, though they sent presents -and envoys, dispatched a large part of his army against the Chalcidians -and Bottiaeans, and shutting them up inside their walls laid waste their -country. While he remained in these parts, the people farther south, -such as the Thessalians, Magnetes, and the other tribes subject to the -Thessalians, and the Hellenes as far as Thermopylae, all feared that the -army might advance against them, and prepared accordingly. These fears -were shared by the Thracians beyond the Strymon to the north, who -inhabited the plains, such as the Panaeans, the Odomanti, the Droi, -and the Dersaeans, all of whom are independent. It was even matter of -conversation among the Hellenes who were enemies of Athens whether he -might not be invited by his ally to advance also against them. Meanwhile -he held Chalcidice and Bottice and Macedonia, and was ravaging them -all; but finding that he was not succeeding in any of the objects of -his invasion, and that his army was without provisions and was suffering -from the severity of the season, he listened to the advice of Seuthes, -son of Spardacus, his nephew and highest officer, and decided to retreat -without delay. This Seuthes had been secretly gained by Perdiccas by the -promise of his sister in marriage with a rich dowry. In accordance with -this advice, and after a stay of thirty days in all, eight of which -were spent in Chalcidice, he retired home as quickly as he could; and -Perdiccas afterwards gave his sister Stratonice to Seuthes as he had -promised. Such was the history of the expedition of Sitalces. - -In the course of this winter, after the dispersion of the Peloponnesian -fleet, the Athenians in Naupactus, under Phormio, coasted along to -Astacus and disembarked, and marched into the interior of Acarnania with -four hundred Athenian heavy infantry and four hundred Messenians. -After expelling some suspected persons from Stratus, Coronta, and other -places, and restoring Cynes, son of Theolytus, to Coronta, they returned -to their ships, deciding that it was impossible in the winter season to -march against Oeniadae, a place which, unlike the rest of Acarnania, had -been always hostile to them; for the river Achelous flowing from Mount -Pindus through Dolopia and the country of the Agraeans and Amphilochians -and the plain of Acarnania, past the town of Stratus in the upper part -of its course, forms lakes where it falls into the sea round Oeniadae, -and thus makes it impracticable for an army in winter by reason of the -water. Opposite to Oeniadae lie most of the islands called Echinades, -so close to the mouths of the Achelous that that powerful stream is -constantly forming deposits against them, and has already joined some -of the islands to the continent, and seems likely in no long while to do -the same with the rest. For the current is strong, deep, and turbid, -and the islands are so thick together that they serve to imprison the -alluvial deposit and prevent its dispersing, lying, as they do, not -in one line, but irregularly, so as to leave no direct passage for the -water into the open sea. The islands in question are uninhabited and of -no great size. There is also a story that Alcmaeon, son of Amphiraus, -during his wanderings after the murder of his mother was bidden by -Apollo to inhabit this spot, through an oracle which intimated that he -would have no release from his terrors until he should find a country to -dwell in which had not been seen by the sun, or existed as land at -the time he slew his mother; all else being to him polluted ground. -Perplexed at this, the story goes on to say, he at last observed this -deposit of the Achelous, and considered that a place sufficient to -support life upon, might have been thrown up during the long interval -that had elapsed since the death of his mother and the beginning of -his wanderings. Settling, therefore, in the district round Oeniadae, he -founded a dominion, and left the country its name from his son Acarnan. -Such is the story we have received concerning Alcmaeon. - -The Athenians and Phormio putting back from Acarnania and arriving at -Naupactus, sailed home to Athens in the spring, taking with them the -ships that they had captured, and such of the prisoners made in the late -actions as were freemen; who were exchanged, man for man. And so ended -this winter, and the third year of this war, of which Thucydides was the -historian. - - - - -BOOK III - -CHAPTER IX - -_Fourth and Fifth Years of the War--Revolt of Mitylene_ - -The next summer, just as the corn was getting ripe, the Peloponnesians -and their allies invaded Attica under the command of Archidamus, son -of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, and sat down and ravaged -the land; the Athenian horse as usual attacking them, wherever it was -practicable, and preventing the mass of the light troops from advancing -from their camp and wasting the parts near the city. After staying -the time for which they had taken provisions, the invaders retired and -dispersed to their several cities. - -Immediately after the invasion of the Peloponnesians all Lesbos, except -Methymna, revolted from the Athenians. The Lesbians had wished to revolt -even before the war, but the Lacedaemonians would not receive them; and -yet now when they did revolt, they were compelled to do so sooner than -they had intended. While they were waiting until the moles for their -harbours and the ships and walls that they had in building should be -finished, and for the arrival of archers and corn and other things that -they were engaged in fetching from the Pontus, the Tenedians, with whom -they were at enmity, and the Methymnians, and some factious persons in -Mitylene itself, who were proxeni of Athens, informed the Athenians -that the Mitylenians were forcibly uniting the island under their -sovereignty, and that the preparations about which they were so -active, were all concerted with the Boeotians their kindred and the -Lacedaemonians with a view to a revolt, and that, unless they were -immediately prevented, Athens would lose Lesbos. - -However, the Athenians, distressed by the plague, and by the war that -had recently broken out and was now raging, thought it a serious matter -to add Lesbos with its fleet and untouched resources to the list of -their enemies; and at first would not believe the charge, giving too -much weight to their wish that it might not be true. But when an embassy -which they sent had failed to persuade the Mitylenians to give up the -union and preparations complained of, they became alarmed, and resolved -to strike the first blow. They accordingly suddenly sent off forty ships -that had been got ready to sail round Peloponnese, under the command -of Cleippides, son of Deinias, and two others; word having been brought -them of a festival in honour of the Malean Apollo outside the town, -which is kept by the whole people of Mitylene, and at which, if haste -were made, they might hope to take them by surprise. If this plan -succeeded, well and good; if not, they were to order the Mitylenians to -deliver up their ships and to pull down their walls, and if they did not -obey, to declare war. The ships accordingly set out; the ten galleys, -forming the contingent of the Mitylenians present with the fleet -according to the terms of the alliance, being detained by the Athenians, -and their crews placed in custody. However, the Mitylenians were -informed of the expedition by a man who crossed from Athens to Euboea, -and going overland to Geraestus, sailed from thence by a merchantman -which he found on the point of putting to sea, and so arrived at -Mitylene the third day after leaving Athens. The Mitylenians accordingly -refrained from going out to the temple at Malea, and moreover barricaded -and kept guard round the half-finished parts of their walls and -harbours. - -When the Athenians sailed in not long after and saw how things stood, -the generals delivered their orders, and upon the Mitylenians refusing -to obey, commenced hostilities. The Mitylenians, thus compelled to go to -war without notice and unprepared, at first sailed out with their fleet -and made some show of fighting, a little in front of the harbour; but -being driven back by the Athenian ships, immediately offered to treat -with the commanders, wishing, if possible, to get the ships away for the -present upon any tolerable terms. The Athenian commanders accepted their -offers, being themselves fearful that they might not be able to cope -with the whole of Lesbos; and an armistice having been concluded, the -Mitylenians sent to Athens one of the informers, already repentant of -his conduct, and others with him, to try to persuade the Athenians of -the innocence of their intentions and to get the fleet recalled. In the -meantime, having no great hope of a favourable answer from Athens, they -also sent off a galley with envoys to Lacedaemon, unobserved by the -Athenian fleet which was anchored at Malea to the north of the town. - -While these envoys, reaching Lacedaemon after a difficult journey -across the open sea, were negotiating for succours being sent them, the -ambassadors from Athens returned without having effected anything; -and hostilities were at once begun by the Mitylenians and the rest of -Lesbos, with the exception of the Methymnians, who came to the aid of -the Athenians with the Imbrians and Lemnians and some few of the other -allies. The Mitylenians made a sortie with all their forces against the -Athenian camp; and a battle ensued, in which they gained some slight -advantage, but retired notwithstanding, not feeling sufficient -confidence in themselves to spend the night upon the field. After -this they kept quiet, wishing to wait for the chance of reinforcements -arriving from Peloponnese before making a second venture, being -encouraged by the arrival of Meleas, a Laconian, and Hermaeondas, a -Theban, who had been sent off before the insurrection but had been -unable to reach Lesbos before the Athenian expedition, and who now stole -in in a galley after the battle, and advised them to send another galley -and envoys back with them, which the Mitylenians accordingly did. - -Meanwhile the Athenians, greatly encouraged by the inaction of the -Mitylenians, summoned allies to their aid, who came in all the quicker -from seeing so little vigour displayed by the Lesbians, and bringing -round their ships to a new station to the south of the town, fortified -two camps, one on each side of the city, and instituted a blockade of -both the harbours. The sea was thus closed against the Mitylenians, who, -however, commanded the whole country, with the rest of the Lesbians who -had now joined them; the Athenians only holding a limited area round -their camps, and using Malea more as the station for their ships and -their market. - -While the war went on in this way at Mitylene, the Athenians, about the -same time in this summer, also sent thirty ships to Peloponnese under -Asopius, son of Phormio; the Acarnanians insisting that the commander -sent should be some son or relative of Phormio. As the ships coasted -along shore they ravaged the seaboard of Laconia; after which Asopius -sent most of the fleet home, and himself went on with twelve vessels to -Naupactus, and afterwards raising the whole Acarnanian population made -an expedition against Oeniadae, the fleet sailing along the Achelous, -while the army laid waste the country. The inhabitants, however, showing -no signs of submitting, he dismissed the land forces and himself sailed -to Leucas, and making a descent upon Nericus was cut off during his -retreat, and most of his troops with him, by the people in those parts -aided by some coastguards; after which the Athenians sailed away, -recovering their dead from the Leucadians under truce. - -Meanwhile the envoys of the Mitylenians sent out in the first ship were -told by the Lacedaemonians to come to Olympia, in order that the rest -of the allies might hear them and decide upon their matter, and so they -journeyed thither. It was the Olympiad in which the Rhodian Dorieus -gained his second victory, and the envoys having been introduced to make -their speech after the festival, spoke as follows: - -"Lacedaemonians and allies, the rule established among the Hellenes -is not unknown to us. Those who revolt in war and forsake their former -confederacy are favourably regarded by those who receive them, in so -far as they are of use to them, but otherwise are thought less well of, -through being considered traitors to their former friends. Nor is this -an unfair way of judging, where the rebels and the power from whom they -secede are at one in policy and sympathy, and a match for each other -in resources and power, and where no reasonable ground exists for the -rebellion. But with us and the Athenians this was not the case; and no -one need think the worse of us for revolting from them in danger, after -having been honoured by them in time of peace. - -"Justice and honesty will be the first topics of our speech, especially -as we are asking for alliance; because we know that there can never be -any solid friendship between individuals, or union between communities -that is worth the name, unless the parties be persuaded of each other's -honesty, and be generally congenial the one to the other; since from -difference in feeling springs also difference in conduct. Between -ourselves and the Athenians alliance began, when you withdrew from the -Median War and they remained to finish the business. But we did not -become allies of the Athenians for the subjugation of the Hellenes, but -allies of the Hellenes for their liberation from the Mede; and as long -as the Athenians led us fairly we followed them loyally; but when we saw -them relax their hostility to the Mede, to try to compass the subjection -of the allies, then our apprehensions began. Unable, however, to unite -and defend themselves, on account of the number of confederates that had -votes, all the allies were enslaved, except ourselves and the Chians, -who continued to send our contingents as independent and nominally free. -Trust in Athens as a leader, however, we could no longer feel, judging -by the examples already given; it being unlikely that she would reduce -our fellow confederates, and not do the same by us who were left, if -ever she had the power. - -"Had we all been still independent, we could have had more faith in -their not attempting any change; but the greater number being their -subjects, while they were treating us as equals, they would naturally -chafe under this solitary instance of independence as contrasted with -the submission of the majority; particularly as they daily grew more -powerful, and we more destitute. Now the only sure basis of an alliance -is for each party to be equally afraid of the other; he who would like -to encroach is then deterred by the reflection that he will not have -odds in his favour. Again, if we were left independent, it was only -because they thought they saw their way to empire more clearly by -specious language and by the paths of policy than by those of force. -Not only were we useful as evidence that powers who had votes, like -themselves, would not, surely, join them in their expeditions, against -their will, without the party attacked being in the wrong; but the same -system also enabled them to lead the stronger states against the weaker -first, and so to leave the former to the last, stripped of their natural -allies, and less capable of resistance. But if they had begun with us, -while all the states still had their resources under their own control, -and there was a centre to rally round, the work of subjugation would -have been found less easy. Besides this, our navy gave them some -apprehension: it was always possible that it might unite with you or -with some other power, and become dangerous to Athens. The court which -we paid to their commons and its leaders for the time being also helped -us to maintain our independence. However, we did not expect to be able -to do so much longer, if this war had not broken out, from the examples -that we had had of their conduct to the rest. - -"How then could we put our trust in such friendship or freedom as we -had here? We accepted each other against our inclination; fear made them -court us in war, and us them in peace; sympathy, the ordinary basis of -confidence, had its place supplied by terror, fear having more share -than friendship in detaining us in the alliance; and the first party -that should be encouraged by the hope of impunity was certain to break -faith with the other. So that to condemn us for being the first to break -off, because they delay the blow that we dread, instead of ourselves -delaying to know for certain whether it will be dealt or not, is to take -a false view of the case. For if we were equally able with them to -meet their plots and imitate their delay, we should be their equals and -should be under no necessity of being their subjects; but the liberty of -offence being always theirs, that of defence ought clearly to be ours. - -"Such, Lacedaemonians and allies, are the grounds and the reasons of -our revolt; clear enough to convince our hearers of the fairness of our -conduct, and sufficient to alarm ourselves, and to make us turn to some -means of safety. This we wished to do long ago, when we sent to you on -the subject while the peace yet lasted, but were balked by your refusing -to receive us; and now, upon the Boeotians inviting us, we at once -responded to the call, and decided upon a twofold revolt, from the -Hellenes and from the Athenians, not to aid the latter in harming the -former, but to join in their liberation, and not to allow the Athenians -in the end to destroy us, but to act in time against them. Our revolt, -however, has taken place prematurely and without preparation--a fact -which makes it all the more incumbent on you to receive us into alliance -and to send us speedy relief, in order to show that you support your -friends, and at the same time do harm to your enemies. You have an -opportunity such as you never had before. Disease and expenditure have -wasted the Athenians: their ships are either cruising round your coasts, -or engaged in blockading us; and it is not probable that they will have -any to spare, if you invade them a second time this summer by sea and -land; but they will either offer no resistance to your vessels, or -withdraw from both our shores. Nor must it be thought that this is a -case of putting yourselves into danger for a country which is not yours. -Lesbos may appear far off, but when help is wanted she will be found -near enough. It is not in Attica that the war will be decided, as some -imagine, but in the countries by which Attica is supported; and the -Athenian revenue is drawn from the allies, and will become still larger -if they reduce us; as not only will no other state revolt, but our -resources will be added to theirs, and we shall be treated worse than -those that were enslaved before. But if you will frankly support us, you -will add to your side a state that has a large navy, which is your -great want; you will smooth the way to the overthrow of the Athenians by -depriving them of their allies, who will be greatly encouraged to come -over; and you will free yourselves from the imputation made against -you, of not supporting insurrection. In short, only show yourselves as -liberators, and you may count upon having the advantage in the war. - -"Respect, therefore, the hopes placed in you by the Hellenes, and that -Olympian Zeus, in whose temple we stand as very suppliants; become the -allies and defenders of the Mitylenians, and do not sacrifice us, who -put our lives upon the hazard, in a cause in which general good will -result to all from our success, and still more general harm if we fail -through your refusing to help us; but be the men that the Hellenes think -you, and our fears desire." - -Such were the words of the Mitylenians. After hearing them out, the -Lacedaemonians and confederates granted what they urged, and took -the Lesbians into alliance, and deciding in favour of the invasion of -Attica, told the allies present to march as quickly as possible to -the Isthmus with two-thirds of their forces; and arriving there first -themselves, got ready hauling machines to carry their ships across from -Corinth to the sea on the side of Athens, in order to make their attack -by sea and land at once. However, the zeal which they displayed was not -imitated by the rest of the confederates, who came in but slowly, being -engaged in harvesting their corn and sick of making expeditions. - -Meanwhile the Athenians, aware that the preparations of the enemy were -due to his conviction of their weakness, and wishing to show him that he -was mistaken, and that they were able, without moving the Lesbian fleet, -to repel with ease that with which they were menaced from Peloponnese, -manned a hundred ships by embarking the citizens of Athens, except the -knights and Pentacosiomedimni, and the resident aliens; and putting -out to the Isthmus, displayed their power, and made descents upon -Peloponnese wherever they pleased. A disappointment so signal made the -Lacedaemonians think that the Lesbians had not spoken the truth; and -embarrassed by the non-appearance of the confederates, coupled with the -news that the thirty ships round Peloponnese were ravaging the lands -near Sparta, they went back home. Afterwards, however, they got ready -a fleet to send to Lesbos, and ordering a total of forty ships from -the different cities in the league, appointed Alcidas to command the -expedition in his capacity of high admiral. Meanwhile the Athenians in -the hundred ships, upon seeing the Lacedaemonians go home, went home -likewise. - -If, at the time that this fleet was at sea, Athens had almost the -largest number of first-rate ships in commission that she ever possessed -at any one moment, she had as many or even more when the war began. At -that time one hundred guarded Attica, Euboea, and Salamis; a hundred -more were cruising round Peloponnese, besides those employed at Potidaea -and in other places; making a grand total of two hundred and fifty -vessels employed on active service in a single summer. It was this, with -Potidaea, that most exhausted her revenues--Potidaea being blockaded -by a force of heavy infantry (each drawing two drachmae a day, one for -himself and another for his servant), which amounted to three thousand -at first, and was kept at this number down to the end of the siege; -besides sixteen hundred with Phormio who went away before it was over; -and the ships being all paid at the same rate. In this way her money was -wasted at first; and this was the largest number of ships ever manned by -her. - -About the same time that the Lacedaemonians were at the Isthmus, the -Mitylenians marched by land with their mercenaries against Methymna, -which they thought to gain by treachery. After assaulting the town, and -not meeting with the success that they anticipated, they withdrew to -Antissa, Pyrrha, and Eresus; and taking measures for the better security -of these towns and strengthening their walls, hastily returned home. -After their departure the Methymnians marched against Antissa, but -were defeated in a sortie by the Antissians and their mercenaries, -and retreated in haste after losing many of their number. Word of this -reaching Athens, and the Athenians learning that the Mitylenians were -masters of the country and their own soldiers unable to hold them -in check, they sent out about the beginning of autumn Paches, son of -Epicurus, to take the command, and a thousand Athenian heavy infantry; -who worked their own passage and, arriving at Mitylene, built a single -wall all round it, forts being erected at some of the strongest points. -Mitylene was thus blockaded strictly on both sides, by land and by sea; -and winter now drew near. - -The Athenians needing money for the siege, although they had for the -first time raised a contribution of two hundred talents from their own -citizens, now sent out twelve ships to levy subsidies from their allies, -with Lysicles and four others in command. After cruising to different -places and laying them under contribution, Lysicles went up the country -from Myus, in Caria, across the plain of the Meander, as far as the hill -of Sandius; and being attacked by the Carians and the people of Anaia, -was slain with many of his soldiers. - -The same winter the Plataeans, who were still being besieged by the -Peloponnesians and Boeotians, distressed by the failure of their -provisions, and seeing no hope of relief from Athens, nor any other -means of safety, formed a scheme with the Athenians besieged with them -for escaping, if possible, by forcing their way over the enemy's walls; -the attempt having been suggested by Theaenetus, son of Tolmides, a -soothsayer, and Eupompides, son of Daimachus, one of their generals. At -first all were to join: afterwards, half hung back, thinking the risk -great; about two hundred and twenty, however, voluntarily persevered in -the attempt, which was carried out in the following way. Ladders were -made to match the height of the enemy's wall, which they measured by -the layers of bricks, the side turned towards them not being thoroughly -whitewashed. These were counted by many persons at once; and though some -might miss the right calculation, most would hit upon it, particularly -as they counted over and over again, and were no great way from the -wall, but could see it easily enough for their purpose. The length -required for the ladders was thus obtained, being calculated from the -breadth of the brick. - -Now the wall of the Peloponnesians was constructed as follows. It -consisted of two lines drawn round the place, one against the Plataeans, -the other against any attack on the outside from Athens, about sixteen -feet apart. The intermediate space of sixteen feet was occupied by huts -portioned out among the soldiers on guard, and built in one block, so as -to give the appearance of a single thick wall with battlements on either -side. At intervals of every ten battlements were towers of considerable -size, and the same breadth as the wall, reaching right across from its -inner to its outer face, with no means of passing except through the -middle. Accordingly on stormy and wet nights the battlements were -deserted, and guard kept from the towers, which were not far apart and -roofed in above. - -Such being the structure of the wall by which the Plataeans were -blockaded, when their preparations were completed, they waited for a -stormy night of wind and rain and without any moon, and then set out, -guided by the authors of the enterprise. Crossing first the ditch that -ran round the town, they next gained the wall of the enemy unperceived -by the sentinels, who did not see them in the darkness, or hear them, -as the wind drowned with its roar the noise of their approach; besides -which they kept a good way off from each other, that they might not be -betrayed by the clash of their weapons. They were also lightly equipped, -and had only the left foot shod to preserve them from slipping in the -mire. They came up to the battlements at one of the intermediate spaces -where they knew them to be unguarded: those who carried the ladders went -first and planted them; next twelve light-armed soldiers with only a -dagger and a breastplate mounted, led by Ammias, son of Coroebus, who -was the first on the wall; his followers getting up after him and going -six to each of the towers. After these came another party of light -troops armed with spears, whose shields, that they might advance the -easier, were carried by men behind, who were to hand them to them when -they found themselves in presence of the enemy. After a good many had -mounted they were discovered by the sentinels in the towers, by the -noise made by a tile which was knocked down by one of the Plataeans as -he was laying hold of the battlements. The alarm was instantly given, -and the troops rushed to the wall, not knowing the nature of the danger, -owing to the dark night and stormy weather; the Plataeans in the town -having also chosen that moment to make a sortie against the wall of the -Peloponnesians upon the side opposite to that on which their men -were getting over, in order to divert the attention of the besiegers. -Accordingly they remained distracted at their several posts, without any -venturing to stir to give help from his own station, and at a loss -to guess what was going on. Meanwhile the three hundred set aside for -service on emergencies went outside the wall in the direction of the -alarm. Fire-signals of an attack were also raised towards Thebes; but -the Plataeans in the town at once displayed a number of others, prepared -beforehand for this very purpose, in order to render the enemy's signals -unintelligible, and to prevent his friends getting a true idea of what -was passing and coming to his aid before their comrades who had gone out -should have made good their escape and be in safety. - -Meanwhile the first of the scaling party that had got up, after -carrying both the towers and putting the sentinels to the sword, posted -themselves inside to prevent any one coming through against them; and -rearing ladders from the wall, sent several men up on the towers, and -from their summit and base kept in check all of the enemy that came up, -with their missiles, while their main body planted a number of ladders -against the wall, and knocking down the battlements, passed over between -the towers; each as soon as he had got over taking up his station at the -edge of the ditch, and plying from thence with arrows and darts any who -came along the wall to stop the passage of his comrades. When all were -over, the party on the towers came down, the last of them not without -difficulty, and proceeded to the ditch, just as the three hundred came -up carrying torches. The Plataeans, standing on the edge of the ditch -in the dark, had a good view of their opponents, and discharged their -arrows and darts upon the unarmed parts of their bodies, while they -themselves could not be so well seen in the obscurity for the torches; -and thus even the last of them got over the ditch, though not without -effort and difficulty; as ice had formed in it, not strong enough to -walk upon, but of that watery kind which generally comes with a wind -more east than north, and the snow which this wind had caused to fall -during the night had made the water in the ditch rise, so that they -could scarcely breast it as they crossed. However, it was mainly the -violence of the storm that enabled them to effect their escape at all. - -Starting from the ditch, the Plataeans went all together along the road -leading to Thebes, keeping the chapel of the hero Androcrates upon their -right; considering that the last road which the Peloponnesians would -suspect them of having taken would be that towards their enemies' -country. Indeed they could see them pursuing with torches upon the -Athens road towards Cithaeron and Druoskephalai or Oakheads. After going -for rather more than half a mile upon the road to Thebes, the Plataeans -turned off and took that leading to the mountain, to Erythrae and -Hysiae, and reaching the hills, made good their escape to Athens, two -hundred and twelve men in all; some of their number having turned back -into the town before getting over the wall, and one archer having been -taken prisoner at the outer ditch. Meanwhile the Peloponnesians gave up -the pursuit and returned to their posts; and the Plataeans in the town, -knowing nothing of what had passed, and informed by those who had turned -back that not a man had escaped, sent out a herald as soon as it was day -to make a truce for the recovery of the dead bodies, and then, learning -the truth, desisted. In this way the Plataean party got over and were -saved. - -Towards the close of the same winter, Salaethus, a Lacedaemonian, -was sent out in a galley from Lacedaemon to Mitylene. Going by sea to -Pyrrha, and from thence overland, he passed along the bed of a torrent, -where the line of circumvallation was passable, and thus entering -unperceived into Mitylene told the magistrates that Attica would -certainly be invaded, and the forty ships destined to relieve them -arrive, and that he had been sent on to announce this and to superintend -matters generally. The Mitylenians upon this took courage, and laid -aside the idea of treating with the Athenians; and now this winter -ended, and with it ended the fourth year of the war of which Thucydides -was the historian. - -The next summer the Peloponnesians sent off the forty-two ships for -Mitylene, under Alcidas, their high admiral, and themselves and their -allies invaded Attica, their object being to distract the Athenians by -a double movement, and thus to make it less easy for them to act against -the fleet sailing to Mitylene. The commander in this invasion was -Cleomenes, in the place of King Pausanias, son of Pleistoanax, his -nephew, who was still a minor. Not content with laying waste whatever -had shot up in the parts which they had before devastated, the invaders -now extended their ravages to lands passed over in their previous -incursions; so that this invasion was more severely felt by the -Athenians than any except the second; the enemy staying on and on until -they had overrun most of the country, in the expectation of hearing -from Lesbos of something having been achieved by their fleet, which they -thought must now have got over. However, as they did not obtain any -of the results expected, and their provisions began to run short, they -retreated and dispersed to their different cities. - -In the meantime the Mitylenians, finding their provisions failing, while -the fleet from Peloponnese was loitering on the way instead of appearing -at Mitylene, were compelled to come to terms with the Athenians in the -following manner. Salaethus having himself ceased to expect the fleet -to arrive, now armed the commons with heavy armour, which they had not -before possessed, with the intention of making a sortie against the -Athenians. The commons, however, no sooner found themselves possessed of -arms than they refused any longer to obey their officers; and forming -in knots together, told the authorities to bring out in public the -provisions and divide them amongst them all, or they would themselves -come to terms with the Athenians and deliver up the city. - -The government, aware of their inability to prevent this, and of the -danger they would be in, if left out of the capitulation, publicly -agreed with Paches and the army to surrender Mitylene at discretion -and to admit the troops into the town; upon the understanding that the -Mitylenians should be allowed to send an embassy to Athens to plead -their cause, and that Paches should not imprison, make slaves of, or put -to death any of the citizens until its return. Such were the terms of -the capitulation; in spite of which the chief authors of the negotiation -with Lacedaemon were so completely overcome by terror when the army -entered that they went and seated themselves by the altars, from which -they were raised up by Paches under promise that he would do them no -wrong, and lodged by him in Tenedos, until he should learn the pleasure -of the Athenians concerning them. Paches also sent some galleys and -seized Antissa, and took such other military measures as he thought -advisable. - -Meanwhile the Peloponnesians in the forty ships, who ought to have made -all haste to relieve Mitylene, lost time in coming round Peloponnese -itself, and proceeding leisurely on the remainder of the voyage, made -Delos without having been seen by the Athenians at Athens, and from -thence arriving at Icarus and Myconus, there first heard of the fall -of Mitylene. Wishing to know the truth, they put into Embatum, in the -Erythraeid, about seven days after the capture of the town. Here they -learned the truth, and began to consider what they were to do; and -Teutiaplus, an Elean, addressed them as follows: - -"Alcidas and Peloponnesians who share with me the command of this -armament, my advice is to sail just as we are to Mitylene, before we -have been heard of. We may expect to find the Athenians as much off -their guard as men generally are who have just taken a city: this will -certainly be so by sea, where they have no idea of any enemy attacking -them, and where our strength, as it happens, mainly lies; while even -their land forces are probably scattered about the houses in the -carelessness of victory. If therefore we were to fall upon them suddenly -and in the night, I have hopes, with the help of the well-wishers that -we may have left inside the town, that we shall become masters of the -place. Let us not shrink from the risk, but let us remember that this is -just the occasion for one of the baseless panics common in war: and that -to be able to guard against these in one's own case, and to detect the -moment when an attack will find an enemy at this disadvantage, is what -makes a successful general." - -These words of Teutiaplus failing to move Alcidas, some of the Ionian -exiles and the Lesbians with the expedition began to urge him, since -this seemed too dangerous, to seize one of the Ionian cities or the -Aeolic town of Cyme, to use as a base for effecting the revolt of Ionia. -This was by no means a hopeless enterprise, as their coming was welcome -everywhere; their object would be by this move to deprive Athens of -her chief source of revenue, and at the same time to saddle her with -expense, if she chose to blockade them; and they would probably induce -Pissuthnes to join them in the war. However, Alcidas gave this proposal -as bad a reception as the other, being eager, since he had come too late -for Mitylene, to find himself back in Peloponnese as soon as possible. - -Accordingly he put out from Embatum and proceeded along shore; and -touching at the Teian town, Myonnesus, there butchered most of the -prisoners that he had taken on his passage. Upon his coming to anchor at -Ephesus, envoys came to him from the Samians at Anaia, and told him that -he was not going the right way to free Hellas in massacring men who had -never raised a hand against him, and who were not enemies of his, but -allies of Athens against their will, and that if he did not stop he -would turn many more friends into enemies than enemies into friends. -Alcidas agreed to this, and let go all the Chians still in his hands and -some of the others that he had taken; the inhabitants, instead of flying -at the sight of his vessels, rather coming up to them, taking them -for Athenian, having no sort of expectation that while the Athenians -commanded the sea Peloponnesian ships would venture over to Ionia. - -From Ephesus Alcidas set sail in haste and fled. He had been seen by -the Salaminian and Paralian galleys, which happened to be sailing from -Athens, while still at anchor off Clarus; and fearing pursuit he now -made across the open sea, fully determined to touch nowhere, if he could -help it, until he got to Peloponnese. Meanwhile news of him had come in -to Paches from the Erythraeid, and indeed from all quarters. As Ionia -was unfortified, great fears were felt that the Peloponnesians coasting -along shore, even if they did not intend to stay, might make descents -in passing and plunder the towns; and now the Paralian and Salaminian, -having seen him at Clarus, themselves brought intelligence of the fact. -Paches accordingly gave hot chase, and continued the pursuit as far as -the isle of Patmos, and then finding that Alcidas had got on too far to -be overtaken, came back again. Meanwhile he thought it fortunate that, -as he had not fallen in with them out at sea, he had not overtaken them -anywhere where they would have been forced to encamp, and so give him -the trouble of blockading them. - -On his return along shore he touched, among other places, at Notium, the -port of Colophon, where the Colophonians had settled after the capture -of the upper town by Itamenes and the barbarians, who had been called in -by certain individuals in a party quarrel. The capture of the town took -place about the time of the second Peloponnesian invasion of Attica. -However, the refugees, after settling at Notium, again split up into -factions, one of which called in Arcadian and barbarian mercenaries -from Pissuthnes and, entrenching these in a quarter apart, formed a new -community with the Median party of the Colophonians who joined them from -the upper town. Their opponents had retired into exile, and now called -in Paches, who invited Hippias, the commander of the Arcadians in the -fortified quarter, to a parley, upon condition that, if they could -not agree, he was to be put back safe and sound in the fortification. -However, upon his coming out to him, he put him into custody, though not -in chains, and attacked suddenly and took by surprise the fortification, -and putting the Arcadians and the barbarians found in it to the sword, -afterwards took Hippias into it as he had promised, and, as soon as he -was inside, seized him and shot him down. Paches then gave up Notium to -the Colophonians not of the Median party; and settlers were afterwards -sent out from Athens, and the place colonized according to Athenian -laws, after collecting all the Colophonians found in any of the cities. - -Arrived at Mitylene, Paches reduced Pyrrha and Eresus; and finding the -Lacedaemonian, Salaethus, in hiding in the town, sent him off to Athens, -together with the Mitylenians that he had placed in Tenedos, and any -other persons that he thought concerned in the revolt. He also sent -back the greater part of his forces, remaining with the rest to settle -Mitylene and the rest of Lesbos as he thought best. - -Upon the arrival of the prisoners with Salaethus, the Athenians at once -put the latter to death, although he offered, among other things, to -procure the withdrawal of the Peloponnesians from Plataea, which was -still under siege; and after deliberating as to what they should do with -the former, in the fury of the moment determined to put to death not -only the prisoners at Athens, but the whole adult male population of -Mitylene, and to make slaves of the women and children. It was remarked -that Mitylene had revolted without being, like the rest, subjected to -the empire; and what above all swelled the wrath of the Athenians was -the fact of the Peloponnesian fleet having ventured over to Ionia to her -support, a fact which was held to argue a long meditated rebellion. -They accordingly sent a galley to communicate the decree to Paches, -commanding him to lose no time in dispatching the Mitylenians. The -morrow brought repentance with it and reflection on the horrid cruelty -of a decree, which condemned a whole city to the fate merited only by -the guilty. This was no sooner perceived by the Mitylenian ambassadors -at Athens and their Athenian supporters, than they moved the authorities -to put the question again to the vote; which they the more easily -consented to do, as they themselves plainly saw that most of the -citizens wished some one to give them an opportunity for reconsidering -the matter. An assembly was therefore at once called, and after much -expression of opinion upon both sides, Cleon, son of Cleaenetus, the -same who had carried the former motion of putting the Mitylenians to -death, the most violent man at Athens, and at that time by far the most -powerful with the commons, came forward again and spoke as follows: - -"I have often before now been convinced that a democracy is incapable -of empire, and never more so than by your present change of mind in the -matter of Mitylene. Fears or plots being unknown to you in your daily -relations with each other, you feel just the same with regard to your -allies, and never reflect that the mistakes into which you may be led by -listening to their appeals, or by giving way to your own compassion, are -full of danger to yourselves, and bring you no thanks for your weakness -from your allies; entirely forgetting that your empire is a despotism -and your subjects disaffected conspirators, whose obedience is ensured -not by your suicidal concessions, but by the superiority given you by -your own strength and not their loyalty. The most alarming feature in -the case is the constant change of measures with which we appear to be -threatened, and our seeming ignorance of the fact that bad laws which -are never changed are better for a city than good ones that have no -authority; that unlearned loyalty is more serviceable than quick-witted -insubordination; and that ordinary men usually manage public affairs -better than their more gifted fellows. The latter are always wanting to -appear wiser than the laws, and to overrule every proposition brought -forward, thinking that they cannot show their wit in more important -matters, and by such behaviour too often ruin their country; while those -who mistrust their own cleverness are content to be less learned than -the laws, and less able to pick holes in the speech of a good speaker; -and being fair judges rather than rival athletes, generally conduct -affairs successfully. These we ought to imitate, instead of being led on -by cleverness and intellectual rivalry to advise your people against our -real opinions. - -"For myself, I adhere to my former opinion, and wonder at those who have -proposed to reopen the case of the Mitylenians, and who are thus causing -a delay which is all in favour of the guilty, by making the sufferer -proceed against the offender with the edge of his anger blunted; -although where vengeance follows most closely upon the wrong, it best -equals it and most amply requites it. I wonder also who will be the man -who will maintain the contrary, and will pretend to show that the crimes -of the Mitylenians are of service to us, and our misfortunes injurious -to the allies. Such a man must plainly either have such confidence in -his rhetoric as to adventure to prove that what has been once for all -decided is still undetermined, or be bribed to try to delude us by -elaborate sophisms. In such contests the state gives the rewards to -others, and takes the dangers for herself. The persons to blame are -you who are so foolish as to institute these contests; who go to see an -oration as you would to see a sight, take your facts on hearsay, judge -of the practicability of a project by the wit of its advocates, and -trust for the truth as to past events not to the fact which you saw -more than to the clever strictures which you heard; the easy victims of -new-fangled arguments, unwilling to follow received conclusions; slaves -to every new paradox, despisers of the commonplace; the first wish of -every man being that he could speak himself, the next to rival those who -can speak by seeming to be quite up with their ideas by applauding -every hit almost before it is made, and by being as quick in catching -an argument as you are slow in foreseeing its consequences; asking, if -I may so say, for something different from the conditions under which -we live, and yet comprehending inadequately those very conditions; -very slaves to the pleasure of the ear, and more like the audience of a -rhetorician than the council of a city. - -"In order to keep you from this, I proceed to show that no one state has -ever injured you as much as Mitylene. I can make allowance for those who -revolt because they cannot bear our empire, or who have been forced -to do so by the enemy. But for those who possessed an island with -fortifications; who could fear our enemies only by sea, and there had -their own force of galleys to protect them; who were independent and -held in the highest honour by you--to act as these have done, this -is not revolt--revolt implies oppression; it is deliberate and wanton -aggression; an attempt to ruin us by siding with our bitterest enemies; -a worse offence than a war undertaken on their own account in the -acquisition of power. The fate of those of their neighbours who had -already rebelled and had been subdued was no lesson to them; their own -prosperity could not dissuade them from affronting danger; but blindly -confident in the future, and full of hopes beyond their power though -not beyond their ambition, they declared war and made their decision to -prefer might to right, their attack being determined not by provocation -but by the moment which seemed propitious. The truth is that great -good fortune coming suddenly and unexpectedly tends to make a people -insolent; in most cases it is safer for mankind to have success in -reason than out of reason; and it is easier for them, one may say, to -stave off adversity than to preserve prosperity. Our mistake has been -to distinguish the Mitylenians as we have done: had they been long -ago treated like the rest, they never would have so far forgotten -themselves, human nature being as surely made arrogant by consideration -as it is awed by firmness. Let them now therefore be punished as their -crime requires, and do not, while you condemn the aristocracy, absolve -the people. This is certain, that all attacked you without distinction, -although they might have come over to us and been now again in -possession of their city. But no, they thought it safer to throw in -their lot with the aristocracy and so joined their rebellion! Consider -therefore: if you subject to the same punishment the ally who is forced -to rebel by the enemy, and him who does so by his own free choice, which -of them, think you, is there that will not rebel upon the slightest -pretext; when the reward of success is freedom, and the penalty of -failure nothing so very terrible? We meanwhile shall have to risk our -money and our lives against one state after another; and if successful, -shall receive a ruined town from which we can no longer draw the revenue -upon which our strength depends; while if unsuccessful, we shall have -an enemy the more upon our hands, and shall spend the time that might be -employed in combating our existing foes in warring with our own allies. - -"No hope, therefore, that rhetoric may instil or money purchase, of the -mercy due to human infirmity must be held out to the Mitylenians. Their -offence was not involuntary, but of malice and deliberate; and mercy -is only for unwilling offenders. I therefore, now as before, persist -against your reversing your first decision, or giving way to the -three failings most fatal to empire--pity, sentiment, and indulgence. -Compassion is due to those who can reciprocate the feeling, not to those -who will never pity us in return, but are our natural and necessary -foes: the orators who charm us with sentiment may find other less -important arenas for their talents, in the place of one where the city -pays a heavy penalty for a momentary pleasure, themselves receiving fine -acknowledgments for their fine phrases; while indulgence should be shown -towards those who will be our friends in future, instead of towards men -who will remain just what they were, and as much our enemies as before. -To sum up shortly, I say that if you follow my advice you will do what -is just towards the Mitylenians, and at the same time expedient; -while by a different decision you will not oblige them so much as pass -sentence upon yourselves. For if they were right in rebelling, you must -be wrong in ruling. However, if, right or wrong, you determine to rule, -you must carry out your principle and punish the Mitylenians as your -interest requires; or else you must give up your empire and cultivate -honesty without danger. Make up your minds, therefore, to give them -like for like; and do not let the victims who escaped the plot be more -insensible than the conspirators who hatched it; but reflect what -they would have done if victorious over you, especially they were the -aggressors. It is they who wrong their neighbour without a cause, that -pursue their victim to the death, on account of the danger which they -foresee in letting their enemy survive; since the object of a wanton -wrong is more dangerous, if he escape, than an enemy who has not this to -complain of. Do not, therefore, be traitors to yourselves, but recall -as nearly as possible the moment of suffering and the supreme importance -which you then attached to their reduction; and now pay them back in -their turn, without yielding to present weakness or forgetting the peril -that once hung over you. Punish them as they deserve, and teach your -other allies by a striking example that the penalty of rebellion is -death. Let them once understand this and you will not have so often to -neglect your enemies while you are fighting with your own confederates." - -Such were the words of Cleon. After him Diodotus, son of Eucrates, who -had also in the previous assembly spoken most strongly against putting -the Mitylenians to death, came forward and spoke as follows: - -"I do not blame the persons who have reopened the case of the -Mitylenians, nor do I approve the protests which we have heard against -important questions being frequently debated. I think the two things -most opposed to good counsel are haste and passion; haste usually goes -hand in hand with folly, passion with coarseness and narrowness of mind. -As for the argument that speech ought not to be the exponent of action, -the man who uses it must be either senseless or interested: senseless -if he believes it possible to treat of the uncertain future through any -other medium; interested if, wishing to carry a disgraceful measure and -doubting his ability to speak well in a bad cause, he thinks to -frighten opponents and hearers by well-aimed calumny. What is still more -intolerable is to accuse a speaker of making a display in order to be -paid for it. If ignorance only were imputed, an unsuccessful speaker -might retire with a reputation for honesty, if not for wisdom; while the -charge of dishonesty makes him suspected, if successful, and thought, if -defeated, not only a fool but a rogue. The city is no gainer by such a -system, since fear deprives it of its advisers; although in truth, if -our speakers are to make such assertions, it would be better for the -country if they could not speak at all, as we should then make fewer -blunders. The good citizen ought to triumph not by frightening his -opponents but by beating them fairly in argument; and a wise city, -without over-distinguishing its best advisers, will nevertheless -not deprive them of their due, and, far from punishing an unlucky -counsellor, will not even regard him as disgraced. In this way -successful orators would be least tempted to sacrifice their convictions -to popularity, in the hope of still higher honours, and unsuccessful -speakers to resort to the same popular arts in order to win over the -multitude. - -"This is not our way; and, besides, the moment that a man is suspected -of giving advice, however good, from corrupt motives, we feel such a -grudge against him for the gain which after all we are not certain he -will receive, that we deprive the city of its certain benefit. Plain -good advice has thus come to be no less suspected than bad; and the -advocate of the most monstrous measures is not more obliged to use -deceit to gain the people, than the best counsellor is to lie in order -to be believed. The city and the city only, owing to these refinements, -can never be served openly and without disguise; he who does serve it -openly being always suspected of serving himself in some secret way in -return. Still, considering the magnitude of the interests involved, and -the position of affairs, we orators must make it our business to look -a little farther than you who judge offhand; especially as we, your -advisers, are responsible, while you, our audience, are not so. For if -those who gave the advice, and those who took it, suffered equally, you -would judge more calmly; as it is, you visit the disasters into which -the whim of the moment may have led you upon the single person of your -adviser, not upon yourselves, his numerous companions in error. - -"However, I have not come forward either to oppose or to accuse in the -matter of Mitylene; indeed, the question before us as sensible men is -not their guilt, but our interests. Though I prove them ever so guilty, -I shall not, therefore, advise their death, unless it be expedient; -nor though they should have claims to indulgence, shall I recommend it, -unless it be dearly for the good of the country. I consider that we are -deliberating for the future more than for the present; and where Cleon -is so positive as to the useful deterrent effects that will follow from -making rebellion capital, I, who consider the interests of the future -quite as much as he, as positively maintain the contrary. And I require -you not to reject my useful considerations for his specious ones: his -speech may have the attraction of seeming the more just in your present -temper against Mitylene; but we are not in a court of justice, but in a -political assembly; and the question is not justice, but how to make the -Mitylenians useful to Athens. - -"Now of course communities have enacted the penalty of death for many -offences far lighter than this: still hope leads men to venture, and no -one ever yet put himself in peril without the inward conviction that he -would succeed in his design. Again, was there ever city rebelling that -did not believe that it possessed either in itself or in its alliances -resources adequate to the enterprise? All, states and individuals, are -alike prone to err, and there is no law that will prevent them; or -why should men have exhausted the list of punishments in search of -enactments to protect them from evildoers? It is probable that in early -times the penalties for the greatest offences were less severe, and -that, as these were disregarded, the penalty of death has been by -degrees in most cases arrived at, which is itself disregarded in like -manner. Either then some means of terror more terrible than this must be -discovered, or it must be owned that this restraint is useless; and that -as long as poverty gives men the courage of necessity, or plenty fills -them with the ambition which belongs to insolence and pride, and the -other conditions of life remain each under the thraldom of some fatal -and master passion, so long will the impulse never be wanting to drive -men into danger. Hope also and cupidity, the one leading and the other -following, the one conceiving the attempt, the other suggesting the -facility of succeeding, cause the widest ruin, and, although invisible -agents, are far stronger than the dangers that are seen. Fortune, -too, powerfully helps the delusion and, by the unexpected aid that she -sometimes lends, tempts men to venture with inferior means; and this is -especially the case with communities, because the stakes played for are -the highest, freedom or empire, and, when all are acting together, each -man irrationally magnifies his own capacity. In fine, it is impossible -to prevent, and only great simplicity can hope to prevent, human nature -doing what it has once set its mind upon, by force of law or by any -other deterrent force whatsoever. - -"We must not, therefore, commit ourselves to a false policy through a -belief in the efficacy of the punishment of death, or exclude rebels -from the hope of repentance and an early atonement of their error. -Consider a moment. At present, if a city that has already revolted -perceive that it cannot succeed, it will come to terms while it is still -able to refund expenses, and pay tribute afterwards. In the other case, -what city, think you, would not prepare better than is now done, and -hold out to the last against its besiegers, if it is all one whether it -surrender late or soon? And how can it be otherwise than hurtful to us -to be put to the expense of a siege, because surrender is out of the -question; and if we take the city, to receive a ruined town from which -we can no longer draw the revenue which forms our real strength against -the enemy? We must not, therefore, sit as strict judges of the offenders -to our own prejudice, but rather see how by moderate chastisements we -may be enabled to benefit in future by the revenue-producing powers -of our dependencies; and we must make up our minds to look for our -protection not to legal terrors but to careful administration. At -present we do exactly the opposite. When a free community, held -in subjection by force, rises, as is only natural, and asserts its -independence, it is no sooner reduced than we fancy ourselves obliged -to punish it severely; although the right course with freemen is not to -chastise them rigorously when they do rise, but rigorously to watch them -before they rise, and to prevent their ever entertaining the idea, -and, the insurrection suppressed, to make as few responsible for it as -possible. - -"Only consider what a blunder you would commit in doing as Cleon -recommends. As things are at present, in all the cities the people -is your friend, and either does not revolt with the oligarchy, or, if -forced to do so, becomes at once the enemy of the insurgents; so that in -the war with the hostile city you have the masses on your side. But -if you butcher the people of Mitylene, who had nothing to do with -the revolt, and who, as soon as they got arms, of their own motion -surrendered the town, first you will commit the crime of killing your -benefactors; and next you will play directly into the hands of the -higher classes, who when they induce their cities to rise, will -immediately have the people on their side, through your having announced -in advance the same punishment for those who are guilty and for those -who are not. On the contrary, even if they were guilty, you ought to -seem not to notice it, in order to avoid alienating the only class -still friendly to us. In short, I consider it far more useful for the -preservation of our empire voluntarily to put up with injustice, than -to put to death, however justly, those whom it is our interest to keep -alive. As for Cleon's idea that in punishment the claims of justice and -expediency can both be satisfied, facts do not confirm the possibility -of such a combination. - -"Confess, therefore, that this is the wisest course, and without -conceding too much either to pity or to indulgence, by neither of which -motives do I any more than Cleon wish you to be influenced, upon the -plain merits of the case before you, be persuaded by me to try calmly -those of the Mitylenians whom Paches sent off as guilty, and to leave -the rest undisturbed. This is at once best for the future, and most -terrible to your enemies at the present moment; inasmuch as good policy -against an adversary is superior to the blind attacks of brute force." - -Such were the words of Diodotus. The two opinions thus expressed were -the ones that most directly contradicted each other; and the Athenians, -notwithstanding their change of feeling, now proceeded to a division, -in which the show of hands was almost equal, although the motion of -Diodotus carried the day. Another galley was at once sent off in haste, -for fear that the first might reach Lesbos in the interval, and the -city be found destroyed; the first ship having about a day and a -night's start. Wine and barley-cakes were provided for the vessel by the -Mitylenian ambassadors, and great promises made if they arrived in time; -which caused the men to use such diligence upon the voyage that they -took their meals of barley-cakes kneaded with oil and wine as they -rowed, and only slept by turns while the others were at the oar. Luckily -they met with no contrary wind, and the first ship making no haste -upon so horrid an errand, while the second pressed on in the manner -described, the first arrived so little before them, that Paches had -only just had time to read the decree, and to prepare to execute the -sentence, when the second put into port and prevented the massacre. The -danger of Mitylene had indeed been great. - -The other party whom Paches had sent off as the prime movers in the -rebellion, were upon Cleon's motion put to death by the Athenians, the -number being rather more than a thousand. The Athenians also demolished -the walls of the Mitylenians, and took possession of their ships. -Afterwards tribute was not imposed upon the Lesbians; but all their -land, except that of the Methymnians, was divided into three thousand -allotments, three hundred of which were reserved as sacred for the gods, -and the rest assigned by lot to Athenian shareholders, who were sent out -to the island. With these the Lesbians agreed to pay a rent of two -minae a year for each allotment, and cultivated the land themselves. The -Athenians also took possession of the towns on the continent belonging -to the Mitylenians, which thus became for the future subject to Athens. -Such were the events that took place at Lesbos. - - - - -CHAPTER X - -_Fifth Year of the War--Trial and Execution of the Plataeans-- -Corcyraean Revolution_ - -During the same summer, after the reduction of Lesbos, the Athenians -under Nicias, son of Niceratus, made an expedition against the island -of Minoa, which lies off Megara and was used as a fortified post by the -Megarians, who had built a tower upon it. Nicias wished to enable the -Athenians to maintain their blockade from this nearer station instead -of from Budorum and Salamis; to stop the Peloponnesian galleys and -privateers sailing out unobserved from the island, as they had been in -the habit of doing; and at the same time prevent anything from coming -into Megara. Accordingly, after taking two towers projecting on the side -of Nisaea, by engines from the sea, and clearing the entrance into the -channel between the island and the shore, he next proceeded to cut off -all communication by building a wall on the mainland at the point where -a bridge across a morass enabled succours to be thrown into the island, -which was not far off from the continent. A few days sufficing to -accomplish this, he afterwards raised some works in the island also, and -leaving a garrison there, departed with his forces. - -About the same time in this summer, the Plataeans, being now without -provisions and unable to support the siege, surrendered to the -Peloponnesians in the following manner. An assault had been made upon -the wall, which the Plataeans were unable to repel. The Lacedaemonian -commander, perceiving their weakness, wished to avoid taking the place -by storm; his instructions from Lacedaemon having been so conceived, in -order that if at any future time peace should be made with Athens, and -they should agree each to restore the places that they had taken in the -war, Plataea might be held to have come over voluntarily, and not be -included in the list. He accordingly sent a herald to them to ask -if they were willing voluntarily to surrender the town to the -Lacedaemonians, and accept them as their judges, upon the understanding -that the guilty should be punished, but no one without form of law. The -Plataeans were now in the last state of weakness, and the herald had -no sooner delivered his message than they surrendered the town. The -Peloponnesians fed them for some days until the judges from Lacedaemon, -who were five in number, arrived. Upon their arrival no charge was -preferred; they simply called up the Plataeans, and asked them whether -they had done the Lacedaemonians and allies any service in the war -then raging. The Plataeans asked leave to speak at greater length, -and deputed two of their number to represent them: Astymachus, son of -Asopolaus, and Lacon, son of Aeimnestus, proxenus of the Lacedaemonians, -who came forward and spoke as follows: - -"Lacedaemonians, when we surrendered our city we trusted in you, and -looked forward to a trial more agreeable to the forms of law than the -present, to which we had no idea of being subjected; the judges also in -whose hands we consented to place ourselves were you, and you only (from -whom we thought we were most likely to obtain justice), and not other -persons, as is now the case. As matters stand, we are afraid that we -have been doubly deceived. We have good reason to suspect, not only that -the issue to be tried is the most terrible of all, but that you will not -prove impartial; if we may argue from the fact that no accusation was -first brought forward for us to answer, but we had ourselves to ask -leave to speak, and from the question being put so shortly, that a true -answer to it tells against us, while a false one can be contradicted. In -this dilemma, our safest, and indeed our only course, seems to be to say -something at all risks: placed as we are, we could scarcely be silent -without being tormented by the damning thought that speaking might have -saved us. Another difficulty that we have to encounter is the difficulty -of convincing you. Were we unknown to each other we might profit by -bringing forward new matter with which you were unacquainted: as it is, -we can tell you nothing that you do not know already, and we fear, not -that you have condemned us in your own minds of having failed in our -duty towards you, and make this our crime, but that to please a third -party we have to submit to a trial the result of which is already -decided. Nevertheless, we will place before you what we can justly urge, -not only on the question of the quarrel which the Thebans have against -us, but also as addressing you and the rest of the Hellenes; and we will -remind you of our good services, and endeavour to prevail with you. - -"To your short question, whether we have done the Lacedaemonians and -allies any service in this war, we say, if you ask us as enemies, that -to refrain from serving you was not to do you injury; if as friends, -that you are more in fault for having marched against us. During the -peace, and against the Mede, we acted well: we have not now been the -first to break the peace, and we were the only Boeotians who then joined -in defending against the Mede the liberty of Hellas. Although an inland -people, we were present at the action at Artemisium; in the battle that -took place in our territory we fought by the side of yourselves and -Pausanias; and in all the other Hellenic exploits of the time we took -a part quite out of proportion to our strength. Besides, you, as -Lacedaemonians, ought not to forget that at the time of the great panic -at Sparta, after the earthquake, caused by the secession of the Helots -to Ithome, we sent the third part of our citizens to assist you. - -"On these great and historical occasions such was the part that we -chose, although afterwards we became your enemies. For this you were to -blame. When we asked for your alliance against our Theban oppressors, -you rejected our petition, and told us to go to the Athenians who were -our neighbours, as you lived too far off. In the war we never have done -to you, and never should have done to you, anything unreasonable. If we -refused to desert the Athenians when you asked us, we did no wrong; they -had helped us against the Thebans when you drew back, and we could no -longer give them up with honour; especially as we had obtained their -alliance and had been admitted to their citizenship at our own request, -and after receiving benefits at their hands; but it was plainly our duty -loyally to obey their orders. Besides, the faults that either of you may -commit in your supremacy must be laid, not upon the followers, but on -the chiefs that lead them astray. - -"With regard to the Thebans, they have wronged us repeatedly, and -their last aggression, which has been the means of bringing us into our -present position, is within your own knowledge. In seizing our city in -time of peace, and what is more at a holy time in the month, they justly -encountered our vengeance, in accordance with the universal law which -sanctions resistance to an invader; and it cannot now be right that we -should suffer on their account. By taking your own immediate interest -and their animosity as the test of justice, you will prove yourselves to -be rather waiters on expediency than judges of right; although if they -seem useful to you now, we and the rest of the Hellenes gave you -much more valuable help at a time of greater need. Now you are the -assailants, and others fear you; but at the crisis to which we allude, -when the barbarian threatened all with slavery, the Thebans were on -his side. It is just, therefore, to put our patriotism then against -our error now, if error there has been; and you will find the merit -outweighing the fault, and displayed at a juncture when there were few -Hellenes who would set their valour against the strength of Xerxes, -and when greater praise was theirs who preferred the dangerous path of -honour to the safe course of consulting their own interest with respect -to the invasion. To these few we belonged, and highly were we honoured -for it; and yet we now fear to perish by having again acted on the same -principles, and chosen to act well with Athens sooner than wisely with -Sparta. Yet in justice the same cases should be decided in the same way, -and policy should not mean anything else than lasting gratitude for -the service of good ally combined with a proper attention to one's own -immediate interest. - -"Consider also that at present the Hellenes generally regard you as a -pattern of worth and honour; and if you pass an unjust sentence upon us -in this which is no obscure cause, but one in which you, the judges, -are as illustrious as we, the prisoners, are blameless, take care -that displeasure be not felt at an unworthy decision in the matter of -honourable men made by men yet more honourable than they, and at the -consecration in the national temples of spoils taken from the -Plataeans, the benefactors of Hellas. Shocking indeed will it seem for -Lacedaemonians to destroy Plataea, and for the city whose name your -fathers inscribed upon the tripod at Delphi for its good service, to -be by you blotted out from the map of Hellas, to please the Thebans. To -such a depth of misfortune have we fallen that, while the Medes' success -had been our ruin, Thebans now supplant us in your once fond regards; -and we have been subjected to two dangers, the greatest of any--that of -dying of starvation then, if we had not surrendered our town, and now of -being tried for our lives. So that we Plataeans, after exertions beyond -our power in the cause of the Hellenes, are rejected by all, forsaken -and unassisted; helped by none of our allies, and reduced to doubt the -stability of our only hope, yourselves. - -"Still, in the name of the gods who once presided over our confederacy, -and of our own good service in the Hellenic cause, we adjure you to -relent; to recall the decision which we fear that the Thebans may have -obtained from you; to ask back the gift that you have given them, that -they disgrace not you by slaying us; to gain a pure instead of a guilty -gratitude, and not to gratify others to be yourselves rewarded with -shame. Our lives may be quickly taken, but it will be a heavy task to -wipe away the infamy of the deed; as we are no enemies whom you might -justly punish, but friends forced into taking arms against you. To grant -us our lives would be, therefore, a righteous judgment; if you consider -also that we are prisoners who surrendered of their own accord, -stretching out our hands for quarter, whose slaughter Hellenic law -forbids, and who besides were always your benefactors. Look at the -sepulchres of your fathers, slain by the Medes and buried in our -country, whom year by year we honoured with garments and all other dues, -and the first-fruits of all that our land produced in their season, -as friends from a friendly country and allies to our old companions -in arms. Should you not decide aright, your conduct would be the very -opposite to ours. Consider only: Pausanias buried them thinking that he -was laying them in friendly ground and among men as friendly; but you, -if you kill us and make the Plataean territory Theban, will leave -your fathers and kinsmen in a hostile soil and among their murderers, -deprived of the honours which they now enjoy. What is more, you will -enslave the land in which the freedom of the Hellenes was won, make -desolate the temples of the gods to whom they prayed before they -overcame the Medes, and take away your ancestral sacrifices from those -who founded and instituted them. - -"It were not to your glory, Lacedaemonians, either to offend in this way -against the common law of the Hellenes and against your own ancestors, -or to kill us your benefactors to gratify another's hatred without -having been wronged yourselves: it were more so to spare us and to yield -to the impressions of a reasonable compassion; reflecting not merely -on the awful fate in store for us, but also on the character of the -sufferers, and on the impossibility of predicting how soon misfortune -may fall even upon those who deserve it not. We, as we have a right to -do and as our need impels us, entreat you, calling aloud upon the gods -at whose common altar all the Hellenes worship, to hear our request, to -be not unmindful of the oaths which your fathers swore, and which we -now plead--we supplicate you by the tombs of your fathers, and appeal -to those that are gone to save us from falling into the hands of the -Thebans and their dearest friends from being given up to their most -detested foes. We also remind you of that day on which we did the most -glorious deeds, by your fathers' sides, we who now on this are like to -suffer the most dreadful fate. Finally, to do what is necessary and -yet most difficult for men in our situation--that is, to make an end of -speaking, since with that ending the peril of our lives draws near--in -conclusion we say that we did not surrender our city to the Thebans (to -that we would have preferred inglorious starvation), but trusted in and -capitulated to you; and it would be just, if we fail to persuade you, to -put us back in the same position and let us take the chance that falls -to us. And at the same time we adjure you not to give us up--your -suppliants, Lacedaemonians, out of your hands and faith, Plataeans -foremost of the Hellenic patriots, to Thebans, our most hated -enemies--but to be our saviours, and not, while you free the rest of the -Hellenes, to bring us to destruction." - -Such were the words of the Plataeans. The Thebans, afraid that the -Lacedaemonians might be moved by what they had heard, came forward and -said that they too desired to address them, since the Plataeans had, -against their wish, been allowed to speak at length instead of being -confined to a simple answer to the question. Leave being granted, the -Thebans spoke as follows: - -"We should never have asked to make this speech if the Plataeans on -their side had contented themselves with shortly answering the question, -and had not turned round and made charges against us, coupled with a -long defence of themselves upon matters outside the present inquiry and -not even the subject of accusation, and with praise of what no one -finds fault with. However, since they have done so, we must answer their -charges and refute their self-praise, in order that neither our bad name -nor their good may help them, but that you may hear the real truth on -both points, and so decide. - -"The origin of our quarrel was this. We settled Plataea some time after -the rest of Boeotia, together with other places out of which we had -driven the mixed population. The Plataeans not choosing to recognize our -supremacy, as had been first arranged, but separating themselves from -the rest of the Boeotians, and proving traitors to their nationality, -we used compulsion; upon which they went over to the Athenians, and with -them did as much harm, for which we retaliated. - -"Next, when the barbarian invaded Hellas, they say that they were the -only Boeotians who did not Medize; and this is where they most glorify -themselves and abuse us. We say that if they did not Medize, it was -because the Athenians did not do so either; just as afterwards when the -Athenians attacked the Hellenes they, the Plataeans, were again the only -Boeotians who Atticized. And yet consider the forms of our respective -governments when we so acted. Our city at that juncture had neither an -oligarchical constitution in which all the nobles enjoyed equal -rights, nor a democracy, but that which is most opposed to law and good -government and nearest a tyranny--the rule of a close cabal. These, -hoping to strengthen their individual power by the success of the Mede, -kept down by force the people, and brought him into the town. The city -as a whole was not its own mistress when it so acted, and ought not to -be reproached for the errors that it committed while deprived of its -constitution. Examine only how we acted after the departure of the Mede -and the recovery of the constitution; when the Athenians attacked the -rest of Hellas and endeavoured to subjugate our country, of the greater -part of which faction had already made them masters. Did not we fight -and conquer at Coronea and liberate Boeotia, and do we not now actively -contribute to the liberation of the rest, providing horses to the cause -and a force unequalled by that of any other state in the confederacy? - -"Let this suffice to excuse us for our Medism. We will now endeavour -to show that you have injured the Hellenes more than we, and are more -deserving of condign punishment. It was in defence against us, say you, -that you became allies and citizens of Athens. If so, you ought only -to have called in the Athenians against us, instead of joining them in -attacking others: it was open to you to do this if you ever felt that -they were leading you where you did not wish to follow, as Lacedaemon -was already your ally against the Mede, as you so much insist; and this -was surely sufficient to keep us off, and above all to allow you to -deliberate in security. Nevertheless, of your own choice and without -compulsion you chose to throw your lot in with Athens. And you say that -it had been base for you to betray your benefactors; but it was surely -far baser and more iniquitous to sacrifice the whole body of the -Hellenes, your fellow confederates, who were liberating Hellas, than the -Athenians only, who were enslaving it. The return that you made them was -therefore neither equal nor honourable, since you called them in, as you -say, because you were being oppressed yourselves, and then became their -accomplices in oppressing others; although baseness rather consists in -not returning like for like than in not returning what is justly due but -must be unjustly paid. - -"Meanwhile, after thus plainly showing that it was not for the sake -of the Hellenes that you alone then did not Medize, but because the -Athenians did not do so either, and you wished to side with them and -to be against the rest; you now claim the benefit of good deeds done -to please your neighbours. This cannot be admitted: you chose the -Athenians, and with them you must stand or fall. Nor can you plead the -league then made and claim that it should now protect you. You abandoned -that league, and offended against it by helping instead of hindering the -subjugation of the Aeginetans and others of its members, and that not -under compulsion, but while in enjoyment of the same institutions that -you enjoy to the present hour, and no one forcing you as in our case. -Lastly, an invitation was addressed to you before you were blockaded -to be neutral and join neither party: this you did not accept. Who then -merit the detestation of the Hellenes more justly than you, you who -sought their ruin under the mask of honour? The former virtues that you -allege you now show not to be proper to your character; the real bent of -your nature has been at length damningly proved: when the Athenians took -the path of injustice you followed them. - -"Of our unwilling Medism and your wilful Atticizing this then is our -explanation. The last wrong wrong of which you complain consists in our -having, as you say, lawlessly invaded your town in time of peace and -festival. Here again we cannot think that we were more in fault than -yourselves. If of our own proper motion we made an armed attack upon -your city and ravaged your territory, we are guilty; but if the first -men among you in estate and family, wishing to put an end to the foreign -connection and to restore you to the common Boeotian country, of their -own free will invited us, wherein is our crime? Where wrong is done, -those who lead, as you say, are more to blame than those who follow. Not -that, in our judgment, wrong was done either by them or by us. Citizens -like yourselves, and with more at stake than you, they opened their own -walls and introduced us into their own city, not as foes but as friends, -to prevent the bad among you from becoming worse; to give honest men -their due; to reform principles without attacking persons, since -you were not to be banished from your city, but brought home to your -kindred, nor to be made enemies to any, but friends alike to all. - -"That our intention was not hostile is proved by our behaviour. We did -no harm to any one, but publicly invited those who wished to live under -a national, Boeotian government to come over to us; which as first you -gladly did, and made an agreement with us and remained tranquil, until -you became aware of the smallness of our numbers. Now it is possible -that there may have been something not quite fair in our entering -without the consent of your commons. At any rate you did not repay us in -kind. Instead of refraining, as we had done, from violence, and inducing -us to retire by negotiation, you fell upon us in violation of your -agreement, and slew some of us in fight, of which we do not so much -complain, for in that there was a certain justice; but others who held -out their hands and received quarter, and whose lives you subsequently -promised us, you lawlessly butchered. If this was not abominable, what -is? And after these three crimes committed one after the other--the -violation of your agreement, the murder of the men afterwards, and the -lying breach of your promise not to kill them, if we refrained from -injuring your property in the country--you still affirm that we are the -criminals and yourselves pretend to escape justice. Not so, if these -your judges decide aright, but you will be punished for all together. - -"Such, Lacedaemonians, are the facts. We have gone into them at some -length both on your account and on our own, that you may fed that -you will justly condemn the prisoners, and we, that we have given an -additional sanction to our vengeance. We would also prevent you from -being melted by hearing of their past virtues, if any such they had: -these may be fairly appealed to by the victims of injustice, but only -aggravate the guilt of criminals, since they offend against their better -nature. Nor let them gain anything by crying and wailing, by calling -upon your fathers' tombs and their own desolate condition. Against this -we point to the far more dreadful fate of our youth, butchered at their -hands; the fathers of whom either fell at Coronea, bringing Boeotia over -to you, or seated, forlorn old men by desolate hearths, with far more -reason implore your justice upon the prisoners. The pity which they -appeal to is rather due to men who suffer unworthily; those who suffer -justly as they do are on the contrary subjects for triumph. For their -present desolate condition they have themselves to blame, since they -wilfully rejected the better alliance. Their lawless act was not -provoked by any action of ours: hate, not justice, inspired their -decision; and even now the satisfaction which they afford us is not -adequate; they will suffer by a legal sentence, not as they pretend -as suppliants asking for quarter in battle, but as prisoners who have -surrendered upon agreement to take their trial. Vindicate, therefore, -Lacedaemonians, the Hellenic law which they have broken; and to us, the -victims of its violation, grant the reward merited by our zeal. Nor let -us be supplanted in your favour by their harangues, but offer an example -to the Hellenes, that the contests to which you invite them are of -deeds, not words: good deeds can be shortly stated, but where wrong is -done a wealth of language is needed to veil its deformity. However, if -leading powers were to do what you are now doing, and putting one short -question to all alike were to decide accordingly, men would be less -tempted to seek fine phrases to cover bad actions." - -Such were the words of the Thebans. The Lacedaemonian judges decided -that the question whether they had received any service from the -Plataeans in the war, was a fair one for them to put; as they had -always invited them to be neutral, agreeably to the original covenant of -Pausanias after the defeat of the Mede, and had again definitely offered -them the same conditions before the blockade. This offer having -been refused, they were now, they conceived, by the loyalty of their -intention released from their covenant; and having, as they considered, -suffered evil at the hands of the Plataeans, they brought them in again -one by one and asked each of them the same question, that is to say, -whether they had done the Lacedaemonians and allies any service in the -war; and upon their saying that they had not, took them out and slew -them, all without exception. The number of Plataeans thus massacred was -not less than two hundred, with twenty-five Athenians who had shared in -the siege. The women were taken as slaves. The city the Thebans gave -for about a year to some political emigrants from Megara and to the -surviving Plataeans of their own party to inhabit, and afterwards razed -it to the ground from the very foundations, and built on to the precinct -of Hera an inn two hundred feet square, with rooms all round above -and below, making use for this purpose of the roofs and doors of the -Plataeans: of the rest of the materials in the wall, the brass and the -iron, they made couches which they dedicated to Hera, for whom they also -built a stone chapel of a hundred feet square. The land they confiscated -and let out on a ten years' lease to Theban occupiers. The adverse -attitude of the Lacedaemonians in the whole Plataean affair was mainly -adopted to please the Thebans, who were thought to be useful in the war -at that moment raging. Such was the end of Plataea, in the ninety-third -year after she became the ally of Athens. - -Meanwhile, the forty ships of the Peloponnesians that had gone to the -relief of the Lesbians, and which we left flying across the open -sea, pursued by the Athenians, were caught in a storm off Crete, and -scattering from thence made their way to Peloponnese, where they found -at Cyllene thirteen Leucadian and Ambraciot galleys, with Brasidas, son -of Tellis, lately arrived as counsellor to Alcidas; the Lacedaemonians, -upon the failure of the Lesbian expedition, having resolved to -strengthen their fleet and sail to Corcyra, where a revolution had -broken out, so as to arrive there before the twelve Athenian ships at -Naupactus could be reinforced from Athens. Brasidas and Alcidas began to -prepare accordingly. - -The Corcyraean revolution began with the return of the prisoners taken -in the sea-fights off Epidamnus. These the Corinthians had released, -nominally upon the security of eight hundred talents given by their -proxeni, but in reality upon their engagement to bring over Corcyra to -Corinth. These men proceeded to canvass each of the citizens, and to -intrigue with the view of detaching the city from Athens. Upon the -arrival of an Athenian and a Corinthian vessel, with envoys on board, a -conference was held in which the Corcyraeans voted to remain allies of -the Athenians according to their agreement, but to be friends of the -Peloponnesians as they had been formerly. Meanwhile, the returned -prisoners brought Peithias, a volunteer proxenus of the Athenians and -leader of the commons, to trial, upon the charge of enslaving Corcyra to -Athens. He, being acquitted, retorted by accusing five of the richest -of their number of cutting stakes in the ground sacred to Zeus and -Alcinous; the legal penalty being a stater for each stake. Upon their -conviction, the amount of the penalty being very large, they seated -themselves as suppliants in the temples to be allowed to pay it by -instalments; but Peithias, who was one of the senate, prevailed upon -that body to enforce the law; upon which the accused, rendered desperate -by the law, and also learning that Peithias had the intention, while -still a member of the senate, to persuade the people to conclude a -defensive and offensive alliance with Athens, banded together armed with -daggers, and suddenly bursting into the senate killed Peithias and sixty -others, senators and private persons; some few only of the party -of Peithias taking refuge in the Athenian galley, which had not yet -departed. - -After this outrage, the conspirators summoned the Corcyraeans to an -assembly, and said that this would turn out for the best, and would -save them from being enslaved by Athens: for the future, they moved -to receive neither party unless they came peacefully in a single ship, -treating any larger number as enemies. This motion made, they compelled -it to be adopted, and instantly sent off envoys to Athens to justify -what had been done and to dissuade the refugees there from any hostile -proceedings which might lead to a reaction. - -Upon the arrival of the embassy, the Athenians arrested the envoys and -all who listened to them, as revolutionists, and lodged them in Aegina. -Meanwhile a Corinthian galley arriving in the island with Lacedaemonian -envoys, the dominant Corcyraean party attacked the commons and defeated -them in battle. Night coming on, the commons took refuge in the -Acropolis and the higher parts of the city, and concentrated themselves -there, having also possession of the Hyllaic harbour; their adversaries -occupying the market-place, where most of them lived, and the harbour -adjoining, looking towards the mainland. - -The next day passed in skirmishes of little importance, each party -sending into the country to offer freedom to the slaves and to invite -them to join them. The mass of the slaves answered the appeal of the -commons; their antagonists being reinforced by eight hundred mercenaries -from the continent. - -After a day's interval hostilities recommenced, victory remaining with -the commons, who had the advantage in numbers and position, the women -also valiantly assisting them, pelting with tiles from the houses, and -supporting the melee with a fortitude beyond their sex. Towards dusk, -the oligarchs in full rout, fearing that the victorious commons might -assault and carry the arsenal and put them to the sword, fired the -houses round the marketplace and the lodging-houses, in order to bar -their advance; sparing neither their own, nor those of their neighbours; -by which much stuff of the merchants was consumed and the city risked -total destruction, if a wind had come to help the flame by blowing on -it. Hostilities now ceasing, both sides kept quiet, passing the night -on guard, while the Corinthian ship stole out to sea upon the victory -of the commons, and most of the mercenaries passed over secretly to the -continent. - -The next day the Athenian general, Nicostratus, son of Diitrephes, came -up from Naupactus with twelve ships and five hundred Messenian heavy -infantry. He at once endeavoured to bring about a settlement, and -persuaded the two parties to agree together to bring to trial ten of the -ringleaders, who presently fled, while the rest were to live in -peace, making terms with each other, and entering into a defensive and -offensive alliance with the Athenians. This arranged, he was about to -sail away, when the leaders of the commons induced him to leave them -five of his ships to make their adversaries less disposed to move, while -they manned and sent with him an equal number of their own. He had no -sooner consented, than they began to enroll their enemies for the -ships; and these, fearing that they might be sent off to Athens, seated -themselves as suppliants in the temple of the Dioscuri. An attempt on -the part of Nicostratus to reassure them and to persuade them to rise -proving unsuccessful, the commons armed upon this pretext, alleging -the refusal of their adversaries to sail with them as a proof of the -hollowness of their intentions, and took their arms out of their houses, -and would have dispatched some whom they fell in with, if Nicostratus -had not prevented it. The rest of the party, seeing what was going on, -seated themselves as suppliants in the temple of Hera, being not less -than four hundred in number; until the commons, fearing that they might -adopt some desperate resolution, induced them to rise, and conveyed them -over to the island in front of the temple, where provisions were sent -across to them. - -At this stage in the revolution, on the fourth or fifth day after the -removal of the men to the island, the Peloponnesian ships arrived from -Cyllene where they had been stationed since their return from Ionia, -fifty-three in number, still under the command of Alcidas, but with -Brasidas also on board as his adviser; and dropping anchor at Sybota, a -harbour on the mainland, at daybreak made sail for Corcyra. - -The Corcyraeans in great confusion and alarm at the state of things in -the city and at the approach of the invader, at once proceeded to equip -sixty vessels, which they sent out, as fast as they were manned, against -the enemy, in spite of the Athenians recommending them to let them sail -out first, and to follow themselves afterwards with all their ships -together. Upon their vessels coming up to the enemy in this straggling -fashion, two immediately deserted: in others the crews were fighting -among themselves, and there was no order in anything that was done; so -that the Peloponnesians, seeing their confusion, placed twenty ships to -oppose the Corcyraeans, and ranged the rest against the twelve Athenian -ships, amongst which were the two vessels Salaminia and Paralus. - -While the Corcyraeans, attacking without judgment and in small -detachments, were already crippled by their own misconduct, the -Athenians, afraid of the numbers of the enemy and of being surrounded, -did not venture to attack the main body or even the centre of the -division opposed to them, but fell upon its wing and sank one vessel; -after which the Peloponnesians formed in a circle, and the Athenians -rowed round them and tried to throw them into disorder. Perceiving this, -the division opposed to the Corcyraeans, fearing a repetition of the -disaster of Naupactus, came to support their friends, and the whole -fleet now bore down, united, upon the Athenians, who retired before it, -backing water, retiring as leisurely as possible in order to give the -Corcyraeans time to escape, while the enemy was thus kept occupied. Such -was the character of this sea-fight, which lasted until sunset. - -The Corcyraeans now feared that the enemy would follow up their victory -and sail against the town and rescue the men in the island, or strike -some other blow equally decisive, and accordingly carried the men -over again to the temple of Hera, and kept guard over the city. The -Peloponnesians, however, although victorious in the sea-fight, did not -venture to attack the town, but took the thirteen Corcyraean vessels -which they had captured, and with them sailed back to the continent -from whence they had put out. The next day equally they refrained -from attacking the city, although the disorder and panic were at their -height, and though Brasidas, it is said, urged Alcidas, his superior -officer, to do so, but they landed upon the promontory of Leukimme and -laid waste the country. - -Meanwhile the commons in Corcyra, being still in great fear of the fleet -attacking them, came to a parley with the suppliants and their friends, -in order to save the town; and prevailed upon some of them to go on -board the ships, of which they still manned thirty, against the expected -attack. But the Peloponnesians after ravaging the country until midday -sailed away, and towards nightfall were informed by beacon signals of -the approach of sixty Athenian vessels from Leucas, under the command of -Eurymedon, son of Thucles; which had been sent off by the Athenians upon -the news of the revolution and of the fleet with Alcidas being about to -sail for Corcyra. - -The Peloponnesians accordingly at once set off in haste by night for -home, coasting along shore; and hauling their ships across the Isthmus -of Leucas, in order not to be seen doubling it, so departed. The -Corcyraeans, made aware of the approach of the Athenian fleet and of the -departure of the enemy, brought the Messenians from outside the walls -into the town, and ordered the fleet which they had manned to sail round -into the Hyllaic harbour; and while it was so doing, slew such of their -enemies as they laid hands on, dispatching afterwards, as they landed -them, those whom they had persuaded to go on board the ships. Next they -went to the sanctuary of Hera and persuaded about fifty men to take -their trial, and condemned them all to death. The mass of the suppliants -who had refused to do so, on seeing what was taking place, slew each -other there in the consecrated ground; while some hanged themselves upon -the trees, and others destroyed themselves as they were severally -able. During seven days that Eurymedon stayed with his sixty ships, the -Corcyraeans were engaged in butchering those of their fellow citizens -whom they regarded as their enemies: and although the crime imputed was -that of attempting to put down the democracy, some were slain also for -private hatred, others by their debtors because of the moneys owed to -them. Death thus raged in every shape; and, as usually happens at such -times, there was no length to which violence did not go; sons were -killed by their fathers, and suppliants dragged from the altar or slain -upon it; while some were even walled up in the temple of Dionysus and -died there. - -So bloody was the march of the revolution, and the impression which it -made was the greater as it was one of the first to occur. Later on, one -may say, the whole Hellenic world was convulsed; struggles being every, -where made by the popular chiefs to bring in the Athenians, and by the -oligarchs to introduce the Lacedaemonians. In peace there would have -been neither the pretext nor the wish to make such an invitation; but -in war, with an alliance always at the command of either faction for -the hurt of their adversaries and their own corresponding advantage, -opportunities for bringing in the foreigner were never wanting to the -revolutionary parties. The sufferings which revolution entailed upon -the cities were many and terrible, such as have occurred and always will -occur, as long as the nature of mankind remains the same; though in a -severer or milder form, and varying in their symptoms, according to the -variety of the particular cases. In peace and prosperity, states and -individuals have better sentiments, because they do not find themselves -suddenly confronted with imperious necessities; but war takes away the -easy supply of daily wants, and so proves a rough master, that brings -most men's characters to a level with their fortunes. Revolution thus -ran its course from city to city, and the places which it arrived at -last, from having heard what had been done before, carried to a still -greater excess the refinement of their inventions, as manifested in the -cunning of their enterprises and the atrocity of their reprisals. Words -had to change their ordinary meaning and to take that which was now -given them. Reckless audacity came to be considered the courage of a -loyal ally; prudent hesitation, specious cowardice; moderation was held -to be a cloak for unmanliness; ability to see all sides of a question, -inaptness to act on any. Frantic violence became the attribute of -manliness; cautious plotting, a justifiable means of self-defence. The -advocate of extreme measures was always trustworthy; his opponent a -man to be suspected. To succeed in a plot was to have a shrewd head, to -divine a plot a still shrewder; but to try to provide against having -to do either was to break up your party and to be afraid of your -adversaries. In fine, to forestall an intending criminal, or to suggest -the idea of a crime where it was wanting, was equally commended until -even blood became a weaker tie than party, from the superior readiness -of those united by the latter to dare everything without reserve; -for such associations had not in view the blessings derivable from -established institutions but were formed by ambition for their -overthrow; and the confidence of their members in each other rested -less on any religious sanction than upon complicity in crime. The fair -proposals of an adversary were met with jealous precautions by the -stronger of the two, and not with a generous confidence. Revenge -also was held of more account than self-preservation. Oaths of -reconciliation, being only proffered on either side to meet an immediate -difficulty, only held good so long as no other weapon was at hand; but -when opportunity offered, he who first ventured to seize it and to take -his enemy off his guard, thought this perfidious vengeance sweeter than -an open one, since, considerations of safety apart, success by treachery -won him the palm of superior intelligence. Indeed it is generally the -case that men are readier to call rogues clever than simpletons honest, -and are as ashamed of being the second as they are proud of being the -first. The cause of all these evils was the lust for power arising from -greed and ambition; and from these passions proceeded the violence of -parties once engaged in contention. The leaders in the cities, each -provided with the fairest professions, on the one side with the cry -of political equality of the people, on the other of a moderate -aristocracy, sought prizes for themselves in those public interests -which they pretended to cherish, and, recoiling from no means in their -struggles for ascendancy engaged in the direst excesses; in their acts -of vengeance they went to even greater lengths, not stopping at what -justice or the good of the state demanded, but making the party caprice -of the moment their only standard, and invoking with equal readiness the -condemnation of an unjust verdict or the authority of the strong arm -to glut the animosities of the hour. Thus religion was in honour with -neither party; but the use of fair phrases to arrive at guilty ends was -in high reputation. Meanwhile the moderate part of the citizens perished -between the two, either for not joining in the quarrel, or because envy -would not suffer them to escape. - -Thus every form of iniquity took root in the Hellenic countries by -reason of the troubles. The ancient simplicity into which honour so -largely entered was laughed down and disappeared; and society became -divided into camps in which no man trusted his fellow. To put an end to -this, there was neither promise to be depended upon, nor oath that could -command respect; but all parties dwelling rather in their calculation -upon the hopelessness of a permanent state of things, were more intent -upon self-defence than capable of confidence. In this contest -the blunter wits were most successful. Apprehensive of their own -deficiencies and of the cleverness of their antagonists, they feared to -be worsted in debate and to be surprised by the combinations of their -more versatile opponents, and so at once boldly had recourse to action: -while their adversaries, arrogantly thinking that they should know -in time, and that it was unnecessary to secure by action what policy -afforded, often fell victims to their want of precaution. - -Meanwhile Corcyra gave the first example of most of the crimes alluded -to; of the reprisals exacted by the governed who had never experienced -equitable treatment or indeed aught but insolence from their -rulers--when their hour came; of the iniquitous resolves of those who -desired to get rid of their accustomed poverty, and ardently coveted -their neighbours' goods; and lastly, of the savage and pitiless excesses -into which men who had begun the struggle, not in a class but in a party -spirit, were hurried by their ungovernable passions. In the confusion -into which life was now thrown in the cities, human nature, always -rebelling against the law and now its master, gladly showed itself -ungoverned in passion, above respect for justice, and the enemy of all -superiority; since revenge would not have been set above religion, and -gain above justice, had it not been for the fatal power of envy. Indeed -men too often take upon themselves in the prosecution of their revenge -to set the example of doing away with those general laws to which all -alike can look for salvation in adversity, instead of allowing them to -subsist against the day of danger when their aid may be required. - -While the revolutionary passions thus for the first time displayed -themselves in the factions of Corcyra, Eurymedon and the Athenian fleet -sailed away; after which some five hundred Corcyraean exiles who had -succeeded in escaping, took some forts on the mainland, and becoming -masters of the Corcyraean territory over the water, made this their base -to Plunder their countrymen in the island, and did so much damage as to -cause a severe famine in the town. They also sent envoys to Lacedaemon -and Corinth to negotiate their restoration; but meeting with no success, -afterwards got together boats and mercenaries and crossed over to the -island, being about six hundred in all; and burning their boats so as to -have no hope except in becoming masters of the country, went up to Mount -Istone, and fortifying themselves there, began to annoy those in the -city and obtained command of the country. - -At the close of the same summer the Athenians sent twenty ships -under the command of Laches, son of Melanopus, and Charoeades, son of -Euphiletus, to Sicily, where the Syracusans and Leontines were at -war. The Syracusans had for allies all the Dorian cities except -Camarina--these had been included in the Lacedaemonian confederacy from -the commencement of the war, though they had not taken any active part -in it--the Leontines had Camarina and the Chalcidian cities. In Italy -the Locrians were for the Syracusans, the Rhegians for their Leontine -kinsmen. The allies of the Leontines now sent to Athens and appealed -to their ancient alliance and to their Ionian origin, to persuade the -Athenians to send them a fleet, as the Syracusans were blockading them -by land and sea. The Athenians sent it upon the plea of their common -descent, but in reality to prevent the exportation of Sicilian corn -to Peloponnese and to test the possibility of bringing Sicily into -subjection. Accordingly they established themselves at Rhegium in Italy, -and from thence carried on the war in concert with their allies. - - - - -CHAPTER XI - -_Year of the War--Campaigns of Demosthenes in Western Greece--Ruin of -Ambracia_ - -Summer was now over. The winter following, the plague a second time -attacked the Athenians; for although it had never entirely left them, -still there had been a notable abatement in its ravages. The second -visit lasted no less than a year, the first having lasted two; and -nothing distressed the Athenians and reduced their power more than this. -No less than four thousand four hundred heavy infantry in the ranks died -of it and three hundred cavalry, besides a number of the multitude -that was never ascertained. At the same time took place the numerous -earthquakes in Athens, Euboea, and Boeotia, particularly at Orchomenus -in the last-named country. - -The same winter the Athenians in Sicily and the Rhegians, with thirty -ships, made an expedition against the islands of Aeolus; it being -impossible to invade them in summer, owing to the want of water. These -islands are occupied by the Liparaeans, a Cnidian colony, who live -in one of them of no great size called Lipara; and from this as their -headquarters cultivate the rest, Didyme, Strongyle, and Hiera. In Hiera -the people in those parts believe that Hephaestus has his forge, from -the quantity of flame which they see it send out by night, and of smoke -by day. These islands lie off the coast of the Sicels and Messinese, and -were allies of the Syracusans. The Athenians laid waste their land, -and as the inhabitants did not submit, sailed back to Rhegium. Thus the -winter ended, and with it ended the fifth year of this war, of which -Thucydides was the historian. - -The next summer the Peloponnesians and their allies set out to invade -Attica under the command of Agis, son of Archidamus, and went as far -as the Isthmus, but numerous earthquakes occurring, turned back again -without the invasion taking place. About the same time that these -earthquakes were so common, the sea at Orobiae, in Euboea, retiring from -the then line of coast, returned in a huge wave and invaded a great part -of the town, and retreated leaving some of it still under water; so -that what was once land is now sea; such of the inhabitants perishing as -could not run up to the higher ground in time. A similar inundation -also occurred at Atalanta, the island off the Opuntian Locrian coast, -carrying away part of the Athenian fort and wrecking one of two ships -which were drawn up on the beach. At Peparethus also the sea retreated -a little, without however any inundation following; and an earthquake -threw down part of the wall, the town hall, and a few other buildings. -The cause, in my opinion, of this phenomenon must be sought in the -earthquake. At the point where its shock has been the most violent, the -sea is driven back and, suddenly recoiling with redoubled force, causes -the inundation. Without an earthquake I do not see how such an accident -could happen. - -During the same summer different operations were carried on by the -different belligerents in Sicily; by the Siceliots themselves against -each other, and by the Athenians and their allies: I shall however -confine myself to the actions in which the Athenians took part, choosing -the most important. The death of the Athenian general Charoeades, killed -by the Syracusans in battle, left Laches in the sole command of the -fleet, which he now directed in concert with the allies against Mylae, -a place belonging to the Messinese. Two Messinese battalions in garrison -at Mylae laid an ambush for the party landing from the ships, but were -routed with great slaughter by the Athenians and their allies, who -thereupon assaulted the fortification and compelled them to surrender -the Acropolis and to march with them upon Messina. This town afterwards -also submitted upon the approach of the Athenians and their allies, and -gave hostages and all other securities required. - -The same summer the Athenians sent thirty ships round Peloponnese under -Demosthenes, son of Alcisthenes, and Procles, son of Theodorus, and -sixty others, with two thousand heavy infantry, against Melos, under -Nicias, son of Niceratus; wishing to reduce the Melians, who, although -islanders, refused to be subjects of Athens or even to join her -confederacy. The devastation of their land not procuring their -submission, the fleet, weighing from Melos, sailed to Oropus in the -territory of Graea, and landing at nightfall, the heavy infantry started -at once from the ships by land for Tanagra in Boeotia, where they were -met by the whole levy from Athens, agreeably to a concerted signal, -under the command of Hipponicus, son of Callias, and Eurymedon, son of -Thucles. They encamped, and passing that day in ravaging the Tanagraean -territory, remained there for the night; and next day, after defeating -those of the Tanagraeans who sailed out against them and some Thebans -who had come up to help the Tanagraeans, took some arms, set up a -trophy, and retired, the troops to the city and the others to the ships. -Nicias with his sixty ships coasted alongshore and ravaged the Locrian -seaboard, and so returned home. - -About this time the Lacedaemonians founded their colony of Heraclea in -Trachis, their object being the following: the Malians form in all three -tribes, the Paralians, the Hiereans, and the Trachinians. The last -of these having suffered severely in a war with their neighbours -the Oetaeans, at first intended to give themselves up to Athens; but -afterwards fearing not to find in her the security that they sought, -sent to Lacedaemon, having chosen Tisamenus for their ambassador. In -this embassy joined also the Dorians from the mother country of the -Lacedaemonians, with the same request, as they themselves also suffered -from the same enemy. After hearing them, the Lacedaemonians determined -to send out the colony, wishing to assist the Trachinians and Dorians, -and also because they thought that the proposed town would lie -conveniently for the purposes of the war against the Athenians. A fleet -might be got ready there against Euboea, with the advantage of a short -passage to the island; and the town would also be useful as a station on -the road to Thrace. In short, everything made the Lacedaemonians -eager to found the place. After first consulting the god at Delphi and -receiving a favourable answer, they sent off the colonists, Spartans, -and Perioeci, inviting also any of the rest of the Hellenes who might -wish to accompany them, except Ionians, Achaeans, and certain other -nationalities; three Lacedaemonians leading as founders of the colony, -Leon, Alcidas, and Damagon. The settlement effected, they fortified anew -the city, now called Heraclea, distant about four miles and a half from -Thermopylae and two miles and a quarter from the sea, and commenced -building docks, closing the side towards Thermopylae just by the pass -itself, in order that they might be easily defended. - -The foundation of this town, evidently meant to annoy Euboea (the -passage across to Cenaeum in that island being a short one), at first -caused some alarm at Athens, which the event however did nothing to -justify, the town never giving them any trouble. The reason of this -was as follows. The Thessalians, who were sovereign in those parts, and -whose territory was menaced by its foundation, were afraid that it might -prove a very powerful neighbour, and accordingly continually harassed -and made war upon the new settlers, until they at last wore them out in -spite of their originally considerable numbers, people flocking from -all quarters to a place founded by the Lacedaemonians, and thus thought -secure of prosperity. On the other hand the Lacedaemonians themselves, -in the persons of their governors, did their full share towards ruining -its prosperity and reducing its population, as they frightened away the -greater part of the inhabitants by governing harshly and in some cases -not fairly, and thus made it easier for their neighbours to prevail -against them. - -The same summer, about the same time that the Athenians were detained -at Melos, their fellow citizens in the thirty ships cruising round -Peloponnese, after cutting off some guards in an ambush at Ellomenus in -Leucadia, subsequently went against Leucas itself with a large armament, -having been reinforced by the whole levy of the Acarnanians except -Oeniadae, and by the Zacynthians and Cephallenians and fifteen ships -from Corcyra. While the Leucadians witnessed the devastation of their -land, without and within the isthmus upon which the town of Leucas and -the temple of Apollo stand, without making any movement on account -of the overwhelming numbers of the enemy, the Acarnanians urged -Demosthenes, the Athenian general, to build a wall so as to cut off -the town from the continent, a measure which they were convinced would -secure its capture and rid them once and for all of a most troublesome -enemy. - -Demosthenes however had in the meanwhile been persuaded by the -Messenians that it was a fine opportunity for him, having so large an -army assembled, to attack the Aetolians, who were not only the enemies -of Naupactus, but whose reduction would further make it easy to gain -the rest of that part of the continent for the Athenians. The Aetolian -nation, although numerous and warlike, yet dwelt in unwalled villages -scattered far apart, and had nothing but light armour, and might, -according to the Messenians, be subdued without much difficulty before -succours could arrive. The plan which they recommended was to attack -first the Apodotians, next the Ophionians, and after these the -Eurytanians, who are the largest tribe in Aetolia, and speak, as is -said, a language exceedingly difficult to understand, and eat their -flesh raw. These once subdued, the rest would easily come in. - -To this plan Demosthenes consented, not only to please the Messenians, -but also in the belief that by adding the Aetolians to his other -continental allies he would be able, without aid from home, to march -against the Boeotians by way of Ozolian Locris to Kytinium in Doris, -keeping Parnassus on his right until he descended to the Phocians, whom -he could force to join him if their ancient friendship for Athens did -not, as he anticipated, at once decide them to do so. Arrived in Phocis -he was already upon the frontier of Boeotia. He accordingly weighed from -Leucas, against the wish of the Acarnanians, and with his whole armament -sailed along the coast to Sollium, where he communicated to them his -intention; and upon their refusing to agree to it on account of the -non-investment of Leucas, himself with the rest of the forces, the -Cephallenians, the Messenians, and Zacynthians, and three hundred -Athenian marines from his own ships (the fifteen Corcyraean vessels -having departed), started on his expedition against the Aetolians. His -base he established at Oeneon in Locris, as the Ozolian Locrians were -allies of Athens and were to meet him with all their forces in the -interior. Being neighbours of the Aetolians and armed in the same way, -it was thought that they would be of great service upon the expedition, -from their acquaintance with the localities and the warfare of the -inhabitants. - -After bivouacking with the army in the precinct of Nemean Zeus, in -which the poet Hesiod is said to have been killed by the people of the -country, according to an oracle which had foretold that he should die in -Nemea, Demosthenes set out at daybreak to invade Aetolia. The first day -he took Potidania, the next Krokyle, and the third Tichium, where he -halted and sent back the booty to Eupalium in Locris, having determined -to pursue his conquests as far as the Ophionians, and, in the event -of their refusing to submit, to return to Naupactus and make them the -objects of a second expedition. Meanwhile the Aetolians had been aware -of his design from the moment of its formation, and as soon as the army -invaded their country came up in great force with all their tribes; -even the most remote Ophionians, the Bomiensians, and Calliensians, who -extend towards the Malian Gulf, being among the number. - -The Messenians, however, adhered to their original advice. Assuring -Demosthenes that the Aetolians were an easy conquest, they urged him to -push on as rapidly as possible, and to try to take the villages as fast -as he came up to them, without waiting until the whole nation should be -in arms against him. Led on by his advisers and trusting in his fortune, -as he had met with no opposition, without waiting for his Locrian -reinforcements, who were to have supplied him with the light-armed -darters in which he was most deficient, he advanced and stormed -Aegitium, the inhabitants flying before him and posting themselves upon -the hills above the town, which stood on high ground about nine miles -from the sea. Meanwhile the Aetolians had gathered to the rescue, and -now attacked the Athenians and their allies, running down from the hills -on every side and darting their javelins, falling back when the Athenian -army advanced, and coming on as it retired; and for a long while the -battle was of this character, alternate advance and retreat, in both -which operations the Athenians had the worst. - -Still as long as their archers had arrows left and were able to use -them, they held out, the light-armed Aetolians retiring before the -arrows; but after the captain of the archers had been killed and his men -scattered, the soldiers, wearied out with the constant repetition of the -same exertions and hard pressed by the Aetolians with their javelins, at -last turned and fled, and falling into pathless gullies and places that -they were unacquainted with, thus perished, the Messenian Chromon, -their guide, having also unfortunately been killed. A great many were -overtaken in the pursuit by the swift-footed and light-armed Aetolians, -and fell beneath their javelins; the greater number however missed their -road and rushed into the wood, which had no ways out, and which was soon -fired and burnt round them by the enemy. Indeed the Athenian army fell -victims to death in every form, and suffered all the vicissitudes of -flight; the survivors escaped with difficulty to the sea and Oeneon in -Locris, whence they had set out. Many of the allies were killed, and -about one hundred and twenty Athenian heavy infantry, not a man less, -and all in the prime of life. These were by far the best men in the city -of Athens that fell during this war. Among the slain was also Procles, -the colleague of Demosthenes. Meanwhile the Athenians took up their -dead under truce from the Aetolians, and retired to Naupactus, and from -thence went in their ships to Athens; Demosthenes staying behind in -Naupactus and in the neighbourhood, being afraid to face the Athenians -after the disaster. - -About the same time the Athenians on the coast of Sicily sailed to -Locris, and in a descent which they made from the ships defeated the -Locrians who came against them, and took a fort upon the river Halex. - -The same summer the Aetolians, who before the Athenian expedition had -sent an embassy to Corinth and Lacedaemon, composed of Tolophus, an -Ophionian, Boriades, an Eurytanian, and Tisander, an Apodotian, obtained -that an army should be sent them against Naupactus, which had invited -the Athenian invasion. The Lacedaemonians accordingly sent off towards -autumn three thousand heavy infantry of the allies, five hundred of whom -were from Heraclea, the newly founded city in Trachis, under the command -of Eurylochus, a Spartan, accompanied by Macarius and Menedaius, also -Spartans. - -The army having assembled at Delphi, Eurylochus sent a herald to the -Ozolian Locrians; the road to Naupactus lying through their territory, -and he having besides conceived the idea of detaching them from Athens. -His chief abettors in Locris were the Amphissians, who were alarmed at -the hostility of the Phocians. These first gave hostages themselves, and -induced the rest to do the same for fear of the invading army; first, -their neighbours the Myonians, who held the most difficult of the -passes, and after them the Ipnians, Messapians, Tritaeans, Chalaeans, -Tolophonians, Hessians, and Oeanthians, all of whom joined in the -expedition; the Olpaeans contenting themselves with giving hostages, -without accompanying the invasion; and the Hyaeans refusing to do -either, until the capture of Polis, one of their villages. - -His preparations completed, Eurylochus lodged the hostages in Kytinium, -in Doris, and advanced upon Naupactus through the country of the -Locrians, taking upon his way Oeneon and Eupalium, two of their towns -that refused to join him. Arrived in the Naupactian territory, and -having been now joined by the Aetolians, the army laid waste the land -and took the suburb of the town, which was unfortified; and after this -Molycrium also, a Corinthian colony subject to Athens. Meanwhile the -Athenian Demosthenes, who since the affair in Aetolia had remained near -Naupactus, having had notice of the army and fearing for the town, went -and persuaded the Acarnanians, although not without difficulty because -of his departure from Leucas, to go to the relief of Naupactus. They -accordingly sent with him on board his ships a thousand heavy infantry, -who threw themselves into the place and saved it; the extent of its -wall and the small number of its defenders otherwise placing it in the -greatest danger. Meanwhile Eurylochus and his companions, finding that -this force had entered and that it was impossible to storm the town, -withdrew, not to Peloponnese, but to the country once called Aeolis, and -now Calydon and Pleuron, and to the places in that neighbourhood, and -Proschium in Aetolia; the Ambraciots having come and urged them to -combine with them in attacking Amphilochian Argos and the rest of -Amphilochia and Acarnania; affirming that the conquest of these -countries would bring all the continent into alliance with Lacedaemon. -To this Eurylochus consented, and dismissing the Aetolians, now remained -quiet with his army in those parts, until the time should come for the -Ambraciots to take the field, and for him to join them before Argos. - -Summer was now over. The winter ensuing, the Athenians in Sicily with -their Hellenic allies, and such of the Sicel subjects or allies of -Syracuse as had revolted from her and joined their army, marched -against the Sicel town Inessa, the acropolis of which was held by -the Syracusans, and after attacking it without being able to take it, -retired. In the retreat, the allies retreating after the Athenians were -attacked by the Syracusans from the fort, and a large part of their army -routed with great slaughter. After this, Laches and the Athenians from -the ships made some descents in Locris, and defeating the Locrians, -who came against them with Proxenus, son of Capaton, upon the river -Caicinus, took some arms and departed. - -The same winter the Athenians purified Delos, in compliance, it appears, -with a certain oracle. It had been purified before by Pisistratus the -tyrant; not indeed the whole island, but as much of it as could be seen -from the temple. All of it was, however, now purified in the following -way. All the sepulchres of those that had died in Delos were taken up, -and for the future it was commanded that no one should be allowed either -to die or to give birth to a child in the island; but that they should -be carried over to Rhenea, which is so near to Delos that Polycrates, -tyrant of Samos, having added Rhenea to his other island conquests -during his period of naval ascendancy, dedicated it to the Delian Apollo -by binding it to Delos with a chain. - -The Athenians, after the purification, celebrated, for the first time, -the quinquennial festival of the Delian games. Once upon a time, -indeed, there was a great assemblage of the Ionians and the neighbouring -islanders at Delos, who used to come to the festival, as the Ionians -now do to that of Ephesus, and athletic and poetical contests took place -there, and the cities brought choirs of dancers. Nothing can be clearer -on this point than the following verses of Homer, taken from a hymn to -Apollo: - - Phoebus, wherever thou strayest, far or near, - Delos was still of all thy haunts most dear. - Thither the robed Ionians take their way - With wife and child to keep thy holiday, - Invoke thy favour on each manly game, - And dance and sing in honour of thy name. - -That there was also a poetical contest in which the Ionians went to -contend, again is shown by the following, taken from the same hymn. -After celebrating the Delian dance of the women, he ends his song of -praise with these verses, in which he also alludes to himself: - - Well, may Apollo keep you all! and so, - Sweethearts, good-bye--yet tell me not I go - Out from your hearts; and if in after hours - Some other wanderer in this world of ours - Touch at your shores, and ask your maidens here - Who sings the songs the sweetest to your ear, - Think of me then, and answer with a smile, - 'A blind old man of Scio's rocky isle.' - -Homer thus attests that there was anciently a great assembly and -festival at Delos. In later times, although the islanders and the -Athenians continued to send the choirs of dancers with sacrifices, the -contests and most of the ceremonies were abolished, probably through -adversity, until the Athenians celebrated the games upon this occasion -with the novelty of horse-races. - -The same winter the Ambraciots, as they had promised Eurylochus when -they retained his army, marched out against Amphilochian Argos with -three thousand heavy infantry, and invading the Argive territory -occupied Olpae, a stronghold on a hill near the sea, which had been -formerly fortified by the Acarnanians and used as the place of assizes -for their nation, and which is about two miles and three-quarters from -the city of Argos upon the sea-coast. Meanwhile the Acarnanians went -with a part of their forces to the relief of Argos, and with the rest -encamped in Amphilochia at the place called Crenae, or the Wells, -to watch for Eurylochus and his Peloponnesians, and to prevent their -passing through and effecting their junction with the Ambraciots; -while they also sent for Demosthenes, the commander of the Aetolian -expedition, to be their leader, and for the twenty Athenian ships that -were cruising off Peloponnese under the command of Aristotle, son -of Timocrates, and Hierophon, son of Antimnestus. On their part, the -Ambraciots at Olpae sent a messenger to their own city, to beg them to -come with their whole levy to their assistance, fearing that the army of -Eurylochus might not be able to pass through the Acarnanians, and that -they might themselves be obliged to fight single-handed, or be unable to -retreat, if they wished it, without danger. - -Meanwhile Eurylochus and his Peloponnesians, learning that the -Ambraciots at Olpae had arrived, set out from Proschium with all haste -to join them, and crossing the Achelous advanced through Acarnania, -which they found deserted by its population, who had gone to the relief -of Argos; keeping on their right the city of the Stratians and its -garrison, and on their left the rest of Acarnania. Traversing the -territory of the Stratians, they advanced through Phytia, next, skirting -Medeon, through Limnaea; after which they left Acarnania behind them -and entered a friendly country, that of the Agraeans. From thence they -reached and crossed Mount Thymaus, which belongs to the Agraeans, and -descended into the Argive territory after nightfall, and passing -between the city of Argos and the Acarnanian posts at Crenae, joined the -Ambraciots at Olpae. - -Uniting here at daybreak, they sat down at the place called Metropolis, -and encamped. Not long afterwards the Athenians in the twenty ships came -into the Ambracian Gulf to support the Argives, with Demosthenes and two -hundred Messenian heavy infantry, and sixty Athenian archers. While the -fleet off Olpae blockaded the hill from the sea, the Acarnanians and a -few of the Amphilochians, most of whom were kept back by force by the -Ambraciots, had already arrived at Argos, and were preparing to give -battle to the enemy, having chosen Demosthenes to command the whole of -the allied army in concert with their own generals. Demosthenes led them -near to Olpae and encamped, a great ravine separating the two armies. -During five days they remained inactive; on the sixth both sides formed -in order of battle. The army of the Peloponnesians was the largest and -outflanked their opponents; and Demosthenes fearing that his right might -be surrounded, placed in ambush in a hollow way overgrown with bushes -some four hundred heavy infantry and light troops, who were to rise up -at the moment of the onset behind the projecting left wing of the enemy, -and to take them in the rear. When both sides were ready they joined -battle; Demosthenes being on the right wing with the Messenians and a -few Athenians, while the rest of the line was made up of the different -divisions of the Acarnanians, and of the Amphilochian carters. The -Peloponnesians and Ambraciots were drawn up pell-mell together, with -the exception of the Mantineans, who were massed on the left, without -however reaching to the extremity of the wing, where Eurylochus and his -men confronted the Messenians and Demosthenes. - -The Peloponnesians were now well engaged and with their outflanking wing -were upon the point of turning their enemy's right; when the Acarnanians -from the ambuscade set upon them from behind, and broke them at the -first attack, without their staying to resist; while the panic into -which they fell caused the flight of most of their army, terrified -beyond measure at seeing the division of Eurylochus and their best -troops cut to pieces. Most of the work was done by Demosthenes and his -Messenians, who were posted in this part of the field. Meanwhile the -Ambraciots (who are the best soldiers in those countries) and the troops -upon the right wing, defeated the division opposed to them and pursued -it to Argos. Returning from the pursuit, they found their main body -defeated; and hard pressed by the Acarnanians, with difficulty made good -their passage to Olpae, suffering heavy loss on the way, as they dashed -on without discipline or order, the Mantineans excepted, who kept their -ranks best of any in the army during the retreat. - -The battle did not end until the evening. The next day Menedaius, who on -the death of Eurylochus and Macarius had succeeded to the sole command, -being at a loss after so signal a defeat how to stay and sustain a -siege, cut off as he was by land and by the Athenian fleet by sea, and -equally so how to retreat in safety, opened a parley with Demosthenes -and the Acarnanian generals for a truce and permission to retreat, and -at the same time for the recovery of the dead. The dead they gave back -to him, and setting up a trophy took up their own also to the number of -about three hundred. The retreat demanded they refused publicly to the -army; but permission to depart without delay was secretly granted to the -Mantineans and to Menedaius and the other commanders and principal men -of the Peloponnesians by Demosthenes and his Acarnanian colleagues; who -desired to strip the Ambraciots and the mercenary host of foreigners of -their supporters; and, above all, to discredit the Lacedaemonians -and Peloponnesians with the Hellenes in those parts, as traitors and -self-seekers. - -While the enemy was taking up his dead and hastily burying them as he -could, and those who obtained permission were secretly planning their -retreat, word was brought to Demosthenes and the Acarnanians that the -Ambraciots from the city, in compliance with the first message from -Olpae, were on the march with their whole levy through Amphilochia to -join their countrymen at Olpae, knowing nothing of what had occurred. -Demosthenes prepared to march with his army against them, and meanwhile -sent on at once a strong division to beset the roads and occupy the -strong positions. In the meantime the Mantineans and others included -in the agreement went out under the pretence of gathering herbs and -firewood, and stole off by twos and threes, picking on the way the -things which they professed to have come out for, until they had gone -some distance from Olpae, when they quickened their pace. The Ambraciots -and such of the rest as had accompanied them in larger parties, seeing -them going on, pushed on in their turn, and began running in order to -catch them up. The Acarnanians at first thought that all alike were -departing without permission, and began to pursue the Peloponnesians; -and believing that they were being betrayed, even threw a dart or two at -some of their generals who tried to stop them and told them that leave -had been given. Eventually, however, they let pass the Mantineans and -Peloponnesians, and slew only the Ambraciots, there being much dispute -and difficulty in distinguishing whether a man was an Ambraciot or a -Peloponnesian. The number thus slain was about two hundred; the rest -escaped into the bordering territory of Agraea, and found refuge with -Salynthius, the friendly king of the Agraeans. - -Meanwhile the Ambraciots from the city arrived at Idomene. Idomene -consists of two lofty hills, the higher of which the troops sent on by -Demosthenes succeeded in occupying after nightfall, unobserved by the -Ambraciots, who had meanwhile ascended the smaller and bivouacked under -it. After supper Demosthenes set out with the rest of the army, as soon -as it was evening; himself with half his force making for the pass, and -the remainder going by the Amphilochian hills. At dawn he fell upon the -Ambraciots while they were still abed, ignorant of what had passed, -and fully thinking that it was their own countrymen--Demosthenes having -purposely put the Messenians in front with orders to address them in -the Doric dialect, and thus to inspire confidence in the sentinels, -who would not be able to see them as it was still night. In this way he -routed their army as soon as he attacked it, slaying most of them where -they were, the rest breaking away in flight over the hills. The roads, -however, were already occupied, and while the Amphilochians knew their -own country, the Ambraciots were ignorant of it and could not tell which -way to turn, and had also heavy armour as against a light-armed enemy, -and so fell into ravines and into the ambushes which had been set for -them, and perished there. In their manifold efforts to escape some even -turned to the sea, which was not far off, and seeing the Athenian ships -coasting alongshore just while the action was going on, swam off to -them, thinking it better in the panic they were in, to perish, if perish -they must, by the hands of the Athenians, than by those of the barbarous -and detested Amphilochians. Of the large Ambraciot force destroyed -in this manner, a few only reached the city in safety; while the -Acarnanians, after stripping the dead and setting up a trophy, returned -to Argos. - -The next day arrived a herald from the Ambraciots who had fled from -Olpae to the Agraeans, to ask leave to take up the dead that had fallen -after the first engagement, when they left the camp with the Mantineans -and their companions, without, like them, having had permission to do -so. At the sight of the arms of the Ambraciots from the city, the herald -was astonished at their number, knowing nothing of the disaster and -fancying that they were those of their own party. Some one asked him -what he was so astonished at, and how many of them had been killed, -fancying in his turn that this was the herald from the troops at -Idomene. He replied: "About two hundred"; upon which his interrogator -took him up, saying: "Why, the arms you see here are of more than a -thousand." The herald replied: "Then they are not the arms of those who -fought with us?" The other answered: "Yes, they are, if at least you -fought at Idomene yesterday." "But we fought with no one yesterday; -but the day before in the retreat." "However that may be, we fought -yesterday with those who came to reinforce you from the city of the -Ambraciots." When the herald heard this and knew that the reinforcement -from the city had been destroyed, he broke into wailing and, stunned -at the magnitude of the present evils, went away at once without having -performed his errand, or again asking for the dead bodies. Indeed, this -was by far the greatest disaster that befell any one Hellenic city in an -equal number of days during this war; and I have not set down the number -of the dead, because the amount stated seems so out of proportion to -the size of the city as to be incredible. In any case I know that if -the Acarnanians and Amphilochians had wished to take Ambracia as the -Athenians and Demosthenes advised, they would have done so without a -blow; as it was, they feared that if the Athenians had it they would be -worse neighbours to them than the present. - -After this the Acarnanians allotted a third of the spoils to the -Athenians, and divided the rest among their own different towns. The -share of the Athenians was captured on the voyage home; the arms now -deposited in the Attic temples are three hundred panoplies, which the -Acarnanians set apart for Demosthenes, and which he brought to Athens -in person, his return to his country after the Aetolian disaster being -rendered less hazardous by this exploit. The Athenians in the twenty -ships also went off to Naupactus. The Acarnanians and Amphilochians, -after the departure of Demosthenes and the Athenians, granted the -Ambraciots and Peloponnesians who had taken refuge with Salynthius -and the Agraeans a free retreat from Oeniadae, to which place they had -removed from the country of Salynthius, and for the future concluded -with the Ambraciots a treaty and alliance for one hundred years, -upon the terms following. It was to be a defensive, not an offensive -alliance; the Ambraciots could not be required to march with the -Acarnanians against the Peloponnesians, nor the Acarnanians with the -Ambraciots against the Athenians; for the rest the Ambraciots were to -give up the places and hostages that they held of the Amphilochians, -and not to give help to Anactorium, which was at enmity with the -Acarnanians. With this arrangement they put an end to the war. After -this the Corinthians sent a garrison of their own citizens to Ambracia, -composed of three hundred heavy infantry, under the command of -Xenocleides, son of Euthycles, who reached their destination after a -difficult journey across the continent. Such was the history of the -affair of Ambracia. - -The same winter the Athenians in Sicily made a descent from their -ships upon the territory of Himera, in concert with the Sicels, who had -invaded its borders from the interior, and also sailed to the islands -of Aeolus. Upon their return to Rhegium they found the Athenian general, -Pythodorus, son of Isolochus, come to supersede Laches in the command -of the fleet. The allies in Sicily had sailed to Athens and induced the -Athenians to send out more vessels to their assistance, pointing out -that the Syracusans who already commanded their land were making efforts -to get together a navy, to avoid being any longer excluded from the sea -by a few vessels. The Athenians proceeded to man forty ships to send to -them, thinking that the war in Sicily would thus be the sooner -ended, and also wishing to exercise their navy. One of the generals, -Pythodorus, was accordingly sent out with a few ships; Sophocles, son -of Sostratides, and Eurymedon, son of Thucles, being destined to follow -with the main body. Meanwhile Pythodorus had taken the command of -Laches' ships, and towards the end of winter sailed against the Locrian -fort, which Laches had formerly taken, and returned after being defeated -in battle by the Locrians. - -In the first days of this spring, the stream of fire issued from Etna, -as on former occasions, and destroyed some land of the Catanians, who -live upon Mount Etna, which is the largest mountain in Sicily. Fifty -years, it is said, had elapsed since the last eruption, there having -been three in all since the Hellenes have inhabited Sicily. Such were -the events of this winter; and with it ended the sixth year of this war, -of which Thucydides was the historian. - - - - -BOOK IV - -CHAPTER XII - -_Seventh Year of the War--Occupation of Pylos--Surrender of the Spartan -Army in Sphacteria_ - -Next summer, about the time of the corn's coming into ear, ten Syracusan -and as many Locrian vessels sailed to Messina, in Sicily, and occupied -the town upon the invitation of the inhabitants; and Messina revolted -from the Athenians. The Syracusans contrived this chiefly because they -saw that the place afforded an approach to Sicily, and feared that the -Athenians might hereafter use it as a base for attacking them with a -larger force; the Locrians because they wished to carry on hostilities -from both sides of the strait and to reduce their enemies, the people of -Rhegium. Meanwhile, the Locrians had invaded the Rhegian territory with -all their forces, to prevent their succouring Messina, and also at -the instance of some exiles from Rhegium who were with them; the long -factions by which that town had been torn rendering it for the moment -incapable of resistance, and thus furnishing an additional temptation -to the invaders. After devastating the country the Locrian land forces -retired, their ships remaining to guard Messina, while others were being -manned for the same destination to carry on the war from thence. - -About the same time in the spring, before the corn was ripe, the -Peloponnesians and their allies invaded Attica under Agis, the son of -Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, and sat down and laid waste the -country. Meanwhile the Athenians sent off the forty ships which they -had been preparing to Sicily, with the remaining generals Eurymedon -and Sophocles; their colleague Pythodorus having already preceded them -thither. These had also instructions as they sailed by to look to the -Corcyraeans in the town, who were being plundered by the exiles in the -mountain. To support these exiles sixty Peloponnesian vessels had lately -sailed, it being thought that the famine raging in the city would -make it easy for them to reduce it. Demosthenes also, who had remained -without employment since his return from Acarnania, applied and -obtained permission to use the fleet, if he wished it, upon the coast of -Peloponnese. - -Off Laconia they heard that the Peloponnesian ships were already at -Corcyra, upon which Eurymedon and Sophocles wished to hasten to the -island, but Demosthenes required them first to touch at Pylos and do -what was wanted there, before continuing their voyage. While they were -making objections, a squall chanced to come on and carried the fleet -into Pylos. Demosthenes at once urged them to fortify the place, it -being for this that he had come on the voyage, and made them observe -there was plenty of stone and timber on the spot, and that the place -was strong by nature, and together with much of the country round -unoccupied; Pylos, or Coryphasium, as the Lacedaemonians call it, being -about forty-five miles distant from Sparta, and situated in the old -country of the Messenians. The commanders told him that there was no -lack of desert headlands in Peloponnese if he wished to put the city -to expense by occupying them. He, however, thought that this place was -distinguished from others of the kind by having a harbour close by; -while the Messenians, the old natives of the country, speaking the same -dialect as the Lacedaemonians, could do them the greatest mischief -by their incursions from it, and would at the same time be a trusty -garrison. - -After speaking to the captains of companies on the subject, and failing -to persuade either the generals or the soldiers, he remained inactive -with the rest from stress of weather; until the soldiers themselves -wanting occupation were seized with a sudden impulse to go round and -fortify the place. Accordingly they set to work in earnest, and having -no iron tools, picked up stones, and put them together as they happened -to fit, and where mortar was needed, carried it on their backs for want -of hods, stooping down to make it stay on, and clasping their hands -together behind to prevent it falling off; sparing no effort to be -able to complete the most vulnerable points before the arrival of the -Lacedaemonians, most of the place being sufficiently strong by nature -without further fortifications. - -Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians were celebrating a festival, and also at -first made light of the news, in the idea that whenever they chose to -take the field the place would be immediately evacuated by the enemy or -easily taken by force; the absence of their army before Athens having -also something to do with their delay. The Athenians fortified the -place on the land side, and where it most required it, in six days, and -leaving Demosthenes with five ships to garrison it, with the main body -of the fleet hastened on their voyage to Corcyra and Sicily. - -As soon as the Peloponnesians in Attica heard of the occupation of -Pylos, they hurried back home; the Lacedaemonians and their king Agis -thinking that the matter touched them nearly. Besides having made their -invasion early in the season, and while the corn was still green, most -of their troops were short of provisions: the weather also was unusually -bad for the time of year, and greatly distressed their army. Many -reasons thus combined to hasten their departure and to make this -invasion a very short one; indeed they only stayed fifteen days in -Attica. - -About the same time the Athenian general Simonides getting together a -few Athenians from the garrisons, and a number of the allies in those -parts, took Eion in Thrace, a Mendaean colony and hostile to Athens, by -treachery, but had no sooner done so than the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans -came up and beat him out of it, with the loss of many of his soldiers. - -On the return of the Peloponnesians from Attica, the Spartans themselves -and the nearest of the Perioeci at once set out for Pylos, the other -Lacedaemonians following more slowly, as they had just come in from -another campaign. Word was also sent round Peloponnese to come up as -quickly as possible to Pylos; while the sixty Peloponnesian ships were -sent for from Corcyra, and being dragged by their crews across the -isthmus of Leucas, passed unperceived by the Athenian squadron at -Zacynthus, and reached Pylos, where the land forces had arrived before -them. Before the Peloponnesian fleet sailed in, Demosthenes found time -to send out unobserved two ships to inform Eurymedon and the Athenians -on board the fleet at Zacynthus of the danger of Pylos and to summon -them to his assistance. While the ships hastened on their voyage in -obedience to the orders of Demosthenes, the Lacedaemonians prepared to -assault the fort by land and sea, hoping to capture with ease a work -constructed in haste, and held by a feeble garrison. Meanwhile, as they -expected the Athenian ships to arrive from Zacynthus, they intended, if -they failed to take the place before, to block up the entrances of the -harbour to prevent their being able to anchor inside it. For the island -of Sphacteria, stretching along in a line close in front of the harbour, -at once makes it safe and narrows its entrances, leaving a passage for -two ships on the side nearest Pylos and the Athenian fortifications, and -for eight or nine on that next the rest of the mainland: for the rest, -the island was entirely covered with wood, and without paths through -not being inhabited, and about one mile and five furlongs in length. -The inlets the Lacedaemonians meant to close with a line of ships placed -close together, with their prows turned towards the sea, and, meanwhile, -fearing that the enemy might make use of the island to operate against -them, carried over some heavy infantry thither, stationing others along -the coast. By this means the island and the continent would be alike -hostile to the Athenians, as they would be unable to land on either; and -the shore of Pylos itself outside the inlet towards the open sea having -no harbour, and, therefore, presenting no point which they could use as -a base to relieve their countrymen, they, the Lacedaemonians, without -sea-fight or risk would in all probability become masters of the place, -occupied as it had been on the spur of the moment, and unfurnished with -provisions. This being determined, they carried over to the island the -heavy infantry, drafted by lot from all the companies. Some others had -crossed over before in relief parties, but these last who were -left there were four hundred and twenty in number, with their Helot -attendants, commanded by Epitadas, son of Molobrus. - -Meanwhile Demosthenes, seeing the Lacedaemonians about to attack him -by sea and land at once, himself was not idle. He drew up under the -fortification and enclosed in a stockade the galleys remaining to him of -those which had been left him, arming the sailors taken out of them with -poor shields made most of them of osier, it being impossible to procure -arms in such a desert place, and even these having been obtained from a -thirty-oared Messenian privateer and a boat belonging to some Messenians -who happened to have come to them. Among these Messenians were forty -heavy infantry, whom he made use of with the rest. Posting most of his -men, unarmed and armed, upon the best fortified and strong points of the -place towards the interior, with orders to repel any attack of the land -forces, he picked sixty heavy infantry and a few archers from his whole -force, and with these went outside the wall down to the sea, where he -thought that the enemy would most likely attempt to land. Although the -ground was difficult and rocky, looking towards the open sea, the fact -that this was the weakest part of the wall would, he thought, encourage -their ardour, as the Athenians, confident in their naval superiority, -had here paid little attention to their defences, and the enemy if he -could force a landing might feel secure of taking the place. At this -point, accordingly, going down to the water's edge, he posted his heavy -infantry to prevent, if possible, a landing, and encouraged them in the -following terms: - -"Soldiers and comrades in this adventure, I hope that none of you in our -present strait will think to show his wit by exactly calculating all the -perils that encompass us, but that you will rather hasten to close with -the enemy, without staying to count the odds, seeing in this your best -chance of safety. In emergencies like ours calculation is out of place; -the sooner the danger is faced the better. To my mind also most of the -chances are for us, if we will only stand fast and not throw away our -advantages, overawed by the numbers of the enemy. One of the points in -our favour is the awkwardness of the landing. This, however, only helps -us if we stand our ground. If we give way it will be practicable enough, -in spite of its natural difficulty, without a defender; and the enemy -will instantly become more formidable from the difficulty he will have -in retreating, supposing that we succeed in repulsing him, which we -shall find it easier to do, while he is on board his ships, than after -he has landed and meets us on equal terms. As to his numbers, these need -not too much alarm you. Large as they may be he can only engage in -small detachments, from the impossibility of bringing to. Besides, the -numerical superiority that we have to meet is not that of an army on -land with everything else equal, but of troops on board ship, upon an -element where many favourable accidents are required to act with effect. -I therefore consider that his difficulties may be fairly set against our -numerical deficiencies, and at the same time I charge you, as Athenians -who know by experience what landing from ships on a hostile territory -means, and how impossible it is to drive back an enemy determined enough -to stand his ground and not to be frightened away by the surf and the -terrors of the ships sailing in, to stand fast in the present emergency, -beat back the enemy at the water's edge, and save yourselves and the -place." - -Thus encouraged by Demosthenes, the Athenians felt more confident, and -went down to meet the enemy, posting themselves along the edge of -the sea. The Lacedaemonians now put themselves in movement and -simultaneously assaulted the fortification with their land forces -and with their ships, forty-three in number, under their admiral, -Thrasymelidas, son of Cratesicles, a Spartan, who made his attack just -where Demosthenes expected. The Athenians had thus to defend themselves -on both sides, from the land and from the sea; the enemy rowing up in -small detachments, the one relieving the other--it being impossible for -many to bring to at once--and showing great ardour and cheering -each other on, in the endeavour to force a passage and to take the -fortification. He who most distinguished himself was Brasidas. Captain -of a galley, and seeing that the captains and steersmen, impressed by -the difficulty of the position, hung back even where a landing might -have seemed possible, for fear of wrecking their vessels, he shouted -out to them, that they must never allow the enemy to fortify himself -in their country for the sake of saving timber, but must shiver their -vessels and force a landing; and bade the allies, instead of hesitating -in such a moment to sacrifice their ships for Lacedaemon in return -for her many benefits, to run them boldly aground, land in one way or -another, and make themselves masters of the place and its garrison. - -Not content with this exhortation, he forced his own steersman to run -his ship ashore, and stepping on to the gangway, was endeavouring to -land, when he was cut down by the Athenians, and after receiving many -wounds fainted away. Falling into the bows, his shield slipped off -his arm into the sea, and being thrown ashore was picked up by the -Athenians, and afterwards used for the trophy which they set up for this -attack. The rest also did their best, but were not able to land, owing -to the difficulty of the ground and the unflinching tenacity of -the Athenians. It was a strange reversal of the order of things for -Athenians to be fighting from the land, and from Laconian land too, -against Lacedaemonians coming from the sea; while Lacedaemonians were -trying to land from shipboard in their own country, now become hostile, -to attack Athenians, although the former were chiefly famous at the -time as an inland people and superior by land, the latter as a maritime -people with a navy that had no equal. - -After continuing their attacks during that day and most of the next, the -Peloponnesians desisted, and the day after sent some of their ships to -Asine for timber to make engines, hoping to take by their aid, in spite -of its height, the wall opposite the harbour, where the landing was -easiest. At this moment the Athenian fleet from Zacynthus arrived, now -numbering fifty sail, having been reinforced by some of the ships on -guard at Naupactus and by four Chian vessels. Seeing the coast and -the island both crowded with heavy infantry, and the hostile ships in -harbour showing no signs of sailing out, at a loss where to anchor, they -sailed for the moment to the desert island of Prote, not far off, where -they passed the night. The next day they got under way in readiness to -engage in the open sea if the enemy chose to put out to meet them, being -determined in the event of his not doing so to sail in and attack him. -The Lacedaemonians did not put out to sea, and having omitted to close -the inlets as they had intended, remained quiet on shore, engaged in -manning their ships and getting ready, in the case of any one sailing -in, to fight in the harbour, which is a fairly large one. - -Perceiving this, the Athenians advanced against them by each inlet, and -falling on the enemy's fleet, most of which was by this time afloat and -in line, at once put it to flight, and giving chase as far as the short -distance allowed, disabled a good many vessels and took five, one with -its crew on board; dashing in at the rest that had taken refuge on -shore, and battering some that were still being manned, before they -could put out, and lashing on to their own ships and towing off empty -others whose crews had fled. At this sight the Lacedaemonians, maddened -by a disaster which cut off their men on the island, rushed to the -rescue, and going into the sea with their heavy armour, laid hold of -the ships and tried to drag them back, each man thinking that success -depended on his individual exertions. Great was the melee, and quite -in contradiction to the naval tactics usual to the two combatants; the -Lacedaemonians in their excitement and dismay being actually engaged in -a sea-fight on land, while the victorious Athenians, in their eagerness -to push their success as far as possible, were carrying on a land-fight -from their ships. After great exertions and numerous wounds on both -sides they separated, the Lacedaemonians saving their empty ships, -except those first taken; and both parties returning to their camp, the -Athenians set up a trophy, gave back the dead, secured the wrecks, and -at once began to cruise round and jealously watch the island, with its -intercepted garrison, while the Peloponnesians on the mainland, whose -contingents had now all come up, stayed where they were before Pylos. - -When the news of what had happened at Pylos reached Sparta, the disaster -was thought so serious that the Lacedaemonians resolved that the -authorities should go down to the camp, and decide on the spot what was -best to be done. There, seeing that it was impossible to help their men, -and not wishing to risk their being reduced by hunger or overpowered by -numbers, they determined, with the consent of the Athenian generals, -to conclude an armistice at Pylos and send envoys to Athens to obtain -a convention, and to endeavour to get back their men as quickly as -possible. - -The generals accepting their offers, an armistice was concluded upon the -terms following: - -That the Lacedaemonians should bring to Pylos and deliver up to the -Athenians the ships that had fought in the late engagement, and all -in Laconia that were vessels of war, and should make no attack on the -fortification either by land or by sea. - -That the Athenians should allow the Lacedaemonians on the mainland to -send to the men in the island a certain fixed quantity of corn ready -kneaded, that is to say, two quarts of barley meal, one pint of wine, -and a piece of meat for each man, and half the same quantity for a -servant. - -That this allowance should be sent in under the eyes of the Athenians, -and that no boat should sail to the island except openly. - -That the Athenians should continue to the island same as before, -without however landing upon it, and should refrain from attacking the -Peloponnesian troops either by land or by sea. - -That if either party should infringe any of these terms in the slightest -particular, the armistice should be at once void. - -That the armistice should hold good until the return of the -Lacedaemonian envoys from Athens--the Athenians sending them thither -in a galley and bringing them back again--and upon the arrival of the -envoys should be at an end, and the ships be restored by the Athenians -in the same state as they received them. - -Such were the terms of the armistice, and the ships were delivered over -to the number of sixty, and the envoys sent off accordingly. Arrived at -Athens they spoke as follows: - -"Athenians, the Lacedaemonians sent us to try to find some way of -settling the affair of our men on the island, that shall be at once -satisfactory to our interests, and as consistent with our dignity in -our misfortune as circumstances permit. We can venture to speak at some -length without any departure from the habit of our country. Men of few -words where many are not wanted, we can be less brief when there is a -matter of importance to be illustrated and an end to be served by its -illustration. Meanwhile we beg you to take what we may say, not in a -hostile spirit, nor as if we thought you ignorant and wished to -lecture you, but rather as a suggestion on the best course to be taken, -addressed to intelligent judges. You can now, if you choose, employ your -present success to advantage, so as to keep what you have got and gain -honour and reputation besides, and you can avoid the mistake of those -who meet with an extraordinary piece of good fortune, and are led on by -hope to grasp continually at something further, through having already -succeeded without expecting it. While those who have known most -vicissitudes of good and bad, have also justly least faith in their -prosperity; and to teach your city and ours this lesson experience has -not been wanting. - -"To be convinced of this you have only to look at our present -misfortune. What power in Hellas stood higher than we did? and yet we -are come to you, although we formerly thought ourselves more able -to grant what we are now here to ask. Nevertheless, we have not been -brought to this by any decay in our power, or through having our heads -turned by aggrandizement; no, our resources are what they have always -been, and our error has been an error of judgment, to which all are -equally liable. Accordingly, the prosperity which your city now enjoys, -and the accession that it has lately received, must not make you fancy -that fortune will be always with you. Indeed sensible men are prudent -enough to treat their gains as precarious, just as they would also -keep a clear head in adversity, and think that war, so far from staying -within the limit to which a combatant may wish to confine it, will run -the course that its chances prescribe; and thus, not being puffed up by -confidence in military success, they are less likely to come to grief, -and most ready to make peace, if they can, while their fortune lasts. -This, Athenians, you have a good opportunity to do now with us, and thus -to escape the possible disasters which may follow upon your refusal, and -the consequent imputation of having owed to accident even your present -advantages, when you might have left behind you a reputation for power -and wisdom which nothing could endanger. - -"The Lacedaemonians accordingly invite you to make a treaty and to end -the war, and offer peace and alliance and the most friendly and intimate -relations in every way and on every occasion between us; and in return -ask for the men on the island, thinking it better for both parties -not to stand out to the end, on the chance of some favourable accident -enabling the men to force their way out, or of their being compelled -to succumb under the pressure of blockade. Indeed if great enmities are -ever to be really settled, we think it will be, not by the system of -revenge and military success, and by forcing an opponent to swear to a -treaty to his disadvantage, but when the more fortunate combatant waives -these his privileges, to be guided by gentler feelings conquers his -rival in generosity, and accords peace on more moderate conditions than -he expected. From that moment, instead of the debt of revenge which -violence must entail, his adversary owes a debt of generosity to be paid -in kind, and is inclined by honour to stand to his agreement. And men -oftener act in this manner towards their greatest enemies than where the -quarrel is of less importance; they are also by nature as glad to give -way to those who first yield to them, as they are apt to be provoked by -arrogance to risks condemned by their own judgment. - -"To apply this to ourselves: if peace was ever desirable for both -parties, it is surely so at the present moment, before anything -irremediable befall us and force us to hate you eternally, personally -as well as politically, and you to miss the advantages that we now offer -you. While the issue is still in doubt, and you have reputation and our -friendship in prospect, and we the compromise of our misfortune before -anything fatal occur, let us be reconciled, and for ourselves choose -peace instead of war, and grant to the rest of the Hellenes a remission -from their sufferings, for which be sure they will think they have -chiefly you to thank. The war that they labour under they know not which -began, but the peace that concludes it, as it depends on your decision, -will by their gratitude be laid to your door. By such a decision you -can become firm friends with the Lacedaemonians at their own invitation, -which you do not force from them, but oblige them by accepting. And from -this friendship consider the advantages that are likely to follow: when -Attica and Sparta are at one, the rest of Hellas, be sure, will remain -in respectful inferiority before its heads." - -Such were the words of the Lacedaemonians, their idea being that the -Athenians, already desirous of a truce and only kept back by their -opposition, would joyfully accept a peace freely offered, and give back -the men. The Athenians, however, having the men on the island, thought -that the treaty would be ready for them whenever they chose to make it, -and grasped at something further. Foremost to encourage them in this -policy was Cleon, son of Cleaenetus, a popular leader of the time -and very powerful with the multitude, who persuaded them to answer as -follows: First, the men in the island must surrender themselves and -their arms and be brought to Athens. Next, the Lacedaemonians must -restore Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaia, all places acquired not by -arms, but by the previous convention, under which they had been ceded by -Athens herself at a moment of disaster, when a truce was more necessary -to her than at present. This done they might take back their men, and -make a truce for as long as both parties might agree. - -To this answer the envoys made no reply, but asked that commissioners -might be chosen with whom they might confer on each point, and quietly -talk the matter over and try to come to some agreement. Hereupon Cleon -violently assailed them, saying that he knew from the first that they -had no right intentions, and that it was clear enough now by their -refusing to speak before the people, and wanting to confer in secret -with a committee of two or three. No, if they meant anything honest let -them say it out before all. The Lacedaemonians, however, seeing that -whatever concessions they might be prepared to make in their misfortune, -it was impossible for them to speak before the multitude and lose credit -with their allies for a negotiation which might after all miscarry, and -on the other hand, that the Athenians would never grant what they -asked upon moderate terms, returned from Athens without having effected -anything. - -Their arrival at once put an end to the armistice at Pylos, and the -Lacedaemonians asked back their ships according to the convention. The -Athenians, however, alleged an attack on the fort in contravention of -the truce, and other grievances seemingly not worth mentioning, and -refused to give them back, insisting upon the clause by which the -slightest infringement made the armistice void. The Lacedaemonians, -after denying the contravention and protesting against their bad faith -in the matter of the ships, went away and earnestly addressed themselves -to the war. Hostilities were now carried on at Pylos upon both sides -with vigour. The Athenians cruised round the island all day with two -ships going different ways; and by night, except on the seaward side in -windy weather, anchored round it with their whole fleet, which, having -been reinforced by twenty ships from Athens come to aid in the blockade, -now numbered seventy sail; while the Peloponnesians remained encamped on -the continent, making attacks on the fort, and on the look-out for any -opportunity which might offer itself for the deliverance of their men. - -Meanwhile the Syracusans and their allies in Sicily had brought up -to the squadron guarding Messina the reinforcement which we left them -preparing, and carried on the war from thence, incited chiefly by the -Locrians from hatred of the Rhegians, whose territory they had invaded -with all their forces. The Syracusans also wished to try their fortune -at sea, seeing that the Athenians had only a few ships actually at -Rhegium, and hearing that the main fleet destined to join them was -engaged in blockading the island. A naval victory, they thought, would -enable them to blockade Rhegium by sea and land, and easily to reduce -it; a success which would at once place their affairs upon a solid -basis, the promontory of Rhegium in Italy and Messina in Sicily being so -near each other that it would be impossible for the Athenians to cruise -against them and command the strait. The strait in question consists -of the sea between Rhegium and Messina, at the point where Sicily -approaches nearest to the continent, and is the Charybdis through which -the story makes Ulysses sail; and the narrowness of the passage and -the strength of the current that pours in from the vast Tyrrhenian and -Sicilian mains, have rightly given it a bad reputation. - -In this strait the Syracusans and their allies were compelled to fight, -late in the day, about the passage of a boat, putting out with rather -more than thirty ships against sixteen Athenian and eight Rhegian -vessels. Defeated by the Athenians they hastily set off, each for -himself, to their own stations at Messina and Rhegium, with the loss of -one ship; night coming on before the battle was finished. After this -the Locrians retired from the Rhegian territory, and the ships of the -Syracusans and their allies united and came to anchor at Cape Pelorus, -in the territory of Messina, where their land forces joined them. Here -the Athenians and Rhegians sailed up, and seeing the ships unmanned, -made an attack, in which they in their turn lost one vessel, which was -caught by a grappling iron, the crew saving themselves by swimming. -After this the Syracusans got on board their ships, and while they were -being towed alongshore to Messina, were again attacked by the Athenians, -but suddenly got out to sea and became the assailants, and caused them -to lose another vessel. After thus holding their own in the voyage -alongshore and in the engagement as above described, the Syracusans -sailed on into the harbour of Messina. - -Meanwhile the Athenians, having received warning that Camarina was -about to be betrayed to the Syracusans by Archias and his party, sailed -thither; and the Messinese took this opportunity to attack by sea and -land with all their forces their Chalcidian neighbour, Naxos. The first -day they forced the Naxians to keep their walls, and laid waste their -country; the next they sailed round with their ships, and laid waste -their land on the river Akesines, while their land forces menaced the -city. Meanwhile the Sicels came down from the high country in great -numbers, to aid against the Messinese; and the Naxians, elated at the -sight, and animated by a belief that the Leontines and their other -Hellenic allies were coming to their support, suddenly sallied out from -the town, and attacked and routed the Messinese, killing more than a -thousand of them; while the remainder suffered severely in their retreat -home, being attacked by the barbarians on the road, and most of them -cut off. The ships put in to Messina, and afterwards dispersed for their -different homes. The Leontines and their allies, with the Athenians, -upon this at once turned their arms against the now weakened Messina, -and attacked, the Athenians with their ships on the side of the harbour, -and the land forces on that of the town. The Messinese, however, -sallying out with Demoteles and some Locrians who had been left to -garrison the city after the disaster, suddenly attacked and routed most -of the Leontine army, killing a great number; upon seeing which the -Athenians landed from their ships, and falling on the Messinese in -disorder chased them back into the town, and setting up a trophy retired -to Rhegium. After this the Hellenes in Sicily continued to make war on -each other by land, without the Athenians. - -Meanwhile the Athenians at Pylos were still besieging the Lacedaemonians -in the island, the Peloponnesian forces on the continent remaining where -they were. The blockade was very laborious for the Athenians from want -of food and water; there was no spring except one in the citadel of -Pylos itself, and that not a large one, and most of them were obliged to -grub up the shingle on the sea beach and drink such water as they could -find. They also suffered from want of room, being encamped in a narrow -space; and as there was no anchorage for the ships, some took their -meals on shore in their turn, while the others were anchored out at sea. -But their greatest discouragement arose from the unexpectedly long time -which it took to reduce a body of men shut up in a desert island, with -only brackish water to drink, a matter which they had imagined would -take them only a few days. The fact was that the Lacedaemonians had made -advertisement for volunteers to carry into the island ground corn, wine, -cheese, and any other food useful in a siege; high prices being offered, -and freedom promised to any of the Helots who should succeed in doing -so. The Helots accordingly were most forward to engage in this risky -traffic, putting off from this or that part of Peloponnese, and running -in by night on the seaward side of the island. They were best pleased, -however, when they could catch a wind to carry them in. It was more easy -to elude the look-out of the galleys, when it blew from the seaward, -as it became impossible for them to anchor round the island; while -the Helots had their boats rated at their value in money, and ran them -ashore, without caring how they landed, being sure to find the soldiers -waiting for them at the landing-places. But all who risked it in fair -weather were taken. Divers also swam in under water from the harbour, -dragging by a cord in skins poppyseed mixed with honey, and bruised -linseed; these at first escaped notice, but afterwards a look-out was -kept for them. In short, both sides tried every possible contrivance, -the one to throw in provisions, and the other to prevent their -introduction. - -At Athens, meanwhile, the news that the army was in great distress, and -that corn found its way in to the men in the island, caused no small -perplexity; and the Athenians began to fear that winter might come on -and find them still engaged in the blockade. They saw that the convoying -of provisions round Peloponnese would be then impossible. The country -offered no resources in itself, and even in summer they could not send -round enough. The blockade of a place without harbours could no -longer be kept up; and the men would either escape by the siege being -abandoned, or would watch for bad weather and sail out in the boats that -brought in their corn. What caused still more alarm was the attitude -of the Lacedaemonians, who must, it was thought by the Athenians, feel -themselves on strong ground not to send them any more envoys; and -they began to repent having rejected the treaty. Cleon, perceiving the -disfavour with which he was regarded for having stood in the way of the -convention, now said that their informants did not speak the truth; and -upon the messengers recommending them, if they did not believe them, to -send some commissioners to see, Cleon himself and Theagenes were chosen -by the Athenians as commissioners. Aware that he would now be obliged -either to say what had been already said by the men whom he was -slandering, or be proved a liar if he said the contrary, he told the -Athenians, whom he saw to be not altogether disinclined for a fresh -expedition, that instead of sending and wasting their time and -opportunities, if they believed what was told them, they ought to sail -against the men. And pointing at Nicias, son of Niceratus, then general, -whom he hated, he tauntingly said that it would be easy, if they had -men for generals, to sail with a force and take those in the island, and -that if he had himself been in command, he would have done it. - -Nicias, seeing the Athenians murmuring against Cleon for not sailing now -if it seemed to him so easy, and further seeing himself the object of -attack, told him that for all that the generals cared, he might take -what force he chose and make the attempt. At first Cleon fancied that -this resignation was merely a figure of speech, and was ready to go, but -finding that it was seriously meant, he drew back, and said that Nicias, -not he, was general, being now frightened, and having never supposed -that Nicias would go so far as to retire in his favour. Nicias, however, -repeated his offer, and resigned the command against Pylos, and called -the Athenians to witness that he did so. And as the multitude is wont to -do, the more Cleon shrank from the expedition and tried to back out -of what he had said, the more they encouraged Nicias to hand over his -command, and clamoured at Cleon to go. At last, not knowing how to get -out of his words, he undertook the expedition, and came forward and said -that he was not afraid of the Lacedaemonians, but would sail without -taking any one from the city with him, except the Lemnians and Imbrians -that were at Athens, with some targeteers that had come up from Aenus, -and four hundred archers from other quarters. With these and the -soldiers at Pylos, he would within twenty days either bring the -Lacedaemonians alive, or kill them on the spot. The Athenians could not -help laughing at his fatuity, while sensible men comforted themselves -with the reflection that they must gain in either circumstance; either -they would be rid of Cleon, which they rather hoped, or if disappointed -in this expectation, would reduce the Lacedaemonians. - -After he had settled everything in the assembly, and the Athenians -had voted him the command of the expedition, he chose as his colleague -Demosthenes, one of the generals at Pylos, and pushed forward the -preparations for his voyage. His choice fell upon Demosthenes because -he heard that he was contemplating a descent on the island; the soldiers -distressed by the difficulties of the position, and rather besieged than -besiegers, being eager to fight it out, while the firing of the island -had increased the confidence of the general. He had been at first -afraid, because the island having never been inhabited was almost -entirely covered with wood and without paths, thinking this to be in -the enemy's favour, as he might land with a large force, and yet might -suffer loss by an attack from an unseen position. The mistakes and -forces of the enemy the wood would in a great measure conceal from him, -while every blunder of his own troops would be at once detected, and -they would be thus able to fall upon him unexpectedly just where they -pleased, the attack being always in their power. If, on the other hand, -he should force them to engage in the thicket, the smaller number who -knew the country would, he thought, have the advantage over the -larger who were ignorant of it, while his own army might be cut off -imperceptibly, in spite of its numbers, as the men would not be able to -see where to succour each other. - -The Aetolian disaster, which had been mainly caused by the wood, had not -a little to do with these reflections. Meanwhile, one of the soldiers -who were compelled by want of room to land on the extremities of -the island and take their dinners, with outposts fixed to prevent a -surprise, set fire to a little of the wood without meaning to do so; -and as it came on to blow soon afterwards, almost the whole was consumed -before they were aware of it. Demosthenes was now able for the first -time to see how numerous the Lacedaemonians really were, having up to -this moment been under the impression that they took in provisions for a -smaller number; he also saw that the Athenians thought success important -and were anxious about it, and that it was now easier to land on the -island, and accordingly got ready for the attempt, sent for troops -from the allies in the neighbourhood, and pushed forward his other -preparations. At this moment Cleon arrived at Pylos with the troops -which he had asked for, having sent on word to say that he was coming. -The first step taken by the two generals after their meeting was to send -a herald to the camp on the mainland, to ask if they were disposed -to avoid all risk and to order the men on the island to surrender -themselves and their arms, to be kept in gentle custody until some -general convention should be concluded. - -On the rejection of this proposition the generals let one day pass, and -the next, embarking all their heavy infantry on board a few ships, -put out by night, and a little before dawn landed on both sides of the -island from the open sea and from the harbour, being about eight hundred -strong, and advanced with a run against the first post in the island. - -The enemy had distributed his force as follows: In this first post there -were about thirty heavy infantry; the centre and most level part, -where the water was, was held by the main body, and by Epitadas their -commander; while a small party guarded the very end of the island, -towards Pylos, which was precipitous on the sea-side and very difficult -to attack from the land, and where there was also a sort of old fort of -stones rudely put together, which they thought might be useful to them, -in case they should be forced to retreat. Such was their disposition. - -The advanced post thus attacked by the Athenians was at once put to the -sword, the men being scarcely out of bed and still arming, the landing -having taken them by surprise, as they fancied the ships were only -sailing as usual to their stations for the night. As soon as day broke, -the rest of the army landed, that is to say, all the crews of rather -more than seventy ships, except the lowest rank of oars, with the -arms they carried, eight hundred archers, and as many targeteers, the -Messenian reinforcements, and all the other troops on duty round Pylos, -except the garrison on the fort. The tactics of Demosthenes had divided -them into companies of two hundred, more or less, and made them occupy -the highest points in order to paralyse the enemy by surrounding him on -every side and thus leaving him without any tangible adversary, exposed -to the cross-fire of their host; plied by those in his rear if he -attacked in front, and by those on one flank if he moved against those -on the other. In short, wherever he went he would have the assailants -behind him, and these light-armed assailants, the most awkward of all; -arrows, darts, stones, and slings making them formidable at a distance, -and there being no means of getting at them at close quarters, as they -could conquer flying, and the moment their pursuer turned they were upon -him. Such was the idea that inspired Demosthenes in his conception of -the descent, and presided over its execution. - -Meanwhile the main body of the troops in the island (that under -Epitadas), seeing their outpost cut off and an army advancing against -them, serried their ranks and pressed forward to close with the Athenian -heavy infantry in front of them, the light troops being upon their -flanks and rear. However, they were not able to engage or to profit by -their superior skill, the light troops keeping them in check on either -side with their missiles, and the heavy infantry remaining stationary -instead of advancing to meet them; and although they routed the light -troops wherever they ran up and approached too closely, yet they -retreated fighting, being lightly equipped, and easily getting the start -in their flight, from the difficult and rugged nature of the ground, -in an island hitherto desert, over which the Lacedaemonians could not -pursue them with their heavy armour. - -After this skirmishing had lasted some little while, the Lacedaemonians -became unable to dash out with the same rapidity as before upon the -points attacked, and the light troops finding that they now fought with -less vigour, became more confident. They could see with their own eyes -that they were many times more numerous than the enemy; they were now -more familiar with his aspect and found him less terrible, the result -not having justified the apprehensions which they had suffered, -when they first landed in slavish dismay at the idea of attacking -Lacedaemonians; and accordingly their fear changing to disdain, they -now rushed all together with loud shouts upon them, and pelted them with -stones, darts, and arrows, whichever came first to hand. The shouting -accompanying their onset confounded the Lacedaemonians, unaccustomed to -this mode of fighting; dust rose from the newly burnt wood, and it was -impossible to see in front of one with the arrows and stones flying -through clouds of dust from the hands of numerous assailants. The -Lacedaemonians had now to sustain a rude conflict; their caps would not -keep out the arrows, darts had broken off in the armour of the wounded, -while they themselves were helpless for offence, being prevented from -using their eyes to see what was before them, and unable to hear the -words of command for the hubbub raised by the enemy; danger encompassed -them on every side, and there was no hope of any means of defence or -safety. - -At last, after many had been already wounded in the confined space in -which they were fighting, they formed in close order and retired on -the fort at the end of the island, which was not far off, and to their -friends who held it. The moment they gave way, the light troops became -bolder and pressed upon them, shouting louder than ever, and killed -as many as they came up with in their retreat, but most of the -Lacedaemonians made good their escape to the fort, and with the garrison -in it ranged themselves all along its whole extent to repulse the enemy -wherever it was assailable. The Athenians pursuing, unable to surround -and hem them in, owing to the strength of the ground, attacked them in -front and tried to storm the position. For a long time, indeed for most -of the day, both sides held out against all the torments of the battle, -thirst, and sun, the one endeavouring to drive the enemy from the high -ground, the other to maintain himself upon it, it being now more easy -for the Lacedaemonians to defend themselves than before, as they could -not be surrounded on the flanks. - -The struggle began to seem endless, when the commander of the Messenians -came to Cleon and Demosthenes, and told them that they were losing their -labour: but if they would give him some archers and light troops to -go round on the enemy's rear by a way he would undertake to find, he -thought he could force the approach. Upon receiving what he asked for, -he started from a point out of sight in order not to be seen by the -enemy, and creeping on wherever the precipices of the island permitted, -and where the Lacedaemonians, trusting to the strength of the ground, -kept no guard, succeeded after the greatest difficulty in getting round -without their seeing him, and suddenly appeared on the high ground in -their rear, to the dismay of the surprised enemy and the still greater -joy of his expectant friends. The Lacedaemonians thus placed between two -fires, and in the same dilemma, to compare small things with great, as -at Thermopylae, where the defenders were cut off through the Persians -getting round by the path, being now attacked in front and behind, began -to give way, and overcome by the odds against them and exhausted from -want of food, retreated. - -The Athenians were already masters of the approaches when Cleon and -Demosthenes perceiving that, if the enemy gave way a single step -further, they would be destroyed by their soldiery, put a stop to the -battle and held their men back; wishing to take the Lacedaemonians alive -to Athens, and hoping that their stubbornness might relax on hearing the -offer of terms, and that they might surrender and yield to the present -overwhelming danger. Proclamation was accordingly made, to know if they -would surrender themselves and their arms to the Athenians to be dealt -at their discretion. - -The Lacedaemonians hearing this offer, most of them lowered their -shields and waved their hands to show that they accepted it. Hostilities -now ceased, and a parley was held between Cleon and Demosthenes and -Styphon, son of Pharax, on the other side; since Epitadas, the first of -the previous commanders, had been killed, and Hippagretas, the next in -command, left for dead among the slain, though still alive, and thus -the command had devolved upon Styphon according to the law, in case of -anything happening to his superiors. Styphon and his companions said -they wished to send a herald to the Lacedaemonians on the mainland, to -know what they were to do. The Athenians would not let any of them go, -but themselves called for heralds from the mainland, and after questions -had been carried backwards and forwards two or three times, the last man -that passed over from the Lacedaemonians on the continent brought this -message: "The Lacedaemonians bid you to decide for yourselves so long as -you do nothing dishonourable"; upon which after consulting together they -surrendered themselves and their arms. The Athenians, after guarding -them that day and night, the next morning set up a trophy in the island, -and got ready to sail, giving their prisoners in batches to be guarded -by the captains of the galleys; and the Lacedaemonians sent a herald and -took up their dead. The number of the killed and prisoners taken in the -island was as follows: four hundred and twenty heavy infantry had passed -over; three hundred all but eight were taken alive to Athens; the rest -were killed. About a hundred and twenty of the prisoners were Spartans. -The Athenian loss was small, the battle not having been fought at close -quarters. - -The blockade in all, counting from the fight at sea to the battle in -the island, had lasted seventy-two days. For twenty of these, during the -absence of the envoys sent to treat for peace, the men had provisions -given them, for the rest they were fed by the smugglers. Corn and other -victual was found in the island; the commander Epitadas having kept -the men upon half rations. The Athenians and Peloponnesians now each -withdrew their forces from Pylos, and went home, and crazy as Cleon's -promise was, he fulfilled it, by bringing the men to Athens within the -twenty days as he had pledged himself to do. - -Nothing that happened in the war surprised the Hellenes so much as this. -It was the opinion that no force or famine could make the Lacedaemonians -give up their arms, but that they would fight on as they could, and -die with them in their hands: indeed people could scarcely believe that -those who had surrendered were of the same stuff as the fallen; and -an Athenian ally, who some time after insultingly asked one of the -prisoners from the island if those that had fallen were men of honour, -received for answer that the atraktos--that is, the arrow--would be -worth a great deal if it could tell men of honour from the rest; in -allusion to the fact that the killed were those whom the stones and the -arrows happened to hit. - -Upon the arrival of the men the Athenians determined to keep them in -prison until the peace, and if the Peloponnesians invaded their country -in the interval, to bring them out and put them to death. Meanwhile the -defence of Pylos was not forgotten; the Messenians from Naupactus sent -to their old country, to which Pylos formerly belonged, some of the -likeliest of their number, and began a series of incursions into -Laconia, which their common dialect rendered most destructive. The -Lacedaemonians, hitherto without experience of incursions or a warfare -of the kind, finding the Helots deserting, and fearing the march of -revolution in their country, began to be seriously uneasy, and in spite -of their unwillingness to betray this to the Athenians began to send -envoys to Athens, and tried to recover Pylos and the prisoners. The -Athenians, however, kept grasping at more, and dismissed envoy after -envoy without their having effected anything. Such was the history of -the affair of Pylos. - - - - -CHAPTER XIII - -_Seventh and Eighth Years of the War--End of Corcyraean Revolution-- -Peace of Gela--Capture of Nisaea_ - -The same summer, directly after these events, the Athenians made an -expedition against the territory of Corinth with eighty ships and two -thousand Athenian heavy infantry, and two hundred cavalry on board horse -transports, accompanied by the Milesians, Andrians, and Carystians from -the allies, under the command of Nicias, son of Niceratus, with two -colleagues. Putting out to sea they made land at daybreak between -Chersonese and Rheitus, at the beach of the country underneath -the Solygian hill, upon which the Dorians in old times established -themselves and carried on war against the Aeolian inhabitants of -Corinth, and where a village now stands called Solygia. The beach where -the fleet came to is about a mile and a half from the village, seven -miles from Corinth, and two and a quarter from the Isthmus. The -Corinthians had heard from Argos of the coming of the Athenian armament, -and had all come up to the Isthmus long before, with the exception of -those who lived beyond it, and also of five hundred who were away in -garrison in Ambracia and Leucadia; and they were there in full force -watching for the Athenians to land. These last, however, gave them the -slip by coming in the dark; and being informed by signals of the -fact the Corinthians left half their number at Cenchreae, in case the -Athenians should go against Crommyon, and marched in all haste to the -rescue. - -Battus, one of the two generals present at the action, went with -a company to defend the village of Solygia, which was unfortified; -Lycophron remaining to give battle with the rest. The Corinthians first -attacked the right wing of the Athenians, which had just landed in front -of Chersonese, and afterwards the rest of the army. The battle was an -obstinate one, and fought throughout hand to hand. The right wing of the -Athenians and Carystians, who had been placed at the end of the -line, received and with some difficulty repulsed the Corinthians, -who thereupon retreated to a wall upon the rising ground behind, and -throwing down the stones upon them, came on again singing the paean, and -being received by the Athenians, were again engaged at close quarters. -At this moment a Corinthian company having come to the relief of the -left wing, routed and pursued the Athenian right to the sea, whence they -were in their turn driven back by the Athenians and Carystians from -the ships. Meanwhile the rest of the army on either side fought on -tenaciously, especially the right wing of the Corinthians, where -Lycophron sustained the attack of the Athenian left, which it was feared -might attempt the village of Solygia. - -After holding on for a long while without either giving way, the -Athenians aided by their horse, of which the enemy had none, at length -routed the Corinthians, who retired to the hill and, halting, remained -quiet there, without coming down again. It was in this rout of the right -wing that they had the most killed, Lycophron their general being among -the number. The rest of the army, broken and put to flight in this way -without being seriously pursued or hurried, retired to the high ground -and there took up its position. The Athenians, finding that the enemy no -longer offered to engage them, stripped his dead and took up their own -and immediately set up a trophy. Meanwhile, the half of the Corinthians -left at Cenchreae to guard against the Athenians sailing on Crommyon, -although unable to see the battle for Mount Oneion, found out what was -going on by the dust, and hurried up to the rescue; as did also the -older Corinthians from the town, upon discovering what had occurred. The -Athenians seeing them all coming against them, and thinking that they -were reinforcements arriving from the neighbouring Peloponnesians, -withdrew in haste to their ships with their spoils and their own dead, -except two that they left behind, not being able to find them, and going -on board crossed over to the islands opposite, and from thence sent a -herald, and took up under truce the bodies which they had left behind. -Two hundred and twelve Corinthians fell in the battle, and rather less -than fifty Athenians. - -Weighing from the islands, the Athenians sailed the same day to Crommyon -in the Corinthian territory, about thirteen miles from the city, and -coming to anchor laid waste the country, and passed the night there. The -next day, after first coasting along to the territory of Epidaurus -and making a descent there, they came to Methana between Epidaurus -and Troezen, and drew a wall across and fortified the isthmus of the -peninsula, and left a post there from which incursions were henceforth -made upon the country of Troezen, Haliae, and Epidaurus. After walling -off this spot, the fleet sailed off home. - -While these events were going on, Eurymedon and Sophocles had put to sea -with the Athenian fleet from Pylos on their way to Sicily and, arriving -at Corcyra, joined the townsmen in an expedition against the party -established on Mount Istone, who had crossed over, as I have mentioned, -after the revolution and become masters of the country, to the great -hurt of the inhabitants. Their stronghold having been taken by an -attack, the garrison took refuge in a body upon some high ground and -there capitulated, agreeing to give up their mercenary auxiliaries, lay -down their arms, and commit themselves to the discretion of the Athenian -people. The generals carried them across under truce to the island of -Ptychia, to be kept in custody until they could be sent to Athens, upon -the understanding that, if any were caught running away, all would -lose the benefit of the treaty. Meanwhile the leaders of the Corcyraean -commons, afraid that the Athenians might spare the lives of the -prisoners, had recourse to the following stratagem. They gained over -some few men on the island by secretly sending friends with instructions -to provide them with a boat, and to tell them, as if for their own -sakes, that they had best escape as quickly as possible, as the Athenian -generals were going to give them up to the Corcyraean people. - -These representations succeeding, it was so arranged that the men were -caught sailing out in the boat that was provided, and the treaty became -void accordingly, and the whole body were given up to the Corcyraeans. -For this result the Athenian generals were in a great measure -responsible; their evident disinclination to sail for Sicily, and -thus to leave to others the honour of conducting the men to Athens, -encouraged the intriguers in their design and seemed to affirm the truth -of their representations. The prisoners thus handed over were shut up -by the Corcyraeans in a large building, and afterwards taken out by -twenties and led past two lines of heavy infantry, one on each side, -being bound together, and beaten and stabbed by the men in the lines -whenever any saw pass a personal enemy; while men carrying whips went by -their side and hastened on the road those that walked too slowly. - -As many as sixty men were taken out and killed in this way without the -knowledge of their friends in the building, who fancied they were merely -being moved from one prison to another. At last, however, someone opened -their eyes to the truth, upon which they called upon the Athenians to -kill them themselves, if such was their pleasure, and refused any longer -to go out of the building, and said they would do all they could to -prevent any one coming in. The Corcyraeans, not liking themselves to -force a passage by the doors, got up on the top of the building, and -breaking through the roof, threw down the tiles and let fly arrows at -them, from which the prisoners sheltered themselves as well as they -could. Most of their number, meanwhile, were engaged in dispatching -themselves by thrusting into their throats the arrows shot by the enemy, -and hanging themselves with the cords taken from some beds that happened -to be there, and with strips made from their clothing; adopting, in -short, every possible means of self-destruction, and also falling -victims to the missiles of their enemies on the roof. Night came on -while these horrors were enacting, and most of it had passed before they -were concluded. When it was day the Corcyraeans threw them in layers -upon wagons and carried them out of the city. All the women taken in -the stronghold were sold as slaves. In this way the Corcyraeans of the -mountain were destroyed by the commons; and so after terrible excesses -the party strife came to an end, at least as far as the period of this -war is concerned, for of one party there was practically nothing left. -Meanwhile the Athenians sailed off to Sicily, their primary destination, -and carried on the war with their allies there. - -At the close of the summer, the Athenians at Naupactus and the -Acarnanians made an expedition against Anactorium, the Corinthian town -lying at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf, and took it by treachery; -and the Acarnanians themselves, sending settlers from all parts of -Acarnania, occupied the place. - -Summer was now over. During the winter ensuing, Aristides, son of -Archippus, one of the commanders of the Athenian ships sent to collect -money from the allies, arrested at Eion, on the Strymon, Artaphernes, -a Persian, on his way from the King to Lacedaemon. He was conducted -to Athens, where the Athenians got his dispatches translated from the -Assyrian character and read them. With numerous references to other -subjects, they in substance told the Lacedaemonians that the King did -not know what they wanted, as of the many ambassadors they had sent him -no two ever told the same story; if however they were prepared to speak -plainly they might send him some envoys with this Persian. The Athenians -afterwards sent back Artaphernes in a galley to Ephesus, and ambassadors -with him, who heard there of the death of King Artaxerxes, son of -Xerxes, which took place about that time, and so returned home. - -The same winter the Chians pulled down their new wall at the command of -the Athenians, who suspected them of meditating an insurrection, after -first however obtaining pledges from the Athenians, and security as far -as this was possible for their continuing to treat them as before. Thus -the winter ended, and with it ended the seventh year of this war of -which Thucydides is the historian. - -In first days of the next summer there was an eclipse of the sun at the -time of new moon, and in the early part of the same month an earthquake. -Meanwhile, the Mitylenian and other Lesbian exiles set out, for the -most part from the continent, with mercenaries hired in Peloponnese, and -others levied on the spot, and took Rhoeteum, but restored it without -injury on the receipt of two thousand Phocaean staters. After this they -marched against Antandrus and took the town by treachery, their plan -being to free Antandrus and the rest of the Actaean towns, formerly -owned by Mitylene but now held by the Athenians. Once fortified there, -they would have every facility for ship-building from the vicinity -of Ida and the consequent abundance of timber, and plenty of other -supplies, and might from this base easily ravage Lesbos, which was -not far off, and make themselves masters of the Aeolian towns on the -continent. - -While these were the schemes of the exiles, the Athenians in the same -summer made an expedition with sixty ships, two thousand heavy infantry, -a few cavalry, and some allied troops from Miletus and other parts, -against Cythera, under the command of Nicias, son of Niceratus, -Nicostratus, son of Diotrephes, and Autocles, son of Tolmaeus. Cythera -is an island lying off Laconia, opposite Malea; the inhabitants are -Lacedaemonians of the class of the Perioeci; and an officer called the -judge of Cythera went over to the place annually from Sparta. A garrison -of heavy infantry was also regularly sent there, and great attention -paid to the island, as it was the landing-place for the merchantmen from -Egypt and Libya, and at the same time secured Laconia from the attacks -of privateers from the sea, at the only point where it is assailable, as -the whole coast rises abruptly towards the Sicilian and Cretan seas. - -Coming to land here with their armament, the Athenians with ten ships -and two thousand Milesian heavy infantry took the town of Scandea, on -the sea; and with the rest of their forces landing on the side of the -island looking towards Malea, went against the lower town of Cythera, -where they found all the inhabitants encamped. A battle ensuing, the -Cytherians held their ground for some little while, and then turned -and fled into the upper town, where they soon afterwards capitulated to -Nicias and his colleagues, agreeing to leave their fate to the decision -of the Athenians, their lives only being safe. A correspondence had -previously been going on between Nicias and certain of the inhabitants, -which caused the surrender to be effected more speedily, and upon terms -more advantageous, present and future, for the Cytherians; who would -otherwise have been expelled by the Athenians on account of their being -Lacedaemonians and their island being so near to Laconia. After the -capitulation, the Athenians occupied the town of Scandea near the -harbour, and appointing a garrison for Cythera, sailed to Asine, Helus, -and most of the places on the sea, and making descents and passing the -night on shore at such spots as were convenient, continued ravaging the -country for about seven days. - -The Lacedaemonians seeing the Athenians masters of Cythera, and -expecting descents of the kind upon their coasts, nowhere opposed -them in force, but sent garrisons here and there through the country, -consisting of as many heavy infantry as the points menaced seemed to -require, and generally stood very much upon the defensive. After the -severe and unexpected blow that had befallen them in the island, the -occupation of Pylos and Cythera, and the apparition on every side of -a war whose rapidity defied precaution, they lived in constant fear -of internal revolution, and now took the unusual step of raising four -hundred horse and a force of archers, and became more timid than ever -in military matters, finding themselves involved in a maritime struggle, -which their organization had never contemplated, and that against -Athenians, with whom an enterprise unattempted was always looked upon -as a success sacrificed. Besides this, their late numerous reverses -of fortune, coming close one upon another without any reason, had -thoroughly unnerved them, and they were always afraid of a second -disaster like that on the island, and thus scarcely dared to take the -field, but fancied that they could not stir without a blunder, for -being new to the experience of adversity they had lost all confidence in -themselves. - -Accordingly they now allowed the Athenians to ravage their seaboard, -without making any movement, the garrisons in whose neighbourhood the -descents were made always thinking their numbers insufficient, and -sharing the general feeling. A single garrison which ventured to resist, -near Cotyrta and Aphrodisia, struck terror by its charge into the -scattered mob of light troops, but retreated, upon being received by the -heavy infantry, with the loss of a few men and some arms, for which the -Athenians set up a trophy, and then sailed off to Cythera. From thence -they sailed round to Epidaurus Limera, ravaged part of the country, -and so came to Thyrea in the Cynurian territory, upon the Argive and -Laconian border. This district had been given by its Lacedaemonian -owners to the expelled Aeginetans to inhabit, in return for their good -offices at the time of the earthquake and the rising of the Helots; and -also because, although subjects of Athens, they had always sided with -Lacedaemon. - -While the Athenians were still at sea, the Aeginetans evacuated a fort -which they were building upon the coast, and retreated into the upper -town where they lived, rather more than a mile from the sea. One of the -Lacedaemonian district garrisons which was helping them in the work, -refused to enter here with them at their entreaty, thinking it dangerous -to shut themselves up within the wall, and retiring to the high ground -remained quiet, not considering themselves a match for the enemy. -Meanwhile the Athenians landed, and instantly advanced with all their -forces and took Thyrea. The town they burnt, pillaging what was in -it; the Aeginetans who were not slain in action they took with them to -Athens, with Tantalus, son of Patrocles, their Lacedaemonian commander, -who had been wounded and taken prisoner. They also took with them a -few men from Cythera whom they thought it safest to remove. These the -Athenians determined to lodge in the islands: the rest of the Cytherians -were to retain their lands and pay four talents tribute; the Aeginetans -captured to be all put to death, on account of the old inveterate feud; -and Tantalus to share the imprisonment of the Lacedaemonians taken on -the island. - -The same summer, the inhabitants of Camarina and Gela in Sicily first -made an armistice with each other, after which embassies from all -the other Sicilian cities assembled at Gela to try to bring about a -pacification. After many expressions of opinion on one side and the -other, according to the griefs and pretensions of the different -parties complaining, Hermocrates, son of Hermon, a Syracusan, the -most influential man among them, addressed the following words to the -assembly: - -"If I now address you, Sicilians, it is not because my city is the least -in Sicily or the greatest sufferer by the war, but in order to state -publicly what appears to me to be the best policy for the whole island. -That war is an evil is a proposition so familiar to every one that it -would be tedious to develop it. No one is forced to engage in it by -ignorance, or kept out of it by fear, if he fancies there is anything to -be gained by it. To the former the gain appears greater than the danger, -while the latter would rather stand the risk than put up with any -immediate sacrifice. But if both should happen to have chosen the -wrong moment for acting in this way, advice to make peace would not be -unserviceable; and this, if we did but see it, is just what we stand -most in need of at the present juncture. - -"I suppose that no one will dispute that we went to war at first in -order to serve our own several interests, that we are now, in view -of the same interests, debating how we can make peace; and that if -we separate without having as we think our rights, we shall go to war -again. And yet, as men of sense, we ought to see that our separate -interests are not alone at stake in the present congress: there is also -the question whether we have still time to save Sicily, the whole of -which in my opinion is menaced by Athenian ambition; and we ought to -find in the name of that people more imperious arguments for peace than -any which I can advance, when we see the first power in Hellas watching -our mistakes with the few ships that she has at present in our waters, -and under the fair name of alliance speciously seeking to turn to -account the natural hostility that exists between us. If we go to war, -and call in to help us a people that are ready enough to carry their -arms even where they are not invited; and if we injure ourselves at -our own expense, and at the same time serve as the pioneers of their -dominion, we may expect, when they see us worn out, that they will -one day come with a larger armament, and seek to bring all of us into -subjection. - -"And yet as sensible men, if we call in allies and court danger, -it should be in order to enrich our different countries with new -acquisitions, and not to ruin what they possess already; and we should -understand that the intestine discords which are so fatal to communities -generally, will be equally so to Sicily, if we, its inhabitants, -absorbed in our local quarrels, neglect the common enemy. These -considerations should reconcile individual with individual, and city -with city, and unite us in a common effort to save the whole of Sicily. -Nor should any one imagine that the Dorians only are enemies of Athens, -while the Chalcidian race is secured by its Ionian blood; the attack in -question is not inspired by hatred of one of two nationalities, but by -a desire for the good things in Sicily, the common property of us all. -This is proved by the Athenian reception of the Chalcidian invitation: -an ally who has never given them any assistance whatever, at once -receives from them almost more than the treaty entitles him to. That the -Athenians should cherish this ambition and practise this policy is very -excusable; and I do not blame those who wish to rule, but those who are -over-ready to serve. It is just as much in men's nature to rule those -who submit to them, as it is to resist those who molest them; one is not -less invariable than the other. Meanwhile all who see these dangers -and refuse to provide for them properly, or who have come here without -having made up their minds that our first duty is to unite to get rid of -the common peril, are mistaken. The quickest way to be rid of it is to -make peace with each other; since the Athenians menace us not from their -own country, but from that of those who invited them here. In this way -instead of war issuing in war, peace quietly ends our quarrels; and the -guests who come hither under fair pretences for bad ends, will have good -reason for going away without having attained them. - -"So far as regards the Athenians, such are the great advantages proved -inherent in a wise policy. Independently of this, in the face of the -universal consent, that peace is the first of blessings, how can we -refuse to make it amongst ourselves; or do you not think that the good -which you have, and the ills that you complain of, would be better -preserved and cured by quiet than by war; that peace has its honours and -splendours of a less perilous kind, not to mention the numerous other -blessings that one might dilate on, with the not less numerous miseries -of war? These considerations should teach you not to disregard my words, -but rather to look in them every one for his own safety. If there be any -here who feels certain either by right or might to effect his object, -let not this surprise be to him too severe a disappointment. Let him -remember that many before now have tried to chastise a wrongdoer, and -failing to punish their enemy have not even saved themselves; while -many who have trusted in force to gain an advantage, instead of gaining -anything more, have been doomed to lose what they had. Vengeance is not -necessarily successful because wrong has been done, or strength sure -because it is confident; but the incalculable element in the future -exercises the widest influence, and is the most treacherous, and yet in -fact the most useful of all things, as it frightens us all equally, and -thus makes us consider before attacking each other. - -"Let us therefore now allow the undefined fear of this unknown future, -and the immediate terror of the Athenians' presence, to produce their -natural impression, and let us consider any failure to carry out -the programmes that we may each have sketched out for ourselves as -sufficiently accounted for by these obstacles, and send away the -intruder from the country; and if everlasting peace be impossible -between us, let us at all events make a treaty for as long a term as -possible, and put off our private differences to another day. In fine, -let us recognize that the adoption of my advice will leave us each -citizens of a free state, and as such arbiters of our own destiny, able -to return good or bad offices with equal effect; while its rejection -will make us dependent on others, and thus not only impotent to repel -an insult, but on the most favourable supposition, friends to our direst -enemies, and at feud with our natural friends. - -"For myself, though, as I said at first, the representative of a great -city, and able to think less of defending myself than of attacking -others, I am prepared to concede something in prevision of these -dangers. I am not inclined to ruin myself for the sake of hurting my -enemies, or so blinded by animosity as to think myself equally master -of my own plans and of fortune which I cannot command; but I am ready -to give up anything in reason. I call upon the rest of you to imitate -my conduct of your own free will, without being forced to do so by the -enemy. There is no disgrace in connections giving way to one another, -a Dorian to a Dorian, or a Chalcidian to his brethren; above and beyond -this we are neighbours, live in the same country, are girt by the same -sea, and go by the same name of Sicilians. We shall go to war again, I -suppose, when the time comes, and again make peace among ourselves by -means of future congresses; but the foreign invader, if we are wise, -will always find us united against him, since the hurt of one is the -danger of all; and we shall never, in future, invite into the island -either allies or mediators. By so acting we shall at the present moment -do for Sicily a double service, ridding her at once of the Athenians, -and of civil war, and in future shall live in freedom at home, and be -less menaced from abroad." - -Such were the words of Hermocrates. The Sicilians took his advice, and -came to an understanding among themselves to end the war, each keeping -what they had--the Camarinaeans taking Morgantina at a price fixed to -be paid to the Syracusans--and the allies of the Athenians called the -officers in command, and told them that they were going to make peace -and that they would be included in the treaty. The generals assenting, -the peace was concluded, and the Athenian fleet afterwards sailed -away from Sicily. Upon their arrival at Athens, the Athenians banished -Pythodorus and Sophocles, and fined Eurymedon for having taken bribes -to depart when they might have subdued Sicily. So thoroughly had the -present prosperity persuaded the citizens that nothing could withstand -them, and that they could achieve what was possible and impracticable -alike, with means ample or inadequate it mattered not. The secret of -this was their general extraordinary success, which made them confuse -their strength with their hopes. - -The same summer the Megarians in the city, pressed by the hostilities of -the Athenians, who invaded their country twice every year with all their -forces, and harassed by the incursions of their own exiles at Pegae, -who had been expelled in a revolution by the popular party, began to ask -each other whether it would not be better to receive back their exiles, -and free the town from one of its two scourges. The friends of the -emigrants, perceiving the agitation, now more openly than before -demanded the adoption of this proposition; and the leaders of the -commons, seeing that the sufferings of the times had tired out -the constancy of their supporters, entered in their alarm into -correspondence with the Athenian generals, Hippocrates, son of Ariphron, -and Demosthenes, son of Alcisthenes, and resolved to betray the town, -thinking this less dangerous to themselves than the return of the party -which they had banished. It was accordingly arranged that the Athenians -should first take the long walls extending for nearly a mile from the -city to the port of Nisaea, to prevent the Peloponnesians coming to the -rescue from that place, where they formed the sole garrison to secure -the fidelity of Megara; and that after this the attempt should be made -to put into their hands the upper town, which it was thought would then -come over with less difficulty. - -The Athenians, after plans had been arranged between themselves and -their correspondents both as to words and actions, sailed by night to -Minoa, the island off Megara, with six hundred heavy infantry under the -command of Hippocrates, and took post in a quarry not far off, out of -which bricks used to be taken for the walls; while Demosthenes, the -other commander, with a detachment of Plataean light troops and another -of Peripoli, placed himself in ambush in the precinct of Enyalius, which -was still nearer. No one knew of it, except those whose business it was -to know that night. A little before daybreak, the traitors in Megara -began to act. Every night for a long time back, under pretence of -marauding, in order to have a means of opening the gates, they had been -used, with the consent of the officer in command, to carry by night a -sculling boat upon a cart along the ditch to the sea, and so to sail -out, bringing it back again before day upon the cart, and taking it -within the wall through the gates, in order, as they pretended, to -baffle the Athenian blockade at Minoa, there being no boat to be seen in -the harbour. On the present occasion the cart was already at the gates, -which had been opened in the usual way for the boat, when the Athenians, -with whom this had been concerted, saw it, and ran at the top of their -speed from the ambush in order to reach the gates before they were shut -again, and while the cart was still there to prevent their being closed; -their Megarian accomplices at the same moment killing the guard at -the gates. The first to run in was Demosthenes with his Plataeans and -Peripoli, just where the trophy now stands; and he was no sooner within -the gates than the Plataeans engaged and defeated the nearest party -of Peloponnesians who had taken the alarm and come to the rescue, and -secured the gates for the approaching Athenian heavy infantry. - -After this, each of the Athenians as fast as they entered went against -the wall. A few of the Peloponnesian garrison stood their ground at -first, and tried to repel the assault, and some of them were killed; but -the main body took fright and fled; the night attack and the sight of -the Megarian traitors in arms against them making them think that all -Megara had gone over to the enemy. It so happened also that the Athenian -herald of his own idea called out and invited any of the Megarians that -wished, to join the Athenian ranks; and this was no sooner heard by the -garrison than they gave way, and, convinced that they were the victims -of a concerted attack, took refuge in Nisaea. By daybreak, the walls -being now taken and the Megarians in the city in great agitation, the -persons who had negotiated with the Athenians, supported by the rest of -the popular party which was privy to the plot, said that they ought to -open the gates and march out to battle. It had been concerted between -them that the Athenians should rush in, the moment that the gates were -opened, while the conspirators were to be distinguished from the rest by -being anointed with oil, and so to avoid being hurt. They could open the -gates with more security, as four thousand Athenian heavy infantry from -Eleusis, and six hundred horse, had marched all night, according to -agreement, and were now close at hand. The conspirators were all ready -anointed and at their posts by the gates, when one of their accomplices -denounced the plot to the opposite party, who gathered together and came -in a body, and roundly said that they must not march out--a thing they -had never yet ventured on even when in greater force than at present--or -wantonly compromise the safety of the town, and that if what they said -was not attended to, the battle would have to be fought in Megara. For -the rest, they gave no signs of their knowledge of the intrigue, but -stoutly maintained that their advice was the best, and meanwhile -kept close by and watched the gates, making it impossible for the -conspirators to effect their purpose. - -The Athenian generals seeing that some obstacle had arisen, and that -the capture of the town by force was no longer practicable, at once -proceeded to invest Nisaea, thinking that, if they could take it -before relief arrived, the surrender of Megara would soon follow. -Iron, stone-masons, and everything else required quickly coming up from -Athens, the Athenians started from the wall which they occupied, and -from this point built a cross wall looking towards Megara down to the -sea on either side of Nisaea; the ditch and the walls being divided -among the army, stones and bricks taken from the suburb, and the -fruit-trees and timber cut down to make a palisade wherever this -seemed necessary; the houses also in the suburb with the addition of -battlements sometimes entering into the fortification. The whole of this -day the work continued, and by the afternoon of the next the wall was -all but completed, when the garrison in Nisaea, alarmed by the absolute -want of provisions, which they used to take in for the day from the -upper town, not anticipating any speedy relief from the Peloponnesians, -and supposing Megara to be hostile, capitulated to the Athenians on -condition that they should give up their arms, and should each be -ransomed for a stipulated sum; their Lacedaemonian commander, and any -others of his countrymen in the place, being left to the discretion of -the Athenians. On these conditions they surrendered and came out, and -the Athenians broke down the long walls at their point of junction -with Megara, took possession of Nisaea, and went on with their other -preparations. - -Just at this time the Lacedaemonian Brasidas, son of Tellis, happened to -be in the neighbourhood of Sicyon and Corinth, getting ready an army for -Thrace. As soon as he heard of the capture of the walls, fearing for -the Peloponnesians in Nisaea and the safety of Megara, he sent to the -Boeotians to meet him as quickly as possible at Tripodiscus, a village -so called of the Megarid, under Mount Geraneia, and went himself, with -two thousand seven hundred Corinthian heavy infantry, four hundred -Phliasians, six hundred Sicyonians, and such troops of his own as he had -already levied, expecting to find Nisaea not yet taken. Hearing of its -fall (he had marched out by night to Tripodiscus), he took three hundred -picked men from the army, without waiting till his coming should be -known, and came up to Megara unobserved by the Athenians, who were down -by the sea, ostensibly, and really if possible, to attempt Nisaea, but -above all to get into Megara and secure the town. He accordingly -invited the townspeople to admit his party, saying that he had hopes of -recovering Nisaea. - -However, one of the Megarian factions feared that he might expel them -and restore the exiles; the other that the commons, apprehensive of this -very danger, might set upon them, and the city be thus destroyed by a -battle within its gates under the eyes of the ambushed Athenians. He was -accordingly refused admittance, both parties electing to remain quiet -and await the event; each expecting a battle between the Athenians -and the relieving army, and thinking it safer to see their friends -victorious before declaring in their favour. - -Unable to carry his point, Brasidas went back to the rest of the army. -At daybreak the Boeotians joined him. Having determined to relieve -Megara, whose danger they considered their own, even before hearing from -Brasidas, they were already in full force at Plataea, when his messenger -arrived to add spurs to their resolution; and they at once sent on to -him two thousand two hundred heavy infantry, and six hundred horse, -returning home with the main body. The whole army thus assembled -numbered six thousand heavy infantry. The Athenian heavy infantry were -drawn up by Nisaea and the sea; but the light troops being scattered -over the plain were attacked by the Boeotian horse and driven to the -sea, being taken entirely by surprise, as on previous occasions no -relief had ever come to the Megarians from any quarter. Here the -Boeotians were in their turn charged and engaged by the Athenian horse, -and a cavalry action ensued which lasted a long time, and in which -both parties claimed the victory. The Athenians killed and stripped -the leader of the Boeotian horse and some few of his comrades who had -charged right up to Nisaea, and remaining masters of the bodies gave -them back under truce, and set up a trophy; but regarding the action -as a whole the forces separated without either side having gained -a decisive advantage, the Boeotians returning to their army and the -Athenians to Nisaea. - -After this Brasidas and the army came nearer to the sea and to Megara, -and taking up a convenient position, remained quiet in order of battle, -expecting to be attacked by the Athenians and knowing that the Megarians -were waiting to see which would be the victor. This attitude seemed -to present two advantages. Without taking the offensive or willingly -provoking the hazards of a battle, they openly showed their readiness to -fight, and thus without bearing the burden of the day would fairly -reap its honours; while at the same time they effectually served their -interests at Megara. For if they had failed to show themselves they -would not have had a chance, but would have certainly been considered -vanquished, and have lost the town. As it was, the Athenians might -possibly not be inclined to accept their challenge, and their object -would be attained without fighting. And so it turned out. The Athenians -formed outside the long walls and, the enemy not attacking, there -remained motionless; their generals having decided that the risk was too -unequal. In fact most of their objects had been already attained; and -they would have to begin a battle against superior numbers, and if -victorious could only gain Megara, while a defeat would destroy the -flower of their heavy soldiery. For the enemy it was different; as even -the states actually represented in his army risked each only a part of -its entire force, he might well be more audacious. Accordingly, after -waiting for some time without either side attacking, the Athenians -withdrew to Nisaea, and the Peloponnesians after them to the point from -which they had set out. The friends of the Megarian exiles now threw -aside their hesitation, and opened the gates to Brasidas and the -commanders from the different states--looking upon him as the victor -and upon the Athenians as having declined the battle--and receiving -them into the town proceeded to discuss matters with them; the party in -correspondence with the Athenians being paralysed by the turn things had -taken. - -Afterwards Brasidas let the allies go home, and himself went back -to Corinth, to prepare for his expedition to Thrace, his original -destination. The Athenians also returning home, the Megarians in the -city most implicated in the Athenian negotiation, knowing that they had -been detected, presently disappeared; while the rest conferred with the -friends of the exiles, and restored the party at Pegae, after binding -them under solemn oaths to take no vengeance for the past, and only to -consult the real interests of the town. However, as soon as they were -in office, they held a review of the heavy infantry, and separating the -battalions, picked out about a hundred of their enemies, and of those -who were thought to be most involved in the correspondence with the -Athenians, brought them before the people, and compelling the vote to be -given openly, had them condemned and executed, and established a close -oligarchy in the town--a revolution which lasted a very long while, -although effected by a very few partisans. - - - - -CHAPTER XIV - -_Eighth and Ninth Years of the War--Invasion of Boeotia--Fall of -Amphipolis--Brilliant Successes of Brasidas_ - -The same summer the Mitylenians were about to fortify Antandrus, as -they had intended, when Demodocus and Aristides, the commanders of the -Athenian squadron engaged in levying subsidies, heard on the Hellespont -of what was being done to the place (Lamachus their colleague having -sailed with ten ships into the Pontus) and conceived fears of its -becoming a second Anaia-the place in which the Samian exiles had -established themselves to annoy Samos, helping the Peloponnesians by -sending pilots to their navy, and keeping the city in agitation and -receiving all its outlaws. They accordingly got together a force from -the allies and set sail, defeated in battle the troops that met them -from Antandrus, and retook the place. Not long after, Lamachus, who had -sailed into the Pontus, lost his ships at anchor in the river Calex, in -the territory of Heraclea, rain having fallen in the interior and the -flood coming suddenly down upon them; and himself and his troops passed -by land through the Bithynian Thracians on the Asiatic side, and arrived -at Chalcedon, the Megarian colony at the mouth of the Pontus. - -The same summer the Athenian general, Demosthenes, arrived at Naupactus -with forty ships immediately after the return from the Megarid. -Hippocrates and himself had had overtures made to them by certain men -in the cities in Boeotia, who wished to change the constitution and -introduce a democracy as at Athens; Ptoeodorus, a Theban exile, being -the chief mover in this intrigue. The seaport town of Siphae, in the bay -of Crisae, in the Thespian territory, was to be betrayed to them by one -party; Chaeronea (a dependency of what was formerly called the Minyan, -now the Boeotian, Orchomenus) to be put into their hands by another from -that town, whose exiles were very active in the business, hiring men in -Peloponnese. Some Phocians also were in the plot, Chaeronea being the -frontier town of Boeotia and close to Phanotis in Phocia. Meanwhile -the Athenians were to seize Delium, the sanctuary of Apollo, in the -territory of Tanagra looking towards Euboea; and all these events were -to take place simultaneously upon a day appointed, in order that the -Boeotians might be unable to unite to oppose them at Delium, being -everywhere detained by disturbances at home. Should the enterprise -succeed, and Delium be fortified, its authors confidently expected that -even if no revolution should immediately follow in Boeotia, yet -with these places in their hands, and the country being harassed by -incursions, and a refuge in each instance near for the partisans engaged -in them, things would not remain as they were, but that the rebels being -supported by the Athenians and the forces of the oligarchs divided, it -would be possible after a while to settle matters according to their -wishes. - -Such was the plot in contemplation. Hippocrates with a force raised at -home awaited the proper moment to take the field against the Boeotians; -while he sent on Demosthenes with the forty ships above mentioned to -Naupactus, to raise in those parts an army of Acarnanians and of the -other allies, and sail and receive Siphae from the conspirators; a -day having been agreed on for the simultaneous execution of both these -operations. Demosthenes on his arrival found Oeniadae already compelled -by the united Acarnanians to join the Athenian confederacy, and himself -raising all the allies in those countries marched against and subdued -Salynthius and the Agraeans; after which he devoted himself to the -preparations necessary to enable him to be at Siphae by the time -appointed. - -About the same time in the summer, Brasidas set out on his march for the -Thracian places with seventeen hundred heavy infantry, and arriving at -Heraclea in Trachis, from thence sent on a messenger to his friends -at Pharsalus, to ask them to conduct himself and his army through the -country. Accordingly there came to Melitia in Achaia Panaerus, Dorus, -Hippolochidas, Torylaus, and Strophacus, the Chalcidian proxenus, under -whose escort he resumed his march, being accompanied also by other -Thessalians, among whom was Niconidas from Larissa, a friend of -Perdiccas. It was never very easy to traverse Thessaly without an -escort; and throughout all Hellas for an armed force to pass without -leave through a neighbour's country was a delicate step to take. Besides -this the Thessalian people had always sympathized with the Athenians. -Indeed if instead of the customary close oligarchy there had been a -constitutional government in Thessaly, he would never have been able -to proceed; since even as it was, he was met on his march at the -river Enipeus by certain of the opposite party who forbade his further -progress, and complained of his making the attempt without the consent -of the nation. To this his escort answered that they had no intention -of taking him through against their will; they were only friends in -attendance on an unexpected visitor. Brasidas himself added that he came -as a friend to Thessaly and its inhabitants, his arms not being directed -against them but against the Athenians, with whom he was at war, -and that although he knew of no quarrel between the Thessalians and -Lacedaemonians to prevent the two nations having access to each other's -territory, he neither would nor could proceed against their wishes; he -could only beg them not to stop him. With this answer they went away, -and he took the advice of his escort, and pushed on without halting, -before a greater force might gather to prevent him. Thus in the day that -he set out from Melitia he performed the whole distance to Pharsalus, -and encamped on the river Apidanus; and so to Phacium and from thence to -Perrhaebia. Here his Thessalian escort went back, and the Perrhaebians, -who are subjects of Thessaly, set him down at Dium in the dominions -of Perdiccas, a Macedonian town under Mount Olympus, looking towards -Thessaly. - -In this way Brasidas hurried through Thessaly before any one could -be got ready to stop him, and reached Perdiccas and Chalcidice. The -departure of the army from Peloponnese had been procured by the -Thracian towns in revolt against Athens and by Perdiccas, alarmed at the -successes of the Athenians. The Chalcidians thought that they would be -the first objects of an Athenian expedition, not that the neighbouring -towns which had not yet revolted did not also secretly join in the -invitation; and Perdiccas also had his apprehensions on account of his -old quarrels with the Athenians, although not openly at war with them, -and above all wished to reduce Arrhabaeus, king of the Lyncestians. It -had been less difficult for them to get an army to leave Peloponnese, -because of the ill fortune of the Lacedaemonians at the present moment. -The attacks of the Athenians upon Peloponnese, and in particular upon -Laconia, might, it was hoped, be diverted most effectually by annoying -them in return, and by sending an army to their allies, especially -as they were willing to maintain it and asked for it to aid them in -revolting. The Lacedaemonians were also glad to have an excuse for -sending some of the Helots out of the country, for fear that the present -aspect of affairs and the occupation of Pylos might encourage them to -move. Indeed fear of their numbers and obstinacy even persuaded the -Lacedaemonians to the action which I shall now relate, their policy at -all times having been governed by the necessity of taking precautions -against them. The Helots were invited by a proclamation to pick out -those of their number who claimed to have most distinguished themselves -against the enemy, in order that they might receive their freedom; the -object being to test them, as it was thought that the first to claim -their freedom would be the most high-spirited and the most apt to -rebel. As many as two thousand were selected accordingly, who crowned -themselves and went round the temples, rejoicing in their new freedom. -The Spartans, however, soon afterwards did away with them, and no one -ever knew how each of them perished. The Spartans now therefore gladly -sent seven hundred as heavy infantry with Brasidas, who recruited the -rest of his force by means of money in Peloponnese. - -Brasidas himself was sent out by the Lacedaemonians mainly at his -own desire, although the Chalcidians also were eager to have a man so -thorough as he had shown himself whenever there was anything to be done -at Sparta, and whose after-service abroad proved of the utmost use to -his country. At the present moment his just and moderate conduct towards -the towns generally succeeded in procuring their revolt, besides -the places which he managed to take by treachery; and thus when the -Lacedaemonians desired to treat, as they ultimately did, they had places -to offer in exchange, and the burden of war meanwhile shifted from -Peloponnese. Later on in the war, after the events in Sicily, the -present valour and conduct of Brasidas, known by experience to some, -by hearsay to others, was what mainly created in the allies of Athens a -feeling for the Lacedaemonians. He was the first who went out and -showed himself so good a man at all points as to leave behind him the -conviction that the rest were like him. - -Meanwhile his arrival in the Thracian country no sooner became known -to the Athenians than they declared war against Perdiccas, whom they -regarded as the author of the expedition, and kept a closer watch on -their allies in that quarter. - -Upon the arrival of Brasidas and his army, Perdiccas immediately started -with them and with his own forces against Arrhabaeus, son of Bromerus, -king of the Lyncestian Macedonians, his neighbour, with whom he had a -quarrel and whom he wished to subdue. However, when he arrived with his -army and Brasidas at the pass leading into Lyncus, Brasidas told him -that before commencing hostilities he wished to go and try to persuade -Arrhabaeus to become the ally of Lacedaemon, this latter having already -made overtures intimating his willingness to make Brasidas arbitrator -between them, and the Chalcidian envoys accompanying him having warned -him not to remove the apprehensions of Perdiccas, in order to ensure his -greater zeal in their cause. Besides, the envoys of Perdiccas had talked -at Lacedaemon about his bringing many of the places round him into -alliance with them; and thus Brasidas thought he might take a larger -view of the question of Arrhabaeus. Perdiccas however retorted that he -had not brought him with him to arbitrate in their quarrel, but to put -down the enemies whom he might point out to him; and that while he, -Perdiccas, maintained half his army it was a breach of faith for -Brasidas to parley with Arrhabaeus. Nevertheless Brasidas disregarded -the wishes of Perdiccas and held the parley in spite of him, and -suffered himself to be persuaded to lead off the army without invading -the country of Arrhabaeus; after which Perdiccas, holding that faith had -not been kept with him, contributed only a third instead of half of the -support of the army. - -The same summer, without loss of time, Brasidas marched with the -Chalcidians against Acanthus, a colony of the Andrians, a little before -vintage. The inhabitants were divided into two parties on the question -of receiving him; those who had joined the Chalcidians in inviting him, -and the popular party. However, fear for their fruit, which was still -out, enabled Brasidas to persuade the multitude to admit him alone, and -to hear what he had to say before making a decision; and he was admitted -accordingly and appeared before the people, and not being a bad speaker -for a Lacedaemonian, addressed them as follows: - -"Acanthians, the Lacedaemonians have sent out me and my army to make -good the reason that we gave for the war when we began it, viz., that we -were going to war with the Athenians in order to free Hellas. Our delay -in coming has been caused by mistaken expectations as to the war at -home, which led us to hope, by our own unassisted efforts and without -your risking anything, to effect the speedy downfall of the Athenians; -and you must not blame us for this, as we are now come the moment that -we were able, prepared with your aid to do our best to subdue them. -Meanwhile I am astonished at finding your gates shut against me, and at -not meeting with a better welcome. We Lacedaemonians thought of you as -allies eager to have us, to whom we should come in spirit even before we -were with you in body; and in this expectation undertook all the risks -of a march of many days through a strange country, so far did our zeal -carry us. It will be a terrible thing if after this you have other -intentions, and mean to stand in the way of your own and Hellenic -freedom. It is not merely that you oppose me yourselves; but wherever I -may go people will be less inclined to join me, on the score that you, -to whom I first came--an important town like Acanthus, and prudent men -like the Acanthians--refused to admit me. I shall have nothing to prove -that the reason which I advance is the true one; it will be said either -that there is something unfair in the freedom which I offer, or that -I am in insufficient force and unable to protect you against an attack -from Athens. Yet when I went with the army which I now have to the -relief of Nisaea, the Athenians did not venture to engage me although -in greater force than I; and it is not likely they will ever send across -sea against you an army as numerous as they had at Nisaea. And for -myself, I have come here not to hurt but to free the Hellenes, witness -the solemn oaths by which I have bound my government that the allies -that I may bring over shall be independent; and besides my object in -coming is not by force or fraud to obtain your alliance, but to -offer you mine to help you against your Athenian masters. I protest, -therefore, against any suspicions of my intentions after the guarantees -which I offer, and equally so against doubts of my ability to protect -you, and I invite you to join me without hesitation. - -"Some of you may hang back because they have private enemies, and fear -that I may put the city into the hands of a party: none need be more -tranquil than they. I am not come here to help this party or that; and I -do not consider that I should be bringing you freedom in any real sense, -if I should disregard your constitution, and enslave the many to the few -or the few to the many. This would be heavier than a foreign yoke; and -we Lacedaemonians, instead of being thanked for our pains, should get -neither honour nor glory, but, contrariwise, reproaches. The charges -which strengthen our hands in the war against the Athenians would on -our own showing be merited by ourselves, and more hateful in us than in -those who make no pretensions to honesty; as it is more disgraceful for -persons of character to take what they covet by fair-seeming fraud than -by open force; the one aggression having for its justification the might -which fortune gives, the other being simply a piece of clever roguery. -A matter which concerns us thus nearly we naturally look to most -jealously; and over and above the oaths that I have mentioned, what -stronger assurance can you have, when you see that our words, compared -with the actual facts, produce the necessary conviction that it is our -interest to act as we say? - -"If to these considerations of mine you put in the plea of inability, -and claim that your friendly feeling should save you from being hurt by -your refusal; if you say that freedom, in your opinion, is not without -its dangers, and that it is right to offer it to those who can accept -it, but not to force it on any against their will, then I shall take the -gods and heroes of your country to witness that I came for your good and -was rejected, and shall do my best to compel you by laying waste your -land. I shall do so without scruple, being justified by the necessity -which constrains me, first, to prevent the Lacedaemonians from being -damaged by you, their friends, in the event of your nonadhesion, through -the moneys that you pay to the Athenians; and secondly, to prevent the -Hellenes from being hindered by you in shaking off their servitude. -Otherwise indeed we should have no right to act as we propose; except -in the name of some public interest, what call should we Lacedaemonians -have to free those who do not wish it? Empire we do not aspire to: it -is what we are labouring to put down; and we should wrong the greater -number if we allowed you to stand in the way of the independence that -we offer to all. Endeavour, therefore, to decide wisely, and strive to -begin the work of liberation for the Hellenes, and lay up for -yourselves endless renown, while you escape private loss, and cover your -commonwealth with glory." - -Such were the words of Brasidas. The Acanthians, after much had been -said on both sides of the question, gave their votes in secret, and the -majority, influenced by the seductive arguments of Brasidas and by fear -for their fruit, decided to revolt from Athens; not however admitting -the army until they had taken his personal security for the oaths sworn -by his government before they sent him out, assuring the independence of -the allies whom he might bring over. Not long after, Stagirus, a colony -of the Andrians, followed their example and revolted. - -Such were the events of this summer. It was in the first days of the -winter following that the places in Boeotia were to be put into the -hands of the Athenian generals, Hippocrates and Demosthenes, the latter -of whom was to go with his ships to Siphae, the former to Delium. A -mistake, however, was made in the days on which they were each to start; -and Demosthenes, sailing first to Siphae, with the Acarnanians and many -of the allies from those parts on board, failed to effect anything, -through the plot having been betrayed by Nicomachus, a Phocian from -Phanotis, who told the Lacedaemonians, and they the Boeotians. Succours -accordingly flocked in from all parts of Boeotia, Hippocrates not being -yet there to make his diversion, and Siphae and Chaeronea were promptly -secured, and the conspirators, informed of the mistake, did not venture -on any movement in the towns. - -Meanwhile Hippocrates made a levy in mass of the citizens, resident -aliens, and foreigners in Athens, and arrived at his destination after -the Boeotians had already come back from Siphae, and encamping his -army began to fortify Delium, the sanctuary of Apollo, in the following -manner. A trench was dug all round the temple and the consecrated -ground, and the earth thrown up from the excavation was made to do -duty as a wall, in which stakes were also planted, the vines round the -sanctuary being cut down and thrown in, together with stones and bricks -pulled down from the houses near; every means, in short, being used -to run up the rampart. Wooden towers were also erected where they -were wanted, and where there was no part of the temple buildings left -standing, as on the side where the gallery once existing had fallen in. -The work was begun on the third day after leaving home, and continued -during the fourth, and till dinnertime on the fifth, when most of it -being now finished the army removed from Delium about a mile and a -quarter on its way home. From this point most of the light troops went -straight on, while the heavy infantry halted and remained where they -were; Hippocrates having stayed behind at Delium to arrange the posts, -and to give directions for the completion of such part of the outworks -as had been left unfinished. - -During the days thus employed the Boeotians were mustering at Tanagra, -and by the time that they had come in from all the towns, found the -Athenians already on their way home. The rest of the eleven Boeotarchs -were against giving battle, as the enemy was no longer in Boeotia, the -Athenians being just over the Oropian border, when they halted; but -Pagondas, son of Aeolidas, one of the Boeotarchs of Thebes (Arianthides, -son of Lysimachidas, being the other), and then commander-in-chief, -thought it best to hazard a battle. He accordingly called the men to -him, company after company, to prevent their all leaving their arms at -once, and urged them to attack the Athenians, and stand the issue of a -battle, speaking as follows: - -"Boeotians, the idea that we ought not to give battle to the Athenians, -unless we came up with them in Boeotia, is one which should never have -entered into the head of any of us, your generals. It was to annoy -Boeotia that they crossed the frontier and built a fort in our country; -and they are therefore, I imagine, our enemies wherever we may come up -with them, and from wheresoever they may have come to act as enemies -do. And if any one has taken up with the idea in question for reasons of -safety, it is high time for him to change his mind. The party attacked, -whose own country is in danger, can scarcely discuss what is prudent -with the calmness of men who are in full enjoyment of what they have -got, and are thinking of attacking a neighbour in order to get more. It -is your national habit, in your country or out of it, to oppose the same -resistance to a foreign invader; and when that invader is Athenian, and -lives upon your frontier besides, it is doubly imperative to do so. As -between neighbours generally, freedom means simply a determination -to hold one's own; and with neighbours like these, who are trying to -enslave near and far alike, there is nothing for it but to fight it out -to the last. Look at the condition of the Euboeans and of most of the -rest of Hellas, and be convinced that others have to fight with their -neighbours for this frontier or that, but that for us conquest means one -frontier for the whole country, about which no dispute can be made, for -they will simply come and take by force what we have. So much more have -we to fear from this neighbour than from another. Besides, people who, -like the Athenians in the present instance, are tempted by pride of -strength to attack their neighbours, usually march most confidently -against those who keep still, and only defend themselves in their own -country, but think twice before they grapple with those who meet them -outside their frontier and strike the first blow if opportunity offers. -The Athenians have shown us this themselves; the defeat which we -inflicted upon them at Coronea, at the time when our quarrels had -allowed them to occupy the country, has given great security to Boeotia -until the present day. Remembering this, the old must equal their -ancient exploits, and the young, the sons of the heroes of that time, -must endeavour not to disgrace their native valour; and trusting in the -help of the god whose temple has been sacrilegiously fortified, and -in the victims which in our sacrifices have proved propitious, we must -march against the enemy, and teach him that he must go and get what he -wants by attacking someone who will not resist him, but that men whose -glory it is to be always ready to give battle for the liberty of their -own country, and never unjustly to enslave that of others, will not let -him go without a struggle." - -By these arguments Pagondas persuaded the Boeotians to attack the -Athenians, and quickly breaking up his camp led his army forward, it -being now late in the day. On nearing the enemy, he halted in a position -where a hill intervening prevented the two armies from seeing each -other, and then formed and prepared for action. Meanwhile Hippocrates -at Delium, informed of the approach of the Boeotians, sent orders to his -troops to throw themselves into line, and himself joined them not long -afterwards, leaving about three hundred horse behind him at Delium, -at once to guard the place in case of attack, and to watch their -opportunity and fall upon the Boeotians during the battle. The Boeotians -placed a detachment to deal with these, and when everything was arranged -to their satisfaction appeared over the hill, and halted in the order -which they had determined on, to the number of seven thousand heavy -infantry, more than ten thousand light troops, one thousand horse, and -five hundred targeteers. On their right were the Thebans and those of -their province, in the centre the Haliartians, Coronaeans, Copaeans, -and the other people around the lake, and on the left the Thespians, -Tanagraeans, and Orchomenians, the cavalry and the light troops being at -the extremity of each wing. The Thebans formed twenty-five shields deep, -the rest as they pleased. Such was the strength and disposition of the -Boeotian army. - -On the side of the Athenians, the heavy infantry throughout the whole -army formed eight deep, being in numbers equal to the enemy, with the -cavalry upon the two wings. Light troops regularly armed there were none -in the army, nor had there ever been any at Athens. Those who had joined -in the invasion, though many times more numerous than those of the -enemy, had mostly followed unarmed, as part of the levy in mass of the -citizens and foreigners at Athens, and having started first on their way -home were not present in any number. The armies being now in line and -upon the point of engaging, Hippocrates, the general, passed along the -Athenian ranks, and encouraged them as follows: - -"Athenians, I shall only say a few words to you, but brave men require -no more, and they are addressed more to your understanding than to your -courage. None of you must fancy that we are going out of our way to -run this risk in the country of another. Fought in their territory the -battle will be for ours: if we conquer, the Peloponnesians will never -invade your country without the Boeotian horse, and in one battle you -will win Boeotia and in a manner free Attica. Advance to meet them -then like citizens of a country in which you all glory as the first in -Hellas, and like sons of the fathers who beat them at Oenophyta with -Myronides and thus gained possession of Boeotia." - -Hippocrates had got half through the army with his exhortation, when -the Boeotians, after a few more hasty words from Pagondas, struck up the -paean, and came against them from the hill; the Athenians advancing to -meet them, and closing at a run. The extreme wing of neither army came -into action, one like the other being stopped by the water-courses in -the way; the rest engaged with the utmost obstinacy, shield against -shield. The Boeotian left, as far as the centre, was worsted by the -Athenians. The Thespians in that part of the field suffered most -severely. The troops alongside them having given way, they were -surrounded in a narrow space and cut down fighting hand to hand; some -of the Athenians also fell into confusion in surrounding the enemy -and mistook and so killed each other. In this part of the field the -Boeotians were beaten, and retreated upon the troops still fighting; but -the right, where the Thebans were, got the better of the Athenians and -shoved them further and further back, though gradually at first. It so -happened also that Pagondas, seeing the distress of his left, had sent -two squadrons of horse, where they could not be seen, round the hill, -and their sudden appearance struck a panic into the victorious wing of -the Athenians, who thought that it was another army coming against them. -At length in both parts of the field, disturbed by this panic, and with -their line broken by the advancing Thebans, the whole Athenian army took -to flight. Some made for Delium and the sea, some for Oropus, others for -Mount Parnes, or wherever they had hopes of safety, pursued and cut down -by the Boeotians, and in particular by the cavalry, composed partly -of Boeotians and partly of Locrians, who had come up just as the rout -began. Night however coming on to interrupt the pursuit, the mass of the -fugitives escaped more easily than they would otherwise have done. The -next day the troops at Oropus and Delium returned home by sea, after -leaving a garrison in the latter place, which they continued to hold -notwithstanding the defeat. - -The Boeotians set up a trophy, took up their own dead, and stripped -those of the enemy, and leaving a guard over them retired to Tanagra, -there to take measures for attacking Delium. Meanwhile a herald came -from the Athenians to ask for the dead, but was met and turned back by -a Boeotian herald, who told him that he would effect nothing until -the return of himself the Boeotian herald, and who then went on to the -Athenians, and told them on the part of the Boeotians that they had -done wrong in transgressing the law of the Hellenes. Of what use was the -universal custom protecting the temples in an invaded country, if the -Athenians were to fortify Delium and live there, acting exactly as -if they were on unconsecrated ground, and drawing and using for their -purposes the water which they, the Boeotians, never touched except for -sacred uses? Accordingly for the god as well as for themselves, in the -name of the deities concerned, and of Apollo, the Boeotians invited them -first to evacuate the temple, if they wished to take up the dead that -belonged to them. - -After these words from the herald, the Athenians sent their own herald -to the Boeotians to say that they had not done any wrong to the temple, -and for the future would do it no more harm than they could help; -not having occupied it originally in any such design, but to defend -themselves from it against those who were really wronging them. The law -of the Hellenes was that conquest of a country, whether more or less -extensive, carried with it possession of the temples in that country, -with the obligation to keep up the usual ceremonies, at least as far -as possible. The Boeotians and most other people who had turned out the -owners of a country, and put themselves in their places by force, now -held as of right the temples which they originally entered as usurpers. -If the Athenians could have conquered more of Boeotia this would have -been the case with them: as things stood, the piece of it which they -had got they should treat as their own, and not quit unless obliged. The -water they had disturbed under the impulsion of a necessity which they -had not wantonly incurred, having been forced to use it in defending -themselves against the Boeotians who first invaded Attica. Besides, -anything done under the pressure of war and danger might reasonably -claim indulgence even in the eye of the god; or why, pray, were the -altars the asylum for involuntary offences? Transgression also was a -term applied to presumptuous offenders, not to the victims of adverse -circumstances. In short, which were most impious--the Boeotians who -wished to barter dead bodies for holy places, or the Athenians who -refused to give up holy places to obtain what was theirs by right? The -condition of evacuating Boeotia must therefore be withdrawn. They were -no longer in Boeotia. They stood where they stood by the right of the -sword. All that the Boeotians had to do was to tell them to take up -their dead under a truce according to the national custom. - -The Boeotians replied that if they were in Boeotia, they must evacuate -that country before taking up their dead; if they were in their own -territory, they could do as they pleased: for they knew that, although -the Oropid where the bodies as it chanced were lying (the battle having -been fought on the borders) was subject to Athens, yet the Athenians -could not get them without their leave. Besides, why should they grant a -truce for Athenian ground? And what could be fairer than to tell them -to evacuate Boeotia if they wished to get what they asked? The -Athenian herald accordingly returned with this answer, without having -accomplished his object. - -Meanwhile the Boeotians at once sent for darters and slingers from the -Malian Gulf, and with two thousand Corinthian heavy infantry who had -joined them after the battle, the Peloponnesian garrison which had -evacuated Nisaea, and some Megarians with them, marched against Delium, -and attacked the fort, and after divers efforts finally succeeded in -taking it by an engine of the following description. They sawed in two -and scooped out a great beam from end to end, and fitting it nicely -together again like a pipe, hung by chains a cauldron at one extremity, -with which communicated an iron tube projecting from the beam, which -was itself in great part plated with iron. This they brought up from -a distance upon carts to the part of the wall principally composed of -vines and timber, and when it was near, inserted huge bellows into their -end of the beam and blew with them. The blast passing closely confined -into the cauldron, which was filled with lighted coals, sulphur and -pitch, made a great blaze, and set fire to the wall, which soon became -untenable for its defenders, who left it and fled; and in this way the -fort was taken. Of the garrison some were killed and two hundred made -prisoners; most of the rest got on board their ships and returned home. - -Soon after the fall of Delium, which took place seventeen days after -the battle, the Athenian herald, without knowing what had happened, came -again for the dead, which were now restored by the Boeotians, who no -longer answered as at first. Not quite five hundred Boeotians fell in -the battle, and nearly one thousand Athenians, including Hippocrates the -general, besides a great number of light troops and camp followers. - -Soon after this battle Demosthenes, after the failure of his voyage to -Siphae and of the plot on the town, availed himself of the Acarnanian -and Agraean troops and of the four hundred Athenian heavy infantry -which he had on board, to make a descent on the Sicyonian coast. Before -however all his ships had come to shore, the Sicyonians came up and -routed and chased to their ships those that had landed, killing some and -taking others prisoners; after which they set up a trophy, and gave back -the dead under truce. - -About the same time with the affair of Delium took place the death -of Sitalces, king of the Odrysians, who was defeated in battle, in a -campaign against the Triballi; Seuthes, son of Sparadocus, his nephew, -succeeding to the kingdom of the Odrysians, and of the rest of Thrace -ruled by Sitalces. - -The same winter Brasidas, with his allies in the Thracian places, -marched against Amphipolis, the Athenian colony on the river Strymon. -A settlement upon the spot on which the city now stands was before -attempted by Aristagoras, the Milesian (when he fled from King Darius), -who was however dislodged by the Edonians; and thirty-two years later -by the Athenians, who sent thither ten thousand settlers of their own -citizens, and whoever else chose to go. These were cut off at Drabescus -by the Thracians. Twenty-nine years after, the Athenians returned -(Hagnon, son of Nicias, being sent out as leader of the colony) and -drove out the Edonians, and founded a town on the spot, formerly called -Ennea Hodoi or Nine Ways. The base from which they started was Eion, -their commercial seaport at the mouth of the river, not more than three -miles from the present town, which Hagnon named Amphipolis, because -the Strymon flows round it on two sides, and he built it so as to be -conspicuous from the sea and land alike, running a long wall across from -river to river, to complete the circumference. - -Brasidas now marched against this town, starting from Arne in -Chalcidice. Arriving about dusk at Aulon and Bromiscus, where the lake -of Bolbe runs into the sea, he supped there, and went on during the -night. The weather was stormy and it was snowing a little, which -encouraged him to hurry on, in order, if possible, to take every one at -Amphipolis by surprise, except the party who were to betray it. The plot -was carried on by some natives of Argilus, an Andrian colony, residing -in Amphipolis, where they had also other accomplices gained over by -Perdiccas or the Chalcidians. But the most active in the matter were the -inhabitants of Argilus itself, which is close by, who had always been -suspected by the Athenians, and had had designs on the place. These men -now saw their opportunity arrive with Brasidas, and having for some -time been in correspondence with their countrymen in Amphipolis for the -betrayal of the town, at once received him into Argilus, and revolted -from the Athenians, and that same night took him on to the bridge over -the river; where he found only a small guard to oppose him, the town -being at some distance from the passage, and the walls not reaching down -to it as at present. This guard he easily drove in, partly through -there being treason in their ranks, partly from the stormy state of the -weather and the suddenness of his attack, and so got across the -bridge, and immediately became master of all the property outside; the -Amphipolitans having houses all over the quarter. - -The passage of Brasidas was a complete surprise to the people in the -town; and the capture of many of those outside, and the flight of the -rest within the wall, combined to produce great confusion among the -citizens; especially as they did not trust one another. It is even said -that if Brasidas, instead of stopping to pillage, had advanced straight -against the town, he would probably have taken it. In fact, however, he -established himself where he was and overran the country outside, and -for the present remained inactive, vainly awaiting a demonstration -on the part of his friends within. Meanwhile the party opposed to the -traitors proved numerous enough to prevent the gates being immediately -thrown open, and in concert with Eucles, the general, who had come -from Athens to defend the place, sent to the other commander in Thrace, -Thucydides, son of Olorus, the author of this history, who was at the -isle of Thasos, a Parian colony, half a day's sail from Amphipolis, to -tell him to come to their relief. On receipt of this message he at once -set sail with seven ships which he had with him, in order, if possible, -to reach Amphipolis in time to prevent its capitulation, or in any case -to save Eion. - -Meanwhile Brasidas, afraid of succours arriving by sea from Thasos, and -learning that Thucydides possessed the right of working the gold -mines in that part of Thrace, and had thus great influence with the -inhabitants of the continent, hastened to gain the town, if possible, -before the people of Amphipolis should be encouraged by his arrival to -hope that he could save them by getting together a force of allies from -the sea and from Thrace, and so refuse to surrender. He accordingly -offered moderate terms, proclaiming that any of the Amphipolitans and -Athenians who chose, might continue to enjoy their property with full -rights of citizenship; while those who did not wish to stay had five -days to depart, taking their property with them. - -The bulk of the inhabitants, upon hearing this, began to change their -minds, especially as only a small number of the citizens were Athenians, -the majority having come from different quarters, and many of the -prisoners outside had relations within the walls. They found the -proclamation a fair one in comparison of what their fear had suggested; -the Athenians being glad to go out, as they thought they ran more risk -than the rest, and further, did not expect any speedy relief, and the -multitude generally being content at being left in possession of their -civic rights, and at such an unexpected reprieve from danger. The -partisans of Brasidas now openly advocated this course, seeing that the -feeling of the people had changed, and that they no longer gave ear -to the Athenian general present; and thus the surrender was made and -Brasidas was admitted by them on the terms of his proclamation. In this -way they gave up the city, and late in the same day Thucydides and his -ships entered the harbour of Eion, Brasidas having just got hold of -Amphipolis, and having been within a night of taking Eion: had the ships -been less prompt in relieving it, in the morning it would have been his. - -After this Thucydides put all in order at Eion to secure it against any -present or future attack of Brasidas, and received such as had elected -to come there from the interior according to the terms agreed on. -Meanwhile Brasidas suddenly sailed with a number of boats down the river -to Eion to see if he could not seize the point running out from the -wall, and so command the entrance; at the same time he attempted it by -land, but was beaten off on both sides and had to content himself with -arranging matters at Amphipolis and in the neighbourhood. Myrcinus, an -Edonian town, also came over to him; the Edonian king Pittacus having -been killed by the sons of Goaxis and his own wife Brauro; and Galepsus -and Oesime, which are Thasian colonies, not long after followed its -example. Perdiccas too came up immediately after the capture and joined -in these arrangements. - -The news that Amphipolis was in the hands of the enemy caused great -alarm at Athens. Not only was the town valuable for the timber it -afforded for shipbuilding, and the money that it brought in; but also, -although the escort of the Thessalians gave the Lacedaemonians a means -of reaching the allies of Athens as far as the Strymon, yet as long as -they were not masters of the bridge but were watched on the side of Eion -by the Athenian galleys, and on the land side impeded by a large and -extensive lake formed by the waters of the river, it was impossible -for them to go any further. Now, on the contrary, the path seemed open. -There was also the fear of the allies revolting, owing to the moderation -displayed by Brasidas in all his conduct, and to the declarations which -he was everywhere making that he sent out to free Hellas. The towns -subject to the Athenians, hearing of the capture of Amphipolis and of -the terms accorded to it, and of the gentleness of Brasidas, felt most -strongly encouraged to change their condition, and sent secret messages -to him, begging him to come on to them; each wishing to be the first to -revolt. Indeed there seemed to be no danger in so doing; their mistake -in their estimate of the Athenian power was as great as that power -afterwards turned out to be, and their judgment was based more upon -blind wishing than upon any sound prevision; for it is a habit of -mankind to entrust to careless hope what they long for, and to use -sovereign reason to thrust aside what they do not fancy. Besides the -late severe blow which the Athenians had met with in Boeotia, joined -to the seductive, though untrue, statements of Brasidas, about the -Athenians not having ventured to engage his single army at Nisaea, made -the allies confident, and caused them to believe that no Athenian force -would be sent against them. Above all the wish to do what was -agreeable at the moment, and the likelihood that they should find the -Lacedaemonians full of zeal at starting, made them eager to venture. -Observing this, the Athenians sent garrisons to the different towns, as -far as was possible at such short notice and in winter; while Brasidas -sent dispatches to Lacedaemon asking for reinforcements, and -himself made preparations for building galleys in the Strymon. The -Lacedaemonians however did not send him any, partly through envy on -the part of their chief men, partly because they were more bent on -recovering the prisoners of the island and ending the war. - -The same winter the Megarians took and razed to the foundations the long -walls which had been occupied by the Athenians; and Brasidas after the -capture of Amphipolis marched with his allies against Acte, a promontory -running out from the King's dike with an inward curve, and ending -in Athos, a lofty mountain looking towards the Aegean Sea. In it are -various towns, Sane, an Andrian colony, close to the canal, and facing -the sea in the direction of Euboea; the others being Thyssus, Cleone, -Acrothoi, Olophyxus, and Dium, inhabited by mixed barbarian races -speaking the two languages. There is also a small Chalcidian element; -but the greater number are Tyrrheno-Pelasgians once settled in Lemnos -and Athens, and Bisaltians, Crestonians, and Edonians; the towns being -all small ones. Most of these came over to Brasidas; but Sane and Dium -held out and saw their land ravaged by him and his army. - -Upon their not submitting, he at once marched against Torone in -Chalcidice, which was held by an Athenian garrison, having been invited -by a few persons who were prepared to hand over the town. Arriving in -the dark a little before daybreak, he sat down with his army near the -temple of the Dioscuri, rather more than a quarter of a mile from the -city. The rest of the town of Torone and the Athenians in garrison did -not perceive his approach; but his partisans knowing that he was coming -(a few of them had secretly gone out to meet him) were on the watch for -his arrival, and were no sooner aware of it than they took it to them -seven light-armed men with daggers, who alone of twenty men ordered -on this service dared to enter, commanded by Lysistratus an Olynthian. -These passed through the sea wall, and without being seen went up and -put to the sword the garrison of the highest post in the town, which -stands on a hill, and broke open the postern on the side of Canastraeum. - -Brasidas meanwhile came a little nearer and then halted with his main -body, sending on one hundred targeteers to be ready to rush in first, -the moment that a gate should be thrown open and the beacon lighted as -agreed. After some time passed in waiting and wondering at the delay, -the targeteers by degrees got up close to the town. The Toronaeans -inside at work with the party that had entered had by this time broken -down the postern and opened the gates leading to the market-place by -cutting through the bar, and first brought some men round and let -them in by the postern, in order to strike a panic into the surprised -townsmen by suddenly attacking them from behind and on both sides at -once; after which they raised the fire-signal as had been agreed, and -took in by the market gates the rest of the targeteers. - -Brasidas seeing the signal told the troops to rise, and dashed forward -amid the loud hurrahs of his men, which carried dismay among the -astonished townspeople. Some burst in straight by the gate, others over -some square pieces of timber placed against the wall (which has fallen -down and was being rebuilt) to draw up stones; Brasidas and the greater -number making straight uphill for the higher part of the town, in order -to take it from top to bottom, and once for all, while the rest of the -multitude spread in all directions. - -The capture of the town was effected before the great body of the -Toronaeans had recovered from their surprise and confusion; but -the conspirators and the citizens of their party at once joined the -invaders. About fifty of the Athenian heavy infantry happened to be -sleeping in the market-place when the alarm reached them. A few of these -were killed fighting; the rest escaped, some by land, others to the two -ships on the station, and took refuge in Lecythus, a fort garrisoned by -their own men in the corner of the town running out into the sea and -cut off by a narrow isthmus; where they were joined by the Toronaeans of -their party. - -Day now arrived, and the town being secured, Brasidas made a -proclamation to the Toronaeans who had taken refuge with the Athenians, -to come out, as many as chose, to their homes without fearing for their -rights or persons, and sent a herald to invite the Athenians to accept a -truce, and to evacuate Lecythus with their property, as being Chalcidian -ground. The Athenians refused this offer, but asked for a truce for a -day to take up their dead. Brasidas granted it for two days, which he -employed in fortifying the houses near, and the Athenians in doing -the same to their positions. Meanwhile he called a meeting of the -Toronaeans, and said very much what he had said at Acanthus, namely, -that they must not look upon those who had negotiated with him for the -capture of the town as bad men or as traitors, as they had not acted as -they had done from corrupt motives or in order to enslave the city, but -for the good and freedom of Torone; nor again must those who had not -shared in the enterprise fancy that they would not equally reap its -fruits, as he had not come to destroy either city or individual. This -was the reason of his proclamation to those that had fled for refuge to -the Athenians: he thought none the worse of them for their friendship -for the Athenians; he believed that they had only to make trial of the -Lacedaemonians to like them as well, or even much better, as acting much -more justly: it was for want of such a trial that they were now afraid -of them. Meanwhile he warned all of them to prepare to be staunch -allies, and for being held responsible for all faults in future: for the -past, they had not wronged the Lacedaemonians but had been wronged by -others who were too strong for them, and any opposition that they might -have offered him could be excused. - -Having encouraged them with this address, as soon as the truce expired -he made his attack upon Lecythus; the Athenians defending themselves -from a poor wall and from some houses with parapets. One day they beat -him off; the next the enemy were preparing to bring up an engine against -them from which they meant to throw fire upon the wooden defences, and -the troops were already coming up to the point where they fancied they -could best bring up the engine, and where place was most assailable; -meanwhile the Athenians put a wooden tower upon a house opposite, and -carried up a quantity of jars and casks of water and big stones, and a -large number of men also climbed up. The house thus laden too heavily -suddenly broke down with a loud crash; at which the men who were near -and saw it were more vexed than frightened; but those not so near, and -still more those furthest off, thought that the place was already taken -at that point, and fled in haste to the sea and the ships. - -Brasidas, perceiving that they were deserting the parapet, and seeing -what was going on, dashed forward with his troops, and immediately took -the fort, and put to the sword all whom he found in it. In this way the -place was evacuated by the Athenians, who went across in their boats -and ships to Pallene. Now there is a temple of Athene in Lecythus, and -Brasidas had proclaimed in the moment of making the assault that he -would give thirty silver minae to the man first on the wall. Being now -of opinion that the capture was scarcely due to human means, he gave -the thirty minae to the goddess for her temple, and razed and cleared -Lecythus, and made the whole of it consecrated ground. The rest of -the winter he spent in settling the places in his hands, and in making -designs upon the rest; and with the expiration of the winter the eighth -year of this war ended. - -In the spring of the summer following, the Lacedaemonians and Athenians -made an armistice for a year; the Athenians thinking that they would -thus have full leisure to take their precautions before Brasidas could -procure the revolt of any more of their towns, and might also, if it -suited them, conclude a general peace; the Lacedaemonians divining the -actual fears of the Athenians, and thinking that after once tasting a -respite from trouble and misery they would be more disposed to consent -to a reconciliation, and to give back the prisoners, and make a treaty -for the longer period. The great idea of the Lacedaemonians was to get -back their men while Brasidas's good fortune lasted: further successes -might make the struggle a less unequal one in Chalcidice, but would -leave them still deprived of their men, and even in Chalcidice not more -than a match for the Athenians and by no means certain of victory. An -armistice was accordingly concluded by Lacedaemon and her allies upon -the terms following: - -1. As to the temple and oracle of the Pythian Apollo, we are agreed that -whosoever will shall have access to it, without fraud or fear, according -to the usages of his forefathers. The Lacedaemonians and the allies -present agree to this, and promise to send heralds to the Boeotians and -Phocians, and to do their best to persuade them to agree likewise. - -2. As to the treasure of the god, we agree to exert ourselves to detect -all malversators, truly and honestly following the customs of our -forefathers, we and you and all others willing to do so, all following -the customs of our forefathers. As to these points the Lacedaemonians -and the other allies are agreed as has been said. - -3. As to what follows, the Lacedaemonians and the other allies agree, -if the Athenians conclude a treaty, to remain, each of us in our own -territory, retaining our respective acquisitions: the garrison -in Coryphasium keeping within Buphras and Tomeus: that in Cythera -attempting no communication with the Peloponnesian confederacy, neither -we with them, nor they with us: that in Nisaea and Minoa not crossing -the road leading from the gates of the temple of Nisus to that of -Poseidon and from thence straight to the bridge at Minoa: the Megarians -and the allies being equally bound not to cross this road, and -the Athenians retaining the island they have taken, without any -communication on either side: as to Troezen, each side retaining what it -has, and as was arranged with the Athenians. - -4. As to the use of the sea, so far as refers to their own coast and to -that of their confederacy, that the Lacedaemonians and their allies may -voyage upon it in any vessel rowed by oars and of not more than five -hundred talents tonnage, not a vessel of war. - -5. That all heralds and embassies, with as many attendants as they -please, for concluding the war and adjusting claims, shall have free -passage, going and coming, to Peloponnese or Athens by land and by sea. - -6. That during the truce, deserters whether bond or free shall be -received neither by you, nor by us. - -7. Further, that satisfaction shall be given by you to us and by us to -you according to the public law of our several countries, all disputes -being settled by law without recourse to hostilities. - -The Lacedaemonians and allies agree to these articles; but if you have -anything fairer or juster to suggest, come to Lacedaemon and let us -know: whatever shall be just will meet with no objection either from -the Lacedaemonians or from the allies. Only let those who come come with -full powers, as you desire us. The truce shall be for one year. - -Approved by the people. - -The tribe of Acamantis had the prytany, Phoenippus was secretary, -Niciades chairman. Laches moved, in the name of the good luck of the -Athenians, that they should conclude the armistice upon the terms agreed -upon by the Lacedaemonians and the allies. It was agreed accordingly -in the popular assembly that the armistice should be for one year, -beginning that very day, the fourteenth of the month of Elaphebolion; -during which time ambassadors and heralds should go and come between the -two countries to discuss the bases of a pacification. That the generals -and prytanes should call an assembly of the people, in which the -Athenians should first consult on the peace, and on the mode in which -the embassy for putting an end to the war should be admitted. That the -embassy now present should at once take the engagement before the people -to keep well and truly this truce for one year. - -On these terms the Lacedaemonians concluded with the Athenians and their -allies on the twelfth day of the Spartan month Gerastius; the allies -also taking the oaths. Those who concluded and poured the libation -were Taurus, son of Echetimides, Athenaeus, son of Pericleidas, and -Philocharidas, son of Eryxidaidas, Lacedaemonians; Aeneas, son of -Ocytus, and Euphamidas, son of Aristonymus, Corinthians; Damotimus, son -of Naucrates, and Onasimus, son of Megacles, Sicyonians; Nicasus, son of -Cecalus, and Menecrates, son of Amphidorus, Megarians; and Amphias, son -of Eupaidas, an Epidaurian; and the Athenian generals Nicostratus, son -of Diitrephes, Nicias, son of Niceratus, and Autocles, son of Tolmaeus. -Such was the armistice, and during the whole of it conferences went on -on the subject of a pacification. - -In the days in which they were going backwards and forwards to these -conferences, Scione, a town in Pallene, revolted from Athens, and went -over to Brasidas. The Scionaeans say that they are Pallenians from -Peloponnese, and that their first founders on their voyage from Troy -were carried in to this spot by the storm which the Achaeans were -caught in, and there settled. The Scionaeans had no sooner revolted than -Brasidas crossed over by night to Scione, with a friendly galley ahead -and himself in a small boat some way behind; his idea being that if he -fell in with a vessel larger than the boat he would have the galley to -defend him, while a ship that was a match for the galley would probably -neglect the small vessel to attack the large one, and thus leave -him time to escape. His passage effected, he called a meeting of the -Scionaeans and spoke to the same effect as at Acanthus and Torone, -adding that they merited the utmost commendation, in that, in spite of -Pallene within the isthmus being cut off by the Athenian occupation -of Potidaea and of their own practically insular position, they had -of their own free will gone forward to meet their liberty instead of -timorously waiting until they had been by force compelled to their own -manifest good. This was a sign that they would valiantly undergo any -trial, however great; and if he should order affairs as he intended, -he should count them among the truest and sincerest friends of the -Lacedaemonians, and would in every other way honour them. - -The Scionaeans were elated by his language, and even those who had -at first disapproved of what was being done catching the general -confidence, they determined on a vigorous conduct of the war, and -welcomed Brasidas with all possible honours, publicly crowning him -with a crown of gold as the liberator of Hellas; while private persons -crowded round him and decked him with garlands as though he had been an -athlete. Meanwhile Brasidas left them a small garrison for the present -and crossed back again, and not long afterwards sent over a larger -force, intending with the help of the Scionaeans to attempt Mende and -Potidaea before the Athenians should arrive; Scione, he felt, being too -like an island for them not to relieve it. He had besides intelligence -in the above towns about their betrayal. - -In the midst of his designs upon the towns in question, a galley -arrived with the commissioners carrying round the news of the armistice, -Aristonymus for the Athenians and Athenaeus for the Lacedaemonians. The -troops now crossed back to Torone, and the commissioners gave Brasidas -notice of the convention. All the Lacedaemonian allies in Thrace -accepted what had been done; and Aristonymus made no difficulty about -the rest, but finding, on counting the days, that the Scionaeans had -revolted after the date of the convention, refused to include them in -it. To this Brasidas earnestly objected, asserting that the revolt took -place before, and would not give up the town. Upon Aristonymus reporting -the case to Athens, the people at once prepared to send an expedition -to Scione. Upon this, envoys arrived from Lacedaemon, alleging that this -would be a breach of the truce, and laying claim to the town upon the -faith of the assertion of Brasidas, and meanwhile offering to submit the -question to arbitration. Arbitration, however, was what the Athenians -did not choose to risk; being determined to send troops at once to -the place, and furious at the idea of even the islanders now daring to -revolt, in a vain reliance upon the power of the Lacedaemonians by land. -Besides the facts of the revolt were rather as the Athenians contended, -the Scionaeans having revolted two days after the convention. Cleon -accordingly succeeded in carrying a decree to reduce and put to death -the Scionaeans; and the Athenians employed the leisure which they now -enjoyed in preparing for the expedition. - -Meanwhile Mende revolted, a town in Pallene and a colony of the -Eretrians, and was received without scruple by Brasidas, in spite of its -having evidently come over during the armistice, on account of certain -infringements of the truce alleged by him against the Athenians. This -audacity of Mende was partly caused by seeing Brasidas forward in the -matter and by the conclusions drawn from his refusal to betray Scione; -and besides, the conspirators in Mende were few, and, as I have already -intimated, had carried on their practices too long not to fear detection -for themselves, and not to wish to force the inclination of the -multitude. This news made the Athenians more furious than ever, and they -at once prepared against both towns. Brasidas, expecting their arrival, -conveyed away to Olynthus in Chalcidice the women and children of -the Scionaeans and Mendaeans, and sent over to them five hundred -Peloponnesian heavy infantry and three hundred Chalcidian targeteers, -all under the command of Polydamidas. - -Leaving these two towns to prepare together against the speedy arrival -of the Athenians, Brasidas and Perdiccas started on a second joint -expedition into Lyncus against Arrhabaeus; the latter with the forces -of his Macedonian subjects, and a corps of heavy infantry composed of -Hellenes domiciled in the country; the former with the Peloponnesians -whom he still had with him and the Chalcidians, Acanthians, and the rest -in such force as they were able. In all there were about three thousand -Hellenic heavy infantry, accompanied by all the Macedonian cavalry with -the Chalcidians, near one thousand strong, besides an immense crowd -of barbarians. On entering the country of Arrhabaeus, they found the -Lyncestians encamped awaiting them, and themselves took up a position -opposite. The infantry on either side were upon a hill, with a plain -between them, into which the horse of both armies first galloped down -and engaged a cavalry action. After this the Lyncestian heavy infantry -advanced from their hill to join their cavalry and offered battle; upon -which Brasidas and Perdiccas also came down to meet them, and engaged -and routed them with heavy loss; the survivors taking refuge upon the -heights and there remaining inactive. The victors now set up a trophy -and waited two or three days for the Illyrian mercenaries who were to -join Perdiccas. Perdiccas then wished to go on and attack the villages -of Arrhabaeus, and to sit still no longer; but Brasidas, afraid that the -Athenians might sail up during his absence, and of something happening -to Mende, and seeing besides that the Illyrians did not appear, far from -seconding this wish was anxious to return. - -While they were thus disputing, the news arrived that the Illyrians -had actually betrayed Perdiccas and had joined Arrhabaeus; and the fear -inspired by their warlike character made both parties now think it best -to retreat. However, owing to the dispute, nothing had been settled as -to when they should start; and night coming on, the Macedonians and -the barbarian crowd took fright in a moment in one of those mysterious -panics to which great armies are liable; and persuaded that an army many -times more numerous than that which had really arrived was advancing and -all but upon them, suddenly broke and fled in the direction of home, -and thus compelled Perdiccas, who at first did not perceive what had -occurred, to depart without seeing Brasidas, the two armies being -encamped at a considerable distance from each other. At daybreak -Brasidas, perceiving that the Macedonians had gone on, and that the -Illyrians and Arrhabaeus were on the point of attacking him, formed his -heavy infantry into a square, with the light troops in the centre, and -himself also prepared to retreat. Posting his youngest soldiers to dash -out wherever the enemy should attack them, he himself with three hundred -picked men in the rear intended to face about during the retreat and -beat off the most forward of their assailants, Meanwhile, before the -enemy approached, he sought to sustain the courage of his soldiers with -the following hasty exhortation: - -"Peloponnesians, if I did not suspect you of being dismayed at being -left alone to sustain the attack of a numerous and barbarian enemy, -I should just have said a few words to you as usual without further -explanation. As it is, in the face of the desertion of our friends and -the numbers of the enemy, I have some advice and information to offer, -which, brief as they must be, will, I hope, suffice for the more -important points. The bravery that you habitually display in war does -not depend on your having allies at your side in this or that encounter, -but on your native courage; nor have numbers any terrors for citizens of -states like yours, in which the many do not rule the few, but rather the -few the many, owing their position to nothing else than to superiority -in the field. Inexperience now makes you afraid of barbarians; and yet -the trial of strength which you had with the Macedonians among them, and -my own judgment, confirmed by what I hear from others, should be enough -to satisfy you that they will not prove formidable. Where an enemy -seems strong but is really weak, a true knowledge of the facts makes his -adversary the bolder, just as a serious antagonist is encountered most -confidently by those who do not know him. Thus the present enemy might -terrify an inexperienced imagination; they are formidable in outward -bulk, their loud yelling is unbearable, and the brandishing of their -weapons in the air has a threatening appearance. But when it comes to -real fighting with an opponent who stands his ground, they are not what -they seemed; they have no regular order that they should be ashamed of -deserting their positions when hard pressed; flight and attack are -with them equally honourable, and afford no test of courage; their -independent mode of fighting never leaving any one who wants to run away -without a fair excuse for so doing. In short, they think frightening -you at a secure distance a surer game than meeting you hand to hand; -otherwise they would have done the one and not the other. You can thus -plainly see that the terrors with which they were at first invested are -in fact trifling enough, though to the eye and ear very prominent. Stand -your ground therefore when they advance, and again wait your opportunity -to retire in good order, and you will reach a place of safety all the -sooner, and will know for ever afterwards that rabble such as these, to -those who sustain their first attack, do but show off their courage by -threats of the terrible things that they are going to do, at a distance, -but with those who give way to them are quick enough to display their -heroism in pursuit when they can do so without danger." - -With this brief address Brasidas began to lead off his army. Seeing -this, the barbarians came on with much shouting and hubbub, thinking -that he was flying and that they would overtake him and cut him off. But -wherever they charged they found the young men ready to dash out against -them, while Brasidas with his picked company sustained their onset. Thus -the Peloponnesians withstood the first attack, to the surprise of the -enemy, and afterwards received and repulsed them as fast as they came -on, retiring as soon as their opponents became quiet. The main body of -the barbarians ceased therefore to molest the Hellenes with Brasidas in -the open country, and leaving behind a certain number to harass their -march, the rest went on after the flying Macedonians, slaying those -with whom they came up, and so arrived in time to occupy the narrow pass -between two hills that leads into the country of Arrhabaeus. They knew -that this was the only way by which Brasidas could retreat, and now -proceeded to surround him just as he entered the most impracticable part -of the road, in order to cut him off. - -Brasidas, perceiving their intention, told his three hundred to run on -without order, each as quickly as he could, to the hill which seemed -easiest to take, and to try to dislodge the barbarians already there, -before they should be joined by the main body closing round him. These -attacked and overpowered the party upon the hill, and the main army -of the Hellenes now advanced with less difficulty towards it--the -barbarians being terrified at seeing their men on that side driven from -the height and no longer following the main body, who, they considered, -had gained the frontier and made good their escape. The heights once -gained, Brasidas now proceeded more securely, and the same day arrived -at Arnisa, the first town in the dominions of Perdiccas. The soldiers, -enraged at the desertion of the Macedonians, vented their rage on all -their yokes of oxen which they found on the road, and on any baggage -which had tumbled off (as might easily happen in the panic of a night -retreat), by unyoking and cutting down the cattle and taking the baggage -for themselves. From this moment Perdiccas began to regard Brasidas as -an enemy and to feel against the Peloponnesians a hatred which could -not be congenial to the adversary of the Athenians. However, he departed -from his natural interests and made it his endeavour to come to terms -with the latter and to get rid of the former. - -On his return from Macedonia to Torone, Brasidas found the Athenians -already masters of Mende, and remained quiet where he was, thinking -it now out of his power to cross over into Pallene and assist the -Mendaeans, but he kept good watch over Torone. For about the same time -as the campaign in Lyncus, the Athenians sailed upon the expedition -which we left them preparing against Mende and Scione, with fifty ships, -ten of which were Chians, one thousand Athenian heavy infantry and six -hundred archers, one hundred Thracian mercenaries and some targeteers -drawn from their allies in the neighbourhood, under the command of -Nicias, son of Niceratus, and Nicostratus, son of Diitrephes. Weighing -from Potidaea, the fleet came to land opposite the temple of Poseidon, -and proceeded against Mende; the men of which town, reinforced by three -hundred Scionaeans, with their Peloponnesian auxiliaries, seven hundred -heavy infantry in all, under Polydamidas, they found encamped upon a -strong hill outside the city. These Nicias, with one hundred and twenty -light-armed Methonaeans, sixty picked men from the Athenian heavy -infantry, and all the archers, tried to reach by a path running up -the hill, but received a wound and found himself unable to force the -position; while Nicostratus, with all the rest of the army, advancing -upon the hill, which was naturally difficult, by a different approach -further off, was thrown into utter disorder; and the whole Athenian -army narrowly escaped being defeated. For that day, as the Mendaeans and -their allies showed no signs of yielding, the Athenians retreated and -encamped, and the Mendaeans at nightfall returned into the town. - -The next day the Athenians sailed round to the Scione side, and took the -suburb, and all day plundered the country, without any one coming out -against them, partly because of intestine disturbances in the town; and -the following night the three hundred Scionaeans returned home. On the -morrow Nicias advanced with half the army to the frontier of Scione and -laid waste the country; while Nicostratus with the remainder sat down -before the town near the upper gate on the road to Potidaea. The arms -of the Mendaeans and of their Peloponnesian auxiliaries within the wall -happened to be piled in that quarter, where Polydamidas accordingly -began to draw them up for battle, encouraging the Mendaeans to make a -sortie. At this moment one of the popular party answered him factiously -that they would not go out and did not want a war, and for thus -answering was dragged by the arm and knocked about by Polydamidas. -Hereupon the infuriated commons at once seized their arms and rushed -at the Peloponnesians and at their allies of the opposite faction. The -troops thus assaulted were at once routed, partly from the suddenness -of the conflict and partly through fear of the gates being opened to the -Athenians, with whom they imagined that the attack had been concerted. -As many as were not killed on the spot took refuge in the citadel, -which they had held from the first; and the whole, Athenian army, Nicias -having by this time returned and being close to the city, now burst into -Mende, which had opened its gates without any convention, and sacked it -just as if they had taken it by storm, the generals even finding some -difficulty in restraining them from also massacring the inhabitants. -After this the Athenians told the Mendaeans that they might retain their -civil rights, and themselves judge the supposed authors of the revolt; -and cut off the party in the citadel by a wall built down to the sea -on either side, appointing troops to maintain the blockade. Having thus -secured Mende, they proceeded against Scione. - -The Scionaeans and Peloponnesians marched out against them, occupying a -strong hill in front of the town, which had to be captured by the enemy -before they could invest the place. The Athenians stormed the hill, -defeated and dislodged its occupants, and, having encamped and set up -a trophy, prepared for the work of circumvallation. Not long after they -had begun their operations, the auxiliaries besieged in the citadel of -Mende forced the guard by the sea-side and arrived by night at Scione, -into which most of them succeeded in entering, passing through the -besieging army. - -While the investment of Scione was in progress, Perdiccas sent a herald -to the Athenian generals and made peace with the Athenians, through -spite against Brasidas for the retreat from Lyncus, from which moment -indeed he had begun to negotiate. The Lacedaemonian Ischagoras was just -then upon the point of starting with an army overland to join Brasidas; -and Perdiccas, being now required by Nicias to give some proof of the -sincerity of his reconciliation to the Athenians, and being himself -no longer disposed to let the Peloponnesians into his country, put in -motion his friends in Thessaly, with whose chief men he always took -care to have relations, and so effectually stopped the army and its -preparation that they did not even try the Thessalians. Ischagoras -himself, however, with Ameinias and Aristeus, succeeded in reaching -Brasidas; they had been commissioned by the Lacedaemonians to inspect -the state of affairs, and brought out from Sparta (in violation of all -precedent) some of their young men to put in command of the towns, -to guard against their being entrusted to the persons upon the spot. -Brasidas accordingly placed Clearidas, son of Cleonymus, in Amphipolis, -and Pasitelidas, son of Hegesander, in Torone. - -The same summer the Thebans dismantled the wall of the Thespians on the -charge of Atticism, having always wished to do so, and now finding it -an easy matter, as the flower of the Thespian youth had perished in the -battle with the Athenians. The same summer also the temple of Hera at -Argos was burnt down, through Chrysis, the priestess, placing a lighted -torch near the garlands and then falling asleep, so that they all caught -fire and were in a blaze before she observed it. Chrysis that very night -fled to Phlius for fear of the Argives, who, agreeably to the law in -such a case, appointed another priestess named Phaeinis. Chrysis at the -time of her flight had been priestess for eight years of the present war -and half the ninth. At the close of the summer the investment of Scione -was completed, and the Athenians, leaving a detachment to maintain the -blockade, returned with the rest of their army. - -During the winter following, the Athenians and Lacedaemonians were -kept quiet by the armistice; but the Mantineans and Tegeans, and their -respective allies, fought a battle at Laodicium, in the Oresthid. The -victory remained doubtful, as each side routed one of the wings opposed -to them, and both set up trophies and sent spoils to Delphi. After heavy -loss on both sides the battle was undecided, and night interrupted -the action; yet the Tegeans passed the night on the field and set up -a trophy at once, while the Mantineans withdrew to Bucolion and set up -theirs afterwards. - -At the close of the same winter, in fact almost in spring, Brasidas made -an attempt upon Potidaea. He arrived by night, and succeeded in planting -a ladder against the wall without being discovered, the ladder being -planted just in the interval between the passing round of the bell and -the return of the man who brought it back. Upon the garrison, however, -taking the alarm immediately afterwards, before his men came up, he -quickly led off his troops, without waiting until it was day. So ended -the winter and the ninth year of this war of which Thucydides is the -historian. - - - - -BOOK V - -CHAPTER XV - -_Tenth Year of the War--Death of Cleon and Brasidas--Peace of Nicias_ - -The next summer the truce for a year ended, after lasting until the -Pythian games. During the armistice the Athenians expelled the Delians -from Delos, concluding that they must have been polluted by some old -offence at the time of their consecration, and that this had been the -omission in the previous purification of the island, which, as I have -related, had been thought to have been duly accomplished by the removal -of the graves of the dead. The Delians had Atramyttium in Asia given -them by Pharnaces, and settled there as they removed from Delos. - -Meanwhile Cleon prevailed on the Athenians to let him set sail at the -expiration of the armistice for the towns in the direction of Thrace -with twelve hundred heavy infantry and three hundred horse from Athens, -a large force of the allies, and thirty ships. First touching at the -still besieged Scione, and taking some heavy infantry from the army -there, he next sailed into Cophos, a harbour in the territory of -Torone, which is not far from the town. From thence, having learnt from -deserters that Brasidas was not in Torone, and that its garrison was not -strong enough to give him battle, he advanced with his army against the -town, sending ten ships to sail round into the harbour. He first came to -the fortification lately thrown up in front of the town by Brasidas in -order to take in the suburb, to do which he had pulled down part of the -original wall and made it all one city. To this point Pasitelidas, the -Lacedaemonian commander, with such garrison as there was in the place, -hurried to repel the Athenian assault; but finding himself hard pressed, -and seeing the ships that had been sent round sailing into the harbour, -Pasitelidas began to be afraid that they might get up to the city before -its defenders were there and, the fortification being also carried, he -might be taken prisoner, and so abandoned the outwork and ran into the -town. But the Athenians from the ships had already taken Torone, and -their land forces following at his heels burst in with him with a rush -over the part of the old wall that had been pulled down, killing some of -the Peloponnesians and Toronaeans in the melee, and making prisoners -of the rest, and Pasitelidas their commander amongst them. Brasidas -meanwhile had advanced to relieve Torone, and had only about four miles -more to go when he heard of its fall on the road, and turned back again. -Cleon and the Athenians set up two trophies, one by the harbour, the -other by the fortification and, making slaves of the wives and children -of the Toronaeans, sent the men with the Peloponnesians and any -Chalcidians that were there, to the number of seven hundred, to Athens; -whence, however, they all came home afterwards, the Peloponnesians on -the conclusion of peace, and the rest by being exchanged against other -prisoners with the Olynthians. About the same time Panactum, a fortress -on the Athenian border, was taken by treachery by the Boeotians. -Meanwhile Cleon, after placing a garrison in Torone, weighed anchor and -sailed around Athos on his way to Amphipolis. - -About the same time Phaeax, son of Erasistratus, set sail with two -colleagues as ambassador from Athens to Italy and Sicily. The Leontines, -upon the departure of the Athenians from Sicily after the pacification, -had placed a number of new citizens upon the roll, and the commons had -a design for redividing the land; but the upper classes, aware of their -intention, called in the Syracusans and expelled the commons. These last -were scattered in various directions; but the upper classes came to an -agreement with the Syracusans, abandoned and laid waste their city, and -went and lived at Syracuse, where they were made citizens. Afterwards -some of them were dissatisfied, and leaving Syracuse occupied Phocaeae, -a quarter of the town of Leontini, and Bricinniae, a strong place in the -Leontine country, and being there joined by most of the exiled commons -carried on war from the fortifications. The Athenians hearing this, sent -Phaeax to see if they could not by some means so convince their allies -there and the rest of the Sicilians of the ambitious designs of Syracuse -as to induce them to form a general coalition against her, and thus save -the commons of Leontini. Arrived in Sicily, Phaeax succeeded at Camarina -and Agrigentum, but meeting with a repulse at Gela did not go on to -the rest, as he saw that he should not succeed with them, but returned -through the country of the Sicels to Catana, and after visiting -Bricinniae as he passed, and encouraging its inhabitants, sailed back to -Athens. - -During his voyage along the coast to and from Sicily, he treated with -some cities in Italy on the subject of friendship with Athens, and also -fell in with some Locrian settlers exiled from Messina, who had been -sent thither when the Locrians were called in by one of the factions -that divided Messina after the pacification of Sicily, and Messina came -for a time into the hands of the Locrians. These being met by Phaeax on -their return home received no injury at his hands, as the Locrians had -agreed with him for a treaty with Athens. They were the only people -of the allies who, when the reconciliation between the Sicilians took -place, had not made peace with her; nor indeed would they have done -so now, if they had not been pressed by a war with the Hipponians and -Medmaeans who lived on their border, and were colonists of theirs. -Phaeax meanwhile proceeded on his voyage, and at length arrived at -Athens. - -Cleon, whom we left on his voyage from Torone to Amphipolis, made Eion -his base, and after an unsuccessful assault upon the Andrian colony -of Stagirus, took Galepsus, a colony of Thasos, by storm. He now sent -envoys to Perdiccas to command his attendance with an army, as -provided by the alliance; and others to Thrace, to Polles, king of the -Odomantians, who was to bring as many Thracian mercenaries as possible; -and himself remained inactive in Eion, awaiting their arrival. Informed -of this, Brasidas on his part took up a position of observation upon -Cerdylium, a place situated in the Argilian country on high ground -across the river, not far from Amphipolis, and commanding a view on all -sides, and thus made it impossible for Cleon's army to move without -his seeing it; for he fully expected that Cleon, despising the scanty -numbers of his opponent, would march against Amphipolis with the -force that he had got with him. At the same time Brasidas made -his preparations, calling to his standard fifteen hundred Thracian -mercenaries and all the Edonians, horse and targeteers; he also had -a thousand Myrcinian and Chalcidian targeteers, besides those in -Amphipolis, and a force of heavy infantry numbering altogether about two -thousand, and three hundred Hellenic horse. Fifteen hundred of these he -had with him upon Cerdylium; the rest were stationed with Clearidas in -Amphipolis. - -After remaining quiet for some time, Cleon was at length obliged to do -as Brasidas expected. His soldiers, tired of their inactivity, began -also seriously to reflect on the weakness and incompetence of their -commander, and the skill and valour that would be opposed to him, and on -their own original unwillingness to accompany him. These murmurs coming -to the ears of Cleon, he resolved not to disgust the army by keeping it -in the same place, and broke up his camp and advanced. The temper of -the general was what it had been at Pylos, his success on that occasion -having given him confidence in his capacity. He never dreamed of any one -coming out to fight him, but said that he was rather going up to view -the place; and if he waited for his reinforcements, it was not in order -to make victory secure in case he should be compelled to engage, but -to be enabled to surround and storm the city. He accordingly came and -posted his army upon a strong hill in front of Amphipolis, and proceeded -to examine the lake formed by the Strymon, and how the town lay on the -side of Thrace. He thought to retire at pleasure without fighting, as -there was no one to be seen upon the wall or coming out of the gates, -all of which were shut. Indeed, it seemed a mistake not to have brought -down engines with him; he could then have taken the town, there being no -one to defend it. - -As soon as Brasidas saw the Athenians in motion he descended himself -from Cerdylium and entered Amphipolis. He did not venture to go out in -regular order against the Athenians: he mistrusted his strength, and -thought it inadequate to the attempt; not in numbers--these were not so -unequal--but in quality, the flower of the Athenian army being in the -field, with the best of the Lemnians and Imbrians. He therefore prepared -to assail them by stratagem. By showing the enemy the number of his -troops, and the shifts which he had been put to to to arm them, he -thought that he should have less chance of beating him than by not -letting him have a sight of them, and thus learn how good a right he -had to despise them. He accordingly picked out a hundred and fifty heavy -infantry and, putting the rest under Clearidas, determined to attack -suddenly before the Athenians retired; thinking that he should not have -again such a chance of catching them alone, if their reinforcements were -once allowed to come up; and so calling all his soldiers together in -order to encourage them and explain his intention, spoke as follows: - -"Peloponnesians, the character of the country from which we have come, -one which has always owed its freedom to valour, and the fact that you -are Dorians and the enemy you are about to fight Ionians, whom you are -accustomed to beat, are things that do not need further comment. But the -plan of attack that I propose to pursue, this it is as well to explain, -in order that the fact of our adventuring with a part instead of with -the whole of our forces may not damp your courage by the apparent -disadvantage at which it places you. I imagine it is the poor opinion -that he has of us, and the fact that he has no idea of any one coming -out to engage him, that has made the enemy march up to the place and -carelessly look about him as he is doing, without noticing us. But the -most successful soldier will always be the man who most happily detects -a blunder like this, and who carefully consulting his own means makes -his attack not so much by open and regular approaches, as by seizing the -opportunity of the moment; and these stratagems, which do the greatest -service to our friends by most completely deceiving our enemies, -have the most brilliant name in war. Therefore, while their careless -confidence continues, and they are still thinking, as in my judgment -they are now doing, more of retreat than of maintaining their position, -while their spirit is slack and not high-strung with expectation, I with -the men under my command will, if possible, take them by surprise and -fall with a run upon their centre; and do you, Clearidas, afterwards, -when you see me already upon them, and, as is likely, dealing terror -among them, take with you the Amphipolitans, and the rest of the allies, -and suddenly open the gates and dash at them, and hasten to engage as -quickly as you can. That is our best chance of establishing a panic -among them, as a fresh assailant has always more terrors for an enemy -than the one he is immediately engaged with. Show yourself a brave -man, as a Spartan should; and do you, allies, follow him like men, and -remember that zeal, honour, and obedience mark the good soldier, and -that this day will make you either free men and allies of Lacedaemon, or -slaves of Athens; even if you escape without personal loss of liberty -or life, your bondage will be on harsher terms than before, and you will -also hinder the liberation of the rest of the Hellenes. No cowardice -then on your part, seeing the greatness of the issues at stake, and I -will show that what I preach to others I can practise myself." - -After this brief speech Brasidas himself prepared for the sally, and -placed the rest with Clearidas at the Thracian gates to support him as -had been agreed. Meanwhile he had been seen coming down from Cerdylium -and then in the city, which is overlooked from the outside, sacrificing -near the temple of Athene; in short, all his movements had been -observed, and word was brought to Cleon, who had at the moment gone on -to look about him, that the whole of the enemy's force could be seen -in the town, and that the feet of horses and men in great numbers were -visible under the gates, as if a sally were intended. Upon hearing this -he went up to look, and having done so, being unwilling to venture upon -the decisive step of a battle before his reinforcements came up, and -fancying that he would have time to retire, bid the retreat be sounded -and sent orders to the men to effect it by moving on the left wing in -the direction of Eion, which was indeed the only way practicable. This -however not being quick enough for him, he joined the retreat in person -and made the right wing wheel round, thus turning its unarmed side -to the enemy. It was then that Brasidas, seeing the Athenian force in -motion and his opportunity come, said to the men with him and the rest: -"Those fellows will never stand before us, one can see that by the way -their spears and heads are going. Troops which do as they do seldom -stand a charge. Quick, someone, and open the gates I spoke of, and let -us be out and at them with no fears for the result." Accordingly -issuing out by the palisade gate and by the first in the long wall then -existing, he ran at the top of his speed along the straight road, where -the trophy now stands as you go by the steepest part of the hill, and -fell upon and routed the centre of the Athenians, panic-stricken by -their own disorder and astounded at his audacity. At the same moment -Clearidas in execution of his orders issued out from the Thracian gates -to support him, and also attacked the enemy. The result was that the -Athenians, suddenly and unexpectedly attacked on both sides, fell into -confusion; and their left towards Eion, which had already got on some -distance, at once broke and fled. Just as it was in full retreat and -Brasidas was passing on to attack the right, he received a wound; but -his fall was not perceived by the Athenians, as he was taken up by those -near him and carried off the field. The Athenian right made a better -stand, and though Cleon, who from the first had no thought of fighting, -at once fled and was overtaken and slain by a Myrcinian targeteer, his -infantry forming in close order upon the hill twice or thrice repulsed -the attacks of Clearidas, and did not finally give way until they were -surrounded and routed by the missiles of the Myrcinian and Chalcidian -horse and the targeteers. Thus the Athenian army was all now in flight; -and such as escaped being killed in the battle, or by the Chalcidian -horse and the targeteers, dispersed among the hills, and with difficulty -made their way to Eion. The men who had taken up and rescued Brasidas, -brought him into the town with the breath still in him: he lived to hear -of the victory of his troops, and not long after expired. The rest of -the army returning with Clearidas from the pursuit stripped the dead and -set up a trophy. - -After this all the allies attended in arms and buried Brasidas at the -public expense in the city, in front of what is now the marketplace, and -the Amphipolitans, having enclosed his tomb, ever afterwards sacrifice -to him as a hero and have given to him the honour of games and annual -offerings. They constituted him the founder of their colony, and pulled -down the Hagnonic erections, and obliterated everything that could be -interpreted as a memorial of his having founded the place; for they -considered that Brasidas had been their preserver, and courting as they -did the alliance of Lacedaemon for fear of Athens, in their present -hostile relations with the latter they could no longer with the same -advantage or satisfaction pay Hagnon his honours. They also gave the -Athenians back their dead. About six hundred of the latter had fallen -and only seven of the enemy, owing to there having been no regular -engagement, but the affair of accident and panic that I have described. -After taking up their dead the Athenians sailed off home, while -Clearidas and his troops remained to arrange matters at Amphipolis. - -About the same time three Lacedaemonians--Ramphias, Autocharidas, and -Epicydidas--led a reinforcement of nine hundred heavy infantry to the -towns in the direction of Thrace, and arriving at Heraclea in Trachis -reformed matters there as seemed good to them. While they delayed there, -this battle took place and so the summer ended. - -With the beginning of the winter following, Ramphias and his companions -penetrated as far as Pierium in Thessaly; but as the Thessalians opposed -their further advance, and Brasidas whom they came to reinforce was -dead, they turned back home, thinking that the moment had gone by, -the Athenians being defeated and gone, and themselves not equal to the -execution of Brasidas's designs. The main cause however of their return -was because they knew that when they set out Lacedaemonian opinion was -really in favour of peace. - -Indeed it so happened that directly after the battle of Amphipolis and -the retreat of Ramphias from Thessaly, both sides ceased to prosecute -the war and turned their attention to peace. Athens had suffered -severely at Delium, and again shortly afterwards at Amphipolis, and -had no longer that confidence in her strength which had made her before -refuse to treat, in the belief of ultimate victory which her success -at the moment had inspired; besides, she was afraid of her allies being -tempted by her reverses to rebel more generally, and repented having -let go the splendid opportunity for peace which the affair of Pylos had -offered. Lacedaemon, on the other hand, found the event of the war to -falsify her notion that a few years would suffice for the overthrow of -the power of the Athenians by the devastation of their land. She had -suffered on the island a disaster hitherto unknown at Sparta; she saw -her country plundered from Pylos and Cythera; the Helots were deserting, -and she was in constant apprehension that those who remained in -Peloponnese would rely upon those outside and take advantage of the -situation to renew their old attempts at revolution. Besides this, as -chance would have it, her thirty years' truce with the Argives was upon -the point of expiring; and they refused to renew it unless Cynuria were -restored to them; so that it seemed impossible to fight Argos and -Athens at once. She also suspected some of the cities in Peloponnese of -intending to go over to the enemy and that was indeed the case. - -These considerations made both sides disposed for an accommodation; the -Lacedaemonians being probably the most eager, as they ardently desired -to recover the men taken upon the island, the Spartans among whom -belonged to the first families and were accordingly related to the -governing body in Lacedaemon. Negotiations had been begun directly after -their capture, but the Athenians in their hour of triumph would not -consent to any reasonable terms; though after their defeat at Delium, -Lacedaemon, knowing that they would be now more inclined to listen, -at once concluded the armistice for a year, during which they were to -confer together and see if a longer period could not be agreed upon. - -Now, however, after the Athenian defeat at Amphipolis, and the death of -Cleon and Brasidas, who had been the two principal opponents of peace on -either side--the latter from the success and honour which war gave him, -the former because he thought that, if tranquillity were restored, -his crimes would be more open to detection and his slanders less -credited--the foremost candidates for power in either city, Pleistoanax, -son of Pausanias, king of Lacedaemon, and Nicias, son of Niceratus, the -most fortunate general of his time, each desired peace more ardently -than ever. Nicias, while still happy and honoured, wished to secure his -good fortune, to obtain a present release from trouble for himself and -his countrymen, and hand down to posterity a name as an ever-successful -statesman, and thought the way to do this was to keep out of danger and -commit himself as little as possible to fortune, and that peace alone -made this keeping out of danger possible. Pleistoanax, again, was -assailed by his enemies for his restoration, and regularly held up by -them to the prejudice of his countrymen, upon every reverse that befell -them, as though his unjust restoration were the cause; the accusation -being that he and his brother Aristocles had bribed the prophetess of -Delphi to tell the Lacedaemonian deputations which successively arrived -at the temple to bring home the seed of the demigod son of Zeus from -abroad, else they would have to plough with a silver share. In this -way, it was insisted, in time he had induced the Lacedaemonians in -the nineteenth year of his exile to Lycaeum (whither he had gone when -banished on suspicion of having been bribed to retreat from Attica, and -had built half his house within the consecrated precinct of Zeus for -fear of the Lacedaemonians), to restore him with the same dances and -sacrifices with which they had instituted their kings upon the first -settlement of Lacedaemon. The smart of this accusation, and the -reflection that in peace no disaster could occur, and that when -Lacedaemon had recovered her men there would be nothing for his enemies -to take hold of (whereas, while war lasted, the highest station must -always bear the scandal of everything that went wrong), made him -ardently desire a settlement. Accordingly this winter was employed in -conferences; and as spring rapidly approached, the Lacedaemonians sent -round orders to the cities to prepare for a fortified occupation of -Attica, and held this as a sword over the heads of the Athenians to -induce them to listen to their overtures; and at last, after many claims -had been urged on either side at the conferences a peace was agreed on -upon the following basis. Each party was to restore its conquests, -but Athens was to keep Nisaea; her demand for Plataea being met by -the Thebans asserting that they had acquired the place not by force or -treachery, but by the voluntary adhesion upon agreement of its citizens; -and the same, according to the Athenian account, being the history of -her acquisition of Nisaea. This arranged, the Lacedaemonians -summoned their allies, and all voting for peace except the Boeotians, -Corinthians, Eleans, and Megarians, who did not approve of these -proceedings, they concluded the treaty and made peace, each of the -contracting parties swearing to the following articles: - -The Athenians and Lacedaemonians and their allies made a treaty, and -swore to it, city by city, as follows; - -1. Touching the national temples, there shall be a free passage by land -and by sea to all who wish it, to sacrifice, travel, consult, and attend -the oracle or games, according to the customs of their countries. - -2. The temple and shrine of Apollo at Delphi and the Delphians shall -be governed by their own laws, taxed by their own state, and judged by -their own judges, the land and the people, according to the custom of -their country. - -3. The treaty shall be binding for fifty years upon the Athenians and -the allies of the Athenians, and upon the Lacedaemonians and the allies -of the Lacedaemonians, without fraud or hurt by land or by sea. - -4. It shall not be lawful to take up arms, with intent to do hurt, -either for the Lacedaemonians and their allies against the Athenians -and their allies, or for the Athenians and their allies against the -Lacedaemonians and their allies, in any way or means whatsoever. But -should any difference arise between them they are to have recourse to -law and oaths, according as may be agreed between the parties. - -5. The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall give back Amphipolis to -the Athenians. Nevertheless, in the case of cities given up by the -Lacedaemonians to the Athenians, the inhabitants shall be allowed to go -where they please and to take their property with them: and the cities -shall be independent, paying only the tribute of Aristides. And it shall -not be lawful for the Athenians or their allies to carry on war against -them after the treaty has been concluded, so long as the tribute is -paid. The cities referred to are Argilus, Stagirus, Acanthus, Scolus, -Olynthus, and Spartolus. These cities shall be neutral, allies neither -of the Lacedaemonians nor of the Athenians: but if the cities consent, -it shall be lawful for the Athenians to make them their allies, provided -always that the cities wish it. The Mecybernaeans, Sanaeans, and -Singaeans shall inhabit their own cities, as also the Olynthians and -Acanthians: but the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall give back -Panactum to the Athenians. - -6. The Athenians shall give back Coryphasium, Cythera, Methana, -Lacedaemonians that are in the prison at Athens or elsewhere in the -Athenian dominions, and shall let go the Peloponnesians besieged in -Scione, and all others in Scione that are allies of the Lacedaemonians, -and all whom Brasidas sent in there, and any others of the allies of the -Lacedaemonians that may be in the prison at Athens or elsewhere in the -Athenian dominions. - -7. The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall in like manner give back -any of the Athenians or their allies that they may have in their hands. - -8. In the case of Scione, Torone, and Sermylium, and any other cities -that the Athenians may have, the Athenians may adopt such measures as -they please. - -9. The Athenians shall take an oath to the Lacedaemonians and their -allies, city by city. Every man shall swear by the most binding oath of -his country, seventeen from each city. The oath shall be as follows; "I -will abide by this agreement and treaty honestly and without deceit." -In the same way an oath shall be taken by the Lacedaemonians and their -allies to the Athenians: and the oath shall be renewed annually by both -parties. Pillars shall be erected at Olympia, Pythia, the Isthmus, at -Athens in the Acropolis, and at Lacedaemon in the temple at Amyclae. - -10. If anything be forgotten, whatever it be, and on whatever point, it -shall be consistent with their oath for both parties, the Athenians and -Lacedaemonians, to alter it, according to their discretion. - -The treaty begins from the ephoralty of Pleistolas in Lacedaemon, on the -27th day of the month of Artemisium, and from the archonship, of Alcaeus -at Athens, on the 25th day of the month of Elaphebolion. Those who -took the oath and poured the libations for the Lacedaemonians were -Pleistoanax, Agis, Pleistolas, Damagetis, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, -Daithus, Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Antippus, Tellis, -Alcinadas, Empedias, Menas, and Laphilus: for the Athenians, Lampon, -Isthmonicus, Nicias, Laches, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, -Myrtilus, Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, -Leon, Lamachus, and Demosthenes. - -This treaty was made in the spring, just at the end of winter, directly -after the city festival of Dionysus, just ten years, with the difference -of a few days, from the first invasion of Attica and the commencement of -this war. This must be calculated by the seasons rather than by trusting -to the enumeration of the names of the several magistrates or offices of -honour that are used to mark past events. Accuracy is impossible where -an event may have occurred in the beginning, or middle, or at any period -in their tenure of office. But by computing by summers and winters, the -method adopted in this history, it will be found that, each of these -amounting to half a year, there were ten summers and as many winters -contained in this first war. - -Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians, to whose lot it fell to begin the work -of restitution, immediately set free all the prisoners of war in their -possession, and sent Ischagoras, Menas, and Philocharidas as envoys to -the towns in the direction of Thrace, to order Clearidas to hand over -Amphipolis to the Athenians, and the rest of their allies each to accept -the treaty as it affected them. They, however, did not like its -terms, and refused to accept it; Clearidas also, willing to oblige the -Chalcidians, would not hand over the town, averring his inability to -do so against their will. Meanwhile he hastened in person to Lacedaemon -with envoys from the place, to defend his disobedience against the -possible accusations of Ischagoras and his companions, and also to see -whether it was too late for the agreement to be altered; and on -finding the Lacedaemonians were bound, quickly set out back again with -instructions from them to hand over the place, if possible, or at all -events to bring out the Peloponnesians that were in it. - -The allies happened to be present in person at Lacedaemon, and those -who had not accepted the treaty were now asked by the Lacedaemonians -to adopt it. This, however, they refused to do, for the same reasons -as before, unless a fairer one than the present were agreed upon; -and remaining firm in their determination were dismissed by the -Lacedaemonians, who now decided on forming an alliance with the -Athenians, thinking that Argos, who had refused the application of -Ampelidas and Lichas for a renewal of the treaty, would without Athens -be no longer formidable, and that the rest of the Peloponnese would be -most likely to keep quiet, if the coveted alliance of Athens were -shut against them. Accordingly, after conference with the Athenian -ambassadors, an alliance was agreed upon and oaths were exchanged, upon -the terms following: - -1. The Lacedaemonians shall be allies of the Athenians for fifty years. - -2. Should any enemy invade the territory of Lacedaemon and injure -the Lacedaemonians, the Athenians shall help in such way as they most -effectively can, according to their power. But if the invader be gone -after plundering the country, that city shall be the enemy of Lacedaemon -and Athens, and shall be chastised by both, and one shall not make peace -without the other. This to be honestly, loyally, and without fraud. - -3. Should any enemy invade the territory of Athens and injure the -Athenians, the Lacedaemonians shall help them in such way as they most -effectively can, according to their power. But if the invader be gone -after plundering the country, that city shall be the enemy of Lacedaemon -and Athens, and shall be chastised by both, and one shall not make peace -without the other. This to be honestly, loyally, and without fraud. - -4. Should the slave population rise, the Athenians shall help the -Lacedaemonians with all their might, according to their power. - -5. This treaty shall be sworn to by the same persons on either side that -swore to the other. It shall be renewed annually by the Lacedaemonians -going to Athens for the Dionysia, and the Athenians to Lacedaemon -for the Hyacinthia, and a pillar shall be set up by either party: at -Lacedaemon near the statue of Apollo at Amyclae, and at Athens on the -Acropolis near the statue of Athene. Should the Lacedaemonians -and Athenians see to add to or take away from the alliance in any -particular, it shall be consistent with their oaths for both parties to -do so, according to their discretion. - -Those who took the oath for the Lacedaemonians were Pleistoanax, -Agis, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daithus, -Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Antippus, Alcinadas, Tellis, -Empedias, Menas, and Laphilus; for the Athenians, Lampon, Isthmionicus, -Laches, Nicias, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtilus, -Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leon, -Lamachus, and Demosthenes. - -This alliance was made not long after the treaty; and the Athenians gave -back the men from the island to the Lacedaemonians, and the summer of -the eleventh year began. This completes the history of the first war, -which occupied the whole of the ten years previously. - - - - -CHAPTER XVI - -_Feeling against Sparta in Peloponnese--League of the Mantineans, -Eleans, Argives, and Athenians--Battle of Mantinea and breaking up of -the League_ - -After the treaty and the alliance between the Lacedaemonians and -Athenians, concluded after the ten years' war, in the ephorate of -Pleistolas at Lacedaemon, and the archonship of Alcaeus at Athens, the -states which had accepted them were at peace; but the Corinthians and -some of the cities in Peloponnese trying to disturb the settlement, -a fresh agitation was instantly commenced by the allies against -Lacedaemon. Further, the Lacedaemonians, as time went on, became -suspected by the Athenians through their not performing some of the -provisions in the treaty; and though for six years and ten months -they abstained from invasion of each other's territory, yet abroad an -unstable armistice did not prevent either party doing the other the most -effectual injury, until they were finally obliged to break the treaty -made after the ten years' war and to have recourse to open hostilities. - -The history of this period has been also written by the same Thucydides, -an Athenian, in the chronological order of events by summers and -winters, to the time when the Lacedaemonians and their allies put an end -to the Athenian empire, and took the Long Walls and Piraeus. The war had -then lasted for twenty-seven years in all. Only a mistaken judgment can -object to including the interval of treaty in the war. Looked at by the -light of facts it cannot, it will be found, be rationally considered -a state of peace, where neither party either gave or got back all that -they had agreed, apart from the violations of it which occurred on both -sides in the Mantinean and Epidaurian wars and other instances, and -the fact that the allies in the direction of Thrace were in as open -hostility as ever, while the Boeotians had only a truce renewed every -ten days. So that the first ten years' war, the treacherous armistice -that followed it, and the subsequent war will, calculating by the -seasons, be found to make up the number of years which I have mentioned, -with the difference of a few days, and to afford an instance of faith -in oracles being for once justified by the event. I certainly all along -remember from the beginning to the end of the war its being commonly -declared that it would last thrice nine years. I lived through the whole -of it, being of an age to comprehend events, and giving my attention to -them in order to know the exact truth about them. It was also my fate -to be an exile from my country for twenty years after my command at -Amphipolis; and being present with both parties, and more especially -with the Peloponnesians by reason of my exile, I had leisure to observe -affairs somewhat particularly. I will accordingly now relate the -differences that arose after the ten years' war, the breach of the -treaty, and the hostilities that followed. - -After the conclusion of the fifty years' truce and of the subsequent -alliance, the embassies from Peloponnese which had been summoned for -this business returned from Lacedaemon. The rest went straight home, but -the Corinthians first turned aside to Argos and opened negotiations with -some of the men in office there, pointing out that Lacedaemon could have -no good end in view, but only the subjugation of Peloponnese, or she -would never have entered into treaty and alliance with the once detested -Athenians, and that the duty of consulting for the safety of Peloponnese -had now fallen upon Argos, who should immediately pass a decree -inviting any Hellenic state that chose, such state being independent and -accustomed to meet fellow powers upon the fair and equal ground of law -and justice, to make a defensive alliance with the Argives; appointing -a few individuals with plenipotentiary powers, instead of making the -people the medium of negotiation, in order that, in the case of an -applicant being rejected, the fact of his overtures might not be -made public. They said that many would come over from hatred of the -Lacedaemonians. After this explanation of their views, the Corinthians -returned home. - -The persons with whom they had communicated reported the proposal to -their government and people, and the Argives passed the decree and chose -twelve men to negotiate an alliance for any Hellenic state that wished -it, except Athens and Lacedaemon, neither of which should be able to -join without reference to the Argive people. Argos came into the -plan the more readily because she saw that war with Lacedaemon was -inevitable, the truce being on the point of expiring; and also because -she hoped to gain the supremacy of Peloponnese. For at this time -Lacedaemon had sunk very low in public estimation because of her -disasters, while the Argives were in a most flourishing condition, -having taken no part in the Attic war, but having on the contrary -profited largely by their neutrality. The Argives accordingly prepared -to receive into alliance any of the Hellenes that desired it. - -The Mantineans and their allies were the first to come over through fear -of the Lacedaemonians. Having taken advantage of the war against Athens -to reduce a large part of Arcadia into subjection, they thought that -Lacedaemon would not leave them undisturbed in their conquests, now -that she had leisure to interfere, and consequently gladly turned to a -powerful city like Argos, the historical enemy of the Lacedaemonians, -and a sister democracy. Upon the defection of Mantinea, the rest of -Peloponnese at once began to agitate the propriety of following her -example, conceiving that the Mantineans not have changed sides without -good reason; besides which they were angry with Lacedaemon among other -reasons for having inserted in the treaty with Athens that it should -be consistent with their oaths for both parties, Lacedaemonians and -Athenians, to add to or take away from it according to their discretion. -It was this clause that was the real origin of the panic in Peloponnese, -by exciting suspicions of a Lacedaemonian and Athenian combination -against their liberties: any alteration should properly have been made -conditional upon the consent of the whole body of the allies. With these -apprehensions there was a very general desire in each state to place -itself in alliance with Argos. - -In the meantime the Lacedaemonians perceiving the agitation going on in -Peloponnese, and that Corinth was the author of it and was herself about -to enter into alliance with the Argives, sent ambassadors thither in the -hope of preventing what was in contemplation. They accused her of having -brought it all about, and told her that she could not desert Lacedaemon -and become the ally of Argos, without adding violation of her oaths to -the crime which she had already committed in not accepting the treaty -with Athens, when it had been expressly agreed that the decision of -the majority of the allies should be binding, unless the gods or heroes -stood in the way. Corinth in her answer, delivered before those of her -allies who had like her refused to accept the treaty, and whom she had -previously invited to attend, refrained from openly stating the injuries -she complained of, such as the non-recovery of Sollium or Anactorium -from the Athenians, or any other point in which she thought she had been -prejudiced, but took shelter under the pretext that she could not give -up her Thracian allies, to whom her separate individual security had -been given, when they first rebelled with Potidaea, as well as upon -subsequent occasions. She denied, therefore, that she committed any -violation of her oaths to the allies in not entering into the treaty -with Athens; having sworn upon the faith of the gods to her Thracian -friends, she could not honestly give them up. Besides, the expression -was, "unless the gods or heroes stand in the way." Now here, as it -appeared to her, the gods stood in the way. This was what she said on -the subject of her former oaths. As to the Argive alliance, she would -confer with her friends and do whatever was right. The Lacedaemonian -envoys returning home, some Argive ambassadors who happened to be in -Corinth pressed her to conclude the alliance without further delay, but -were told to attend at the next congress to be held at Corinth. - -Immediately afterwards an Elean embassy arrived, and first making an -alliance with Corinth went on from thence to Argos, according to their -instructions, and became allies of the Argives, their country being just -then at enmity with Lacedaemon and Lepreum. Some time back there had -been a war between the Lepreans and some of the Arcadians; and the -Eleans being called in by the former with the offer of half their lands, -had put an end to the war, and leaving the land in the hands of its -Leprean occupiers had imposed upon them the tribute of a talent to the -Olympian Zeus. Till the Attic war this tribute was paid by the Lepreans, -who then took the war as an excuse for no longer doing so, and upon the -Eleans using force appealed to Lacedaemon. The case was thus submitted -to her arbitrament; but the Eleans, suspecting the fairness of the -tribunal, renounced the reference and laid waste the Leprean territory. -The Lacedaemonians nevertheless decided that the Lepreans were -independent and the Eleans aggressors, and as the latter did not abide -by the arbitration, sent a garrison of heavy infantry into Lepreum. Upon -this the Eleans, holding that Lacedaemon had received one of their rebel -subjects, put forward the convention providing that each confederate -should come out of the Attic war in possession of what he had when he -went into it, and considering that justice had not been done them -went over to the Argives, and now made the alliance through their -ambassadors, who had been instructed for that purpose. Immediately -after them the Corinthians and the Thracian Chalcidians became allies -of Argos. Meanwhile the Boeotians and Megarians, who acted together, -remained quiet, being left to do as they pleased by Lacedaemon, and -thinking that the Argive democracy would not suit so well with their -aristocratic government as the Lacedaemonian constitution. - -About the same time in this summer Athens succeeded in reducing Scione, -put the adult males to death, and, making slaves of the women and -children, gave the land for the Plataeans to live in. She also brought -back the Delians to Delos, moved by her misfortunes in the field and by -the commands of the god at Delphi. Meanwhile the Phocians and Locrians -commenced hostilities. The Corinthians and Argives, being now in -alliance, went to Tegea to bring about its defection from Lacedaemon, -seeing that, if so considerable a state could be persuaded to join, -all Peloponnese would be with them. But when the Tegeans said that they -would do nothing against Lacedaemon, the hitherto zealous Corinthians -relaxed their activity, and began to fear that none of the rest would -now come over. Still they went to the Boeotians and tried to persuade -them to alliance and a common action generally with Argos and -themselves, and also begged them to go with them to Athens and obtain -for them a ten days' truce similar to that made between the Athenians -and Boeotians not long after the fifty years' treaty, and, in the event -of the Athenians refusing, to throw up the armistice, and not make -any truce in future without Corinth. These were the requests of the -Corinthians. The Boeotians stopped them on the subject of the Argive -alliance, but went with them to Athens, where however they failed -to obtain the ten days' truce; the Athenian answer being that -the Corinthians had truce already, as being allies of Lacedaemon. -Nevertheless the Boeotians did not throw up their ten days' truce, in -spite of the prayers and reproaches of the Corinthians for their breach -of faith; and these last had to content themselves with a de facto -armistice with Athens. - -The same summer the Lacedaemonians marched into Arcadia with their whole -levy under Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias, king of Lacedaemon, against -the Parrhasians, who were subjects of Mantinea, and a faction of whom -had invited their aid. They also meant to demolish, if possible, the -fort of Cypsela which the Mantineans had built and garrisoned in the -Parrhasian territory, to annoy the district of Sciritis in Laconia. The -Lacedaemonians accordingly laid waste the Parrhasian country, and the -Mantineans, placing their town in the hands of an Argive garrison, -addressed themselves to the defence of their confederacy, but being -unable to save Cypsela or the Parrhasian towns went back to Mantinea. -Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians made the Parrhasians independent, razed the -fortress, and returned home. - -The same summer the soldiers from Thrace who had gone out with -Brasidas came back, having been brought from thence after the treaty by -Clearidas; and the Lacedaemonians decreed that the Helots who had fought -with Brasidas should be free and allowed to live where they liked, and -not long afterwards settled them with the Neodamodes at Lepreum, which -is situated on the Laconian and Elean border; Lacedaemon being at this -time at enmity with Elis. Those however of the Spartans who had been -taken prisoners on the island and had surrendered their arms might, it -was feared, suppose that they were to be subjected to some degradation -in consequence of their misfortune, and so make some attempt at -revolution, if left in possession of their franchise. These were -therefore at once disfranchised, although some of them were in office at -the time, and thus placed under a disability to take office, or buy and -sell anything. After some time, however, the franchise was restored to -them. - -The same summer the Dians took Thyssus, a town on Acte by Athos in -alliance with Athens. During the whole of this summer intercourse -between the Athenians and Peloponnesians continued, although each party -began to suspect the other directly after the treaty, because of the -places specified in it not being restored. Lacedaemon, to whose lot it -had fallen to begin by restoring Amphipolis and the other towns, had -not done so. She had equally failed to get the treaty accepted by her -Thracian allies, or by the Boeotians or the Corinthians; although she -was continually promising to unite with Athens in compelling their -compliance, if it were longer refused. She also kept fixing a time at -which those who still refused to come in were to be declared enemies -to both parties, but took care not to bind herself by any written -agreement. Meanwhile the Athenians, seeing none of these professions -performed in fact, began to suspect the honesty of her intentions, and -consequently not only refused to comply with her demands for Pylos, but -also repented having given up the prisoners from the island, and kept -tight hold of the other places, until Lacedaemon's part of the treaty -should be fulfilled. Lacedaemon, on the other hand, said she had done -what she could, having given up the Athenian prisoners of war in her -possession, evacuated Thrace, and performed everything else in her -power. Amphipolis it was out of her ability to restore; but she would -endeavour to bring the Boeotians and Corinthians into the treaty, to -recover Panactum, and send home all the Athenian prisoners of war in -Boeotia. Meanwhile she required that Pylos should be restored, or at all -events that the Messenians and Helots should be withdrawn, as her troops -had been from Thrace, and the place garrisoned, if necessary, by the -Athenians themselves. After a number of different conferences held -during the summer, she succeeded in persuading Athens to withdraw from -Pylos the Messenians and the rest of the Helots and deserters from -Laconia, who were accordingly settled by her at Cranii in Cephallenia. -Thus during this summer there was peace and intercourse between the two -peoples. - -Next winter, however, the ephors under whom the treaty had been made -were no longer in office, and some of their successors were directly -opposed to it. Embassies now arrived from the Lacedaemonian confederacy, -and the Athenians, Boeotians, and Corinthians also presented themselves -at Lacedaemon, and after much discussion and no agreement between them, -separated for their several homes; when Cleobulus and Xenares, the two -ephors who were the most anxious to break off the treaty, took advantage -of this opportunity to communicate privately with the Boeotians and -Corinthians, and, advising them to act as much as possible together, -instructed the former first to enter into alliance with Argos, and then -try and bring themselves and the Argives into alliance with Lacedaemon. -The Boeotians would so be least likely to be compelled to come into the -Attic treaty; and the Lacedaemonians would prefer gaining the friendship -and alliance of Argos even at the price of the hostility of Athens -and the rupture of the treaty. The Boeotians knew that an honourable -friendship with Argos had been long the desire of Lacedaemon; for the -Lacedaemonians believed that this would considerably facilitate the -conduct of the war outside Peloponnese. Meanwhile they begged the -Boeotians to place Panactum in her hands in order that she might, if -possible, obtain Pylos in exchange for it, and so be more in a position -to resume hostilities with Athens. - -After receiving these instructions for their governments from Xenares -and Cleobulus and their friends at Lacedaemon, the Boeotians and -Corinthians departed. On their way home they were joined by two persons -high in office at Argos, who had waited for them on the road, and who -now sounded them upon the possibility of the Boeotians joining the -Corinthians, Eleans, and Mantineans in becoming the allies of Argos, in -the idea that if this could be effected they would be able, thus united, -to make peace or war as they pleased either against Lacedaemon or any -other power. The Boeotian envoys were were pleased at thus hearing -themselves accidentally asked to do what their friends at Lacedaemon -had told them; and the two Argives perceiving that their proposal was -agreeable, departed with a promise to send ambassadors to the Boeotians. -On their arrival the Boeotians reported to the Boeotarchs what had been -said to them at Lacedaemon and also by the Argives who had met them, -and the Boeotarchs, pleased with the idea, embraced it with the more -eagerness from the lucky coincidence of Argos soliciting the very thing -wanted by their friends at Lacedaemon. Shortly afterwards ambassadors -appeared from Argos with the proposals indicated; and the Boeotarchs -approved of the terms and dismissed the ambassadors with a promise to -send envoys to Argos to negotiate the alliance. - -In the meantime it was decided by the Boeotarchs, the Corinthians, -the Megarians, and the envoys from Thrace first to interchange oaths -together to give help to each other whenever it was required and not -to make war or peace except in common; after which the Boeotians and -Megarians, who acted together, should make the alliance with Argos. But -before the oaths were taken the Boeotarchs communicated these proposals -to the four councils of the Boeotians, in whom the supreme power -resides, and advised them to interchange oaths with all such cities as -should be willing to enter into a defensive league with the Boeotians. -But the members of the Boeotian councils refused their assent to the -proposal, being afraid of offending Lacedaemon by entering into a league -with the deserter Corinth; the Boeotarchs not having acquainted -them with what had passed at Lacedaemon and with the advice given by -Cleobulus and Xenares and the Boeotian partisans there, namely, that -they should become allies of Corinth and Argos as a preliminary to a -junction with Lacedaemon; fancying that, even if they should say nothing -about this, the councils would not vote against what had been decided -and advised by the Boeotarchs. This difficulty arising, the Corinthians -and the envoys from Thrace departed without anything having been -concluded; and the Boeotarchs, who had previously intended after -carrying this to try and effect the alliance with Argos, now omitted to -bring the Argive question before the councils, or to send to Argos the -envoys whom they had promised; and a general coldness and delay ensued -in the matter. - -In this same winter Mecyberna was assaulted and taken by the Olynthians, -having an Athenian garrison inside it. - -All this while negotiations had been going on between the Athenians -and Lacedaemonians about the conquests still retained by each, and -Lacedaemon, hoping that if Athens were to get back Panactum from the -Boeotians she might herself recover Pylos, now sent an embassy to -the Boeotians, and begged them to place Panactum and their Athenian -prisoners in her hands, in order that she might exchange them for Pylos. -This the Boeotians refused to do, unless Lacedaemon made a separate -alliance with them as she had done with Athens. Lacedaemon knew that -this would be a breach of faith to Athens, as it had been agreed that -neither of them should make peace or war without the other; yet wishing -to obtain Panactum which she hoped to exchange for Pylos, and the party -who pressed for the dissolution of the treaty strongly affecting the -Boeotian connection, she at length concluded the alliance just as -winter gave way to spring; and Panactum was instantly razed. And so the -eleventh year of the war ended. - -In the first days of the summer following, the Argives, seeing that the -promised ambassadors from Boeotia did not arrive, and that Panactum -was being demolished, and that a separate alliance had been concluded -between the Boeotians and Lacedaemonians, began to be afraid that Argos -might be left alone, and all the confederacy go over to Lacedaemon. They -fancied that the Boeotians had been persuaded by the Lacedaemonians to -raze Panactum and to enter into the treaty with the Athenians, and that -Athens was privy to this arrangement, and even her alliance, therefore, -no longer open to them--a resource which they had always counted -upon, by reason of the dissensions existing, in the event of the -noncontinuance of their treaty with Lacedaemon. In this strait the -Argives, afraid that, as the result of refusing to renew the treaty with -Lacedaemon and of aspiring to the supremacy in Peloponnese, they would -have the Lacedaemonians, Tegeans, Boeotians, and Athenians on their -hands all at once, now hastily sent off Eustrophus and Aeson, who seemed -the persons most likely to be acceptable, as envoys to Lacedaemon, -with the view of making as good a treaty as they could with the -Lacedaemonians, upon such terms as could be got, and being left in -peace. - -Having reached Lacedaemon, their ambassadors proceeded to negotiate the -terms of the proposed treaty. What the Argives first demanded was that -they might be allowed to refer to the arbitration of some state or -private person the question of the Cynurian land, a piece of frontier -territory about which they have always been disputing, and which -contains the towns of Thyrea and Anthene, and is occupied by the -Lacedaemonians. The Lacedaemonians at first said that they could not -allow this point to be discussed, but were ready to conclude upon the -old terms. Eventually, however, the Argive ambassadors succeeded in -obtaining from them this concession: For the present there was to be -a truce for fifty years, but it should be competent for either party, -there being neither plague nor war in Lacedaemon or Argos, to give a -formal challenge and decide the question of this territory by battle, as -on a former occasion, when both sides claimed the victory; pursuit -not being allowed beyond the frontier of Argos or Lacedaemon. The -Lacedaemonians at first thought this mere folly; but at last, anxious -at any cost to have the friendship of Argos they agreed to the terms -demanded, and reduced them to writing. However, before any of this -should become binding, the ambassadors were to return to Argos and -communicate with their people and, in the event of their approval, to -come at the feast of the Hyacinthia and take the oaths. - -The envoys returned accordingly. In the meantime, while the -Argives were engaged in these negotiations, the Lacedaemonian -ambassadors--Andromedes, Phaedimus, and Antimenidas--who were to receive -the prisoners from the Boeotians and restore them and Panactum to the -Athenians, found that the Boeotians had themselves razed Panactum, upon -the plea that oaths had been anciently exchanged between their people -and the Athenians, after a dispute on the subject to the effect that -neither should inhabit the place, but that they should graze it in -common. As for the Athenian prisoners of war in the hands of the -Boeotians, these were delivered over to Andromedes and his colleagues, -and by them conveyed to Athens and given back. The envoys at the same -time announced the razing of Panactum, which to them seemed as good as -its restitution, as it would no longer lodge an enemy of Athens. This -announcement was received with great indignation by the Athenians, -who thought that the Lacedaemonians had played them false, both in the -matter of the demolition of Panactum, which ought to have been restored -to them standing, and in having, as they now heard, made a separate -alliance with the Boeotians, in spite of their previous promise to join -Athens in compelling the adhesion of those who refused to accede to -the treaty. The Athenians also considered the other points in which -Lacedaemon had failed in her compact, and thinking that they had been -overreached, gave an angry answer to the ambassadors and sent them away. - -The breach between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians having gone thus -far, the party at Athens, also, who wished to cancel the treaty, -immediately put themselves in motion. Foremost amongst these was -Alcibiades, son of Clinias, a man yet young in years for any other -Hellenic city, but distinguished by the splendour of his ancestry. -Alcibiades thought the Argive alliance really preferable, not that -personal pique had not also a great deal to do with his opposition; he -being offended with the Lacedaemonians for having negotiated the treaty -through Nicias and Laches, and having overlooked him on account of his -youth, and also for not having shown him the respect due to the ancient -connection of his family with them as their proxeni, which, renounced -by his grandfather, he had lately himself thought to renew by his -attentions to their prisoners taken in the island. Being thus, as he -thought, slighted on all hands, he had in the first instance spoken -against the treaty, saying that the Lacedaemonians were not to be -trusted, but that they only treated, in order to be enabled by this -means to crush Argos, and afterwards to attack Athens alone; and now, -immediately upon the above occurring, he sent privately to the Argives, -telling them to come as quickly as possible to Athens, accompanied by -the Mantineans and Eleans, with proposals of alliance; as the moment was -propitious and he himself would do all he could to help them. - -Upon receiving this message and discovering that the Athenians, far from -being privy to the Boeotian alliance, were involved in a serious quarrel -with the Lacedaemonians, the Argives paid no further attention to the -embassy which they had just sent to Lacedaemon on the subject of the -treaty, and began to incline rather towards the Athenians, reflecting -that, in the event of war, they would thus have on their side a city -that was not only an ancient ally of Argos, but a sister democracy -and very powerful at sea. They accordingly at once sent ambassadors to -Athens to treat for an alliance, accompanied by others from Elis and -Mantinea. - -At the same time arrived in haste from Lacedaemon an embassy consisting -of persons reputed well disposed towards the Athenians--Philocharidas, -Leon, and Endius--for fear that the Athenians in their irritation -might conclude alliance with the Argives, and also to ask back Pylos in -exchange for Panactum, and in defence of the alliance with the Boeotians -to plead that it had not been made to hurt the Athenians. Upon the -envoys speaking in the senate upon these points, and stating that they -had come with full powers to settle all others at issue between them, -Alcibiades became afraid that, if they were to repeat these statements -to the popular assembly, they might gain the multitude, and the -Argive alliance might be rejected, and accordingly had recourse to -the following stratagem. He persuaded the Lacedaemonians by a solemn -assurance that if they would say nothing of their full powers in -the assembly, he would give back Pylos to them (himself, the present -opponent of its restitution, engaging to obtain this from the -Athenians), and would settle the other points at issue. His plan was to -detach them from Nicias and to disgrace them before the people, as being -without sincerity in their intentions, or even common consistency in -their language, and so to get the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans taken -into alliance. This plan proved successful. When the envoys appeared -before the people, and upon the question being put to them, did not say -as they had said in the senate, that they had come with full powers, -the Athenians lost all patience, and carried away by Alcibiades, who -thundered more loudly than ever against the Lacedaemonians, were ready -instantly to introduce the Argives and their companions and to take -them into alliance. An earthquake, however, occurring, before anything -definite had been done, this assembly was adjourned. - -In the assembly held the next day, Nicias, in spite of the -Lacedaemonians having been deceived themselves, and having allowed -him to be deceived also in not admitting that they had come with -full powers, still maintained that it was best to be friends with the -Lacedaemonians, and, letting the Argive proposals stand over, to send -once more to Lacedaemon and learn her intentions. The adjournment of -the war could only increase their own prestige and injure that of their -rivals; the excellent state of their affairs making it their interest to -preserve this prosperity as long as possible, while those of Lacedaemon -were so desperate that the sooner she could try her fortune again the -better. He succeeded accordingly in persuading them to send ambassadors, -himself being among the number, to invite the Lacedaemonians, if they -were really sincere, to restore Panactum intact with Amphipolis, and -to abandon their alliance with the Boeotians (unless they consented to -accede to the treaty), agreeably to the stipulation which forbade either -to treat without the other. The ambassadors were also directed to say -that the Athenians, had they wished to play false, might already have -made alliance with the Argives, who were indeed come to Athens for that -very purpose, and went off furnished with instructions as to any other -complaints that the Athenians had to make. Having reached Lacedaemon, -they communicated their instructions, and concluded by telling the -Lacedaemonians that unless they gave up their alliance with the -Boeotians, in the event of their not acceding to the treaty, the -Athenians for their part would ally themselves with the Argives and -their friends. The Lacedaemonians, however, refused to give up the -Boeotian alliance--the party of Xenares the ephor, and such as shared -their view, carrying the day upon this point--but renewed the oaths at -the request of Nicias, who feared to return without having accomplished -anything and to be disgraced; as was indeed his fate, he being held -the author of the treaty with Lacedaemon. When he returned, and the -Athenians heard that nothing had been done at Lacedaemon, they flew into -a passion, and deciding that faith had not been kept with them, took -advantage of the presence of the Argives and their allies, who had been -introduced by Alcibiades, and made a treaty and alliance with them upon -the terms following: - -The Athenians, Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans, acting for themselves -and the allies in their respective empires, made a treaty for a hundred -years, to be without fraud or hurt by land and by sea. - -1. It shall not be lawful to carry on war, either for the Argives, -Eleans, Mantineans, and their allies, against the Athenians, or the -allies in the Athenian empire: or for the Athenians and their allies -against the Argives, Eleans, Mantineans, or their allies, in any way or -means whatsoever. - -The Athenians, Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans shall be allies for a -hundred years upon the terms following: - -2. If an enemy invade the country of the Athenians, the Argives, Eleans, -and Mantineans shall go to the relief of Athens, according as the -Athenians may require by message, in such way as they most effectually -can, to the best of their power. But if the invader be gone after -plundering the territory, the offending state shall be the enemy of -the Argives, Mantineans, Eleans, and Athenians, and war shall be made -against it by all these cities: and no one of the cities shall be able -to make peace with that state, except all the above cities agree to do -so. - -3. Likewise the Athenians shall go to the relief of Argos, Mantinea, -and Elis, if an enemy invade the country of Elis, Mantinea, or Argos, -according as the above cities may require by message, in such way -as they most effectually can, to the best of their power. But if the -invader be gone after plundering the territory, the state offending -shall be the enemy of the Athenians, Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans, -and war shall be made against it by all these cities, and peace may not -be made with that state except all the above cities agree to it. - -4. No armed force shall be allowed to pass for hostile purposes through -the country of the powers contracting, or of the allies in their -respective empires, or to go by sea, except all the cities--that is to -say, Athens, Argos, Mantinea, and Elis--vote for such passage. - -5. The relieving troops shall be maintained by the city sending them for -thirty days from their arrival in the city that has required them, and -upon their return in the same way: if their services be desired for a -longer period, the city that sent for them shall maintain them, at the -rate of three Aeginetan obols per day for a heavy-armed soldier, archer, -or light soldier, and an Aeginetan drachma for a trooper. - -6. The city sending for the troops shall have the command when the war -is in its own country: but in case of the cities resolving upon a joint -expedition the command shall be equally divided among all the cities. - -7. The treaty shall be sworn to by the Athenians for themselves and -their allies, by the Argives, Mantineans, Eleans, and their allies, by -each state individually. Each shall swear the oath most binding in his -country over full-grown victims: the oath being as follows: - -"I STAND BY THE ALLIANCE AND ITS ARTICLES, JUSTLY, INNOCENTLY, AND -SINCERELY, AND I WILL NOT TRANSGRESS THE SAME IN ANY WAY OR MEANS -WHATSOEVER." - -The oath shall be taken at Athens by the Senate and the magistrates, the -Prytanes administering it: at Argos by the Senate, the Eighty, and the -Artynae, the Eighty administering it: at Mantinea by the Demiurgi, -the Senate, and the other magistrates, the Theori and Polemarchs -administering it: at Elis by the Demiurgi, the magistrates, and the Six -Hundred, the Demiurgi and the Thesmophylaces administering it. The oaths -shall be renewed by the Athenians going to Elis, Mantinea, and Argos -thirty days before the Olympic games: by the Argives, Mantineans, -and Eleans going to Athens ten days before the great feast of the -Panathenaea. The articles of the treaty, the oaths, and the alliance -shall be inscribed on a stone pillar by the Athenians in the citadel, -by the Argives in the market-place, in the temple of Apollo: by the -Mantineans in the temple of Zeus, in the market-place: and a brazen -pillar shall be erected jointly by them at the Olympic games now at -hand. Should the above cities see good to make any addition in these -articles, whatever all the above cities shall agree upon, after -consulting together, shall be binding. - -Although the treaty and alliances were thus concluded, still the treaty -between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians was not renounced by either -party. Meanwhile Corinth, although the ally of the Argives, did not -accede to the new treaty, any more than she had done to the alliance, -defensive and offensive, formed before this between the Eleans, Argives, -and Mantineans, when she declared herself content with the first -alliance, which was defensive only, and which bound them to help each -other, but not to join in attacking any. The Corinthians thus stood -aloof from their allies, and again turned their thoughts towards -Lacedaemon. - -At the Olympic games which were held this summer, and in which the -Arcadian Androsthenes was victor the first time in the wrestling and -boxing, the Lacedaemonians were excluded from the temple by the Eleans, -and thus prevented from sacrificing or contending, for having refused -to pay the fine specified in the Olympic law imposed upon them by the -Eleans, who alleged that they had attacked Fort Phyrcus, and sent heavy -infantry of theirs into Lepreum during the Olympic truce. The amount of -the fine was two thousand minae, two for each heavy-armed soldier, as -the law prescribes. The Lacedaemonians sent envoys, and pleaded that the -imposition was unjust; saying that the truce had not yet been proclaimed -at Lacedaemon when the heavy infantry were sent off. But the Eleans -affirmed that the armistice with them had already begun (they -proclaim it first among themselves), and that the aggression of the -Lacedaemonians had taken them by surprise while they were living -quietly as in time of peace, and not expecting anything. Upon this the -Lacedaemonians submitted, that if the Eleans really believed that they -had committed an aggression, it was useless after that to proclaim the -truce at Lacedaemon; but they had proclaimed it notwithstanding, as -believing nothing of the kind, and from that moment the Lacedaemonians -had made no attack upon their country. Nevertheless the Eleans adhered -to what they had said, that nothing would persuade them that an -aggression had not been committed; if, however, the Lacedaemonians would -restore Lepreum, they would give up their own share of the money and pay -that of the god for them. - -As this proposal was not accepted, the Eleans tried a second. Instead -of restoring Lepreum, if this was objected to, the Lacedaemonians should -ascend the altar of the Olympian Zeus, as they were so anxious to have -access to the temple, and swear before the Hellenes that they would -surely pay the fine at a later day. This being also refused, the -Lacedaemonians were excluded from the temple, the sacrifice, and -the games, and sacrificed at home; the Lepreans being the only other -Hellenes who did not attend. Still the Eleans were afraid of the -Lacedaemonians sacrificing by force, and kept guard with a heavy-armed -company of their young men; being also joined by a thousand Argives, the -same number of Mantineans, and by some Athenian cavalry who stayed at -Harpina during the feast. Great fears were felt in the assembly of -the Lacedaemonians coming in arms, especially after Lichas, son of -Arcesilaus, a Lacedaemonian, had been scourged on the course by the -umpires; because, upon his horses being the winners, and the Boeotian -people being proclaimed the victor on account of his having no right -to enter, he came forward on the course and crowned the charioteer, in -order to show that the chariot was his. After this incident all -were more afraid than ever, and firmly looked for a disturbance: the -Lacedaemonians, however, kept quiet, and let the feast pass by, as we -have seen. After the Olympic games, the Argives and the allies repaired -to Corinth to invite her to come over to them. There they found some -Lacedaemonian envoys; and a long discussion ensued, which after all -ended in nothing, as an earthquake occurred, and they dispersed to their -different homes. - -Summer was now over. The winter following a battle took place between -the Heracleots in Trachinia and the Aenianians, Dolopians, Malians, and -certain of the Thessalians, all tribes bordering on and hostile to the -town, which directly menaced their country. Accordingly, after having -opposed and harassed it from its very foundation by every means in their -power, they now in this battle defeated the Heracleots, Xenares, son of -Cnidis, their Lacedaemonian commander, being among the slain. Thus the -winter ended and the twelfth year of this war ended also. After the -battle, Heraclea was so terribly reduced that in the first days of the -summer following the Boeotians occupied the place and sent away the -Lacedaemonian Agesippidas for misgovernment, fearing that the town might -be taken by the Athenians while the Lacedaemonians were distracted -with the affairs of Peloponnese. The Lacedaemonians, nevertheless, were -offended with them for what they had done. - -The same summer Alcibiades, son of Clinias, now one of the generals -at Athens, in concert with the Argives and the allies, went into -Peloponnese with a few Athenian heavy infantry and archers and some of -the allies in those parts whom he took up as he passed, and with this -army marched here and there through Peloponnese, and settled various -matters connected with the alliance, and among other things induced the -Patrians to carry their walls down to the sea, intending himself also -to build a fort near the Achaean Rhium. However, the Corinthians and -Sicyonians, and all others who would have suffered by its being built, -came up and hindered him. - -The same summer war broke out between the Epidaurians and Argives. The -pretext was that the Epidaurians did not send an offering for their -pasture-land to Apollo Pythaeus, as they were bound to do, the Argives -having the chief management of the temple; but, apart from this pretext, -Alcibiades and the Argives were determined, if possible, to gain -possession of Epidaurus, and thus to ensure the neutrality of Corinth -and give the Athenians a shorter passage for their reinforcements from -Aegina than if they had to sail round Scyllaeum. The Argives accordingly -prepared to invade Epidaurus by themselves, to exact the offering. - -About the same time the Lacedaemonians marched out with all their people -to Leuctra upon their frontier, opposite to Mount Lycaeum, under the -command of Agis, son of Archidamus, without any one knowing their -destination, not even the cities that sent the contingents. The -sacrifices, however, for crossing the frontier not proving propitious, -the Lacedaemonians returned home themselves, and sent word to the allies -to be ready to march after the month ensuing, which happened to be the -month of Carneus, a holy time for the Dorians. Upon the retreat of the -Lacedaemonians the Argives marched out on the last day but three of the -month before Carneus, and keeping this as the day during the whole time -that they were out, invaded and plundered Epidaurus. The Epidaurians -summoned their allies to their aid, some of whom pleaded the month as -an excuse; others came as far as the frontier of Epidaurus and there -remained inactive. - -While the Argives were in Epidaurus embassies from the cities assembled -at Mantinea, upon the invitation of the Athenians. The conference having -begun, the Corinthian Euphamidas said that their actions did not agree -with their words; while they were sitting deliberating about peace, the -Epidaurians and their allies and the Argives were arrayed against each -other in arms; deputies from each party should first go and separate the -armies, and then the talk about peace might be resumed. In compliance -with this suggestion, they went and brought back the Argives from -Epidaurus, and afterwards reassembled, but without succeeding any -better in coming to a conclusion; and the Argives a second time invaded -Epidaurus and plundered the country. The Lacedaemonians also marched out -to Caryae; but the frontier sacrifices again proving unfavourable, they -went back again, and the Argives, after ravaging about a third of the -Epidaurian territory, returned home. Meanwhile a thousand Athenian heavy -infantry had come to their aid under the command of Alcibiades, but -finding that the Lacedaemonian expedition was at an end, and that they -were no longer wanted, went back again. - -So passed the summer. The next winter the Lacedaemonians managed to -elude the vigilance of the Athenians, and sent in a garrison of three -hundred men to Epidaurus, under the command of Agesippidas. Upon this -the Argives went to the Athenians and complained of their having allowed -an enemy to pass by sea, in spite of the clause in the treaty by which -the allies were not to allow an enemy to pass through their country. -Unless, therefore, they now put the Messenians and Helots in Pylos to -annoy the Lacedaemonians, they, the Argives, should consider that faith -had not been kept with them. The Athenians were persuaded by Alcibiades -to inscribe at the bottom of the Laconian pillar that the Lacedaemonians -had not kept their oaths, and to convey the Helots at Cranii to Pylos -to plunder the country; but for the rest they remained quiet as -before. During this winter hostilities went on between the Argives and -Epidaurians, without any pitched battle taking place, but only forays -and ambuscades, in which the losses were small and fell now on one side -and now on the other. At the close of the winter, towards the beginning -of spring, the Argives went with scaling ladders to Epidaurus, expecting -to find it left unguarded on account of the war and to be able to take -it by assault, but returned unsuccessful. And the winter ended, and with -it the thirteenth year of the war ended also. - -In the middle of the next summer the Lacedaemonians, seeing the -Epidaurians, their allies, in distress, and the rest of Peloponnese -either in revolt or disaffected, concluded that it was high time for -them to interfere if they wished to stop the progress of the evil, and -accordingly with their full force, the Helots included, took the field -against Argos, under the command of Agis, son of Archidamus, king of the -Lacedaemonians. The Tegeans and the other Arcadian allies of Lacedaemon -joined in the expedition. The allies from the rest of Peloponnese and -from outside mustered at Phlius; the Boeotians with five thousand heavy -infantry and as many light troops, and five hundred horse and the same -number of dismounted troopers; the Corinthians with two thousand heavy -infantry; the rest more or less as might happen; and the Phliasians with -all their forces, the army being in their country. - -The preparations of the Lacedaemonians from the first had been known to -the Argives, who did not, however, take the field until the enemy was on -his road to join the rest at Phlius. Reinforced by the Mantineans with -their allies, and by three thousand Elean heavy infantry, they advanced -and fell in with the Lacedaemonians at Methydrium in Arcadia. Each party -took up its position upon a hill, and the Argives prepared to engage the -Lacedaemonians while they were alone; but Agis eluded them by breaking -up his camp in the night, and proceeded to join the rest of the allies -at Phlius. The Argives discovering this at daybreak, marched first -to Argos and then to the Nemean road, by which they expected the -Lacedaemonians and their allies would come down. However, Agis, -instead of taking this road as they expected, gave the Lacedaemonians, -Arcadians, and Epidaurians their orders, and went along another -difficult road, and descended into the plain of Argos. The Corinthians, -Pellenians, and Phliasians marched by another steep road; while the -Boeotians, Megarians, and Sicyonians had instructions to come down by -the Nemean road where the Argives were posted, in order that, if the -enemy advanced into the plain against the troops of Agis, they might -fall upon his rear with their cavalry. These dispositions concluded, -Agis invaded the plain and began to ravage Saminthus and other places. - -Discovering this, the Argives came up from Nemea, day having now -dawned. On their way they fell in with the troops of the Phliasians and -Corinthians, and killed a few of the Phliasians and had perhaps a -few more of their own men killed by the Corinthians. Meanwhile the -Boeotians, Megarians, and Sicyonians, advancing upon Nemea according to -their instructions, found the Argives no longer there, as they had gone -down on seeing their property ravaged, and were now forming for battle, -the Lacedaemonians imitating their example. The Argives were now -completely surrounded; from the plain the Lacedaemonians and their -allies shut them off from their city; above them were the Corinthians, -Phliasians, and Pellenians; and on the side of Nemea the Boeotians, -Sicyonians, and Megarians. Meanwhile their army was without cavalry, the -Athenians alone among the allies not having yet arrived. Now the bulk of -the Argives and their allies did not see the danger of their position, -but thought that they could not have a fairer field, having intercepted -the Lacedaemonians in their own country and close to the city. Two men, -however, in the Argive army, Thrasylus, one of the five generals, and -Alciphron, the Lacedaemonian proxenus, just as the armies were upon the -point of engaging, went and held a parley with Agis and urged him not to -bring on a battle, as the Argives were ready to refer to fair and equal -arbitration whatever complaints the Lacedaemonians might have against -them, and to make a treaty and live in peace in future. - -The Argives who made these statements did so upon their own authority, -not by order of the people, and Agis on his accepted their proposals, -and without himself either consulting the majority, simply communicated -the matter to a single individual, one of the high officers accompanying -the expedition, and granted the Argives a truce for four months, in -which to fulfil their promises; after which he immediately led off the -army without giving any explanation to any of the other allies. The -Lacedaemonians and allies followed their general out of respect for the -law, but amongst themselves loudly blamed Agis for going away from so -fair a field (the enemy being hemmed in on every side by infantry and -cavalry) without having done anything worthy of their strength. Indeed -this was by far the finest Hellenic army ever yet brought together; and -it should have been seen while it was still united at Nemea, with the -Lacedaemonians in full force, the Arcadians, Boeotians, Corinthians, -Sicyonians, Pellenians, Phliasians and Megarians, and all these the -flower of their respective populations, thinking themselves a match not -merely for the Argive confederacy, but for another such added to it. The -army thus retired blaming Agis, and returned every man to his home. The -Argives however blamed still more loudly the persons who had concluded -the truce without consulting the people, themselves thinking that they -had let escape with the Lacedaemonians an opportunity such as they -should never see again; as the struggle would have been under the walls -of their city, and by the side of many and brave allies. On their return -accordingly they began to stone Thrasylus in the bed of the Charadrus, -where they try all military causes before entering the city. Thrasylus -fled to the altar, and so saved his life; his property however they -confiscated. - -After this arrived a thousand Athenian heavy infantry and three hundred -horse, under the command of Laches and Nicostratus; whom the Argives, -being nevertheless loath to break the truce with the Lacedaemonians, -begged to depart, and refused to bring before the people, to whom they -had a communication to make, until compelled to do so by the entreaties -of the Mantineans and Eleans, who were still at Argos. The Athenians, by -the mouth of Alcibiades their ambassador there present, told the Argives -and the allies that they had no right to make a truce at all without -the consent of their fellow confederates, and now that the Athenians -had arrived so opportunely the war ought to be resumed. These arguments -proving successful with the allies, they immediately marched upon -Orchomenos, all except the Argives, who, although they had consented -like the rest, stayed behind at first, but eventually joined the others. -They now all sat down and besieged Orchomenos, and made assaults upon -it; one of their reasons for desiring to gain this place being that -hostages from Arcadia had been lodged there by the Lacedaemonians. The -Orchomenians, alarmed at the weakness of their wall and the numbers of -the enemy, and at the risk they ran of perishing before relief arrived, -capitulated upon condition of joining the league, of giving hostages of -their own to the Mantineans, and giving up those lodged with them by the -Lacedaemonians. Orchomenos thus secured, the allies now consulted as to -which of the remaining places they should attack next. The Eleans -were urgent for Lepreum; the Mantineans for Tegea; and the Argives and -Athenians giving their support to the Mantineans, the Eleans went home -in a rage at their not having voted for Lepreum; while the rest of the -allies made ready at Mantinea for going against Tegea, which a party -inside had arranged to put into their hands. - -Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians, upon their return from Argos after -concluding the four months' truce, vehemently blamed Agis for not having -subdued Argos, after an opportunity such as they thought they had never -had before; for it was no easy matter to bring so many and so good -allies together. But when the news arrived of the capture of Orchomenos, -they became more angry than ever, and, departing from all precedent, in -the heat of the moment had almost decided to raze his house, and to fine -him ten thousand drachmae. Agis however entreated them to do none of -these things, promising to atone for his fault by good service in the -field, failing which they might then do to him whatever they pleased; -and they accordingly abstained from razing his house or fining him -as they had threatened to do, and now made a law, hitherto unknown at -Lacedaemon, attaching to him ten Spartans as counsellors, without whose -consent he should have no power to lead an army out of the city. - -At this juncture arrived word from their friends in Tegea that, unless -they speedily appeared, Tegea would go over from them to the Argives and -their allies, if it had not gone over already. Upon this news a force -marched out from Lacedaemon, of the Spartans and Helots and all their -people, and that instantly and upon a scale never before witnessed. -Advancing to Orestheum in Maenalia, they directed the Arcadians in their -league to follow close after them to Tegea, and, going on themselves as -far as Orestheum, from thence sent back the sixth part of the Spartans, -consisting of the oldest and youngest men, to guard their homes, and -with the rest of their army arrived at Tegea; where their Arcadian -allies soon after joined them. Meanwhile they sent to Corinth, to the -Boeotians, the Phocians, and Locrians, with orders to come up as quickly -as possible to Mantinea. These had but short notice; and it was not easy -except all together, and after waiting for each other, to pass through -the enemy's country, which lay right across and blocked up the line of -communication. Nevertheless they made what haste they could. Meanwhile -the Lacedaemonians with the Arcadian allies that had joined them, -entered the territory of Mantinea, and encamping near the temple of -Heracles began to plunder the country. - -Here they were seen by the Argives and their allies, who immediately -took up a strong and difficult position, and formed in order of battle. -The Lacedaemonians at once advanced against them, and came on within a -stone's throw or javelin's cast, when one of the older men, seeing the -enemy's position to be a strong one, hallooed to Agis that he was minded -to cure one evil with another; meaning that he wished to make amends for -his retreat, which had been so much blamed, from Argos, by his present -untimely precipitation. Meanwhile Agis, whether in consequence of this -halloo or of some sudden new idea of his own, quickly led back his army -without engaging, and entering the Tegean territory, began to turn off -into that of Mantinea the water about which the Mantineans and Tegeans -are always fighting, on account of the extensive damage it does to -whichever of the two countries it falls into. His object in this was to -make the Argives and their allies come down from the hill, to resist the -diversion of the water, as they would be sure to do when they knew of -it, and thus to fight the battle in the plain. He accordingly stayed -that day where he was, engaged in turning off the water. The Argives -and their allies were at first amazed at the sudden retreat of the enemy -after advancing so near, and did not know what to make of it; but when -he had gone away and disappeared, without their having stirred to pursue -him, they began anew to find fault with their generals, who had not -only let the Lacedaemonians get off before, when they were so happily -intercepted before Argos, but who now again allowed them to run away, -without any one pursuing them, and to escape at their leisure while the -Argive army was leisurely betrayed. The generals, half-stunned for the -moment, afterwards led them down from the hill, and went forward and -encamped in the plain, with the intention of attacking the enemy. - -The next day the Argives and their allies formed in the order in which -they meant to fight, if they chanced to encounter the enemy; and the -Lacedaemonians returning from the water to their old encampment by the -temple of Heracles, suddenly saw their adversaries close in front of -them, all in complete order, and advanced from the hill. A shock like -that of the present moment the Lacedaemonians do not ever remember -to have experienced: there was scant time for preparation, as they -instantly and hastily fell into their ranks, Agis, their king, directing -everything, agreeably to the law. For when a king is in the field all -commands proceed from him: he gives the word to the Polemarchs; they to -the Lochages; these to the Pentecostyes; these again to the Enomotarchs, -and these last to the Enomoties. In short all orders required pass -in the same way and quickly reach the troops; as almost the whole -Lacedaemonian army, save for a small part, consists of officers under -officers, and the care of what is to be done falls upon many. - -In this battle the left wing was composed of the Sciritae, who in a -Lacedaemonian army have always that post to themselves alone; next to -these were the soldiers of Brasidas from Thrace, and the Neodamodes with -them; then came the Lacedaemonians themselves, company after company, -with the Arcadians of Heraea at their side. After these were the -Maenalians, and on the right wing the Tegeans with a few of the -Lacedaemonians at the extremity; their cavalry being posted upon the two -wings. Such was the Lacedaemonian formation. That of their opponents was -as follows: On the right were the Mantineans, the action taking place in -their country; next to them the allies from Arcadia; after whom came the -thousand picked men of the Argives, to whom the state had given a long -course of military training at the public expense; next to them the rest -of the Argives, and after them their allies, the Cleonaeans and Orneans, -and lastly the Athenians on the extreme left, and lastly the Athenians -on the extreme left, and their own cavalry with them. - -Such were the order and the forces of the two combatants. The -Lacedaemonian army looked the largest; though as to putting down the -numbers of either host, or of the contingents composing it, I could not -do so with any accuracy. Owing to the secrecy of their government the -number of the Lacedaemonians was not known, and men are so apt to brag -about the forces of their country that the estimate of their opponents -was not trusted. The following calculation, however, makes it possible -to estimate the numbers of the Lacedaemonians present upon this -occasion. There were seven companies in the field without counting the -Sciritae, who numbered six hundred men: in each company there were four -Pentecostyes, and in the Pentecosty four Enomoties. The first rank of -the Enomoty was composed of four soldiers: as to the depth, although -they had not been all drawn up alike, but as each captain chose, they -were generally ranged eight deep; the first rank along the whole line, -exclusive of the Sciritae, consisted of four hundred and forty-eight -men. - -The armies being now on the eve of engaging, each contingent received -some words of encouragement from its own commander. The Mantineans were, -reminded that they were going to fight for their country and to avoid -returning to the experience of servitude after having tasted that -of empire; the Argives, that they would contend for their ancient -supremacy, to regain their once equal share of Peloponnese of which they -had been so long deprived, and to punish an enemy and a neighbour for a -thousand wrongs; the Athenians, of the glory of gaining the honours of -the day with so many and brave allies in arms, and that a victory over -the Lacedaemonians in Peloponnese would cement and extend their empire, -and would besides preserve Attica from all invasions in future. These -were the incitements addressed to the Argives and their allies. The -Lacedaemonians meanwhile, man to man, and with their war-songs in -the ranks, exhorted each brave comrade to remember what he had learnt -before; well aware that the long training of action was of more -saving virtue than any brief verbal exhortation, though never so well -delivered. - -After this they joined battle, the Argives and their allies advancing -with haste and fury, the Lacedaemonians slowly and to the music of many -flute-players--a standing institution in their army, that has nothing to -do with religion, but is meant to make them advance evenly, stepping in -time, without break their order, as large armies are apt to do in the -moment of engaging. - -Just before the battle joined, King Agis resolved upon the following -manoeuvre. All armies are alike in this: on going into action they get -forced out rather on their right wing, and one and the other overlap -with this adversary's left; because fear makes each man do his best -to shelter his unarmed side with the shield of the man next him on the -right, thinking that the closer the shields are locked together the -better will he be protected. The man primarily responsible for this is -the first upon the right wing, who is always striving to withdraw from -the enemy his unarmed side; and the same apprehension makes the rest -follow him. On the present occasion the Mantineans reached with their -wing far beyond the Sciritae, and the Lacedaemonians and Tegeans still -farther beyond the Athenians, as their army was the largest. Agis, -afraid of his left being surrounded, and thinking that the Mantineans -outflanked it too far, ordered the Sciritae and Brasideans to move -out from their place in the ranks and make the line even with the -Mantineans, and told the Polemarchs Hipponoidas and Aristocles to -fill up the gap thus formed, by throwing themselves into it with two -companies taken from the right wing; thinking that his right would still -be strong enough and to spare, and that the line fronting the Mantineans -would gain in solidity. - -However, as he gave these orders in the moment of the onset, and at -short notice, it so happened that Aristocles and Hipponoidas would not -move over, for which offence they were afterwards banished from Sparta, -as having been guilty of cowardice; and the enemy meanwhile closed -before the Sciritae (whom Agis on seeing that the two companies did -not move over ordered to return to their place) had time to fill up -the breach in question. Now it was, however, that the Lacedaemonians, -utterly worsted in respect of skill, showed themselves as superior in -point of courage. As soon as they came to close quarters with the enemy, -the Mantinean right broke their Sciritae and Brasideans, and, bursting -in with their allies and the thousand picked Argives into the unclosed -breach in their line, cut up and surrounded the Lacedaemonians, and -drove them in full rout to the wagons, slaying some of the older men on -guard there. But the Lacedaemonians, worsted in this part of the field, -with the rest of their army, and especially the centre, where the three -hundred knights, as they are called, fought round King Agis, fell on -the older men of the Argives and the five companies so named, and on -the Cleonaeans, the Orneans, and the Athenians next them, and instantly -routed them; the greater number not even waiting to strike a blow, but -giving way the moment that they came on, some even being trodden under -foot, in their fear of being overtaken by their assailants. - -The army of the Argives and their allies, having given way in this -quarter, was now completely cut in two, and the Lacedaemonian and Tegean -right simultaneously closing round the Athenians with the troops that -outflanked them, these last found themselves placed between two fires, -being surrounded on one side and already defeated on the other. Indeed -they would have suffered more severely than any other part of the army, -but for the services of the cavalry which they had with them. Agis also -on perceiving the distress of his left opposed to the Mantineans and the -thousand Argives, ordered all the army to advance to the support of the -defeated wing; and while this took place, as the enemy moved past and -slanted away from them, the Athenians escaped at their leisure, and -with them the beaten Argive division. Meanwhile the Mantineans and their -allies and the picked body of the Argives ceased to press the enemy, -and seeing their friends defeated and the Lacedaemonians in full advance -upon them, took to flight. Many of the Mantineans perished; but the bulk -of the picked body of the Argives made good their escape. The flight -and retreat, however, were neither hurried nor long; the Lacedaemonians -fighting long and stubbornly until the rout of their enemy, but that -once effected, pursuing for a short time and not far. - -Such was the battle, as nearly as possible as I have described it; the -greatest that had occurred for a very long while among the Hellenes, -and joined by the most considerable states. The Lacedaemonians took up -a position in front of the enemy's dead, and immediately set up a trophy -and stripped the slain; they took up their own dead and carried them -back to Tegea, where they buried them, and restored those of the enemy -under truce. The Argives, Orneans, and Cleonaeans had seven hundred -killed; the Mantineans two hundred, and the Athenians and Aeginetans -also two hundred, with both their generals. On the side of the -Lacedaemonians, the allies did not suffer any loss worth speaking of: as -to the Lacedaemonians themselves it was difficult to learn the truth; it -is said, however, that there were slain about three hundred of them. - -While the battle was impending, Pleistoanax, the other king, set out -with a reinforcement composed of the oldest and youngest men, and got -as far as Tegea, where he heard of the victory and went back again. The -Lacedaemonians also sent and turned back the allies from Corinth and -from beyond the Isthmus, and returning themselves dismissed their -allies, and kept the Carnean holidays, which happened to be at that -time. The imputations cast upon them by the Hellenes at the time, -whether of cowardice on account of the disaster in the island, or of -mismanagement and slowness generally, were all wiped out by this single -action: fortune, it was thought, might have humbled them, but the men -themselves were the same as ever. - -The day before this battle, the Epidaurians with all their forces -invaded the deserted Argive territory, and cut off many of the guards -left there in the absence of the Argive army. After the battle three -thousand Elean heavy infantry arriving to aid the Mantineans, and a -reinforcement of one thousand Athenians, all these allies marched -at once against Epidaurus, while the Lacedaemonians were keeping the -Carnea, and dividing the work among them began to build a wall round -the city. The rest left off; but the Athenians finished at once the part -assigned to them round Cape Heraeum; and having all joined in leaving -a garrison in the fortification in question, they returned to their -respective cities. - -Summer now came to an end. In the first days of the next winter, when -the Carnean holidays were over, the Lacedaemonians took the field, and -arriving at Tegea sent on to Argos proposals of accommodation. They had -before had a party in the town desirous of overthrowing the democracy; -and after the battle that had been fought, these were now far more in a -position to persuade the people to listen to terms. Their plan was first -to make a treaty with the Lacedaemonians, to be followed by an alliance, -and after this to fall upon the commons. Lichas, son of Arcesilaus, the -Argive proxenus, accordingly arrived at Argos with two proposals from -Lacedaemon, to regulate the conditions of war or peace, according as -they preferred the one or the other. After much discussion, Alcibiades -happening to be in the town, the Lacedaemonian party, who now ventured -to act openly, persuaded the Argives to accept the proposal for -accommodation; which ran as follows: - -The assembly of the Lacedaemonians agrees to treat with the Argives upon -the terms following: - -1. The Argives shall restore to the Orchomenians their children, and -to the Maenalians their men, and shall restore the men they have in -Mantinea to the Lacedaemonians. - -2. They shall evacuate Epidaurus, and raze the fortification there. If -the Athenians refuse to withdraw from Epidaurus, they shall be declared -enemies of the Argives and of the Lacedaemonians, and of the allies of -the Lacedaemonians and the allies of the Argives. - -3. If the Lacedaemonians have any children in their custody, they shall -restore them every one to his city. - -4. As to the offering to the god, the Argives, if they wish, shall -impose an oath upon the Epidaurians, but, if not, they shall swear it -themselves. - -5. All the cities in Peloponnese, both small and great, shall be -independent according to the customs of their country. - -6. If any of the powers outside Peloponnese invade Peloponnesian -territory, the parties contracting shall unite to repel them, on such -terms as they may agree upon, as being most fair for the Peloponnesians. - -7. All allies of the Lacedaemonians outside Peloponnese shall be on the -same footing as the Lacedaemonians, and the allies of the Argives shall -be on the same footing as the Argives, being left in enjoyment of their -own possessions. - -8. This treaty shall be shown to the allies, and shall be concluded, if -they approve; if the allies think fit, they may send the treaty to be -considered at home. - -The Argives began by accepting this proposal, and the Lacedaemonian army -returned home from Tegea. After this intercourse was renewed between -them, and not long afterwards the same party contrived that the Argives -should give up the league with the Mantineans, Eleans, and Athenians, -and should make a treaty and alliance with the Lacedaemonians; which was -consequently done upon the terms following: - -The Lacedaemonians and Argives agree to a treaty and alliance for fifty -years upon the terms following: - -1. All disputes shall be decided by fair and impartial arbitration, -agreeably to the customs of the two countries. - -2. The rest of the cities in Peloponnese may be included in this treaty -and alliance, as independent and sovereign, in full enjoyment of -what they possess, all disputes being decided by fair and impartial -arbitration, agreeably to the customs of the said cities. - -3. All allies of the Lacedaemonians outside Peloponnese shall be upon -the same footing as the Lacedaemonians themselves, and the allies of -the Argives shall be upon the same footing as the Argives themselves, -continuing to enjoy what they possess. - -4. If it shall be anywhere necessary to make an expedition in common, -the Lacedaemonians and Argives shall consult upon it and decide, as may -be most fair for the allies. - -5. If any of the cities, whether inside or outside Peloponnese, have a -question whether of frontiers or otherwise, it must be settled, but if -one allied city should have a quarrel with another allied city, it -must be referred to some third city thought impartial by both parties. -Private citizens shall have their disputes decided according to the laws -of their several countries. - -The treaty and above alliance concluded, each party at once released -everything whether acquired by war or otherwise, and thenceforth acting -in common voted to receive neither herald nor embassy from the Athenians -unless they evacuated their forts and withdrew from Peloponnese, and -also to make neither peace nor war with any, except jointly. Zeal was -not wanting: both parties sent envoys to the Thracian places and to -Perdiccas, and persuaded the latter to join their league. Still he did -not at once break off from Athens, although minded to do so upon seeing -the way shown him by Argos, the original home of his family. They also -renewed their old oaths with the Chalcidians and took new ones: the -Argives, besides, sent ambassadors to the Athenians, bidding them -evacuate the fort at Epidaurus. The Athenians, seeing their own men -outnumbered by the rest of the garrison, sent Demosthenes to bring them -out. This general, under colour of a gymnastic contest which he arranged -on his arrival, got the rest of the garrison out of the place, and shut -the gates behind them. Afterwards the Athenians renewed their treaty -with the Epidaurians, and by themselves gave up the fortress. - -After the defection of Argos from the league, the Mantineans, though -they held out at first, in the end finding themselves powerless without -the Argives, themselves too came to terms with Lacedaemon, and gave up -their sovereignty over the towns. The Lacedaemonians and Argives, each a -thousand strong, now took the field together, and the former first went -by themselves to Sicyon and made the government there more oligarchical -than before, and then both, uniting, put down the democracy at Argos and -set up an oligarchy favourable to Lacedaemon. These events occurred at -the close of the winter, just before spring; and the fourteenth year of -the war ended. The next summer the people of Dium, in Athos, revolted -from the Athenians to the Chalcidians, and the Lacedaemonians settled -affairs in Achaea in a way more agreeable to the interests of their -country. Meanwhile the popular party at Argos little by little -gathered new consistency and courage, and waited for the moment of the -Gymnopaedic festival at Lacedaemon, and then fell upon the oligarchs. -After a fight in the city, victory declared for the commons, who slew -some of their opponents and banished others. The Lacedaemonians for a -long while let the messages of their friends at Argos remain without -effect. At last they put off the Gymnopaediae and marched to their -succour, but learning at Tegea the defeat of the oligarchs, refused to -go any further in spite of the entreaties of those who had escaped, -and returned home and kept the festival. Later on, envoys arrived with -messages from the Argives in the town and from the exiles, when the -allies were also at Sparta; and after much had been said on both sides, -the Lacedaemonians decided that the party in the town had done wrong, -and resolved to march against Argos, but kept delaying and putting -off the matter. Meanwhile the commons at Argos, in fear of the -Lacedaemonians, began again to court the Athenian alliance, which they -were convinced would be of the greatest service to them; and accordingly -proceeded to build long walls to the sea, in order that in case of a -blockade by land; with the help of the Athenians they might have the -advantage of importing what they wanted by sea. Some of the cities in -Peloponnese were also privy to the building of these walls; and the -Argives with all their people, women and slaves not excepted, addressed -themselves to the work, while carpenters and masons came to them from -Athens. - -Summer was now over. The winter following the Lacedaemonians, hearing of -the walls that were building, marched against Argos with their allies, -the Corinthians excepted, being also not without intelligence in the -city itself; Agis, son of Archidamus, their king, was in command. The -intelligence which they counted upon within the town came to nothing; -they however took and razed the walls which were being built, and after -capturing the Argive town Hysiae and killing all the freemen that fell -into their hands, went back and dispersed every man to his city. After -this the Argives marched into Phlius and plundered it for harbouring -their exiles, most of whom had settled there, and so returned home. -The same winter the Athenians blockaded Macedonia, on the score of the -league entered into by Perdiccas with the Argives and Lacedaemonians, -and also of his breach of his engagements on the occasion of the -expedition prepared by Athens against the Chalcidians in the direction -of Thrace and against Amphipolis, under the command of Nicias, son of -Niceratus, which had to be broken up mainly because of his desertion. -He was therefore proclaimed an enemy. And thus the winter ended, and the -fifteenth year of the war ended with it. - - - - -CHAPTER XVII - -_Sixteenth Year of the War--The Melian Conference--Fate of Melos_ - -The next summer Alcibiades sailed with twenty ships to Argos and seized -the suspected persons still left of the Lacedaemonian faction to the -number of three hundred, whom the Athenians forthwith lodged in the -neighbouring islands of their empire. The Athenians also made an -expedition against the isle of Melos with thirty ships of their own, six -Chian, and two Lesbian vessels, sixteen hundred heavy infantry, three -hundred archers, and twenty mounted archers from Athens, and about -fifteen hundred heavy infantry from the allies and the islanders. -The Melians are a colony of Lacedaemon that would not submit to the -Athenians like the other islanders, and at first remained neutral and -took no part in the struggle, but afterwards upon the Athenians using -violence and plundering their territory, assumed an attitude of open -hostility. Cleomedes, son of Lycomedes, and Tisias, son of Tisimachus, -the generals, encamping in their territory with the above armament, -before doing any harm to their land, sent envoys to negotiate. These the -Melians did not bring before the people, but bade them state the object -of their mission to the magistrates and the few; upon which the Athenian -envoys spoke as follows: - -Athenians. Since the negotiations are not to go on before the people, in -order that we may not be able to speak straight on without interruption, -and deceive the ears of the multitude by seductive arguments which would -pass without refutation (for we know that this is the meaning of our -being brought before the few), what if you who sit there were to pursue -a method more cautious still? Make no set speech yourselves, but take -us up at whatever you do not like, and settle that before going any -farther. And first tell us if this proposition of ours suits you. - -The Melian commissioners answered: - -Melians. To the fairness of quietly instructing each other as you -propose there is nothing to object; but your military preparations are -too far advanced to agree with what you say, as we see you are come to -be judges in your own cause, and that all we can reasonably expect -from this negotiation is war, if we prove to have right on our side and -refuse to submit, and in the contrary case, slavery. - -Athenians. If you have met to reason about presentiments of the future, -or for anything else than to consult for the safety of your state upon -the facts that you see before you, we will give over; otherwise we will -go on. - -Melians. It is natural and excusable for men in our position to turn -more ways than one both in thought and utterance. However, the question -in this conference is, as you say, the safety of our country; and the -discussion, if you please, can proceed in the way which you propose. - -Athenians. For ourselves, we shall not trouble you with specious -pretences--either of how we have a right to our empire because we -overthrew the Mede, or are now attacking you because of wrong that you -have done us--and make a long speech which would not be believed; and in -return we hope that you, instead of thinking to influence us by saying -that you did not join the Lacedaemonians, although their colonists, or -that you have done us no wrong, will aim at what is feasible, holding -in view the real sentiments of us both; since you know as well as we -do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in -power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they -must. - -Melians. As we think, at any rate, it is expedient--we speak as we -are obliged, since you enjoin us to let right alone and talk only of -interest--that you should not destroy what is our common protection, the -privilege of being allowed in danger to invoke what is fair and right, -and even to profit by arguments not strictly valid if they can be got -to pass current. And you are as much interested in this as any, as your -fall would be a signal for the heaviest vengeance and an example for the -world to meditate upon. - -Athenians. The end of our empire, if end it should, does not frighten -us: a rival empire like Lacedaemon, even if Lacedaemon was our real -antagonist, is not so terrible to the vanquished as subjects who by -themselves attack and overpower their rulers. This, however, is a risk -that we are content to take. We will now proceed to show you that we are -come here in the interest of our empire, and that we shall say what we -are now going to say, for the preservation of your country; as we -would fain exercise that empire over you without trouble, and see you -preserved for the good of us both. - -Melians. And how, pray, could it turn out as good for us to serve as for -you to rule? - -Athenians. Because you would have the advantage of submitting before -suffering the worst, and we should gain by not destroying you. - -Melians. So that you would not consent to our being neutral, friends -instead of enemies, but allies of neither side. - -Athenians. No; for your hostility cannot so much hurt us as your -friendship will be an argument to our subjects of our weakness, and your -enmity of our power. - -Melians. Is that your subjects' idea of equity, to put those who have -nothing to do with you in the same category with peoples that are most -of them your own colonists, and some conquered rebels? - -Athenians. As far as right goes they think one has as much of it as the -other, and that if any maintain their independence it is because they -are strong, and that if we do not molest them it is because we are -afraid; so that besides extending our empire we should gain in security -by your subjection; the fact that you are islanders and weaker than -others rendering it all the more important that you should not succeed -in baffling the masters of the sea. - -Melians. But do you consider that there is no security in the policy -which we indicate? For here again if you debar us from talking about -justice and invite us to obey your interest, we also must explain ours, -and try to persuade you, if the two happen to coincide. How can you -avoid making enemies of all existing neutrals who shall look at case -from it that one day or another you will attack them? And what is this -but to make greater the enemies that you have already, and to force -others to become so who would otherwise have never thought of it? - -Athenians. Why, the fact is that continentals generally give us but -little alarm; the liberty which they enjoy will long prevent their -taking precautions against us; it is rather islanders like yourselves, -outside our empire, and subjects smarting under the yoke, who would -be the most likely to take a rash step and lead themselves and us into -obvious danger. - -Melians. Well then, if you risk so much to retain your empire, and your -subjects to get rid of it, it were surely great baseness and cowardice -in us who are still free not to try everything that can be tried, before -submitting to your yoke. - -Athenians. Not if you are well advised, the contest not being an equal -one, with honour as the prize and shame as the penalty, but a question -of self-preservation and of not resisting those who are far stronger -than you are. - -Melians. But we know that the fortune of war is sometimes more impartial -than the disproportion of numbers might lead one to suppose; to submit -is to give ourselves over to despair, while action still preserves for -us a hope that we may stand erect. - -Athenians. Hope, danger's comforter, may be indulged in by those who -have abundant resources, if not without loss at all events without ruin; -but its nature is to be extravagant, and those who go so far as to put -their all upon the venture see it in its true colours only when they are -ruined; but so long as the discovery would enable them to guard against -it, it is never found wanting. Let not this be the case with you, who -are weak and hang on a single turn of the scale; nor be like the vulgar, -who, abandoning such security as human means may still afford, when -visible hopes fail them in extremity, turn to invisible, to prophecies -and oracles, and other such inventions that delude men with hopes to -their destruction. - -Melians. You may be sure that we are as well aware as you of the -difficulty of contending against your power and fortune, unless the -terms be equal. But we trust that the gods may grant us fortune as good -as yours, since we are just men fighting against unjust, and that what -we want in power will be made up by the alliance of the Lacedaemonians, -who are bound, if only for very shame, to come to the aid of their -kindred. Our confidence, therefore, after all is not so utterly -irrational. - -Athenians. When you speak of the favour of the gods, we may as fairly -hope for that as yourselves; neither our pretensions nor our conduct -being in any way contrary to what men believe of the gods, or practise -among themselves. Of the gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a -necessary law of their nature they rule wherever they can. And it is not -as if we were the first to make this law, or to act upon it when made: -we found it existing before us, and shall leave it to exist for ever -after us; all we do is to make use of it, knowing that you and everybody -else, having the same power as we have, would do the same as we do. -Thus, as far as the gods are concerned, we have no fear and no reason to -fear that we shall be at a disadvantage. But when we come to your notion -about the Lacedaemonians, which leads you to believe that shame will -make them help you, here we bless your simplicity but do not envy your -folly. The Lacedaemonians, when their own interests or their country's -laws are in question, are the worthiest men alive; of their conduct -towards others much might be said, but no clearer idea of it could be -given than by shortly saying that of all the men we know they are most -conspicuous in considering what is agreeable honourable, and what is -expedient just. Such a way of thinking does not promise much for the -safety which you now unreasonably count upon. - -Melians. But it is for this very reason that we now trust to their -respect for expediency to prevent them from betraying the Melians, their -colonists, and thereby losing the confidence of their friends in Hellas -and helping their enemies. - -Athenians. Then you do not adopt the view that expediency goes with -security, while justice and honour cannot be followed without danger; -and danger the Lacedaemonians generally court as little as possible. - -Melians. But we believe that they would be more likely to face even -danger for our sake, and with more confidence than for others, as our -nearness to Peloponnese makes it easier for them to act, and our common -blood ensures our fidelity. - -Athenians. Yes, but what an intending ally trusts to is not the goodwill -of those who ask his aid, but a decided superiority of power for action; -and the Lacedaemonians look to this even more than others. At least, -such is their distrust of their home resources that it is only with -numerous allies that they attack a neighbour; now is it likely that -while we are masters of the sea they will cross over to an island? - -Melians. But they would have others to send. The Cretan Sea is a wide -one, and it is more difficult for those who command it to intercept -others, than for those who wish to elude them to do so safely. And -should the Lacedaemonians miscarry in this, they would fall upon your -land, and upon those left of your allies whom Brasidas did not reach; -and instead of places which are not yours, you will have to fight for -your own country and your own confederacy. - -Athenians. Some diversion of the kind you speak of you may one day -experience, only to learn, as others have done, that the Athenians never -once yet withdrew from a siege for fear of any. But we are struck by -the fact that, after saying you would consult for the safety of your -country, in all this discussion you have mentioned nothing which men -might trust in and think to be saved by. Your strongest arguments depend -upon hope and the future, and your actual resources are too scanty, as -compared with those arrayed against you, for you to come out victorious. -You will therefore show great blindness of judgment, unless, after -allowing us to retire, you can find some counsel more prudent than this. -You will surely not be caught by that idea of disgrace, which in dangers -that are disgraceful, and at the same time too plain to be mistaken, -proves so fatal to mankind; since in too many cases the very men that -have their eyes perfectly open to what they are rushing into, let the -thing called disgrace, by the mere influence of a seductive name, lead -them on to a point at which they become so enslaved by the phrase as in -fact to fall wilfully into hopeless disaster, and incur disgrace more -disgraceful as the companion of error, than when it comes as the result -of misfortune. This, if you are well advised, you will guard against; -and you will not think it dishonourable to submit to the greatest -city in Hellas, when it makes you the moderate offer of becoming its -tributary ally, without ceasing to enjoy the country that belongs to -you; nor when you have the choice given you between war and security, -will you be so blinded as to choose the worse. And it is certain that -those who do not yield to their equals, who keep terms with their -superiors, and are moderate towards their inferiors, on the whole -succeed best. Think over the matter, therefore, after our withdrawal, -and reflect once and again that it is for your country that you are -consulting, that you have not more than one, and that upon this one -deliberation depends its prosperity or ruin. - -The Athenians now withdrew from the conference; and the Melians, left -to themselves, came to a decision corresponding with what they had -maintained in the discussion, and answered: "Our resolution, Athenians, -is the same as it was at first. We will not in a moment deprive of -freedom a city that has been inhabited these seven hundred years; but we -put our trust in the fortune by which the gods have preserved it until -now, and in the help of men, that is, of the Lacedaemonians; and so we -will try and save ourselves. Meanwhile we invite you to allow us to be -friends to you and foes to neither party, and to retire from our country -after making such a treaty as shall seem fit to us both." - -Such was the answer of the Melians. The Athenians now departing from the -conference said: "Well, you alone, as it seems to us, judging from these -resolutions, regard what is future as more certain than what is before -your eyes, and what is out of sight, in your eagerness, as already -coming to pass; and as you have staked most on, and trusted most in, -the Lacedaemonians, your fortune, and your hopes, so will you be most -completely deceived." - -The Athenian envoys now returned to the army; and the Melians showing -no signs of yielding, the generals at once betook themselves to -hostilities, and drew a line of circumvallation round the Melians, -dividing the work among the different states. Subsequently the Athenians -returned with most of their army, leaving behind them a certain number -of their own citizens and of the allies to keep guard by land and sea. -The force thus left stayed on and besieged the place. - -About the same time the Argives invaded the territory of Phlius and lost -eighty men cut off in an ambush by the Phliasians and Argive exiles. -Meanwhile the Athenians at Pylos took so much plunder from the -Lacedaemonians that the latter, although they still refrained from -breaking off the treaty and going to war with Athens, yet proclaimed -that any of their people that chose might plunder the Athenians. The -Corinthians also commenced hostilities with the Athenians for private -quarrels of their own; but the rest of the Peloponnesians stayed -quiet. Meanwhile the Melians attacked by night and took the part of the -Athenian lines over against the market, and killed some of the men, and -brought in corn and all else that they could find useful to them, and -so returned and kept quiet, while the Athenians took measures to keep -better guard in future. - -Summer was now over. The next winter the Lacedaemonians intended to -invade the Argive territory, but arriving at the frontier found -the sacrifices for crossing unfavourable, and went back again. This -intention of theirs gave the Argives suspicions of certain of their -fellow citizens, some of whom they arrested; others, however, escaped -them. About the same time the Melians again took another part of -the Athenian lines which were but feebly garrisoned. Reinforcements -afterwards arriving from Athens in consequence, under the command of -Philocrates, son of Demeas, the siege was now pressed vigorously; -and some treachery taking place inside, the Melians surrendered at -discretion to the Athenians, who put to death all the grown men whom -they took, and sold the women and children for slaves, and subsequently -sent out five hundred colonists and inhabited the place themselves. - - - - -BOOK VI - -CHAPTER XVIII - -_Seventeenth Year of the War--The Sicilian Campaign--Affair of the -Hermae--Departure of the Expedition_ - -The same winter the Athenians resolved to sail again to Sicily, with a -greater armament than that under Laches and Eurymedon, and, if possible, -to conquer the island; most of them being ignorant of its size and of -the number of its inhabitants, Hellenic and barbarian, and of the fact -that they were undertaking a war not much inferior to that against the -Peloponnesians. For the voyage round Sicily in a merchantman is not far -short of eight days; and yet, large as the island is, there are only two -miles of sea to prevent its being mainland. - -It was settled originally as follows, and the peoples that occupied it -are these. The earliest inhabitants spoken of in any part of the country -are the Cyclopes and Laestrygones; but I cannot tell of what race -they were, or whence they came or whither they went, and must leave my -readers to what the poets have said of them and to what may be generally -known concerning them. The Sicanians appear to have been the next -settlers, although they pretend to have been the first of all and -aborigines; but the facts show that they were Iberians, driven by the -Ligurians from the river Sicanus in Iberia. It was from them that the -island, before called Trinacria, took its name of Sicania, and to the -present day they inhabit the west of Sicily. On the fall of Ilium, some -of the Trojans escaped from the Achaeans, came in ships to Sicily, and -settled next to the Sicanians under the general name of Elymi; their -towns being called Eryx and Egesta. With them settled some of the -Phocians carried on their way from Troy by a storm, first to Libya, and -afterwards from thence to Sicily. The Sicels crossed over to Sicily from -their first home Italy, flying from the Opicans, as tradition says and -as seems not unlikely, upon rafts, having watched till the wind set down -the strait to effect the passage; although perhaps they may have sailed -over in some other way. Even at the present day there are still Sicels -in Italy; and the country got its name of Italy from Italus, a king of -the Sicels, so called. These went with a great host to Sicily, defeated -the Sicanians in battle and forced them to remove to the south and west -of the island, which thus came to be called Sicily instead of Sicania, -and after they crossed over continued to enjoy the richest parts of the -country for near three hundred years before any Hellenes came to Sicily; -indeed they still hold the centre and north of the island. There were -also Phoenicians living all round Sicily, who had occupied promontories -upon the sea coasts and the islets adjacent for the purpose of trading -with the Sicels. But when the Hellenes began to arrive in considerable -numbers by sea, the Phoenicians abandoned most of their stations, and -drawing together took up their abode in Motye, Soloeis, and Panormus, -near the Elymi, partly because they confided in their alliance, and also -because these are the nearest points for the voyage between Carthage and -Sicily. - -These were the barbarians in Sicily, settled as I have said. Of the -Hellenes, the first to arrive were Chalcidians from Euboea with -Thucles, their founder. They founded Naxos and built the altar to -Apollo Archegetes, which now stands outside the town, and upon which the -deputies for the games sacrifice before sailing from Sicily. Syracuse -was founded the year afterwards by Archias, one of the Heraclids from -Corinth, who began by driving out the Sicels from the island upon which -the inner city now stands, though it is no longer surrounded by water: -in process of time the outer town also was taken within the walls and -became populous. Meanwhile Thucles and the Chalcidians set out from -Naxos in the fifth year after the foundation of Syracuse, and drove -out the Sicels by arms and founded Leontini and afterwards Catana; the -Catanians themselves choosing Evarchus as their founder. - -About the same time Lamis arrived in Sicily with a colony from Megara, -and after founding a place called Trotilus beyond the river Pantacyas, -and afterwards leaving it and for a short while joining the Chalcidians -at Leontini, was driven out by them and founded Thapsus. After his death -his companions were driven out of Thapsus, and founded a place called -the Hyblaean Megara; Hyblon, a Sicel king, having given up the place and -inviting them thither. Here they lived two hundred and forty-five years; -after which they were expelled from the city and the country by the -Syracusan tyrant Gelo. Before their expulsion, however, a hundred -years after they had settled there, they sent out Pamillus and founded -Selinus; he having come from their mother country Megara to join them in -its foundation. Gela was founded by Antiphemus from Rhodes and Entimus -from Crete, who joined in leading a colony thither, in the forty-fifth -year after the foundation of Syracuse. The town took its name from the -river Gelas, the place where the citadel now stands, and which was first -fortified, being called Lindii. The institutions which they adopted were -Dorian. Near one hundred and eight years after the foundation of Gela, -the Geloans founded Acragas (Agrigentum), so called from the river of -that name, and made Aristonous and Pystilus their founders; giving their -own institutions to the colony. Zancle was originally founded by -pirates from Cuma, the Chalcidian town in the country of the Opicans: -afterwards, however, large numbers came from Chalcis and the rest of -Euboea, and helped to people the place; the founders being Perieres and -Crataemenes from Cuma and Chalcis respectively. It first had the name -of Zancle given it by the Sicels, because the place is shaped like a -sickle, which the Sicels call zanclon; but upon the original settlers -being afterwards expelled by some Samians and other Ionians who landed -in Sicily flying from the Medes, and the Samians in their turn not long -afterwards by Anaxilas, tyrant of Rhegium, the town was by him colonized -with a mixed population, and its name changed to Messina, after his old -country. - -Himera was founded from Zancle by Euclides, Simus, and Sacon, most of -those who went to the colony being Chalcidians; though they were joined -by some exiles from Syracuse, defeated in a civil war, called the -Myletidae. The language was a mixture of Chalcidian and Doric, but the -institutions which prevailed were the Chalcidian. Acrae and Casmenae -were founded by the Syracusans; Acrae seventy years after Syracuse, -Casmenae nearly twenty after Acrae. Camarina was first founded by -the Syracusans, close upon a hundred and thirty-five years after the -building of Syracuse; its founders being Daxon and Menecolus. But -the Camarinaeans being expelled by arms by the Syracusans for having -revolted, Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, some time later receiving their -land in ransom for some Syracusan prisoners, resettled Camarina, himself -acting as its founder. Lastly, it was again depopulated by Gelo, and -settled once more for the third time by the Geloans. - -Such is the list of the peoples, Hellenic and barbarian, inhabiting -Sicily, and such the magnitude of the island which the Athenians were -now bent upon invading; being ambitious in real truth of conquering the -whole, although they had also the specious design of succouring their -kindred and other allies in the island. But they were especially incited -by envoys from Egesta, who had come to Athens and invoked their aid more -urgently than ever. The Egestaeans had gone to war with their neighbours -the Selinuntines upon questions of marriage and disputed territory, -and the Selinuntines had procured the alliance of the Syracusans, and -pressed Egesta hard by land and sea. The Egestaeans now reminded the -Athenians of the alliance made in the time of Laches, during the former -Leontine war, and begged them to send a fleet to their aid, and among a -number of other considerations urged as a capital argument that if -the Syracusans were allowed to go unpunished for their depopulation of -Leontini, to ruin the allies still left to Athens in Sicily, and to get -the whole power of the island into their hands, there would be a danger -of their one day coming with a large force, as Dorians, to the aid -of their Dorian brethren, and as colonists, to the aid of the -Peloponnesians who had sent them out, and joining these in pulling down -the Athenian empire. The Athenians would, therefore, do well to unite -with the allies still left to them, and to make a stand against the -Syracusans; especially as they, the Egestaeans, were prepared to furnish -money sufficient for the war. The Athenians, hearing these arguments -constantly repeated in their assemblies by the Egestaeans and their -supporters, voted first to send envoys to Egesta, to see if there was -really the money that they talked of in the treasury and temples, and -at the same time to ascertain in what posture was the war with the -Selinuntines. - -The envoys of the Athenians were accordingly dispatched to Sicily. -The same winter the Lacedaemonians and their allies, the Corinthians -excepted, marched into the Argive territory, and ravaged a small part -of the land, and took some yokes of oxen and carried off some corn. They -also settled the Argive exiles at Orneae, and left them a few soldiers -taken from the rest of the army; and after making a truce for a certain -while, according to which neither Orneatae nor Argives were to injure -each other's territory, returned home with the army. Not long afterwards -the Athenians came with thirty ships and six hundred heavy infantry, and -the Argives joining them with all their forces, marched out and besieged -the men in Orneae for one day; but the garrison escaped by night, the -besiegers having bivouacked some way off. The next day the Argives, -discovering it, razed Orneae to the ground, and went back again; after -which the Athenians went home in their ships. Meanwhile the Athenians -took by sea to Methone on the Macedonian border some cavalry of their -own and the Macedonian exiles that were at Athens, and plundered the -country of Perdiccas. Upon this the Lacedaemonians sent to the Thracian -Chalcidians, who had a truce with Athens from one ten days to another, -urging them to join Perdiccas in the war, which they refused to do. And -the winter ended, and with it ended the sixteenth year of this war of -which Thucydides is the historian. - -Early in the spring of the following summer the Athenian envoys arrived -from Sicily, and the Egestaeans with them, bringing sixty talents of -uncoined silver, as a month's pay for sixty ships, which they were to -ask to have sent them. The Athenians held an assembly and, after hearing -from the Egestaeans and their own envoys a report, as attractive as it -was untrue, upon the state of affairs generally, and in particular as to -the money, of which, it was said, there was abundance in the temples and -the treasury, voted to send sixty ships to Sicily, under the command of -Alcibiades, son of Clinias, Nicias, son of Niceratus, and Lamachus, son -of Xenophanes, who were appointed with full powers; they were to help -the Egestaeans against the Selinuntines, to restore Leontini upon -gaining any advantage in the war, and to order all other matters in -Sicily as they should deem best for the interests of Athens. Five days -after this a second assembly was held, to consider the speediest means -of equipping the ships, and to vote whatever else might be required by -the generals for the expedition; and Nicias, who had been chosen to the -command against his will, and who thought that the state was not well -advised, but upon a slight aid specious pretext was aspiring to the -conquest of the whole of Sicily, a great matter to achieve, came forward -in the hope of diverting the Athenians from the enterprise, and gave -them the following counsel: - -"Although this assembly was convened to consider the preparations to be -made for sailing to Sicily, I think, notwithstanding, that we have still -this question to examine, whether it be better to send out the ships at -all, and that we ought not to give so little consideration to a matter -of such moment, or let ourselves be persuaded by foreigners into -undertaking a war with which we have nothing to do. And yet, -individually, I gain in honour by such a course, and fear as little as -other men for my person--not that I think a man need be any the worse -citizen for taking some thought for his person and estate; on the -contrary, such a man would for his own sake desire the prosperity of his -country more than others--nevertheless, as I have never spoken against -my convictions to gain honour, I shall not begin to do so now, but shall -say what I think best. Against your character any words of mine would be -weak enough, if I were to advise your keeping what you have got and -not risking what is actually yours for advantages which are dubious -in themselves, and which you may or may not attain. I will, therefore, -content myself with showing that your ardour is out of season, and your -ambition not easy of accomplishment. - -"I affirm, then, that you leave many enemies behind you here to go -yonder and bring more back with you. You imagine, perhaps, that the -treaty which you have made can be trusted; a treaty that will continue -to exist nominally, as long as you keep quiet--for nominal it has -become, owing to the practices of certain men here and at Sparta--but -which in the event of a serious reverse in any quarter would not delay -our enemies a moment in attacking us; first, because the convention was -forced upon them by disaster and was less honourable to them than to us; -and secondly, because in this very convention there are many points that -are still disputed. Again, some of the most powerful states have never -yet accepted the arrangement at all. Some of these are at open war with -us; others (as the Lacedaemonians do not yet move) are restrained by -truces renewed every ten days, and it is only too probable that if they -found our power divided, as we are hurrying to divide it, they would -attack us vigorously with the Siceliots, whose alliance they would -have in the past valued as they would that of few others. A man ought, -therefore, to consider these points, and not to think of running risks -with a country placed so critically, or of grasping at another empire -before we have secured the one we have already; for in fact the Thracian -Chalcidians have been all these years in revolt from us without being -yet subdued, and others on the continents yield us but a doubtful -obedience. Meanwhile the Egestaeans, our allies, have been wronged, and -we run to help them, while the rebels who have so long wronged us still -wait for punishment. - -"And yet the latter, if brought under, might be kept under; while the -Sicilians, even if conquered, are too far off and too numerous to be -ruled without difficulty. Now it is folly to go against men who could -not be kept under even if conquered, while failure would leave us in -a very different position from that which we occupied before the -enterprise. The Siceliots, again, to take them as they are at present, -in the event of a Syracusan conquest (the favourite bugbear of the -Egestaeans), would to my thinking be even less dangerous to us than -before. At present they might possibly come here as separate states for -love of Lacedaemon; in the other case one empire would scarcely attack -another; for after joining the Peloponnesians to overthrow ours, they -could only expect to see the same hands overthrow their own in the same -way. The Hellenes in Sicily would fear us most if we never went there at -all, and next to this, if after displaying our power we went away again -as soon as possible. We all know that that which is farthest off, -and the reputation of which can least be tested, is the object of -admiration; at the least reverse they would at once begin to look down -upon us, and would join our enemies here against us. You have yourselves -experienced this with regard to the Lacedaemonians and their allies, -whom your unexpected success, as compared with what you feared at first, -has made you suddenly despise, tempting you further to aspire to -the conquest of Sicily. Instead, however, of being puffed up by the -misfortunes of your adversaries, you ought to think of breaking their -spirit before giving yourselves up to confidence, and to understand that -the one thought awakened in the Lacedaemonians by their disgrace is how -they may even now, if possible, overthrow us and repair their dishonour; -inasmuch as military reputation is their oldest and chiefest study. -Our struggle, therefore, if we are wise, will not be for the barbarian -Egestaeans in Sicily, but how to defend ourselves most effectually -against the oligarchical machinations of Lacedaemon. - -"We should also remember that we are but now enjoying some respite from -a great pestilence and from war, to the no small benefit of our estates -and persons, and that it is right to employ these at home on our own -behalf, instead of using them on behalf of these exiles whose interest -it is to lie as fairly as they can, who do nothing but talk themselves -and leave the danger to others, and who if they succeed will show no -proper gratitude, and if they fail will drag down their friends with -them. And if there be any man here, overjoyed at being chosen to -command, who urges you to make the expedition, merely for ends of his -own--specially if he be still too young to command--who seeks to be -admired for his stud of horses, but on account of its heavy expenses -hopes for some profit from his appointment, do not allow such a one to -maintain his private splendour at his country's risk, but remember that -such persons injure the public fortune while they squander their own, -and that this is a matter of importance, and not for a young man to -decide or hastily to take in hand. - -"When I see such persons now sitting here at the side of that same -individual and summoned by him, alarm seizes me; and I, in my turn, -summon any of the older men that may have such a person sitting next him -not to let himself be shamed down, for fear of being thought a coward -if he do not vote for war, but, remembering how rarely success is got -by wishing and how often by forecast, to leave to them the mad dream -of conquest, and as a true lover of his country, now threatened by the -greatest danger in its history, to hold up his hand on the other side; -to vote that the Siceliots be left in the limits now existing between -us, limits of which no one can complain (the Ionian sea for the coasting -voyage, and the Sicilian across the open main), to enjoy their own -possessions and to settle their own quarrels; that the Egestaeans, for -their part, be told to end by themselves with the Selinuntines the war -which they began without consulting the Athenians; and that for the -future we do not enter into alliance, as we have been used to do, with -people whom we must help in their need, and who can never help us in -ours. - -"And you, Prytanis, if you think it your duty to care for the -commonwealth, and if you wish to show yourself a good citizen, put -the question to the vote, and take a second time the opinions of the -Athenians. If you are afraid to move the question again, consider that -a violation of the law cannot carry any prejudice with so many abettors, -that you will be the physician of your misguided city, and that the -virtue of men in office is briefly this, to do their country as much -good as they can, or in any case no harm that they can avoid." - -Such were the words of Nicias. Most of the Athenians that came forward -spoke in favour of the expedition, and of not annulling what had -been voted, although some spoke on the other side. By far the warmest -advocate of the expedition was, however, Alcibiades, son of Clinias, who -wished to thwart Nicias both as his political opponent and also because -of the attack he had made upon him in his speech, and who was, besides, -exceedingly ambitious of a command by which he hoped to reduce Sicily -and Carthage, and personally to gain in wealth and reputation by means -of his successes. For the position he held among the citizens led him -to indulge his tastes beyond what his real means would bear, both in -keeping horses and in the rest of his expenditure; and this later on had -not a little to do with the ruin of the Athenian state. Alarmed at the -greatness of his licence in his own life and habits, and of the ambition -which he showed in all things soever that he undertook, the mass of -the people set him down as a pretender to the tyranny, and became his -enemies; and although publicly his conduct of the war was as good as -could be desired, individually, his habits gave offence to every one, -and caused them to commit affairs to other hands, and thus before long -to ruin the city. Meanwhile he now came forward and gave the following -advice to the Athenians: - -"Athenians, I have a better right to command than others--I must begin -with this as Nicias has attacked me--and at the same time I believe -myself to be worthy of it. The things for which I am abused, bring fame -to my ancestors and to myself, and to the country profit besides. The -Hellenes, after expecting to see our city ruined by the war, concluded -it to be even greater than it really is, by reason of the magnificence -with which I represented it at the Olympic games, when I sent into -the lists seven chariots, a number never before entered by any private -person, and won the first prize, and was second and fourth, and took -care to have everything else in a style worthy of my victory. Custom -regards such displays as honourable, and they cannot be made without -leaving behind them an impression of power. Again, any splendour that -I may have exhibited at home in providing choruses or otherwise, is -naturally envied by my fellow citizens, but in the eyes of foreigners -has an air of strength as in the other instance. And this is no useless -folly, when a man at his own private cost benefits not himself only, but -his city: nor is it unfair that he who prides himself on his position -should refuse to be upon an equality with the rest. He who is badly off -has his misfortunes all to himself, and as we do not see men courted in -adversity, on the like principle a man ought to accept the insolence of -prosperity; or else, let him first mete out equal measure to all, and -then demand to have it meted out to him. What I know is that persons of -this kind and all others that have attained to any distinction, although -they may be unpopular in their lifetime in their relations with their -fellow-men and especially with their equals, leave to posterity the -desire of claiming connection with them even without any ground, and -are vaunted by the country to which they belonged, not as strangers or -ill-doers, but as fellow-countrymen and heroes. Such are my aspirations, -and however I am abused for them in private, the question is whether -any one manages public affairs better than I do. Having united the most -powerful states of Peloponnese, without great danger or expense to you, -I compelled the Lacedaemonians to stake their all upon the issue of a -single day at Mantinea; and although victorious in the battle, they have -never since fully recovered confidence. - -"Thus did my youth and so-called monstrous folly find fitting arguments -to deal with the power of the Peloponnesians, and by its ardour win -their confidence and prevail. And do not be afraid of my youth now, -but while I am still in its flower, and Nicias appears fortunate, avail -yourselves to the utmost of the services of us both. Neither rescind -your resolution to sail to Sicily, on the ground that you would be going -to attack a great power. The cities in Sicily are peopled by motley -rabbles, and easily change their institutions and adopt new ones in -their stead; and consequently the inhabitants, being without any feeling -of patriotism, are not provided with arms for their persons, and have -not regularly established themselves on the land; every man thinks that -either by fair words or by party strife he can obtain something at the -public expense, and then in the event of a catastrophe settle in some -other country, and makes his preparations accordingly. From a mob like -this you need not look for either unanimity in counsel or concert in -action; but they will probably one by one come in as they get a fair -offer, especially if they are torn by civil strife as we are told. -Moreover, the Siceliots have not so many heavy infantry as they boast; -just as the Hellenes generally did not prove so numerous as each state -reckoned itself, but Hellas greatly over-estimated their numbers, and -has hardly had an adequate force of heavy infantry throughout this war. -The states in Sicily, therefore, from all that I can hear, will be found -as I say, and I have not pointed out all our advantages, for we -shall have the help of many barbarians, who from their hatred of the -Syracusans will join us in attacking them; nor will the powers at home -prove any hindrance, if you judge rightly. Our fathers with these very -adversaries, which it is said we shall now leave behind us when we -sail, and the Mede as their enemy as well, were able to win the empire, -depending solely on their superiority at sea. The Peloponnesians had -never so little hope against us as at present; and let them be ever so -sanguine, although strong enough to invade our country even if we stay -at home, they can never hurt us with their navy, as we leave one of our -own behind us that is a match for them. - -"In this state of things what reason can we give to ourselves for -holding back, or what excuse can we offer to our allies in Sicily for -not helping them? They are our confederates, and we are bound to assist -them, without objecting that they have not assisted us. We did not take -them into alliance to have them to help us in Hellas, but that they -might so annoy our enemies in Sicily as to prevent them from coming over -here and attacking us. It is thus that empire has been won, both by us -and by all others that have held it, by a constant readiness to support -all, whether barbarians or Hellenes, that invite assistance; since if -all were to keep quiet or to pick and choose whom they ought to assist, -we should make but few new conquests, and should imperil those we have -already won. Men do not rest content with parrying the attacks of a -superior, but often strike the first blow to prevent the attack being -made. And we cannot fix the exact point at which our empire shall -stop; we have reached a position in which we must not be content with -retaining but must scheme to extend it, for, if we cease to rule others, -we are in danger of being ruled ourselves. Nor can you look at inaction -from the same point of view as others, unless you are prepared to change -your habits and make them like theirs. - -"Be convinced, then, that we shall augment our power at home by this -adventure abroad, and let us make the expedition, and so humble the -pride of the Peloponnesians by sailing off to Sicily, and letting them -see how little we care for the peace that we are now enjoying; and at -the same time we shall either become masters, as we very easily may, of -the whole of Hellas through the accession of the Sicilian Hellenes, or -in any case ruin the Syracusans, to the no small advantage of ourselves -and our allies. The faculty of staying if successful, or of returning, -will be secured to us by our navy, as we shall be superior at sea to all -the Siceliots put together. And do not let the do-nothing policy which -Nicias advocates, or his setting of the young against the old, turn you -from your purpose, but in the good old fashion by which our fathers, -old and young together, by their united counsels brought our affairs -to their present height, do you endeavour still to advance them; -understanding that neither youth nor old age can do anything the one -without the other, but that levity, sobriety, and deliberate judgment -are strongest when united, and that, by sinking into inaction, the city, -like everything else, will wear itself out, and its skill in everything -decay; while each fresh struggle will give it fresh experience, and -make it more used to defend itself not in word but in deed. In short, -my conviction is that a city not inactive by nature could not choose a -quicker way to ruin itself than by suddenly adopting such a policy, and -that the safest rule of life is to take one's character and institutions -for better and for worse, and to live up to them as closely as one can." - -Such were the words of Alcibiades. After hearing him and the Egestaeans -and some Leontine exiles, who came forward reminding them of their oaths -and imploring their assistance, the Athenians became more eager for the -expedition than before. Nicias, perceiving that it would be now useless -to try to deter them by the old line of argument, but thinking that -he might perhaps alter their resolution by the extravagance of his -estimates, came forward a second time and spoke as follows: - -"I see, Athenians, that you are thoroughly bent upon the expedition, and -therefore hope that all will turn out as we wish, and proceed to give -you my opinion at the present juncture. From all that I hear we are -going against cities that are great and not subject to one another, or -in need of change, so as to be glad to pass from enforced servitude -to an easier condition, or in the least likely to accept our rule in -exchange for freedom; and, to take only the Hellenic towns, they are -very numerous for one island. Besides Naxos and Catana, which I expect -to join us from their connection with Leontini, there are seven others -armed at all points just like our own power, particularly Selinus and -Syracuse, the chief objects of our expedition. These are full of heavy -infantry, archers, and darters, have galleys in abundance and crowds to -man them; they have also money, partly in the hands of private persons, -partly in the temples at Selinus, and at Syracuse first-fruits from some -of the barbarians as well. But their chief advantage over us lies in -the number of their horses, and in the fact that they grow their corn at -home instead of importing it. - -"Against a power of this kind it will not do to have merely a weak naval -armament, but we shall want also a large land army to sail with us, if -we are to do anything worthy of our ambition, and are not to be shut out -from the country by a numerous cavalry; especially if the cities should -take alarm and combine, and we should be left without friends (except -the Egestaeans) to furnish us with horse to defend ourselves with. It -would be disgraceful to have to retire under compulsion, or to send -back for reinforcements, owing to want of reflection at first: we must -therefore start from home with a competent force, seeing that we are -going to sail far from our country, and upon an expedition not like any -which you may undertaken undertaken the quality of allies, among your -subject states here in Hellas, where any additional supplies needed were -easily drawn from the friendly territory; but we are cutting ourselves -off, and going to a land entirely strange, from which during four months -in winter it is not even easy for a messenger get to Athens. - -"I think, therefore, that we ought to take great numbers of heavy -infantry, both from Athens and from our allies, and not merely from our -subjects, but also any we may be able to get for love or for money in -Peloponnese, and great numbers also of archers and slingers, to make -head against the Sicilian horse. Meanwhile we must have an overwhelming -superiority at sea, to enable us the more easily to carry in what we -want; and we must take our own corn in merchant vessels, that is to say, -wheat and parched barley, and bakers from the mills compelled to serve -for pay in the proper proportion; in order that in case of our being -weather-bound the armament may not want provisions, as it is not every -city that will be able to entertain numbers like ours. We must also -provide ourselves with everything else as far as we can, so as not to be -dependent upon others; and above all we must take with us from home as -much money as possible, as the sums talked of as ready at Egesta are -readier, you may be sure, in talk than in any other way. - -"Indeed, even if we leave Athens with a force not only equal to that of -the enemy except in the number of heavy infantry in the field, but -even at all points superior to him, we shall still find it difficult to -conquer Sicily or save ourselves. We must not disguise from ourselves -that we go to found a city among strangers and enemies, and that he who -undertakes such an enterprise should be prepared to become master of the -country the first day he lands, or failing in this to find everything -hostile to him. Fearing this, and knowing that we shall have need of -much good counsel and more good fortune--a hard matter for mortal man to -aspire to--I wish as far as may be to make myself independent of fortune -before sailing, and when I do sail, to be as safe as a strong force -can make me. This I believe to be surest for the country at large, -and safest for us who are to go on the expedition. If any one thinks -differently I resign to him my command." - -With this Nicias concluded, thinking that he should either disgust the -Athenians by the magnitude of the undertaking, or, if obliged to sail -on the expedition, would thus do so in the safest way possible. The -Athenians, however, far from having their taste for the voyage taken -away by the burdensomeness of the preparations, became more eager for it -than ever; and just the contrary took place of what Nicias had thought, -as it was held that he had given good advice, and that the expedition -would be the safest in the world. All alike fell in love with the -enterprise. The older men thought that they would either subdue the -places against which they were to sail, or at all events, with so -large a force, meet with no disaster; those in the prime of life felt -a longing for foreign sights and spectacles, and had no doubt that they -should come safe home again; while the idea of the common people and the -soldiery was to earn wages at the moment, and make conquests that would -supply a never-ending fund of pay for the future. With this enthusiasm -of the majority, the few that liked it not, feared to appear unpatriotic -by holding up their hands against it, and so kept quiet. - -At last one of the Athenians came forward and called upon Nicias and -told him that he ought not to make excuses or put them off, but say at -once before them all what forces the Athenians should vote him. Upon -this he said, not without reluctance, that he would advise upon that -matter more at leisure with his colleagues; as far however as he could -see at present, they must sail with at least one hundred galleys--the -Athenians providing as many transports as they might determine, and -sending for others from the allies--not less than five thousand heavy -infantry in all, Athenian and allied, and if possible more; and the rest -of the armament in proportion; archers from home and from Crete, and -slingers, and whatever else might seem desirable, being got ready by the -generals and taken with them. - -Upon hearing this the Athenians at once voted that the generals should -have full powers in the matter of the numbers of the army and of the -expedition generally, to do as they judged best for the interests of -Athens. After this the preparations began; messages being sent to -the allies and the rolls drawn up at home. And as the city had just -recovered from the plague and the long war, and a number of young -men had grown up and capital had accumulated by reason of the truce, -everything was the more easily provided. - -In the midst of these preparations all the stone Hermae in the city of -Athens, that is to say the customary square figures, so common in the -doorways of private houses and temples, had in one night most of them -their fares mutilated. No one knew who had done it, but large public -rewards were offered to find the authors; and it was further voted -that any one who knew of any other act of impiety having been committed -should come and give information without fear of consequences, whether -he were citizen, alien, or slave. The matter was taken up the more -seriously, as it was thought to be ominous for the expedition, and part -of a conspiracy to bring about a revolution and to upset the democracy. - -Information was given accordingly by some resident aliens and body -servants, not about the Hermae but about some previous mutilations of -other images perpetrated by young men in a drunken frolic, and of mock -celebrations of the mysteries, averred to take place in private houses. -Alcibiades being implicated in this charge, it was taken hold of by -those who could least endure him, because he stood in the way of their -obtaining the undisturbed direction of the people, and who thought -that if he were once removed the first place would be theirs. These -accordingly magnified the matter and loudly proclaimed that the affair -of the mysteries and the mutilation of the Hermae were part and parcel -of a scheme to overthrow the democracy, and that nothing of all this had -been done without Alcibiades; the proofs alleged being the general and -undemocratic licence of his life and habits. - -Alcibiades repelled on the spot the charges in question, and also before -going on the expedition, the preparations for which were now complete, -offered to stand his trial, that it might be seen whether he was guilty -of the acts imputed to him; desiring to be punished if found guilty, -but, if acquitted, to take the command. Meanwhile he protested against -their receiving slanders against him in his absence, and begged them -rather to put him to death at once if he were guilty, and pointed out -the imprudence of sending him out at the head of so large an army, with -so serious a charge still undecided. But his enemies feared that he -would have the army for him if he were tried immediately, and that the -people might relent in favour of the man whom they already caressed -as the cause of the Argives and some of the Mantineans joining in the -expedition, and did their utmost to get this proposition rejected, -putting forward other orators who said that he ought at present to sail -and not delay the departure of the army, and be tried on his return -within a fixed number of days; their plan being to have him sent for -and brought home for trial upon some graver charge, which they would the -more easily get up in his absence. Accordingly it was decreed that he -should sail. - -After this the departure for Sicily took place, it being now about -midsummer. Most of the allies, with the corn transports and the smaller -craft and the rest of the expedition, had already received orders to -muster at Corcyra, to cross the Ionian Sea from thence in a body to the -Iapygian promontory. But the Athenians themselves, and such of their -allies as happened to be with them, went down to Piraeus upon a day -appointed at daybreak, and began to man the ships for putting out to -sea. With them also went down the whole population, one may say, of the -city, both citizens and foreigners; the inhabitants of the country each -escorting those that belonged to them, their friends, their relatives, -or their sons, with hope and lamentation upon their way, as they thought -of the conquests which they hoped to make, or of the friends whom they -might never see again, considering the long voyage which they were going -to make from their country. Indeed, at this moment, when they were now -upon the point of parting from one another, the danger came more home to -them than when they voted for the expedition; although the strength of -the armament, and the profuse provision which they remarked in every -department, was a sight that could not but comfort them. As for the -foreigners and the rest of the crowd, they simply went to see a sight -worth looking at and passing all belief. - -Indeed this armament that first sailed out was by far the most costly -and splendid Hellenic force that had ever been sent out by a single city -up to that time. In mere number of ships and heavy infantry that against -Epidaurus under Pericles, and the same when going against Potidaea under -Hagnon, was not inferior; containing as it did four thousand Athenian -heavy infantry, three hundred horse, and one hundred galleys accompanied -by fifty Lesbian and Chian vessels and many allies besides. But these -were sent upon a short voyage and with a scanty equipment. The present -expedition was formed in contemplation of a long term of service by land -and sea alike, and was furnished with ships and troops so as to be ready -for either as required. The fleet had been elaborately equipped at great -cost to the captains and the state; the treasury giving a drachma a day -to each seaman, and providing empty ships, sixty men-of-war and forty -transports, and manning these with the best crews obtainable; while the -captains gave a bounty in addition to the pay from the treasury to -the thranitae and crews generally, besides spending lavishly upon -figure-heads and equipments, and one and all making the utmost exertions -to enable their own ships to excel in beauty and fast sailing. Meanwhile -the land forces had been picked from the best muster-rolls, and vied -with each other in paying great attention to their arms and personal -accoutrements. From this resulted not only a rivalry among themselves in -their different departments, but an idea among the rest of the Hellenes -that it was more a display of power and resources than an armament -against an enemy. For if any one had counted up the public expenditure -of the state, and the private outlay of individuals--that is to say, -the sums which the state had already spent upon the expedition and was -sending out in the hands of the generals, and those which individuals -had expended upon their personal outfit, or as captains of galleys had -laid out and were still to lay out upon their vessels; and if he had -added to this the journey money which each was likely to have provided -himself with, independently of the pay from the treasury, for a voyage -of such length, and what the soldiers or traders took with them for the -purpose of exchange--it would have been found that many talents in all -were being taken out of the city. Indeed the expedition became not -less famous for its wonderful boldness and for the splendour of its -appearance, than for its overwhelming strength as compared with the -peoples against whom it was directed, and for the fact that this was the -longest passage from home hitherto attempted, and the most ambitious in -its objects considering the resources of those who undertook it. - -The ships being now manned, and everything put on board with which they -meant to sail, the trumpet commanded silence, and the prayers customary -before putting out to sea were offered, not in each ship by itself, but -by all together to the voice of a herald; and bowls of wine were mixed -through all the armament, and libations made by the soldiers and their -officers in gold and silver goblets. In their prayers joined also the -crowds on shore, the citizens and all others that wished them well. The -hymn sung and the libations finished, they put out to sea, and first -out in column then raced each other as far as Aegina, and so hastened to -reach Corcyra, where the rest of the allied forces were also assembling. - - - - -CHAPTER XIX - -_Seventeenth Year of the War--Parties at Syracuse--Story of Harmodius -and Aristogiton--Disgrace of Alcibiades_ - -Meanwhile at Syracuse news came in from many quarters of the expedition, -but for a long while met with no credence whatever. Indeed, an assembly -was held in which speeches, as will be seen, were delivered by -different orators, believing or contradicting the report of the Athenian -expedition; among whom Hermocrates, son of Hermon, came forward, being -persuaded that he knew the truth of the matter, and gave the following -counsel: - -"Although I shall perhaps be no better believed than others have been -when I speak upon the reality of the expedition, and although I know -that those who either make or repeat statements thought not worthy of -belief not only gain no converts but are thought fools for their pains, -I shall certainly not be frightened into holding my tongue when the -state is in danger, and when I am persuaded that I can speak with more -authority on the matter than other persons. Much as you wonder at it, -the Athenians nevertheless have set out against us with a large force, -naval and military, professedly to help the Egestaeans and to restore -Leontini, but really to conquer Sicily, and above all our city, which -once gained, the rest, they think, will easily follow. Make up your -minds, therefore, to see them speedily here, and see how you can best -repel them with the means under your hand, and do be taken off your -guard through despising the news, or neglect the common weal through -disbelieving it. Meanwhile those who believe me need not be dismayed at -the force or daring of the enemy. They will not be able to do us more -hurt than we shall do them; nor is the greatness of their armament -altogether without advantage to us. Indeed, the greater it is the -better, with regard to the rest of the Siceliots, whom dismay will make -more ready to join us; and if we defeat or drive them away, disappointed -of the objects of their ambition (for I do not fear for a moment that -they will get what they want), it will be a most glorious exploit for -us, and in my judgment by no means an unlikely one. Few indeed have been -the large armaments, either Hellenic or barbarian, that have gone far -from home and been successful. They cannot be more numerous than the -people of the country and their neighbours, all of whom fear leagues -together; and if they miscarry for want of supplies in a foreign land, -to those against whom their plans were laid none the less they leave -renown, although they may themselves have been the main cause of their -own discomfort. Thus these very Athenians rose by the defeat of the -Mede, in a great measure due to accidental causes, from the mere fact -that Athens had been the object of his attack; and this may very well be -the case with us also. - -"Let us, therefore, confidently begin preparations here; let us send and -confirm some of the Sicels, and obtain the friendship and alliance -of others, and dispatch envoys to the rest of Sicily to show that the -danger is common to all, and to Italy to get them to become our allies, -or at all events to refuse to receive the Athenians. I also think that -it would be best to send to Carthage as well; they are by no means there -without apprehension, but it is their constant fear that the Athenians -may one day attack their city, and they may perhaps think that they -might themselves suffer by letting Sicily be sacrificed, and be willing -to help us secretly if not openly, in one way if not in another. They -are the best able to do so, if they will, of any of the present day, as -they possess most gold and silver, by which war, like everything else, -flourishes. Let us also send to Lacedaemon and Corinth, and ask them to -come here and help us as soon as possible, and to keep alive the war in -Hellas. But the true thing of all others, in my opinion, to do at the -present moment, is what you, with your constitutional love of quiet, -will be slow to see, and what I must nevertheless mention. If we -Siceliots, all together, or at least as many as possible besides -ourselves, would only launch the whole of our actual navy with two -months' provisions, and meet the Athenians at Tarentum and the Iapygian -promontory, and show them that before fighting for Sicily they must -first fight for their passage across the Ionian Sea, we should strike -dismay into their army, and set them on thinking that we have a base for -our defensive--for Tarentum is ready to receive us--while they have a -wide sea to cross with all their armament, which could with difficulty -keep its order through so long a voyage, and would be easy for us to -attack as it came on slowly and in small detachments. On the other hand, -if they were to lighten their vessels, and draw together their fast -sailers and with these attack us, we could either fall upon them when -they were wearied with rowing, or if we did not choose to do so, we -could retire to Tarentum; while they, having crossed with few provisions -just to give battle, would be hard put to it in desolate places, and -would either have to remain and be blockaded, or to try to sail along -the coast, abandoning the rest of their armament, and being further -discouraged by not knowing for certain whether the cities would receive -them. In my opinion this consideration alone would be sufficient to -deter them from putting out from Corcyra; and what with deliberating and -reconnoitring our numbers and whereabouts, they would let the season -go on until winter was upon them, or, confounded by so unexpected a -circumstance, would break up the expedition, especially as their most -experienced general has, as I hear, taken the command against his will, -and would grasp at the first excuse offered by any serious demonstration -of ours. We should also be reported, I am certain, as more numerous -than we really are, and men's minds are affected by what they hear, -and besides the first to attack, or to show that they mean to defend -themselves against an attack, inspire greater fear because men see that -they are ready for the emergency. This would just be the case with the -Athenians at present. They are now attacking us in the belief that we -shall not resist, having a right to judge us severely because we did -not help the Lacedaemonians in crushing them; but if they were to see -us showing a courage for which they are not prepared, they would be more -dismayed by the surprise than they could ever be by our actual power. I -could wish to persuade you to show this courage; but if this cannot be, -at all events lose not a moment in preparing generally for the war; -and remember all of you that contempt for an assailant is best shown by -bravery in action, but that for the present the best course is to accept -the preparations which fear inspires as giving the surest promise of -safety, and to act as if the danger was real. That the Athenians are -coming to attack us, and are already upon the voyage, and all but -here--this is what I am sure of." - -Thus far spoke Hermocrates. Meanwhile the people of Syracuse were at -great strife among themselves; some contending that the Athenians had no -idea of coming and that there was no truth in what he said; some asking -if they did come what harm they could do that would not be repaid them -tenfold in return; while others made light of the whole affair and -turned it into ridicule. In short, there were few that believed -Hermocrates and feared for the future. Meanwhile Athenagoras, the leader -of the people and very powerful at that time with the masses, came -forward and spoke as follows: - -"For the Athenians, he who does not wish that they may be as misguided -as they are supposed to be, and that they may come here to become our -subjects, is either a coward or a traitor to his country; while as for -those who carry such tidings and fill you with so much alarm, I wonder -less at their audacity than at their folly if they flatter themselves -that we do not see through them. The fact is that they have their -private reasons to be afraid, and wish to throw the city into -consternation to have their own terrors cast into the shade by the -public alarm. In short, this is what these reports are worth; they do -not arise of themselves, but are concocted by men who are always causing -agitation here in Sicily. However, if you are well advised, you will -not be guided in your calculation of probabilities by what these persons -tell you, but by what shrewd men and of large experience, as I esteem -the Athenians to be, would be likely to do. Now it is not likely that -they would leave the Peloponnesians behind them, and before they have -well ended the war in Hellas wantonly come in quest of a new war quite -as arduous in Sicily; indeed, in my judgment, they are only too glad -that we do not go and attack them, being so many and so great cities as -we are. - -"However, if they should come as is reported, I consider Sicily better -able to go through with the war than Peloponnese, as being at all points -better prepared, and our city by itself far more than a match for this -pretended army of invasion, even were it twice as large again. I know -that they will not have horses with them, or get any here, except a -few perhaps from the Egestaeans; or be able to bring a force of heavy -infantry equal in number to our own, in ships which will already have -enough to do to come all this distance, however lightly laden, not to -speak of the transport of the other stores required against a city of -this magnitude, which will be no slight quantity. In fact, so strong is -my opinion upon the subject, that I do not well see how they could -avoid annihilation if they brought with them another city as large as -Syracuse, and settled down and carried on war from our frontier; much -less can they hope to succeed with all Sicily hostile to them, as -all Sicily will be, and with only a camp pitched from the ships, and -composed of tents and bare necessaries, from which they would not be -able to stir far for fear of our cavalry. - -"But the Athenians see this as I tell you, and as I have reason to know -are looking after their possessions at home, while persons here invent -stories that neither are true nor ever will be. Nor is this the first -time that I see these persons, when they cannot resort to deeds, trying -by such stories and by others even more abominable to frighten your -people and get into their hands the government: it is what I see always. -And I cannot help fearing that trying so often they may one day succeed, -and that we, as long as we do not feel the smart, may prove too weak for -the task of prevention, or, when the offenders are known, of pursuit. -The result is that our city is rarely at rest, but is subject to -constant troubles and to contests as frequent against herself as against -the enemy, not to speak of occasional tyrannies and infamous cabals. -However, I will try, if you will support me, to let nothing of this -happen in our time, by gaining you, the many, and by chastising the -authors of such machinations, not merely when they are caught in the -act--a difficult feat to accomplish--but also for what they have the -wish though not the power to do; as it is necessary to punish an enemy -not only for what he does, but also beforehand for what he intends to -do, if the first to relax precaution would not be also the first to -suffer. I shall also reprove, watch, and on occasion warn the few--the -most effectual way, in my opinion, of turning them from their evil -courses. And after all, as I have often asked, what would you have, -young men? Would you hold office at once? The law forbids it, a law -enacted rather because you are not competent than to disgrace you when -competent. Meanwhile you would not be on a legal equality with the many! -But how can it be right that citizens of the same state should be held -unworthy of the same privileges? - -"It will be said, perhaps, that democracy is neither wise nor equitable, -but that the holders of property are also the best fitted to rule. I -say, on the contrary, first, that the word demos, or people, includes -the whole state, oligarchy only a part; next, that if the best guardians -of property are the rich, and the best counsellors the wise, none -can hear and decide so well as the many; and that all these talents, -severally and collectively, have their just place in a democracy. But an -oligarchy gives the many their share of the danger, and not content with -the largest part takes and keeps the whole of the profit; and this is -what the powerful and young among you aspire to, but in a great city -cannot possibly obtain. - -"But even now, foolish men, most senseless of all the Hellenes that I -know, if you have no sense of the wickedness of your designs, or most -criminal if you have that sense and still dare to pursue them--even now, -if it is not a case for repentance, you may still learn wisdom, and -thus advance the interest of the country, the common interest of us all. -Reflect that in the country's prosperity the men of merit in your ranks -will have a share and a larger share than the great mass of your fellow -countrymen, but that if you have other designs you run a risk of being -deprived of all; and desist from reports like these, as the people know -your object and will not put up with it. If the Athenians arrive, this -city will repulse them in a manner worthy of itself; we have moreover, -generals who will see to this matter. And if nothing of this be true, as -I incline to believe, the city will not be thrown into a panic by your -intelligence, or impose upon itself a self-chosen servitude by choosing -you for its rulers; the city itself will look into the matter, and will -judge your words as if they were acts, and, instead of allowing itself -to be deprived of its liberty by listening to you, will strive to -preserve that liberty, by taking care to have always at hand the means -of making itself respected." - -Such were the words of Athenagoras. One of the generals now stood up and -stopped any other speakers coming forward, adding these words of his own -with reference to the matter in hand: "It is not well for speakers to -utter calumnies against one another, or for their hearers to entertain -them; we ought rather to look to the intelligence that we have received, -and see how each man by himself and the city as a whole may best prepare -to repel the invaders. Even if there be no need, there is no harm in -the state being furnished with horses and arms and all other insignia of -war; and we will undertake to see to and order this, and to send round -to the cities to reconnoitre and do all else that may appear desirable. -Part of this we have seen to already, and whatever we discover shall -be laid before you." After these words from the general, the Syracusans -departed from the assembly. - -In the meantime the Athenians with all their allies had now arrived at -Corcyra. Here the generals began by again reviewing the armament, and -made arrangements as to the order in which they were to anchor and -encamp, and dividing the whole fleet into three divisions, allotted one -to each of their number, to avoid sailing all together and being thus -embarrassed for water, harbourage, or provisions at the stations which -they might touch at, and at the same time to be generally better ordered -and easier to handle, by each squadron having its own commander. Next -they sent on three ships to Italy and Sicily to find out which of the -cities would receive them, with instructions to meet them on the way and -let them know before they put in to land. - -After this the Athenians weighed from Corcyra, and proceeded to cross -to Sicily with an armament now consisting of one hundred and thirty-four -galleys in all (besides two Rhodian fifty-oars), of which one hundred -were Athenian vessels--sixty men-of-war, and forty troopships--and the -remainder from Chios and the other allies; five thousand and one hundred -heavy infantry in all, that is to say, fifteen hundred Athenian citizens -from the rolls at Athens and seven hundred Thetes shipped as marines, -and the rest allied troops, some of them Athenian subjects, and besides -these five hundred Argives, and two hundred and fifty Mantineans serving -for hire; four hundred and eighty archers in all, eighty of whom were -Cretans, seven hundred slingers from Rhodes, one hundred and twenty -light-armed exiles from Megara, and one horse-transport carrying thirty -horses. - -Such was the strength of the first armament that sailed over for the -war. The supplies for this force were carried by thirty ships of -burden laden with corn, which conveyed the bakers, stone-masons, and -carpenters, and the tools for raising fortifications, accompanied by one -hundred boats, like the former pressed into the service, besides many -other boats and ships of burden which followed the armament voluntarily -for purposes of trade; all of which now left Corcyra and struck across -the Ionian Sea together. The whole force making land at the Iapygian -promontory and Tarentum, with more or less good fortune, coasted along -the shores of Italy, the cities shutting their markets and gates against -them, and according them nothing but water and liberty to anchor, and -Tarentum and Locri not even that, until they arrived at Rhegium, the -extreme point of Italy. Here at length they reunited, and not gaining -admission within the walls pitched a camp outside the city in the -precinct of Artemis, where a market was also provided for them, and drew -their ships on shore and kept quiet. Meanwhile they opened negotiations -with the Rhegians, and called upon them as Chalcidians to assist their -Leontine kinsmen; to which the Rhegians replied that they would not -side with either party, but should await the decision of the rest of -the Italiots, and do as they did. Upon this the Athenians now began to -consider what would be the best action to take in the affairs of Sicily, -and meanwhile waited for the ships sent on to come back from Egesta, in -order to know whether there was really there the money mentioned by the -messengers at Athens. - -In the meantime came in from all quarters to the Syracusans, as well as -from their own officers sent to reconnoitre, the positive tidings that -the fleet was at Rhegium; upon which they laid aside their incredulity -and threw themselves heart and soul into the work of preparation. -Guards or envoys, as the case might be, were sent round to the Sicels, -garrisons put into the posts of the Peripoli in the country, horses and -arms reviewed in the city to see that nothing was wanting, and all other -steps taken to prepare for a war which might be upon them at any moment. - -Meanwhile the three ships that had been sent on came from Egesta to the -Athenians at Rhegium, with the news that so far from there being the -sums promised, all that could be produced was thirty talents. The -generals were not a little disheartened at being thus disappointed -at the outset, and by the refusal to join in the expedition of the -Rhegians, the people they had first tried to gain and had had had most -reason to count upon, from their relationship to the Leontines and -constant friendship for Athens. If Nicias was prepared for the news -from Egesta, his two colleagues were taken completely by surprise. The -Egestaeans had had recourse to the following stratagem, when the first -envoys from Athens came to inspect their resources. They took the envoys -in question to the temple of Aphrodite at Eryx and showed them the -treasures deposited there: bowls, wine-ladles, censers, and a large -number of other pieces of plate, which from being in silver gave an -impression of wealth quite out of proportion to their really small -value. They also privately entertained the ships' crews, and collected -all the cups of gold and silver that they could find in Egesta itself or -could borrow in the neighbouring Phoenician and Hellenic towns, and each -brought them to the banquets as their own; and as all used pretty nearly -the same, and everywhere a great quantity of plate was shown, the effect -was most dazzling upon the Athenian sailors, and made them talk loudly -of the riches they had seen when they got back to Athens. The dupes in -question--who had in their turn persuaded the rest--when the news got -abroad that there was not the money supposed at Egesta, were much blamed -by the soldiers. - -Meanwhile the generals consulted upon what was to be done. The opinion -of Nicias was to sail with all the armament to Selinus, the main object -of the expedition, and if the Egestaeans could provide money for the -whole force, to advise accordingly; but if they could not, to require -them to supply provisions for the sixty ships that they had asked for, -to stay and settle matters between them and the Selinuntines either -by force or by agreement, and then to coast past the other cities, and -after displaying the power of Athens and proving their zeal for their -friends and allies, to sail home again (unless they should have some -sudden and unexpected opportunity of serving the Leontines, or of -bringing over some of the other cities), and not to endanger the state -by wasting its home resources. - -Alcibiades said that a great expedition like the present must not -disgrace itself by going away without having done anything; heralds must -be sent to all the cities except Selinus and Syracuse, and efforts -be made to make some of the Sicels revolt from the Syracusans, and to -obtain the friendship of others, in order to have corn and troops; and -first of all to gain the Messinese, who lay right in the passage and -entrance to Sicily, and would afford an excellent harbour and base for -the army. Thus, after bringing over the towns and knowing who would -be their allies in the war, they might at length attack Syracuse and -Selinus; unless the latter came to terms with Egesta and the former -ceased to oppose the restoration of Leontini. - -Lamachus, on the other hand, said that they ought to sail straight to -Syracuse, and fight their battle at once under the walls of the town -while the people were still unprepared, and the panic at its height. -Every armament was most terrible at first; if it allowed time to run on -without showing itself, men's courage revived, and they saw it appear -at last almost with indifference. By attacking suddenly, while Syracuse -still trembled at their coming, they would have the best chance of -gaining a victory for themselves and of striking a complete panic into -the enemy by the aspect of their numbers--which would never appear so -considerable as at present--by the anticipation of coming disaster, and -above all by the immediate danger of the engagement. They might also -count upon surprising many in the fields outside, incredulous of their -coming; and at the moment that the enemy was carrying in his property -the army would not want for booty if it sat down in force before the -city. The rest of the Siceliots would thus be immediately less -disposed to enter into alliance with the Syracusans, and would join the -Athenians, without waiting to see which were the strongest. They must -make Megara their naval station as a place to retreat to and a base from -which to attack: it was an uninhabited place at no great distance from -Syracuse either by land or by sea. - -After speaking to this effect, Lamachus nevertheless gave his support -to the opinion of Alcibiades. After this Alcibiades sailed in his own -vessel across to Messina with proposals of alliance, but met with no -success, the inhabitants answering that they could not receive him -within their walls, though they would provide him with a market outside. -Upon this he sailed back to Rhegium. Immediately upon his return the -generals manned and victualled sixty ships out of the whole fleet and -coasted along to Naxos, leaving the rest of the armament behind them -at Rhegium with one of their number. Received by the Naxians, they then -coasted on to Catana, and being refused admittance by the inhabitants, -there being a Syracusan party in the town, went on to the river Terias. -Here they bivouacked, and the next day sailed in single file to Syracuse -with all their ships except ten which they sent on in front to sail -into the great harbour and see if there was any fleet launched, and -to proclaim by herald from shipboard that the Athenians were come -to restore the Leontines to their country, as being their allies and -kinsmen, and that such of them, therefore, as were in Syracuse should -leave it without fear and join their friends and benefactors the -Athenians. After making this proclamation and reconnoitring the city and -the harbours, and the features of the country which they would have to -make their base of operations in the war, they sailed back to Catana. - -An assembly being held here, the inhabitants refused to receive the -armament, but invited the generals to come in and say what they desired; -and while Alcibiades was speaking and the citizens were intent on the -assembly, the soldiers broke down an ill-walled-up postern gate -without being observed, and getting inside the town, flocked into the -marketplace. The Syracusan party in the town no sooner saw the army -inside than they became frightened and withdrew, not being at all -numerous; while the rest voted for an alliance with the Athenians and -invited them to fetch the rest of their forces from Rhegium. After this -the Athenians sailed to Rhegium, and put off, this time with all the -armament, for Catana, and fell to work at their camp immediately upon -their arrival. - -Meanwhile word was brought them from Camarina that if they went there -the town would go over to them, and also that the Syracusans were -manning a fleet. The Athenians accordingly sailed alongshore with all -their armament, first to Syracuse, where they found no fleet manning, -and so always along the coast to Camarina, where they brought to at the -beach, and sent a herald to the people, who, however, refused to receive -them, saying that their oaths bound them to receive the Athenians only -with a single vessel, unless they themselves sent for more. Disappointed -here, the Athenians now sailed back again, and after landing and -plundering on Syracusan territory and losing some stragglers from their -light infantry through the coming up of the Syracusan horse, so got back -to Catana. - -There they found the Salaminia come from Athens for Alcibiades, with -orders for him to sail home to answer the charges which the state -brought against him, and for certain others of the soldiers who with -him were accused of sacrilege in the matter of the mysteries and of the -Hermae. For the Athenians, after the departure of the expedition, had -continued as active as ever in investigating the facts of the mysteries -and of the Hermae, and, instead of testing the informers, in their -suspicious temper welcomed all indifferently, arresting and imprisoning -the best citizens upon the evidence of rascals, and preferring to sift -the matter to the bottom sooner than to let an accused person of good -character pass unquestioned, owing to the rascality of the informer. The -commons had heard how oppressive the tyranny of Pisistratus and his sons -had become before it ended, and further that that had been put down at -last, not by themselves and Harmodius, but by the Lacedaemonians, and so -were always in fear and took everything suspiciously. - -Indeed, the daring action of Aristogiton and Harmodius was undertaken -in consequence of a love affair, which I shall relate at some length, to -show that the Athenians are not more accurate than the rest of the world -in their accounts of their own tyrants and of the facts of their own -history. Pisistratus dying at an advanced age in possession of the -tyranny, was succeeded by his eldest son, Hippias, and not Hipparchus, -as is vulgarly believed. Harmodius was then in the flower of youthful -beauty, and Aristogiton, a citizen in the middle rank of life, was his -lover and possessed him. Solicited without success by Hipparchus, son of -Pisistratus, Harmodius told Aristogiton, and the enraged lover, afraid -that the powerful Hipparchus might take Harmodius by force, immediately -formed a design, such as his condition in life permitted, for -overthrowing the tyranny. In the meantime Hipparchus, after a second -solicitation of Harmodius, attended with no better success, unwilling -to use violence, arranged to insult him in some covert way. Indeed, -generally their government was not grievous to the multitude, or in any -way odious in practice; and these tyrants cultivated wisdom and virtue -as much as any, and without exacting from the Athenians more than a -twentieth of their income, splendidly adorned their city, and carried on -their wars, and provided sacrifices for the temples. For the rest, the -city was left in full enjoyment of its existing laws, except that care -was always taken to have the offices in the hands of some one of the -family. Among those of them that held the yearly archonship at Athens -was Pisistratus, son of the tyrant Hippias, and named after his -grandfather, who dedicated during his term of office the altar to the -twelve gods in the market-place, and that of Apollo in the Pythian -precinct. The Athenian people afterwards built on to and lengthened the -altar in the market-place, and obliterated the inscription; but that in -the Pythian precinct can still be seen, though in faded letters, and is -to the following effect: - -Pisistratus, the son of Hippias, Sent up this record of his archonship -In precinct of Apollo Pythias. - -That Hippias was the eldest son and succeeded to the government, is what -I positively assert as a fact upon which I have had more exact accounts -than others, and may be also ascertained by the following circumstance. -He is the only one of the legitimate brothers that appears to have had -children; as the altar shows, and the pillar placed in the Athenian -Acropolis, commemorating the crime of the tyrants, which mentions no -child of Thessalus or of Hipparchus, but five of Hippias, which he had -by Myrrhine, daughter of Callias, son of Hyperechides; and naturally -the eldest would have married first. Again, his name comes first on the -pillar after that of his father; and this too is quite natural, as -he was the eldest after him, and the reigning tyrant. Nor can I ever -believe that Hippias would have obtained the tyranny so easily, if -Hipparchus had been in power when he was killed, and he, Hippias, had -had to establish himself upon the same day; but he had no doubt been -long accustomed to overawe the citizens, and to be obeyed by his -mercenaries, and thus not only conquered, but conquered with ease, -without experiencing any of the embarrassment of a younger brother -unused to the exercise of authority. It was the sad fate which made -Hipparchus famous that got him also the credit with posterity of having -been tyrant. - -To return to Harmodius; Hipparchus having been repulsed in his -solicitations insulted him as he had resolved, by first inviting a -sister of his, a young girl, to come and bear a basket in a certain -procession, and then rejecting her, on the plea that she had never been -invited at all owing to her unworthiness. If Harmodius was indignant at -this, Aristogiton for his sake now became more exasperated than ever; -and having arranged everything with those who were to join them in the -enterprise, they only waited for the great feast of the Panathenaea, the -sole day upon which the citizens forming part of the procession could -meet together in arms without suspicion. Aristogiton and Harmodius were -to begin, but were to be supported immediately by their accomplices -against the bodyguard. The conspirators were not many, for better -security, besides which they hoped that those not in the plot would be -carried away by the example of a few daring spirits, and use the arms in -their hands to recover their liberty. - -At last the festival arrived; and Hippias with his bodyguard was outside -the city in the Ceramicus, arranging how the different parts of the -procession were to proceed. Harmodius and Aristogiton had already -their daggers and were getting ready to act, when seeing one of their -accomplices talking familiarly with Hippias, who was easy of access to -every one, they took fright, and concluded that they were discovered and -on the point of being taken; and eager if possible to be revenged first -upon the man who had wronged them and for whom they had undertaken all -this risk, they rushed, as they were, within the gates, and meeting -with Hipparchus by the Leocorium recklessly fell upon him at once, -infuriated, Aristogiton by love, and Harmodius by insult, and smote him -and slew him. Aristogiton escaped the guards at the moment, through the -crowd running up, but was afterwards taken and dispatched in no merciful -way: Harmodius was killed on the spot. - -When the news was brought to Hippias in the Ceramicus, he at once -proceeded not to the scene of action, but to the armed men in the -procession, before they, being some distance away, knew anything of the -matter, and composing his features for the occasion, so as not to betray -himself, pointed to a certain spot, and bade them repair thither without -their arms. They withdrew accordingly, fancying he had something to say; -upon which he told the mercenaries to remove the arms, and there and -then picked out the men he thought guilty and all found with daggers, -the shield and spear being the usual weapons for a procession. - -In this way offended love first led Harmodius and Aristogiton to -conspire, and the alarm of the moment to commit the rash action -recounted. After this the tyranny pressed harder on the Athenians, and -Hippias, now grown more fearful, put to death many of the citizens, and -at the same time began to turn his eyes abroad for a refuge in case of -revolution. Thus, although an Athenian, he gave his daughter, Archedice, -to a Lampsacene, Aeantides, son of the tyrant of Lampsacus, seeing that -they had great influence with Darius. And there is her tomb in Lampsacus -with this inscription: - -Archedice lies buried in this earth, Hippias her sire, and Athens gave -her birth; Unto her bosom pride was never known, Though daughter, wife, -and sister to the throne. - -Hippias, after reigning three years longer over the Athenians, -was deposed in the fourth by the Lacedaemonians and the banished -Alcmaeonidae, and went with a safe conduct to Sigeum, and to Aeantides -at Lampsacus, and from thence to King Darius; from whose court he set -out twenty years after, in his old age, and came with the Medes to -Marathon. - -With these events in their minds, and recalling everything they knew by -hearsay on the subject, the Athenian people grow difficult of humour and -suspicious of the persons charged in the affair of the mysteries, and -persuaded that all that had taken place was part of an oligarchical and -monarchical conspiracy. In the state of irritation thus produced, many -persons of consideration had been already thrown into prison, and -far from showing any signs of abating, public feeling grew daily more -savage, and more arrests were made; until at last one of those in -custody, thought to be the most guilty of all, was induced by a fellow -prisoner to make a revelation, whether true or not is a matter on which -there are two opinions, no one having been able, either then or since, -to say for certain who did the deed. However this may be, the other -found arguments to persuade him, that even if he had not done it, he -ought to save himself by gaining a promise of impunity, and free the -state of its present suspicions; as he would be surer of safety if he -confessed after promise of impunity than if he denied and were brought -to trial. He accordingly made a revelation, affecting himself and others -in the affair of the Hermae; and the Athenian people, glad at last, as -they supposed, to get at the truth, and furious until then at not being -able to discover those who had conspired against the commons, at once -let go the informer and all the rest whom he had not denounced, and -bringing the accused to trial executed as many as were apprehended, and -condemned to death such as had fled and set a price upon their heads. -In this it was, after all, not clear whether the sufferers had been -punished unjustly, while in any case the rest of the city received -immediate and manifest relief. - -To return to Alcibiades: public feeling was very hostile to him, being -worked on by the same enemies who had attacked him before he went out; -and now that the Athenians fancied that they had got at the truth of -the matter of the Hermae, they believed more firmly than ever that -the affair of the mysteries also, in which he was implicated, had been -contrived by him in the same intention and was connected with the plot -against the democracy. Meanwhile it so happened that, just at the time -of this agitation, a small force of Lacedaemonians had advanced as far -as the Isthmus, in pursuance of some scheme with the Boeotians. It was -now thought that this had come by appointment, at his instigation, and -not on account of the Boeotians, and that, if the citizens had not -acted on the information received, and forestalled them by arresting the -prisoners, the city would have been betrayed. The citizens went so far -as to sleep one night armed in the temple of Theseus within the walls. -The friends also of Alcibiades at Argos were just at this time suspected -of a design to attack the commons; and the Argive hostages deposited in -the islands were given up by the Athenians to the Argive people to be -put to death upon that account: in short, everywhere something was found -to create suspicion against Alcibiades. It was therefore decided to -bring him to trial and execute him, and the Salaminia was sent to Sicily -for him and the others named in the information, with instructions to -order him to come and answer the charges against him, but not to arrest -him, because they wished to avoid causing any agitation in the army or -among the enemy in Sicily, and above all to retain the services of the -Mantineans and Argives, who, it was thought, had been induced to join -by his influence. Alcibiades, with his own ship and his fellow accused, -accordingly sailed off with the Salaminia from Sicily, as though to -return to Athens, and went with her as far as Thurii, and there they -left the ship and disappeared, being afraid to go home for trial with -such a prejudice existing against them. The crew of the Salaminia stayed -some time looking for Alcibiades and his companions, and at length, as -they were nowhere to be found, set sail and departed. Alcibiades, now an -outlaw, crossed in a boat not long after from Thurii to Peloponnese; and -the Athenians passed sentence of death by default upon him and those in -his company. - - - - -CHAPTER XX - -_Seventeenth and Eighteenth Years of the War--Inaction of the Athenian -Army--Alcibiades at Sparta--Investment of Syracuse_ - -The Athenian generals left in Sicily now divided the armament into two -parts, and, each taking one by lot, sailed with the whole for Selinus -and Egesta, wishing to know whether the Egestaeans would give the money, -and to look into the question of Selinus and ascertain the state of the -quarrel between her and Egesta. Coasting along Sicily, with the shore -on their left, on the side towards the Tyrrhene Gulf they touched at -Himera, the only Hellenic city in that part of the island, and being -refused admission resumed their voyage. On their way they took Hyccara, -a petty Sicanian seaport, nevertheless at war with Egesta, and making -slaves of the inhabitants gave up the town to the Egestaeans, some of -whose horse had joined them; after which the army proceeded through the -territory of the Sicels until it reached Catana, while the fleet sailed -along the coast with the slaves on board. Meanwhile Nicias sailed -straight from Hyccara along the coast and went to Egesta and, after -transacting his other business and receiving thirty talents, rejoined -the forces. They now sold their slaves for the sum of one hundred and -twenty talents, and sailed round to their Sicel allies to urge them to -send troops; and meanwhile went with half their own force to the hostile -town of Hybla in the territory of Gela, but did not succeed in taking -it. - -Summer was now over. The winter following, the Athenians at once began -to prepare for moving on Syracuse, and the Syracusans on their side -for marching against them. From the moment when the Athenians failed to -attack them instantly as they at first feared and expected, every day -that passed did something to revive their courage; and when they saw -them sailing far away from them on the other side of Sicily, and going -to Hybla only to fail in their attempts to storm it, they thought less -of them than ever, and called upon their generals, as the multitude is -apt to do in its moments of confidence, to lead them to Catana, since -the enemy would not come to them. Parties also of the Syracusan horse -employed in reconnoitring constantly rode up to the Athenian armament, -and among other insults asked them whether they had not really come to -settle with the Syracusans in a foreign country rather than to resettle -the Leontines in their own. - -Aware of this, the Athenian generals determined to draw them out in mass -as far as possible from the city, and themselves in the meantime to sail -by night alongshore, and take up at their leisure a convenient position. -This they knew they could not so well do, if they had to disembark from -their ships in front of a force prepared for them, or to go by land -openly. The numerous cavalry of the Syracusans (a force which they were -themselves without) would then be able to do the greatest mischief to -their light troops and the crowd that followed them; but this plan would -enable them to take up a position in which the horse could do them no -hurt worth speaking of, some Syracusan exiles with the army having told -them of the spot near the Olympieum, which they afterwards occupied. In -pursuance of their idea, the generals imagined the following stratagem. -They sent to Syracuse a man devoted to them, and by the Syracusan -generals thought to be no less in their interest; he was a native of -Catana, and said he came from persons in that place, whose names the -Syracusan generals were acquainted with, and whom they knew to be among -the members of their party still left in the city. He told them that -the Athenians passed the night in the town, at some distance from their -arms, and that if the Syracusans would name a day and come with all -their people at daybreak to attack the armament, they, their friends, -would close the gates upon the troops in the city, and set fire to the -vessels, while the Syracusans would easily take the camp by an attack -upon the stockade. In this they would be aided by many of the Catanians, -who were already prepared to act, and from whom he himself came. - -The generals of the Syracusans, who did not want confidence, and who had -intended even without this to march on Catana, believed the man without -any sufficient inquiry, fixed at once a day upon which they would be -there, and dismissed him, and the Selinuntines and others of their -allies having now arrived, gave orders for all the Syracusans to march -out in mass. Their preparations completed, and the time fixed for their -arrival being at hand, they set out for Catana, and passed the night -upon the river Symaethus, in the Leontine territory. Meanwhile the -Athenians no sooner knew of their approach than they took all their -forces and such of the Sicels or others as had joined them, put them on -board their ships and boats, and sailed by night to Syracuse. Thus, when -morning broke the Athenians were landing opposite the Olympieum ready -to seize their camping ground, and the Syracusan horse having ridden up -first to Catana and found that all the armament had put to sea, turned -back and told the infantry, and then all turned back together, and went -to the relief of the city. - -In the meantime, as the march before the Syracusans was a long one, the -Athenians quietly sat down their army in a convenient position, -where they could begin an engagement when they pleased, and where the -Syracusan cavalry would have least opportunity of annoying them, either -before or during the action, being fenced off on one side by walls, -houses, trees, and by a marsh, and on the other by cliffs. They also -felled the neighbouring trees and carried them down to the sea, and -formed a palisade alongside of their ships, and with stones which they -picked up and wood hastily raised a fort at Daskon, the most vulnerable -point of their position, and broke down the bridge over the Anapus. -These preparations were allowed to go on without any interruption from -the city, the first hostile force to appear being the Syracusan cavalry, -followed afterwards by all the foot together. At first they came close -up to the Athenian army, and then, finding that they did not offer to -engage, crossed the Helorine road and encamped for the night. - -The next day the Athenians and their allies prepared for battle, their -dispositions being as follows: Their right wing was occupied by the -Argives and Mantineans, the centre by the Athenians, and the rest of the -field by the other allies. Half their army was drawn up eight deep in -advance, half close to their tents in a hollow square, formed also eight -deep, which had orders to look out and be ready to go to the support of -the troops hardest pressed. The camp followers were placed inside this -reserve. The Syracusans, meanwhile, formed their heavy infantry sixteen -deep, consisting of the mass levy of their own people, and such -allies as had joined them, the strongest contingent being that of the -Selinuntines; next to them the cavalry of the Geloans, numbering two -hundred in all, with about twenty horse and fifty archers from Camarina. -The cavalry was posted on their right, full twelve hundred strong, and -next to it the darters. As the Athenians were about to begin the attack, -Nicias went along the lines, and addressed these words of encouragement -to the army and the nations composing it: - -"Soldiers, a long exhortation is little needed by men like ourselves, -who are here to fight in the same battle, the force itself being, to my -thinking, more fit to inspire confidence than a fine speech with a weak -army. Where we have Argives, Mantineans, Athenians, and the first of the -islanders in the ranks together, it were strange indeed, with so -many and so brave companions in arms, if we did not feel confident -of victory; especially when we have mass levies opposed to our picked -troops, and what is more, Siceliots, who may disdain us but will not -stand against us, their skill not being at all commensurate to their -rashness. You may also remember that we are far from home and have no -friendly land near, except what your own swords shall win you; and here -I put before you a motive just the reverse of that which the enemy are -appealing to; their cry being that they shall fight for their country, -mine that we shall fight for a country that is not ours, where we must -conquer or hardly get away, as we shall have their horse upon us in -great numbers. Remember, therefore, your renown, and go boldly against -the enemy, thinking the present strait and necessity more terrible than -they." - -After this address Nicias at once led on the army. The Syracusans were -not at that moment expecting an immediate engagement, and some had even -gone away to the town, which was close by; these now ran up as hard as -they could and, though behind time, took their places here or there -in the main body as fast as they joined it. Want of zeal or daring was -certainly not the fault of the Syracusans, either in this or the other -battles, but although not inferior in courage, so far as their military -science might carry them, when this failed them they were compelled to -give up their resolution also. On the present occasion, although they -had not supposed that the Athenians would begin the attack, and although -constrained to stand upon their defence at short notice, they at once -took up their arms and advanced to meet them. First, the stone-throwers, -slingers, and archers of either army began skirmishing, and routed or -were routed by one another, as might be expected between light troops; -next, soothsayers brought forward the usual victims, and trumpeters -urged on the heavy infantry to the charge; and thus they advanced, -the Syracusans to fight for their country, and each individual for -his safety that day and liberty hereafter; in the enemy's army, the -Athenians to make another's country theirs and to save their own from -suffering by their defeat; the Argives and independent allies to help -them in getting what they came for, and to earn by victory another sight -of the country they had left behind; while the subject allies owed most -of their ardour to the desire of self-preservation, which they could -only hope for if victorious; next to which, as a secondary motive, came -the chance of serving on easier terms, after helping the Athenians to a -fresh conquest. - -The armies now came to close quarters, and for a long while fought -without either giving ground. Meanwhile there occurred some claps of -thunder with lightning and heavy rain, which did not fail to add to -the fears of the party fighting for the first time, and very little -acquainted with war; while to their more experienced adversaries these -phenomena appeared to be produced by the time of year, and much more -alarm was felt at the continued resistance of the enemy. At last the -Argives drove in the Syracusan left, and after them the Athenians routed -the troops opposed to them, and the Syracusan army was thus cut in two -and betook itself to flight. The Athenians did not pursue far, being -held in check by the numerous and undefeated Syracusan horse, who -attacked and drove back any of their heavy infantry whom they saw -pursuing in advance of the rest; in spite of which the victors followed -so far as was safe in a body, and then went back and set up a trophy. -Meanwhile the Syracusans rallied at the Helorine road, where they -re-formed as well as they could under the circumstances, and even sent -a garrison of their own citizens to the Olympieum, fearing that the -Athenians might lay hands on some of the treasures there. The rest -returned to the town. - -The Athenians, however, did not go to the temple, but collected their -dead and laid them upon a pyre, and passed the night upon the field. The -next day they gave the enemy back their dead under truce, to the number -of about two hundred and sixty, Syracusans and allies, and gathered -together the bones of their own, some fifty, Athenians and allies, -and taking the spoils of the enemy, sailed back to Catana. It was now -winter; and it did not seem possible for the moment to carry on the war -before Syracuse, until horse should have been sent for from Athens -and levied among the allies in Sicily--to do away with their utter -inferiority in cavalry--and money should have been collected in the -country and received from Athens, and until some of the cities, which -they hoped would be now more disposed to listen to them after -the battle, should have been brought over, and corn and all other -necessaries provided, for a campaign in the spring against Syracuse. - -With this intention they sailed off to Naxos and Catana for the winter. -Meanwhile the Syracusans burned their dead and then held an assembly, -in which Hermocrates, son of Hermon, a man who with a general ability -of the first order had given proofs of military capacity and brilliant -courage in the war, came forward and encouraged them, and told them not -to let what had occurred make them give way, since their spirit had -not been conquered, but their want of discipline had done the mischief. -Still they had not been beaten by so much as might have been expected, -especially as they were, one might say, novices in the art of war, an -army of artisans opposed to the most practised soldiers in Hellas. What -had also done great mischief was the number of the generals (there were -fifteen of them) and the quantity of orders given, combined with the -disorder and insubordination of the troops. But if they were to have -a few skilful generals, and used this winter in preparing their heavy -infantry, finding arms for such as had not got any, so as to make them -as numerous as possible, and forcing them to attend to their training -generally, they would have every chance of beating their adversaries, -courage being already theirs and discipline in the field having thus -been added to it. Indeed, both these qualities would improve, since -danger would exercise them in discipline, while their courage would -be led to surpass itself by the confidence which skill inspires. The -generals should be few and elected with full powers, and an oath should -be taken to leave them entire discretion in their command: if they -adopted this plan, their secrets would be better kept, all preparations -would be properly made, and there would be no room for excuses. - -The Syracusans heard him, and voted everything as he advised, and -elected three generals, Hermocrates himself, Heraclides, son of -Lysimachus, and Sicanus, son of Execestes. They also sent envoys to -Corinth and Lacedaemon to procure a force of allies to join them, and to -induce the Lacedaemonians for their sakes openly to address themselves -in real earnest to the war against the Athenians, that they might either -have to leave Sicily or be less able to send reinforcements to their -army there. - -The Athenian forces at Catana now at once sailed against Messina, in the -expectation of its being betrayed to them. The intrigue, however, after -all came to nothing: Alcibiades, who was in the secret, when he left -his command upon the summons from home, foreseeing that he would be -outlawed, gave information of the plot to the friends of the Syracusans -in Messina, who had at once put to death its authors, and now rose in -arms against the opposite faction with those of their way of thinking, -and succeeded in preventing the admission of the Athenians. The latter -waited for thirteen days, and then, as they were exposed to the weather -and without provisions, and met with no success, went back to Naxos, -where they made places for their ships to lie in, erected a palisade -round their camp, and retired into winter quarters; meanwhile they sent -a galley to Athens for money and cavalry to join them in the spring. -During the winter the Syracusans built a wall on to the city, so as -to take in the statue of Apollo Temenites, all along the side looking -towards Epipolae, to make the task of circumvallation longer and more -difficult, in case of their being defeated, and also erected a fort at -Megara and another in the Olympieum, and stuck palisades along the sea -wherever there was a landing Place. Meanwhile, as they knew that the -Athenians were wintering at Naxos, they marched with all their people to -Catana, and ravaged the land and set fire to the tents and encampment -of the Athenians, and so returned home. Learning also that the Athenians -were sending an embassy to Camarina, on the strength of the alliance -concluded in the time of Laches, to gain, if possible, that city, they -sent another from Syracuse to oppose them. They had a shrewd suspicion -that the Camarinaeans had not sent what they did send for the first -battle very willingly; and they now feared that they would refuse to -assist them at all in future, after seeing the success of the Athenians -in the action, and would join the latter on the strength of their -old friendship. Hermocrates, with some others, accordingly arrived at -Camarina from Syracuse, and Euphemus and others from the Athenians; and -an assembly of the Camarinaeans having been convened, Hermocrates spoke -as follows, in the hope of prejudicing them against the Athenians: - -"Camarinaeans, we did not come on this embassy because we were afraid of -your being frightened by the actual forces of the Athenians, but rather -of your being gained by what they would say to you before you heard -anything from us. They are come to Sicily with the pretext that you -know, and the intention which we all suspect, in my opinion less to -restore the Leontines to their homes than to oust us from ours; as it -is out of all reason that they should restore in Sicily the cities that -they lay waste in Hellas, or should cherish the Leontine Chalcidians -because of their Ionian blood and keep in servitude the Euboean -Chalcidians, of whom the Leontines are a colony. No; but the same policy -which has proved so successful in Hellas is now being tried in Sicily. -After being chosen as the leaders of the Ionians and of the other allies -of Athenian origin, to punish the Mede, the Athenians accused some of -failure in military service, some of fighting against each other, and -others, as the case might be, upon any colourable pretext that could -be found, until they thus subdued them all. In fine, in the struggle -against the Medes, the Athenians did not fight for the liberty of the -Hellenes, or the Hellenes for their own liberty, but the former to make -their countrymen serve them instead of him, the latter to change one -master for another, wiser indeed than the first, but wiser for evil. - -"But we are not now come to declare to an audience familiar with them -the misdeeds of a state so open to accusation as is the Athenian, but -much rather to blame ourselves, who, with the warnings we possess in the -Hellenes in those parts that have been enslaved through not supporting -each other, and seeing the same sophisms being now tried upon -ourselves--such as restorations of Leontine kinsfolk and support of -Egestaean allies--do not stand together and resolutely show them -that here are no Ionians, or Hellespontines, or islanders, who change -continually, but always serve a master, sometimes the Mede and sometimes -some other, but free Dorians from independent Peloponnese, dwelling in -Sicily. Or, are we waiting until we be taken in detail, one city after -another; knowing as we do that in no other way can we be conquered, and -seeing that they turn to this plan, so as to divide some of us by words, -to draw some by the bait of an alliance into open war with each other, -and to ruin others by such flattery as different circumstances may -render acceptable? And do we fancy when destruction first overtakes a -distant fellow countryman that the danger will not come to each of us -also, or that he who suffers before us will suffer in himself alone? - -"As for the Camarinaean who says that it is the Syracusan, not he, -that is the enemy of the Athenian, and who thinks it hard to have to -encounter risk in behalf of my country, I would have him bear in mind -that he will fight in my country, not more for mine than for his own, -and by so much the more safely in that he will enter on the struggle -not alone, after the way has been cleared by my ruin, but with me as his -ally, and that the object of the Athenian is not so much to punish the -enmity of the Syracusan as to use me as a blind to secure the friendship -of the Camarinaean. As for him who envies or even fears us (and envied -and feared great powers must always be), and who on this account wishes -Syracuse to be humbled to teach us a lesson, but would still have her -survive, in the interest of his own security the wish that he indulges -is not humanly possible. A man can control his own desires, but -he cannot likewise control circumstances; and in the event of his -calculations proving mistaken, he may live to bewail his own misfortune, -and wish to be again envying my prosperity. An idle wish, if he now -sacrifice us and refuse to take his share of perils which are the same, -in reality though not in name, for him as for us; what is nominally the -preservation of our power being really his own salvation. It was to be -expected that you, of all people in the world, Camarinaeans, being our -immediate neighbours and the next in danger, would have foreseen this, -and instead of supporting us in the lukewarm way that you are now doing, -would rather come to us of your own accord, and be now offering at -Syracuse the aid which you would have asked for at Camarina, if to -Camarina the Athenians had first come, to encourage us to resist the -invader. Neither you, however, nor the rest have as yet bestirred -yourselves in this direction. - -"Fear perhaps will make you study to do right both by us and by the -invaders, and plead that you have an alliance with the Athenians. -But you made that alliance, not against your friends, but against the -enemies that might attack you, and to help the Athenians when they were -wronged by others, not when as now they are wronging their neighbours. -Even the Rhegians, Chalcidians though they be, refuse to help to restore -the Chalcidian Leontines; and it would be strange if, while they suspect -the gist of this fine pretence and are wise without reason, you, with -every reason on your side, should yet choose to assist your natural -enemies, and should join with their direst foes in undoing those whom -nature has made your own kinsfolk. This is not to do right; but you -should help us without fear of their armament, which has no terrors if -we hold together, but only if we let them succeed in their endeavours -to separate us; since even after attacking us by ourselves and being -victorious in battle, they had to go off without effecting their -purpose. - -"United, therefore, we have no cause to despair, but rather new -encouragement to league together; especially as succour will come to us -from the Peloponnesians, in military matters the undoubted superiors of -the Athenians. And you need not think that your prudent policy of taking -sides with neither, because allies of both, is either safe for you or -fair to us. Practically it is not as fair as it pretends to be. If the -vanquished be defeated, and the victor conquer, through your refusing to -join, what is the effect of your abstention but to leave the former to -perish unaided, and to allow the latter to offend unhindered? And yet it -were more honourable to join those who are not only the injured party, -but your own kindred, and by so doing to defend the common interests of -Sicily and save your friends the Athenians from doing wrong. - -"In conclusion, we Syracusans say that it is useless for us to -demonstrate either to you or to the rest what you know already as well -as we do; but we entreat, and if our entreaty fail, we protest that we -are menaced by our eternal enemies the Ionians, and are betrayed by -you our fellow Dorians. If the Athenians reduce us, they will owe their -victory to your decision, but in their own name will reap the honour, -and will receive as the prize of their triumph the very men who enabled -them to gain it. On the other hand, if we are the conquerors, you -will have to pay for having been the cause of our danger. Consider, -therefore; and now make your choice between the security which present -servitude offers and the prospect of conquering with us and so escaping -disgraceful submission to an Athenian master and avoiding the lasting -enmity of Syracuse." - -Such were the words of Hermocrates; after whom Euphemus, the Athenian -ambassador, spoke as follows: - -"Although we came here only to renew the former alliance, the attack of -the Syracusans compels us to speak of our empire and of the good right -we have to it. The best proof of this the speaker himself furnished, -when he called the Ionians eternal enemies of the Dorians. It is the -fact; and the Peloponnesian Dorians being our superiors in numbers and -next neighbours, we Ionians looked out for the best means of escaping -their domination. After the Median War we had a fleet, and so got rid of -the empire and supremacy of the Lacedaemonians, who had no right to give -orders to us more than we to them, except that of being the strongest at -that moment; and being appointed leaders of the King's former subjects, -we continue to be so, thinking that we are least likely to fall under -the dominion of the Peloponnesians, if we have a force to defend -ourselves with, and in strict truth having done nothing unfair in -reducing to subjection the Ionians and islanders, the kinsfolk whom the -Syracusans say we have enslaved. They, our kinsfolk, came against their -mother country, that is to say against us, together with the Mede, and, -instead of having the courage to revolt and sacrifice their property as -we did when we abandoned our city, chose to be slaves themselves, and to -try to make us so. - -"We, therefore, deserve to rule because we placed the largest fleet and -an unflinching patriotism at the service of the Hellenes, and because -these, our subjects, did us mischief by their ready subservience to the -Medes; and, desert apart, we seek to strengthen ourselves against the -Peloponnesians. We make no fine profession of having a right to rule -because we overthrew the barbarian single-handed, or because we risked -what we did risk for the freedom of the subjects in question any more -than for that of all, and for our own: no one can be quarrelled with -for providing for his proper safety. If we are now here in Sicily, it -is equally in the interest of our security, with which we perceive that -your interest also coincides. We prove this from the conduct which -the Syracusans cast against us and which you somewhat too timorously -suspect; knowing that those whom fear has made suspicious may be carried -away by the charm of eloquence for the moment, but when they come to act -follow their interests. - -"Now, as we have said, fear makes us hold our empire in Hellas, and fear -makes us now come, with the help of our friends, to order safely matters -in Sicily, and not to enslave any but rather to prevent any from -being enslaved. Meanwhile, let no one imagine that we are interesting -ourselves in you without your having anything to do with us, seeing -that, if you are preserved and able to make head against the -Syracusans, they will be less likely to harm us by sending troops to the -Peloponnesians. In this way you have everything to do with us, and on -this account it is perfectly reasonable for us to restore the Leontines, -and to make them, not subjects like their kinsmen in Euboea, but as -powerful as possible, to help us by annoying the Syracusans from their -frontier. In Hellas we are alone a match for our enemies; and as for the -assertion that it is out of all reason that we should free the Sicilian, -while we enslave the Chalcidian, the fact is that the latter is useful -to us by being without arms and contributing money only; while the -former, the Leontines and our other friends, cannot be too independent. - -"Besides, for tyrants and imperial cities nothing is unreasonable if -expedient, no one a kinsman unless sure; but friendship or enmity is -everywhere an affair of time and circumstance. Here, in Sicily, our -interest is not to weaken our friends, but by means of their strength to -cripple our enemies. Why doubt this? In Hellas we treat our allies as -we find them useful. The Chians and Methymnians govern themselves and -furnish ships; most of the rest have harder terms and pay tribute in -money; while others, although islanders and easy for us to take, -are free altogether, because they occupy convenient positions round -Peloponnese. In our settlement of the states here in Sicily, we should -therefore; naturally be guided by our interest, and by fear, as we say, -of the Syracusans. Their ambition is to rule you, their object to use -the suspicions that we excite to unite you, and then, when we have gone -away without effecting anything, by force or through your isolation, to -become the masters of Sicily. And masters they must become, if you unite -with them; as a force of that magnitude would be no longer easy for us -to deal with united, and they would be more than a match for you as soon -as we were away. - -"Any other view of the case is condemned by the facts. When you first -asked us over, the fear which you held out was that of danger to Athens -if we let you come under the dominion of Syracuse; and it is not right -now to mistrust the very same argument by which you claimed to convince -us, or to give way to suspicion because we are come with a larger force -against the power of that city. Those whom you should really distrust -are the Syracusans. We are not able to stay here without you, and if -we proved perfidious enough to bring you into subjection, we should be -unable to keep you in bondage, owing to the length of the voyage and -the difficulty of guarding large, and in a military sense continental, -towns: they, the Syracusans, live close to you, not in a camp, but in -a city greater than the force we have with us, plot always against you, -never let slip an opportunity once offered, as they have shown in the -case of the Leontines and others, and now have the face, just as if you -were fools, to invite you to aid them against the power that hinders -this, and that has thus far maintained Sicily independent. We, as -against them, invite you to a much more real safety, when we beg you -not to betray that common safety which we each have in the other, and -to reflect that they, even without allies, will, by their numbers, -have always the way open to you, while you will not often have the -opportunity of defending yourselves with such numerous auxiliaries; -if, through your suspicions, you once let these go away unsuccessful -or defeated, you will wish to see if only a handful of them back again, -when the day is past in which their presence could do anything for you. - -"But we hope, Camarinaeans, that the calumnies of the Syracusans will -not be allowed to succeed either with you or with the rest: we have told -you the whole truth upon the things we are suspected of, and will now -briefly recapitulate, in the hope of convincing you. We assert that we -are rulers in Hellas in order not to be subjects; liberators in Sicily -that we may not be harmed by the Sicilians; that we are compelled to -interfere in many things, because we have many things to guard against; -and that now, as before, we are come as allies to those of you who -suffer wrong in this island, not without invitation but upon invitation. -Accordingly, instead of making yourselves judges or censors of our -conduct, and trying to turn us, which it were now difficult to do, so -far as there is anything in our interfering policy or in our character -that chimes in with your interest, this take and make use of; and -be sure that, far from being injurious to all alike, to most of the -Hellenes that policy is even beneficial. Thanks to it, all men in -all places, even where we are not, who either apprehend or meditate -aggression, from the near prospect before them, in the one case, of -obtaining our intervention in their favour, in the other, of our arrival -making the venture dangerous, find themselves constrained, respectively, -to be moderate against their will, and to be preserved without trouble -of their own. Do not you reject this security that is open to all who -desire it, and is now offered to you; but do like others, and instead of -being always on the defensive against the Syracusans, unite with us, and -in your turn at last threaten them." - -Such were the words of Euphemus. What the Camarinaeans felt was this. -Sympathizing with the Athenians, except in so far as they might be -afraid of their subjugating Sicily, they had always been at enmity with -their neighbour Syracuse. From the very fact, however, that they were -their neighbours, they feared the Syracusans most of the two, and being -apprehensive of their conquering even without them, both sent them -in the first instance the few horsemen mentioned, and for the future -determined to support them most in fact, although as sparingly as -possible; but for the moment in order not to seem to slight the -Athenians, especially as they had been successful in the engagement, to -answer both alike. Agreeably to this resolution they answered that -as both the contending parties happened to be allies of theirs, they -thought it most consistent with their oaths at present to side with -neither; with which answer the ambassadors of either party departed. - -In the meantime, while Syracuse pursued her preparations for war, the -Athenians were encamped at Naxos, and tried by negotiation to gain -as many of the Sicels as possible. Those more in the low lands, and -subjects of Syracuse, mostly held aloof; but the peoples of the interior -who had never been otherwise than independent, with few exceptions, at -once joined the Athenians, and brought down corn to the army, and in -some cases even money. The Athenians marched against those who refused -to join, and forced some of them to do so; in the case of others they -were stopped by the Syracusans sending garrisons and reinforcements. -Meanwhile the Athenians moved their winter quarters from Naxos to -Catana, and reconstructed the camp burnt by the Syracusans, and stayed -there the rest of the winter. They also sent a galley to Carthage, -with proffers of friendship, on the chance of obtaining assistance, -and another to Tyrrhenia; some of the cities there having spontaneously -offered to join them in the war. They also sent round to the Sicels and -to Egesta, desiring them to send them as many horses as possible, and -meanwhile prepared bricks, iron, and all other things necessary for the -work of circumvallation, intending by the spring to begin hostilities. - -In the meantime the Syracusan envoys dispatched to Corinth and -Lacedaemon tried as they passed along the coast to persuade the Italiots -to interfere with the proceedings of the Athenians, which threatened -Italy quite as much as Syracuse, and having arrived at Corinth made a -speech calling on the Corinthians to assist them on the ground of their -common origin. The Corinthians voted at once to aid them heart and soul -themselves, and then sent on envoys with them to Lacedaemon, to help -them to persuade her also to prosecute the war with the Athenians more -openly at home and to send succours to Sicily. The envoys from Corinth -having reached Lacedaemon found there Alcibiades with his fellow -refugees, who had at once crossed over in a trading vessel from Thurii, -first to Cyllene in Elis, and afterwards from thence to Lacedaemon; -upon the Lacedaemonians' own invitation, after first obtaining a safe -conduct, as he feared them for the part he had taken in the affair -of Mantinea. The result was that the Corinthians, Syracusans, and -Alcibiades, pressing all the same request in the assembly of the -Lacedaemonians, succeeded in persuading them; but as the ephors and the -authorities, although resolved to send envoys to Syracuse to prevent -their surrendering to the Athenians, showed no disposition to send them -any assistance, Alcibiades now came forward and inflamed and stirred the -Lacedaemonians by speaking as follows: - -"I am forced first to speak to you of the prejudice with which I am -regarded, in order that suspicion may not make you disinclined to listen -to me upon public matters. The connection, with you as your proxeni, -which the ancestors of our family by reason of some discontent -renounced, I personally tried to renew by my good offices towards you, -in particular upon the occasion of the disaster at Pylos. But although I -maintained this friendly attitude, you yet chose to negotiate the peace -with the Athenians through my enemies, and thus to strengthen them and -to discredit me. You had therefore no right to complain if I turned to -the Mantineans and Argives, and seized other occasions of thwarting and -injuring you; and the time has now come when those among you, who in -the bitterness of the moment may have been then unfairly angry with me, -should look at the matter in its true light, and take a different view. -Those again who judged me unfavourably, because I leaned rather to the -side of the commons, must not think that their dislike is any better -founded. We have always been hostile to tyrants, and all who oppose -arbitrary power are called commons; hence we continued to act as leaders -of the multitude; besides which, as democracy was the government of -the city, it was necessary in most things to conform to established -conditions. However, we endeavoured to be more moderate than the -licentious temper of the times; and while there were others, formerly -as now, who tried to lead the multitude astray--the same who banished -me--our party was that of the whole people, our creed being to do our -part in preserving the form of government under which the city enjoyed -the utmost greatness and freedom, and which we had found existing. As -for democracy, the men of sense among us knew what it was, and I perhaps -as well as any, as I have the more cause to complain of it; but there is -nothing new to be said of a patent absurdity; meanwhile we did not think -it safe to alter it under the pressure of your hostility. - -"So much then for the prejudices with which I am regarded: I now can -call your attention to the questions you must consider, and upon which -superior knowledge perhaps permits me to speak. We sailed to Sicily -first to conquer, if possible, the Siceliots, and after them the -Italiots also, and finally to assail the empire and city of Carthage. -In the event of all or most of these schemes succeeding, we were then -to attack Peloponnese, bringing with us the entire force of the Hellenes -lately acquired in those parts, and taking a number of barbarians into -our pay, such as the Iberians and others in those countries, confessedly -the most warlike known, and building numerous galleys in addition to -those which we had already, timber being plentiful in Italy; and with -this fleet blockading Peloponnese from the sea and assailing it with -our armies by land, taking some of the cities by storm, drawing works of -circumvallation round others, we hoped without difficulty to effect its -reduction, and after this to rule the whole of the Hellenic name. Money -and corn meanwhile for the better execution of these plans were to be -supplied in sufficient quantities by the newly acquired places in those -countries, independently of our revenues here at home. - -"You have thus heard the history of the present expedition from the man -who most exactly knows what our objects were; and the remaining generals -will, if they can, carry these out just the same. But that the states in -Sicily must succumb if you do not help them, I will now show. Although -the Siceliots, with all their inexperience, might even now be saved if -their forces were united, the Syracusans alone, beaten already in one -battle with all their people and blockaded from the sea, will be unable -to withstand the Athenian armament that is now there. But if Syracuse -falls, all Sicily falls also, and Italy immediately afterwards; and the -danger which I just now spoke of from that quarter will before long be -upon you. None need therefore fancy that Sicily only is in question; -Peloponnese will be so also, unless you speedily do as I tell you, and -send on board ship to Syracuse troops that shall able to row their ships -themselves, and serve as heavy infantry the moment that they land; -and what I consider even more important than the troops, a Spartan -as commanding officer to discipline the forces already on foot and to -compel recusants to serve. The friends that you have already will thus -become more confident, and the waverers will be encouraged to join -you. Meanwhile you must carry on the war here more openly, that the -Syracusans, seeing that you do not forget them, may put heart into their -resistance, and that the Athenians may be less able to reinforce their -armament. You must fortify Decelea in Attica, the blow of which the -Athenians are always most afraid and the only one that they think they -have not experienced in the present war; the surest method of harming an -enemy being to find out what he most fears, and to choose this means of -attacking him, since every one naturally knows best his own weak points -and fears accordingly. The fortification in question, while it benefits -you, will create difficulties for your adversaries, of which I shall -pass over many, and shall only mention the chief. Whatever property -there is in the country will most of it become yours, either by capture -or surrender; and the Athenians will at once be deprived of their -revenues from the silver mines at Laurium, of their present gains from -their land and from the law courts, and above all of the revenue from -their allies, which will be paid less regularly, as they lose their awe -of Athens and see you addressing yourselves with vigour to the war. -The zeal and speed with which all this shall be done depends, -Lacedaemonians, upon yourselves; as to its possibility, I am quite -confident, and I have little fear of being mistaken. - -"Meanwhile I hope that none of you will think any the worse of me if, -after having hitherto passed as a lover of my country, I now actively -join its worst enemies in attacking it, or will suspect what I say as -the fruit of an outlaw's enthusiasm. I am an outlaw from the iniquity -of those who drove me forth, not, if you will be guided by me, from your -service; my worst enemies are not you who only harmed your foes, but -they who forced their friends to become enemies; and love of country is -what I do not feel when I am wronged, but what I felt when secure in my -rights as a citizen. Indeed I do not consider that I am now attacking -a country that is still mine; I am rather trying to recover one that is -mine no longer; and the true lover of his country is not he who consents -to lose it unjustly rather than attack it, but he who longs for it so -much that he will go all lengths to recover it. For myself, therefore, -Lacedaemonians, I beg you to use me without scruple for danger and -trouble of every kind, and to remember the argument in every one's -mouth, that if I did you great harm as an enemy, I could likewise do you -good service as a friend, inasmuch as I know the plans of the Athenians, -while I only guessed yours. For yourselves I entreat you to believe that -your most capital interests are now under deliberation; and I urge you -to send without hesitation the expeditions to Sicily and Attica; by the -presence of a small part of your forces you will save important cities -in that island, and you will destroy the power of Athens both present -and prospective; after this you will dwell in security and enjoy the -supremacy over all Hellas, resting not on force but upon consent and -affection." - -Such were the words of Alcibiades. The Lacedaemonians, who had -themselves before intended to march against Athens, but were still -waiting and looking about them, at once became much more in earnest -when they received this particular information from Alcibiades, and -considered that they had heard it from the man who best knew the truth -of the matter. Accordingly they now turned their attention to the -fortifying of Decelea and sending immediate aid to the Sicilians; and -naming Gylippus, son of Cleandridas, to the command of the Syracusans, -bade him consult with that people and with the Corinthians and arrange -for succours reaching the island, in the best and speediest way possible -under the circumstances. Gylippus desired the Corinthians to send him at -once two ships to Asine, and to prepare the rest that they intended to -send, and to have them ready to sail at the proper time. Having settled -this, the envoys departed from Lacedaemon. - -In the meantime arrived the Athenian galley from Sicily sent by the -generals for money and cavalry; and the Athenians, after hearing -what they wanted, voted to send the supplies for the armament and the -cavalry. And the winter ended, and with it ended the seventeenth year of -the present war of which Thucydides is the historian. - -The next summer, at the very beginning of the season, the Athenians in -Sicily put out from Catana, and sailed along shore to Megara in Sicily, -from which, as I have mentioned above, the Syracusans expelled the -inhabitants in the time of their tyrant Gelo, themselves occupying the -territory. Here the Athenians landed and laid waste the country, and -after an unsuccessful attack upon a fort of the Syracusans, went on with -the fleet and army to the river Terias, and advancing inland laid waste -the plain and set fire to the corn; and after killing some of a small -Syracusan party which they encountered, and setting up a trophy, -went back again to their ships. They now sailed to Catana and took in -provisions there, and going with their whole force against Centoripa, -a town of the Sicels, acquired it by capitulation, and departed, after -also burning the corn of the Inessaeans and Hybleans. Upon their return -to Catana they found the horsemen arrived from Athens, to the number of -two hundred and fifty (with their equipments, but without their horses -which were to be procured upon the spot), and thirty mounted archers and -three hundred talents of silver. - -The same spring the Lacedaemonians marched against Argos, and went as -far as Cleonae, when an earthquake occurred and caused them to return. -After this the Argives invaded the Thyreatid, which is on their border, -and took much booty from the Lacedaemonians, which was sold for no less -than twenty-five talents. The same summer, not long after, the -Thespian commons made an attack upon the party in office, which was -not successful, but succours arrived from Thebes, and some were caught, -while others took refuge at Athens. - -The same summer the Syracusans learned that the Athenians had been -joined by their cavalry, and were on the point of marching against them; -and seeing that without becoming masters of Epipolae, a precipitous -spot situated exactly over the town, the Athenians could not, even if -victorious in battle, easily invest them, they determined to guard its -approaches, in order that the enemy might not ascend unobserved by this, -the sole way by which ascent was possible, as the remainder is lofty -ground, and falls right down to the city, and can all be seen from -inside; and as it lies above the rest the place is called by the -Syracusans Epipolae or Overtown. They accordingly went out in mass at -daybreak into the meadow along the river Anapus, their new generals, -Hermocrates and his colleagues, having just come into office, and held -a review of their heavy infantry, from whom they first selected a -picked body of six hundred, under the command of Diomilus, an exile -from Andros, to guard Epipolae, and to be ready to muster at a moment's -notice to help wherever help should be required. - -Meanwhile the Athenians, the very same morning, were holding a review, -having already made land unobserved with all the armament from Catana, -opposite a place called Leon, not much more than half a mile from -Epipolae, where they disembarked their army, bringing the fleet to -anchor at Thapsus, a peninsula running out into the sea, with a narrow -isthmus, and not far from the city of Syracuse either by land or water. -While the naval force of the Athenians threw a stockade across the -isthmus and remained quiet at Thapsus, the land army immediately went on -at a run to Epipolae, and succeeded in getting up by Euryelus before -the Syracusans perceived them, or could come up from the meadow and the -review. Diomilus with his six hundred and the rest advanced as quickly -as they could, but they had nearly three miles to go from the meadow -before reaching them. Attacking in this way in considerable disorder, -the Syracusans were defeated in battle at Epipolae and retired to the -town, with a loss of about three hundred killed, and Diomilus among the -number. After this the Athenians set up a trophy and restored to the -Syracusans their dead under truce, and next day descended to Syracuse -itself; and no one coming out to meet them, reascended and built a fort -at Labdalum, upon the edge of the cliffs of Epipolae, looking towards -Megara, to serve as a magazine for their baggage and money, whenever -they advanced to battle or to work at the lines. - -Not long afterwards three hundred cavalry came to them from Egesta, and -about a hundred from the Sicels, Naxians, and others; and thus, with the -two hundred and fifty from Athens, for whom they had got horses from -the Egestaeans and Catanians, besides others that they bought, they now -mustered six hundred and fifty cavalry in all. After posting a garrison -in Labdalum, they advanced to Syca, where they sat down and quickly -built the Circle or centre of their wall of circumvallation. The -Syracusans, appalled at the rapidity with which the work advanced, -determined to go out against them and give battle and interrupt it; and -the two armies were already in battle array, when the Syracusan generals -observed that their troops found such difficulty in getting into line, -and were in such disorder, that they led them back into the town, except -part of the cavalry. These remained and hindered the Athenians from -carrying stones or dispersing to any great distance, until a tribe of -the Athenian heavy infantry, with all the cavalry, charged and routed -the Syracusan horse with some loss; after which they set up a trophy for -the cavalry action. - -The next day the Athenians began building the wall to the north of the -Circle, at the same time collecting stone and timber, which they kept -laying down towards Trogilus along the shortest line for their works -from the great harbour to the sea; while the Syracusans, guided by their -generals, and above all by Hermocrates, instead of risking any more -general engagements, determined to build a counterwork in the direction -in which the Athenians were going to carry their wall. If this could be -completed in time, the enemy's lines would be cut; and meanwhile, if he -were to attempt to interrupt them by an attack, they would send a part -of their forces against him, and would secure the approaches beforehand -with their stockade, while the Athenians would have to leave off working -with their whole force in order to attend to them. They accordingly -sallied forth and began to build, starting from their city, running -a cross wall below the Athenian Circle, cutting down the olives and -erecting wooden towers. As the Athenian fleet had not yet sailed round -into the great harbour, the Syracusans still commanded the seacoast, and -the Athenians brought their provisions by land from Thapsus. - -The Syracusans now thought the stockades and stonework of their -counterwall sufficiently far advanced; and as the Athenians, afraid of -being divided and so fighting at a disadvantage, and intent upon their -own wall, did not come out to interrupt them, they left one tribe to -guard the new work and went back into the city. Meanwhile the Athenians -destroyed their pipes of drinking-water carried underground into the -city; and watching until the rest of the Syracusans were in their tents -at midday, and some even gone away into the city, and those in the -stockade keeping but indifferent guard, appointed three hundred picked -men of their own, and some men picked from the light troops and -armed for the purpose, to run suddenly as fast as they could to the -counterwork, while the rest of the army advanced in two divisions, the -one with one of the generals to the city in case of a sortie, the other -with the other general to the stockade by the postern gate. The three -hundred attacked and took the stockade, abandoned by its garrison, who -took refuge in the outworks round the statue of Apollo Temenites. Here -the pursuers burst in with them, and after getting in were beaten out by -the Syracusans, and some few of the Argives and Athenians slain; after -which the whole army retired, and having demolished the counterwork and -pulled up the stockade, carried away the stakes to their own lines, and -set up a trophy. - -The next day the Athenians from the Circle proceeded to fortify the -cliff above the marsh which on this side of Epipolae looks towards the -great harbour; this being also the shortest line for their work to -go down across the plain and the marsh to the harbour. Meanwhile the -Syracusans marched out and began a second stockade, starting from the -city, across the middle of the marsh, digging a trench alongside to make -it impossible for the Athenians to carry their wall down to the sea. As -soon as the Athenians had finished their work at the cliff they again -attacked the stockade and ditch of the Syracusans. Ordering the fleet -to sail round from Thapsus into the great harbour of Syracuse, they -descended at about dawn from Epipolae into the plain, and laying doors -and planks over the marsh, where it was muddy and firmest, crossed over -on these, and by daybreak took the ditch and the stockade, except a -small portion which they captured afterwards. A battle now ensued, in -which the Athenians were victorious, the right wing of the Syracusans -flying to the town and the left to the river. The three hundred picked -Athenians, wishing to cut off their passage, pressed on at a run to the -bridge, when the alarmed Syracusans, who had with them most of their -cavalry, closed and routed them, hurling them back upon the Athenian -right wing, the first tribe of which was thrown into a panic by the -shock. Seeing this, Lamachus came to their aid from the Athenian left -with a few archers and with the Argives, and crossing a ditch, was left -alone with a few that had crossed with him, and was killed with five or -six of his men. These the Syracusans managed immediately to snatch up -in haste and get across the river into a place of security, themselves -retreating as the rest of the Athenian army now came up. - -Meanwhile those who had at first fled for refuge to the city, seeing the -turn affairs were taking, now rallied from the town and formed against -the Athenians in front of them, sending also a part of their number to -the Circle on Epipolae, which they hoped to take while denuded of its -defenders. These took and destroyed the Athenian outwork of a thousand -feet, the Circle itself being saved by Nicias, who happened to have been -left in it through illness, and who now ordered the servants to set fire -to the engines and timber thrown down before the wall; want of men, as -he was aware, rendering all other means of escape impossible. This step -was justified by the result, the Syracusans not coming any further on -account of the fire, but retreating. Meanwhile succours were coming up -from the Athenians below, who had put to flight the troops opposed to -them; and the fleet also, according to orders, was sailing from Thapsus -into the great harbour. Seeing this, the troops on the heights retired -in haste, and the whole army of the Syracusans re-entered the city, -thinking that with their present force they would no longer be able to -hinder the wall reaching the sea. - -After this the Athenians set up a trophy and restored to the Syracusans -their dead under truce, receiving in return Lamachus and those who had -fallen with him. The whole of their forces, naval and military, being -now with them, they began from Epipolae and the cliffs and enclosed -the Syracusans with a double wall down to the sea. Provisions were now -brought in for the armament from all parts of Italy; and many of the -Sicels, who had hitherto been looking to see how things went, came as -allies to the Athenians: there also arrived three ships of fifty oars -from Tyrrhenia. Meanwhile everything else progressed favourably for -their hopes. The Syracusans began to despair of finding safety in arms, -no relief having reached them from Peloponnese, and were now proposing -terms of capitulation among themselves and to Nicias, who after the -death of Lamachus was left sole commander. No decision was come to, but, -as was natural with men in difficulties and besieged more straitly than -before, there was much discussion with Nicias and still more in the -town. Their present misfortunes had also made them suspicious of -one another; and the blame of their disasters was thrown upon the -ill-fortune or treachery of the generals under whose command they had -happened; and these were deposed and others, Heraclides, Eucles, and -Tellias, elected in their stead. - -Meanwhile the Lacedaemonian, Gylippus, and the ships from Corinth -were now off Leucas, intent upon going with all haste to the relief of -Sicily. The reports that reached them being of an alarming kind, and all -agreeing in the falsehood that Syracuse was already completely invested, -Gylippus abandoned all hope of Sicily, and wishing to save Italy, -rapidly crossed the Ionian Sea to Tarentum with the Corinthian, Pythen, -two Laconian, and two Corinthian vessels, leaving the Corinthians to -follow him after manning, in addition to their own ten, two Leucadian -and two Ambraciot ships. From Tarentum Gylippus first went on an embassy -to Thurii, and claimed anew the rights of citizenship which his father -had enjoyed; failing to bring over the townspeople, he weighed anchor -and coasted along Italy. Opposite the Terinaean Gulf he was caught -by the wind which blows violently and steadily from the north in that -quarter, and was carried out to sea; and after experiencing very rough -weather, remade Tarentum, where he hauled ashore and refitted such of -his ships as had suffered most from the tempest. Nicias heard of his -approach, but, like the Thurians, despised the scanty number of his -ships, and set down piracy as the only probable object of the voyage, -and so took no precautions for the present. - -About the same time in this summer, the Lacedaemonians invaded Argos -with their allies, and laid waste most of the country. The Athenians -went with thirty ships to the relief of the Argives, thus breaking their -treaty with the Lacedaemonians in the most overt manner. Up to this time -incursions from Pylos, descents on the coast of the rest of Peloponnese, -instead of on the Laconian, had been the extent of their co-operation -with the Argives and Mantineans; and although the Argives had often -begged them to land, if only for a moment, with their heavy infantry in -Laconia, lay waste ever so little of it with them, and depart, they had -always refused to do so. Now, however, under the command of Phytodorus, -Laespodius, and Demaratus, they landed at Epidaurus Limera, Prasiae, -and other places, and plundered the country; and thus furnished the -Lacedaemonians with a better pretext for hostilities against Athens. -After the Athenians had retired from Argos with their fleet, and the -Lacedaemonians also, the Argives made an incursion into the Phlisaid, -and returned home after ravaging their land and killing some of the -inhabitants. - - - - -BOOK VII - -CHAPTER XXI - -_Eighteenth and Nineteenth Years of the War--Arrival of Gylippus at -Syracuse--Fortification of Decelea--Successes of the Syracusans_ - -After refitting their ships, Gylippus and Pythen coasted along from -Tarentum to Epizephyrian Locris. They now received the more correct -information that Syracuse was not yet completely invested, but that -it was still possible for an army arriving at Epipolae to effect an -entrance; and they consulted, accordingly, whether they should keep -Sicily on their right and risk sailing in by sea, or, leaving it on -their left, should first sail to Himera and, taking with them the -Himeraeans and any others that might agree to join them, go to Syracuse -by land. Finally they determined to sail for Himera, especially as the -four Athenian ships which Nicias had at length sent off, on hearing that -they were at Locris, had not yet arrived at Rhegium. Accordingly, before -these reached their post, the Peloponnesians crossed the strait and, -after touching at Rhegium and Messina, came to Himera. Arrived there, -they persuaded the Himeraeans to join in the war, and not only to go -with them themselves but to provide arms for the seamen from their -vessels which they had drawn ashore at Himera; and they sent and -appointed a place for the Selinuntines to meet them with all their -forces. A few troops were also promised by the Geloans and some of the -Sicels, who were now ready to join them with much greater alacrity, -owing to the recent death of Archonidas, a powerful Sicel king in that -neighbourhood and friendly to Athens, and owing also to the vigour shown -by Gylippus in coming from Lacedaemon. Gylippus now took with him about -seven hundred of his sailors and marines, that number only having arms, -a thousand heavy infantry and light troops from Himera with a body of -a hundred horse, some light troops and cavalry from Selinus, a few -Geloans, and Sicels numbering a thousand in all, and set out on his -march for Syracuse. - -Meanwhile the Corinthian fleet from Leucas made all haste to arrive; and -one of their commanders, Gongylus, starting last with a single ship, was -the first to reach Syracuse, a little before Gylippus. Gongylus found -the Syracusans on the point of holding an assembly to consider whether -they should put an end to the war. This he prevented, and reassured -them by telling them that more vessels were still to arrive, and that -Gylippus, son of Cleandridas, had been dispatched by the Lacedaemonians -to take the command. Upon this the Syracusans took courage, and -immediately marched out with all their forces to meet Gylippus, who they -found was now close at hand. Meanwhile Gylippus, after taking Ietae, a -fort of the Sicels, on his way, formed his army in order of battle, and -so arrived at Epipolae, and ascending by Euryelus, as the Athenians had -done at first, now advanced with the Syracusans against the Athenian -lines. His arrival chanced at a critical moment. The Athenians had -already finished a double wall of six or seven furlongs to the great -harbour, with the exception of a small portion next the sea, which they -were still engaged upon; and in the remainder of the circle towards -Trogilus on the other sea, stones had been laid ready for building for -the greater part of the distance, and some points had been left half -finished, while others were entirely completed. The danger of Syracuse -had indeed been great. - -Meanwhile the Athenians, recovering from the confusion into which -they had been first thrown by the sudden approach of Gylippus and -the Syracusans, formed in order of battle. Gylippus halted at a short -distance off and sent on a herald to tell them that, if they would -evacuate Sicily with bag and baggage within five days' time, he -was willing to make a truce accordingly. The Athenians treated this -proposition with contempt, and dismissed the herald without an answer. -After this both sides began to prepare for action. Gylippus, observing -that the Syracusans were in disorder and did not easily fall into line, -drew off his troops more into the open ground, while Nicias did not lead -on the Athenians but lay still by his own wall. When Gylippus saw that -they did not come on, he led off his army to the citadel of the quarter -of Apollo Temenites, and passed the night there. On the following day -he led out the main body of his army, and, drawing them up in order of -battle before the walls of the Athenians to prevent their going to the -relief of any other quarter, dispatched a strong force against Fort -Labdalum, and took it, and put all whom he found in it to the sword, -the place not being within sight of the Athenians. On the same day an -Athenian galley that lay moored off the harbour was captured by the -Syracusans. - -After this the Syracusans and their allies began to carry a single wall, -starting from the city, in a slanting direction up Epipolae, in order -that the Athenians, unless they could hinder the work, might be no -longer able to invest them. Meanwhile the Athenians, having now finished -their wall down to the sea, had come up to the heights; and part of -their wall being weak, Gylippus drew out his army by night and attacked -it. However, the Athenians who happened to be bivouacking outside took -the alarm and came out to meet him, upon seeing which he quickly led his -men back again. The Athenians now built their wall higher, and in future -kept guard at this point themselves, disposing their confederates along -the remainder of the works, at the stations assigned to them. Nicias -also determined to fortify Plemmyrium, a promontory over against the -city, which juts out and narrows the mouth of the Great Harbour. He -thought that the fortification of this place would make it easier to -bring in supplies, as they would be able to carry on their blockade from -a less distance, near to the port occupied by the Syracusans; instead -of being obliged, upon every movement of the enemy's navy, to put out -against them from the bottom of the great harbour. Besides this, he now -began to pay more attention to the war by sea, seeing that the coming -of Gylippus had diminished their hopes by land. Accordingly, he conveyed -over his ships and some troops, and built three forts in which he placed -most of his baggage, and moored there for the future the larger craft -and men-of-war. This was the first and chief occasion of the losses -which the crews experienced. The water which they used was scarce -and had to be fetched from far, and the sailors could not go out for -firewood without being cut off by the Syracusan horse, who were masters -of the country; a third of the enemy's cavalry being stationed at the -little town of Olympieum, to prevent plundering incursions on the part -of the Athenians at Plemmyrium. Meanwhile Nicias learned that the rest -of the Corinthian fleet was approaching, and sent twenty ships to watch -for them, with orders to be on the look-out for them about Locris and -Rhegium and the approach to Sicily. - -Gylippus, meanwhile, went on with the wall across Epipolae, using the -stones which the Athenians had laid down for their own wall, and at the -same time constantly led out the Syracusans and their allies, and formed -them in order of battle in front of the lines, the Athenians forming -against him. At last he thought that the moment was come, and began the -attack; and a hand-to-hand fight ensued between the lines, where the -Syracusan cavalry could be of no use; and the Syracusans and their -allies were defeated and took up their dead under truce, while the -Athenians erected a trophy. After this Gylippus called the soldiers -together, and said that the fault was not theirs but his; he had kept -their lines too much within the works, and had thus deprived them of -the services of their cavalry and darters. He would now, therefore, lead -them on a second time. He begged them to remember that in material force -they would be fully a match for their opponents, while, with respect -to moral advantages, it were intolerable if Peloponnesians and Dorians -should not feel confident of overcoming Ionians and islanders with the -motley rabble that accompanied them, and of driving them out of the -country. - -After this he embraced the first opportunity that offered of again -leading them against the enemy. Now Nicias and the Athenians held the -opinion that even if the Syracusans should not wish to offer battle, it -was necessary for them to prevent the building of the cross wall, as it -already almost overlapped the extreme point of their own, and if it went -any further it would from that moment make no difference whether they -fought ever so many successful actions, or never fought at all. They -accordingly came out to meet the Syracusans. Gylippus led out his heavy -infantry further from the fortifications than on the former occasion, -and so joined battle; posting his horse and darters upon the flank -of the Athenians in the open space, where the works of the two walls -terminated. During the engagement the cavalry attacked and routed the -left wing of the Athenians, which was opposed to them; and the rest -of the Athenian army was in consequence defeated by the Syracusans and -driven headlong within their lines. The night following the Syracusans -carried their wall up to the Athenian works and passed them, thus -putting it out of their power any longer to stop them, and depriving -them, even if victorious in the field, of all chance of investing the -city for the future. - -After this the remaining twelve vessels of the Corinthians, Ambraciots, -and Leucadians sailed into the harbour under the command of Erasinides, -a Corinthian, having eluded the Athenian ships on guard, and helped -the Syracusans in completing the remainder of the cross wall. Meanwhile -Gylippus went into the rest of Sicily to raise land and naval forces, -and also to bring over any of the cities that either were lukewarm in -the cause or had hitherto kept out of the war altogether. Syracusan and -Corinthian envoys were also dispatched to Lacedaemon and Corinth to get -a fresh force sent over, in any way that might offer, either in -merchant vessels or transports, or in any other manner likely to prove -successful, as the Athenians too were sending for reinforcements; while -the Syracusans proceeded to man a fleet and to exercise, meaning to -try their fortune in this way also, and generally became exceedingly -confident. - -Nicias perceiving this, and seeing the strength of the enemy and his -own difficulties daily increasing, himself also sent to Athens. He had -before sent frequent reports of events as they occurred, and felt it -especially incumbent upon him to do so now, as he thought that they were -in a critical position, and that, unless speedily recalled or strongly -reinforced from home, they had no hope of safety. He feared, however, -that the messengers, either through inability to speak, or through -failure of memory, or from a wish to please the multitude, might not -report the truth, and so thought it best to write a letter, to ensure -that the Athenians should know his own opinion without its being lost in -transmission, and be able to decide upon the real facts of the case. - -His emissaries, accordingly, departed with the letter and the requisite -verbal instructions; and he attended to the affairs of the army, making -it his aim now to keep on the defensive and to avoid any unnecessary -danger. - -At the close of the same summer the Athenian general Euetion marched -in concert with Perdiccas with a large body of Thracians against -Amphipolis, and failing to take it brought some galleys round into -the Strymon, and blockaded the town from the river, having his base at -Himeraeum. - -Summer was now over. The winter ensuing, the persons sent by Nicias, -reaching Athens, gave the verbal messages which had been entrusted to -them, and answered any questions that were asked them, and delivered -the letter. The clerk of the city now came forward and read out to the -Athenians the letter, which was as follows: - -"Our past operations, Athenians, have been made known to you by many -other letters; it is now time for you to become equally familiar with -our present condition, and to take your measures accordingly. We had -defeated in most of our engagements with them the Syracusans, against -whom we were sent, and we had built the works which we now occupy, when -Gylippus arrived from Lacedaemon with an army obtained from Peloponnese -and from some of the cities in Sicily. In our first battle with him we -were victorious; in the battle on the following day we were overpowered -by a multitude of cavalry and darters, and compelled to retire within -our lines. We have now, therefore, been forced by the numbers of those -opposed to us to discontinue the work of circumvallation, and to remain -inactive; being unable to make use even of all the force we have, since -a large portion of our heavy infantry is absorbed in the defence of our -lines. Meanwhile the enemy have carried a single wall past our lines, -thus making it impossible for us to invest them in future, until this -cross wall be attacked by a strong force and captured. So that the -besieger in name has become, at least from the land side, the besieged -in reality; as we are prevented by their cavalry from even going for any -distance into the country. - -"Besides this, an embassy has been dispatched to Peloponnese to procure -reinforcements, and Gylippus has gone to the cities in Sicily, partly -in the hope of inducing those that are at present neutral to join him in -the war, partly of bringing from his allies additional contingents for -the land forces and material for the navy. For I understand that they -contemplate a combined attack, upon our lines with their land forces and -with their fleet by sea. You must none of you be surprised that I say by -sea also. They have discovered that the length of the time we have now -been in commission has rotted our ships and wasted our crews, and that -with the entireness of our crews and the soundness of our ships the -pristine efficiency of our navy has departed. For it is impossible -for us to haul our ships ashore and careen them, because, the -enemy's vessels being as many or more than our own, we are constantly -anticipating an attack. Indeed, they may be seen exercising, and it lies -with them to take the initiative; and not having to maintain a blockade, -they have greater facilities for drying their ships. - -"This we should scarcely be able to do, even if we had plenty of ships -to spare, and were freed from our present necessity of exhausting all -our strength upon the blockade. For it is already difficult to carry -in supplies past Syracuse; and were we to relax our vigilance in the -slightest degree it would become impossible. The losses which our crews -have suffered and still continue to suffer arise from the following -causes. Expeditions for fuel and for forage, and the distance from -which water has to be fetched, cause our sailors to be cut off by the -Syracusan cavalry; the loss of our previous superiority emboldens our -slaves to desert; our foreign seamen are impressed by the unexpected -appearance of a navy against us, and the strength of the enemy's -resistance; such of them as were pressed into the service take the -first opportunity of departing to their respective cities; such as were -originally seduced by the temptation of high pay, and expected little -fighting and large gains, leave us either by desertion to the enemy -or by availing themselves of one or other of the various facilities of -escape which the magnitude of Sicily affords them. Some even engage in -trade themselves and prevail upon the captains to take Hyccaric slaves -on board in their place; thus they have ruined the efficiency of our -navy. - -"Now I need not remind you that the time during which a crew is in its -prime is short, and that the number of sailors who can start a ship on -her way and keep the rowing in time is small. But by far my greatest -trouble is, that holding the post which I do, I am prevented by the -natural indocility of the Athenian seaman from putting a stop to these -evils; and that meanwhile we have no source from which to recruit our -crews, which the enemy can do from many quarters, but are compelled to -depend both for supplying the crews in service and for making good -our losses upon the men whom we brought with us. For our present -confederates, Naxos and Catana, are incapable of supplying us. There is -only one thing more wanting to our opponents, I mean the defection of -our Italian markets. If they were to see you neglect to relieve us from -our present condition, and were to go over to the enemy, famine would -compel us to evacuate, and Syracuse would finish the war without a blow. - -"I might, it is true, have written to you something different and -more agreeable than this, but nothing certainly more useful, if it is -desirable for you to know the real state of things here before taking -your measures. Besides I know that it is your nature to love to be -told the best side of things, and then to blame the teller if the -expectations which he has raised in your minds are not answered by the -result; and I therefore thought it safest to declare to you the truth. - -"Now you are not to think that either your generals or your soldiers -have ceased to be a match for the forces originally opposed to them. -But you are to reflect that a general Sicilian coalition is being formed -against us; that a fresh army is expected from Peloponnese, while the -force we have here is unable to cope even with our present antagonists; -and you must promptly decide either to recall us or to send out to us -another fleet and army as numerous again, with a large sum of money, -and someone to succeed me, as a disease in the kidneys unfits me for -retaining my post. I have, I think, some claim on your indulgence, as -while I was in my prime I did you much good service in my commands. But -whatever you mean to do, do it at the commencement of spring and without -delay, as the enemy will obtain his Sicilian reinforcements shortly, -those from Peloponnese after a longer interval; and unless you attend -to the matter the former will be here before you, while the latter will -elude you as they have done before." - -Such were the contents of Nicias's letter. When the Athenians had heard -it they refused to accept his resignation, but chose him two colleagues, -naming Menander and Euthydemus, two of the officers at the seat of war, -to fill their places until their arrival, that Nicias might not be left -alone in his sickness to bear the whole weight of affairs. They also -voted to send out another army and navy, drawn partly from the Athenians -on the muster-roll, partly from the allies. The colleagues chosen for -Nicias were Demosthenes, son of Alcisthenes, and Eurymedon, son of -Thucles. Eurymedon was sent off at once, about the time of the winter -solstice, with ten ships, a hundred and twenty talents of silver, and -instructions to tell the army that reinforcements would arrive, and that -care would be taken of them; but Demosthenes stayed behind to organize -the expedition, meaning to start as soon as it was spring, and sent for -troops to the allies, and meanwhile got together money, ships, and heavy -infantry at home. - -The Athenians also sent twenty vessels round Peloponnese to prevent -any one crossing over to Sicily from Corinth or Peloponnese. For the -Corinthians, filled with confidence by the favourable alteration in -Sicilian affairs which had been reported by the envoys upon their -arrival, and convinced that the fleet which they had before sent out -had not been without its use, were now preparing to dispatch a force of -heavy infantry in merchant vessels to Sicily, while the Lacedaemonians -did the like for the rest of Peloponnese. The Corinthians also manned -a fleet of twenty-five vessels, intending to try the result of a battle -with the squadron on guard at Naupactus, and meanwhile to make it -less easy for the Athenians there to hinder the departure of their -merchantmen, by obliging them to keep an eye upon the galleys thus -arrayed against them. - -In the meantime the Lacedaemonians prepared for their invasion of -Attica, in accordance with their own previous resolve, and at the -instigation of the Syracusans and Corinthians, who wished for an -invasion to arrest the reinforcements which they heard that Athens -was about to send to Sicily. Alcibiades also urgently advised the -fortification of Decelea, and a vigorous prosecution of the war. But the -Lacedaemonians derived most encouragement from the belief that -Athens, with two wars on her hands, against themselves and against the -Siceliots, would be more easy to subdue, and from the conviction that -she had been the first to infringe the truce. In the former war, they -considered, the offence had been more on their own side, both on account -of the entrance of the Thebans into Plataea in time of peace, and also -of their own refusal to listen to the Athenian offer of arbitration, in -spite of the clause in the former treaty that where arbitration should -be offered there should be no appeal to arms. For this reason they -thought that they deserved their misfortunes, and took to heart -seriously the disaster at Pylos and whatever else had befallen them. -But when, besides the ravages from Pylos, which went on without any -intermission, the thirty Athenian ships came out from Argos and wasted -part of Epidaurus, Prasiae, and other places; when upon every dispute -that arose as to the interpretation of any doubtful point in the treaty, -their own offers of arbitration were always rejected by the Athenians, -the Lacedaemonians at length decided that Athens had now committed the -very same offence as they had before done, and had become the guilty -party; and they began to be full of ardour for the war. They spent this -winter in sending round to their allies for iron, and in getting ready -the other implements for building their fort; and meanwhile began -raising at home, and also by forced requisitions in the rest of -Peloponnese, a force to be sent out in the merchantmen to their allies -in Sicily. Winter thus ended, and with it the eighteenth year of this -war of which Thucydides is the historian. - -In the first days of the spring following, at an earlier period than -usual, the Lacedaemonians and their allies invaded Attica, under the -command of Agis, son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. They -began by devastating the parts bordering upon the plain, and next -proceeded to fortify Decelea, dividing the work among the different -cities. Decelea is about thirteen or fourteen miles from the city of -Athens, and the same distance or not much further from Boeotia; and the -fort was meant to annoy the plain and the richest parts of the country, -being in sight of Athens. While the Peloponnesians and their allies in -Attica were engaged in the work of fortification, their countrymen -at home sent off, at about the same time, the heavy infantry in the -merchant vessels to Sicily; the Lacedaemonians furnishing a picked force -of Helots and Neodamodes (or freedmen), six hundred heavy infantry in -all, under the command of Eccritus, a Spartan; and the Boeotians three -hundred heavy infantry, commanded by two Thebans, Xenon and Nicon, and -by Hegesander, a Thespian. These were among the first to put out into -the open sea, starting from Taenarus in Laconia. Not long after their -departure the Corinthians sent off a force of five hundred heavy -infantry, consisting partly of men from Corinth itself, and partly -of Arcadian mercenaries, placed under the command of Alexarchus, a -Corinthian. The Sicyonians also sent off two hundred heavy infantry at -same time as the Corinthians, under the command of Sargeus, a Sicyonian. -Meantime the five-and-twenty vessels manned by Corinth during the winter -lay confronting the twenty Athenian ships at Naupactus until the heavy -infantry in the merchantmen were fairly on their way from Peloponnese; -thus fulfilling the object for which they had been manned originally, -which was to divert the attention of the Athenians from the merchantmen -to the galleys. - -During this time the Athenians were not idle. Simultaneously with the -fortification of Decelea, at the very beginning of spring, they sent -thirty ships round Peloponnese, under Charicles, son of Apollodorus, -with instructions to call at Argos and demand a force of their heavy -infantry for the fleet, agreeably to the alliance. At the same time -they dispatched Demosthenes to Sicily, as they had intended, with sixty -Athenian and five Chian vessels, twelve hundred Athenian heavy infantry -from the muster-roll, and as many of the islanders as could be raised -in the different quarters, drawing upon the other subject allies for -whatever they could supply that would be of use for the war. Demosthenes -was instructed first to sail round with Charicles and to operate with -him upon the coasts of Laconia, and accordingly sailed to Aegina and -there waited for the remainder of his armament, and for Charicles to -fetch the Argive troops. - -In Sicily, about the same time in this spring, Gylippus came to Syracuse -with as many troops as he could bring from the cities which he had -persuaded to join. Calling the Syracusans together, he told them -that they must man as many ships as possible, and try their hand at -a sea-fight, by which he hoped to achieve an advantage in the war not -unworthy of the risk. With him Hermocrates actively joined in trying to -encourage his countrymen to attack the Athenians at sea, saying that the -latter had not inherited their naval prowess nor would they retain -it for ever; they had been landsmen even to a greater degree than the -Syracusans, and had only become a maritime power when obliged by the -Mede. Besides, to daring spirits like the Athenians, a daring adversary -would seem the most formidable; and the Athenian plan of paralysing by -the boldness of their attack a neighbour often not their inferior in -strength could now be used against them with as good effect by the -Syracusans. He was convinced also that the unlooked-for spectacle of -Syracusans daring to face the Athenian navy would cause a terror to the -enemy, the advantages of which would far outweigh any loss that Athenian -science might inflict upon their inexperience. He accordingly urged -them to throw aside their fears and to try their fortune at sea; and the -Syracusans, under the influence of Gylippus and Hermocrates, and perhaps -some others, made up their minds for the sea-fight and began to man -their vessels. - -When the fleet was ready, Gylippus led out the whole army by night; his -plan being to assault in person the forts on Plemmyrium by land, while -thirty-five Syracusan galleys sailed according to appointment against -the enemy from the great harbour, and the forty-five remaining came -round from the lesser harbour, where they had their arsenal, in order -to effect a junction with those inside and simultaneously to attack -Plemmyrium, and thus to distract the Athenians by assaulting them on -two sides at once. The Athenians quickly manned sixty ships, and with -twenty-five of these engaged the thirty-five of the Syracusans in the -great harbour, sending the rest to meet those sailing round from the -arsenal; and an action now ensued directly in front of the mouth of the -great harbour, maintained with equal tenacity on both sides; the one -wishing to force the passage, the other to prevent them. - -In the meantime, while the Athenians in Plemmyrium were down at the sea, -attending to the engagement, Gylippus made a sudden attack on the forts -in the early morning and took the largest first, and afterwards the two -smaller, whose garrisons did not wait for him, seeing the largest -so easily taken. At the fall of the first fort, the men from it who -succeeded in taking refuge in their boats and merchantmen, found great -difficulty in reaching the camp, as the Syracusans were having the best -of it in the engagement in the great harbour, and sent a fast-sailing -galley to pursue them. But when the two others fell, the Syracusans were -now being defeated; and the fugitives from these sailed alongshore with -more ease. The Syracusan ships fighting off the mouth of the harbour -forced their way through the Athenian vessels and sailing in without -any order fell foul of one another, and transferred the victory to the -Athenians; who not only routed the squadron in question, but also that -by which they were at first being defeated in the harbour, sinking -eleven of the Syracusan vessels and killing most of the men, except -the crews of three ships whom they made prisoners. Their own loss was -confined to three vessels; and after hauling ashore the Syracusan wrecks -and setting up a trophy upon the islet in front of Plemmyrium, they -retired to their own camp. - -Unsuccessful at sea, the Syracusans had nevertheless the forts in -Plemmyrium, for which they set up three trophies. One of the two last -taken they razed, but put in order and garrisoned the two others. In the -capture of the forts a great many men were killed and made prisoners, -and a great quantity of property was taken in all. As the Athenians had -used them as a magazine, there was a large stock of goods and corn of -the merchants inside, and also a large stock belonging to the captains; -the masts and other furniture of forty galleys being taken, besides -three galleys which had been drawn up on shore. Indeed the first and -chiefest cause of the ruin of the Athenian army was the capture of -Plemmyrium; even the entrance of the harbour being now no longer safe -for carrying in provisions, as the Syracusan vessels were stationed -there to prevent it, and nothing could be brought in without fighting; -besides the general impression of dismay and discouragement produced -upon the army. - -After this the Syracusans sent out twelve ships under the command -of Agatharchus, a Syracusan. One of these went to Peloponnese with -ambassadors to describe the hopeful state of their affairs, and to -incite the Peloponnesians to prosecute the war there even more actively -than they were now doing, while the eleven others sailed to Italy, -hearing that vessels laden with stores were on their way to the -Athenians. After falling in with and destroying most of the vessels in -question, and burning in the Caulonian territory a quantity of timber -for shipbuilding, which had been got ready for the Athenians, the -Syracusan squadron went to Locri, and one of the merchantmen from -Peloponnese coming in, while they were at anchor there, carrying -Thespian heavy infantry, took these on board and sailed alongshore -towards home. The Athenians were on the look-out for them with twenty -ships at Megara, but were only able to take one vessel with its crew; -the rest getting clear off to Syracuse. There was also some skirmishing -in the harbour about the piles which the Syracusans had driven in the -sea in front of the old docks, to allow their ships to lie at anchor -inside, without being hurt by the Athenians sailing up and running them -down. The Athenians brought up to them a ship of ten thousand talents -burden furnished with wooden turrets and screens, and fastened ropes -round the piles from their boats, wrenched them up and broke them, or -dived down and sawed them in two. Meanwhile the Syracusans plied them -with missiles from the docks, to which they replied from their large -vessel; until at last most of the piles were removed by the Athenians. -But the most awkward part of the stockade was the part out of sight: -some of the piles which had been driven in did not appear above water, -so that it was dangerous to sail up, for fear of running the ships upon -them, just as upon a reef, through not seeing them. However divers went -down and sawed off even these for reward; although the Syracusans drove -in others. Indeed there was no end to the contrivances to which they -resorted against each other, as might be expected between two hostile -armies confronting each other at such a short distance: and skirmishes -and all kinds of other attempts were of constant occurrence. Meanwhile -the Syracusans sent embassies to the cities, composed of Corinthians, -Ambraciots, and Lacedaemonians, to tell them of the capture of -Plemmyrium, and that their defeat in the sea-fight was due less to the -strength of the enemy than to their own disorder; and generally, to let -them know that they were full of hope, and to desire them to come to -their help with ships and troops, as the Athenians were expected with a -fresh army, and if the one already there could be destroyed before the -other arrived, the war would be at an end. - -While the contending parties in Sicily were thus engaged, Demosthenes, -having now got together the armament with which he was to go to the -island, put out from Aegina, and making sail for Peloponnese, joined -Charicles and the thirty ships of the Athenians. Taking on board the -heavy infantry from Argos they sailed to Laconia, and, after first -plundering part of Epidaurus Limera, landed on the coast of Laconia, -opposite Cythera, where the temple of Apollo stands, and, laying waste -part of the country, fortified a sort of isthmus, to which the Helots of -the Lacedaemonians might desert, and from whence plundering incursions -might be made as from Pylos. Demosthenes helped to occupy this place, -and then immediately sailed on to Corcyra to take up some of the -allies in that island, and so to proceed without delay to Sicily; while -Charicles waited until he had completed the fortification of the place -and, leaving a garrison there, returned home subsequently with his -thirty ships and the Argives also. - -This same summer arrived at Athens thirteen hundred targeteers, Thracian -swordsmen of the tribe of the Dii, who were to have sailed to Sicily -with Demosthenes. Since they had come too late, the Athenians determined -to send them back to Thrace, whence they had come; to keep them for -the Decelean war appearing too expensive, as the pay of each man was -a drachma a day. Indeed since Decelea had been first fortified by the -whole Peloponnesian army during this summer, and then occupied for the -annoyance of the country by the garrisons from the cities relieving -each other at stated intervals, it had been doing great mischief to the -Athenians; in fact this occupation, by the destruction of property and -loss of men which resulted from it, was one of the principal causes of -their ruin. Previously the invasions were short, and did not prevent -their enjoying their land during the rest of the time: the enemy was now -permanently fixed in Attica; at one time it was an attack in force, at -another it was the regular garrison overrunning the country and making -forays for its subsistence, and the Lacedaemonian king, Agis, was in the -field and diligently prosecuting the war; great mischief was therefore -done to the Athenians. They were deprived of their whole country: more -than twenty thousand slaves had deserted, a great part of them artisans, -and all their sheep and beasts of burden were lost; and as the cavalry -rode out daily upon excursions to Decelea and to guard the country, -their horses were either lamed by being constantly worked upon rocky -ground, or wounded by the enemy. - -Besides, the transport of provisions from Euboea, which had before been -carried on so much more quickly overland by Decelea from Oropus, was now -effected at great cost by sea round Sunium; everything the city required -had to be imported from abroad, and instead of a city it became a -fortress. Summer and winter the Athenians were worn out by having to -keep guard on the fortifications, during the day by turns, by night all -together, the cavalry excepted, at the different military posts or upon -the wall. But what most oppressed them was that they had two wars at -once, and had thus reached a pitch of frenzy which no one would have -believed possible if he had heard of it before it had come to pass. -For could any one have imagined that even when besieged by the -Peloponnesians entrenched in Attica, they would still, instead of -withdrawing from Sicily, stay on there besieging in like manner -Syracuse, a town (taken as a town) in no way inferior to Athens, or -would so thoroughly upset the Hellenic estimate of their strength and -audacity, as to give the spectacle of a people which, at the beginning -of the war, some thought might hold out one year, some two, none more -than three, if the Peloponnesians invaded their country, now seventeen -years after the first invasion, after having already suffered from all -the evils of war, going to Sicily and undertaking a new war nothing -inferior to that which they already had with the Peloponnesians? These -causes, the great losses from Decelea, and the other heavy charges that -fell upon them, produced their financial embarrassment; and it was at -this time that they imposed upon their subjects, instead of the tribute, -the tax of a twentieth upon all imports and exports by sea, which they -thought would bring them in more money; their expenditure being now not -the same as at first, but having grown with the war while their revenues -decayed. - -Accordingly, not wishing to incur expense in their present want of -money, they sent back at once the Thracians who came too late for -Demosthenes, under the conduct of Diitrephes, who was instructed, as -they were to pass through the Euripus, to make use of them if possible -in the voyage alongshore to injure the enemy. Diitrephes first landed -them at Tanagra and hastily snatched some booty; he then sailed across -the Euripus in the evening from Chalcis in Euboea and disembarking in -Boeotia led them against Mycalessus. The night he passed unobserved -near the temple of Hermes, not quite two miles from Mycalessus, and -at daybreak assaulted and took the town, which is not a large one; the -inhabitants being off their guard and not expecting that any one would -ever come up so far from the sea to molest them, the wall too being -weak, and in some places having tumbled down, while in others it had -not been built to any height, and the gates also being left open through -their feeling of security. The Thracians bursting into Mycalessus sacked -the houses and temples, and butchered the inhabitants, sparing neither -youth nor age, but killing all they fell in with, one after the other, -children and women, and even beasts of burden, and whatever other -living creatures they saw; the Thracian race, like the bloodiest of the -barbarians, being even more so when it has nothing to fear. Everywhere -confusion reigned and death in all its shapes; and in particular they -attacked a boys' school, the largest that there was in the place, into -which the children had just gone, and massacred them all. In short, the -disaster falling upon the whole town was unsurpassed in magnitude, and -unapproached by any in suddenness and in horror. - -Meanwhile the Thebans heard of it and marched to the rescue, and -overtaking the Thracians before they had gone far, recovered the plunder -and drove them in panic to the Euripus and the sea, where the vessels -which brought them were lying. The greatest slaughter took place while -they were embarking, as they did not know how to swim, and those in -the vessels on seeing what was going on on on shore moored them out -of bowshot: in the rest of the retreat the Thracians made a very -respectable defence against the Theban horse, by which they were first -attacked, dashing out and closing their ranks according to the tactics -of their country, and lost only a few men in that part of the affair. A -good number who were after plunder were actually caught in the town and -put to death. Altogether the Thracians had two hundred and fifty killed -out of thirteen hundred, the Thebans and the rest who came to the rescue -about twenty, troopers and heavy infantry, with Scirphondas, one of -the Boeotarchs. The Mycalessians lost a large proportion of their -population. - -While Mycalessus thus experienced a calamity for its extent as -lamentable as any that happened in the war, Demosthenes, whom we left -sailing to Corcyra, after the building of the fort in Laconia, found -a merchantman lying at Phea in Elis, in which the Corinthian heavy -infantry were to cross to Sicily. The ship he destroyed, but the men -escaped, and subsequently got another in which they pursued their -voyage. After this, arriving at Zacynthus and Cephallenia, he took a -body of heavy infantry on board, and sending for some of the Messenians -from Naupactus, crossed over to the opposite coast of Acarnania, to -Alyzia, and to Anactorium which was held by the Athenians. While he was -in these parts he was met by Eurymedon returning from Sicily, where he -had been sent, as has been mentioned, during the winter, with the money -for the army, who told him the news, and also that he had heard, while -at sea, that the Syracusans had taken Plemmyrium. Here, also, Conon -came to them, the commander at Naupactus, with news that the twenty-five -Corinthian ships stationed opposite to him, far from giving over the -war, were meditating an engagement; and he therefore begged them to send -him some ships, as his own eighteen were not a match for the enemy's -twenty-five. Demosthenes and Eurymedon, accordingly, sent ten of their -best sailers with Conon to reinforce the squadron at Naupactus, and -meanwhile prepared for the muster of their forces; Eurymedon, who was -now the colleague of Demosthenes, and had turned back in consequence of -his appointment, sailing to Corcyra to tell them to man fifteen ships -and to enlist heavy infantry; while Demosthenes raised slingers and -darters from the parts about Acarnania. - -Meanwhile the envoys, already mentioned, who had gone from Syracuse -to the cities after the capture of Plemmyrium, had succeeded in their -mission, and were about to bring the army that they had collected, when -Nicias got scent of it, and sent to the Centoripae and Alicyaeans and -other of the friendly Sicels, who held the passes, not to let the enemy -through, but to combine to prevent their passing, there being no other -way by which they could even attempt it, as the Agrigentines would not -give them a passage through their country. Agreeably to this request the -Sicels laid a triple ambuscade for the Siceliots upon their march, -and attacking them suddenly, while off their guard, killed about eight -hundred of them and all the envoys, the Corinthian only excepted, by -whom fifteen hundred who escaped were conducted to Syracuse. - -About the same time the Camarinaeans also came to the assistance of -Syracuse with five hundred heavy infantry, three hundred darters, and as -many archers, while the Geloans sent crews for five ships, four hundred -darters, and two hundred horse. Indeed almost the whole of Sicily, -except the Agrigentines, who were neutral, now ceased merely to watch -events as it had hitherto done, and actively joined Syracuse against the -Athenians. - -While the Syracusans after the Sicel disaster put off any immediate -attack upon the Athenians, Demosthenes and Eurymedon, whose forces from -Corcyra and the continent were now ready, crossed the Ionian Gulf with -all their armament to the Iapygian promontory, and starting from thence -touched at the Choerades Isles lying off Iapygia, where they took on -board a hundred and fifty Iapygian darters of the Messapian tribe, and -after renewing an old friendship with Artas the chief, who had furnished -them with the darters, arrived at Metapontium in Italy. Here they -persuaded their allies the Metapontines to send with them three hundred -darters and two galleys, and with this reinforcement coasted on to -Thurii, where they found the party hostile to Athens recently expelled -by a revolution, and accordingly remained there to muster and review the -whole army, to see if any had been left behind, and to prevail upon -the Thurians resolutely to join them in their expedition, and in the -circumstances in which they found themselves to conclude a defensive and -offensive alliance with the Athenians. - -About the same time the Peloponnesians in the twenty-five ships -stationed opposite to the squadron at Naupactus to protect the passage -of the transports to Sicily had got ready for engaging, and manning -some additional vessels, so as to be numerically little inferior to the -Athenians, anchored off Erineus in Achaia in the Rhypic country. The -place off which they lay being in the form of a crescent, the land -forces furnished by the Corinthians and their allies on the spot came -up and ranged themselves upon the projecting headlands on either side, -while the fleet, under the command of Polyanthes, a Corinthian, held -the intervening space and blocked up the entrance. The Athenians under -Diphilus now sailed out against them with thirty-three ships from -Naupactus, and the Corinthians, at first not moving, at length thought -they saw their opportunity, raised the signal, and advanced and engaged -the Athenians. After an obstinate struggle, the Corinthians lost three -ships, and without sinking any altogether, disabled seven of the enemy, -which were struck prow to prow and had their foreships stove in by the -Corinthian vessels, whose cheeks had been strengthened for this very -purpose. After an action of this even character, in which either party -could claim the victory (although the Athenians became masters of the -wrecks through the wind driving them out to sea, the Corinthians not -putting out again to meet them), the two combatants parted. No pursuit -took place, and no prisoners were made on either side; the Corinthians -and Peloponnesians who were fighting near the shore escaping with ease, -and none of the Athenian vessels having been sunk. The Athenians now -sailed back to Naupactus, and the Corinthians immediately set up a -trophy as victors, because they had disabled a greater number of the -enemy's ships. Moreover they held that they had not been worsted, for -the very same reason that their opponent held that he had not been -victorious; the Corinthians considering that they were conquerors, -if not decidedly conquered, and the Athenians thinking themselves -vanquished, because not decidedly victorious. However, when the -Peloponnesians sailed off and their land forces had dispersed, the -Athenians also set up a trophy as victors in Achaia, about two miles and -a quarter from Erineus, the Corinthian station. - -This was the termination of the action at Naupactus. To return to -Demosthenes and Eurymedon: the Thurians having now got ready to join -in the expedition with seven hundred heavy infantry and three hundred -darters, the two generals ordered the ships to sail along the coast to -the Crotonian territory, and meanwhile held a review of all the land -forces upon the river Sybaris, and then led them through the Thurian -country. Arrived at the river Hylias, they here received a message -from the Crotonians, saying that they would not allow the army to pass -through their country; upon which the Athenians descended towards the -shore, and bivouacked near the sea and the mouth of the Hylias, where -the fleet also met them, and the next day embarked and sailed along the -coast touching at all the cities except Locri, until they came to Petra -in the Rhegian territory. - -Meanwhile the Syracusans hearing of their approach resolved to make a -second attempt with their fleet and their other forces on shore, which -they had been collecting for this very purpose in order to do something -before their arrival. In addition to other improvements suggested by the -former sea-fight which they now adopted in the equipment of their navy, -they cut down their prows to a smaller compass to make them more -solid and made their cheeks stouter, and from these let stays into the -vessels' sides for a length of six cubits within and without, in the -same way as the Corinthians had altered their prows before engaging the -squadron at Naupactus. The Syracusans thought that they would thus have -an advantage over the Athenian vessels, which were not constructed with -equal strength, but were slight in the bows, from their being more used -to sail round and charge the enemy's side than to meet him prow to prow, -and that the battle being in the great harbour, with a great many ships -in not much room, was also a fact in their favour. Charging prow to -prow, they would stave in the enemy's bows, by striking with solid and -stout beaks against hollow and weak ones; and secondly, the Athenians -for want of room would be unable to use their favourite manoeuvre of -breaking the line or of sailing round, as the Syracusans would do their -best not to let them do the one, and want of room would prevent their -doing the other. This charging prow to prow, which had hitherto been -thought want of skill in a helmsman, would be the Syracusans' chief -manoeuvre, as being that which they should find most useful, since the -Athenians, if repulsed, would not be able to back water in any direction -except towards the shore, and that only for a little way, and in the -little space in front of their own camp. The rest of the harbour would -be commanded by the Syracusans; and the Athenians, if hard pressed, by -crowding together in a small space and all to the same point, would -run foul of one another and fall into disorder, which was, in fact, the -thing that did the Athenians most harm in all the sea-fights, they not -having, like the Syracusans, the whole harbour to retreat over. As to -their sailing round into the open sea, this would be impossible, with -the Syracusans in possession of the way out and in, especially as -Plemmyrium would be hostile to them, and the mouth of the harbour was -not large. - -With these contrivances to suit their skill and ability, and now more -confident after the previous sea-fight, the Syracusans attacked by land -and sea at once. The town force Gylippus led out a little the first and -brought them up to the wall of the Athenians, where it looked towards -the city, while the force from the Olympieum, that is to say, the heavy -infantry that were there with the horse and the light troops of the -Syracusans, advanced against the wall from the opposite side; the ships -of the Syracusans and allies sailing out immediately afterwards. The -Athenians at first fancied that they were to be attacked by land -only, and it was not without alarm that they saw the fleet suddenly -approaching as well; and while some were forming upon the walls and -in front of them against the advancing enemy, and some marching out in -haste against the numbers of horse and darters coming from the Olympieum -and from outside, others manned the ships or rushed down to the beach -to oppose the enemy, and when the ships were manned put out with -seventy-five sail against about eighty of the Syracusans. - -After spending a great part of the day in advancing and retreating -and skirmishing with each other, without either being able to gain any -advantage worth speaking of, except that the Syracusans sank one or two -of the Athenian vessels, they parted, the land force at the same time -retiring from the lines. The next day the Syracusans remained quiet, and -gave no signs of what they were going to do; but Nicias, seeing that the -battle had been a drawn one, and expecting that they would attack again, -compelled the captains to refit any of the ships that had suffered, and -moored merchant vessels before the stockade which they had driven -into the sea in front of their ships, to serve instead of an enclosed -harbour, at about two hundred feet from each other, in order that any -ship that was hard pressed might be able to retreat in safety and sail -out again at leisure. These preparations occupied the Athenians all day -until nightfall. - -The next day the Syracusans began operations at an earlier hour, but -with the same plan of attack by land and sea. A great part of the day -the rivals spent as before, confronting and skirmishing with each -other; until at last Ariston, son of Pyrrhicus, a Corinthian, the ablest -helmsman in the Syracusan service, persuaded their naval commanders to -send to the officials in the city, and tell them to move the sale market -as quickly as they could down to the sea, and oblige every one to -bring whatever eatables he had and sell them there, thus enabling the -commanders to land the crews and dine at once close to the ships, and -shortly afterwards, the selfsame day, to attack the Athenians again when -they were not expecting it. - -In compliance with this advice a messenger was sent and the market got -ready, upon which the Syracusans suddenly backed water and withdrew to -the town, and at once landed and took their dinner upon the spot; while -the Athenians, supposing that they had returned to the town because -they felt they were beaten, disembarked at their leisure and set about -getting their dinners and about their other occupations, under the idea -that they done with fighting for that day. Suddenly the Syracusans had -manned their ships and again sailed against them; and the Athenians, in -great confusion and most of them fasting, got on board, and with great -difficulty put out to meet them. For some time both parties remained on -the defensive without engaging, until the Athenians at last resolved not -to let themselves be worn out by waiting where they were, but to attack -without delay, and giving a cheer, went into action. The Syracusans -received them, and charging prow to prow as they had intended, stove in -a great part of the Athenian foreships by the strength of their beaks; -the darters on the decks also did great damage to the Athenians, but -still greater damage was done by the Syracusans who went about in small -boats, ran in upon the oars of the Athenian galleys, and sailed against -their sides, and discharged from thence their darts upon the sailors. - -At last, fighting hard in this fashion, the Syracusans gained the -victory, and the Athenians turned and fled between the merchantmen -to their own station. The Syracusan ships pursued them as far as the -merchantmen, where they were stopped by the beams armed with dolphins -suspended from those vessels over the passage. Two of the Syracusan -vessels went too near in the excitement of victory and were destroyed, -one of them being taken with its crew. After sinking seven of the -Athenian vessels and disabling many, and taking most of the men -prisoners and killing others, the Syracusans retired and set up trophies -for both the engagements, being now confident of having a decided -superiority by sea, and by no means despairing of equal success by land. - - - - -CHAPTER XXII - -_Nineteenth Year of the War--Arrival of Demosthenes--Defeat of the -Athenians at Epipolae--Folly and Obstinancy of Nicias_ - -In the meantime, while the Syracusans were preparing for a second attack -upon both elements, Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived with the succours -from Athens, consisting of about seventy-three ships, including the -foreigners; nearly five thousand heavy infantry, Athenian and allied; -a large number of darters, Hellenic and barbarian, and slingers and -archers and everything else upon a corresponding scale. The Syracusans -and their allies were for the moment not a little dismayed at the idea -that there was to be no term or ending to their dangers, seeing, in -spite of the fortification of Decelea, a new army arrive nearly equal to -the former, and the power of Athens proving so great in every quarter. -On the other hand, the first Athenian armament regained a certain -confidence in the midst of its misfortunes. Demosthenes, seeing how -matters stood, felt that he could not drag on and fare as Nicias had -done, who by wintering in Catana instead of at once attacking Syracuse -had allowed the terror of his first arrival to evaporate in contempt, -and had given time to Gylippus to arrive with a force from Peloponnese, -which the Syracusans would never have sent for if he had attacked -immediately; for they fancied that they were a match for him by -themselves, and would not have discovered their inferiority until they -were already invested, and even if they then sent for succours, they -would no longer have been equally able to profit by their arrival. -Recollecting this, and well aware that it was now on the first day -after his arrival that he like Nicias was most formidable to the enemy, -Demosthenes determined to lose no time in drawing the utmost profit from -the consternation at the moment inspired by his army; and seeing that -the counterwall of the Syracusans, which hindered the Athenians from -investing them, was a single one, and that he who should become master -of the way up to Epipolae, and afterwards of the camp there, would find -no difficulty in taking it, as no one would even wait for his attack, -made all haste to attempt the enterprise. This he took to be the -shortest way of ending the war, as he would either succeed and take -Syracuse, or would lead back the armament instead of frittering away the -lives of the Athenians engaged in the expedition and the resources of -the country at large. - -First therefore the Athenians went out and laid waste the lands of the -Syracusans about the Anapus and carried all before them as at first by -land and by sea, the Syracusans not offering to oppose them upon -either element, unless it were with their cavalry and darters from the -Olympieum. Next Demosthenes resolved to attempt the counterwall first by -means of engines. As however the engines that he brought up were burnt -by the enemy fighting from the wall, and the rest of the forces repulsed -after attacking at many different points, he determined to delay -no longer, and having obtained the consent of Nicias and his fellow -commanders, proceeded to put in execution his plan of attacking -Epipolae. As by day it seemed impossible to approach and get up without -being observed, he ordered provisions for five days, took all the masons -and carpenters, and other things, such as arrows, and everything else -that they could want for the work of fortification if successful, and, -after the first watch, set out with Eurymedon and Menander and the whole -army for Epipolae, Nicias being left behind in the lines. Having come -up by the hill of Euryelus (where the former army had ascended at first) -unobserved by the enemy's guards, they went up to the fort which the -Syracusans had there, and took it, and put to the sword part of the -garrison. The greater number, however, escaped at once and gave the -alarm to the camps, of which there were three upon Epipolae, defended by -outworks, one of the Syracusans, one of the other Siceliots, and one of -the allies; and also to the six hundred Syracusans forming the original -garrison for this part of Epipolae. These at once advanced against the -assailants and, falling in with Demosthenes and the Athenians, were -routed by them after a sharp resistance, the victors immediately pushing -on, eager to achieve the objects of the attack without giving time for -their ardour to cool; meanwhile others from the very beginning were -taking the counterwall of the Syracusans, which was abandoned by its -garrison, and pulling down the battlements. The Syracusans and the -allies, and Gylippus with the troops under his command, advanced to the -rescue from the outworks, but engaged in some consternation (a night -attack being a piece of audacity which they had never expected), and -were at first compelled to retreat. But while the Athenians, flushed -with their victory, now advanced with less order, wishing to make their -way as quickly as possible through the whole force of the enemy not yet -engaged, without relaxing their attack or giving them time to rally, the -Boeotians made the first stand against them, attacked them, routed them, -and put them to flight. - -The Athenians now fell into great disorder and perplexity, so that it -was not easy to get from one side or the other any detailed account -of the affair. By day certainly the combatants have a clearer notion, -though even then by no means of all that takes place, no one knowing -much of anything that does not go on in his own immediate neighbourhood; -but in a night engagement (and this was the only one that occurred -between great armies during the war) how could any one know anything for -certain? Although there was a bright moon they saw each other only as -men do by moonlight, that is to say, they could distinguish the form of -the body, but could not tell for certain whether it was a friend or an -enemy. Both had great numbers of heavy infantry moving about in a small -space. Some of the Athenians were already defeated, while others were -coming up yet unconquered for their first attack. A large part also -of the rest of their forces either had only just got up, or were still -ascending, so that they did not know which way to march. Owing to the -rout that had taken place all in front was now in confusion, and -the noise made it difficult to distinguish anything. The victorious -Syracusans and allies were cheering each other on with loud cries, by -night the only possible means of communication, and meanwhile receiving -all who came against them; while the Athenians were seeking for one -another, taking all in front of them for enemies, even although they -might be some of their now flying friends; and by constantly asking -for the watchword, which was their only means of recognition, not only -caused great confusion among themselves by asking all at once, but also -made it known to the enemy, whose own they did not so readily discover, -as the Syracusans were victorious and not scattered, and thus less -easily mistaken. The result was that if the Athenians fell in with a -party of the enemy that was weaker than they, it escaped them through -knowing their watchword; while if they themselves failed to answer they -were put to the sword. But what hurt them as much, or indeed more than -anything else, was the singing of the paean, from the perplexity which -it caused by being nearly the same on either side; the Argives and -Corcyraeans and any other Dorian peoples in the army, struck terror into -the Athenians whenever they raised their paean, no less than did the -enemy. Thus, after being once thrown into disorder, they ended by coming -into collision with each other in many parts of the field, friends with -friends, and citizens with citizens, and not only terrified one another, -but even came to blows and could only be parted with difficulty. In the -pursuit many perished by throwing themselves down the cliffs, the way -down from Epipolae being narrow; and of those who got down safely into -the plain, although many, especially those who belonged to the first -armament, escaped through their better acquaintance with the locality, -some of the newcomers lost their way and wandered over the country, and -were cut off in the morning by the Syracusan cavalry and killed. - -The next day the Syracusans set up two trophies, one upon Epipolae where -the ascent had been made, and the other on the spot where the first -check was given by the Boeotians; and the Athenians took back their -dead under truce. A great many of the Athenians and allies were killed, -although still more arms were taken than could be accounted for by the -number of the dead, as some of those who were obliged to leap down from -the cliffs without their shields escaped with their lives and did not -perish like the rest. - -After this the Syracusans, recovering their old confidence at such an -unexpected stroke of good fortune, dispatched Sicanus with fifteen ships -to Agrigentum where there was a revolution, to induce if possible the -city to join them; while Gylippus again went by land into the rest -of Sicily to bring up reinforcements, being now in hope of taking the -Athenian lines by storm, after the result of the affair on Epipolae. - -In the meantime the Athenian generals consulted upon the disaster -which had happened, and upon the general weakness of the army. They saw -themselves unsuccessful in their enterprises, and the soldiers disgusted -with their stay; disease being rife among them owing to its being the -sickly season of the year, and to the marshy and unhealthy nature of -the spot in which they were encamped; and the state of their affairs -generally being thought desperate. Accordingly, Demosthenes was of -opinion that they ought not to stay any longer; but agreeably to his -original idea in risking the attempt upon Epipolae, now that this had -failed, he gave his vote for going away without further loss of time, -while the sea might yet be crossed, and their late reinforcement might -give them the superiority at all events on that element. He also said -that it would be more profitable for the state to carry on the war -against those who were building fortifications in Attica, than against -the Syracusans whom it was no longer easy to subdue; besides which it -was not right to squander large sums of money to no purpose by going on -with the siege. - -This was the opinion of Demosthenes. Nicias, without denying the bad -state of their affairs, was unwilling to avow their weakness, or to have -it reported to the enemy that the Athenians in full council were openly -voting for retreat; for in that case they would be much less likely -to effect it when they wanted without discovery. Moreover, his own -particular information still gave him reason to hope that the affairs -of the enemy would soon be in a worse state than their own, if the -Athenians persevered in the siege; as they would wear out the Syracusans -by want of money, especially with the more extensive command of the sea -now given them by their present navy. Besides this, there was a party -in Syracuse who wished to betray the city to the Athenians, and -kept sending him messages and telling him not to raise the siege. -Accordingly, knowing this and really waiting because he hesitated -between the two courses and wished to see his way more clearly, in his -public speech on this occasion he refused to lead off the army, saying -he was sure the Athenians would never approve of their returning without -a vote of theirs. Those who would vote upon their conduct, instead of -judging the facts as eye-witnesses like themselves and not from what -they might hear from hostile critics, would simply be guided by the -calumnies of the first clever speaker; while many, indeed most, of the -soldiers on the spot, who now so loudly proclaimed the danger of their -position, when they reached Athens would proclaim just as loudly the -opposite, and would say that their generals had been bribed to betray -them and return. For himself, therefore, who knew the Athenian temper, -sooner than perish under a dishonourable charge and by an unjust -sentence at the hands of the Athenians, he would rather take his chance -and die, if die he must, a soldier's death at the hand of the enemy. -Besides, after all, the Syracusans were in a worse case than themselves. -What with paying mercenaries, spending upon fortified posts, and now for -a full year maintaining a large navy, they were already at a loss and -would soon be at a standstill: they had already spent two thousand -talents and incurred heavy debts besides, and could not lose even -ever so small a fraction of their present force through not paying it, -without ruin to their cause; depending as they did more upon mercenaries -than upon soldiers obliged to serve, like their own. He therefore said -that they ought to stay and carry on the siege, and not depart defeated -in point of money, in which they were much superior. - -Nicias spoke positively because he had exact information of the -financial distress at Syracuse, and also because of the strength of the -Athenian party there which kept sending him messages not to raise the -siege; besides which he had more confidence than before in his fleet, -and felt sure at least of its success. Demosthenes, however, would not -hear for a moment of continuing the siege, but said that if they could -not lead off the army without a decree from Athens, and if they were -obliged to stay on, they ought to remove to Thapsus or Catana; where -their land forces would have a wide extent of country to overrun, and -could live by plundering the enemy, and would thus do them damage; while -the fleet would have the open sea to fight in, that is to say, instead -of a narrow space which was all in the enemy's favour, a wide sea-room -where their science would be of use, and where they could retreat or -advance without being confined or circumscribed either when they put -out or put in. In any case he was altogether opposed to their staying on -where they were, and insisted on removing at once, as quickly and with -as little delay as possible; and in this judgment Eurymedon agreed. -Nicias however still objecting, a certain diffidence and hesitation -came over them, with a suspicion that Nicias might have some further -information to make him so positive. - - - - -CHAPTER XXIII - -_Nineteenth Year of the War--Battles in the Great Harbour--Retreat and -Annihilation of the Athenian Army_ - -While the Athenians lingered on in this way without moving from where -they were, Gylippus and Sicanus now arrived at Syracuse. Sicanus had -failed to gain Agrigentum, the party friendly to the Syracusans having -been driven out while he was still at Gela; but Gylippus was accompanied -not only by a large number of troops raised in Sicily, but by the heavy -infantry sent off in the spring from Peloponnese in the merchantmen, who -had arrived at Selinus from Libya. They had been carried to Libya by a -storm, and having obtained two galleys and pilots from the Cyrenians, -on their voyage alongshore had taken sides with the Euesperitae and had -defeated the Libyans who were besieging them, and from thence coasting -on to Neapolis, a Carthaginian mart, and the nearest point to Sicily, -from which it is only two days' and a night's voyage, there crossed -over and came to Selinus. Immediately upon their arrival the Syracusans -prepared to attack the Athenians again by land and sea at once. The -Athenian generals seeing a fresh army come to the aid of the enemy, and -that their own circumstances, far from improving, were becoming daily -worse, and above all distressed by the sickness of the soldiers, now -began to repent of not having removed before; and Nicias no longer -offering the same opposition, except by urging that there should be -no open voting, they gave orders as secretly as possible for all to be -prepared to sail out from the camp at a given signal. All was at last -ready, and they were on the point of sailing away, when an eclipse of -the moon, which was then at the full, took place. Most of the Athenians, -deeply impressed by this occurrence, now urged the generals to wait; and -Nicias, who was somewhat over-addicted to divination and practices -of that kind, refused from that moment even to take the question of -departure into consideration, until they had waited the thrice nine days -prescribed by the soothsayers. - -The besiegers were thus condemned to stay in the country; and the -Syracusans, getting wind of what had happened, became more eager than -ever to press the Athenians, who had now themselves acknowledged -that they were no longer their superiors either by sea or by land, as -otherwise they would never have planned to sail away. Besides which -the Syracusans did not wish them to settle in any other part of Sicily, -where they would be more difficult to deal with, but desired to force -them to fight at sea as quickly as possible, in a position favourable -to themselves. Accordingly they manned their ships and practised for -as many days as they thought sufficient. When the moment arrived they -assaulted on the first day the Athenian lines, and upon a small force of -heavy infantry and horse sallying out against them by certain gates, cut -off some of the former and routed and pursued them to the lines, where, -as the entrance was narrow, the Athenians lost seventy horses and some -few of the heavy infantry. - -Drawing off their troops for this day, on the next the Syracusans went -out with a fleet of seventy-six sail, and at the same time advanced with -their land forces against the lines. The Athenians put out to meet -them with eighty-six ships, came to close quarters, and engaged. The -Syracusans and their allies first defeated the Athenian centre, and then -caught Eurymedon, the commander of the right wing, who was sailing out -from the line more towards the land in order to surround the enemy, in -the hollow and recess of the harbour, and killed him and destroyed the -ships accompanying him; after which they now chased the whole Athenian -fleet before them and drove them ashore. - -Gylippus seeing the enemy's fleet defeated and carried ashore beyond -their stockades and camp, ran down to the breakwater with some of his -troops, in order to cut off the men as they landed and make it easier -for the Syracusans to tow off the vessels by the shore being friendly -ground. The Tyrrhenians who guarded this point for the Athenians, seeing -them come on in disorder, advanced out against them and attacked and -routed their van, hurling it into the marsh of Lysimeleia. Afterwards -the Syracusan and allied troops arrived in greater numbers, and the -Athenians fearing for their ships came up also to the rescue and engaged -them, and defeated and pursued them to some distance and killed a few of -their heavy infantry. They succeeded in rescuing most of their ships -and brought them down by their camp; eighteen however were taken by the -Syracusans and their allies, and all the men killed. The rest the enemy -tried to burn by means of an old merchantman which they filled with -faggots and pine-wood, set on fire, and let drift down the wind which -blew full on the Athenians. The Athenians, however, alarmed for their -ships, contrived means for stopping it and putting it out, and checking -the flames and the nearer approach of the merchantman, thus escaped the -danger. - -After this the Syracusans set up a trophy for the sea-fight and for the -heavy infantry whom they had cut off up at the lines, where they took -the horses; and the Athenians for the rout of the foot driven by the -Tyrrhenians into the marsh, and for their own victory with the rest of -the army. - -The Syracusans had now gained a decisive victory at sea, where until now -they had feared the reinforcement brought by Demosthenes, and deep, -in consequence, was the despondency of the Athenians, and great their -disappointment, and greater still their regret for having come on the -expedition. These were the only cities that they had yet encountered, -similar to their own in character, under democracies like themselves, -which had ships and horses, and were of considerable magnitude. They had -been unable to divide and bring them over by holding out the prospect -of changes in their governments, or to crush them by their great -superiority in force, but had failed in most of their attempts, and -being already in perplexity, had now been defeated at sea, where -defeat could never have been expected, and were thus plunged deeper in -embarrassment than ever. - -Meanwhile the Syracusans immediately began to sail freely along the -harbour, and determined to close up its mouth, so that the Athenians -might not be able to steal out in future, even if they wished. Indeed, -the Syracusans no longer thought only of saving themselves, but also how -to hinder the escape of the enemy; thinking, and thinking rightly, that -they were now much the stronger, and that to conquer the Athenians and -their allies by land and sea would win them great glory in Hellas. The -rest of the Hellenes would thus immediately be either freed or released -from apprehension, as the remaining forces of Athens would be henceforth -unable to sustain the war that would be waged against her; while they, -the Syracusans, would be regarded as the authors of this deliverance, -and would be held in high admiration, not only with all men now living -but also with posterity. Nor were these the only considerations that -gave dignity to the struggle. They would thus conquer not only the -Athenians but also their numerous allies, and conquer not alone, -but with their companions in arms, commanding side by side with the -Corinthians and Lacedaemonians, having offered their city to stand in -the van of danger, and having been in a great measure the pioneers of -naval success. - -Indeed, there were never so many peoples assembled before a single city, -if we except the grand total gathered together in this war under Athens -and Lacedaemon. The following were the states on either side who came -to Syracuse to fight for or against Sicily, to help to conquer or -defend the island. Right or community of blood was not the bond of union -between them, so much as interest or compulsion as the case might be. -The Athenians themselves being Ionians went against the Dorians of -Syracuse of their own free will; and the peoples still speaking Attic -and using the Athenian laws, the Lemnians, Imbrians, and Aeginetans, -that is to say the then occupants of Aegina, being their colonists, -went with them. To these must be also added the Hestiaeans dwelling -at Hestiaea in Euboea. Of the rest some joined in the expedition as -subjects of the Athenians, others as independent allies, others as -mercenaries. To the number of the subjects paying tribute belonged the -Eretrians, Chalcidians, Styrians, and Carystians from Euboea; the Ceans, -Andrians, and Tenians from the islands; and the Milesians, Samians, and -Chians from Ionia. The Chians, however, joined as independent allies, -paying no tribute, but furnishing ships. Most of these were Ionians and -descended from the Athenians, except the Carystians, who are Dryopes, -and although subjects and obliged to serve, were still Ionians fighting -against Dorians. Besides these there were men of Aeolic race, the -Methymnians, subjects who provided ships, not tribute, and the Tenedians -and Aenians who paid tribute. These Aeolians fought against their -Aeolian founders, the Boeotians in the Syracusan army, because they -were obliged, while the Plataeans, the only native Boeotians opposed to -Boeotians, did so upon a just quarrel. Of the Rhodians and Cytherians, -both Dorians, the latter, Lacedaemonian colonists, fought in the -Athenian ranks against their Lacedaemonian countrymen with Gylippus; -while the Rhodians, Argives by race, were compelled to bear arms against -the Dorian Syracusans and their own colonists, the Geloans, serving with -the Syracusans. Of the islanders round Peloponnese, the Cephallenians -and Zacynthians accompanied the Athenians as independent allies, -although their insular position really left them little choice in -the matter, owing to the maritime supremacy of Athens, while the -Corcyraeans, who were not only Dorians but Corinthians, were openly -serving against Corinthians and Syracusans, although colonists of the -former and of the same race as the latter, under colour of compulsion, -but really out of free will through hatred of Corinth. The Messenians, -as they are now called in Naupactus and from Pylos, then held by the -Athenians, were taken with them to the war. There were also a few -Megarian exiles, whose fate it was to be now fighting against the -Megarian Selinuntines. - -The engagement of the rest was more of a voluntary nature. It was less -the league than hatred of the Lacedaemonians and the immediate private -advantage of each individual that persuaded the Dorian Argives to join -the Ionian Athenians in a war against Dorians; while the Mantineans and -other Arcadian mercenaries, accustomed to go against the enemy pointed -out to them at the moment, were led by interest to regard the Arcadians -serving with the Corinthians as just as much their enemies as any -others. The Cretans and Aetolians also served for hire, and the Cretans -who had joined the Rhodians in founding Gela, thus came to consent to -fight for pay against, instead of for, their colonists. There were also -some Acarnanians paid to serve, although they came chiefly for love of -Demosthenes and out of goodwill to the Athenians whose allies they -were. These all lived on the Hellenic side of the Ionian Gulf. Of the -Italiots, there were the Thurians and Metapontines, dragged into -the quarrel by the stern necessities of a time of revolution; of the -Siceliots, the Naxians and the Catanians; and of the barbarians, the -Egestaeans, who called in the Athenians, most of the Sicels, and outside -Sicily some Tyrrhenian enemies of Syracuse and Iapygian mercenaries. - -Such were the peoples serving with the Athenians. Against these the -Syracusans had the Camarinaeans their neighbours, the Geloans who -live next to them; then passing over the neutral Agrigentines, the -Selinuntines settled on the farther side of the island. These inhabit -the part of Sicily looking towards Libya; the Himeraeans came from the -side towards the Tyrrhenian Sea, being the only Hellenic inhabitants in -that quarter, and the only people that came from thence to the aid of -the Syracusans. Of the Hellenes in Sicily the above peoples joined in -the war, all Dorians and independent, and of the barbarians the Sicels -only, that is to say, such as did not go over to the Athenians. Of the -Hellenes outside Sicily there were the Lacedaemonians, who provided a -Spartan to take the command, and a force of Neodamodes or Freedmen, and -of Helots; the Corinthians, who alone joined with naval and land forces, -with their Leucadian and Ambraciot kinsmen; some mercenaries sent by -Corinth from Arcadia; some Sicyonians forced to serve, and from outside -Peloponnese the Boeotians. In comparison, however, with these foreign -auxiliaries, the great Siceliot cities furnished more in every -department--numbers of heavy infantry, ships, and horses, and an immense -multitude besides having been brought together; while in comparison, -again, one may say, with all the rest put together, more was provided by -the Syracusans themselves, both from the greatness of the city and from -the fact that they were in the greatest danger. - -Such were the auxiliaries brought together on either side, all of which -had by this time joined, neither party experiencing any subsequent -accession. It was no wonder, therefore, if the Syracusans and their -allies thought that it would win them great glory if they could follow -up their recent victory in the sea-fight by the capture of the whole -Athenian armada, without letting it escape either by sea or by land. -They began at once to close up the Great Harbour by means of boats, -merchant vessels, and galleys moored broadside across its mouth, which -is nearly a mile wide, and made all their other arrangements for the -event of the Athenians again venturing to fight at sea. There was, in -fact, nothing little either in their plans or their ideas. - -The Athenians, seeing them closing up the harbour and informed of their -further designs, called a council of war. The generals and colonels -assembled and discussed the difficulties of the situation; the point -which pressed most being that they no longer had provisions for -immediate use (having sent on to Catana to tell them not to send any, in -the belief that they were going away), and that they would not have any -in future unless they could command the sea. They therefore determined -to evacuate their upper lines, to enclose with a cross wall and garrison -a small space close to the ships, only just sufficient to hold their -stores and sick, and manning all the ships, seaworthy or not, with every -man that could be spared from the rest of their land forces, to fight it -out at sea, and, if victorious, to go to Catana, if not, to burn their -vessels, form in close order, and retreat by land for the nearest -friendly place they could reach, Hellenic or barbarian. This was no -sooner settled than carried into effect; they descended gradually from -the upper lines and manned all their vessels, compelling all to go on -board who were of age to be in any way of use. They thus succeeded in -manning about one hundred and ten ships in all, on board of which they -embarked a number of archers and darters taken from the Acarnanians and -from the other foreigners, making all other provisions allowed by the -nature of their plan and by the necessities which imposed it. All was -now nearly ready, and Nicias, seeing the soldiery disheartened by their -unprecedented and decided defeat at sea, and by reason of the scarcity -of provisions eager to fight it out as soon as possible, called them all -together, and first addressed them, speaking as follows: - -"Soldiers of the Athenians and of the allies, we have all an equal -interest in the coming struggle, in which life and country are at stake -for us quite as much as they can be for the enemy; since if our fleet -wins the day, each can see his native city again, wherever that city may -be. You must not lose heart, or be like men without any experience, who -fail in a first essay and ever afterwards fearfully forebode a future -as disastrous. But let the Athenians among you who have already had -experience of many wars, and the allies who have joined us in so many -expeditions, remember the surprises of war, and with the hope that -fortune will not be always against us, prepare to fight again in a -manner worthy of the number which you see yourselves to be. - -"Now, whatever we thought would be of service against the crush of -vessels in such a narrow harbour, and against the force upon the decks -of the enemy, from which we suffered before, has all been considered -with the helmsmen, and, as far as our means allowed, provided. A number -of archers and darters will go on board, and a multitude that we should -not have employed in an action in the open sea, where our science would -be crippled by the weight of the vessels; but in the present land-fight -that we are forced to make from shipboard all this will be useful. We -have also discovered the changes in construction that we must make to -meet theirs; and against the thickness of their cheeks, which did us the -greatest mischief, we have provided grappling-irons, which will prevent -an assailant backing water after charging, if the soldiers on deck here -do their duty; since we are absolutely compelled to fight a land battle -from the fleet, and it seems to be our interest neither to back water -ourselves, nor to let the enemy do so, especially as the shore, except -so much of it as may be held by our troops, is hostile ground. - -"You must remember this and fight on as long as you can, and must not -let yourselves be driven ashore, but once alongside must make up your -minds not to part company until you have swept the heavy infantry from -the enemy's deck. I say this more for the heavy infantry than for the -seamen, as it is more the business of the men on deck; and our land -forces are even now on the whole the strongest. The sailors I advise, -and at the same time implore, not to be too much daunted by their -misfortunes, now that we have our decks better armed and greater number -of vessels. Bear in mind how well worth preserving is the pleasure felt -by those of you who through your knowledge of our language and imitation -of our manners were always considered Athenians, even though not so in -reality, and as such were honoured throughout Hellas, and had your full -share of the advantages of our empire, and more than your share in -the respect of our subjects and in protection from ill treatment. You, -therefore, with whom alone we freely share our empire, we now justly -require not to betray that empire in its extremity, and in scorn of -Corinthians, whom you have often conquered, and of Siceliots, none of -whom so much as presumed to stand against us when our navy was in its -prime, we ask you to repel them, and to show that even in sickness and -disaster your skill is more than a match for the fortune and vigour of -any other. - -"For the Athenians among you I add once more this reflection: You left -behind you no more such ships in your docks as these, no more heavy -infantry in their flower; if you do aught but conquer, our enemies here -will immediately sail thither, and those that are left of us at Athens -will become unable to repel their home assailants, reinforced by -these new allies. Here you will fall at once into the hands of the -Syracusans--I need not remind you of the intentions with which you -attacked them--and your countrymen at home will fall into those of -the Lacedaemonians. Since the fate of both thus hangs upon this single -battle, now, if ever, stand firm, and remember, each and all, that you -who are now going on board are the army and navy of the Athenians, and -all that is left of the state and the great name of Athens, in whose -defence if any man has any advantage in skill or courage, now is the -time for him to show it, and thus serve himself and save all." - -After this address Nicias at once gave orders to man the ships. -Meanwhile Gylippus and the Syracusans could perceive by the preparations -which they saw going on that the Athenians meant to fight at sea. They -had also notice of the grappling-irons, against which they specially -provided by stretching hides over the prows and much of the upper part -of their vessels, in order that the irons when thrown might slip off -without taking hold. All being now ready, the generals and Gylippus -addressed them in the following terms: - -"Syracusans and allies, the glorious character of our past achievements -and the no less glorious results at issue in the coming battle are, -we think, understood by most of you, or you would never have thrown -yourselves with such ardour into the struggle; and if there be any one -not as fully aware of the facts as he ought to be, we will declare them -to him. The Athenians came to this country first to effect the conquest -of Sicily, and after that, if successful, of Peloponnese and the rest of -Hellas, possessing already the greatest empire yet known, of present or -former times, among the Hellenes. Here for the first time they found -in you men who faced their navy which made them masters everywhere; you -have already defeated them in the previous sea-fights, and will in all -likelihood defeat them again now. When men are once checked in what they -consider their special excellence, their whole opinion of themselves -suffers more than if they had not at first believed in their -superiority, the unexpected shock to their pride causing them to give -way more than their real strength warrants; and this is probably now the -case with the Athenians. - -"With us it is different. The original estimate of ourselves which gave -us courage in the days of our unskilfulness has been strengthened, while -the conviction superadded to it that we must be the best seamen of the -time, if we have conquered the best, has given a double measure of -hope to every man among us; and, for the most part, where there is the -greatest hope, there is also the greatest ardour for action. The means -to combat us which they have tried to find in copying our armament are -familiar to our warfare, and will be met by proper provisions; while -they will never be able to have a number of heavy infantry on their -decks, contrary to their custom, and a number of darters (born landsmen, -one may say, Acarnanians and others, embarked afloat, who will not know -how to discharge their weapons when they have to keep still), without -hampering their vessels and falling all into confusion among themselves -through fighting not according to their own tactics. For they will gain -nothing by the number of their ships--I say this to those of you who may -be alarmed by having to fight against odds--as a quantity of ships in a -confined space will only be slower in executing the movements required, -and most exposed to injury from our means of offence. Indeed, if you -would know the plain truth, as we are credibly informed, the excess of -their sufferings and the necessities of their present distress have made -them desperate; they have no confidence in their force, but wish to -try their fortune in the only way they can, and either to force their -passage and sail out, or after this to retreat by land, it being -impossible for them to be worse off than they are. - -"The fortune of our greatest enemies having thus betrayed itself, and -their disorder being what I have described, let us engage in anger, -convinced that, as between adversaries, nothing is more legitimate -than to claim to sate the whole wrath of one's soul in punishing the -aggressor, and nothing more sweet, as the proverb has it, than the -vengeance upon an enemy, which it will now be ours to take. That enemies -they are and mortal enemies you all know, since they came here to -enslave our country, and if successful had in reserve for our men all -that is most dreadful, and for our children and wives all that is -most dishonourable, and for the whole city the name which conveys the -greatest reproach. None should therefore relent or think it gain if they -go away without further danger to us. This they will do just the same, -even if they get the victory; while if we succeed, as we may expect, in -chastising them, and in handing down to all Sicily her ancient freedom -strengthened and confirmed, we shall have achieved no mean triumph. And -the rarest dangers are those in which failure brings little loss and -success the greatest advantage." - -After the above address to the soldiers on their side, the Syracusan -generals and Gylippus now perceived that the Athenians were manning -their ships, and immediately proceeded to man their own also. Meanwhile -Nicias, appalled by the position of affairs, realizing the greatness and -the nearness of the danger now that they were on the point of putting -out from shore, and thinking, as men are apt to think in great crises, -that when all has been done they have still something left to do, and -when all has been said that they have not yet said enough, again called -on the captains one by one, addressing each by his father's name and by -his own, and by that of his tribe, and adjured them not to belie their -own personal renown, or to obscure the hereditary virtues for which -their ancestors were illustrious: he reminded them of their country, the -freest of the free, and of the unfettered discretion allowed in it to -all to live as they pleased; and added other arguments such as men would -use at such a crisis, and which, with little alteration, are made to -serve on all occasions alike--appeals to wives, children, and national -gods--without caring whether they are thought commonplace, but -loudly invoking them in the belief that they will be of use in the -consternation of the moment. Having thus admonished them, not, he felt, -as he would, but as he could, Nicias withdrew and led the troops to the -sea, and ranged them in as long a line as he was able, in order to aid -as far as possible in sustaining the courage of the men afloat; while -Demosthenes, Menander, and Euthydemus, who took the command on board, -put out from their own camp and sailed straight to the barrier across -the mouth of the harbour and to the passage left open, to try to force -their way out. - -The Syracusans and their allies had already put out with about the same -number of ships as before, a part of which kept guard at the outlet, and -the remainder all round the rest of the harbour, in order to attack the -Athenians on all sides at once; while the land forces held themselves in -readiness at the points at which the vessels might put into the shore. -The Syracusan fleet was commanded by Sicanus and Agatharchus, who had -each a wing of the whole force, with Pythen and the Corinthians in the -centre. When the rest of the Athenians came up to the barrier, with the -first shock of their charge they overpowered the ships stationed there, -and tried to undo the fastenings; after this, as the Syracusans and -allies bore down upon them from all quarters, the action spread from the -barrier over the whole harbour, and was more obstinately disputed than -any of the preceding ones. On either side the rowers showed great zeal -in bringing up their vessels at the boatswains' orders, and the helmsmen -great skill in manoeuvring, and great emulation one with another; while -the ships once alongside, the soldiers on board did their best not to -let the service on deck be outdone by the others; in short, every man -strove to prove himself the first in his particular department. And as -many ships were engaged in a small compass (for these were the largest -fleets fighting in the narrowest space ever known, being together little -short of two hundred), the regular attacks with the beak were few, there -being no opportunity of backing water or of breaking the line; while the -collisions caused by one ship chancing to run foul of another, either -in flying from or attacking a third, were more frequent. So long as a -vessel was coming up to the charge the men on the decks rained darts and -arrows and stones upon her; but once alongside, the heavy infantry tried -to board each other's vessel, fighting hand to hand. In many quarters -it happened, by reason of the narrow room, that a vessel was charging an -enemy on one side and being charged herself on another, and that two or -sometimes more ships had perforce got entangled round one, obliging the -helmsmen to attend to defence here, offence there, not to one thing at -once, but to many on all sides; while the huge din caused by the number -of ships crashing together not only spread terror, but made the orders -of the boatswains inaudible. The boatswains on either side in the -discharge of their duty and in the heat of the conflict shouted -incessantly orders and appeals to their men; the Athenians they urged to -force the passage out, and now if ever to show their mettle and lay hold -of a safe return to their country; to the Syracusans and their allies -they cried that it would be glorious to prevent the escape of the enemy, -and, conquering, to exalt the countries that were theirs. The generals, -moreover, on either side, if they saw any in any part of the battle -backing ashore without being forced to do so, called out to the captain -by name and asked him--the Athenians, whether they were retreating -because they thought the thrice hostile shore more their own than that -sea which had cost them so much labour to win; the Syracusans, whether -they were flying from the flying Athenians, whom they well knew to be -eager to escape in whatever way they could. - -Meanwhile the two armies on shore, while victory hung in the balance, -were a prey to the most agonizing and conflicting emotions; the natives -thirsting for more glory than they had already won, while the invaders -feared to find themselves in even worse plight than before. The all of -the Athenians being set upon their fleet, their fear for the event was -like nothing they had ever felt; while their view of the struggle was -necessarily as chequered as the battle itself. Close to the scene of -action and not all looking at the same point at once, some saw their -friends victorious and took courage and fell to calling upon heaven not -to deprive them of salvation, while others who had their eyes turned -upon the losers, wailed and cried aloud, and, although spectators, were -more overcome than the actual combatants. Others, again, were gazing -at some spot where the battle was evenly disputed; as the strife -was protracted without decision, their swaying bodies reflected the -agitation of their minds, and they suffered the worst agony of all, -ever just within reach of safety or just on the point of destruction. -In short, in that one Athenian army as long as the sea-fight remained -doubtful there was every sound to be heard at once, shrieks, cheers, "We -win," "We lose," and all the other manifold exclamations that a great -host would necessarily utter in great peril; and with the men in the -fleet it was nearly the same; until at last the Syracusans and their -allies, after the battle had lasted a long while, put the Athenians to -flight, and with much shouting and cheering chased them in open rout to -the shore. The naval force, one one way, one another, as many as were -not taken afloat now ran ashore and rushed from on board their ships -to their camp; while the army, no more divided, but carried away by one -impulse, all with shrieks and groans deplored the event, and ran down, -some to help the ships, others to guard what was left of their wall, -while the remaining and most numerous part already began to consider how -they should save themselves. Indeed, the panic of the present moment -had never been surpassed. They now suffered very nearly what they had -inflicted at Pylos; as then the Lacedaemonians with the loss of their -fleet lost also the men who had crossed over to the island, so now the -Athenians had no hope of escaping by land, without the help of some -extraordinary accident. - -The sea-fight having been a severe one, and many ships and lives having -been lost on both sides, the victorious Syracusans and their allies now -picked up their wrecks and dead, and sailed off to the city and set up -a trophy. The Athenians, overwhelmed by their misfortune, never even -thought of asking leave to take up their dead or wrecks, but wished to -retreat that very night. Demosthenes, however, went to Nicias and gave -it as his opinion that they should man the ships they had left and make -another effort to force their passage out next morning; saying that they -had still left more ships fit for service than the enemy, the Athenians -having about sixty remaining as against less than fifty of their -opponents. Nicias was quite of his mind; but when they wished to man the -vessels, the sailors refused to go on board, being so utterly overcome -by their defeat as no longer to believe in the possibility of success. - -Accordingly they all now made up their minds to retreat by land. -Meanwhile the Syracusan Hermocrates--suspecting their intention, and -impressed by the danger of allowing a force of that magnitude to retire -by land, establish itself in some other part of Sicily, and from thence -renew the war--went and stated his views to the authorities, and pointed -out to them that they ought not to let the enemy get away by night, but -that all the Syracusans and their allies should at once march out and -block up the roads and seize and guard the passes. The authorities were -entirely of his opinion, and thought that it ought to be done, but on -the other hand felt sure that the people, who had given themselves over -to rejoicing, and were taking their ease after a great battle at sea, -would not be easily brought to obey; besides, they were celebrating a -festival, having on that day a sacrifice to Heracles, and most of them -in their rapture at the victory had fallen to drinking at the festival, -and would probably consent to anything sooner than to take up their -arms and march out at that moment. For these reasons the thing appeared -impracticable to the magistrates; and Hermocrates, finding himself -unable to do anything further with them, had now recourse to the -following stratagem of his own. What he feared was that the Athenians -might quietly get the start of them by passing the most difficult places -during the night; and he therefore sent, as soon as it was dusk, some -friends of his own to the camp with some horsemen who rode up within -earshot and called out to some of the men, as though they were -well-wishers of the Athenians, and told them to tell Nicias (who had -in fact some correspondents who informed him of what went on inside the -town) not to lead off the army by night as the Syracusans were guarding -the roads, but to make his preparations at his leisure and to retreat -by day. After saying this they departed; and their hearers informed the -Athenian generals, who put off going for that night on the strength of -this message, not doubting its sincerity. - -Since after all they had not set out at once, they now determined to -stay also the following day to give time to the soldiers to pack up as -well as they could the most useful articles, and, leaving everything -else behind, to start only with what was strictly necessary for their -personal subsistence. Meanwhile the Syracusans and Gylippus marched out -and blocked up the roads through the country by which the Athenians were -likely to pass, and kept guard at the fords of the streams and rivers, -posting themselves so as to receive them and stop the army where they -thought best; while their fleet sailed up to the beach and towed off the -ships of the Athenians. Some few were burned by the Athenians themselves -as they had intended; the rest the Syracusans lashed on to their own -at their leisure as they had been thrown up on shore, without any one -trying to stop them, and conveyed to the town. - -After this, Nicias and Demosthenes now thinking that enough had been -done in the way of preparation, the removal of the army took place -upon the second day after the sea-fight. It was a lamentable scene, -not merely from the single circumstance that they were retreating after -having lost all their ships, their great hopes gone, and themselves and -the state in peril; but also in leaving the camp there were things most -grievous for every eye and heart to contemplate. The dead lay unburied, -and each man as he recognized a friend among them shuddered with grief -and horror; while the living whom they were leaving behind, wounded or -sick, were to the living far more shocking than the dead, and more to -be pitied than those who had perished. These fell to entreating and -bewailing until their friends knew not what to do, begging them to take -them and loudly calling to each individual comrade or relative whom they -could see, hanging upon the necks of their tent-fellows in the act of -departure, and following as far as they could, and, when their bodily -strength failed them, calling again and again upon heaven and shrieking -aloud as they were left behind. So that the whole army being filled with -tears and distracted after this fashion found it not easy to go, even -from an enemy's land, where they had already suffered evils too great -for tears and in the unknown future before them feared to suffer more. -Dejection and self-condemnation were also rife among them. Indeed they -could only be compared to a starved-out town, and that no small one, -escaping; the whole multitude upon the march being not less than forty -thousand men. All carried anything they could which might be of use, -and the heavy infantry and troopers, contrary to their wont, while under -arms carried their own victuals, in some cases for want of servants, in -others through not trusting them; as they had long been deserting and -now did so in greater numbers than ever. Yet even thus they did not -carry enough, as there was no longer food in the camp. Moreover their -disgrace generally, and the universality of their sufferings, however to -a certain extent alleviated by being borne in company, were still -felt at the moment a heavy burden, especially when they contrasted the -splendour and glory of their setting out with the humiliation in which -it had ended. For this was by far the greatest reverse that ever befell -an Hellenic army. They had come to enslave others, and were departing in -fear of being enslaved themselves: they had sailed out with prayer -and paeans, and now started to go back with omens directly contrary; -travelling by land instead of by sea, and trusting not in their fleet -but in their heavy infantry. Nevertheless the greatness of the danger -still impending made all this appear tolerable. - -Nicias seeing the army dejected and greatly altered, passed along the -ranks and encouraged and comforted them as far as was possible under the -circumstances, raising his voice still higher and higher as he went from -one company to another in his earnestness, and in his anxiety that the -benefit of his words might reach as many as possible: - -"Athenians and allies, even in our present position we must still hope -on, since men have ere now been saved from worse straits than this; -and you must not condemn yourselves too severely either because of your -disasters or because of your present unmerited sufferings. I myself who -am not superior to any of you in strength--indeed you see how I am in -my sickness--and who in the gifts of fortune am, I think, whether in -private life or otherwise, the equal of any, am now exposed to the same -danger as the meanest among you; and yet my life has been one of much -devotion toward the gods, and of much justice and without offence toward -men. I have, therefore, still a strong hope for the future, and our -misfortunes do not terrify me as much as they might. Indeed we may hope -that they will be lightened: our enemies have had good fortune enough; -and if any of the gods was offended at our expedition, we have been -already amply punished. Others before us have attacked their neighbours -and have done what men will do without suffering more than they could -bear; and we may now justly expect to find the gods more kind, for we -have become fitter objects for their pity than their jealousy. And -then look at yourselves, mark the numbers and efficiency of the heavy -infantry marching in your ranks, and do not give way too much to -despondency, but reflect that you are yourselves at once a city wherever -you sit down, and that there is no other in Sicily that could easily -resist your attack, or expel you when once established. The safety and -order of the march is for yourselves to look to; the one thought of -each man being that the spot on which he may be forced to fight must -be conquered and held as his country and stronghold. Meanwhile we shall -hasten on our way night and day alike, as our provisions are scanty; -and if we can reach some friendly place of the Sicels, whom fear of the -Syracusans still keeps true to us, you may forthwith consider yourselves -safe. A message has been sent on to them with directions to meet us with -supplies of food. To sum up, be convinced, soldiers, that you must be -brave, as there is no place near for your cowardice to take refuge in, -and that if you now escape from the enemy, you may all see again what -your hearts desire, while those of you who are Athenians will raise up -again the great power of the state, fallen though it be. Men make the -city and not walls or ships without men in them." - -As he made this address, Nicias went along the ranks, and brought back -to their place any of the troops that he saw straggling out of the line; -while Demosthenes did as much for his part of the army, addressing them -in words very similar. The army marched in a hollow square, the division -under Nicias leading, and that of Demosthenes following, the heavy -infantry being outside and the baggage-carriers and the bulk of the army -in the middle. When they arrived at the ford of the river Anapus there -they found drawn up a body of the Syracusans and allies, and routing -these, made good their passage and pushed on, harassed by the charges of -the Syracusan horse and by the missiles of their light troops. On that -day they advanced about four miles and a half, halting for the night -upon a certain hill. On the next they started early and got on about -two miles further, and descended into a place in the plain and there -encamped, in order to procure some eatables from the houses, as the -place was inhabited, and to carry on with them water from thence, as for -many furlongs in front, in the direction in which they were going, it -was not plentiful. The Syracusans meanwhile went on and fortified the -pass in front, where there was a steep hill with a rocky ravine on -each side of it, called the Acraean cliff. The next day the Athenians -advancing found themselves impeded by the missiles and charges of the -horse and darters, both very numerous, of the Syracusans and allies; -and after fighting for a long while, at length retired to the same camp, -where they had no longer provisions as before, it being impossible to -leave their position by reason of the cavalry. - -Early next morning they started afresh and forced their way to the -hill, which had been fortified, where they found before them the enemy's -infantry drawn up many shields deep to defend the fortification, the -pass being narrow. The Athenians assaulted the work, but were greeted -by a storm of missiles from the hill, which told with the greater -effect through its being a steep one, and unable to force the passage, -retreated again and rested. Meanwhile occurred some claps of thunder and -rain, as often happens towards autumn, which still further disheartened -the Athenians, who thought all these things to be omens of their -approaching ruin. While they were resting, Gylippus and the Syracusans -sent a part of their army to throw up works in their rear on the way by -which they had advanced; however, the Athenians immediately sent some -of their men and prevented them; after which they retreated more towards -the plain and halted for the night. When they advanced the next day the -Syracusans surrounded and attacked them on every side, and disabled many -of them, falling back if the Athenians advanced and coming on if they -retired, and in particular assaulting their rear, in the hope of routing -them in detail, and thus striking a panic into the whole army. For a -long while the Athenians persevered in this fashion, but after advancing -for four or five furlongs halted to rest in the plain, the Syracusans -also withdrawing to their own camp. - -During the night Nicias and Demosthenes, seeing the wretched condition -of their troops, now in want of every kind of necessary, and numbers of -them disabled in the numerous attacks of the enemy, determined to light -as many fires as possible, and to lead off the army, no longer by the -same route as they had intended, but towards the sea in the opposite -direction to that guarded by the Syracusans. The whole of this route was -leading the army not to Catana but to the other side of Sicily, towards -Camarina, Gela, and the other Hellenic and barbarian towns in that -quarter. They accordingly lit a number of fires and set out by night. -Now all armies, and the greatest most of all, are liable to fears and -alarms, especially when they are marching by night through an enemy's -country and with the enemy near; and the Athenians falling into one of -these panics, the leading division, that of Nicias, kept together and -got on a good way in front, while that of Demosthenes, comprising rather -more than half the army, got separated and marched on in some disorder. -By morning, however, they reached the sea, and getting into the Helorine -road, pushed on in order to reach the river Cacyparis, and to follow the -stream up through the interior, where they hoped to be met by the Sicels -whom they had sent for. Arrived at the river, they found there also a -Syracusan party engaged in barring the passage of the ford with a wall -and a palisade, and forcing this guard, crossed the river and went on to -another called the Erineus, according to the advice of their guides. - -Meanwhile, when day came and the Syracusans and allies found that the -Athenians were gone, most of them accused Gylippus of having let them -escape on purpose, and hastily pursuing by the road which they had -no difficulty in finding that they had taken, overtook them about -dinner-time. They first came up with the troops under Demosthenes, who -were behind and marching somewhat slowly and in disorder, owing to the -night panic above referred to, and at once attacked and engaged them, -the Syracusan horse surrounding them with more ease now that they were -separated from the rest and hemming them in on one spot. The division of -Nicias was five or six miles on in front, as he led them more rapidly, -thinking that under the circumstances their safety lay not in staying -and fighting, unless obliged, but in retreating as fast as possible, and -only fighting when forced to do so. On the other hand, Demosthenes was, -generally speaking, harassed more incessantly, as his post in the rear -left him the first exposed to the attacks of the enemy; and now, finding -that the Syracusans were in pursuit, he omitted to push on, in order to -form his men for battle, and so lingered until he was surrounded by -his pursuers and himself and the Athenians with him placed in the most -distressing position, being huddled into an enclosure with a wall all -round it, a road on this side and on that, and olive-trees in great -number, where missiles were showered in upon them from every quarter. -This mode of attack the Syracusans had with good reason adopted in -preference to fighting at close quarters, as to risk a struggle with -desperate men was now more for the advantage of the Athenians than for -their own; besides, their success had now become so certain that they -began to spare themselves a little in order not to be cut off in the -moment of victory, thinking too that, as it was, they would be able in -this way to subdue and capture the enemy. - -In fact, after plying the Athenians and allies all day long from every -side with missiles, they at length saw that they were worn out with -their wounds and other sufferings; and Gylippus and the Syracusans and -their allies made a proclamation, offering their liberty to any of the -islanders who chose to come over to them; and some few cities went -over. Afterwards a capitulation was agreed upon for all the rest with -Demosthenes, to lay down their arms on condition that no one was to -be put to death either by violence or imprisonment or want of the -necessaries of life. Upon this they surrendered to the number of six -thousand in all, laying down all the money in their possession, which -filled the hollows of four shields, and were immediately conveyed by the -Syracusans to the town. - -Meanwhile Nicias with his division arrived that day at the river -Erineus, crossed over, and posted his army upon some high ground upon -the other side. The next day the Syracusans overtook him and told him -that the troops under Demosthenes had surrendered, and invited him to -follow their example. Incredulous of the fact, Nicias asked for a truce -to send a horseman to see, and upon the return of the messenger with -the tidings that they had surrendered, sent a herald to Gylippus and the -Syracusans, saying that he was ready to agree with them on behalf of the -Athenians to repay whatever money the Syracusans had spent upon the war -if they would let his army go; and offered until the money was paid to -give Athenians as hostages, one for every talent. The Syracusans and -Gylippus rejected this proposition, and attacked this division as they -had the other, standing all round and plying them with missiles until -the evening. Food and necessaries were as miserably wanting to the -troops of Nicias as they had been to their comrades; nevertheless they -watched for the quiet of the night to resume their march. But as they -were taking up their arms the Syracusans perceived it and raised their -paean, upon which the Athenians, finding that they were discovered, laid -them down again, except about three hundred men who forced their way -through the guards and went on during the night as they were able. - -As soon as it was day Nicias put his army in motion, pressed, as before, -by the Syracusans and their allies, pelted from every side by their -missiles, and struck down by their javelins. The Athenians pushed on for -the Assinarus, impelled by the attacks made upon them from every side -by a numerous cavalry and the swarm of other arms, fancying that they -should breathe more freely if once across the river, and driven on also -by their exhaustion and craving for water. Once there they rushed in, -and all order was at an end, each man wanting to cross first, and the -attacks of the enemy making it difficult to cross at all; forced to -huddle together, they fell against and trod down one another, some dying -immediately upon the javelins, others getting entangled together and -stumbling over the articles of baggage, without being able to rise -again. Meanwhile the opposite bank, which was steep, was lined by the -Syracusans, who showered missiles down upon the Athenians, most of them -drinking greedily and heaped together in disorder in the hollow bed -of the river. The Peloponnesians also came down and butchered them, -especially those in the water, which was thus immediately spoiled, but -which they went on drinking just the same, mud and all, bloody as it -was, most even fighting to have it. - -At last, when many dead now lay piled one upon another in the stream, -and part of the army had been destroyed at the river, and the few that -escaped from thence cut off by the cavalry, Nicias surrendered himself -to Gylippus, whom he trusted more than he did the Syracusans, and told -him and the Lacedaemonians to do what they liked with him, but to stop -the slaughter of the soldiers. Gylippus, after this, immediately gave -orders to make prisoners; upon which the rest were brought together -alive, except a large number secreted by the soldiery, and a party -was sent in pursuit of the three hundred who had got through the guard -during the night, and who were now taken with the rest. The number of -the enemy collected as public property was not considerable; but -that secreted was very large, and all Sicily was filled with them, -no convention having been made in their case as for those taken with -Demosthenes. Besides this, a large portion were killed outright, the -carnage being very great, and not exceeded by any in this Sicilian war. -In the numerous other encounters upon the march, not a few also had -fallen. Nevertheless many escaped, some at the moment, others served as -slaves, and then ran away subsequently. These found refuge at Catana. - -The Syracusans and their allies now mustered and took up the spoils and -as many prisoners as they could, and went back to the city. The rest of -their Athenian and allied captives were deposited in the quarries, this -seeming the safest way of keeping them; but Nicias and Demosthenes were -butchered, against the will of Gylippus, who thought that it would -be the crown of his triumph if he could take the enemy's generals to -Lacedaemon. One of them, as it happened, Demosthenes, was one of her -greatest enemies, on account of the affair of the island and of Pylos; -while the other, Nicias, was for the same reasons one of her greatest -friends, owing to his exertions to procure the release of the prisoners -by persuading the Athenians to make peace. For these reasons the -Lacedaemonians felt kindly towards him; and it was in this that Nicias -himself mainly confided when he surrendered to Gylippus. But some of the -Syracusans who had been in correspondence with him were afraid, it was -said, of his being put to the torture and troubling their success by his -revelations; others, especially the Corinthians, of his escaping, as he -was wealthy, by means of bribes, and living to do them further mischief; -and these persuaded the allies and put him to death. This or the like -was the cause of the death of a man who, of all the Hellenes in my time, -least deserved such a fate, seeing that the whole course of his life had -been regulated with strict attention to virtue. - -The prisoners in the quarries were at first hardly treated by the -Syracusans. Crowded in a narrow hole, without any roof to cover them, -the heat of the sun and the stifling closeness of the air tormented them -during the day, and then the nights, which came on autumnal and chilly, -made them ill by the violence of the change; besides, as they had to do -everything in the same place for want of room, and the bodies of those -who died of their wounds or from the variation in the temperature, -or from similar causes, were left heaped together one upon another, -intolerable stenches arose; while hunger and thirst never ceased to -afflict them, each man during eight months having only half a pint of -water and a pint of corn given him daily. In short, no single suffering -to be apprehended by men thrust into such a place was spared them. For -some seventy days they thus lived all together, after which all, except -the Athenians and any Siceliots or Italiots who had joined in the -expedition, were sold. The total number of prisoners taken it would be -difficult to state exactly, but it could not have been less than seven -thousand. - -This was the greatest Hellenic achievement of any in thig war, or, in my -opinion, in Hellenic history; at once most glorious to the victors, and -most calamitous to the conquered. They were beaten at all points and -altogether; all that they suffered was great; they were destroyed, -as the saying is, with a total destruction, their fleet, their army, -everything was destroyed, and few out of many returned home. Such were -the events in Sicily. - - - - -BOOK VIII - -CHAPTER XXIV - -_Nineteenth and Twentieth Years of the War--Revolt of Ionia-- -Intervention of Persia--The War in Ionia_ - -When the news was brought to Athens, for a long while they disbelieved -even the most respectable of the soldiers who had themselves escaped -from the scene of action and clearly reported the matter, a destruction -so complete not being thought credible. When the conviction was forced -upon them, they were angry with the orators who had joined in promoting -the expedition, just as if they had not themselves voted it, and were -enraged also with the reciters of oracles and soothsayers, and all -other omen-mongers of the time who had encouraged them to hope that -they should conquer Sicily. Already distressed at all points and in all -quarters, after what had now happened, they were seized by a fear and -consternation quite without example. It was grievous enough for the -state and for every man in his proper person to lose so many heavy -infantry, cavalry, and able-bodied troops, and to see none left to -replace them; but when they saw, also, that they had not sufficient -ships in their docks, or money in the treasury, or crews for the ships, -they began to despair of salvation. They thought that their enemies in -Sicily would immediately sail with their fleet against Piraeus, inflamed -by so signal a victory; while their adversaries at home, redoubling -all their preparations, would vigorously attack them by sea and land at -once, aided by their own revolted confederates. Nevertheless, with -such means as they had, it was determined to resist to the last, and to -provide timber and money, and to equip a fleet as they best could, to -take steps to secure their confederates and above all Euboea, to reform -things in the city upon a more economical footing, and to elect a board -of elders to advise upon the state of affairs as occasion should arise. -In short, as is the way of a democracy, in the panic of the moment they -were ready to be as prudent as possible. - -These resolves were at once carried into effect. Summer was now over. -The winter ensuing saw all Hellas stirring under the impression of -the great Athenian disaster in Sicily. Neutrals now felt that even if -uninvited they ought no longer to stand aloof from the war, but should -volunteer to march against the Athenians, who, as they severally -reflected, would probably have come against them if the Sicilian -campaign had succeeded. Besides, they considered that the war would now -be short, and that it would be creditable for them to take part in it. -Meanwhile the allies of the Lacedaemonians felt all more anxious than -ever to see a speedy end to their heavy labours. But above all, the -subjects of the Athenians showed a readiness to revolt even beyond their -ability, judging the circumstances with passion, and refusing even to -hear of the Athenians being able to last out the coming summer. Beyond -all this, Lacedaemon was encouraged by the near prospect of being joined -in great force in the spring by her allies in Sicily, lately forced by -events to acquire their navy. With these reasons for confidence in every -quarter, the Lacedaemonians now resolved to throw themselves without -reserve into the war, considering that, once it was happily terminated, -they would be finally delivered from such dangers as that which would -have threatened them from Athens, if she had become mistress of Sicily, -and that the overthrow of the Athenians would leave them in quiet -enjoyment of the supremacy over all Hellas. - -Their king, Agis, accordingly set out at once during this winter with -some troops from Decelea, and levied from the allies contributions for -the fleet, and turning towards the Malian Gulf exacted a sum of money -from the Oetaeans by carrying off most of their cattle in reprisal for -their old hostility, and, in spite of the protests and opposition of the -Thessalians, forced the Achaeans of Phthiotis and the other subjects -of the Thessalians in those parts to give him money and hostages, and -deposited the hostages at Corinth, and tried to bring their countrymen -into the confederacy. The Lacedaemonians now issued a requisition to the -cities for building a hundred ships, fixing their own quota and that -of the Boeotians at twenty-five each; that of the Phocians and Locrians -together at fifteen; that of the Corinthians at fifteen; that of the -Arcadians, Pellenians, and Sicyonians together at ten; and that of the -Megarians, Troezenians, Epidaurians, and Hermionians together at -ten also; and meanwhile made every other preparation for commencing -hostilities by the spring. - -In the meantime the Athenians were not idle. During this same winter, -as they had determined, they contributed timber and pushed on their -ship-building, and fortified Sunium to enable their corn-ships to round -it in safety, and evacuated the fort in Laconia which they had built on -their way to Sicily; while they also, for economy, cut down any other -expenses that seemed unnecessary, and above all kept a careful look-out -against the revolt of their confederates. - -While both parties were thus engaged, and were as intent upon preparing -for the war as they had been at the outset, the Euboeans first of all -sent envoys during this winter to Agis to treat of their revolting from -Athens. Agis accepted their proposals, and sent for Alcamenes, son of -Sthenelaidas, and Melanthus from Lacedaemon, to take the command in -Euboea. These accordingly arrived with some three hundred Neodamodes, -and Agis began to arrange for their crossing over. But in the meanwhile -arrived some Lesbians, who also wished to revolt; and these being -supported by the Boeotians, Agis was persuaded to defer acting in the -matter of Euboea, and made arrangements for the revolt of the Lesbians, -giving them Alcamenes, who was to have sailed to Euboea, as governor, -and himself promising them ten ships, and the Boeotians the same number. -All this was done without instructions from home, as Agis while at -Decelea with the army that he commanded had power to send troops to -whatever quarter he pleased, and to levy men and money. During this -period, one might say, the allies obeyed him much more than they did the -Lacedaemonians in the city, as the force he had with him made him feared -at once wherever he went. While Agis was engaged with the Lesbians, the -Chians and Erythraeans, who were also ready to revolt, applied, not to -him but at Lacedaemon; where they arrived accompanied by an ambassador -from Tissaphernes, the commander of King Darius, son of Artaxerxes, in -the maritime districts, who invited the Peloponnesians to come over, and -promised to maintain their army. The King had lately called upon him -for the tribute from his government, for which he was in arrears, being -unable to raise it from the Hellenic towns by reason of the Athenians; -and he therefore calculated that by weakening the Athenians he should -get the tribute better paid, and should also draw the Lacedaemonians -into alliance with the King; and by this means, as the King had -commanded him, take alive or dead Amorges, the bastard son of -Pissuthnes, who was in rebellion on the coast of Caria. - -While the Chians and Tissaphernes thus joined to effect the same -object, about the same time Calligeitus, son of Laophon, a Megarian, -and Timagoras, son of Athenagoras, a Cyzicene, both of them exiles from -their country and living at the court of Pharnabazus, son of Pharnaces, -arrived at Lacedaemon upon a mission from Pharnabazus, to procure a -fleet for the Hellespont; by means of which, if possible, he might -himself effect the object of Tissaphernes' ambition and cause the cities -in his government to revolt from the Athenians, and so get the -tribute, and by his own agency obtain for the King the alliance of the -Lacedaemonians. - -The emissaries of Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes treating apart, a keen -competition now ensued at Lacedaemon as to whether a fleet and army -should be sent first to Ionia and Chios, or to the Hellespont. The -Lacedaemonians, however, decidedly favoured the Chians and Tissaphernes, -who were seconded by Alcibiades, the family friend of Endius, one of the -ephors for that year. Indeed, this is how their house got its Laconic -name, Alcibiades being the family name of Endius. Nevertheless the -Lacedaemonians first sent to Chios Phrynis, one of the Perioeci, to -see whether they had as many ships as they said, and whether their city -generally was as great as was reported; and upon his bringing word that -they had been told the truth, immediately entered into alliance with the -Chians and Erythraeans, and voted to send them forty ships, there being -already, according to the statement of the Chians, not less than sixty -in the island. At first the Lacedaemonians meant to send ten of these -forty themselves, with Melanchridas their admiral; but afterwards, -an earthquake having occurred, they sent Chalcideus instead of -Melanchridas, and instead of the ten ships equipped only five in -Laconia. And the winter ended, and with it ended also the nineteenth -year of this war of which Thucydides is the historian. - -At the beginning of the next summer the Chians were urging that the -fleet should be sent off, being afraid that the Athenians, from whom all -these embassies were kept a secret, might find out what was going on, -and the Lacedaemonians at once sent three Spartans to Corinth to haul -the ships as quickly as possible across the Isthmus from the other sea -to that on the side of Athens, and to order them all to sail to Chios, -those which Agis was equipping for Lesbos not excepted. The number of -ships from the allied states was thirty-nine in all. - -Meanwhile Calligeitus and Timagoras did not join on behalf of -Pharnabazus in the expedition to Chios or give the money--twenty-five -talents--which they had brought with them to help in dispatching -a force, but determined to sail afterwards with another force by -themselves. Agis, on the other hand, seeing the Lacedaemonians bent upon -going to Chios first, himself came in to their views; and the allies -assembled at Corinth and held a council, in which they decided to sail -first to Chios under the command of Chalcideus, who was equipping the -five vessels in Laconia, then to Lesbos, under the command of Alcamenes, -the same whom Agis had fixed upon, and lastly to go to the Hellespont, -where the command was given to Clearchus, son of Ramphias. Meanwhile -they would take only half the ships across the Isthmus first, and let -those sail off at once, in order that the Athenians might attend less to -the departing squadron than to those to be taken across afterwards, as -no care had been taken to keep this voyage secret through contempt of -the impotence of the Athenians, who had as yet no fleet of any account -upon the sea. Agreeably to this determination, twenty-one vessels were -at once conveyed across the Isthmus. - -They were now impatient to set sail, but the Corinthians were not -willing to accompany them until they had celebrated the Isthmian -festival, which fell at that time. Upon this Agis proposed to them to -save their scruples about breaking the Isthmian truce by taking the -expedition upon himself. The Corinthians not consenting to this, a delay -ensued, during which the Athenians conceived suspicions of what was -preparing at Chios, and sent Aristocrates, one of their generals, and -charged them with the fact, and, upon the denial of the Chians, ordered -them to send with them a contingent of ships, as faithful confederates. -Seven were sent accordingly. The reason of the dispatch of the ships -lay in the fact that the mass of the Chians were not privy to the -negotiations, while the few who were in the secret did not wish to break -with the multitude until they had something positive to lean upon, -and no longer expected the Peloponnesians to arrive by reason of their -delay. - -In the meantime the Isthmian games took place, and the Athenians, who -had been also invited, went to attend them, and now seeing more clearly -into the designs of the Chians, as soon as they returned to Athens took -measures to prevent the fleet putting out from Cenchreae without -their knowledge. After the festival the Peloponnesians set sail -with twenty-one ships for Chios, under the command of Alcamenes. The -Athenians first sailed against them with an equal number, drawing off -towards the open sea. The enemy, however, turning back before he had -followed them far, the Athenians returned also, not trusting the seven -Chian ships which formed part of their number, and afterwards manned -thirty-seven vessels in all and chased him on his passage alongshore -into Spiraeum, a desert Corinthian port on the edge of the Epidaurian -frontier. After losing one ship out at sea, the Peloponnesians got the -rest together and brought them to anchor. The Athenians now attacked not -only from the sea with their fleet, but also disembarked upon the coast; -and a melee ensued of the most confused and violent kind, in which the -Athenians disabled most of the enemy's vessels and killed Alcamenes -their commander, losing also a few of their own men. - -After this they separated, and the Athenians, detaching a sufficient -number of ships to blockade those of the enemy, anchored with the rest -at the islet adjacent, upon which they proceeded to encamp, and sent to -Athens for reinforcements; the Peloponnesians having been joined on the -day after the battle by the Corinthians, who came to help the ships, and -by the other inhabitants in the vicinity not long afterwards. These -saw the difficulty of keeping guard in a desert place, and in their -perplexity at first thought of burning the ships, but finally resolved -to haul them up on shore and sit down and guard them with their land -forces until a convenient opportunity for escaping should present -itself. Agis also, on being informed of the disaster, sent them a -Spartan of the name of Thermon. The Lacedaemonians first received the -news of the fleet having put out from the Isthmus, Alcamenes having been -ordered by the ephors to send off a horseman when this took place, -and immediately resolved to dispatch their own five vessels under -Chalcideus, and Alcibiades with him. But while they were full of this -resolution came the second news of the fleet having taken refuge in -Spiraeum; and disheartened at their first step in the Ionian war proving -a failure, they laid aside the idea of sending the ships from their own -country, and even wished to recall some that had already sailed. - -Perceiving this, Alcibiades again persuaded Endius and the other ephors -to persevere in the expedition, saying that the voyage would be made -before the Chians heard of the fleet's misfortune, and that as soon as -he set foot in Ionia, he should, by assuring them of the weakness of the -Athenians and the zeal of Lacedaemon, have no difficulty in persuading -the cities to revolt, as they would readily believe his testimony. He -also represented to Endius himself in private that it would be glorious -for him to be the means of making Ionia revolt and the King become the -ally of Lacedaemon, instead of that honour being left to Agis (Agis, -it must be remembered, was the enemy of Alcibiades); and Endius and his -colleagues thus persuaded, he put to sea with the five ships and the -Lacedaemonian Chalcideus, and made all haste upon the voyage. - -About this time the sixteen Peloponnesian ships from Sicily, which had -served through the war with Gylippus, were caught on their return off -Leucadia and roughly handled by the twenty-seven Athenian vessels under -Hippocles, son of Menippus, on the lookout for the ships from Sicily. -After losing one of their number, the rest escaped from the Athenians -and sailed into Corinth. - -Meanwhile Chalcideus and Alcibiades seized all they met with on their -voyage, to prevent news of their coming, and let them go at Corycus, -the first point which they touched at in the continent. Here they were -visited by some of their Chian correspondents and, being urged by them -to sail up to the town without announcing their coming, arrived suddenly -before Chios. The many were amazed and confounded, while the few had -so arranged that the council should be sitting at the time; and after -speeches from Chalcideus and Alcibiades stating that many more ships -were sailing up, but saying nothing of the fleet being blockaded in -Spiraeum, the Chians revolted from the Athenians, and the Erythraeans -immediately afterwards. After this three vessels sailed over to -Clazomenae, and made that city revolt also; and the Clazomenians -immediately crossed over to the mainland and began to fortify Polichna, -in order to retreat there, in case of necessity, from the island where -they dwelt. - -While the revolted places were all engaged in fortifying and preparing -for the war, news of Chios speedily reached Athens. The Athenians -thought the danger by which they were now menaced great and -unmistakable, and that the rest of their allies would not consent to -keep quiet after the secession of the greatest of their number. In the -consternation of the moment they at once took off the penalty attaching -to whoever proposed or put to the vote a proposal for using the thousand -talents which they had jealously avoided touching throughout the whole -war, and voted to employ them to man a large number of ships, and -to send off at once under Strombichides, son of Diotimus, the eight -vessels, forming part of the blockading fleet at Spiraeum, which -had left the blockade and had returned after pursuing and failing to -overtake the vessels with Chalcideus. These were to be followed -shortly afterwards by twelve more under Thrasycles, also taken from the -blockade. They also recalled the seven Chian vessels, forming part of -their squadron blockading the fleet in Spiraeum, and giving the slaves -on board their liberty, put the freemen in confinement, and speedily -manned and sent out ten fresh ships to blockade the Peloponnesians in -the place of all those that had departed, and decided to man thirty -more. Zeal was not wanting, and no effort was spared to send relief to -Chios. - -In the meantime Strombichides with his eight ships arrived at Samos, -and, taking one Samian vessel, sailed to Teos and required them to -remain quiet. Chalcideus also set sail with twenty-three ships for Teos -from Chios, the land forces of the Clazomenians and Erythraeans moving -alongshore to support him. Informed of this in time, Strombichides put -out from Teos before their arrival, and while out at sea, seeing the -number of the ships from Chios, fled towards Samos, chased by the enemy. -The Teians at first would not receive the land forces, but upon the -flight of the Athenians took them into the town. There they waited for -some time for Chalcideus to return from the pursuit, and as time went on -without his appearing, began themselves to demolish the wall which the -Athenians had built on the land side of the city of the Teians, being -assisted by a few of the barbarians who had come up under the command of -Stages, the lieutenant of Tissaphernes. - -Meanwhile Chalcideus and Alcibiades, after chasing Strombichides into -Samos, armed the crews of the ships from Peloponnese and left them at -Chios, and filling their places with substitutes from Chios and manning -twenty others, sailed off to effect the revolt of Miletus. The wish of -Alcibiades, who had friends among the leading men of the Milesians, was -to bring over the town before the arrival of the ships from Peloponnese, -and thus, by causing the revolt of as many cities as possible with the -help of the Chian power and of Chalcideus, to secure the honour for the -Chians and himself and Chalcideus, and, as he had promised, for Endius -who had sent them out. Not discovered until their voyage was nearly -completed, they arrived a little before Strombichides and Thrasycles -(who had just come with twelve ships from Athens, and had joined -Strombichides in pursuing them), and occasioned the revolt of Miletus. -The Athenians sailing up close on their heels with nineteen ships found -Miletus closed against them, and took up their station at the -adjacent island of Lade. The first alliance between the King and the -Lacedaemonians was now concluded immediately upon the revolt of the -Milesians, by Tissaphernes and Chalcideus, and was as follows: - -The Lacedaemonians and their allies made a treaty with the King and -Tissaphernes upon the terms following: - -1. Whatever country or cities the King has, or the King's ancestors had, -shall be the king's: and whatever came in to the Athenians from these -cities, either money or any other thing, the King and the Lacedaemonians -and their allies shall jointly hinder the Athenians from receiving -either money or any other thing. - -2. The war with the Athenians shall be carried on jointly by the King -and by the Lacedaemonians and their allies: and it shall not be lawful -to make peace with the Athenians except both agree, the King on his side -and the Lacedaemonians and their allies on theirs. - -3. If any revolt from the King, they shall be the enemies of -the Lacedaemonians and their allies. And if any revolt from the -Lacedaemonians and their allies, they shall be the enemies of the King -in like manner. - -This was the alliance. After this the Chians immediately manned ten more -vessels and sailed for Anaia, in order to gain intelligence of those -in Miletus, and also to make the cities revolt. A message, however, -reaching them from Chalcideus to tell them to go back again, and that -Amorges was at hand with an army by land, they sailed to the temple of -Zeus, and there sighting ten more ships sailing up with which Diomedon -had started from Athens after Thrasycles, fled, one ship to Ephesus, -the rest to Teos. The Athenians took four of their ships empty, the men -finding time to escape ashore; the rest took refuge in the city of the -Teians; after which the Athenians sailed off to Samos, while the Chians -put to sea with their remaining vessels, accompanied by the land forces, -and caused Lebedos to revolt, and after it Erae. After this they both -returned home, the fleet and the army. - -About the same time the twenty ships of the Peloponnesians in Spiraeum, -which we left chased to land and blockaded by an equal number of -Athenians, suddenly sallied out and defeated the blockading squadron, -took four of their ships, and, sailing back to Cenchreae, prepared again -for the voyage to Chios and Ionia. Here they were joined by Astyochus -as high admiral from Lacedaemon, henceforth invested with the supreme -command at sea. The land forces now withdrawing from Teos, Tissaphernes -repaired thither in person with an army and completed the demolition of -anything that was left of the wall, and so departed. Not long after his -departure Diomedon arrived with ten Athenian ships, and, having made -a convention by which the Teians admitted him as they had the enemy, -coasted along to Erae, and, failing in an attempt upon the town, sailed -back again. - -About this time took place the rising of the commons at Samos against -the upper classes, in concert with some Athenians, who were there in -three vessels. The Samian commons put to death some two hundred in all -of the upper classes, and banished four hundred more, and themselves -took their land and houses; after which the Athenians decreed their -independence, being now sure of their fidelity, and the commons -henceforth governed the city, excluding the landholders from all share -in affairs, and forbidding any of the commons to give his daughter in -marriage to them or to take a wife from them in future. - -After this, during the same summer, the Chians, whose zeal continued as -active as ever, and who even without the Peloponnesians found themselves -in sufficient force to effect the revolt of the cities and also wished -to have as many companions in peril as possible, made an expedition with -thirteen ships of their own to Lesbos; the instructions from Lacedaemon -being to go to that island next, and from thence to the Hellespont. -Meanwhile the land forces of the Peloponnesians who were with the Chians -and of the allies on the spot, moved alongshore for Clazomenae and Cuma, -under the command of Eualas, a Spartan; while the fleet under Diniadas, -one of the Perioeci, first sailed up to Methymna and caused it to -revolt, and, leaving four ships there, with the rest procured the revolt -of Mitylene. - -In the meantime Astyochus, the Lacedaemonian admiral, set sail from -Cenchreae with four ships, as he had intended, and arrived at Chios. -On the third day after his arrival, the Athenian ships, twenty-five in -number, sailed to Lesbos under Diomedon and Leon, who had lately arrived -with a reinforcement of ten ships from Athens. Late in the same day -Astyochus put to sea, and taking one Chian vessel with him sailed to -Lesbos to render what assistance he could. Arrived at Pyrrha, and from -thence the next day at Eresus, he there learned that Mitylene had been -taken, almost without a blow, by the Athenians, who had sailed up and -unexpectedly put into the harbour, had beaten the Chian ships, and -landing and defeating the troops opposed to them had become masters of -the city. Informed of this by the Eresians and the Chian ships, which -had been left with Eubulus at Methymna, and had fled upon the capture of -Mitylene, and three of which he now fell in with, one having been taken -by the Athenians, Astyochus did not go on to Mitylene, but raised and -armed Eresus, and, sending the heavy infantry from his own ships by land -under Eteonicus to Antissa and Methymna, himself proceeded alongshore -thither with the ships which he had with him and with the three Chians, -in the hope that the Methymnians upon seeing them would be encouraged to -persevere in their revolt. As, however, everything went against him -in Lesbos, he took up his own force and sailed back to Chios; the land -forces on board, which were to have gone to the Hellespont, being also -conveyed back to their different cities. After this six of the allied -Peloponnesian ships at Cenchreae joined the forces at Chios. The -Athenians, after restoring matters to their old state in Lesbos, set -sail from thence and took Polichna, the place that the Clazomenians were -fortifying on the continent, and carried the inhabitants back to their -town upon the island, except the authors of the revolt, who withdrew to -Daphnus; and thus Clazomenae became once more Athenian. - -The same summer the Athenians in the twenty ships at Lade, blockading -Miletus, made a descent at Panormus in the Milesian territory, and -killed Chalcideus the Lacedaemonian commander, who had come with a -few men against them, and the third day after sailed over and set up -a trophy, which, as they were not masters of the country, was however -pulled down by the Milesians. Meanwhile Leon and Diomedon with the -Athenian fleet from Lesbos issuing from the Oenussae, the isles off -Chios, and from their forts of Sidussa and Pteleum in the Erythraeid, -and from Lesbos, carried on the war against the Chians from the ships, -having on board heavy infantry from the rolls pressed to serve as -marines. Landing in Cardamyle and in Bolissus they defeated with heavy -loss the Chians that took the field against them and, laying desolate -the places in that neighbourhood, defeated the Chians again in another -battle at Phanae, and in a third at Leuconium. After this the Chians -ceased to meet them in the field, while the Athenians devastated the -country, which was beautifully stocked and had remained uninjured ever -since the Median wars. Indeed, after the Lacedaemonians, the Chians are -the only people that I have known who knew how to be wise in prosperity, -and who ordered their city the more securely the greater it grew. Nor -was this revolt, in which they might seem to have erred on the side of -rashness, ventured upon until they had numerous and gallant allies to -share the danger with them, and until they perceived the Athenians -after the Sicilian disaster themselves no longer denying the thoroughly -desperate state of their affairs. And if they were thrown out by one -of the surprises which upset human calculations, they found out their -mistake in company with many others who believed, like them, in the -speedy collapse of the Athenian power. While they were thus blockaded -from the sea and plundered by land, some of the citizens undertook to -bring the city over to the Athenians. Apprised of this the authorities -took no action themselves, but brought Astyochus, the admiral, from -Erythrae, with four ships that he had with him, and considered how they -could most quietly, either by taking hostages or by some other means, -put an end to the conspiracy. - -While the Chians were thus engaged, a thousand Athenian heavy infantry -and fifteen hundred Argives (five hundred of whom were light troops -furnished with armour by the Athenians), and one thousand of the allies, -towards the close of the same summer sailed from Athens in forty-eight -ships, some of which were transports, under the command of Phrynichus, -Onomacles, and Scironides, and putting into Samos crossed over and -encamped at Miletus. Upon this the Milesians came out to the number of -eight hundred heavy infantry, with the Peloponnesians who had come with -Chalcideus, and some foreign mercenaries of Tissaphernes, Tissaphernes -himself and his cavalry, and engaged the Athenians and their allies. -While the Argives rushed forward on their own wing with the careless -disdain of men advancing against Ionians who would never stand their -charge, and were defeated by the Milesians with a loss little short of -three hundred men, the Athenians first defeated the Peloponnesians, and -driving before them the barbarians and the ruck of the army, without -engaging the Milesians, who after the rout of the Argives retreated into -the town upon seeing their comrades worsted, crowned their victory by -grounding their arms under the very walls of Miletus. Thus, in this -battle, the Ionians on both sides overcame the Dorians, the Athenians -defeating the Peloponnesians opposed to them, and the Milesians the -Argives. After setting up a trophy, the Athenians prepared to draw a -wall round the place, which stood upon an isthmus; thinking that, if -they could gain Miletus, the other towns also would easily come over to -them. - -Meanwhile about dusk tidings reached them that the fifty-five ships -from Peloponnese and Sicily might be instantly expected. Of these the -Siceliots, urged principally by the Syracusan Hermocrates to join -in giving the finishing blow to the power of Athens, furnished -twenty-two--twenty from Syracuse, and two from Silenus; and the ships -that we left preparing in Peloponnese being now ready, both squadrons -had been entrusted to Therimenes, a Lacedaemonian, to take to Astyochus, -the admiral. They now put in first at Leros the island off Miletus, and -from thence, discovering that the Athenians were before the town, sailed -into the Iasic Gulf, in order to learn how matters stood at Miletus. -Meanwhile Alcibiades came on horseback to Teichiussa in the Milesian -territory, the point of the gulf at which they had put in for the night, -and told them of the battle in which he had fought in person by the side -of the Milesians and Tissaphernes, and advised them, if they did not -wish to sacrifice Ionia and their cause, to fly to the relief of Miletus -and hinder its investment. - -Accordingly they resolved to relieve it the next morning. Meanwhile -Phrynichus, the Athenian commander, had received precise intelligence of -the fleet from Leros, and when his colleagues expressed a wish to keep -the sea and fight it out, flatly refused either to stay himself or to -let them or any one else do so if he could help it. Where they could -hereafter contend, after full and undisturbed preparation, with an exact -knowledge of the number of the enemy's fleet and of the force which they -could oppose to him, he would never allow the reproach of disgrace to -drive him into a risk that was unreasonable. It was no disgrace for an -Athenian fleet to retreat when it suited them: put it as they would, it -would be more disgraceful to be beaten, and to expose the city not only -to disgrace, but to the most serious danger. After its late misfortunes -it could hardly be justified in voluntarily taking the offensive even -with the strongest force, except in a case of absolute necessity: -much less then without compulsion could it rush upon peril of its own -seeking. He told them to take up their wounded as quickly as they could -and the troops and stores which they had brought with them, and leaving -behind what they had taken from the enemy's country, in order to lighten -the ships, to sail off to Samos, and there concentrating all their ships -to attack as opportunity served. As he spoke so he acted; and thus not -now more than afterwards, nor in this alone but in all that he had to do -with, did Phrynichus show himself a man of sense. In this way that -very evening the Athenians broke up from before Miletus, leaving their -victory unfinished, and the Argives, mortified at their disaster, -promptly sailed off home from Samos. - -As soon as it was morning the Peloponnesians weighed from Teichiussa and -put into Miletus after the departure of the Athenians; they stayed one -day, and on the next took with them the Chian vessels originally chased -into port with Chalcideus, and resolved to sail back for the tackle -which they had put on shore at Teichiussa. Upon their arrival -Tissaphernes came to them with his land forces and induced them to sail -to Iasus, which was held by his enemy Amorges. Accordingly they suddenly -attacked and took Iasus, whose inhabitants never imagined that the ships -could be other than Athenian. The Syracusans distinguished themselves -most in the action. Amorges, a bastard of Pissuthnes and a rebel from -the King, was taken alive and handed over to Tissaphernes, to carry to -the King, if he chose, according to his orders: Iasus was sacked by the -army, who found a very great booty there, the place being wealthy from -ancient date. The mercenaries serving with Amorges the Peloponnesians -received and enrolled in their army without doing them any harm, -since most of them came from Peloponnese, and handed over the town to -Tissaphernes with all the captives, bond or free, at the stipulated -price of one Doric stater a head; after which they returned to Miletus. -Pedaritus, son of Leon, who had been sent by the Lacedaemonians to take -the command at Chios, they dispatched by land as far as Erythrae with -the mercenaries taken from Amorges; appointing Philip to remain as -governor of Miletus. - -Summer was now over. The winter following, Tissaphernes put Iasus in a -state of defence, and passing on to Miletus distributed a month's pay to -all the ships as he had promised at Lacedaemon, at the rate of an Attic -drachma a day for each man. In future, however, he was resolved not to -give more than three obols, until he had consulted the King; when if the -King should so order he would give, he said, the full drachma. However, -upon the protest of the Syracusan general Hermocrates (for as Therimenes -was not admiral, but only accompanied them in order to hand over the -ships to Astyochus, he made little difficulty about the pay), it was -agreed that the amount of five ships' pay should be given over and above -the three obols a day for each man; Tissaphernes paying thirty talents -a month for fifty-five ships, and to the rest, for as many ships as they -had beyond that number, at the same rate. - -The same winter the Athenians in Samos, having been joined by -thirty-five more vessels from home under Charminus, Strombichides, and -Euctemon, called in their squadron at Chios and all the rest, intending -to blockade Miletus with their navy, and to send a fleet and an army -against Chios; drawing lots for the respective services. This intention -they carried into effect; Strombichides, Onamacles, and Euctemon sailing -against Chios, which fell to their lot, with thirty ships and a part -of the thousand heavy infantry, who had been to Miletus, in transports; -while the rest remained masters of the sea with seventy-four ships at -Samos, and advanced upon Miletus. - -Meanwhile Astyochus, whom we left at Chios collecting the hostages -required in consequence of the conspiracy, stopped upon learning that -the fleet with Therimenes had arrived, and that the affairs of the -league were in a more flourishing condition, and putting out to sea with -ten Peloponnesian and as many Chian vessels, after a futile attack upon -Pteleum, coasted on to Clazomenae, and ordered the Athenian party to -remove inland to Daphnus, and to join the Peloponnesians, an order in -which also joined Tamos the king's lieutenant in Ionia. This order being -disregarded, Astyochus made an attack upon the town, which was unwalled, -and having failed to take it was himself carried off by a strong gale -to Phocaea and Cuma, while the rest of the ships put in at the islands -adjacent to Clazomenae--Marathussa, Pele, and Drymussa. Here they were -detained eight days by the winds, and, plundering and consuming all the -property of the Clazomenians there deposited, put the rest on shipboard -and sailed off to Phocaea and Cuma to join Astyochus. - -While he was there, envoys arrived from the Lesbians who wished to -revolt again. With Astyochus they were successful; but the Corinthians -and the other allies being averse to it by reason of their former -failure, he weighed anchor and set sail for Chios, where they eventually -arrived from different quarters, the fleet having been scattered by a -storm. After this Pedaritus, whom we left marching along the coast from -Miletus, arrived at Erythrae, and thence crossed over with his army to -Chios, where he found also about five hundred soldiers who had been left -there by Chalcideus from the five ships with their arms. Meanwhile some -Lesbians making offers to revolt, Astyochus urged upon Pedaritus and the -Chians that they ought to go with their ships and effect the revolt -of Lesbos, and so increase the number of their allies, or, if not -successful, at all events harm the Athenians. The Chians, however, -turned a deaf ear to this, and Pedaritus flatly refused to give up to -him the Chian vessels. - -Upon this Astyochus took five Corinthian and one Megarian vessel, -with another from Hermione, and the ships which had come with him from -Laconia, and set sail for Miletus to assume his command as admiral; -after telling the Chians with many threats that he would certainly -not come and help them if they should be in need. At Corycus in the -Erythraeid he brought to for the night; the Athenian armament sailing -from Samos against Chios being only separated from him by a hill, upon -the other side of which it brought to; so that neither perceived the -other. But a letter arriving in the night from Pedaritus to say that -some liberated Erythraean prisoners had come from Samos to betray -Erythrae, Astyochus at once put back to Erythrae, and so just escaped -falling in with the Athenians. Here Pedaritus sailed over to join him; -and after inquiry into the pretended treachery, finding that the whole -story had been made up to procure the escape of the men from Samos, they -acquitted them of the charge, and sailed away, Pedaritus to Chios and -Astyochus to Miletus as he had intended. - -Meanwhile the Athenian armament sailing round Corycus fell in with three -Chian men-of-war off Arginus, and gave immediate chase. A great storm -coming on, the Chians with difficulty took refuge in the harbour; the -three Athenian vessels most forward in the pursuit being wrecked -and thrown up near the city of Chios, and the crews slain or taken -prisoners. The rest of the Athenian fleet took refuge in the harbour -called Phoenicus, under Mount Mimas, and from thence afterwards put into -Lesbos and prepared for the work of fortification. - -The same winter the Lacedaemonian Hippocrates sailed out from -Peloponnese with ten Thurian ships under the command of Dorieus, son of -Diagoras, and two colleagues, one Laconian and one Syracusan vessel, -and arrived at Cnidus, which had already revolted at the instigation of -Tissaphernes. When their arrival was known at Miletus, orders came to -them to leave half their squadron to guard Cnidus, and with the rest to -cruise round Triopium and seize all the merchantmen arriving from Egypt. -Triopium is a promontory of Cnidus and sacred to Apollo. This coming to -the knowledge of the Athenians, they sailed from Samos and captured -the six ships on the watch at Triopium, the crews escaping out of them. -After this the Athenians sailed into Cnidus and made an assault upon -the town, which was unfortified, and all but took it; and the next -day assaulted it again, but with less effect, as the inhabitants had -improved their defences during the night, and had been reinforced by the -crews escaped from the ships at Triopium. The Athenians now withdrew, -and after plundering the Cnidian territory sailed back to Samos. - -About the same time Astyochus came to the fleet at Miletus. The -Peloponnesian camp was still plentifully supplied, being in receipt of -sufficient pay, and the soldiers having still in hand the large booty -taken at Iasus. The Milesians also showed great ardour for the war. -Nevertheless the Peloponnesians thought the first convention with -Tissaphernes, made with Chalcideus, defective, and more advantageous -to him than to them, and consequently while Therimenes was still there -concluded another, which was as follows: - -The convention of the Lacedaemonians and the allies with King Darius and -the sons of the King, and with Tissaphernes for a treaty and friendship, -as follows: - -1. Neither the Lacedaemonians nor the allies of the Lacedaemonians shall -make war against or otherwise injure any country or cities that belong -to King Darius or did belong to his father or to his ancestors; neither -shall the Lacedaemonians nor the allies of the Lacedaemonians exact -tribute from such cities. Neither shall King Darius nor any of -the subjects of the King make war against or otherwise injure the -Lacedaemonians or their allies. - -2. If the Lacedaemonians or their allies should require any assistance -from the King, or the King from the Lacedaemonians or their allies, -whatever they both agree upon they shall be right in doing. - -3. Both shall carry on jointly the war against the Athenians and their -allies: and if they make peace, both shall do so jointly. - -4. The expense of all troops in the King's country, sent for by the -King, shall be borne by the King. - -5. If any of the states comprised in this convention with the King -attack the King's country, the rest shall stop them and aid the King -to the best of their power. And if any in the King's country or in the -countries under the King's rule attack the country of the Lacedaemonians -or their allies, the King shall stop it and help them to the best of his -power. - -After this convention Therimenes handed over the fleet to Astyochus, -sailed off in a small boat, and was lost. The Athenian armament had -now crossed over from Lesbos to Chios, and being master by sea and land -began to fortify Delphinium, a place naturally strong on the land side, -provided with more than one harbour, and also not far from the city of -Chios. Meanwhile the Chians remained inactive. Already defeated in -so many battles, they were now also at discord among themselves; the -execution of the party of Tydeus, son of Ion, by Pedaritus upon the -charge of Atticism, followed by the forcible imposition of an oligarchy -upon the rest of the city, having made them suspicious of one another; -and they therefore thought neither themselves not the mercenaries under -Pedaritus a match for the enemy. They sent, however, to Miletus to beg -Astyochus to assist them, which he refused to do, and was accordingly -denounced at Lacedaemon by Pedaritus as a traitor. Such was the state of -the Athenian affairs at Chios; while their fleet at Samos kept sailing -out against the enemy in Miletus, until they found that he would not -accept their challenge, and then retired again to Samos and remained -quiet. - -In the same winter the twenty-seven ships equipped by the Lacedaemonians -for Pharnabazus through the agency of the Megarian Calligeitus, and the -Cyzicene Timagoras, put out from Peloponnese and sailed for Ionia about -the time of the solstice, under the command of Antisthenes, a Spartan. -With them the Lacedaemonians also sent eleven Spartans as advisers to -Astyochus; Lichas, son of Arcesilaus, being among the number. Arrived at -Miletus, their orders were to aid in generally superintending the good -conduct of the war; to send off the above ships or a greater or less -number to the Hellespont to Pharnabazus, if they thought proper, -appointing Clearchus, son of Ramphias, who sailed with them, to the -command; and further, if they thought proper, to make Antisthenes -admiral, dismissing Astyochus, whom the letters of Pedaritus had caused -to be regarded with suspicion. Sailing accordingly from Malea across -the open sea, the squadron touched at Melos and there fell in with ten -Athenian ships, three of which they took empty and burned. After this, -being afraid that the Athenian vessels escaped from Melos might, as -they in fact did, give information of their approach to the Athenians at -Samos, they sailed to Crete, and having lengthened their voyage by -way of precaution made land at Caunus in Asia, from whence considering -themselves in safety they sent a message to the fleet at Miletus for a -convoy along the coast. - -Meanwhile the Chians and Pedaritus, undeterred by the backwardness of -Astyochus, went on sending messengers pressing him to come with all -the fleet to assist them against their besiegers, and not to leave the -greatest of the allied states in Ionia to be shut up by sea and overrun -and pillaged by land. There were more slaves at Chios than in any one -other city except Lacedaemon, and being also by reason of their numbers -punished more rigorously when they offended, most of them, when they saw -the Athenian armament firmly established in the island with a fortified -position, immediately deserted to the enemy, and through their knowledge -of the country did the greatest mischief. The Chians therefore urged -upon Astyochus that it was his duty to assist them, while there was -still a hope and a possibility of stopping the enemy's progress, while -Delphinium was still in process of fortification and unfinished, and -before the completion of a higher rampart which was being added to -protect the camp and fleet of their besiegers. Astyochus now saw that -the allies also wished it and prepared to go, in spite of his intention -to the contrary owing to the threat already referred to. - -In the meantime news came from Caunus of the arrival of the twenty-seven -ships with the Lacedaemonian commissioners; and Astyochus, postponing -everything to the duty of convoying a fleet of that importance, in -order to be more able to command the sea, and to the safe conduct of the -Lacedaemonians sent as spies over his behaviour, at once gave up going -to Chios and set sail for Caunus. As he coasted along he landed at the -Meropid Cos and sacked the city, which was unfortified and had been -lately laid in ruins by an earthquake, by far the greatest in living -memory, and, as the inhabitants had fled to the mountains, overran the -country and made booty of all it contained, letting go, however, the -free men. From Cos arriving in the night at Cnidus he was constrained by -the representations of the Cnidians not to disembark the sailors, but to -sail as he was straight against the twenty Athenian vessels, which with -Charminus, one of the commanders at Samos, were on the watch for the -very twenty-seven ships from Peloponnese which Astyochus was himself -sailing to join; the Athenians in Samos having heard from Melos of their -approach, and Charminus being on the look-out off Syme, Chalce, Rhodes, -and Lycia, as he now heard that they were at Caunus. - -Astyochus accordingly sailed as he was to Syme, before he was heard of, -in the hope of catching the enemy somewhere out at sea. Rain, however, -and foggy weather encountered him, and caused his ships to straggle -and get into disorder in the dark. In the morning his fleet had parted -company and was most of it still straggling round the island, and the -left wing only in sight of Charminus and the Athenians, who took it for -the squadron which they were watching for from Caunus, and hastily put -out against it with part only of their twenty vessels, and attacking -immediately sank three ships and disabled others, and had the advantage -in the action until the main body of the fleet unexpectedly hove in -sight, when they were surrounded on every side. Upon this they took to -flight, and after losing six ships with the rest escaped to Teutlussa -or Beet Island, and from thence to Halicarnassus. After this the -Peloponnesians put into Cnidus and, being joined by the twenty-seven -ships from Caunus, sailed all together and set up a trophy in Syme, and -then returned to anchor at Cnidus. - -As soon as the Athenians knew of the sea-fight, they sailed with all the -ships at Samos to Syme, and, without attacking or being attacked by the -fleet at Cnidus, took the ships' tackle left at Syme, and touching at -Lorymi on the mainland sailed back to Samos. Meanwhile the Peloponnesian -ships, being now all at Cnidus, underwent such repairs as were -needed; while the eleven Lacedaemonian commissioners conferred with -Tissaphernes, who had come to meet them, upon the points which did not -satisfy them in the past transactions, and upon the best and mutually -most advantageous manner of conducting the war in future. The severest -critic of the present proceedings was Lichas, who said that neither -of the treaties could stand, neither that of Chalcideus, nor that of -Therimenes; it being monstrous that the King should at this date pretend -to the possession of all the country formerly ruled by himself or by his -ancestors--a pretension which implicitly put back under the yoke all the -islands--Thessaly, Locris, and everything as far as Boeotia--and made -the Lacedaemonians give to the Hellenes instead of liberty a Median -master. He therefore invited Tissaphernes to conclude another and a -better treaty, as they certainly would not recognize those existing -and did not want any of his pay upon such conditions. This offended -Tissaphernes so much that he went away in a rage without settling -anything. - - - - -CHAPTER XXV - -_Twentieth and Twenty-first Years of the War--Intrigues of -Alcibiades--Withdrawal of the Persian Subsidies--Oligarchical Coup -d'Etat at Athens--Patriotism of the Army at Samos_ - -The Peloponnesians now determined to sail to Rhodes, upon the invitation -of some of the principal men there, hoping to gain an island powerful by -the number of its seamen and by its land forces, and also thinking that -they would be able to maintain their fleet from their own confederacy, -without having to ask for money from Tissaphernes. They accordingly -at once set sail that same winter from Cnidus, and first put in with -ninety-four ships at Camirus in the Rhodian country, to the great alarm -of the mass of the inhabitants, who were not privy to the intrigue, and -who consequently fled, especially as the town was unfortified. They were -afterwards, however, assembled by the Lacedaemonians together with -the inhabitants of the two other towns of Lindus and Ialysus; and the -Rhodians were persuaded to revolt from the Athenians and the island went -over to the Peloponnesians. Meanwhile the Athenians had received the -alarm and set sail with the fleet from Samos to forestall them, and came -within sight of the island, but being a little too late sailed off for -the moment to Chalce, and from thence to Samos, and subsequently waged -war against Rhodes, issuing from Chalce, Cos, and Samos. - -The Peloponnesians now levied a contribution of thirty-two talents from -the Rhodians, after which they hauled their ships ashore and for eighty -days remained inactive. During this time, and even earlier, before they -removed to Rhodes, the following intrigues took place. After the -death of Chalcideus and the battle at Miletus, Alcibiades began to be -suspected by the Peloponnesians; and Astyochus received from Lacedaemon -an order from them to put him to death, he being the personal enemy of -Agis, and in other respects thought unworthy of confidence. Alcibiades -in his alarm first withdrew to Tissaphernes, and immediately began to -do all he could with him to injure the Peloponnesian cause. Henceforth -becoming his adviser in everything, he cut down the pay from an Attic -drachma to three obols a day, and even this not paid too regularly; and -told Tissaphernes to say to the Peloponnesians that the Athenians, whose -maritime experience was of an older date than their own, only gave their -men three obols, not so much from poverty as to prevent their seamen -being corrupted by being too well off, and injuring their condition by -spending money upon enervating indulgences, and also paid their crews -irregularly in order to have a security against their deserting in the -arrears which they would leave behind them. He also told Tissaphernes -to bribe the captains and generals of the cities, and so to obtain their -connivance--an expedient which succeeded with all except the Syracusans, -Hermocrates alone opposing him on behalf of the whole confederacy. -Meanwhile the cities asking for money Alcibiades sent off, by roundly -telling them in the name of Tissaphernes that it was great impudence -in the Chians, the richest people in Hellas, not content with being -defended by a foreign force, to expect others to risk not only their -lives but their money as well in behalf of their freedom; while the -other cities, he said, had had to pay largely to Athens before their -rebellion, and could not justly refuse to contribute as much or even -more now for their own selves. He also pointed out that Tissaphernes was -at present carrying on the war at his own charges, and had good cause -for economy, but that as soon as he received remittances from the king -he would give them their pay in full and do what was reasonable for the -cities. - -Alcibiades further advised Tissaphernes not to be in too great a -hurry to end the war, or to let himself be persuaded to bring up the -Phoenician fleet which he was equipping, or to provide pay for more -Hellenes, and thus put the power by land and sea into the same hands; -but to leave each of the contending parties in possession of one -element, thus enabling the king when he found one troublesome to call -in the other. For if the command of the sea and land were united in one -hand, he would not know where to turn for help to overthrow the dominant -power; unless he at last chose to stand up himself, and go through with -the struggle at great expense and hazard. The cheapest plan was to let -the Hellenes wear each other out, at a small share of the expense and -without risk to himself. Besides, he would find the Athenians the most -convenient partners in empire as they did not aim at conquests on -shore, and carried on the war upon principles and with a practice most -advantageous to the King; being prepared to combine to conquer the sea -for Athens, and for the King all the Hellenes inhabiting his country, -whom the Peloponnesians, on the contrary, had come to liberate. Now it -was not likely that the Lacedaemonians would free the Hellenes from the -Hellenic Athenians, without freeing them also from the barbarian Mede, -unless overthrown by him in the meanwhile. Alcibiades therefore urged -him to wear them both out at first, and, after docking the Athenian -power as much as he could, forthwith to rid the country of the -Peloponnesians. In the main Tissaphernes approved of this policy, so far -at least as could be conjectured from his behaviour; since he now gave -his confidence to Alcibiades in recognition of his good advice, and kept -the Peloponnesians short of money, and would not let them fight at sea, -but ruined their cause by pretending that the Phoenician fleet would -arrive, and that they would thus be enabled to contend with the odds in -their favour, and so made their navy lose its efficiency, which had been -very remarkable, and generally betrayed a coolness in the war that was -too plain to be mistaken. - -Alcibiades gave this advice to Tissaphernes and the King, with whom he -then was, not merely because he thought it really the best, but because -he was studying means to effect his restoration to his country, well -knowing that if he did not destroy it he might one day hope to persuade -the Athenians to recall him, and thinking that his best chance of -persuading them lay in letting them see that he possessed the favour of -Tissaphernes. The event proved him to be right. When the Athenians at -Samos found that he had influence with Tissaphernes, principally of -their own motion (though partly also through Alcibiades himself sending -word to their chief men to tell the best men in the army that, if there -were only an oligarchy in the place of the rascally democracy that had -banished him, he would be glad to return to his country and to make -Tissaphernes their friend), the captains and chief men in the armament -at once embraced the idea of subverting the democracy. - -The design was first mooted in the camp, and afterwards from thence -reached the city. Some persons crossed over from Samos and had an -interview with Alcibiades, who immediately offered to make first -Tissaphernes, and afterwards the King, their friend, if they would give -up the democracy and make it possible for the King to trust them. -The higher class, who also suffered most severely from the war, now -conceived great hopes of getting the government into their own hands, -and of triumphing over the enemy. Upon their return to Samos the -emissaries formed their partisans into a club, and openly told the mass -of the armament that the King would be their friend, and would -provide them with money, if Alcibiades were restored and the democracy -abolished. The multitude, if at first irritated by these intrigues, were -nevertheless kept quiet by the advantageous prospect of the pay from the -King; and the oligarchical conspirators, after making this communication -to the people, now re-examined the proposals of Alcibiades among -themselves, with most of their associates. Unlike the rest, who thought -them advantageous and trustworthy, Phrynichus, who was still general, -by no means approved of the proposals. Alcibiades, he rightly thought, -cared no more for an oligarchy than for a democracy, and only sought to -change the institutions of his country in order to get himself recalled -by his associates; while for themselves their one object should be -to avoid civil discord. It was not the King's interest, when the -Peloponnesians were now their equals at sea, and in possession of some -of the chief cities in his empire, to go out of his way to side with -the Athenians whom he did not trust, when he might make friends of the -Peloponnesians who had never injured him. And as for the allied states -to whom oligarchy was now offered, because the democracy was to be put -down at Athens, he well knew that this would not make the rebels come in -any the sooner, or confirm the loyal in their allegiance; as the allies -would never prefer servitude with an oligarchy or democracy to freedom -with the constitution which they actually enjoyed, to whichever type it -belonged. Besides, the cities thought that the so-called better classes -would prove just as oppressive as the commons, as being those who -originated, proposed, and for the most part benefited from the acts of -the commons injurious to the confederates. Indeed, if it depended on the -better classes, the confederates would be put to death without trial and -with violence; while the commons were their refuge and the chastiser -of these men. This he positively knew that the cities had learned -by experience, and that such was their opinion. The propositions of -Alcibiades, and the intrigues now in progress, could therefore never -meet with his approval. - -However, the members of the club assembled, agreeably to their original -determination, accepted what was proposed, and prepared to send Pisander -and others on an embassy to Athens to treat for the restoration of -Alcibiades and the abolition of the democracy in the city, and thus to -make Tissaphernes the friend of the Athenians. - -Phrynichus now saw that there would be a proposal to restore Alcibiades, -and that the Athenians would consent to it; and fearing after what he -had said against it that Alcibiades, if restored, would revenge himself -upon him for his opposition, had recourse to the following expedient. -He sent a secret letter to the Lacedaemonian admiral Astyochus, who was -still in the neighbourhood of Miletus, to tell him that Alcibiades was -ruining their cause by making Tissaphernes the friend of the Athenians, -and containing an express revelation of the rest of the intrigue, -desiring to be excused if he sought to harm his enemy even at the -expense of the interests of his country. However, Astyochus, instead -of thinking of punishing Alcibiades, who, besides, no longer ventured -within his reach as formerly, went up to him and Tissaphernes at -Magnesia, communicated to them the letter from Samos, and turned -informer, and, if report may be trusted, became the paid creature -of Tissaphernes, undertaking to inform him as to this and all other -matters; which was also the reason why he did not remonstrate more -strongly against the pay not being given in full. Upon this Alcibiades -instantly sent to the authorities at Samos a letter against Phrynichus, -stating what he had done, and requiring that he should be put to -death. Phrynichus distracted, and placed in the utmost peril by the -denunciation, sent again to Astyochus, reproaching him with having so -ill kept the secret of his previous letter, and saying that he was now -prepared to give them an opportunity of destroying the whole Athenian -armament at Samos; giving a detailed account of the means which he -should employ, Samos being unfortified, and pleading that, being in -danger of his life on their account, he could not now be blamed for -doing this or anything else to escape being destroyed by his mortal -enemies. This also Astyochus revealed to Alcibiades. - -Meanwhile Phrynichus having had timely notice that he was playing him -false, and that a letter on the subject was on the point of arriving -from Alcibiades, himself anticipated the news, and told the army that -the enemy, seeing that Samos was unfortified and the fleet not all -stationed within the harbour, meant to attack the camp, that he could -be certain of this intelligence, and that they must fortify Samos as -quickly as possible, and generally look to their defences. It will be -remembered that he was general, and had himself authority to carry out -these measures. Accordingly they addressed themselves to the work -of fortification, and Samos was thus fortified sooner than it -would otherwise have been. Not long afterwards came the letter from -Alcibiades, saying that the army was betrayed by Phrynichus, and the -enemy about to attack it. Alcibiades, however, gained no credit, it -being thought that he was in the secret of the enemy's designs, and had -tried to fasten them upon Phrynichus, and to make out that he was their -accomplice, out of hatred; and consequently far from hurting him he -rather bore witness to what he had said by this intelligence. - -After this Alcibiades set to work to persuade Tissaphernes to become -the friend of the Athenians. Tissaphernes, although afraid of the -Peloponnesians because they had more ships in Asia than the Athenians, -was yet disposed to be persuaded if he could, especially after -his quarrel with the Peloponnesians at Cnidus about the treaty of -Therimenes. The quarrel had already taken place, as the Peloponnesians -were by this time actually at Rhodes; and in it the original argument -of Alcibiades touching the liberation of all the towns by the -Lacedaemonians had been verified by the declaration of Lichas that it -was impossible to submit to a convention which made the King master of -all the states at any former time ruled by himself or by his fathers. - -While Alcibiades was besieging the favour of Tissaphernes with an -earnestness proportioned to the greatness of the issue, the Athenian -envoys who had been dispatched from Samos with Pisander arrived at -Athens, and made a speech before the people, giving a brief summary -of their views, and particularly insisting that, if Alcibiades were -recalled and the democratic constitution changed, they could have the -King as their ally, and would be able to overcome the Peloponnesians. -A number of speakers opposed them on the question of the democracy, the -enemies of Alcibiades cried out against the scandal of a restoration to -be effected by a violation of the constitution, and the Eumolpidae -and Ceryces protested in behalf of the mysteries, the cause of his -banishment, and called upon the gods to avert his recall; when Pisander, -in the midst of much opposition and abuse, came forward, and taking each -of his opponents aside asked him the following question: In the face -of the fact that the Peloponnesians had as many ships as their own -confronting them at sea, more cities in alliance with them, and the King -and Tissaphernes to supply them with money, of which the Athenians had -none left, had he any hope of saving the state, unless someone could -induce the King to come over to their side? Upon their replying that -they had not, he then plainly said to them: "This we cannot have unless -we have a more moderate form of government, and put the offices into -fewer hands, and so gain the King's confidence, and forthwith restore -Alcibiades, who is the only man living that can bring this about. The -safety of the state, not the form of its government, is for the moment -the most pressing question, as we can always change afterwards whatever -we do not like." - -The people were at first highly irritated at the mention of an -oligarchy, but upon understanding clearly from Pisander that this was -the only resource left, they took counsel of their fears, and promised -themselves some day to change the government again, and gave way. They -accordingly voted that Pisander should sail with ten others and make the -best arrangement that they could with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades. At -the same time the people, upon a false accusation of Pisander, dismissed -Phrynichus from his post together with his colleague Scironides, sending -Diomedon and Leon to replace them in the command of the fleet. The -accusation was that Phrynichus had betrayed Iasus and Amorges; and -Pisander brought it because he thought him a man unfit for the business -now in hand with Alcibiades. Pisander also went the round of all the -clubs already existing in the city for help in lawsuits and elections, -and urged them to draw together and to unite their efforts for the -overthrow of the democracy; and after taking all other measures required -by the circumstances, so that no time might be lost, set off with his -ten companions on his voyage to Tissaphernes. - -In the same winter Leon and Diomedon, who had by this time joined the -fleet, made an attack upon Rhodes. The ships of the Peloponnesians they -found hauled up on shore, and, after making a descent upon the coast and -defeating the Rhodians who appeared in the field against them, withdrew -to Chalce and made that place their base of operations instead of Cos, -as they could better observe from thence if the Peloponnesian fleet -put out to sea. Meanwhile Xenophantes, a Laconian, came to Rhodes -from Pedaritus at Chios, with the news that the fortification of the -Athenians was now finished, and that, unless the whole Peloponnesian -fleet came to the rescue, the cause in Chios must be lost. Upon this -they resolved to go to his relief. In the meantime Pedaritus, with the -mercenaries that he had with him and the whole force of the Chians, made -an assault upon the work round the Athenian ships and took a portion -of it, and got possession of some vessels that were hauled up on shore, -when the Athenians sallied out to the rescue, and first routing the -Chians, next defeated the remainder of the force round Pedaritus, who -was himself killed, with many of the Chians, a great number of arms -being also taken. - -After this the Chians were besieged even more straitly than before -by land and sea, and the famine in the place was great. Meanwhile the -Athenian envoys with Pisander arrived at the court of Tissaphernes, and -conferred with him about the proposed agreement. However, Alcibiades, -not being altogether sure of Tissaphernes (who feared the Peloponnesians -more than the Athenians, and besides wished to wear out both parties, -as Alcibiades himself had recommended), had recourse to the following -stratagem to make the treaty between the Athenians and Tissaphernes -miscarry by reason of the magnitude of his demands. In my opinion -Tissaphernes desired this result, fear being his motive; while -Alcibiades, who now saw that Tissaphernes was determined not to treat -on any terms, wished the Athenians to think, not that he was unable to -persuade Tissaphernes, but that after the latter had been persuaded and -was willing to join them, they had not conceded enough to him. For the -demands of Alcibiades, speaking for Tissaphernes, who was present, were -so extravagant that the Athenians, although for a long while they agreed -to whatever he asked, yet had to bear the blame of failure: he required -the cession of the whole of Ionia, next of the islands adjacent, besides -other concessions, and these passed without opposition; at last, in the -third interview, Alcibiades, who now feared a complete discovery of his -inability, required them to allow the King to build ships and sail along -his own coast wherever and with as many as he pleased. Upon this the -Athenians would yield no further, and concluding that there was nothing -to be done, but that they had been deceived by Alcibiades, went away in -a passion and proceeded to Samos. - -Tissaphernes immediately after this, in the same winter, proceeded -along shore to Caunus, desiring to bring the Peloponnesian fleet back -to Miletus, and to supply them with pay, making a fresh convention upon -such terms as he could get, in order not to bring matters to an absolute -breach between them. He was afraid that if many of their ships were left -without pay they would be compelled to engage and be defeated, or that -their vessels being left without hands the Athenians would attain -their objects without his assistance. Still more he feared that the -Peloponnesians might ravage the continent in search of supplies. Having -calculated and considered all this, agreeably to his plan of keeping the -two sides equal, he now sent for the Peloponnesians and gave them pay, -and concluded with them a third treaty in words following: - -In the thirteenth year of the reign of Darius, while Alexippidas was -ephor at Lacedaemon, a convention was concluded in the plain of the -Maeander by the Lacedaemonians and their allies with Tissaphernes, -Hieramenes, and the sons of Pharnaces, concerning the affairs of the -King and of the Lacedaemonians and their allies. - -1. The country of the King in Asia shall be the King's, and the King -shall treat his own country as he pleases. - -2. The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall not invade or injure the -King's country: neither shall the King invade or injure that of the -Lacedaemonians or of their allies. If any of the Lacedaemonians or of -their allies invade or injure the King's country, the Lacedaemonians and -their allies shall prevent it: and if any from the King's country invade -or injure the country of the Lacedaemonians or of their allies, the King -shall prevent it. - -3. Tissaphernes shall provide pay for the ships now present, according -to the agreement, until the arrival of the King's vessels: but after the -arrival of the King's vessels the Lacedaemonians and their allies may -pay their own ships if they wish it. If, however, they choose to receive -the pay from Tissaphernes, Tissaphernes shall furnish it: and the -Lacedaemonians and their allies shall repay him at the end of the war -such moneys as they shall have received. - -4. After the vessels have arrived, the ships of the Lacedaemonians and -of their allies and those of the King shall carry on the war jointly, -according as Tissaphernes and the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall -think best. If they wish to make peace with the Athenians, they shall -make peace also jointly. - -This was the treaty. After this Tissaphernes prepared to bring up the -Phoenician fleet according to agreement, and to make good his other -promises, or at all events wished to make it appear that he was so -preparing. - -Winter was now drawing towards its close, when the Boeotians took Oropus -by treachery, though held by an Athenian garrison. Their accomplices in -this were some of the Eretrians and of the Oropians themselves, who -were plotting the revolt of Euboea, as the place was exactly opposite -Eretria, and while in Athenian hands was necessarily a source of great -annoyance to Eretria and the rest of Euboea. Oropus being in their -hands, the Eretrians now came to Rhodes to invite the Peloponnesians -into Euboea. The latter, however, were rather bent on the relief of the -distressed Chians, and accordingly put out to sea and sailed with all -their ships from Rhodes. Off Triopium they sighted the Athenian fleet -out at sea sailing from Chalce, and, neither attacking the other, -arrived, the latter at Samos, the Peloponnesians at Miletus, seeing that -it was no longer possible to relieve Chios without a battle. And this -winter ended, and with it ended the twentieth year of this war of which -Thucydides is the historian. - -Early in the spring of the summer following, Dercyllidas, a Spartan, was -sent with a small force by land to the Hellespont to effect the revolt -of Abydos, which is a Milesian colony; and the Chians, while Astyochus -was at a loss how to help them, were compelled to fight at sea by the -pressure of the siege. While Astyochus was still at Rhodes they had -received from Miletus, as their commander after the death of Pedaritus, -a Spartan named Leon, who had come out with Antisthenes, and twelve -vessels which had been on guard at Miletus, five of which were Thurian, -four Syracusans, one from Anaia, one Milesian, and one Leon's own. -Accordingly the Chians marched out in mass and took up a strong -position, while thirty-six of their ships put out and engaged thirty-two -of the Athenians; and after a tough fight, in which the Chians and their -allies had rather the best of it, as it was now late, retired to their -city. - -Immediately after this Dercyllidas arrived by land from Miletus; and -Abydos in the Hellespont revolted to him and Pharnabazus, and Lampsacus -two days later. Upon receipt of this news Strombichides hastily sailed -from Chios with twenty-four Athenian ships, some transports carrying -heavy infantry being of the number, and defeating the Lampsacenes who -came out against him, took Lampsacus, which was unfortified, at the -first assault, and making prize of the slaves and goods restored the -freemen to their homes, and went on to Abydos. The inhabitants, however, -refusing to capitulate, and his assaults failing to take the place, he -sailed over to the coast opposite, and appointed Sestos, the town in the -Chersonese held by the Medes at a former period in this history, as the -centre for the defence of the whole Hellespont. - -In the meantime the Chians commanded the sea more than before; and the -Peloponnesians at Miletus and Astyochus, hearing of the sea-fight and -of the departure of the squadron with Strombichides, took fresh courage. -Coasting along with two vessels to Chios, Astyochus took the ships from -that place, and now moved with the whole fleet upon Samos, from whence, -however, he sailed back to Miletus, as the Athenians did not put out -against him, owing to their suspicions of one another. For it was about -this time, or even before, that the democracy was put down at Athens. -When Pisander and the envoys returned from Tissaphernes to Samos they at -once strengthened still further their interest in the army itself, and -instigated the upper class in Samos to join them in establishing an -oligarchy, the very form of government which a party of them had -lately risen to avoid. At the same time the Athenians at Samos, after a -consultation among themselves, determined to let Alcibiades alone, since -he refused to join them, and besides was not the man for an oligarchy; -and now that they were once embarked, to see for themselves how they -could best prevent the ruin of their cause, and meanwhile to sustain the -war, and to contribute without stint money and all else that might be -required from their own private estates, as they would henceforth labour -for themselves alone. - -After encouraging each other in these resolutions, they now at once -sent off half the envoys and Pisander to do what was necessary at Athens -(with instructions to establish oligarchies on their way in all the -subject cities which they might touch at), and dispatched the other half -in different directions to the other dependencies. Diitrephes also, who -was in the neighbourhood of Chios, and had been elected to the command -of the Thracian towns, was sent off to his government, and arriving -at Thasos abolished the democracy there. Two months, however, had not -elapsed after his departure before the Thasians began to fortify their -town, being already tired of an aristocracy with Athens, and in daily -expectation of freedom from Lacedaemon. Indeed there was a party of them -(whom the Athenians had banished), with the Peloponnesians, who with -their friends in the town were already making every exertion to bring -a squadron, and to effect the revolt of Thasos; and this party thus saw -exactly what they most wanted done, that is to say, the reformation of -the government without risk, and the abolition of the democracy which -would have opposed them. Things at Thasos thus turned out just the -contrary to what the oligarchical conspirators at Athens expected; and -the same in my opinion was the case in many of the other dependencies; -as the cities no sooner got a moderate government and liberty of action, -than they went on to absolute freedom without being at all seduced by -the show of reform offered by the Athenians. - -Pisander and his colleagues on their voyage alongshore abolished, as had -been determined, the democracies in the cities, and also took some heavy -infantry from certain places as their allies, and so came to Athens. -Here they found most of the work already done by their associates. Some -of the younger men had banded together, and secretly assassinated one -Androcles, the chief leader of the commons, and mainly responsible for -the banishment of Alcibiades; Androcles being singled out both because -he was a popular leader and because they sought by his death to -recommend themselves to Alcibiades, who was, as they supposed, to be -recalled, and to make Tissaphernes their friend. There were also some -other obnoxious persons whom they secretly did away with in the same -manner. Meanwhile their cry in public was that no pay should be given -except to persons serving in the war, and that not more than five -thousand should share in the government, and those such as were most -able to serve the state in person and in purse. - -But this was a mere catchword for the multitude, as the authors of the -revolution were really to govern. However, the Assembly and the Council -of the Bean still met notwithstanding, although they discussed nothing -that was not approved of by the conspirators, who both supplied the -speakers and reviewed in advance what they were to say. Fear, and the -sight of the numbers of the conspirators, closed the mouths of the rest; -or if any ventured to rise in opposition, he was presently put to death -in some convenient way, and there was neither search for the murderers -nor justice to be had against them if suspected; but the people remained -motionless, being so thoroughly cowed that men thought themselves lucky -to escape violence, even when they held their tongues. An exaggerated -belief in the numbers of the conspirators also demoralized the people, -rendered helpless by the magnitude of the city, and by their want of -intelligence with each other, and being without means of finding out -what those numbers really were. For the same reason it was impossible -for any one to open his grief to a neighbour and to concert measures to -defend himself, as he would have had to speak either to one whom he -did not know, or whom he knew but did not trust. Indeed all the popular -party approached each other with suspicion, each thinking his neighbour -concerned in what was going on, the conspirators having in their ranks -persons whom no one could ever have believed capable of joining an -oligarchy; and these it was who made the many so suspicious, and so -helped to procure impunity for the few, by confirming the commons in -their mistrust of one another. - -At this juncture arrived Pisander and his colleagues, who lost no time -in doing the rest. First they assembled the people, and moved to elect -ten commissioners with full powers to frame a constitution, and that -when this was done they should on an appointed day lay before the people -their opinion as to the best mode of governing the city. Afterwards, -when the day arrived, the conspirators enclosed the assembly in Colonus, -a temple of Poseidon, a little more than a mile outside the city; when -the commissioners simply brought forward this single motion, that any -Athenian might propose with impunity whatever measure he pleased, heavy -penalties being imposed upon any who should indict for illegality, or -otherwise molest him for so doing. The way thus cleared, it was now -plainly declared that all tenure of office and receipt of pay under the -existing institutions were at an end, and that five men must be elected -as presidents, who should in their turn elect one hundred, and each -of the hundred three apiece; and that this body thus made up to four -hundred should enter the council chamber with full powers and govern -as they judged best, and should convene the five thousand whenever they -pleased. - -The man who moved this resolution was Pisander, who was throughout -the chief ostensible agent in putting down the democracy. But he who -concerted the whole affair, and prepared the way for the catastrophe, -and who had given the greatest thought to the matter, was Antiphon, -one of the best men of his day in Athens; who, with a head to contrive -measures and a tongue to recommend them, did not willingly come forward -in the assembly or upon any public scene, being ill looked upon by the -multitude owing to his reputation for talent; and who yet was the one -man best able to aid in the courts, or before the assembly, the suitors -who required his opinion. Indeed, when he was afterwards himself tried -for his life on the charge of having been concerned in setting up this -very government, when the Four Hundred were overthrown and hardly dealt -with by the commons, he made what would seem to be the best defence of -any known up to my time. Phrynichus also went beyond all others in his -zeal for the oligarchy. Afraid of Alcibiades, and assured that he was -no stranger to his intrigues with Astyochus at Samos, he held that -no oligarchy was ever likely to restore him, and once embarked in the -enterprise, proved, where danger was to be faced, by far the staunchest -of them all. Theramenes, son of Hagnon, was also one of the foremost of -the subverters of the democracy--a man as able in council as in debate. -Conducted by so many and by such sagacious heads, the enterprise, great -as it was, not unnaturally went forward; although it was no light matter -to deprive the Athenian people of its freedom, almost a hundred years -after the deposition of the tyrants, when it had been not only not -subject to any during the whole of that period, but accustomed during -more than half of it to rule over subjects of its own. - -The assembly ratified the proposed constitution, without a single -opposing voice, and was then dissolved; after which the Four Hundred -were brought into the council chamber in the following way. On account -of the enemy at Decelea, all the Athenians were constantly on the wall -or in the ranks at the various military posts. On that day the persons -not in the secret were allowed to go home as usual, while orders were -given to the accomplices of the conspirators to hang about, without -making any demonstration, at some little distance from the posts, and in -case of any opposition to what was being done, to seize the arms and -put it down. There were also some Andrians and Tenians, three hundred -Carystians, and some of the settlers in Aegina come with their own arms -for this very purpose, who had received similar instructions. These -dispositions completed, the Four Hundred went, each with a dagger -concealed about his person, accompanied by one hundred and twenty -Hellenic youths, whom they employed wherever violence was needed, and -appeared before the Councillors of the Bean in the council chamber, and -told them to take their pay and be gone; themselves bringing it for the -whole of the residue of their term of office, and giving it to them as -they went out. - -Upon the Council withdrawing in this way without venturing any -objection, and the rest of the citizens making no movement, the Four -Hundred entered the council chamber, and for the present contented -themselves with drawing lots for their Prytanes, and making their -prayers and sacrifices to the gods upon entering office, but afterwards -departed widely from the democratic system of government, and except -that on account of Alcibiades they did not recall the exiles, ruled the -city by force; putting to death some men, though not many, whom they -thought it convenient to remove, and imprisoning and banishing others. -They also sent to Agis, the Lacedaemonian king, at Decelea, to say -that they desired to make peace, and that he might reasonably be more -disposed to treat now that he had them to deal with instead of the -inconstant commons. - -Agis, however, did not believe in the tranquillity of the city, or that -the commons would thus in a moment give up their ancient liberty, -but thought that the sight of a large Lacedaemonian force would be -sufficient to excite them if they were not already in commotion, of -which he was by no means certain. He accordingly gave to the envoys of -the Four Hundred an answer which held out no hopes of an accommodation, -and sending for large reinforcements from Peloponnese, not long -afterwards, with these and his garrison from Decelea, descended to the -very walls of Athens; hoping either that civil disturbances might help -to subdue them to his terms, or that, in the confusion to be expected -within and without the city, they might even surrender without a blow -being struck; at all events he thought he would succeed in seizing the -Long Walls, bared of their defenders. However, the Athenians saw him -come close up, without making the least disturbance within the city; and -sending out their cavalry, and a number of their heavy infantry, light -troops, and archers, shot down some of his soldiers who approached too -near, and got possession of some arms and dead. Upon this Agis, at last -convinced, led his army back again and, remaining with his own troops in -the old position at Decelea, sent the reinforcement back home, after a -few days' stay in Attica. After this the Four Hundred persevering sent -another embassy to Agis, and now meeting with a better reception, at his -suggestion dispatched envoys to Lacedaemon to negotiate a treaty, being -desirous of making peace. - -They also sent ten men to Samos to reassure the army, and to explain -that the oligarchy was not established for the hurt of the city or the -citizens, but for the salvation of the country at large; and that there -were five thousand, not four hundred only, concerned; although, what -with their expeditions and employments abroad, the Athenians had never -yet assembled to discuss a question important enough to bring five -thousand of them together. The emissaries were also told what to say -upon all other points, and were so sent off immediately after the -establishment of the new government, which feared, as it turned out -justly, that the mass of seamen would not be willing to remain under the -oligarchical constitution, and, the evil beginning there, might be the -means of their overthrow. - -Indeed at Samos the question of the oligarchy had already entered upon a -new phase, the following events having taken place just at the time that -the Four Hundred were conspiring. That part of the Samian population -which has been mentioned as rising against the upper class, and as -being the democratic party, had now turned round, and yielding to the -solicitations of Pisander during his visit, and of the Athenians in -the conspiracy at Samos, had bound themselves by oaths to the number -of three hundred, and were about to fall upon the rest of their fellow -citizens, whom they now in their turn regarded as the democratic party. -Meanwhile they put to death one Hyperbolus, an Athenian, a pestilent -fellow that had been ostracized, not from fear of his influence or -position, but because he was a rascal and a disgrace to the city; being -aided in this by Charminus, one of the generals, and by some of the -Athenians with them, to whom they had sworn friendship, and with whom -they perpetrated other acts of the kind, and now determined to attack -the people. The latter got wind of what was coming, and told two of the -generals, Leon and Diomedon, who, on account of the credit which they -enjoyed with the commons, were unwilling supporters of the oligarchy; -and also Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, the former a captain of a galley, -the latter serving with the heavy infantry, besides certain others who -had ever been thought most opposed to the conspirators, entreating them -not to look on and see them destroyed, and Samos, the sole remaining -stay of their empire, lost to the Athenians. Upon hearing this, the -persons whom they addressed now went round the soldiers one by one, and -urged them to resist, especially the crew of the Paralus, which was made -up entirely of Athenians and freemen, and had from time out of mind been -enemies of oligarchy, even when there was no such thing existing; and -Leon and Diomedon left behind some ships for their protection in case -of their sailing away anywhere themselves. Accordingly, when the Three -Hundred attacked the people, all these came to the rescue, and foremost -of all the crew of the Paralus; and the Samian commons gained the -victory, and putting to death some thirty of the Three Hundred, and -banishing three others of the ringleaders, accorded an amnesty to the -rest, and lived together under a democratic government for the future. - -The ship Paralus, with Chaereas, son of Archestratus, on board, an -Athenian who had taken an active part in the revolution, was now without -loss of time sent off by the Samians and the army to Athens to report -what had occurred; the fact that the Four Hundred were in power -not being yet known. When they sailed into harbour the Four Hundred -immediately arrested two or three of the Parali and, taking the vessel -from the rest, shifted them into a troopship and set them to keep guard -round Euboea. Chaereas, however, managed to secrete himself as soon as -he saw how things stood, and returning to Samos, drew a picture to the -soldiers of the horrors enacting at Athens, in which everything was -exaggerated; saying that all were punished with stripes, that no one -could say a word against the holders of power, that the soldiers' wives -and children were outraged, and that it was intended to seize and -shut up the relatives of all in the army at Samos who were not of -the government's way of thinking, to be put to death in case of their -disobedience; besides a host of other injurious inventions. - -On hearing this the first thought of the army was to fall upon the chief -authors of the oligarchy and upon all the rest concerned. Eventually, -however, they desisted from this idea upon the men of moderate views -opposing it and warning them against ruining their cause, with the enemy -close at hand and ready for battle. After this, Thrasybulus, son of -Lycus, and Thrasyllus, the chief leaders in the revolution, now wishing -in the most public manner to change the government at Samos to a -democracy, bound all the soldiers by the most tremendous oaths, and -those of the oligarchical party more than any, to accept a democratic -government, to be united, to prosecute actively the war with the -Peloponnesians, and to be enemies of the Four Hundred, and to hold no -communication with them. The same oath was also taken by all the Samians -of full age; and the soldiers associated the Samians in all their -affairs and in the fruits of their dangers, having the conviction that -there was no way of escape for themselves or for them, but that the -success of the Four Hundred or of the enemy at Miletus must be their -ruin. - -The struggle now was between the army trying to force a democracy upon -the city, and the Four Hundred an oligarchy upon the camp. Meanwhile the -soldiers forthwith held an assembly, in which they deposed the former -generals and any of the captains whom they suspected, and chose -new captains and generals to replace them, besides Thrasybulus and -Thrasyllus, whom they had already. They also stood up and encouraged one -another, and among other things urged that they ought not to lose heart -because the city had revolted from them, as the party seceding was -smaller and in every way poorer in resources than themselves. They had -the whole fleet with which to compel the other cities in their empire to -give them money just as if they had their base in the capital, having a -city in Samos which, so far from wanting strength, had when at war been -within an ace of depriving the Athenians of the command of the sea, -while as far as the enemy was concerned they had the same base of -operations as before. Indeed, with the fleet in their hands, they were -better able to provide themselves with supplies than the government -at home. It was their advanced position at Samos which had throughout -enabled the home authorities to command the entrance into Piraeus; and -if they refused to give them back the constitution, they would now find -that the army was more in a position to exclude them from the sea than -they were to exclude the army. Besides, the city was of little or no use -towards enabling them to overcome the enemy; and they had lost nothing -in losing those who had no longer either money to send them (the -soldiers having to find this for themselves), or good counsel, which -entitles cities to direct armies. On the contrary, even in this the -home government had done wrong in abolishing the institutions of their -ancestors, while the army maintained the said institutions, and would -try to force the home government to do so likewise. So that even in -point of good counsel the camp had as good counsellors as the city. -Moreover, they had but to grant him security for his person and his -recall, and Alcibiades would be only too glad to procure them the -alliance of the King. And above all if they failed altogether, with the -navy which they possessed, they had numbers of places to retire to in -which they would find cities and lands. - -Debating together and comforting themselves after this manner, they -pushed on their war measures as actively as ever; and the ten envoys -sent to Samos by the Four Hundred, learning how matters stood while they -were still at Delos, stayed quiet there. About this time a cry arose a - Peloponnesian fleet at Miletus that Astyochus and Tissaphernes -were ruining their cause. Astyochus had not been willing to fight at -sea--either before, while they were still in full vigour and the -fleet of the Athenians small, or now, when the enemy was, as they were -informed, in a state of sedition and his ships not yet united--but kept -them waiting for the Phoenician fleet from Tissaphernes, which had only -a nominal existence, at the risk of wasting away in inactivity. While -Tissaphernes not only did not bring up the fleet in question, but was -ruining their navy by payments made irregularly, and even then not made -in full. They must therefore, they insisted, delay no longer, but fight -a decisive naval engagement. The Syracusans were the most urgent of any. - -The confederates and Astyochus, aware of these murmurs, had already -decided in council to fight a decisive battle; and when the news reached -them of the disturbance at Samos, they put to sea with all their ships, -one hundred and ten in number, and, ordering the Milesians to move by -land upon Mycale, set sail thither. The Athenians with the eighty-two -ships from Samos were at the moment lying at Glauce in Mycale, a -point where Samos approaches near to the continent; and, seeing the -Peloponnesian fleet sailing against them, retired into Samos, not -thinking themselves numerically strong enough to stake their all upon a -battle. Besides, they had notice from Miletus of the wish of the enemy -to engage, and were expecting to be joined from the Hellespont by -Strombichides, to whom a messenger had been already dispatched, with -the ships that had gone from Chios to Abydos. The Athenians accordingly -withdrew to Samos, and the Peloponnesians put in at Mycale, and -encamped with the land forces of the Milesians and the people of the -neighbourhood. The next day they were about to sail against Samos, when -tidings reached them of the arrival of Strombichides with the squadron -from the Hellespont, upon which they immediately sailed back to Miletus. -The Athenians, thus reinforced, now in their turn sailed against Miletus -with a hundred and eight ships, wishing to fight a decisive battle, but, -as no one put out to meet them, sailed back to Samos. - - - - -CHAPTER XXVI - -_Twenty-first Year of the War--Recall of Alcibiades to Samos--Revolt of -Euboea and Downfall of the Four Hundred--Battle of Cynossema_ - -In the same summer, immediately after this, the Peloponnesians -having refused to fight with their fleet united, through not thinking -themselves a match for the enemy, and being at a loss where to look for -money for such a number of ships, especially as Tissaphernes proved so -bad a paymaster, sent off Clearchus, son of Ramphias, with forty ships -to Pharnabazus, agreeably to the original instructions from Peloponnese; -Pharnabazus inviting them and being prepared to furnish pay, and -Byzantium besides sending offers to revolt to them. These Peloponnesian -ships accordingly put out into the open sea, in order to escape the -observation of the Athenians, and being overtaken by a storm, the -majority with Clearchus got into Delos, and afterwards returned to -Miletus, whence Clearchus proceeded by land to the Hellespont to take -the command: ten, however, of their number, under the Megarian Helixus, -made good their passage to the Hellespont, and effected the revolt of -Byzantium. After this, the commanders at Samos were informed of it, and -sent a squadron against them to guard the Hellespont; and an encounter -took place before Byzantium between eight vessels on either side. - -Meanwhile the chiefs at Samos, and especially Thrasybulus, who from the -moment that he had changed the government had remained firmly resolved -to recall Alcibiades, at last in an assembly brought over the mass of -the soldiery, and upon their voting for his recall and amnesty, sailed -over to Tissaphernes and brought Alcibiades to Samos, being convinced -that their only chance of salvation lay in his bringing over -Tissaphernes from the Peloponnesians to themselves. An assembly was -then held in which Alcibiades complained of and deplored his private -misfortune in having been banished, and speaking at great length -upon public affairs, highly incited their hopes for the future, and -extravagantly magnified his own influence with Tissaphernes. His object -in this was to make the oligarchical government at Athens afraid of him, -to hasten the dissolution of the clubs, to increase his credit with the -army at Samos and heighten their own confidence, and lastly to prejudice -the enemy as strongly as possible against Tissaphernes, and blast the -hopes which they entertained. Alcibiades accordingly held out to the -army such extravagant promises as the following: that Tissaphernes had -solemnly assured him that if he could only trust the Athenians they -should never want for supplies while he had anything left, no, not even -if he should have to coin his own silver couch, and that he would bring -the Phoenician fleet now at Aspendus to the Athenians instead of to the -Peloponnesians; but that he could only trust the Athenians if Alcibiades -were recalled to be his security for them. - -Upon hearing this and much more besides, the Athenians at once elected -him general together with the former ones, and put all their affairs -into his hands. There was now not a man in the army who would have -exchanged his present hopes of safety and vengeance upon the Four -Hundred for any consideration whatever; and after what they had been -told they were now inclined to disdain the enemy before them, and to -sail at once for Piraeus. To the plan of sailing for Piraeus, leaving -their more immediate enemies behind them, Alcibiades opposed the most -positive refusal, in spite of the numbers that insisted upon it, -saying that now that he had been elected general he would first sail -to Tissaphernes and concert with him measures for carrying on the -war. Accordingly, upon leaving this assembly, he immediately took -his departure in order to have it thought that there was an entire -confidence between them, and also wishing to increase his consideration -with Tissaphernes, and to show that he had now been elected general and -was in a position to do him good or evil as he chose; thus managing -to frighten the Athenians with Tissaphernes and Tissaphernes with the -Athenians. - -Meanwhile the Peloponnesians at Miletus heard of the recall of -Alcibiades and, already distrustful of Tissaphernes, now became far more -disgusted with him than ever. Indeed after their refusal to go out -and give battle to the Athenians when they appeared before Miletus, -Tissaphernes had grown slacker than ever in his payments; and even -before this, on account of Alcibiades, his unpopularity had been on -the increase. Gathering together, just as before, the soldiers and some -persons of consideration besides the soldiery began to reckon up how -they had never yet received their pay in full; that what they did -receive was small in quantity, and even that paid irregularly, and that -unless they fought a decisive battle or removed to some station where -they could get supplies, the ships' crews would desert; and that it -was all the fault of Astyochus, who humoured Tissaphernes for his own -private advantage. - -The army was engaged in these reflections, when the following -disturbance took place about the person of Astyochus. Most of the -Syracusan and Thurian sailors were freemen, and these the freest crews -in the armament were likewise the boldest in setting upon Astyochus and -demanding their pay. The latter answered somewhat stiffly and threatened -them, and when Dorieus spoke up for his own sailors even went so far -as to lift his baton against him; upon seeing which the mass of men, in -sailor fashion, rushed in a fury to strike Astyochus. He, however, saw -them in time and fled for refuge to an altar; and they were thus parted -without his being struck. Meanwhile the fort built by Tissaphernes in -Miletus was surprised and taken by the Milesians, and the garrison in -it turned out--an act which met with the approval of the rest of the -allies, and in particular of the Syracusans, but which found no favour -with Lichas, who said moreover that the Milesians and the rest in the -King's country ought to show a reasonable submission to Tissaphernes and -to pay him court, until the war should be happily settled. The Milesians -were angry with him for this and for other things of the kind, and upon -his afterwards dying of sickness, would not allow him to be buried where -the Lacedaemonians with the army desired. - -The discontent of the army with Astyochus and Tissaphernes had reached -this pitch, when Mindarus arrived from Lacedaemon to succeed Astyochus -as admiral, and assumed the command. Astyochus now set sail for home; -and Tissaphernes sent with him one of his confidants, Gaulites, a -Carian, who spoke the two languages, to complain of the Milesians for -the affair of the fort, and at the same time to defend himself against -the Milesians, who were, as he was aware, on their way to Sparta chiefly -to denounce his conduct, and had with them Hermocrates, who was to -accuse Tissaphernes of joining with Alcibiades to ruin the Peloponnesian -cause and of playing a double game. Indeed Hermocrates had always -been at enmity with him about the pay not being restored in full; -and eventually when he was banished from Syracuse, and new -commanders--Potamis, Myscon, and Demarchus--had come out to Miletus to -the ships of the Syracusans, Tissaphernes, pressed harder than ever upon -him in his exile, and among other charges against him accused him of -having once asked him for money, and then given himself out as his enemy -because he failed to obtain it. - -While Astyochus and the Milesians and Hermocrates made sail for -Lacedaemon, Alcibiades had now crossed back from Tissaphernes to Samos. -After his return the envoys of the Four Hundred sent, as has been -mentioned above, to pacify and explain matters to the forces at Samos, -arrived from Delos; and an assembly was held in which they attempted to -speak. The soldiers at first would not hear them, and cried out to -put to death the subverters of the democracy, but at last, after some -difficulty, calmed down and gave them a hearing. Upon this the envoys -proceeded to inform them that the recent change had been made to save -the city, and not to ruin it or to deliver it over to the enemy, for -they had already had an opportunity of doing this when he invaded the -country during their government; that all the Five Thousand would have -their proper share in the government; and that their hearers' relatives -had neither outrage, as Chaereas had slanderously reported, nor other -ill treatment to complain of, but were all in undisturbed enjoyment of -their property just as they had left them. Besides these they made a -number of other statements which had no better success with their angry -auditors; and amid a host of different opinions the one which found most -favour was that of sailing to Piraeus. Now it was that Alcibiades for -the first time did the state a service, and one of the most signal kind. -For when the Athenians at Samos were bent upon sailing against their -countrymen, in which case Ionia and the Hellespont would most certainly -at once have passed into possession of the enemy, Alcibiades it was who -prevented them. At that moment, when no other man would have been able -to hold back the multitude, he put a stop to the intended expedition, -and rebuked and turned aside the resentment felt, on personal grounds, -against the envoys; he dismissed them with an answer from himself, -to the effect that he did not object to the government of the Five -Thousand, but insisted that the Four Hundred should be deposed and the -Council of Five Hundred reinstated in power: meanwhile any retrenchments -for economy, by which pay might be better found for the armament, met -with his entire approval. Generally, he bade them hold out and show a -bold face to the enemy, since if the city were saved there was good hope -that the two parties might some day be reconciled, whereas if either -were once destroyed, that at Samos, or that at Athens, there would no -longer be any one to be reconciled to. Meanwhile arrived envoys from the -Argives, with offers of support to the Athenian commons at Samos: these -were thanked by Alcibiades, and dismissed with a request to come when -called upon. The Argives were accompanied by the crew of the Paralus, -whom we left placed in a troopship by the Four Hundred with orders to -cruise round Euboea, and who being employed to carry to Lacedaemon some -Athenian envoys sent by the Four Hundred--Laespodias, Aristophon, -and Melesias--as they sailed by Argos laid hands upon the envoys, and -delivering them over to the Argives as the chief subverters of the -democracy, themselves, instead of returning to Athens, took the Argive -envoys on board, and came to Samos in the galley which had been confided -to them. - -The same summer at the time that the return of Alcibiades coupled -with the general conduct of Tissaphernes had carried to its height the -discontent of the Peloponnesians, who no longer entertained any doubt of -his having joined the Athenians, Tissaphernes wishing, it would seem, -to clear himself to them of these charges, prepared to go after the -Phoenician fleet to Aspendus, and invited Lichas to go with him; saying -that he would appoint Tamos as his lieutenant to provide pay for the -armament during his own absence. Accounts differ, and it is not easy to -ascertain with what intention he went to Aspendus, and did not bring the -fleet after all. That one hundred and forty-seven Phoenician ships came -as far as Aspendus is certain; but why they did not come on has been -variously accounted for. Some think that he went away in pursuance -of his plan of wasting the Peloponnesian resources, since at any -rate Tamos, his lieutenant, far from being any better, proved a worse -paymaster than himself: others that he brought the Phoenicians to -Aspendus to exact money from them for their discharge, having never -intended to employ them: others again that it was in view of the outcry -against him at Lacedaemon, in order that it might be said that he was -not in fault, but that the ships were really manned and that he had -certainly gone to fetch them. To myself it seems only too evident that -he did not bring up the fleet because he wished to wear out and paralyse -the Hellenic forces, that is, to waste their strength by the time lost -during his journey to Aspendus, and to keep them evenly balanced by not -throwing his weight into either scale. Had he wished to finish the war, -he could have done so, assuming of course that he made his appearance in -a way which left no room for doubt; as by bringing up the fleet he would -in all probability have given the victory to the Lacedaemonians, whose -navy, even as it was, faced the Athenian more as an equal than as an -inferior. But what convicts him most clearly, is the excuse which he put -forward for not bringing the ships. He said that the number assembled -was less than the King had ordered; but surely it would only have -enhanced his credit if he spent little of the King's money and effected -the same end at less cost. In any case, whatever was his intention, -Tissaphernes went to Aspendus and saw the Phoenicians; and the -Peloponnesians at his desire sent a Lacedaemonian called Philip with two -galleys to fetch the fleet. - -Alcibiades finding that Tissaphernes had gone to Aspendus, himself -sailed thither with thirteen ships, promising to do a great and -certain service to the Athenians at Samos, as he would either bring the -Phoenician fleet to the Athenians, or at all events prevent its -joining the Peloponnesians. In all probability he had long known that -Tissaphernes never meant to bring the fleet at all, and wished to -compromise him as much as possible in the eyes of the Peloponnesians -through his apparent friendship for himself and the Athenians, and thus -in a manner to oblige him to join their side. - -While Alcibiades weighed anchor and sailed eastward straight for -Phaselis and Caunus, the envoys sent by the Four Hundred to Samos -arrived at Athens. Upon their delivering the message from Alcibiades, -telling them to hold out and to show a firm front to the enemy, and -saying that he had great hopes of reconciling them with the army and -of overcoming the Peloponnesians, the majority of the members of the -oligarchy, who were already discontented and only too much inclined to -be quit of the business in any safe way that they could, were at once -greatly strengthened in their resolve. These now banded together and -strongly criticized the administration, their leaders being some of -the principal generals and men in office under the oligarchy, such as -Theramenes, son of Hagnon, Aristocrates, son of Scellias, and others; -who, although among the most prominent members of the government (being -afraid, as they said, of the army at Samos, and most especially of -Alcibiades, and also lest the envoys whom they had sent to Lacedaemon -might do the state some harm without the authority of the people), -without insisting on objections to the excessive concentration of power -in a few hands, yet urged that the Five Thousand must be shown to exist -not merely in name but in reality, and the constitution placed upon -a fairer basis. But this was merely their political cry; most of them -being driven by private ambition into the line of conduct so surely -fatal to oligarchies that arise out of democracies. For all at once -pretend to be not only equals but each the chief and master of his -fellows; while under a democracy a disappointed candidate accepts his -defeat more easily, because he has not the humiliation of being beaten -by his equals. But what most clearly encouraged the malcontents was the -power of Alcibiades at Samos, and their own disbelief in the stability -of the oligarchy; and it was now a race between them as to which should -first become the leader of the commons. - -Meanwhile the leaders and members of the Four Hundred most opposed to a -democratic form of government--Phrynichus who had had the quarrel with -Alcibiades during his command at Samos, Aristarchus the bitter and -inveterate enemy of the commons, and Pisander and Antiphon and others -of the chiefs who already as soon as they entered upon power, and again -when the army at Samos seceded from them and declared for a democracy, -had sent envoys from their own body to Lacedaemon and made every effort -for peace, and had built the wall in Eetionia--now redoubled their -exertions when their envoys returned from Samos, and they saw not only -the people but their own most trusted associates turning against them. -Alarmed at the state of things at Athens as at Samos, they now sent off -in haste Antiphon and Phrynichus and ten others with injunctions to make -peace with Lacedaemon upon any terms, no matter what, that should be at -all tolerable. Meanwhile they pushed on more actively than ever with the -wall in Eetionia. Now the meaning of this wall, according to Theramenes -and his supporters, was not so much to keep out the army of Samos, in -case of its trying to force its way into Piraeus, as to be able to let -in, at pleasure, the fleet and army of the enemy. For Eetionia is a mole -of Piraeus, close alongside of the entrance of the harbour, and was now -fortified in connection with the wall already existing on the land side, -so that a few men placed in it might be able to command the entrance; -the old wall on the land side and the new one now being built within on -the side of the sea, both ending in one of the two towers standing at -the narrow mouth of the harbour. They also walled off the largest porch -in Piraeus which was in immediate connection with this wall, and kept -it in their own hands, compelling all to unload there the corn that came -into the harbour, and what they had in stock, and to take it out from -thence when they sold it. - -These measures had long provoked the murmurs of Theramenes, and when -the envoys returned from Lacedaemon without having effected any general -pacification, he affirmed that this wall was like to prove the ruin of -the state. At this moment forty-two ships from Peloponnese, including -some Siceliot and Italiot vessels from Locri and Tarentum, had been -invited over by the Euboeans and were already riding off Las in Laconia -preparing for the voyage to Euboea, under the command of Agesandridas, -son of Agesander, a Spartan. Theramenes now affirmed that this squadron -was destined not so much to aid Euboea as the party fortifying Eetionia, -and that unless precautions were speedily taken the city would be -surprised and lost. This was no mere calumny, there being really some -such plan entertained by the accused. Their first wish was to have the -oligarchy without giving up the empire; failing this to keep their ships -and walls and be independent; while, if this also were denied them, -sooner than be the first victims of the restored democracy, they were -resolved to call in the enemy and make peace, give up their walls and -ships, and at all costs retain possession of the government, if their -lives were only assured to them. - -For this reason they pushed forward the construction of their work with -posterns and entrances and means of introducing the enemy, being eager -to have it finished in time. Meanwhile the murmurs against them were at -first confined to a few persons and went on in secret, until Phrynichus, -after his return from the embassy to Lacedaemon, was laid wait for and -stabbed in full market by one of the Peripoli, falling down dead before -he had gone far from the council chamber. The assassin escaped; but -his accomplice, an Argive, was taken and put to the torture by the Four -Hundred, without their being able to extract from him the name of his -employer, or anything further than that he knew of many men who used -to assemble at the house of the commander of the Peripoli and at -other houses. Here the matter was allowed to drop. This so emboldened -Theramenes and Aristocrates and the rest of their partisans in the Four -Hundred and out of doors, that they now resolved to act. For by this -time the ships had sailed round from Las, and anchoring at Epidaurus had -overrun Aegina; and Theramenes asserted that, being bound for Euboea, -they would never have sailed in to Aegina and come back to anchor at -Epidaurus, unless they had been invited to come to aid in the designs -of which he had always accused the government. Further inaction -had therefore now become impossible. In the end, after a great many -seditious harangues and suspicions, they set to work in real earnest. -The heavy infantry in Piraeus building the wall in Eetionia, among -whom was Aristocrates, a colonel, with his own tribe, laid hands upon -Alexicles, a general under the oligarchy and the devoted adherent of the -cabal, and took him into a house and confined him there. In this they -were assisted by one Hermon, commander of the Peripoli in Munychia, -and others, and above all had with them the great bulk of the heavy -infantry. As soon as the news reached the Four Hundred, who happened to -be sitting in the council chamber, all except the disaffected wished at -once to go to the posts where the arms were, and menaced Theramenes -and his party. Theramenes defended himself, and said that he was ready -immediately to go and help to rescue Alexicles; and taking with him one -of the generals belonging to his party, went down to Piraeus, followed -by Aristarchus and some young men of the cavalry. All was now panic and -confusion. Those in the city imagined that Piraeus was already taken and -the prisoner put to death, while those in Piraeus expected every moment -to be attacked by the party in the city. The older men, however, stopped -the persons running up and down the town and making for the stands of -arms; and Thucydides the Pharsalian, proxenus of the city, came forward -and threw himself in the way of the rival factions, and appealed to them -not to ruin the state, while the enemy was still at hand waiting for his -opportunity, and so at length succeeded in quieting them and in keeping -their hands off each other. Meanwhile Theramenes came down to Piraeus, -being himself one of the generals, and raged and stormed against the -heavy infantry, while Aristarchus and the adversaries of the people were -angry in right earnest. Most of the heavy infantry, however, went on -with the business without faltering, and asked Theramenes if he thought -the wall had been constructed for any good purpose, and whether it would -not be better that it should be pulled down. To this he answered that if -they thought it best to pull it down, he for his part agreed with them. -Upon this the heavy infantry and a number of the people in Piraeus -immediately got up on the fortification and began to demolish it. Now -their cry to the multitude was that all should join in the work who -wished the Five Thousand to govern instead of the Four Hundred. For -instead of saying in so many words "all who wished the commons to -govern," they still disguised themselves under the name of the Five -Thousand; being afraid that these might really exist, and that they -might be speaking to one of their number and get into trouble through -ignorance. Indeed this was why the Four Hundred neither wished the Five -Thousand to exist, nor to have it known that they did not exist; being -of opinion that to give themselves so many partners in empire would be -downright democracy, while the mystery in question would make the people -afraid of one another. - -The next day the Four Hundred, although alarmed, nevertheless assembled -in the council chamber, while the heavy infantry in Piraeus, -after having released their prisoner Alexicles and pulled down the -fortification, went with their arms to the theatre of Dionysus, close to -Munychia, and there held an assembly in which they decided to march into -the city, and setting forth accordingly halted in the Anaceum. Here they -were joined by some delegates from the Four Hundred, who reasoned -with them one by one, and persuaded those whom they saw to be the most -moderate to remain quiet themselves, and to keep in the rest; saying -that they would make known the Five Thousand, and have the Four Hundred -chosen from them in rotation, as should be decided by the Five Thousand, -and meanwhile entreated them not to ruin the state or drive it into the -arms of the enemy. After a great many had spoken and had been spoken to, -the whole body of heavy infantry became calmer than before, absorbed -by their fears for the country at large, and now agreed to hold upon an -appointed day an assembly in the theatre of Dionysus for the restoration -of concord. - -When the day came for the assembly in the theatre, and they were upon -the point of assembling, news arrived that the forty-two ships under -Agesandridas were sailing from Megara along the coast of Salamis. The -people to a man now thought that it was just what Theramenes and -his party had so often said, that the ships were sailing to the -fortification, and concluded that they had done well to demolish it. -But though it may possibly have been by appointment that Agesandridas -hovered about Epidaurus and the neighbourhood, he would also naturally -be kept there by the hope of an opportunity arising out of the -troubles in the town. In any case the Athenians, on receipt of the news -immediately ran down in mass to Piraeus, seeing themselves threatened -by the enemy with a worse war than their war among themselves, not at -a distance, but close to the harbour of Athens. Some went on board the -ships already afloat, while others launched fresh vessels, or ran to -defend the walls and the mouth of the harbour. - -Meanwhile the Peloponnesian vessels sailed by, and rounding Sunium -anchored between Thoricus and Prasiae, and afterwards arrived at Oropus. -The Athenians, with revolution in the city, and unwilling to lose a -moment in going to the relief of their most important possession (for -Euboea was everything to them now that they were shut out from Attica), -were compelled to put to sea in haste and with untrained crews, and sent -Thymochares with some vessels to Eretria. These upon their arrival, with -the ships already in Euboea, made up a total of thirty-six vessels, and -were immediately forced to engage. For Agesandridas, after his crews had -dined, put out from Oropus, which is about seven miles from Eretria by -sea; and the Athenians, seeing him sailing up, immediately began to man -their vessels. The sailors, however, instead of being by their ships, as -they supposed, were gone away to purchase provisions for their dinner -in the houses in the outskirts of the town; the Eretrians having so -arranged that there should be nothing on sale in the marketplace, in -order that the Athenians might be a long time in manning their ships, -and, the enemy's attack taking them by surprise, might be compelled to -put to sea just as they were. A signal also was raised in Eretria to -give them notice in Oropus when to put to sea. The Athenians, forced -to put out so poorly prepared, engaged off the harbour of Eretria, and -after holding their own for some little while notwithstanding, were at -length put to flight and chased to the shore. Such of their number as -took refuge in Eretria, which they presumed to be friendly to them, -found their fate in that city, being butchered by the inhabitants; while -those who fled to the Athenian fort in the Eretrian territory, and the -vessels which got to Chalcis, were saved. The Peloponnesians, after -taking twenty-two Athenian ships, and killing or making prisoners of the -crews, set up a trophy, and not long afterwards effected the revolt -of the whole of Euboea (except Oreus, which was held by the Athenians -themselves), and made a general settlement of the affairs of the island. - -When the news of what had happened in Euboea reached Athens, a panic -ensued such as they had never before known. Neither the disaster in -Sicily, great as it seemed at the time, nor any other had ever so much -alarmed them. The camp at Samos was in revolt; they had no more ships or -men to man them; they were at discord among themselves and might at any -moment come to blows; and a disaster of this magnitude coming on the top -of all, by which they lost their fleet, and worst of all Euboea, which -was of more value to them than Attica, could not occur without throwing -them into the deepest despondency. Meanwhile their greatest and most -immediate trouble was the possibility that the enemy, emboldened by his -victory, might make straight for them and sail against Piraeus, which -they had no longer ships to defend; and every moment they expected him -to arrive. This, with a little more courage, he might easily have done, -in which case he would either have increased the dissensions of the city -by his presence, or, if he had stayed to besiege it, have compelled the -fleet from Ionia, although the enemy of the oligarchy, to come to the -rescue of their country and of their relatives, and in the meantime -would have become master of the Hellespont, Ionia, the islands, and of -everything as far as Euboea, or, to speak roundly, of the whole Athenian -empire. But here, as on so many other occasions, the Lacedaemonians -proved the most convenient people in the world for the Athenians to -be at war with. The wide difference between the two characters, the -slowness and want of energy of the Lacedaemonians as contrasted with the -dash and enterprise of their opponents, proved of the greatest service, -especially to a maritime empire like Athens. Indeed this was shown by -the Syracusans, who were most like the Athenians in character, and also -most successful in combating them. - -Nevertheless, upon receipt of the news, the Athenians manned twenty -ships and called immediately a first assembly in the Pnyx, where they -had been used to meet formerly, and deposed the Four Hundred and voted -to hand over the government to the Five Thousand, of which body all who -furnished a suit of armour were to be members, decreeing also that no -one should receive pay for the discharge of any office, or if he did -should be held accursed. Many other assemblies were held afterwards, -in which law-makers were elected and all other measures taken to form a -constitution. It was during the first period of this constitution that -the Athenians appear to have enjoyed the best government that they ever -did, at least in my time. For the fusion of the high and the low was -effected with judgment, and this was what first enabled the state to -raise up her head after her manifold disasters. They also voted for the -recall of Alcibiades and of other exiles, and sent to him and to the -camp at Samos, and urged them to devote themselves vigorously to the -war. - -Upon this revolution taking place, the party of Pisander and Alexicles -and the chiefs of the oligarchs immediately withdrew to Decelea, with -the single exception of Aristarchus, one of the generals, who hastily -took some of the most barbarian of the archers and marched to Oenoe. -This was a fort of the Athenians upon the Boeotian border, at that -moment besieged by the Corinthians, irritated by the loss of a party -returning from Decelea, who had been cut off by the garrison. The -Corinthians had volunteered for this service, and had called upon the -Boeotians to assist them. After communicating with them, Aristarchus -deceived the garrison in Oenoe by telling them that their countrymen -in the city had compounded with the Lacedaemonians, and that one of the -terms of the capitulation was that they must surrender the place to the -Boeotians. The garrison believed him as he was general, and besides knew -nothing of what had occurred owing to the siege, and so evacuated the -fort under truce. In this way the Boeotians gained possession of Oenoe, -and the oligarchy and the troubles at Athens ended. - -To return to the Peloponnesians in Miletus. No pay was forthcoming from -any of the agents deputed by Tissaphernes for that purpose upon his -departure for Aspendus; neither the Phoenician fleet nor Tissaphernes -showed any signs of appearing, and Philip, who had been sent with him, -and another Spartan, Hippocrates, who was at Phaselis, wrote word to -Mindarus, the admiral, that the ships were not coming at all, and that -they were being grossly abused by Tissaphernes. Meanwhile Pharnabazus -was inviting them to come, and making every effort to get the fleet and, -like Tissaphernes, to cause the revolt of the cities in his government -still subject to Athens, founding great hopes on his success; until at -length, at about the period of the summer which we have now reached, -Mindarus yielded to his importunities, and, with great order and at a -moment's notice, in order to elude the enemy at Samos, weighed anchor -with seventy-three ships from Miletus and set sail for the Hellespont. -Thither sixteen vessels had already preceded him in the same summer, and -had overrun part of the Chersonese. Being caught in a storm, Mindarus -was compelled to run in to Icarus and, after being detained five or six -days there by stress of weather, arrived at Chios. - -Meanwhile Thrasyllus had heard of his having put out from Miletus, -and immediately set sail with fifty-five ships from Samos, in haste to -arrive before him in the Hellespont. But learning that he was at Chios, -and expecting that he would stay there, he posted scouts in Lesbos -and on the continent opposite to prevent the fleet moving without his -knowing it, and himself coasted along to Methymna, and gave orders to -prepare meal and other necessaries, in order to attack them from -Lesbos in the event of their remaining for any length of time at Chios. -Meanwhile he resolved to sail against Eresus, a town in Lesbos which -had revolted, and, if he could, to take it. For some of the principal -Methymnian exiles had carried over about fifty heavy infantry, their -sworn associates, from Cuma, and hiring others from the continent, so as -to make up three hundred in all, chose Anaxander, a Theban, to command -them, on account of the community of blood existing between the Thebans -and the Lesbians, and first attacked Methymna. Balked in this attempt by -the advance of the Athenian guards from Mitylene, and repulsed a second -time in a battle outside the city, they then crossed the mountain and -effected the revolt of Eresus. Thrasyllus accordingly determined to go -there with all his ships and to attack the place. Meanwhile Thrasybulus -had preceded him thither with five ships from Samos, as soon as he heard -that the exiles had crossed over, and coming too late to save Eresus, -went on and anchored before the town. Here they were joined also by two -vessels on their way home from the Hellespont, and by the ships of the -Methymnians, making a grand total of sixty-seven vessels; and the forces -on board now made ready with engines and every other means available to -do their utmost to storm Eresus. - -In the meantime Mindarus and the Peloponnesian fleet at Chios, after -taking provisions for two days and receiving three Chian pieces of money -for each man from the Chians, on the third day put out in haste from the -island; in order to avoid falling in with the ships at Eresus, they did -not make for the open sea, but keeping Lesbos on their left, sailed for -the continent. After touching at the port of Carteria, in the Phocaeid, -and dining, they went on along the Cumaean coast and supped at -Arginusae, on the continent over against Mitylene. From thence they -continued their voyage along the coast, although it was late in the -night, and arriving at Harmatus on the continent opposite Methymna, -dined there; and swiftly passing Lectum, Larisa, Hamaxitus, and the -neighbouring towns, arrived a little before midnight at Rhoeteum. Here -they were now in the Hellespont. Some of the ships also put in at Sigeum -and at other places in the neighbourhood. - -Meanwhile the warnings of the fire signals and the sudden increase in -the number of fires on the enemy's shore informed the eighteen Athenian -ships at Sestos of the approach of the Peloponnesian fleet. That very -night they set sail in haste just as they were, and, hugging the shore -of the Chersonese, coasted along to Elaeus, in order to sail out into -the open sea away from the fleet of the enemy. - -After passing unobserved the sixteen ships at Abydos, which had -nevertheless been warned by their approaching friends to be on the -alert to prevent their sailing out, at dawn they sighted the fleet of -Mindarus, which immediately gave chase. All had not time to get away; -the greater number however escaped to Imbros and Lemnos, while four -of the hindmost were overtaken off Elaeus. One of these was stranded -opposite to the temple of Protesilaus and taken with its crew, two -others without their crews; the fourth was abandoned on the shore of -Imbros and burned by the enemy. - -After this the Peloponnesians were joined by the squadron from Abydos, -which made up their fleet to a grand total of eighty-six vessels; they -spent the day in unsuccessfully besieging Elaeus, and then sailed back -to Abydos. Meanwhile the Athenians, deceived by their scouts, and never -dreaming of the enemy's fleet getting by undetected, were tranquilly -besieging Eresus. As soon as they heard the news they instantly -abandoned Eresus, and made with all speed for the Hellespont, and after -taking two of the Peloponnesian ships which had been carried out too -far into the open sea in the ardour of the pursuit and now fell in their -way, the next day dropped anchor at Elaeus, and, bringing back the -ships that had taken refuge at Imbros, during five days prepared for the -coming engagement. - -After this they engaged in the following way. The Athenians formed in -column and sailed close alongshore to Sestos; upon perceiving which the -Peloponnesians put out from Abydos to meet them. Realizing that a battle -was now imminent, both combatants extended their flank; the Athenians -along the Chersonese from Idacus to Arrhiani with seventy-six ships; -the Peloponnesians from Abydos to Dardanus with eighty-six. The -Peloponnesian right wing was occupied by the Syracusans, their left by -Mindarus in person with the best sailers in the navy; the Athenian left -by Thrasyllus, their right by Thrasybulus, the other commanders being -in different parts of the fleet. The Peloponnesians hastened to engage -first, and outflanking with their left the Athenian right sought to cut -them off, if possible, from sailing out of the straits, and to drive -their centre upon the shore, which was not far off. The Athenians -perceiving their intention extended their own wing and outsailed them, -while their left had by this time passed the point of Cynossema. This, -however, obliged them to thin and weaken their centre, especially -as they had fewer ships than the enemy, and as the coast round Point -Cynossema formed a sharp angle which prevented their seeing what was -going on on the other side of it. - -The Peloponnesians now attacked their centre and drove ashore the ships -of the Athenians, and disembarked to follow up their victory. No help -could be given to the centre either by the squadron of Thrasybulus on -the right, on account of the number of ships attacking him, or by that -of Thrasyllus on the left, from whom the point of Cynossema hid what -was going on, and who was also hindered by his Syracusan and other -opponents, whose numbers were fully equal to his own. At length, -however, the Peloponnesians in the confidence of victory began to -scatter in pursuit of the ships of the enemy, and allowed a considerable -part of their fleet to get into disorder. On seeing this the squadron -of Thrasybulus discontinued their lateral movement and, facing about, -attacked and routed the ships opposed to them, and next fell roughly -upon the scattered vessels of the victorious Peloponnesian division, and -put most of them to flight without a blow. The Syracusans also had by -this time given way before the squadron of Thrasyllus, and now openly -took to flight upon seeing the flight of their comrades. - -The rout was now complete. Most of the Peloponnesians fled for refuge -first to the river Midius, and afterwards to Abydos. Only a few -ships were taken by the Athenians; as owing to the narrowness of the -Hellespont the enemy had not far to go to be in safety. Nevertheless -nothing could have been more opportune for them than this victory. Up to -this time they had feared the Peloponnesian fleet, owing to a number -of petty losses and to the disaster in Sicily; but they now ceased -to mistrust themselves or any longer to think their enemies good for -anything at sea. Meanwhile they took from the enemy eight Chian -vessels, five Corinthian, two Ambraciot, two Boeotian, one Leucadian, -Lacedaemonian, Syracusan, and Pellenian, losing fifteen of their own. -After setting up a trophy upon Point Cynossema, securing the wrecks, and -restoring to the enemy his dead under truce, they sent off a galley to -Athens with the news of their victory. The arrival of this vessel with -its unhoped-for good news, after the recent disasters of Euboea, and -in the revolution at Athens, gave fresh courage to the Athenians, and -caused them to believe that if they put their shoulders to the wheel -their cause might yet prevail. - -On the fourth day after the sea-fight the Athenians in Sestos having -hastily refitted their ships sailed against Cyzicus, which had revolted. -Off Harpagium and Priapus they sighted at anchor the eight vessels from -Byzantium, and, sailing up and routing the troops on shore, took the -ships, and then went on and recovered the town of Cyzicus, which was -unfortified, and levied money from the citizens. In the meantime the -Peloponnesians sailed from Abydos to Elaeus, and recovered such of their -captured galleys as were still uninjured, the rest having been burned by -the Elaeusians, and sent Hippocrates and Epicles to Euboea to fetch the -squadron from that island. - -About the same time Alcibiades returned with his thirteen ships from -Caunus and Phaselis to Samos, bringing word that he had prevented -the Phoenician fleet from joining the Peloponnesians, and had made -Tissaphernes more friendly to the Athenians than before. Alcibiades -now manned nine more ships, and levied large sums of money from the -Halicarnassians, and fortified Cos. After doing this and placing a -governor in Cos, he sailed back to Samos, autumn being now at hand. -Meanwhile Tissaphernes, upon hearing that the Peloponnesian fleet had -sailed from Miletus to the Hellespont, set off again back from Aspendus, -and made all sail for Ionia. While the Peloponnesians were in the -Hellespont, the Antandrians, a people of Aeolic extraction, conveyed by -land across Mount Ida some heavy infantry from Abydos, and introduced -them into the town; having been ill-treated by Arsaces, the Persian -lieutenant of Tissaphernes. This same Arsaces had, upon pretence of -a secret quarrel, invited the chief men of the Delians to undertake -military service (these were Delians who had settled at Atramyttium -after having been driven from their homes by the Athenians for the sake -of purifying Delos); and after drawing them out from their town as his -friends and allies, had laid wait for them at dinner, and surrounded -them and caused them to be shot down by his soldiers. This deed made the -Antandrians fear that he might some day do them some mischief; and as -he also laid upon them burdens too heavy for them to bear, they expelled -his garrison from their citadel. - -Tissaphernes, upon hearing of this act of the Peloponnesians in addition -to what had occurred at Miletus and Cnidus, where his garrisons had been -also expelled, now saw that the breach between them was serious; and -fearing further injury from them, and being also vexed to think that -Pharnabazus should receive them, and in less time and at less cost -perhaps succeed better against Athens than he had done, determined to -rejoin them in the Hellespont, in order to complain of the events at -Antandros and excuse himself as best he could in the matter of the -Phoenician fleet and of the other charges against him. Accordingly he -went first to Ephesus and offered sacrifice to Artemis.... - -[When the winter after this summer is over the twenty-first year of this -war will be completed. ] - -THE END - - - - - - - - -End of Project Gutenberg's The History of the Peloponnesian War, by Thucydides - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PELOPONNESIAN WAR *** - -***** This file should be named 7142.txt or 7142.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/7/1/4/7142/ - -Produced by Albert Imrie - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions -will be renamed. - -Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no -one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation -(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without -permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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You can also find out about how to make a -donation to Project Gutenberg, and how to get involved. - - -**Welcome To The World of Free Plain Vanilla Electronic Texts** - -**eBooks Readable By Both Humans and By Computers, Since 1971** - -*****These eBooks Were Prepared By Thousands of Volunteers!***** - - -Title: The History of the Peloponnesian War - -Author: Thucydides - translated by Richard Crawley - -Release Date: December, 2004 [EBook #7142] -[Yes, we are more than one year ahead of schedule] -[This file was first posted on March 15, 2003] -[Date last updated: June 19, 2004] - -Edition: 10 - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ASCII - -*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR *** - - - - -This etext was prepared by Albert Imrie, Colorado, USA - - - - -THE HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR -by Thucydides 431 BC - -translated by Richard Crawley - - - - -With Permission -to -CONNOP THIRLWALL -Historian of Greece -This Translation of the Work of His -Great Predecessor -is Respectfully Inscribed -by --The Translator- - - - - -CONTENTS - - -BOOK I - -CHAPTER I -The state of Greece from the earliest Times to the -Commencement of the Peloponnesian War - -CHAPTER II -Causes of the War - The Affair of Epidamnus - -The Affair of Potidaea - -CHAPTER III -Congress of the Peloponnesian Confederacy at -Lacedaemon - -CHAPTER IV -From the End of the Persian to the Beginning of -the Peloponnesian War - The Progress from -Supremacy to Empire - -CHAPTER V -Second Congress at Lacedaemon - Preparations for -War and Diplomatic Skirmishes - Cylon - -Pausanias - Themistocles - - -BOOK II - -CHAPTER VI -Beginning of the Peloponnesian War - First -Invasion of Attica - Funeral Oration of Pericles - -CHAPTER VII -Second Year of the War - The Plague of Athens - -Position and Policy of Pericles - Fall of Potidaea - -CHAPTER VIII -Third Year of the War - Investment of Plataea - -Naval Victories of Phormio - Thracian Irruption -into Macedonia under Sitalces - - -BOOK III - -CHAPTER IX -Fourth and Fifth Years of the War - Revolt of -Mitylene - -CHAPTER X -Fifth Year of the War - Trial and Execution of the -Plataeans - Corcyraean Revolution - -CHAPTER XI -Sixth Year of the War - Campaigns of Demosthenes -in Western Greece - Ruin of Ambracia - - -BOOK IV - -CHAPTER XII -Seventh Year of the War - Occupation of pylos - -Surrender of the Spartan Army in Sphacteria - -CHAPTER XIII -Seventh and Eighth Years of the War - End of -Corcyraean Revolution - Peace of Gela - -Capture of Nisaea - -CHAPTER XIV -Eighth and Ninth Years of the War - Invasion of -Boeotia - Fall of Amphipolis - Brilliant Successes -of Brasidas - - -BOOK V - -CHAPTER XV -Tenth Year of the War - Death of Cleon and -Brasidas - Peace of Nicias - -CHAPTER XVI -Feeling against Sparta in Peloponnese - League -of the Mantineans, Eleans, Argives, and -Athenians - Battle of Mantinea and breaking up of -the League - -CHAPTER XVII -Sixteenth Year of the War - The Melian -Conference - Fate of Melos - - -BOOK VI - -CHAPTER XVIII -Seventeenth Year of the War - The Sicilian -Campaign - Affair of the Hermae - Departure of the -Expedition - -CHAPTER XIX -Seventeenth Year of the War - Parties at Syracuse - -Story of Harmodius and Aristogiton - -Disgrace of Alcibiades - -CHAPTER XX -Seventeenth and Eighteenth Years of the War - -Inaction of the Athenian Army - Alcibiades at -Sparta -Investment of Syracuse - - -BOOK VII - -CHAPTER XXI -Eighteenth and Nineteenth Years of the War - -Arrival of Gylippus at Syracuse - Fortification -of Decelea - Successes of the Syracusans - -CHAPTER XXII -Nineteenth Year of the War - Arrival of -Demosthenes - Defeat of the Athenians at Epipolae - -Folly and Obstinacy of Nicias - -CHAPTER XXIII -Nineteenth Year of the War - Battles in the Great -Harbour - Retreat and Annihilation of the -Athenian Army - - -BOOK VIII - -CHAPTER XXIV -Nineteenth and Twentieth Years of the War - -Revolt of Ionia - Intervention of Persia - The -War in Ionia - -CHAPTER XXV -Twentieth and Twenty-first Years of the War - -Intrigues of Alcibiades - Withdrawal of the -Persian Subsidies - Oligarchical Coup d'Etat -at Athens - Patriotism of the Army at Samos - -CHAPTER XXVI -Twenty first Year of the War - Recall of -Alcibiades to Samos - Revolt of Euboea and -Downfall of the Four Hundred - Battle of Cynossema - - - - - -BOOK I - - -CHAPTER I - -_The State of Greece from the earliest Times to the -Commencement of the Peloponnesian War_ - -Thucydides, an Athenian, wrote the history of the war between -the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, beginning at the moment -that it broke out, and believing that it would be a great war -and more worthy of relation than any that had preceded it. -This belief was not without its grounds. The preparations of -both the combatants were in every department in the last state -of perfection; and he could see the rest of the Hellenic race -taking sides in the quarrel; those who delayed doing so at once -having it in contemplation. Indeed this was the greatest movement -yet known in history, not only of the Hellenes, but of a large -part of the barbarian world--I had almost said of mankind. For -though the events of remote antiquity, and even those that more -immediately preceded the war, could not from lapse of time be -clearly ascertained, yet the evidences which an inquiry carried -as far back as was practicable leads me to trust, all point to -the conclusion that there was nothing on a great scale, either in -war or in other matters. - -For instance, it is evident that the country now called Hellas -had in ancient times no settled population; on the contrary, -migrations were of frequent occurrence, the several tribes -readily abandoning their homes under the pressure of superior -numbers. Without commerce, without freedom of communication -either by land or sea, cultivating no more of their territory -than the exigencies of life required, destitute of capital, -never planting their land (for they could not tell when an invader -might not come and take it all away, and when he did come they -had no walls to stop him), thinking that the necessities of -daily sustenance could be supplied at one place as well as -another, they cared little for shifting their habitation, and -consequently neither built large cities nor attained to any other -form of greatness. The richest soils were always most subject -to this change of masters; such as the district now called -Thessaly, Boeotia, most of the Peloponnese, Arcadia excepted, -and the most fertile parts of the rest of Hellas. The goodness -of the land favoured the aggrandizement of particular individuals, -and thus created faction which proved a fertile source of ruin. -It also invited invasion. Accordingly Attica, from the poverty -of its soil enjoying from a very remote period freedom from -faction, never changed its inhabitants. And here is no -inconsiderable exemplification of my assertion that the migrations -were the cause of there being no correspondent growth in other -parts. The most powerful victims of war or faction from -the rest of Hellas took refuge with the Athenians as a safe -retreat; and at an early period, becoming naturalized, -swelled the already large population of the city to such a -height that Attica became at last too small to hold them, and -they had to send out colonies to Ionia. - -There is also another circumstance that contributes not a little -to my conviction of the weakness of ancient times. Before the Trojan -war there is no indication of any common action in Hellas, nor -indeed of the universal prevalence of the name; on the contrary, -before the time of Hellen, son of Deucalion, no such appellation -existed, but the country went by the names of the different tribes, in -particular of the Pelasgian. It was not till Hellen and his sons -grew strong in Phthiotis, and were invited as allies into the other -cities, that one by one they gradually acquired from the connection -the name of Hellenes; though a long time elapsed before that name -could fasten itself upon all. The best proof of this is furnished by -Homer. Born long after the Trojan War, he nowhere calls all of them by -that name, nor indeed any of them except the followers of Achilles -from Phthiotis, who were the original Hellenes: in his poems they -are called Danaans, Argives, and Achaeans. He does not even use the -term barbarian, probably because the Hellenes had not yet been -marked off from the rest of the world by one distinctive -appellation. It appears therefore that the several Hellenic -communities, comprising not only those who first acquired the name, -city by city, as they came to understand each other, but also those -who assumed it afterwards as the name of the whole people, were before -the Trojan war prevented by their want of strength and the absence -of mutual intercourse from displaying any collective action. - -Indeed, they could not unite for this expedition till they had -gained increased familiarity with the sea. And the first person -known to us by tradition as having established a navy is Minos. He -made himself master of what is now called the Hellenic sea, and -ruled over the Cyclades, into most of which he sent the first -colonies, expelling the Carians and appointing his own sons governors; -and thus did his best to put down piracy in those waters, a -necessary step to secure the revenues for his own use. - -For in early times the Hellenes and the barbarians of the coast -and islands, as communication by sea became more common, were -tempted to turn pirates, under the conduct of their most powerful men; -the motives being to serve their own cupidity and to support the -needy. They would fall upon a town unprotected by walls, and -consisting of a mere collection of villages, and would plunder it; -indeed, this came to be the main source of their livelihood, no -disgrace being yet attached to such an achievement, but even some -glory. An illustration of this is furnished by the honour with which -some of the inhabitants of the continent still regard a successful -marauder, and by the question we find the old poets everywhere -representing the people as asking of voyagers--"Are they pirates?"--as -if those who are asked the question would have no idea of -disclaiming the imputation, or their interrogators of reproaching them -for it. The same rapine prevailed also by land. - -And even at the present day many of Hellas still follow the old -fashion, the Ozolian Locrians for instance, the Aetolians, the -Acarnanians, and that region of the continent; and the custom of -carrying arms is still kept up among these continentals, from the -old piratical habits. The whole of Hellas used once to carry arms, -their habitations being unprotected and their communication with -each other unsafe; indeed, to wear arms was as much a part of everyday -life with them as with the barbarians. And the fact that the people in -these parts of Hellas are still living in the old way points to a time -when the same mode of life was once equally common to all. The -Athenians were the first to lay aside their weapons, and to adopt an -easier and more luxurious mode of life; indeed, it is only lately that -their rich old men left off the luxury of wearing undergarments of -linen, and fastening a knot of their hair with a tie of golden -grasshoppers, a fashion which spread to their Ionian kindred and -long prevailed among the old men there. On the contrary, a modest -style of dressing, more in conformity with modern ideas, was first -adopted by the Lacedaemonians, the rich doing their best to assimilate -their way of life to that of the common people. They also set the -example of contending naked, publicly stripping and anointing -themselves with oil in their gymnastic exercises. Formerly, even in -the Olympic contests, the athletes who contended wore belts across -their middles; and it is but a few years since that the practice -ceased. To this day among some of the barbarians, especially in -Asia, when prizes for boxing and wrestling are offered, belts are worn -by the combatants. And there are many other points in which a likeness -might be shown between the life of the Hellenic world of old and the -barbarian of to-day. - -With respect to their towns, later on, at an era of increased -facilities of navigation and a greater supply of capital, we find -the shores becoming the site of walled towns, and the isthmuses -being occupied for the purposes of commerce and defence against a -neighbour. But the old towns, on account of the great prevalence of -piracy, were built away from the sea, whether on the islands or the -continent, and still remain in their old sites. For the pirates used -to plunder one another, and indeed all coast populations, whether -seafaring or not. - -The islanders, too, were great pirates. These islanders were Carians -and Phoenicians, by whom most of the islands were colonized, as was -proved by the following fact. During the purification of Delos by -Athens in this war all the graves in the island were taken up, and -it was found that above half their inmates were Carians: they were -identified by the fashion of the arms buried with them, and by the -method of interment, which was the same as the Carians still follow. -But as soon as Minos had formed his navy, communication by sea -became easier, as he colonized most of the islands, and thus -expelled the malefactors. The coast population now began to apply -themselves more closely to the acquisition of wealth, and their life -became more settled; some even began to build themselves walls on -the strength of their newly acquired riches. For the love of gain -would reconcile the weaker to the dominion of the stronger, and the -possession of capital enabled the more powerful to reduce the -smaller towns to subjection. And it was at a somewhat later stage of -this development that they went on the expedition against Troy. - -What enabled Agamemnon to raise the armament was more, in my -opinion, his superiority in strength, than the oaths of Tyndareus, -which bound the suitors to follow him. Indeed, the account given by -those Peloponnesians who have been the recipients of the most credible -tradition is this. First of all Pelops, arriving among a needy -population from Asia with vast wealth, acquired such power that, -stranger though he was, the country was called after him; and this -power fortune saw fit materially to increase in the hands of his -descendants. Eurystheus had been killed in Attica by the Heraclids. -Atreus was his mother's brother; and to the hands of his relation, who -had left his father on account of the death of Chrysippus, Eurystheus, -when he set out on his expedition, had committed Mycenae and the -government. As time went on and Eurystheus did not return, Atreus -complied with the wishes of the Mycenaeans, who were influenced by -fear of the Heraclids--besides, his power seemed considerable, and he -had not neglected to court the favour of the populace--and assumed -the sceptre of Mycenae and the rest of the dominions of Eurystheus. -And so the power of the descendants of Pelops came to be greater -than that of the descendants of Perseus. To all this Agamemnon -succeeded. He had also a navy far stronger than his contemporaries, so -that, in my opinion, fear was quite as strong an element as love in -the formation of the confederate expedition. The strength of his -navy is shown by the fact that his own was the largest contingent, and -that of the Arcadians was furnished by him; this at least is what -Homer says, if his testimony is deemed sufficient. Besides, in his -account of the transmission of the sceptre, he calls him - - Of many an isle, and of all Argos king. - -Now Agamemnon's was a continental power; and he could not have been -master of any except the adjacent islands (and these would not be -many), but through the possession of a fleet. - -And from this expedition we may infer the character of earlier -enterprises. Now Mycenae may have been a small place, and many of -the towns of that age may appear comparatively insignificant, but no -exact observer would therefore feel justified in rejecting the -estimate given by the poets and by tradition of the magnitude of the -armament. For I suppose if Lacedaemon were to become desolate, and the -temples and the foundations of the public buildings were left, that as -time went on there would be a strong disposition with posterity to -refuse to accept her fame as a true exponent of her power. And yet -they occupy two-fifths of Peloponnese and lead the whole, not to speak -of their numerous allies without. Still, as the city is neither -built in a compact form nor adorned with magnificent temples and -public edifices, but composed of villages after the old fashion of -Hellas, there would be an impression of inadequacy. Whereas, if Athens -were to suffer the same misfortune, I suppose that any inference -from the appearance presented to the eye would make her power to -have been twice as great as it is. We have therefore no right to be -sceptical, nor to content ourselves with an inspection of a town to -the exclusion of a consideration of its power; but we may safely -conclude that the armament in question surpassed all before it, as -it fell short of modern efforts; if we can here also accept the -testimony of Homer's poems, in which, without allowing for the -exaggeration which a poet would feel himself licensed to employ, we -can see that it was far from equalling ours. He has represented it -as consisting of twelve hundred vessels; the Boeotian complement of -each ship being a hundred and twenty men, that of the ships of -Philoctetes fifty. By this, I conceive, he meant to convey the maximum -and the minimum complement: at any rate, he does not specify the -amount of any others in his catalogue of the ships. That they were all -rowers as well as warriors we see from his account of the ships of -Philoctetes, in which all the men at the oar are bowmen. Now it is -improbable that many supernumeraries sailed, if we except the kings -and high officers; especially as they had to cross the open sea with -munitions of war, in ships, moreover, that had no decks, but were -equipped in the old piratical fashion. So that if we strike the -average of the largest and smallest ships, the number of those who -sailed will appear inconsiderable, representing, as they did, the -whole force of Hellas. And this was due not so much to scarcity of men -as of money. Difficulty of subsistence made the invaders reduce the -numbers of the army to a point at which it might live on the country -during the prosecution of the war. Even after the victory they -obtained on their arrival--and a victory there must have been, or the -fortifications of the naval camp could never have been built--there -is no indication of their whole force having been employed; on the -contrary, they seem to have turned to cultivation of the Chersonese -and to piracy from want of supplies. This was what really enabled -the Trojans to keep the field for ten years against them; the -dispersion of the enemy making them always a match for the -detachment left behind. If they had brought plenty of supplies with -them, and had persevered in the war without scattering for piracy -and agriculture, they would have easily defeated the Trojans in the -field, since they could hold their own against them with the -division on service. In short, if they had stuck to the siege, the -capture of Troy would have cost them less time and less trouble. But -as want of money proved the weakness of earlier expeditions, so from -the same cause even the one in question, more famous than its -predecessors, may be pronounced on the evidence of what it effected to -have been inferior to its renown and to the current opinion about it -formed under the tuition of the poets. - -Even after the Trojan War, Hellas was still engaged in removing -and settling, and thus could not attain to the quiet which must -precede growth. The late return of the Hellenes from Ilium caused many -revolutions, and factions ensued almost everywhere; and it was the -citizens thus driven into exile who founded the cities. Sixty years -after the capture of Ilium, the modern Boeotians were driven out of -Arne by the Thessalians, and settled in the present Boeotia, the -former Cadmeis; though there was a division of them there before, some -of whom joined the expedition to Ilium. Twenty years later, the -Dorians and the Heraclids became masters of Peloponnese; so that -much had to be done and many years had to elapse before Hellas could -attain to a durable tranquillity undisturbed by removals, and could -begin to send out colonies, as Athens did to Ionia and most of the -islands, and the Peloponnesians to most of Italy and Sicily and some -places in the rest of Hellas. All these places were founded -subsequently to the war with Troy. - -But as the power of Hellas grew, and the acquisition of wealth -became more an object, the revenues of the states increasing, -tyrannies were by their means established almost everywhere--the old -form of government being hereditary monarchy with definite -prerogatives--and Hellas began to fit out fleets and apply herself -more closely to the sea. It is said that the Corinthians were the -first to approach the modern style of naval architecture, and that -Corinth was the first place in Hellas where galleys were built; and -we have Ameinocles, a Corinthian shipwright, making four ships for -the Samians. Dating from the end of this war, it is nearly three -hundred years ago that Ameinocles went to Samos. Again, the earliest -sea-fight in history was between the Corinthians and Corcyraeans; this -was about two hundred and sixty years ago, dating from the same time. -Planted on an isthmus, Corinth had from time out of mind been a -commercial emporium; as formerly almost all communication between the -Hellenes within and without Peloponnese was carried on overland, and -the Corinthian territory was the highway through which it travelled. -She had consequently great money resources, as is shown by the epithet -"wealthy" bestowed by the old poets on the place, and this enabled -her, when traffic by sea became more common, to procure her navy and -put down piracy; and as she could offer a mart for both branches of -the trade, she acquired for herself all the power which a large -revenue affords. Subsequently the Ionians attained to great naval -strength in the reign of Cyrus, the first king of the Persians, and of -his son Cambyses, and while they were at war with the former commanded -for a while the Ionian sea. Polycrates also, the tyrant of Samos, -had a powerful navy in the reign of Cambyses, with which he reduced -many of the islands, and among them Rhenea, which he consecrated to -the Delian Apollo. About this time also the Phocaeans, while they were -founding Marseilles, defeated the Carthaginians in a sea-fight. -These were the most powerful navies. And even these, although so -many generations had elapsed since the Trojan war, seem to have been -principally composed of the old fifty-oars and long-boats, and to have -counted few galleys among their ranks. Indeed it was only shortly -the Persian war, and the death of Darius the successor of Cambyses, -that the Sicilian tyrants and the Corcyraeans acquired any large -number of galleys. For after these there were no navies of any account -in Hellas till the expedition of Xerxes; Aegina, Athens, and others -may have possessed a few vessels, but they were principally -fifty-oars. It was quite at the end of this period that the war with -Aegina and the prospect of the barbarian invasion enabled Themistocles -to persuade the Athenians to build the fleet with which they fought at -Salamis; and even these vessels had not complete decks. - -The navies, then, of the Hellenes during the period we have -traversed were what I have described. All their insignificance did not -prevent their being an element of the greatest power to those who -cultivated them, alike in revenue and in dominion. They were the means -by which the islands were reached and reduced, those of the smallest -area falling the easiest prey. Wars by land there were none, none at -least by which power was acquired; we have the usual border -contests, but of distant expeditions with conquest for object we -hear nothing among the Hellenes. There was no union of subject -cities round a great state, no spontaneous combination of equals for -confederate expeditions; what fighting there was consisted merely of -local warfare between rival neighbours. The nearest approach to a -coalition took place in the old war between Chalcis and Eretria; -this was a quarrel in which the rest of the Hellenic name did to -some extent take sides. - -Various, too, were the obstacles which the national growth -encountered in various localities. The power of the Ionians was -advancing with rapid strides, when it came into collision with Persia, -under King Cyrus, who, after having dethroned Croesus and overrun -everything between the Halys and the sea, stopped not till he had -reduced the cities of the coast; the islands being only left to be -subdued by Darius and the Phoenician navy. - -Again, wherever there were tyrants, their habit of providing -simply for themselves, of looking solely to their personal comfort and -family aggrandizement, made safety the great aim of their policy, -and prevented anything great proceeding from them; though they would -each have their affairs with their immediate neighbours. All this is -only true of the mother country, for in Sicily they attained to very -great power. Thus for a long time everywhere in Hellas do we find -causes which make the states alike incapable of combination for -great and national ends, or of any vigorous action of their own. - -But at last a time came when the tyrants of Athens and the far older -tyrannies of the rest of Hellas were, with the exception of those in -Sicily, once and for all put down by Lacedaemon; for this city, though -after the settlement of the Dorians, its present inhabitants, it -suffered from factions for an unparalleled length of time, still at -a very early period obtained good laws, and enjoyed a freedom from -tyrants which was unbroken; it has possessed the same form of -government for more than four hundred years, reckoning to the end of -the late war, and has thus been in a position to arrange the affairs -of the other states. Not many years after the deposition of the -tyrants, the battle of Marathon was fought between the Medes and the -Athenians. Ten years afterwards, the barbarian returned with the -armada for the subjugation of Hellas. In the face of this great -danger, the command of the confederate Hellenes was assumed by the -Lacedaemonians in virtue of their superior power; and the Athenians, -having made up their minds to abandon their city, broke up their -homes, threw themselves into their ships, and became a naval people. -This coalition, after repulsing the barbarian, soon afterwards split -into two sections, which included the Hellenes who had revolted from -the King, as well as those who had aided him in the war. At the end of -the one stood Athens, at the head of the other Lacedaemon, one the -first naval, the other the first military power in Hellas. For a short -time the league held together, till the Lacedaemonians and Athenians -quarrelled and made war upon each other with their allies, a duel into -which all the Hellenes sooner or later were drawn, though some might -at first remain neutral. So that the whole period from the Median -war to this, with some peaceful intervals, was spent by each power -in war, either with its rival, or with its own revolted allies, and -consequently afforded them constant practice in military matters, -and that experience which is learnt in the school of danger. - -The policy of Lacedaemon was not to exact tribute from her allies, -but merely to secure their subservience to her interests by -establishing oligarchies among them; Athens, on the contrary, had by -degrees deprived hers of their ships, and imposed instead -contributions in money on all except Chios and Lesbos. Both found -their resources for this war separately to exceed the sum of their -strength when the alliance flourished intact. - -Having now given the result of my inquiries into early times, I -grant that there will be a difficulty in believing every particular -detail. The way that most men deal with traditions, even traditions of -their own country, is to receive them all alike as they are delivered, -without applying any critical test whatever. The general Athenian -public fancy that Hipparchus was tyrant when he fell by the hands of -Harmodius and Aristogiton, not knowing that Hippias, the eldest of the -sons of Pisistratus, was really supreme, and that Hipparchus and -Thessalus were his brothers; and that Harmodius and Aristogiton -suspecting, on the very day, nay at the very moment fixed on for the -deed, that information had been conveyed to Hippias by their -accomplices, concluded that he had been warned, and did not attack -him, yet, not liking to be apprehended and risk their lives for -nothing, fell upon Hipparchus near the temple of the daughters of -Leos, and slew him as he was arranging the Panathenaic procession. - -There are many other unfounded ideas current among the rest of the -Hellenes, even on matters of contemporary history, which have not been -obscured by time. For instance, there is the notion that the -Lacedaemonian kings have two votes each, the fact being that they have -only one; and that there is a company of Pitane, there being simply no -such thing. So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of -truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand. On the -whole, however, the conclusions I have drawn from the proofs quoted -may, I believe, safely be relied on. Assuredly they will not be -disturbed either by the lays of a poet displaying the exaggeration -of his craft, or by the compositions of the chroniclers that are -attractive at truth's expense; the subjects they treat of being out of -the reach of evidence, and time having robbed most of them of -historical value by enthroning them in the region of legend. Turning -from these, we can rest satisfied with having proceeded upon the -clearest data, and having arrived at conclusions as exact as can be -expected in matters of such antiquity. To come to this war: despite -the known disposition of the actors in a struggle to overrate its -importance, and when it is over to return to their admiration of -earlier events, yet an examination of the facts will show that it -was much greater than the wars which preceded it. - -With reference to the speeches in this history, some were -delivered before the war began, others while it was going on; some I -heard myself, others I got from various quarters; it was in all -cases difficult to carry them word for word in one's memory, so my -habit has been to make the speakers say what was in my opinion -demanded of them by the various occasions, of course adhering as -closely as possible to the general sense of what they really said. And -with reference to the narrative of events, far from permitting -myself to derive it from the first source that came to hand, I did not -even trust my own impressions, but it rests partly on what I saw -myself, partly on what others saw for me, the accuracy of the report -being always tried by the most severe and detailed tests possible. -My conclusions have cost me some labour from the want of coincidence -between accounts of the same occurrences by different eye-witnesses, -arising sometimes from imperfect memory, sometimes from undue -partiality for one side or the other. The absence of romance in my -history will, I fear, detract somewhat from its interest; but if it be -judged useful by those inquirers who desire an exact knowledge of -the past as an aid to the interpretation of the future, which in the -course of human things must resemble if it does not reflect it, I -shall be content. In fine, I have written my work, not as an essay -which is to win the applause of the moment, but as a possession for -all time. - -The Median War, the greatest achievement of past times, yet found -a speedy decision in two actions by sea and two by land. The -Peloponnesian War was prolonged to an immense length, and, long as -it was, it was short without parallel for the misfortunes that it -brought upon Hellas. Never had so many cities been taken and laid -desolate, here by the barbarians, here by the parties contending -(the old inhabitants being sometimes removed to make room for others); -never was there so much banishing and blood-shedding, now on the field -of battle, now in the strife of faction. Old stories of occurrences -handed down by tradition, but scantily confirmed by experience, -suddenly ceased to be incredible; there were earthquakes of -unparalleled extent and violence; eclipses of the sun occurred with -a frequency unrecorded in previous history; there were great -droughts in sundry places and consequent famines, and that most -calamitous and awfully fatal visitation, the plague. All this came -upon them with the late war, which was begun by the Athenians and -Peloponnesians by the dissolution of the thirty years' truce made -after the conquest of Euboea. To the question why they broke the -treaty, I answer by placing first an account of their grounds of -complaint and points of difference, that no one may ever have to ask -the immediate cause which plunged the Hellenes into a war of such -magnitude. The real cause I consider to be the one which was -formally most kept out of sight. The growth of the power of Athens, -and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon, made war -inevitable. Still it is well to give the grounds alleged by either -side which led to the dissolution of the treaty and the breaking out -of the war. - - - - -CHAPTER II - -_Causes of the War - The Affair of Epidamnus - -The Affair of Potidaea_ - -The city of Epidamnus stands on the right of the entrance of the -Ionic Gulf. Its vicinity is inhabited by the Taulantians, an -Illyrian people. The place is a colony from Corcyra, founded by -Phalius, son of Eratocleides, of the family of the Heraclids, who -had according to ancient usage been summoned for the purpose from -Corinth, the mother country. The colonists were joined by some -Corinthians, and others of the Dorian race. Now, as time went on, -the city of Epidamnus became great and populous; but falling a prey to -factions arising, it is said, from a war with her neighbours the -barbarians, she became much enfeebled, and lost a considerable -amount of her power. The last act before the war was the expulsion -of the nobles by the people. The exiled party joined the barbarians, -and proceeded to plunder those in the city by sea and land; and the -Epidamnians, finding themselves hard pressed, sent ambassadors to -Corcyra beseeching their mother country not to allow them to perish, -but to make up matters between them and the exiles, and to rid them of -the war with the barbarians. The ambassadors seated themselves in -the temple of Hera as suppliants, and made the above requests to the -Corcyraeans. But the Corcyraeans refused to accept their supplication, -and they were dismissed without having effected anything. - -When the Epidamnians found that no help could be expected from -Corcyra, they were in a strait what to do next. So they sent to Delphi -and inquired of the God whether they should deliver their city to -the Corinthians and endeavour to obtain some assistance from their -founders. The answer he gave them was to deliver the city and place -themselves under Corinthian protection. So the Epidamnians went to -Corinth and delivered over the colony in obedience to the commands -of the oracle. They showed that their founder came from Corinth, and -revealed the answer of the god; and they begged them not to allow them -to perish, but to assist them. This the Corinthians consented to do. -Believing the colony to belong as much to themselves as to the -Corcyraeans, they felt it to be a kind of duty to undertake their -protection. Besides, they hated the Corcyraeans for their contempt -of the mother country. Instead of meeting with the usual honours -accorded to the parent city by every other colony at public -assemblies, such as precedence at sacrifices, Corinth found herself -treated with contempt by a power which in point of wealth could -stand comparison with any even of the richest communities in Hellas, -which possessed great military strength, and which sometimes could not -repress a pride in the high naval position of an, island whose -nautical renown dated from the days of its old inhabitants, the -Phaeacians. This was one reason of the care that they lavished on -their fleet, which became very efficient; indeed they began the war -with a force of a hundred and twenty galleys. - -All these grievances made Corinth eager to send the promised aid -to Epidamnus. Advertisement was made for volunteer settlers, and a -force of Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Corinthians was dispatched. -They marched by land to Apollonia, a Corinthian colony, the route by -sea being avoided from fear of Corcyraean interruption. When the -Corcyraeans heard of the arrival of the settlers and troops in -Epidamnus, and the surrender of the colony to Corinth, they took fire. -Instantly putting to sea with five-and-twenty ships, which were -quickly followed by others, they insolently commanded the -Epidamnians to receive back the banished nobles--(it must be premised -that the Epidamnian exiles had come to Corcyra and, pointing to the -sepulchres of their ancestors, had appealed to their kindred to -restore them)--and to dismiss the Corinthian garrison and settlers. -But to all this the Epidamnians turned a deaf ear. Upon this the -Corcyraeans commenced operations against them with a fleet of forty -sail. They took with them the exiles, with a view to their -restoration, and also secured the services of the Illyrians. Sitting -down before the city, they issued a proclamation to the effect that -any of the natives that chose, and the foreigners, might depart -unharmed, with the alternative of being treated as enemies. On their -refusal the Corcyraeans proceeded to besiege the city, which stands on -an isthmus; and the Corinthians, receiving intelligence of the -investment of Epidamnus, got together an armament and proclaimed a -colony to Epidamnus, perfect political equality being guaranteed to -all who chose to go. Any who were not prepared to sail at once -might, by paying down the sum of fifty Corinthian drachmae, have a -share in the colony without leaving Corinth. Great numbers took -advantage of this proclamation, some being ready to start directly, -others paying the requisite forfeit. In case of their passage being -disputed by the Corcyraeans, several cities were asked to lend them -a convoy. Megara prepared to accompany them with eight ships, Pale -in Cephallonia with four; Epidaurus furnished five, Hermione one, -Troezen two, Leucas ten, and Ambracia eight. The Thebans and -Phliasians were asked for money, the Eleans for hulls as well; while -Corinth herself furnished thirty ships and three thousand heavy -infantry. - -When the Corcyraeans heard of their preparations they came to -Corinth with envoys from Lacedaemon and Sicyon, whom they persuaded to -accompany them, and bade her recall the garrison and settlers, as -she had nothing to do with Epidamnus. If, however, she had any -claims to make, they were willing to submit the matter to the -arbitration of such of the cities in Peloponnese as should be chosen -by mutual agreement, and that the colony should remain with the city -to whom the arbitrators might assign it. They were also willing to -refer the matter to the oracle at Delphi. If, in defiance of their -protestations, war was appealed to, they should be themselves -compelled by this violence to seek friends in quarters where they -had no desire to seek them, and to make even old ties give way to -the necessity of assistance. The answer they got from Corinth was -that, if they would withdraw their fleet and the barbarians from -Epidamnus, negotiation might be possible; but, while the town was -still being besieged, going before arbitrators was out of the -question. The Corcyraeans retorted that if Corinth would withdraw -her troops from Epidamnus they would withdraw theirs, or they were -ready to let both parties remain in statu quo, an armistice being -concluded till judgment could be given. - -Turning a deaf ear to all these proposals, when their ships were -manned and their allies had come in, the Corinthians sent a herald -before them to declare war and, getting under way with seventy-five -ships and two thousand heavy infantry, sailed for Epidamnus to give -battle to the Corcyraeans. The fleet was under the command of -Aristeus, son of Pellichas, Callicrates, son of Callias, and -Timanor, son of Timanthes; the troops under that of Archetimus, son of -Eurytimus, and Isarchidas, son of Isarchus. When they had reached -Actium in the territory of Anactorium, at the mouth of the mouth of -the Gulf of Ambracia, where the temple of Apollo stands, the -Corcyraeans sent on a herald in a light boat to warn them not to -sail against them. Meanwhile they proceeded to man their ships, all of -which had been equipped for action, the old vessels being -undergirded to make them seaworthy. On the return of the herald -without any peaceful answer from the Corinthians, their ships being -now manned, they put out to sea to meet the enemy with a fleet of -eighty sail (forty were engaged in the siege of Epidamnus), formed -line, and went into action, and gained a decisive victory, and -destroyed fifteen of the Corinthian vessels. The same day had seen -Epidamnus compelled by its besiegers to capitulate; the conditions -being that the foreigners should be sold, and the Corinthians kept -as prisoners of war, till their fate should be otherwise decided. - -After the engagement the Corcyraeans set up a trophy on Leukimme, -a headland of Corcyra, and slew all their captives except the -Corinthians, whom they kept as prisoners of war. Defeated at sea, -the Corinthians and their allies repaired home, and left the -Corcyraeans masters of all the sea about those parts. Sailing to -Leucas, a Corinthian colony, they ravaged their territory, and burnt -Cyllene, the harbour of the Eleans, because they had furnished ships -and money to Corinth. For almost the whole of the period that followed -the battle they remained masters of the sea, and the allies of Corinth -were harassed by Corcyraean cruisers. At last Corinth, roused by the -sufferings of her allies, sent out ships and troops in the fall of the -summer, who formed an encampment at Actium and about Chimerium, in -Thesprotis, for the protection of Leucas and the rest of the -friendly cities. The Corcyraeans on their part formed a similar -station on Leukimme. Neither party made any movement, but they -remained confronting each other till the end of the summer, and winter -was at hand before either of them returned home. - -Corinth, exasperated by the war with the Corcyraeans, spent the -whole of the year after the engagement and that succeeding it in -building ships, and in straining every nerve to form an efficient -fleet; rowers being drawn from Peloponnese and the rest of Hellas by -the inducement of large bounties. The Corcyraeans, alarmed at the news -of their preparations, being without a single ally in Hellas (for they -had not enrolled themselves either in the Athenian or in the -Lacedaemonian confederacy), decided to repair to Athens in order to -enter into alliance and to endeavour to procure support from her. -Corinth also, hearing of their intentions, sent an embassy to Athens -to prevent the Corcyraean navy being joined by the Athenian, and her -prospect of ordering the war according to her wishes being thus -impeded. An assembly was convoked, and the rival advocates appeared: -the Corcyraeans spoke as follows: - -"Athenians! when a people that have not rendered any important -service or support to their neighbours in times past, for which they -might claim to be repaid, appear before them as we now appear before -you to solicit their assistance, they may fairly be required to -satisfy certain preliminary conditions. They should show, first, -that it is expedient or at least safe to grant their request; next, -that they will retain a lasting sense of the kindness. But if they -cannot clearly establish any of these points, they must not be annoyed -if they meet with a rebuff. Now the Corcyraeans believe that with -their petition for assistance they can also give you a satisfactory -answer on these points, and they have therefore dispatched us -hither. It has so happened that our policy as regards you with respect -to this request, turns out to be inconsistent, and as regards our -interests, to be at the present crisis inexpedient. We say -inconsistent, because a power which has never in the whole of her past -history been willing to ally herself with any of her neighbours, is -now found asking them to ally themselves with her. And we say -inexpedient, because in our present war with Corinth it has left us in -a position of entire isolation, and what once seemed the wise -precaution of refusing to involve ourselves in alliances with other -powers, lest we should also involve ourselves in risks of their -choosing, has now proved to be folly and weakness. It is true that -in the late naval engagement we drove back the Corinthians from our -shores single-handed. But they have now got together a still larger -armament from Peloponnese and the rest of Hellas; and we, seeing our -utter inability to cope with them without foreign aid, and the -magnitude of the danger which subjection to them implies, find it -necessary to ask help from you and from every other power. And we hope -to be excused if we forswear our old principle of complete political -isolation, a principle which was not adopted with any sinister -intention, but was rather the consequence of an error in judgment. - -"Now there are many reasons why in the event of your compliance -you will congratulate yourselves on this request having been made to -you. First, because your assistance will be rendered to a power which, -herself inoffensive, is a victim to the injustice of others. Secondly, -because all that we most value is at stake in the present contest, and -your welcome of us under these circumstances will be a proof of -goodwill which will ever keep alive the gratitude you will lay up in -our hearts. Thirdly, yourselves excepted, we are the greatest naval -power in Hellas. Moreover, can you conceive a stroke of good fortune -more rare in itself, or more disheartening to your enemies, than -that the power whose adhesion you would have valued above much -material and moral strength should present herself self-invited, -should deliver herself into your hands without danger and without -expense, and should lastly put you in the way of gaining a high -character in the eyes of the world, the gratitude of those whom you -shall assist, and a great accession of strength for yourselves? You -may search all history without finding many instances of a people -gaining all these advantages at once, or many instances of a power -that comes in quest of assistance being in a position to give to the -people whose alliance she solicits as much safety and honour as she -will receive. But it will be urged that it is only in the case of a -war that we shall be found useful. To this we answer that if any of -you imagine that that war is far off, he is grievously mistaken, and -is blind to the fact that Lacedaemon regards you with jealousy and -desires war, and that Corinth is powerful there--the same, remember, -that is your enemy, and is even now trying to subdue us as a -preliminary to attacking you. And this she does to prevent our -becoming united by a common enmity, and her having us both on her -hands, and also to ensure getting the start of you in one of two ways, -either by crippling our power or by making its strength her own. Now -it is our policy to be beforehand with her--that is, for Corcyra to -make an offer of alliance and for you to accept it; in fact, we -ought to form plans against her instead of waiting to defeat the plans -she forms against us. - -"If she asserts that for you to receive a colony of hers into -alliance is not right, let her know that every colony that is well -treated honours its parent state, but becomes estranged from it by -injustice. For colonists are not sent forth on the understanding -that they are to be the slaves of those that remain behind, but that -they are to be their equals. And that Corinth was injuring us is -clear. Invited to refer the dispute about Epidamnus to arbitration, -they chose to prosecute their complaints war rather than by a fair -trial. And let their conduct towards us who are their kindred be a -warning to you not to be misled by their deceit, nor to yield to their -direct requests; concessions to adversaries only end in self-reproach, -and the more strictly they are avoided the greater will be the -chance of security. - -"If it be urged that your reception of us will be a breach of the -treaty existing between you and Lacedaemon, the answer is that we -are a neutral state, and that one of the express provisions of that -treaty is that it shall be competent for any Hellenic state that is -neutral to join whichever side it pleases. And it is intolerable for -Corinth to be allowed to obtain men for her navy not only from her -allies, but also from the rest of Hellas, no small number being -furnished by your own subjects; while we are to be excluded both -from the alliance left open to us by treaty, and from any assistance -that we might get from other quarters, and you are to be accused of -political immorality if you comply with our request. On the other -hand, we shall have much greater cause to complain of you, if you do -not comply with it; if we, who are in peril and are no enemies of -yours, meet with a repulse at your hands, while Corinth, who is the -aggressor and your enemy, not only meets with no hindrance from you, -but is even allowed to draw material for war from your dependencies. -This ought not to be, but you should either forbid her enlisting men -in your dominions, or you should lend us too what help you may think -advisable. - -"But your real policy is to afford us avowed countenance and -support. The advantages of this course, as we premised in the -beginning of our speech, are many. We mention one that is perhaps -the chief. Could there be a clearer guarantee of our good faith than -is offered by the fact that the power which is at enmity with you is -also at enmity with us, and that that power is fully able to punish -defection? And there is a wide difference between declining the -alliance of an inland and of a maritime power. For your first -endeavour should be to prevent, if possible, the existence of any -naval power except your own; failing this, to secure the friendship of -the strongest that does exist. And if any of you believe that what -we urge is expedient, but fear to act upon this belief, lest it should -lead to a breach of the treaty, you must remember that on the one -hand, whatever your fears, your strength will be formidable to your -antagonists; on the other, whatever the confidence you derive from -refusing to receive us, your weakness will have no terrors for a -strong enemy. You must also remember that your decision is for Athens -no less than Corcyra, and that you are not making the best provision -for her interests, if at a time when you are anxiously scanning the -horizon that you may be in readiness for the breaking out of the war -which is all but upon you, you hesitate to attach to your side a -place whose adhesion or estrangement is alike pregnant with the most -vital consequences. For it lies conveniently for the coast-navigation -in the direction of Italy and Sicily, being able to bar the passage -of naval reinforcements from thence to Peloponnese, and from -Peloponnese thither; and it is in other respects a most desirable -station. To sum up as shortly as possible, embracing both general -and particular considerations, let this show you the folly of -sacrificing us. Remember that there are but three considerable -naval powers in Hellas--Athens, Corcyra, and Corinth--and that if you -allow two of these three to become one, and Corinth to secure us for -herself, you will have to hold the sea against the united fleets of -Corcyra and Peloponnese. But if you receive us, you will have our -ships to reinforce you in the struggle." - -Such were the words of the Corcyraeans. After they had finished, the -Corinthians spoke as follows: - -"These Corcyraeans in the speech we have just heard do not confine -themselves to the question of their reception into your alliance. They -also talk of our being guilty of injustice, and their being the -victims of an unjustifiable war. It becomes necessary for us to -touch upon both these points before we proceed to the rest of what -we have to say, that you may have a more correct idea of the grounds -of our claim, and have good cause to reject their petition. -According to them, their old policy of refusing all offers of alliance -was a policy of moderation. It was in fact adopted for bad ends, not -for good; indeed their conduct is such as to make them by no means -desirous of having allies present to witness it, or of having the -shame of asking their concurrence. Besides, their geographical -situation makes them independent of others, and consequently the -decision in cases where they injure any lies not with judges appointed -by mutual agreement, but with themselves, because, while they seldom -make voyages to their neighbours, they are constantly being visited by -foreign vessels which are compelled to put in to Corcyra. In short, -the object that they propose to themselves, in their specious policy -of complete isolation, is not to avoid sharing in the crimes of -others, but to secure monopoly of crime to themselves--the licence of -outrage wherever they can compel, of fraud wherever they can elude, -and the enjoyment of their gains without shame. And yet if they were -the honest men they pretend to be, the less hold that others had -upon them, the stronger would be the light in which they might have -put their honesty by giving and taking what was just. - -"But such has not been their conduct either towards others or -towards us. The attitude of our colony towards us has always been -one of estrangement and is now one of hostility; for, say they: 'We -were not sent out to be ill-treated.' We rejoin that we did not -found the colony to be insulted by them, but to be their head and to -be regarded with a proper respect. At any rate our other colonies -honour us, and we are much beloved by our colonists; and clearly, if -the majority are satisfied with us, these can have no good reason -for a dissatisfaction in which they stand alone, and we are not acting -improperly in making war against them, nor are we making war against -them without having received signal provocation. Besides, if we were -in the wrong, it would be honourable in them to give way to our -wishes, and disgraceful for us to trample on their moderation; but -in the pride and licence of wealth they have sinned again and again -against us, and never more deeply than when Epidamnus, our dependency, -which they took no steps to claim in its distress upon our coming to -relieve it, was by them seized, and is now held by force of arms. - -"As to their allegation that they wished the question to be first -submitted to arbitration, it is obvious that a challenge coming from -the party who is safe in a commanding position cannot gain the -credit due only to him who, before appealing to arms, in deeds as well -as words, places himself on a level with his adversary. In their case, -it was not before they laid siege to the place, but after they at -length understood that we should not tamely suffer it, that they -thought of the specious word arbitration. And not satisfied with their -own misconduct there, they appear here now requiring you to join -with them not in alliance but in crime, and to receive them in spite -of their being at enmity with us. But it was when they stood firmest -that they should have made overtures to you, and not at a time when we -have been wronged and they are in peril; nor yet at a time when you -will be admitting to a share in your protection those who never -admitted you to a share in their power, and will be incurring an equal -amount of blame from us with those in whose offences you had no -hand. No, they should have shared their power with you before they -asked you to share your fortunes with them. - -"So then the reality of the grievances we come to complain of, and -the violence and rapacity of our opponents, have both been proved. But -that you cannot equitably receive them, this you have still to -learn. It may be true that one of the provisions of the treaty is that -it shall be competent for any state, whose name was not down on the -list, to join whichever side it pleases. But this agreement is not -meant for those whose object in joining is the injury of other powers, -but for those whose need of support does not arise from the fact of -defection, and whose adhesion will not bring to the power that is -mad enough to receive them war instead of peace; which will be the -case with you, if you refuse to listen to us. For you cannot become -their auxiliary and remain our friend; if you join in their attack, -you must share the punishment which the defenders inflict on them. And -yet you have the best possible right to be neutral, or, failing -this, you should on the contrary join us against them. Corinth is at -least in treaty with you; with Corcyra you were never even in truce. -But do not lay down the principle that defection is to be -patronized. Did we on the defection of the Samians record our vote -against you, when the rest of the Peloponnesian powers were equally -divided on the question whether they should assist them? No, we told -them to their face that every power has a right to punish its own -allies. Why, if you make it your policy to receive and assist all -offenders, you will find that just as many of your dependencies will -come over to us, and the principle that you establish will press -less heavily on us than on yourselves. - -"This then is what Hellenic law entitles us to demand as a right. -But we have also advice to offer and claims on your gratitude, -which, since there is no danger of our injuring you, as we are not -enemies, and since our friendship does not amount to very frequent -intercourse, we say ought to be liquidated at the present juncture. -When you were in want of ships of war for the war against the -Aeginetans, before the Persian invasion, Corinth supplied you with -twenty vessels. That good turn, and the line we took on the Samian -question, when we were the cause of the Peloponnesians refusing to -assist them, enabled you to conquer Aegina and to punish Samos. And we -acted thus at crises when, if ever, men are wont in their efforts -against their enemies to forget everything for the sake of victory, -regarding him who assists them then as a friend, even if thus far he -has been a foe, and him who opposes them then as a foe, even if he has -thus far been a friend; indeed they allow their real interests to -suffer from their absorbing preoccupation in the struggle. - -"Weigh well these considerations, and let your youth learn what they -are from their elders, and let them determine to do unto us as we have -done unto you. And let them not acknowledge the justice of what we -say, but dispute its wisdom in the contingency of war. Not only is the -straightest path generally speaking the wisest; but the coming of -the war, which the Corcyraeans have used as a bugbear to persuade -you to do wrong, is still uncertain, and it is not worth while to be -carried away by it into gaining the instant and declared enmity of -Corinth. It were, rather, wise to try and counteract the -unfavourable impression which your conduct to Megara has created. -For kindness opportunely shown has a greater power of removing old -grievances than the facts of the case may warrant. And do not be -seduced by the prospect of a great naval alliance. Abstinence from all -injustice to other first-rate powers is a greater tower of strength -than anything that can be gained by the sacrifice of permanent -tranquillity for an apparent temporary advantage. It is now our turn -to benefit by the principle that we laid down at Lacedaemon, that -every power has a right to punish her own allies. We now claim to -receive the same from you, and protest against your rewarding us for -benefiting you by our vote by injuring us by yours. On the contrary, -return us like for like, remembering that this is that very crisis in -which he who lends aid is most a friend, and he who opposes is most a -foe. And for these Corcyraeans--neither receive them into alliance in -our despite, nor be their abettors in crime. So do, and you will act -as we have a right to expect of you, and at the same time best consult -your own interests." - -Such were the words of the Corinthians. - -When the Athenians had heard both out, two assemblies were held. -In the first there was a manifest disposition to listen to the -representations of Corinth; in the second, public feeling had -changed and an alliance with Corcyra was decided on, with certain -reservations. It was to be a defensive, not an offensive alliance. -It did not involve a breach of the treaty with Peloponnese: Athens -could not be required to join Corcyra in any attack upon Corinth. -But each of the contracting parties had a right to the other's -assistance against invasion, whether of his own territory or that of -an ally. For it began now to be felt that the coming of the -Peloponnesian war was only a question of time, and no one was -willing to see a naval power of such magnitude as Corcyra sacrificed -to Corinth; though if they could let them weaken each other by -mutual conflict, it would be no bad preparation for the struggle which -Athens might one day have to wage with Corinth and the other naval -powers. At the same time the island seemed to lie conveniently on -the coasting passage to Italy and Sicily. With these views, Athens -received Corcyra into alliance and, on the departure of the -Corinthians not long afterwards, sent ten ships to their assistance. -They were commanded by Lacedaemonius, the son of Cimon, Diotimus, -the son of Strombichus, and Proteas, the son of Epicles. Their -instructions were to avoid collision with the Corinthian fleet -except under certain circumstances. If it sailed to Corcyra and -threatened a landing on her coast, or in any of her possessions, -they were to do their utmost to prevent it. These instructions were -prompted by an anxiety to avoid a breach of the treaty. - -Meanwhile the Corinthians completed their preparations, and sailed -for Corcyra with a hundred and fifty ships. Of these Elis furnished -ten, Megara twelve, Leucas ten, Ambracia twenty-seven, Anactorium one, -and Corinth herself ninety. Each of these contingents had its own -admiral, the Corinthian being under the command of Xenoclides, son of -Euthycles, with four colleagues. Sailing from Leucas, they made land -at the part of the continent opposite Corcyra. They anchored in the -harbour of Chimerium, in the territory of Thesprotis, above which, -at some distance from the sea, lies the city of Ephyre, in the Elean -district. By this city the Acherusian lake pours its waters into the -sea. It gets its name from the river Acheron, which flows through -Thesprotis and falls into the lake. There also the river Thyamis -flows, forming the boundary between Thesprotis and Kestrine; and -between these rivers rises the point of Chimerium. In this part of the -continent the Corinthians now came to anchor, and formed an -encampment. When the Corcyraeans saw them coming, they manned a -hundred and ten ships, commanded by Meikiades, Aisimides, and -Eurybatus, and stationed themselves at one of the Sybota isles; the -ten Athenian ships being present. On Point Leukimme they posted -their land forces, and a thousand heavy infantry who had come from -Zacynthus to their assistance. Nor were the Corinthians on the -mainland without their allies. The barbarians flocked in large numbers -to their assistance, the inhabitants of this part of the continent -being old allies of theirs. - -When the Corinthian preparations were completed, they took three -days' provisions and put out from Chimerium by night, ready for -action. Sailing with the dawn, they sighted the Corcyraean fleet out -at sea and coming towards them. When they perceived each other, both -sides formed in order of battle. On the Corcyraean right wing lay -the Athenian ships, the rest of the line being occupied by their own -vessels formed in three squadrons, each of which was commanded by -one of the three admirals. Such was the Corcyraean formation. The -Corinthian was as follows: on the right wing lay the Megarian and -Ambraciot ships, in the centre the rest of the allies in order. But -the left was composed of the best sailers in the Corinthian navy, to -encounter the Athenians and the right wing of the Corcyraeans. As soon -as the signals were raised on either side, they joined battle. Both -sides had a large number of heavy infantry on their decks, and a large -number of archers and darters, the old imperfect armament still -prevailing. The sea-fight was an obstinate one, though not -remarkable for its science; indeed it was more like a battle by -land. Whenever they charged each other, the multitude and crush of the -vessels made it by no means easy to get loose; besides, their hopes of -victory lay principally in the heavy infantry on the decks, who -stood and fought in order, the ships remaining stationary. The -manoeuvre of breaking the line was not tried; in short, strength and -pluck had more share in the fight than science. Everywhere tumult -reigned, the battle being one scene of confusion; meanwhile the -Athenian ships, by coming up to the Corcyraeans whenever they were -pressed, served to alarm the enemy, though their commanders could -not join in the battle from fear of their instructions. The right wing -of the Corinthians suffered most. The Corcyraeans routed it, and -chased them in disorder to the continent with twenty ships, sailed -up to their camp, and burnt the tents which they found empty, and -plundered the stuff. So in this quarter the Corinthians and their -allies were defeated, and the Corcyraeans were victorious. But where -the Corinthians themselves were, on the left, they gained a decided -success; the scanty forces of the Corcyraeans being further weakened -by the want of the twenty ships absent on the pursuit. Seeing the -Corcyraeans hard pressed, the Athenians began at length to assist them -more unequivocally. At first, it is true, they refrained from charging -any ships; but when the rout was becoming patent, and the -Corinthians were pressing on, the time at last came when every one set -to, and all distinction was laid aside, and it came to this point, -that the Corinthians and Athenians raised their hands against each -other. - -After the rout, the Corinthians, instead of employing themselves -in lashing fast and hauling after them the hulls of the vessels -which they had disabled, turned their attention to the men, whom -they butchered as they sailed through, not caring so much to make -prisoners. Some even of their own friends were slain by them, by -mistake, in their ignorance of the defeat of the right wing For the -number of the ships on both sides, and the distance to which they -covered the sea, made it difficult, after they had once joined, to -distinguish between the conquering and the conquered; this battle -proving far greater than any before it, any at least between Hellenes, -for the number of vessels engaged. After the Corinthians had chased -the Corcyraeans to the land, they turned to the wrecks and their dead, -most of whom they succeeded in getting hold of and conveying to -Sybota, the rendezvous of the land forces furnished by their barbarian -allies. Sybota, it must be known, is a desert harbour of Thesprotis. -This task over, they mustered anew, and sailed against the -Corcyraeans, who on their part advanced to meet them with all their -ships that were fit for service and remaining to them, accompanied -by the Athenian vessels, fearing that they might attempt a landing -in their territory. It was by this time getting late, and the paean -had been sung for the attack, when the Corinthians suddenly began to -back water. They had observed twenty Athenian ships sailing up, -which had been sent out afterwards to reinforce the ten vessels by the -Athenians, who feared, as it turned out justly, the defeat of the -Corcyraeans and the inability of their handful of ships to protect -them. These ships were thus seen by the Corinthians first. They -suspected that they were from Athens, and that those which they saw -were not all, but that there were more behind; they accordingly -began to retire. The Corcyraeans meanwhile had not sighted them, as -they were advancing from a point which they could not so well see, and -were wondering why the Corinthians were backing water, when some -caught sight of them, and cried out that there were ships in sight -ahead. Upon this they also retired; for it was now getting dark, and -the retreat of the Corinthians had suspended hostilities. Thus they -parted from each other, and the battle ceased with night. The -Corcyraeans were in their camp at Leukimme, when these twenty ships -from Athens, under the command of Glaucon, the son of Leagrus, and -Andocides, son of Leogoras, bore on through the corpses and the -wrecks, and sailed up to the camp, not long after they were sighted. -It was now night, and the Corcyraeans feared that they might be -hostile vessels; but they soon knew them, and the ships came to -anchor. - -The next day the thirty Athenian vessels put out to sea, accompanied -by all the Corcyraean ships that were seaworthy, and sailed to the -harbour at Sybota, where the Corinthians lay, to see if they would -engage. The Corinthians put out from the land and formed a line in the -open sea, but beyond this made no further movement, having no -intention of assuming the offensive. For they saw reinforcements -arrived fresh from Athens, and themselves confronted by numerous -difficulties, such as the necessity of guarding the prisoners whom -they had on board and the want of all means of refitting their ships -in a desert place. What they were thinking more about was how their -voyage home was to be effected; they feared that the Athenians might -consider that the treaty was dissolved by the collision which had -occurred, and forbid their departure. - -Accordingly they resolved to put some men on board a boat, and -send them without a herald's wand to the Athenians, as an -experiment. Having done so, they spoke as follows: "You do wrong, -Athenians, to begin war and break the treaty. Engaged in chastising -our enemies, we find you placing yourselves in our path in arms -against us. Now if your intentions are to prevent us sailing to -Corcyra, or anywhere else that we may wish, and if you are for -breaking the treaty, first take us that are here and treat us as -enemies." Such was what they said, and all the Corcyraean armament -that were within hearing immediately called out to take them and -kill them. But the Athenians answered as follows: "Neither are we -beginning war, Peloponnesians, nor are we breaking the treaty; but -these Corcyraeans are our allies, and we are come to help them. So -if you want to sail anywhere else, we place no obstacle in your way; -but if you are going to sail against Corcyra, or any of her -possessions, we shall do our best to stop you." - -Receiving this answer from the Athenians, the Corinthians -commenced preparations for their voyage home, and set up a trophy in -Sybota, on the continent; while the Corcyraeans took up the wrecks and -dead that had been carried out to them by the current, and by a wind -which rose in the night and scattered them in all directions, and -set up their trophy in Sybota, on the island, as victors. The -reasons each side had for claiming the victory were these. The -Corinthians had been victorious in the sea-fight until night; and -having thus been enabled to carry off most wrecks and dead, they -were in possession of no fewer than a thousand prisoners of war, and -had sunk close upon seventy vessels. The Corcyraeans had destroyed -about thirty ships, and after the arrival of the Athenians had taken -up the wrecks and dead on their side; they had besides seen the -Corinthians retire before them, backing water on sight of the Athenian -vessels, and upon the arrival of the Athenians refuse to sail out -against them from Sybota. Thus both sides claimed the victory. - -The Corinthians on the voyage home took Anactorium, which stands -at the mouth of the Ambracian gulf. The place was taken by -treachery, being common ground to the Corcyraeans and Corinthians. -After establishing Corinthian settlers there, they retired home. Eight -hundred of the Corcyraeans were slaves; these they sold; two hundred -and fifty they retained in captivity, and treated with great -attention, in the hope that they might bring over their country to -Corinth on their return; most of them being, as it happened, men of -very high position in Corcyra. In this way Corcyra maintained her -political existence in the war with Corinth, and the Athenian -vessels left the island. This was the first cause of the war that -Corinth had against the Athenians, viz. , that they had fought -against them with the Corcyraeans in time of treaty. - -Almost immediately after this, fresh differences arose between the -Athenians and Peloponnesians, and contributed their share to the -war. Corinth was forming schemes for retaliation, and Athens suspected -her hostility. The Potidaeans, who inhabit the isthmus of Pallene, -being a Corinthian colony, but tributary allies of Athens, were -ordered to raze the wall looking towards Pallene, to give hostages, to -dismiss the Corinthian magistrates, and in future not to receive the -persons sent from Corinth annually to succeed them. It was feared that -they might be persuaded by Perdiccas and the Corinthians to revolt, -and might draw the rest of the allies in the direction of Thrace to -revolt with them. These precautions against the Potidaeans were -taken by the Athenians immediately after the battle at Corcyra. Not -only was Corinth at length openly hostile, but Perdiccas, son of -Alexander, king of the Macedonians, had from an old friend and ally -been made an enemy. He had been made an enemy by the Athenians -entering into alliance with his brother Philip and Derdas, who were in -league against him. In his alarm he had sent to Lacedaemon to try -and involve the Athenians in a war with the Peloponnesians, and was -endeavouring to win over Corinth in order to bring about the revolt of -Potidaea. He also made overtures to the Chalcidians in the direction -of Thrace, and to the Bottiaeans, to persuade them to join in the -revolt; for he thought that if these places on the border could be -made his allies, it would be easier to carry on the war with their -co-operation. Alive to all this, and wishing to anticipate the -revolt of the cities, the Athenians acted as follows. They were just -then sending off thirty ships and a thousand heavy infantry for his -country under the command of Archestratus, son of Lycomedes, with four -colleagues. They instructed the captains to take hostages of the -Potidaeans, to raze the wall, and to be on their guard against the -revolt of the neighbouring cities. - -Meanwhile the Potidaeans sent envoys to Athens on the chance of -persuading them to take no new steps in their matters; they also -went to Lacedaemon with the Corinthians to secure support in case of -need. Failing after prolonged negotiation to obtain anything -satisfactory from the Athenians; being unable, for all they could say, -to prevent the vessels that were destined for Macedonia from also -sailing against them; and receiving from the Lacedaemonian -government a promise to invade Attica, if the Athenians should -attack Potidaea, the Potidaeans, thus favoured by the moment, at -last entered into league with the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans, and -revolted. And Perdiccas induced the Chalcidians to abandon and -demolish their towns on the seaboard and, settling inland at Olynthus, -to make that one city a strong place: meanwhile to those who -followed his advice he gave a part of his territory in Mygdonia -round Lake Bolbe as a place of abode while the war against the -Athenians should last. They accordingly demolished their towns, -removed inland and prepared for war. The thirty ships of the -Athenians, arriving before the Thracian places, found Potidaea and the -rest in revolt. Their commanders, considering it to be quite -impossible with their present force to carry on war with Perdiccas and -with the confederate towns as well turned to Macedonia, their original -destination, and, having established themselves there, carried on -war in co-operation with Philip, and the brothers of Derdas, who had -invaded the country from the interior. - -Meanwhile the Corinthians, with Potidaea in revolt and the -Athenian ships on the coast of Macedonia, alarmed for the safety of -the place and thinking its danger theirs, sent volunteers from -Corinth, and mercenaries from the rest of Peloponnese, to the number -of sixteen hundred heavy infantry in all, and four hundred light -troops. Aristeus, son of Adimantus, who was always a steady friend -to the Potidaeans, took command of the expedition, and it was -principally for love of him that most of the men from Corinth -volunteered. They arrived in Thrace forty days after the revolt of -Potidaea. - -The Athenians also immediately received the news of the revolt of -the cities. On being informed that Aristeus and his reinforcements -were on their way, they sent two thousand heavy infantry of their -own citizens and forty ships against the places in revolt, under the -command of Callias, son of Calliades, and four colleagues. They -arrived in Macedonia first, and found the force of a thousand men that -had been first sent out, just become masters of Therme and besieging -Pydna. Accordingly they also joined in the investment, and besieged -Pydna for a while. Subsequently they came to terms and concluded a -forced alliance with Perdiccas, hastened by the calls of Potidaea -and by the arrival of Aristeus at that place. They withdrew from -Macedonia, going to Beroea and thence to Strepsa, and, after a -futile attempt on the latter place, they pursued by land their march -to Potidaea with three thousand heavy infantry of their own -citizens, besides a number of their allies, and six hundred Macedonian -horsemen, the followers of Philip and Pausanias. With these sailed -seventy ships along the coast. Advancing by short marches, on the -third day they arrived at Gigonus, where they encamped. - -Meanwhile the Potidaeans and the Peloponnesians with Aristeus were -encamped on the side looking towards Olynthus on the isthmus, in -expectation of the Athenians, and had established their market outside -the city. The allies had chosen Aristeus general of all the -infantry; while the command of the cavalry was given to Perdiccas, who -had at once left the alliance of the Athenians and gone back to that -of the Potidaeans, having deputed Iolaus as his general: The plan of -Aristeus was to keep his own force on the isthmus, and await the -attack of the Athenians; leaving the Chalcidians and the allies -outside the isthmus, and the two hundred cavalry from Perdiccas in -Olynthus to act upon the Athenian rear, on the occasion of their -advancing against him; and thus to place the enemy between two -fires. While Callias the Athenian general and his colleagues -dispatched the Macedonian horse and a few of the allies to Olynthus, -to prevent any movement being made from that quarter, the Athenians -themselves broke up their camp and marched against Potidaea. After -they had arrived at the isthmus, and saw the enemy preparing for -battle, they formed against him, and soon afterwards engaged. The wing -of Aristeus, with the Corinthians and other picked troops round him, -routed the wing opposed to it, and followed for a considerable -distance in pursuit. But the rest of the army of the Potidaeans and of -the Peloponnesians was defeated by the Athenians, and took refuge -within the fortifications. Returning from the pursuit, Aristeus -perceived the defeat of the rest of the army. Being at a loss which of -the two risks to choose, whether to go to Olynthus or to Potidaea, -he at last determined to draw his men into as small a space as -possible, and force his way with a run into Potidaea. Not without -difficulty, through a storm of missiles, he passed along by the -breakwater through the sea, and brought off most of his men safe, -though a few were lost. Meanwhile the auxiliaries of the Potidaeans -from Olynthus, which is about seven miles off and in sight of -Potidaea, when the battle began and the signals were raised, -advanced a little way to render assistance; and the Macedonian horse -formed against them to prevent it. But on victory speedily declaring -for the Athenians and the signals being taken down, they retired -back within the wall; and the Macedonians returned to the Athenians. -Thus there were no cavalry present on either side. After the battle -the Athenians set up a trophy, and gave back their dead to the -Potidaeans under truce. The Potidaeans and their allies had close upon -three hundred killed; the Athenians a hundred and fifty of their own -citizens, and Callias their general. - -The wall on the side of the isthmus had now works at once raised -against it, and manned by the Athenians. That on the side of Pallene -had no works raised against it. They did not think themselves strong -enough at once to keep a garrison in the isthmus and to cross over -to Pallene and raise works there; they were afraid that the Potidaeans -and their allies might take advantage of their division to attack -them. Meanwhile the Athenians at home learning that there were no -works at Pallene, some time afterwards sent off sixteen hundred -heavy infantry of their own citizens under the command of Phormio, son -of Asopius. Arrived at Pallene, he fixed his headquarters at -Aphytis, and led his army against Potidaea by short marches, -ravaging the country as he advanced. No one venturing to meet him in -the field, he raised works against the wall on the side of Pallene. So -at length Potidaea was strongly invested on either side, and from -the sea by the ships co-operating in the blockade. Aristeus, seeing -its investment complete, and having no hope of its salvation, except -in the event of some movement from the Peloponnese, or of some other -improbable contingency, advised all except five hundred to watch for a -wind and sail out of the place, in order that their provisions might -last the longer. He was willing to be himself one of those who -remained. Unable to persuade them, and desirous of acting on the -next alternative, and of having things outside in the best posture -possible, he eluded the guardships of the Athenians and sailed out. -Remaining among the Chalcidians, he continued to carry on the war; -in particular he laid an ambuscade near the city of the Sermylians, -and cut off many of them; he also communicated with Peloponnese, and -tried to contrive some method by which help might be brought. -Meanwhile, after the completion of the investment of Potidaea, Phormio -next employed his sixteen hundred men in ravaging Chalcidice and -Bottica: some of the towns also were taken by him. - - - - -CHAPTER III - -_Congress of the Peloponnesian Confederacy at Lacedaemon_ - -The Athenians and Peloponnesians had these antecedent grounds of -complaint against each other: the complaint of Corinth was that her -colony of Potidaea, and Corinthian and Peloponnesian citizens within -it, were being besieged; that of Athens against the Peloponnesians -that they had incited a town of hers, a member of her alliance and a -contributor to her revenue, to revolt, and had come and were openly -fighting against her on the side of the Potidaeans. For all this, -war had not yet broken out: there was still truce for a while; for -this was a private enterprise on the part of Corinth. - -But the siege of Potidaea put an end to her inaction; she had men -inside it: besides, she feared for the place. Immediately summoning -the allies to Lacedaemon, she came and loudly accused Athens of breach -of the treaty and aggression on the rights of Peloponnese. With her, -the Aeginetans, formally unrepresented from fear of Athens, in -secret proved not the least urgent of the advocates for war, asserting -that they had not the independence guaranteed to them by the treaty. -After extending the summons to any of their allies and others who -might have complaints to make of Athenian aggression, the -Lacedaemonians held their ordinary assembly, and invited them to -speak. There were many who came forward and made their several -accusations; among them the Megarians, in a long list of grievances, -called special attention to the fact of their exclusion from the ports -of the Athenian empire and the market of Athens, in defiance of the -treaty. Last of all the Corinthians came forward, and having let those -who preceded them inflame the Lacedaemonians, now followed with a -speech to this effect: - -"Lacedaemonians! the confidence which you feel in your -constitution and social order, inclines you to receive any reflections -of ours on other powers with a certain scepticism. Hence springs -your moderation, but hence also the rather limited knowledge which you -betray in dealing with foreign politics. Time after time was our voice -raised to warn you of the blows about to be dealt us by Athens, and -time after time, instead of taking the trouble to ascertain the -worth of our communications, you contented yourselves with -suspecting the speakers of being inspired by private interest. And so, -instead of calling these allies together before the blow fell, you -have delayed to do so till we are smarting under it; allies among whom -we have not the worst title to speak, as having the greatest -complaints to make, complaints of Athenian outrage and Lacedaemonian -neglect. Now if these assaults on the rights of Hellas had been made -in the dark, you might be unacquainted with the facts, and it would be -our duty to enlighten you. As it is, long speeches are not needed -where you see servitude accomplished for some of us, meditated for -others--in particular for our allies--and prolonged preparations in -the aggressor against the hour of war. Or what, pray, is the meaning -of their reception of Corcyra by fraud, and their holding it against -us by force? what of the siege of Potidaea?--places one of which lies -most conveniently for any action against the Thracian towns; while the -other would have contributed a very large navy to the Peloponnesians? - -"For all this you are responsible. You it was who first allowed them -to fortify their city after the Median war, and afterwards to erect -the long walls--you who, then and now, are always depriving of -freedom not only those whom they have enslaved, but also those who -have as yet been your allies. For the true author of the subjugation -of a people is not so much the immediate agent, as the power which -permits it having the means to prevent it; particularly if that -power aspires to the glory of being the liberator of Hellas. We are at -last assembled. It has not been easy to assemble, nor even now are our -objects defined. We ought not to be still inquiring into the fact of -our wrongs, but into the means of our defence. For the aggressors with -matured plans to oppose to our indecision have cast threats aside -and betaken themselves to action. And we know what are the paths by -which Athenian aggression travels, and how insidious is its -progress. A degree of confidence she may feel from the idea that -your bluntness of perception prevents your noticing her; but it is -nothing to the impulse which her advance will receive from the -knowledge that you see, but do not care to interfere. You, -Lacedaemonians, of all the Hellenes are alone inactive, and defend -yourselves not by doing anything but by looking as if you would do -something; you alone wait till the power of an enemy is becoming twice -its original size, instead of crushing it in its infancy. And yet -the world used to say that you were to be depended upon; but in your -case, we fear, it said more than the truth. The Mede, we ourselves -know, had time to come from the ends of the earth to Peloponnese, -without any force of yours worthy of the name advancing to meet him. -But this was a distant enemy. Well, Athens at all events is a near -neighbour, and yet Athens you utterly disregard; against Athens you -prefer to act on the defensive instead of on the offensive, and to -make it an affair of chances by deferring the struggle till she has -grown far stronger than at first. And yet you know that on the whole -the rock on which the barbarian was wrecked was himself, and that if -our present enemy Athens has not again and again annihilated us, we -owe it more to her blunders than to your protection; Indeed, -expectations from you have before now been the ruin of some, whose -faith induced them to omit preparation. - -"We hope that none of you will consider these words of -remonstrance to be rather words of hostility; men remonstrate with -friends who are in error, accusations they reserve for enemies who -have wronged them. Besides, we consider that we have as good a right -as any one to point out a neighbour's faults, particularly when we -contemplate the great contrast between the two national characters; -a contrast of which, as far as we can see, you have little perception, -having never yet considered what sort of antagonists you will -encounter in the Athenians, how widely, how absolutely different -from yourselves. The Athenians are addicted to innovation, and their -designs are characterized by swiftness alike in conception and -execution; you have a genius for keeping what you have got, -accompanied by a total want of invention, and when forced to act you -never go far enough. Again, they are adventurous beyond their power, -and daring beyond their judgment, and in danger they are sanguine; -your wont is to attempt less than is justified by your power, to -mistrust even what is sanctioned by your judgment, and to fancy that -from danger there is no release. Further, there is promptitude on -their side against procrastination on yours; they are never at home, -you are never from it: for they hope by their absence to extend -their acquisitions, you fear by your advance to endanger what you have -left behind. They are swift to follow up a success, and slow to recoil -from a reverse. Their bodies they spend ungrudgingly in their -country's cause; their intellect they jealously husband to be employed -in her service. A scheme unexecuted is with them a positive loss, a -successful enterprise a comparative failure. The deficiency created by -the miscarriage of an undertaking is soon filled up by fresh hopes; -for they alone are enabled to call a thing hoped for a thing got, by -the speed with which they act upon their resolutions. Thus they toil -on in trouble and danger all the days of their life, with little -opportunity for enjoying, being ever engaged in getting: their only -idea of a holiday is to do what the occasion demands, and to them -laborious occupation is less of a misfortune than the peace of a quiet -life. To describe their character in a word, one might truly say -that they were born into the world to take no rest themselves and to -give none to others. - -"Such is Athens, your antagonist. And yet, Lacedaemonians, you still -delay, and fail to see that peace stays longest with those, who are -not more careful to use their power justly than to show their -determination not to submit to injustice. On the contrary, your -ideal of fair dealing is based on the principle that, if you do not -injure others, you need not risk your own fortunes in preventing -others from injuring you. Now you could scarcely have succeeded in -such a policy even with a neighbour like yourselves; but in the -present instance, as we have just shown, your habits are old-fashioned -as compared with theirs. It is the law as in art, so in politics, that -improvements ever prevail; and though fixed usages may be best for -undisturbed communities, constant necessities of action must be -accompanied by the constant improvement of methods. Thus it happens -that the vast experience of Athens has carried her further than you on -the path of innovation. - -"Here, at least, let your procrastination end. For the present, -assist your allies and Potidaea in particular, as you promised, by a -speedy invasion of Attica, and do not sacrifice friends and kindred to -their bitterest enemies, and drive the rest of us in despair to some -other alliance. Such a step would not be condemned either by the -Gods who received our oaths, or by the men who witnessed them. The -breach of a treaty cannot be laid to the people whom desertion compels -to seek new relations, but to the power that fails to assist its -confederate. But if you will only act, we will stand by you; it -would be unnatural for us to change, and never should we meet with -such a congenial ally. For these reasons choose the right course, -and endeavour not to let Peloponnese under your supremacy degenerate -from the prestige that it enjoyed under that of your ancestors." - -Such were the words of the Corinthians. There happened to be -Athenian envoys present at Lacedaemon on other business. On hearing -the speeches they thought themselves called upon to come before the -Lacedaemonians. Their intention was not to offer a defence on any of -the charges which the cities brought against them, but to show on a -comprehensive view that it was not a matter to be hastily decided -on, but one that demanded further consideration. There was also a wish -to call attention to the great power of Athens, and to refresh the -memory of the old and enlighten the ignorance of the young, from a -notion that their words might have the effect of inducing them to -prefer tranquillity to war. So they came to the Lacedaemonians and -said that they too, if there was no objection, wished to speak to -their assembly. They replied by inviting them to come forward. The -Athenians advanced, and spoke as follows: - -"The object of our mission here was not to argue with your allies, -but to attend to the matters on which our state dispatched us. -However, the vehemence of the outcry that we hear against us has -prevailed on us to come forward. It is not to combat the accusations -of the cities (indeed you are not the judges before whom either we -or they can plead), but to prevent your taking the wrong course on -matters of great importance by yielding too readily to the persuasions -of your allies. We also wish to show on a review of the whole -indictment that we have a fair title to our possessions, and that -our country has claims to consideration. We need not refer to remote -antiquity: there we could appeal to the voice of tradition, but not to -the experience of our audience. But to the Median War and contemporary -history we must refer, although we are rather tired of continually -bringing this subject forward. In our action during that war we ran -great risk to obtain certain advantages: you had your share in the -solid results, do not try to rob us of all share in the good that -the glory may do us. However, the story shall be told not so much to -deprecate hostility as to testify against it, and to show, if you -are so ill advised as to enter into a struggle with Athens, what -sort of an antagonist she is likely to prove. We assert that at -Marathon we were at the front, and faced the barbarian -single-handed. That when he came the second time, unable to cope -with him by land we went on board our ships with all our people, and -joined in the action at Salamis. This prevented his taking the -Peloponnesian states in detail, and ravaging them with his fleet; when -the multitude of his vessels would have made any combination for -self-defence impossible. The best proof of this was furnished by the -invader himself. Defeated at sea, he considered his power to be no -longer what it had been, and retired as speedily as possible with -the greater part of his army. - -"Such, then, was the result of the matter, and it was clearly proved -that it was on the fleet of Hellas that her cause depended. Well, to -this result we contributed three very useful elements, viz., the -largest number of ships, the ablest commander, and the most -unhesitating patriotism. Our contingent of ships was little less -than two-thirds of the whole four hundred; the commander was -Themistocles, through whom chiefly it was that the battle took place -in the straits, the acknowledged salvation of our cause. Indeed, -this was the reason of your receiving him with honours such as had -never been accorded to any foreign visitor. While for daring -patriotism we had no competitors. Receiving no reinforcements from -behind, seeing everything in front of us already subjugated, we had -the spirit, after abandoning our city, after sacrificing our -property (instead of deserting the remainder of the league or -depriving them of our services by dispersing), to throw ourselves into -our ships and meet the danger, without a thought of resenting your -neglect to assist us. We assert, therefore, that we conferred on you -quite as much as we received. For you had a stake to fight for; the -cities which you had left were still filled with your homes, and you -had the prospect of enjoying them again; and your coming was -prompted quite as much by fear for yourselves as for us; at all -events, you never appeared till we had nothing left to lose. But we -left behind us a city that was a city no longer, and staked our -lives for a city that had an existence only in desperate hope, and -so bore our full share in your deliverance and in ours. But if we -had copied others, and allowed fears for our territory to make us give -in our adhesion to the Mede before you came, or if we had suffered our -ruin to break our spirit and prevent us embarking in our ships, your -naval inferiority would have made a sea-fight unnecessary, and his -objects would have been peaceably attained. - -"Surely, Lacedaemonians, neither by the patriotism that we displayed -at that crisis, nor by the wisdom of our counsels, do we merit our -extreme unpopularity with the Hellenes, not at least unpopularity -for our empire. That empire we acquired by no violent means, but -because you were unwilling to prosecute to its conclusion the war -against the barbarian, and because the allies attached themselves to -us and spontaneously asked us to assume the command. And the nature of -the case first compelled us to advance our empire to its present -height; fear being our principal motive, though honour and interest -afterwards came in. And at last, when almost all hated us, when some -had already revolted and had been subdued, when you had ceased to be -the friends that you once were, and had become objects of suspicion -and dislike, it appeared no longer safe to give up our empire; -especially as all who left us would fall to you. And no one can -quarrel with a people for making, in matters of tremendous risk, the -best provision that it can for its interest. - -"You, at all events, Lacedaemonians, have used your supremacy to -settle the states in Peloponnese as is agreeable to you. And if at the -period of which we were speaking you had persevered to the end of -the matter, and had incurred hatred in your command, we are sure -that you would have made yourselves just as galling to the allies, and -would have been forced to choose between a strong government and -danger to yourselves. It follows that it was not a very wonderful -action, or contrary to the common practice of mankind, if we did -accept an empire that was offered to us, and refused to give it up -under the pressure of three of the strongest motives, fear, honour, -and interest. And it was not we who set the example, for it has always -been law that the weaker should be subject to the stronger. Besides, -we believed ourselves to be worthy of our position, and so you thought -us till now, when calculations of interest have made you take up the -cry of justice--a consideration which no one ever yet brought forward -to hinder his ambition when he had a chance of gaining anything by -might. And praise is due to all who, if not so superior to human -nature as to refuse dominion, yet respect justice more than their -position compels them to do. - -"We imagine that our moderation would be best demonstrated by the -conduct of others who should be placed in our position; but even our -equity has very unreasonably subjected us to condemnation instead of -approval. Our abatement of our rights in the contract trials with -our allies, and our causing them to be decided by impartial laws at -Athens, have gained us the character of being litigious. And none care -to inquire why this reproach is not brought against other imperial -powers, who treat their subjects with less moderation than we do; -the secret being that where force can be used, law is not needed. -But our subjects are so habituated to associate with us as equals that -any defeat whatever that clashes with their notions of justice, -whether it proceeds from a legal judgment or from the power which -our empire gives us, makes them forget to be grateful for being -allowed to retain most of their possessions, and more vexed at a -part being taken, than if we had from the first cast law aside and -openly gratified our covetousness. If we had done so, not even would -they have disputed that the weaker must give way to the stronger. -Men's indignation, it seems, is more excited by legal wrong than by -violent wrong; the first looks like being cheated by an equal, the -second like being compelled by a superior. At all events they -contrived to put up with much worse treatment than this from the Mede, -yet they think our rule severe, and this is to be expected, for the -present always weighs heavy on the conquered. This at least is -certain. If you were to succeed in overthrowing us and in taking our -place, you would speedily lose the popularity with which fear of us -has invested you, if your policy of to-day is at all to tally with the -sample that you gave of it during the brief period of your command -against the Mede. Not only is your life at home regulated by rules and -institutions incompatible with those of others, but your citizens -abroad act neither on these rules nor on those which are recognized by -the rest of Hellas. - -"Take time then in forming your resolution, as the matter is of -great importance; and do not be persuaded by the opinions and -complaints of others to bring trouble on yourselves, but consider -the vast influence of accident in war, before you are engaged in it. -As it continues, it generally becomes an affair of chances, chances -from which neither of us is exempt, and whose event we must risk in -the dark. It is a common mistake in going to war to begin at the wrong -end, to act first, and wait for disaster to discuss the matter. But we -are not yet by any means so misguided, nor, so far as we can see, -are you; accordingly, while it is still open to us both to choose -aright, we bid you not to dissolve the treaty, or to break your oaths, -but to have our differences settled by arbitration according to our -agreement. Or else we take the gods who heard the oaths to witness, -and if you begin hostilities, whatever line of action you choose, we -will try not to be behindhand in repelling you." - -Such were the words of the Athenians. After the Lacedaemonians had -heard the complaints of the allies against the Athenians, and the -observations of the latter, they made all withdraw, and consulted by -themselves on the question before them. The opinions of the majority -all led to the same conclusion; the Athenians were open aggressors, -and war must be declared at once. But Archidamus, the Lacedaemonian -king, came forward, who had the reputation of being at once a wise and -a moderate man, and made the following speech: - -"I have not lived so long, Lacedaemonians, without having had the -experience of many wars, and I see those among you of the same age -as myself, who will not fall into the common misfortune of longing for -war from inexperience or from a belief in its advantage and its -safety. This, the war on which you are now debating, would be one of -the greatest magnitude, on a sober consideration of the matter. In a -struggle with Peloponnesians and neighbours our strength is of the -same character, and it is possible to move swiftly on the different -points. But a struggle with a people who live in a distant land, who -have also an extraordinary familiarity with the sea, and who are in -the highest state of preparation in every other department; with -wealth private and public, with ships, and horses, and heavy infantry, -and a population such as no one other Hellenic place can equal, and -lastly a number of tributary allies--what can justify us in rashly -beginning such a struggle? wherein is our trust that we should rush on -it unprepared? Is it in our ships? There we are inferior; while if -we are to practise and become a match for them, time must intervene. -Is it in our money? There we have a far greater deficiency. We neither -have it in our treasury, nor are we ready to contribute it from our -private funds. Confidence might possibly be felt in our superiority in -heavy infantry and population, which will enable us to invade and -devastate their lands. But the Athenians have plenty of other land -in their empire, and can import what they want by sea. Again, if we -are to attempt an insurrection of their allies, these will have to -be supported with a fleet, most of them being islanders. What then -is to be our war? For unless we can either beat them at sea, or -deprive them of the revenues which feed their navy, we shall meet with -little but disaster. Meanwhile our honour will be pledged to keeping -on, particularly if it be the opinion that we began the quarrel. For -let us never be elated by the fatal hope of the war being quickly -ended by the devastation of their lands. I fear rather that we may -leave it as a legacy to our children; so improbable is it that the -Athenian spirit will be the slave of their land, or Athenian -experience be cowed by war. - -"Not that I would bid you be so unfeeling as to suffer them to -injure your allies, and to refrain from unmasking their intrigues; but -I do bid you not to take up arms at once, but to send and -remonstrate with them in a tone not too suggestive of war, nor again -too suggestive of submission, and to employ the interval in perfecting -our own preparations. The means will be, first, the acquisition of -allies, Hellenic or barbarian it matters not, so long as they are an -accession to our strength naval or pecuniary--I say Hellenic or -barbarian, because the odium of such an accession to all who like us -are the objects of the designs of the Athenians is taken away by the -law of self-preservation--and secondly the development of our home -resources. If they listen to our embassy, so much the better; but if -not, after the lapse of two or three years our position will have -become materially strengthened, and we can then attack them if we -think proper. Perhaps by that time the sight of our preparations, -backed by language equally significant, will have disposed them to -submission, while their land is still untouched, and while their -counsels may be directed to the retention of advantages as yet -undestroyed. For the only light in which you can view their land is -that of a hostage in your hands, a hostage the more valuable the -better it is cultivated. This you ought to spare as long as -possible, and not make them desperate, and so increase the -difficulty of dealing with them. For if while still unprepared, -hurried away by the complaints of our allies, we are induced to lay it -waste, have a care that we do not bring deep disgrace and deep -perplexity upon Peloponnese. Complaints, whether of communities or -individuals, it is possible to adjust; but war undertaken by a -coalition for sectional interests, whose progress there is no means of -foreseeing, does not easily admit of creditable settlement. - -"And none need think it cowardice for a number of confederates to -pause before they attack a single city. The Athenians have allies as -numerous as our own, and allies that pay tribute, and war is a -matter not so much of arms as of money, which makes arms of use. And -this is more than ever true in a struggle between a continental and -a maritime power. First, then, let us provide money, and not allow -ourselves to be carried away by the talk of our allies before we -have done so: as we shall have the largest share of responsibility for -the consequences be they good or bad, we have also a right to a -tranquil inquiry respecting them. - -"And the slowness and procrastination, the parts of our character -that are most assailed by their criticism, need not make you blush. If -we undertake the war without preparation, we should by hastening its -commencement only delay its conclusion: further, a free and a famous -city has through all time been ours. The quality which they condemn is -really nothing but a wise moderation; thanks to its possession, we -alone do not become insolent in success and give way less than -others in misfortune; we are not carried away by the pleasure of -hearing ourselves cheered on to risks which our judgment condemns; -nor, if annoyed, are we any the more convinced by attempts to -exasperate us by accusation. We are both warlike and wise, and it is -our sense of order that makes us so. We are warlike, because -self-control contains honour as a chief constituent, and honour -bravery. And we are wise, because we are educated with too little -learning to despise the laws, and with too severe a self-control to -disobey them, and are brought up not to be too knowing in useless -matters--such as the knowledge which can give a specious criticism of -an enemy's plans in theory, but fails to assail them with equal -success in practice--but are taught to consider that the schemes of -our enemies are not dissimilar to our own, and that the freaks of -chance are not determinable by calculation. In practice we always base -our preparations against an enemy on the assumption that his plans are -good; indeed, it is right to rest our hopes not on a belief in his -blunders, but on the soundness of our provisions. Nor ought we to -believe that there is much difference between man and man, but to -think that the superiority lies with him who is reared in the severest -school. These practices, then, which our ancestors have delivered to -us, and by whose maintenance we have always profited, must not be -given up. And we must not be hurried into deciding in a day's brief -space a question which concerns many lives and fortunes and many -cities, and in which honour is deeply involved--but we must decide -calmly. This our strength peculiarly enables us to do. As for the -Athenians, send to them on the matter of Potidaea, send on the -matter of the alleged wrongs of the allies, particularly as they are -prepared with legal satisfaction; and to proceed against one who -offers arbitration as against a wrongdoer, law forbids. Meanwhile do -not omit preparation for war. This decision will be the best for -yourselves, the most terrible to your opponents." - -Such were the words of Archidamus. Last came forward Sthenelaidas, -one of the ephors for that year, and spoke to the Lacedaemonians as -follows: - -"The long speech of the Athenians I do not pretend to understand. -They said a good deal in praise of themselves, but nowhere denied that -they are injuring our allies and Peloponnese. And yet if they -behaved well against the Mede then, but ill towards us now, they -deserve double punishment for having ceased to be good and for -having become bad. We meanwhile are the same then and now, and shall -not, if we are wise, disregard the wrongs of our allies, or put off -till to-morrow the duty of assisting those who must suffer to-day. -Others have much money and ships and horses, but we have good allies -whom we must not give up to the Athenians, nor by lawsuits and words -decide the matter, as it is anything but in word that we are harmed, -but render instant and powerful help. And let us not be told that it -is fitting for us to deliberate under injustice; long deliberation -is rather fitting for those who have injustice in contemplation. -Vote therefore, Lacedaemonians, for war, as the honour of Sparta -demands, and neither allow the further aggrandizement of Athens, nor -betray our allies to ruin, but with the gods let us advance against -the aggressors." - -With these words he, as ephor, himself put the question to the -assembly of the Lacedaemonians. He said that he could not determine -which was the loudest acclamation (their mode of decision is by -acclamation not by voting); the fact being that he wished to make them -declare their opinion openly and thus to increase their ardour for -war. Accordingly he said: "All Lacedaemonians who are of opinion -that the treaty has been broken, and that Athens is guilty, leave your -seats and go there," pointing out a certain place; "all who are of the -opposite opinion, there." They accordingly stood up and divided; and -those who held that the treaty had been broken were in a decided -majority. Summoning the allies, they told them that their opinion -was that Athens had been guilty of injustice, but that they wished -to convoke all the allies and put it to the vote; in order that they -might make war, if they decided to do so, on a common resolution. -Having thus gained their point, the delegates returned home at once; -the Athenian envoys a little later, when they had dispatched the -objects of their mission. This decision of the assembly, judging -that the treaty had been broken, was made in the fourteenth year of -the thirty years' truce, which was entered into after the affair of -Euboea. - -The Lacedaemonians voted that the treaty had been broken, and that -the war must be declared, not so much because they were persuaded by -the arguments of the allies, as because they feared the growth of -the power of the Athenians, seeing most of Hellas already subject to -them. - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -_From the end of the Persian to the beginning of the -Peloponnesian War - The Progress from Supremacy to Empire_ - -The way in which Athens came to be placed in the circumstances -under which her power grew was this. After the Medes had returned -from Europe, defeated by sea and land by the Hellenes, and after -those of them who had fled with their ships to Mycale had been -destroyed, Leotychides, king of the Lacedaemonians, the commander of -the Hellenes at Mycale, departed home with the allies from -Peloponnese. But the Athenians and the allies from Ionia and -Hellespont, who had now revolted from the King, remained and laid -siege to Sestos, which was still held by the Medes. After wintering -before it, they became masters of the place on its evacuation by the -barbarians; and after this they sailed away from Hellespont to their -respective cities. Meanwhile the Athenian people, after the departure -of the barbarian from their country, at once proceeded to carry over -their children and wives, and such property as they had left, from -the places where they had deposited them, and prepared to rebuild -their city and their walls. For only isolated portions of the -circumference had been left standing, and most of the houses were in -ruins; though a few remained, in which the Persian grandees had taken -up their quarters. - -Perceiving what they were going to do, the Lacedaemonians sent an -embassy to Athens. They would have themselves preferred to see neither -her nor any other city in possession of a wall; though here they acted -principally at the instigation of their allies, who were alarmed at -the strength of her newly acquired navy and the valour which she had -displayed in the war with the Medes. They begged her not only to -abstain from building walls for herself, but also to join them in -throwing down the walls that still held together of the -ultra-Peloponnesian cities. The real meaning of their advice, the -suspicion that it contained against the Athenians, was not proclaimed; -it was urged that so the barbarian, in the event of a third -invasion, would not have any strong place, such as he now had in -Thebes, for his base of operations; and that Peloponnese would suffice -for all as a base both for retreat and offence. After the -Lacedaemonians had thus spoken, they were, on the advice of -Themistocles, immediately dismissed by the Athenians, with the -answer that ambassadors should be sent to Sparta to discuss the -question. Themistocles told the Athenians to send him off with all -speed to Lacedaemon, but not to dispatch his colleagues as soon as -they had selected them, but to wait until they had raised their wall -to the height from which defence was possible. Meanwhile the whole -population in the city was to labour at the wall, the Athenians, their -wives, and their children, sparing no edifice, private or public, -which might be of any use to the work, but throwing all down. After -giving these instructions, and adding that he would be responsible for -all other matters there, he departed. Arrived at Lacedaemon he did not -seek an audience with the authorities, but tried to gain time and made -excuses. When any of the government asked him why he did not appear in -the assembly, he would say that he was waiting for his colleagues, who -had been detained in Athens by some engagement; however, that he -expected their speedy arrival, and wondered that they were not yet -there. At first the Lacedaemonians trusted the words of -Themistocles, through their friendship for him; but when others -arrived, all distinctly declaring that the work was going on and -already attaining some elevation, they did not know how to -disbelieve it. Aware of this, he told them that rumours are deceptive, -and should not be trusted; they should send some reputable persons -from Sparta to inspect, whose report might be trusted. They dispatched -them accordingly. Concerning these Themistocles secretly sent word -to the Athenians to detain them as far as possible without putting -them under open constraint, and not to let them go until they had -themselves returned. For his colleagues had now joined him, -Abronichus, son of Lysicles, and Aristides, son of Lysimachus, with -the news that the wall was sufficiently advanced; and he feared that -when the Lacedaemonians heard the facts, they might refuse to let them -go. So the Athenians detained the envoys according to his message, and -Themistocles had an audience with the Lacedaemonians, and at last -openly told them that Athens was now fortified sufficiently to protect -its inhabitants; that any embassy which the Lacedaemonians or their -allies might wish to send to them should in future proceed on the -assumption that the people to whom they were going was able to -distinguish both its own and the general interests. That when the -Athenians thought fit to abandon their city and to embark in their -ships, they ventured on that perilous step without consulting them; -and that on the other hand, wherever they had deliberated with the -Lacedaemonians, they had proved themselves to be in judgment second to -none. That they now thought it fit that their city should have a wall, -and that this would be more for the advantage of both the citizens -of Athens and the Hellenic confederacy; for without equal military -strength it was impossible to contribute equal or fair counsel to -the common interest. It followed, he observed, either that all the -members of the confederacy should be without walls, or that the -present step should be considered a right one. - -The Lacedaemonians did not betray any open signs of anger against -the Athenians at what they heard. The embassy, it seems, was -prompted not by a desire to obstruct, but to guide the counsels of -their government: besides, Spartan feeling was at that time very -friendly towards Athens on account of the patriotism which she had -displayed in the struggle with the Mede. Still the defeat of their -wishes could not but cause them secret annoyance. The envoys of each -state departed home without complaint. - -In this way the Athenians walled their city in a little while. To -this day the building shows signs of the haste of its execution; the -foundations are laid of stones of all kinds, and in some places not -wrought or fitted, but placed just in the order in which they were -brought by the different hands; and many columns, too, from tombs, and -sculptured stones were put in with the rest. For the bounds of the -city were extended at every point of the circumference; and so they -laid hands on everything without exception in their haste. -Themistocles also persuaded them to finish the walls of Piraeus, which -had been begun before, in his year of office as archon; being -influenced alike by the fineness of a locality that has three -natural harbours, and by the great start which the Athenians would -gain in the acquisition of power by becoming a naval people. For he -first ventured to tell them to stick to the sea and forthwith began to -lay the foundations of the empire. It was by his advice, too, that -they built the walls of that thickness which can still be discerned -round Piraeus, the stones being brought up by two wagons meeting -each other. Between the walls thus formed there was neither rubble nor -mortar, but great stones hewn square and fitted together, cramped to -each other on the outside with iron and lead. About half the height -that he intended was finished. His idea was by their size and -thickness to keep off the attacks of an enemy; he thought that they -might be adequately defended by a small garrison of invalids, and -the rest be freed for service in the fleet. For the fleet claimed most -of his attention. He saw, as I think, that the approach by sea was -easier for the king's army than that by land: he also thought -Piraeus more valuable than the upper city; indeed, he was always -advising the Athenians, if a day should come when they were hard -pressed by land, to go down into Piraeus, and defy the world with -their fleet. Thus, therefore, the Athenians completed their wall, -and commenced their other buildings immediately after the retreat of -the Mede. - -Meanwhile Pausanias, son of Cleombrotus, was sent out from -Lacedaemon as commander-in-chief of the Hellenes, with twenty ships -from Peloponnese. With him sailed the Athenians with thirty ships, and -a number of the other allies. They made an expedition against Cyprus -and subdued most of the island, and afterwards against Byzantium, -which was in the hands of the Medes, and compelled it to surrender. -This event took place while the Spartans were still supreme. But the -violence of Pausanias had already begun to be disagreeable to the -Hellenes, particularly to the Ionians and the newly liberated -populations. These resorted to the Athenians and requested them as -their kinsmen to become their leaders, and to stop any attempt at -violence on the part of Pausanias. The Athenians accepted their -overtures, and determined to put down any attempt of the kind and to -settle everything else as their interests might seem to demand. In the -meantime the Lacedaemonians recalled Pausanias for an investigation of -the reports which had reached them. Manifold and grave accusations had -been brought against him by Hellenes arriving in Sparta; and, to all -appearance, there had been in him more of the mimicry of a despot than -of the attitude of a general. As it happened, his recall came just -at the time when the hatred which he had inspired had induced the -allies to desert him, the soldiers from Peloponnese excepted, and to -range themselves by the side of the Athenians. On his arrival at -Lacedaemon, he was censured for his private acts of oppression, but -was acquitted on the heaviest counts and pronounced not guilty; it -must be known that the charge of Medism formed one of the principal, -and to all appearance one of the best founded, articles against him. -The Lacedaemonians did not, however, restore him to his command, but -sent out Dorkis and certain others with a small force; who found the -allies no longer inclined to concede to them the supremacy. Perceiving -this they departed, and the Lacedaemonians did not send out any to -succeed them. They feared for those who went out a deterioration -similar to that observable in Pausanias; besides, they desired to be -rid of the Median War, and were satisfied of the competency of the -Athenians for the position, and of their friendship at the time -towards themselves. - -The Athenians, having thus succeeded to the supremacy by the -voluntary act of the allies through their hatred of Pausanias, fixed -which cities were to contribute money against the barbarian, which -ships; their professed object being to retaliate for their -sufferings by ravaging the King's country. Now was the time that the -office of "Treasurers for Hellas" was first instituted by the -Athenians. These officers received the tribute, as the money -contributed was called. The tribute was first fixed at four hundred -and sixty talents. The common treasury was at Delos, and the -congresses were held in the temple. Their supremacy commenced with -independent allies who acted on the resolutions of a common -congress. It was marked by the following undertakings in war and in -administration during the interval between the Median and the -present war, against the barbarian, against their own rebel allies, -and against the Peloponnesian powers which would come in contact -with them on various occasions. My excuse for relating these events, -and for venturing on this digression, is that this passage of -history has been omitted by all my predecessors, who have confined -themselves either to Hellenic history before the Median War, or the -Median War itself. Hellanicus, it is true, did touch on these events -in his Athenian history; but he is somewhat concise and not accurate -in his dates. Besides, the history of these events contains an -explanation of the growth of the Athenian empire. - -First the Athenians besieged and captured Eion on the Strymon from -the Medes, and made slaves of the inhabitants, being under the command -of Cimon, son of Miltiades. Next they enslaved Scyros, the island in -the Aegean, containing a Dolopian population, and colonized it -themselves. This was followed by a war against Carystus, in which -the rest of Euboea remained neutral, and which was ended by -surrender on conditions. After this Naxos left the confederacy, and -a war ensued, and she had to return after a siege; this was the -first instance of the engagement being broken by the subjugation of an -allied city, a precedent which was followed by that of the rest in the -order which circumstances prescribed. Of all the causes of -defection, that connected with arrears of tribute and vessels, and -with failure of service, was the chief; for the Athenians were very -severe and exacting, and made themselves offensive by applying the -screw of necessity to men who were not used to and in fact not -disposed for any continuous labour. In some other respects the -Athenians were not the old popular rulers they had been at first; -and if they had more than their fair share of service, it was -correspondingly easy for them to reduce any that tried to leave the -confederacy. For this the allies had themselves to blame; the wish -to get off service making most of them arrange to pay their share of -the expense in money instead of in ships, and so to avoid having to -leave their homes. Thus while Athens was increasing her navy with -the funds which they contributed, a revolt always found them without -resources or experience for war. - -Next we come to the actions by land and by sea at the river -Eurymedon, between the Athenians with their allies, and the Medes, -when the Athenians won both battles on the same day under the -conduct of Cimon, son of Miltiades, and captured and destroyed the -whole Phoenician fleet, consisting of two hundred vessels. Some time -afterwards occurred the defection of the Thasians, caused by -disagreements about the marts on the opposite coast of Thrace, and -about the mine in their possession. Sailing with a fleet to Thasos, -the Athenians defeated them at sea and effected a landing on the -island. About the same time they sent ten thousand settlers of their -own citizens and the allies to settle the place then called Ennea -Hodoi or Nine Ways, now Amphipolis. They succeeded in gaining -possession of Ennea Hodoi from the Edonians, but on advancing into the -interior of Thrace were cut off in Drabescus, a town of the -Edonians, by the assembled Thracians, who regarded the settlement of -the place Ennea Hodoi as an act of hostility. Meanwhile the Thasians -being defeated in the field and suffering siege, appealed to -Lacedaemon, and desired her to assist them by an invasion of Attica. -Without informing Athens, she promised and intended to do so, but -was prevented by the occurrence of the earthquake, accompanied by -the secession of the Helots and the Thuriats and Aethaeans of the -Perioeci to Ithome. Most of the Helots were the descendants of the old -Messenians that were enslaved in the famous war; and so all of them -came to be called Messenians. So the Lacedaemonians being engaged in a -war with the rebels in Ithome, the Thasians in the third year of the -siege obtained terms from the Athenians by razing their walls, -delivering up their ships, and arranging to pay the moneys demanded at -once, and tribute in future; giving up their possessions on the -continent together with the mine. - -The Lacedaemonians, meanwhile, finding the war against the rebels in -Ithome likely to last, invoked the aid of their allies, and especially -of the Athenians, who came in some force under the command of Cimon. -The reason for this pressing summons lay in their reputed skill in -siege operations; a long siege had taught the Lacedaemonians their own -deficiency in this art, else they would have taken the place by -assault. The first open quarrel between the Lacedaemonians and -Athenians arose out of this expedition. The Lacedaemonians, when -assault failed to take the place, apprehensive of the enterprising and -revolutionary character of the Athenians, and further looking upon -them as of alien extraction, began to fear that, if they remained, -they might be tempted by the besieged in Ithome to attempt some -political changes. They accordingly dismissed them alone of the -allies, without declaring their suspicions, but merely saying that -they had now no need of them. But the Athenians, aware that their -dismissal did not proceed from the more honourable reason of the -two, but from suspicions which had been conceived, went away deeply -offended, and conscious of having done nothing to merit such treatment -from the Lacedaemonians; and the instant that they returned home -they broke off the alliance which had been made against the Mede, -and allied themselves with Sparta's enemy Argos; each of the -contracting parties taking the same oaths and making the same alliance -with the Thessalians. - -Meanwhile the rebels in Ithome, unable to prolong further a ten -years' resistance, surrendered to Lacedaemon; the conditions being -that they should depart from Peloponnese under safe conduct, and -should never set foot in it again: any one who might hereafter be -found there was to be the slave of his captor. It must be known that -the Lacedaemonians had an old oracle from Delphi, to the effect that -they should let go the suppliant of Zeus at Ithome. So they went forth -with their children and their wives, and being received by Athens from -the hatred that she now felt for the Lacedaemonians, were located at -Naupactus, which she had lately taken from the Ozolian Locrians. The -Athenians received another addition to their confederacy in the -Megarians; who left the Lacedaemonian alliance, annoyed by a war about -boundaries forced on them by Corinth. The Athenians occupied Megara -and Pegae, and built the Megarians their long walls from the city to -Nisaea, in which they placed an Athenian garrison. This was the -principal cause of the Corinthians conceiving such a deadly hatred -against Athens. - -Meanwhile Inaros, son of Psammetichus, a Libyan king of the -Libyans on the Egyptian border, having his headquarters at Marea, -the town above Pharos, caused a revolt of almost the whole of Egypt -from King Artaxerxes and, placing himself at its head, invited the -Athenians to his assistance. Abandoning a Cyprian expedition upon -which they happened to be engaged with two hundred ships of their -own and their allies, they arrived in Egypt and sailed from the sea -into the Nile, and making themselves masters of the river and -two-thirds of Memphis, addressed themselves to the attack of the -remaining third, which is called White Castle. Within it were Persians -and Medes who had taken refuge there, and Egyptians who had not joined -the rebellion. - -Meanwhile the Athenians, making a descent from their fleet upon -Haliae, were engaged by a force of Corinthians and Epidaurians; and -the Corinthians were victorious. Afterwards the Athenians engaged -the Peloponnesian fleet off Cecruphalia; and the Athenians were -victorious. Subsequently war broke out between Aegina and Athens, -and there was a great battle at sea off Aegina between the Athenians -and Aeginetans, each being aided by their allies; in which victory -remained with the Athenians, who took seventy of the enemy's ships, -and landed in the country and commenced a siege under the command of -Leocrates, son of Stroebus. Upon this the Peloponnesians, desirous -of aiding the Aeginetans, threw into Aegina a force of three hundred -heavy infantry, who had before been serving with the Corinthians and -Epidaurians. Meanwhile the Corinthians and their allies occupied the -heights of Geraneia, and marched down into the Megarid, in the -belief that, with a large force absent in Aegina and Egypt, Athens -would be unable to help the Megarians without raising the siege of -Aegina. But the Athenians, instead of moving the army of Aegina, -raised a force of the old and young men that had been left in the -city, and marched into the Megarid under the command of Myronides. -After a drawn battle with the Corinthians, the rival hosts parted, -each with the impression that they had gained the victory. The -Athenians, however, if anything, had rather the advantage, and on -the departure of the Corinthians set up a trophy. Urged by the -taunts of the elders in their city, the Corinthians made their -preparations, and about twelve days afterwards came and set up their -trophy as victors. Sallying out from Megara, the Athenians cut off the -party that was employed in erecting the trophy, and engaged and -defeated the rest. In the retreat of the vanquished army, a -considerable division, pressed by the pursuers and mistaking the road, -dashed into a field on some private property, with a deep trench all -round it, and no way out. Being acquainted with the place, the -Athenians hemmed their front with heavy infantry and, placing the -light troops round in a circle, stoned all who had gone in. Corinth -here suffered a severe blow. The bulk of her army continued its -retreat home. - -About this time the Athenians began to build the long walls to the -sea, that towards Phalerum and that towards Piraeus. Meanwhile the -Phocians made an expedition against Doris, the old home of the -Lacedaemonians, containing the towns of Boeum, Kitinium, and -Erineum. They had taken one of these towns, when the Lacedaemonians -under Nicomedes, son of Cleombrotus, commanding for King -Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias, who was still a minor, came to the -aid of the Dorians with fifteen hundred heavy infantry of their own, -and ten thousand of their allies. After compelling the Phocians to -restore the town on conditions, they began their retreat. The route by -sea, across the Crissaean Gulf, exposed them to the risk of being -stopped by the Athenian fleet; that across Geraneia seemed scarcely -safe, the Athenians holding Megara and Pegae. For the pass was a -difficult one, and was always guarded by the Athenians; and, in the -present instance, the Lacedaemonians had information that they meant -to dispute their passage. So they resolved to remain in Boeotia, and -to consider which would be the safest line of march. They had also -another reason for this resolve. Secret encouragement had been given -them by a party in Athens, who hoped to put an end to the reign of -democracy and the building of the Long Walls. Meanwhile the -Athenians marched against them with their whole levy and a thousand -Argives and the respective contingents of the rest of their allies. -Altogether they were fourteen thousand strong. The march was -prompted by the notion that the Lacedaemonians were at a loss how to -effect their passage, and also by suspicions of an attempt to -overthrow the democracy. Some cavalry also joined the Athenians from -their Thessalian allies; but these went over to the Lacedaemonians -during the battle. - -The battle was fought at Tanagra in Boeotia. After heavy loss on -both sides, victory declared for the Lacedaemonians and their -allies. After entering the Megarid and cutting down the fruit trees, -the Lacedaemonians returned home across Geraneia and the isthmus. -Sixty-two days after the battle the Athenians marched into Boeotia -under the command of Myronides, defeated the Boeotians in battle at -Oenophyta, and became masters of Boeotia and Phocis. They dismantled -the walls of the Tanagraeans, took a hundred of the richest men of the -Opuntian Locrians as hostages, and finished their own long walls. This -was followed by the surrender of the Aeginetans to Athens on -conditions; they pulled down their walls, gave up their ships, and -agreed to pay tribute in future. The Athenians sailed round -Peloponnese under Tolmides, son of Tolmaeus, burnt the arsenal of -Lacedaemon, took Chalcis, a town of the Corinthians, and in a -descent upon Sicyon defeated the Sicyonians in battle. - -Meanwhile the Athenians in Egypt and their allies were still -there, and encountered all the vicissitudes of war. First the -Athenians were masters of Egypt, and the King sent Megabazus a Persian -to Lacedaemon with money to bribe the Peloponnesians to invade -Attica and so draw off the Athenians from Egypt. Finding that the -matter made no progress, and that the money was only being wasted, -he recalled Megabazus with the remainder of the money, and sent -Megabuzus, son of Zopyrus, a Persian, with a large army to Egypt. -Arriving by land he defeated the Egyptians and their allies in a -battle, and drove the Hellenes out of Memphis, and at length shut them -up in the island of Prosopitis, where he besieged them for a year -and six months. At last, draining the canal of its waters, which he -diverted into another channel, he left their ships high and dry and -joined most of the island to the mainland, and then marched over on -foot and captured it. Thus the enterprise of the Hellenes came to ruin -after six years of war. Of all that large host a few travelling -through Libya reached Cyrene in safety, but most of them perished. And -thus Egypt returned to its subjection to the King, except Amyrtaeus, -the king in the marshes, whom they were unable to capture from the -extent of the marsh; the marshmen being also the most warlike of the -Egyptians. Inaros, the Libyan king, the sole author of the Egyptian -revolt, was betrayed, taken, and crucified. Meanwhile a relieving -squadron of fifty vessels had sailed from Athens and the rest of the -confederacy for Egypt. They put in to shore at the Mendesian mouth -of the Nile, in total ignorance of what had occurred. Attacked on -the land side by the troops, and from the sea by the Phoenician -navy, most of the ships were destroyed; the few remaining being -saved by retreat. Such was the end of the great expedition of the -Athenians and their allies to Egypt. - -Meanwhile Orestes, son of Echecratidas, the Thessalian king, being -an exile from Thessaly, persuaded the Athenians to restore him. Taking -with them the Boeotians and Phocians their allies, the Athenians -marched to Pharsalus in Thessaly. They became masters of the -country, though only in the immediate vicinity of the camp; beyond -which they could not go for fear of the Thessalian cavalry. But they -failed to take the city or to attain any of the other objects of their -expedition, and returned home with Orestes without having effected -anything. Not long after this a thousand of the Athenians embarked -in the vessels that were at Pegae (Pegae, it must be remembered, was -now theirs), and sailed along the coast to Sicyon under the command of -Pericles, son of Xanthippus. Landing in Sicyon and defeating the -Sicyonians who engaged them, they immediately took with them the -Achaeans and, sailing across, marched against and laid siege to -Oeniadae in Acarnania. Failing however to take it, they returned home. - -Three years afterwards a truce was made between the Peloponnesians -and Athenians for five years. Released from Hellenic war, the -Athenians made an expedition to Cyprus with two hundred vessels of -their own and their allies, under the command of Cimon. Sixty of these -were detached to Egypt at the instance of Amyrtaeus, the king in the -marshes; the rest laid siege to Kitium, from which, however, they were -compelled to retire by the death of Cimon and by scarcity of -provisions. Sailing off Salamis in Cyprus, they fought with the -Phoenicians, Cyprians, and Cilicians by land and sea, and, being -victorious on both elements departed home, and with them the -returned squadron from Egypt. After this the Lacedaemonians marched -out on a sacred war, and, becoming masters of the temple at Delphi, it -in the hands of the Delphians. Immediately after their retreat, the -Athenians marched out, became masters of the temple, and placed it -in the hands of the Phocians. - -Some time after this, Orchomenus, Chaeronea, and some other places -in Boeotia being in the hands of the Boeotian exiles, the Athenians -marched against the above-mentioned hostile places with a thousand -Athenian heavy infantry and the allied contingents, under the -command of Tolmides, son of Tolmaeus. They took Chaeronea, and made -slaves of the inhabitants, and, leaving a garrison, commenced their -return. On their road they were attacked at Coronea by the Boeotian -exiles from Orchomenus, with some Locrians and Euboean exiles, and -others who were of the same way of thinking, were defeated in -battle, and some killed, others taken captive. The Athenians evacuated -all Boeotia by a treaty providing for the recovery of the men; and the -exiled Boeotians returned, and with all the rest regained their -independence. - -This was soon afterwards followed by the revolt of Euboea from -Athens. Pericles had already crossed over with an army of Athenians to -the island, when news was brought to him that Megara had revolted, -that the Peloponnesians were on the point of invading Attica, and that -the Athenian garrison had been cut off by the Megarians, with the -exception of a few who had taken refuge in Nisaea. The Megarians had -introduced the Corinthians, Sicyonians, and Epidaurians into the -town before they revolted. Meanwhile Pericles brought his army back in -all haste from Euboea. After this the Peloponnesians marched into -Attica as far as Eleusis and Thrius, ravaging the country under the -conduct of King Pleistoanax, the son of Pausanias, and without -advancing further returned home. The Athenians then crossed over again -to Euboea under the command of Pericles, and subdued the whole of -the island: all but Histiaea was settled by convention; the Histiaeans -they expelled from their homes, and occupied their territory -themselves. - -Not long after their return from Euboea, they made a truce with -the Lacedaemonians and their allies for thirty years, giving up the -posts which they occupied in Peloponnese--Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and -Achaia. In the sixth year of the truce, war broke out between the -Samians and Milesians about Priene. Worsted in the war, the -Milesians came to Athens with loud complaints against the Samians. -In this they were joined by certain private persons from Samos itself, -who wished to revolutionize the government. Accordingly the -Athenians sailed to Samos with forty ships and set up a democracy; -took hostages from the Samians, fifty boys and as many men, lodged -them in Lemnos, and after leaving a garrison in the island returned -home. But some of the Samians had not remained in the island, but -had fled to the continent. Making an agreement with the most -powerful of those in the city, and an alliance with Pissuthnes, son of -Hystaspes, the then satrap of Sardis, they got together a force of -seven hundred mercenaries, and under cover of night crossed over to -Samos. Their first step was to rise on the commons, most of whom -they secured; their next to steal their hostages from Lemnos; after -which they revolted, gave up the Athenian garrison left with them -and its commanders to Pissuthnes, and instantly prepared for an -expedition against Miletus. The Byzantines also revolted with them. - -As soon as the Athenians heard the news, they sailed with sixty -ships against Samos. Sixteen of these went to Caria to look out for -the Phoenician fleet, and to Chios and Lesbos carrying round orders -for reinforcements, and so never engaged; but forty-four ships under -the command of Pericles with nine colleagues gave battle, off the -island of Tragia, to seventy Samian vessels, of which twenty were -transports, as they were sailing from Miletus. Victory remained with -the Athenians. Reinforced afterwards by forty ships from Athens, and -twenty-five Chian and Lesbian vessels, the Athenians landed, and -having the superiority by land invested the city with three walls; -it was also invested from the sea. Meanwhile Pericles took sixty ships -from the blockading squadron, and departed in haste for Caunus and -Caria, intelligence having been brought in of the approach of the -Phoenician fleet to the aid of the Samians; indeed Stesagoras and -others had left the island with five ships to bring them. But in the -meantime the Samians made a sudden sally, and fell on the camp, -which they found unfortified. Destroying the look-out vessels, and -engaging and defeating such as were being launched to meet them, -they remained masters of their own seas for fourteen days, and carried -in and carried out what they pleased. But on the arrival of -Pericles, they were once more shut up. Fresh reinforcements afterwards -arrived--forty ships from Athens with Thucydides, Hagnon, and -Phormio; twenty with Tlepolemus and Anticles, and thirty vessels -from Chios and Lesbos. After a brief attempt at fighting, the Samians, -unable to hold out, were reduced after a nine months' siege and -surrendered on conditions; they razed their walls, gave hostages, -delivered up their ships, and arranged to pay the expenses of the -war by instalments. The Byzantines also agreed to be subject as -before. - - - - -CHAPTER V - -_Second Congress at Lacedaemon - Preparations for War and -Diplomatic Skirmishes - Cylon - Pausanias - Themistocles_ - -After this, though not many years later, we at length come to what -has been already related, the affairs of Corcyra and Potidaea, and the -events that served as a pretext for the present war. All these actions -of the Hellenes against each other and the barbarian occurred in the -fifty years' interval between the retreat of Xerxes and the -beginning of the present war. During this interval the Athenians -succeeded in placing their empire on a firmer basis, and advanced -their own home power to a very great height. The Lacedaemonians, -though fully aware of it, opposed it only for a little while, but -remained inactive during most of the period, being of old slow to go -to war except under the pressure of necessity, and in the present -instance being hampered by wars at home; until the growth of the -Athenian power could be no longer ignored, and their own confederacy -became the object of its encroachments. They then felt that they could -endure it no longer, but that the time had come for them to throw -themselves heart and soul upon the hostile power, and break it, if -they could, by commencing the present war. And though the -Lacedaemonians had made up their own minds on the fact of the breach -of the treaty and the guilt of the Athenians, yet they sent to -Delphi and inquired of the God whether it would be well with them if -they went to war; and, as it is reported, received from him the answer -that if they put their whole strength into the war, victory would be -theirs, and the promise that he himself would be with them, whether -invoked or uninvoked. Still they wished to summon their allies -again, and to take their vote on the propriety of making war. After -the ambassadors from the confederates had arrived and a congress had -been convened, they all spoke their minds, most of them denouncing the -Athenians and demanding that the war should begin. In particular the -Corinthians. They had before on their own account canvassed the cities -in detail to induce them to vote for the war, in the fear that it -might come too late to save Potidaea; they were present also on this -occasion, and came forward the last, and made the following speech: - -"Fellow allies, we can no longer accuse the Lacedaemonians of having -failed in their duty: they have not only voted for war themselves, but -have assembled us here for that purpose. We say their duty, for -supremacy has its duties. Besides equitably administering private -interests, leaders are required to show a special care for the -common welfare in return for the special honours accorded to them by -all in other ways. For ourselves, all who have already had dealings -with the Athenians require no warning to be on their guard against -them. The states more inland and out of the highway of communication -should understand that, if they omit to support the coast powers, -the result will be to injure the transit of their produce for -exportation and the reception in exchange of their imports from the -sea; and they must not be careless judges of what is now said, as if -it had nothing to do with them, but must expect that the sacrifice -of the powers on the coast will one day be followed by the extension -of the danger to the interior, and must recognize that their own -interests are deeply involved in this discussion. For these reasons -they should not hesitate to exchange peace for war. If wise men remain -quiet, while they are not injured, brave men abandon peace for war -when they are injured, returning to an understanding on a favourable -opportunity: in fact, they are neither intoxicated by their success in -war, nor disposed to take an injury for the sake of the delightful -tranquillity of peace. Indeed, to falter for the sake of such delights -is, if you remain inactive, the quickest way of losing the sweets of -repose to which you cling; while to conceive extravagant pretensions -from success in war is to forget how hollow is the confidence by which -you are elated. For if many ill-conceived plans have succeeded through -the still greater fatuity of an opponent, many more, apparently well -laid, have on the contrary ended in disgrace. The confidence with -which we form our schemes is never completely justified in their -execution; speculation is carried on in safety, but, when it comes -to action, fear causes failure. - -"To apply these rules to ourselves, if we are now kindling war it is -under the pressure of injury, with adequate grounds of complaint; -and after we have chastised the Athenians we will in season desist. We -have many reasons to expect success--first, superiority in numbers -and in military experience, and secondly our general and unvarying -obedience in the execution of orders. The naval strength which they -possess shall be raised by us from our respective antecedent -resources, and from the moneys at Olympia and Delphi. A loan from -these enables us to seduce their foreign sailors by the offer of -higher pay. For the power of Athens is more mercenary than national; -while ours will not be exposed to the same risk, as its strength -lies more in men than in money. A single defeat at sea is in all -likelihood their ruin: should they hold out, in that case there will -be the more time for us to exercise ourselves in naval matters; and as -soon as we have arrived at an equality in science, we need scarcely -ask whether we shall be their superiors in courage. For the advantages -that we have by nature they cannot acquire by education; while their -superiority in science must be removed by our practice. The money -required for these objects shall be provided by our contributions: -nothing indeed could be more monstrous than the suggestion that, while -their allies never tire of contributing for their own servitude, we -should refuse to spend for vengeance and self-preservation the -treasure which by such refusal we shall forfeit to Athenian rapacity -and see employed for our own ruin. - -"We have also other ways of carrying on the war, such as revolt of -their allies, the surest method of depriving them of their revenues, -which are the source of their strength, and establishment of fortified -positions in their country, and various operations which cannot be -foreseen at present. For war of all things proceeds least upon -definite rules, but draws principally upon itself for contrivances -to meet an emergency; and in such cases the party who faces the -struggle and keeps his temper best meets with most security, and he -who loses his temper about it with correspondent disaster. Let us also -reflect that if it was merely a number of disputes of territory -between rival neighbours, it might be borne; but here we have an enemy -in Athens that is a match for our whole coalition, and more than a -match for any of its members; so that unless as a body and as -individual nationalities and individual cities we make an unanimous -stand against her, she will easily conquer us divided and in detail. -That conquest, terrible as it may sound, would, it must be known, have -no other end than slavery pure and simple; a word which Peloponnese -cannot even hear whispered without disgrace, or without disgrace see -so many states abused by one. Meanwhile the opinion would be either -that we were justly so used, or that we put up with it from cowardice, -and were proving degenerate sons in not even securing for ourselves -the freedom which our fathers gave to Hellas; and in allowing the -establishment in Hellas of a tyrant state, though in individual states -we think it our duty to put down sole rulers. And we do not know how -this conduct can be held free from three of the gravest failings, want -of sense, of courage, or of vigilance. For we do not suppose that -you have taken refuge in that contempt of an enemy which has proved so -fatal in so many instances--a feeling which from the numbers that it -has ruined has come to be called not contemptuous but contemptible. - -"There is, however, no advantage in reflections on the past -further than may be of service to the present. For the future we -must provide by maintaining what the present gives us and redoubling -our efforts; it is hereditary to us to win virtue as the fruit of -labour, and you must not change the habit, even though you should have -a slight advantage in wealth and resources; for it is not right that -what was won in want should be lost in plenty; no, we must boldly -advance to the war for many reasons; the god has commanded it and -promised to be with us, and the rest of Hellas will all join in the -struggle, part from fear, part from interest. You will be the first to -break a treaty which the god, in advising us to go to war, judges to -be violated already, but rather to support a treaty that has been -outraged: indeed, treaties are broken not by resistance but by -aggression. - -"Your position, therefore, from whatever quarter you may view it, -will amply justify you in going to war; and this step we recommend -in the interests of all, bearing in mind that identity of interest -is the surest of bonds, whether between states or individuals. Delay -not, therefore, to assist Potidaea, a Dorian city besieged by Ionians, -which is quite a reversal of the order of things; nor to assert the -freedom of the rest. It is impossible for us to wait any longer when -waiting can only mean immediate disaster for some of us, and, if it -comes to be known that we have conferred but do not venture to protect -ourselves, like disaster in the near future for the rest. Delay not, -fellow allies, but, convinced of the necessity of the crisis and the -wisdom of this counsel, vote for the war, undeterred by its -immediate terrors, but looking beyond to the lasting peace by which it -will be succeeded. Out of war peace gains fresh stability, but to -refuse to abandon repose for war is not so sure a method of avoiding -danger. We must believe that the tyrant city that has been established -in Hellas has been established against all alike, with a programme -of universal empire, part fulfilled, part in contemplation; let us -then attack and reduce it, and win future security for ourselves and -freedom for the Hellenes who are now enslaved." - -Such were the words of the Corinthians. The Lacedaemonians, having -now heard all, give their opinion, took the vote of all the allied -states present in order, great and small alike; and the majority voted -for war. This decided, it was still impossible for them to commence at -once, from their want of preparation; but it was resolved that the -means requisite were to be procured by the different states, and -that there was to be no delay. And indeed, in spite of the time -occupied with the necessary arrangements, less than a year elapsed -before Attica was invaded, and the war openly begun. - -This interval was spent in sending embassies to Athens charged -with complaints, in order to obtain as good a pretext for war as -possible, in the event of her paying no attention to them. The first -Lacedaemonian embassy was to order the Athenians to drive out the -curse of the goddess; the history of which is as follows. In former -generations there was an Athenian of the name of Cylon, a victor at -the Olympic games, of good birth and powerful position, who had -married a daughter of Theagenes, a Megarian, at that time tyrant of -Megara. Now this Cylon was inquiring at Delphi; when he was told by -the god to seize the Acropolis of Athens on the grand festival of -Zeus. Accordingly, procuring a force from Theagenes and persuading his -friends to join him, when the Olympic festival in Peloponnese came, he -seized the Acropolis, with the intention of making himself tyrant, -thinking that this was the grand festival of Zeus, and also an -occasion appropriate for a victor at the Olympic games. Whether the -grand festival that was meant was in Attica or elsewhere was a -question which he never thought of, and which the oracle did not offer -to solve. For the Athenians also have a festival which is called the -grand festival of Zeus Meilichios or Gracious, viz., the Diasia. It is -celebrated outside the city, and the whole people sacrifice not real -victims but a number of bloodless offerings peculiar to the country. -However, fancying he had chosen the right time, he made the attempt. -As soon as the Athenians perceived it, they flocked in, one and all, -from the country, and sat down, and laid siege to the citadel. But -as time went on, weary of the labour of blockade, most of them -departed; the responsibility of keeping guard being left to the nine -archons, with plenary powers to arrange everything according to -their good judgment. It must be known that at that time most political -functions were discharged by the nine archons. Meanwhile Cylon and his -besieged companions were distressed for want of food and water. -Accordingly Cylon and his brother made their escape; but the rest -being hard pressed, and some even dying of famine, seated themselves -as suppliants at the altar in the Acropolis. The Athenians who were -charged with the duty of keeping guard, when they saw them at the -point of death in the temple, raised them up on the understanding that -no harm should be done to them, led them out, and slew them. Some -who as they passed by took refuge at the altars of the awful goddesses -were dispatched on the spot. From this deed the men who killed them -were called accursed and guilty against the goddess, they and their -descendants. Accordingly these cursed ones were driven out by the -Athenians, driven out again by Cleomenes of Lacedaemon and an Athenian -faction; the living were driven out, and the bones of the dead were -taken up; thus they were cast out. For all that, they came back -afterwards, and their descendants are still in the city. - -This, then was the curse that the Lacedaemonians ordered them to -drive out. They were actuated primarily, as they pretended, by a -care for the honour of the gods; but they also know that Pericles, son -of Xanthippus, was connected with the curse on his mother's side, -and they thought that his banishment would materially advance their -designs on Athens. Not that they really hoped to succeed in -procuring this; they rather thought to create a prejudice against -him in the eyes of his countrymen from the feeling that the war -would be partly caused by his misfortune. For being the most -powerful man of his time, and the leading Athenian statesman, he -opposed the Lacedaemonians in everything, and would have no -concessions, but ever urged the Athenians on to war. - -The Athenians retorted by ordering the Lacedaemonians to drive out -the curse of Taenarus. The Lacedaemonians had once raised up some -Helot suppliants from the temple of Poseidon at Taenarus, led them -away and slain them; for which they believe the great earthquake at -Sparta to have been a retribution. The Athenians also ordered them -to drive out the curse of the goddess of the Brazen House; the history -of which is as follows. After Pausanias the Lacedaemonian had been -recalled by the Spartans from his command in the Hellespont (this is -his first recall), and had been tried by them and acquitted, not being -again sent out in a public capacity, he took a galley of Hermione on -his own responsibility, without the authority of the Lacedaemonians, -and arrived as a private person in the Hellespont. He came -ostensibly for the Hellenic war, really to carry on his intrigues with -the King, which he had begun before his recall, being ambitious of -reigning over Hellas. The circumstance which first enabled him to -lay the King under an obligation, and to make a beginning of the whole -design, was this. Some connections and kinsmen of the King had been -taken in Byzantium, on its capture from the Medes, when he was first -there, after the return from Cyprus. These captives he sent off to the -King without the knowledge of the rest of the allies, the account -being that they had escaped from him. He managed this with the help of -Gongylus, an Eretrian, whom he had placed in charge of Byzantium and -the prisoners. He also gave Gongylus a letter for the King, the -contents of which were as follows, as was afterwards discovered: -"Pausanias, the general of Sparta, anxious to do you a favour, sends -you these his prisoners of war. I propose also, with your approval, to -marry your daughter, and to make Sparta and the rest of Hellas subject -to you. I may say that I think I am able to do this, with your -co-operation. Accordingly if any of this please you, send a safe man -to the sea through whom we may in future conduct our correspondence." - -This was all that was revealed in the writing, and Xerxes was -pleased with the letter. He sent off Artabazus, son of Pharnaces, to -the sea with orders to supersede Megabates, the previous governor in -the satrapy of Daskylion, and to send over as quickly as possible to -Pausanias at Byzantium a letter which he entrusted to him; to show him -the royal signet, and to execute any commission which he might receive -from Pausanias on the King's matters with all care and fidelity. -Artabazus on his arrival carried the King's orders into effect, and -sent over the letter, which contained the following answer: "Thus -saith King Xerxes to Pausanias. For the men whom you have saved for me -across sea from Byzantium, an obligation is laid up for you in our -house, recorded for ever; and with your proposals I am well pleased. -Let neither night nor day stop you from diligently performing any of -your promises to me; neither for cost of gold nor of silver let them -be hindered, nor yet for number of troops, wherever it may be that -their presence is needed; but with Artabazus, an honourable man whom I -send you, boldly advance my objects and yours, as may be most for -the honour and interest of us both." - -Before held in high honour by the Hellenes as the hero of Plataea, -Pausanias, after the receipt of this letter, became prouder than ever, -and could no longer live in the usual style, but went out of Byzantium -in a Median dress, was attended on his march through Thrace by a -bodyguard of Medes and Egyptians, kept a Persian table, and was -quite unable to contain his intentions, but betrayed by his conduct in -trifles what his ambition looked one day to enact on a grander -scale. He also made himself difficult of access, and displayed so -violent a temper to every one without exception that no one could come -near him. Indeed, this was the principal reason why the confederacy -went over to the Athenians. - -The above-mentioned conduct, coming to the ears of the -Lacedaemonians, occasioned his first recall. And after his second -voyage out in the ship of Hermione, without their orders, he gave -proofs of similar behaviour. Besieged and expelled from Byzantium by -the Athenians, he did not return to Sparta; but news came that he -had settled at Colonae in the Troad, and was intriguing with the -barbarians, and that his stay there was for no good purpose; and the -ephors, now no longer hesitating, sent him a herald and a scytale with -orders to accompany the herald or be declared a public enemy. -Anxious above everything to avoid suspicion, and confident that he -could quash the charge by means of money, he returned a second time to -Sparta. At first thrown into prison by the ephors (whose powers enable -them to do this to the King), soon compromised the matter and came out -again, and offered himself for trial to any who wished to institute an -inquiry concerning him. - -Now the Spartans had no tangible proof against him--neither his -enemies nor the nation--of that indubitable kind required for the -punishment of a member of the royal family, and at that moment in high -office; he being regent for his first cousin King Pleistarchus, -Leonidas's son, who was still a minor. But by his contempt of the laws -and imitation of the barbarians, he gave grounds for much suspicion of -his being discontented with things established; all the occasions on -which he had in any way departed from the regular customs were -passed in review, and it was remembered that he had taken upon himself -to have inscribed on the tripod at Delphi, which was dedicated by -the Hellenes as the first-fruits of the spoil of the Medes, the -following couplet: - - The Mede defeated, great Pausanias raised - This monument, that Phoebus might be praised. - -At the time the Lacedaemonians had at once erased the couplet, and -inscribed the names of the cities that had aided in the overthrow of -the barbarian and dedicated the offering. Yet it was considered that -Pausanias had here been guilty of a grave offence, which, -interpreted by the light of the attitude which he had since assumed, -gained a new significance, and seemed to be quite in keeping with -his present schemes. Besides, they were informed that he was even -intriguing with the Helots; and such indeed was the fact, for he -promised them freedom and citizenship if they would join him in -insurrection and would help him to carry out his plans to the end. -Even now, mistrusting the evidence even of the Helots themselves, -the ephors would not consent to take any decided step against him; -in accordance with their regular custom towards themselves, namely, to -be slow in taking any irrevocable resolve in the matter of a Spartan -citizen without indisputable proof. At last, it is said, the person -who was going to carry to Artabazus the last letter for the King, a -man of Argilus, once the favourite and most trusty servant of -Pausanias, turned informer. Alarmed by the reflection that none of the -previous messengers had ever returned, having counterfeited the -seal, in order that, if he found himself mistaken in his surmises, -or if Pausanias should ask to make some correction, he might not be -discovered, he undid the letter, and found the postscript that he -had suspected, viz. an order to put him to death. - -On being shown the letter, the ephors now felt more certain. -Still, they wished to hear Pausanias commit himself with their own -ears. Accordingly the man went by appointment to Taenarus as a -suppliant, and there built himself a hut divided into two by a -partition; within which he concealed some of the ephors and let them -hear the whole matter plainly. For Pausanias came to him and asked him -the reason of his suppliant position; and the man reproached him -with the order that he had written concerning him, and one by one -declared all the rest of the circumstances, how he who had never yet -brought him into any danger, while employed as agent between him and -the King, was yet just like the mass of his servants to be rewarded -with death. Admitting all this, and telling him not to be angry -about the matter, Pausanias gave him the pledge of raising him up from -the temple, and begged him to set off as quickly as possible, and -not to hinder the business in hand. - -The ephors listened carefully, and then departed, taking no action -for the moment, but, having at last attained to certainty, were -preparing to arrest him in the city. It is reported that, as he was -about to be arrested in the street, he saw from the face of one of the -ephors what he was coming for; another, too, made him a secret signal, -and betrayed it to him from kindness. Setting off with a run for the -temple of the goddess of the Brazen House, the enclosure of which -was near at hand, he succeeded in taking sanctuary before they took -him, and entering into a small chamber, which formed part of the -temple, to avoid being exposed to the weather, lay still there. The -ephors, for the moment distanced in the pursuit, afterwards took off -the roof of the chamber, and having made sure that he was inside, shut -him in, barricaded the doors, and staying before the place, reduced -him by starvation. When they found that he was on the point of -expiring, just as he was, in the chamber, they brought him out of -the temple, while the breath was still in him, and as soon as he was -brought out he died. They were going to throw him into the Kaiadas, -where they cast criminals, but finally decided to inter him -somewhere near. But the god at Delphi afterwards ordered the -Lacedaemonians to remove the tomb to the place of his death--where he -now lies in the consecrated ground, as an inscription on a monument -declares--and, as what had been done was a curse to them, to give -back two bodies instead of one to the goddess of the Brazen House. -So they had two brazen statues made, and dedicated them as a -substitute for Pausanias. the Athenians retorted by telling the -Lacedaemonians to drive out what the god himself had pronounced to -be a curse. - -To return to the Medism of Pausanias. Matter was found in the course -of the inquiry to implicate Themistocles; and the Lacedaemonians -accordingly sent envoys to the Athenians and required them to punish -him as they had punished Pausanias. The Athenians consented to do -so. But he had, as it happened, been ostracized, and, with a residence -at Argos, was in the habit of visiting other parts of Peloponnese. -So they sent with the Lacedaemonians, who were ready to join in the -pursuit, persons with instructions to take him wherever they found -him. But Themistocles got scent of their intentions, and fled from -Peloponnese to Corcyra, which was under obligations towards him. But -the Corcyraeans alleged that they could not venture to shelter him -at the cost of offending Athens and Lacedaemon, and they conveyed -him over to the continent opposite. Pursued by the officers who hung -on the report of his movements, at a loss where to turn, he was -compelled to stop at the house of Admetus, the Molossian king, -though they were not on friendly terms. Admetus happened not to be -indoors, but his wife, to whom he made himself a suppliant, instructed -him to take their child in his arms and sit down by the hearth. Soon -afterwards Admetus came in, and Themistocles told him who he was, -and begged him not to revenge on Themistocles in exile any -opposition which his requests might have experienced from Themistocles -at Athens. Indeed, he was now far too low for his revenge; retaliation -was only honourable between equals. Besides, his opposition to the -king had only affected the success of a request, not the safety of his -person; if the king were to give him up to the pursuers that he -mentioned, and the fate which they intended for him, he would just -be consigning him to certain death. - -The King listened to him and raised him up with his son, as he was -sitting with him in his arms after the most effectual method of -supplication, and on the arrival of the Lacedaemonians not long -afterwards, refused to give him up for anything they could say, but -sent him off by land to the other sea to Pydna in Alexander's -dominions, as he wished to go to the Persian king. There he met with a -merchantman on the point of starting for Ionia. Going on board, he was -carried by a storm to the Athenian squadron which was blockading -Naxos. In his alarm--he was luckily unknown to the people in the -vessel--he told the master who he was and what he was flying for, and -said that, if he refused to save him, he would declare that he was -taking him for a bribe. Meanwhile their safety consisted in letting no -one leave the ship until a favourable time for sailing should arise. -If he complied with his wishes, he promised him a proper recompense. -The master acted as he desired, and, after lying to for a day and a -night out of reach of the squadron, at length arrived at Ephesus. - -After having rewarded him with a present of money, as soon as he -received some from his friends at Athens and from his secret hoards at -Argos, Themistocles started inland with one of the coast Persians, and -sent a letter to King Artaxerxes, Xerxes's son, who had just come to -the throne. Its contents were as follows: "I, Themistocles, am come to -you, who did your house more harm than any of the Hellenes, when I was -compelled to defend myself against your father's invasion--harm, -however, far surpassed by the good that I did him during his -retreat, which brought no danger for me but much for him. For the -past, you are a good turn in my debt"--here he mentioned the warning -sent to Xerxes from Salamis to retreat, as well as his finding the -bridges unbroken, which, as he falsely pretended, was due to him-- -"for the present, able to do you great service, I am here, pursued -by the Hellenes for my friendship for you. However, I desire a -year's grace, when I shall be able to declare in person the objects of -my coming." - -It is said that the King approved his intention, and told him to -do as he said. He employed the interval in making what progress he -could in the study of the Persian tongue, and of the customs of the -country. Arrived at court at the end of the year, he attained to -very high consideration there, such as no Hellene has ever possessed -before or since; partly from his splendid antecedents, partly from the -hopes which he held out of effecting for him the subjugation of -Hellas, but principally by the proof which experience daily gave of -his capacity. For Themistocles was a man who exhibited the most -indubitable signs of genius; indeed, in this particular he has a claim -on our admiration quite extraordinary and unparalleled. By his own -native capacity, alike unformed and unsupplemented by study, he was at -once the best judge in those sudden crises which admit of little or of -no deliberation, and the best prophet of the future, even to its -most distant possibilities. An able theoretical expositor of all -that came within the sphere of his practice, he was not without the -power of passing an adequate judgment in matters in which he had no -experience. He could also excellently divine the good and evil which -lay hid in the unseen future. In fine, whether we consider the -extent of his natural powers, or the slightness of his application, -this extraordinary man must be allowed to have surpassed all others in -the faculty of intuitively meeting an emergency. Disease was the -real cause of his death; though there is a story of his having ended -his life by poison, on finding himself unable to fulfil his promises -to the king. However this may be, there is a monument to him in the -marketplace of Asiatic Magnesia. He was governor of the district, -the King having given him Magnesia, which brought in fifty talents a -year, for bread, Lampsacus, which was considered to be the richest -wine country, for wine, and Myos for other provisions. His bones, it -is said, were conveyed home by his relatives in accordance with his -wishes, and interred in Attic ground. This was done without the -knowledge of the Athenians; as it is against the law to bury in Attica -an outlaw for treason. So ends the history of Pausanias and -Themistocles, the Lacedaemonian and the Athenian, the most famous -men of their time in Hellas. - -To return to the Lacedaemonians. The history of their first embassy, -the injunctions which it conveyed, and the rejoinder which it -provoked, concerning the expulsion of the accursed persons, have -been related already. It was followed by a second, which ordered -Athens to raise the siege of Potidaea, and to respect the independence -of Aegina. Above all, it gave her most distinctly to understand that -war might be prevented by the revocation of the Megara decree, -excluding the Megarians from the use of Athenian harbours and of the -market of Athens. But Athens was not inclined either to revoke the -decree, or to entertain their other proposals; she accused the -Megarians of pushing their cultivation into the consecrated ground and -the unenclosed land on the border, and of harbouring her runaway -slaves. At last an embassy arrived with the Lacedaemonian ultimatum. -The ambassadors were Ramphias, Melesippus, and Agesander. Not a word -was said on any of the old subjects; there was simply this: -"Lacedaemon wishes the peace to continue, and there is no reason why -it should not, if you would leave the Hellenes independent." Upon this -the Athenians held an assembly, and laid the matter before their -consideration. It was resolved to deliberate once for all on all their -demands, and to give them an answer. There were many speakers who came -forward and gave their support to one side or the other, urging the -necessity of war, or the revocation of the decree and the folly of -allowing it to stand in the way of peace. Among them came forward -Pericles, son of Xanthippus, the first man of his time at Athens, -ablest alike in counsel and in action, and gave the following advice: - -"There is one principle, Athenians, which I hold to through -everything, and that is the principle of no concession to the -Peloponnesians. I know that the spirit which inspires men while they -are being persuaded to make war is not always retained in action; that -as circumstances change, resolutions change. Yet I see that now as -before the same, almost literally the same, counsel is demanded of me; -and I put it to those of you who are allowing yourselves to be -persuaded, to support the national resolves even in the case of -reverses, or to forfeit all credit for their wisdom in the event of -success. For sometimes the course of things is as arbitrary as the -plans of man; indeed this is why we usually blame chance for -whatever does not happen as we expected. Now it was clear before -that Lacedaemon entertained designs against us; it is still more clear -now. The treaty provides that we shall mutually submit our differences -to legal settlement, and that we shall meanwhile each keep what we -have. Yet the Lacedaemonians never yet made us any such offer, never -yet would accept from us any such offer; on the contrary, they wish -complaints to be settled by war instead of by negotiation; and in -the end we find them here dropping the tone of expostulation and -adopting that of command. They order us to raise the siege of -Potidaea, to let Aegina be independent, to revoke the Megara decree; -and they conclude with an ultimatum warning us to leave the Hellenes -independent. I hope that you will none of you think that we shall be -going to war for a trifle if we refuse to revoke the Megara decree, -which appears in front of their complaints, and the revocation of -which is to save us from war, or let any feeling of self-reproach -linger in your minds, as if you went to war for slight cause. Why, -this trifle contains the whole seal and trial of your resolution. If -you give way, you will instantly have to meet some greater demand, -as having been frightened into obedience in the first instance; -while a firm refusal will make them clearly understand that they -must treat you more as equals. Make your decision therefore at once, -either to submit before you are harmed, or if we are to go to war, -as I for one think we ought, to do so without caring whether the -ostensible cause be great or small, resolved against making -concessions or consenting to a precarious tenure of our possessions. -For all claims from an equal, urged upon a neighbour as commands -before any attempt at legal settlement, be they great or be they -small, have only one meaning, and that is slavery. - -"As to the war and the resources of either party, a detailed -comparison will not show you the inferiority of Athens. Personally -engaged in the cultivation of their land, without funds either private -or public, the Peloponnesians are also without experience in long wars -across sea, from the strict limit which poverty imposes on their -attacks upon each other. Powers of this description are quite -incapable of often manning a fleet or often sending out an army: -they cannot afford the absence from their homes, the expenditure -from their own funds; and besides, they have not command of the sea. -Capital, it must be remembered, maintains a war more than forced -contributions. Farmers are a class of men that are always more ready -to serve in person than in purse. Confident that the former will -survive the dangers, they are by no means so sure that the latter will -not be prematurely exhausted, especially if the war last longer than -they expect, which it very likely will. In a single battle the -Peloponnesians and their allies may be able to defy all Hellas, but -they are incapacitated from carrying on a war against a power -different in character from their own, by the want of the single -council-chamber requisite to prompt and vigorous action, and the -substitution of a diet composed of various races, in which every state -possesses an equal vote, and each presses its own ends, a condition of -things which generally results in no action at all. The great wish -of some is to avenge themselves on some particular enemy, the great -wish of others to save their own pocket. Slow in assembling, they -devote a very small fraction of the time to the consideration of any -public object, most of it to the prosecution of their own objects. -Meanwhile each fancies that no harm will come of his neglect, that -it is the business of somebody else to look after this or that for -him; and so, by the same notion being entertained by all separately, -the common cause imperceptibly decays. - -"But the principal point is the hindrance that they will -experience from want of money. The slowness with which it comes in -will cause delay; but the opportunities of war wait for no man. Again, -we need not be alarmed either at the possibility of their raising -fortifications in Attica, or at their navy. It would be difficult -for any system of fortifications to establish a rival city, even in -time of peace, much more, surely, in an enemy's country, with Athens -just as much fortified against it as it against Athens; while a mere -post might be able to do some harm to the country by incursions and by -the facilities which it would afford for desertion, but can never -prevent our sailing into their country and raising fortifications -there, and making reprisals with our powerful fleet. For our naval -skill is of more use to us for service on land, than their military -skill for service at sea. Familiarity with the sea they will not -find an easy acquisition. If you who have been practising at it ever -since the Median invasion have not yet brought it to perfection, is -there any chance of anything considerable being effected by an -agricultural, unseafaring population, who will besides be prevented -from practising by the constant presence of strong squadrons of -observation from Athens? With a small squadron they might hazard an -engagement, encouraging their ignorance by numbers; but the -restraint of a strong force will prevent their moving, and through -want of practice they will grow more clumsy, and consequently more -timid. It must be kept in mind that seamanship, just like anything -else, is a matter of art, and will not admit of being taken up -occasionally as an occupation for times of leisure; on the contrary, -it is so exacting as to leave leisure for nothing else. - -"Even if they were to touch the moneys at Olympia or Delphi, and try -to seduce our foreign sailors by the temptation of higher pay, that -would only be a serious danger if we could not still be a match for -them by embarking our own citizens and the aliens resident among us. -But in fact by this means we are always a match for them; and, best of -all, we have a larger and higher class of native coxswains and sailors -among our own citizens than all the rest of Hellas. And to say nothing -of the danger of such a step, none of our foreign sailors would -consent to become an outlaw from his country, and to take service with -them and their hopes, for the sake of a few days' high pay. - -"This, I think, is a tolerably fair account of the position of the -Peloponnesians; that of Athens is free from the defects that I have -criticized in them, and has other advantages of its own, which they -can show nothing to equal. If they march against our country we will -sail against theirs, and it will then be found that the desolation -of the whole of Attica is not the same as that of even a fraction of -Peloponnese; for they will not be able to supply the deficiency except -by a battle, while we have plenty of land both on the islands and -the continent. The rule of the sea is indeed a great matter. -Consider for a moment. Suppose that we were islanders; can you -conceive a more impregnable position? Well, this in future should, -as far as possible, be our conception of our position. Dismissing -all thought of our land and houses, we must vigilantly guard the sea -and the city. No irritation that we may feel for the former must -provoke us to a battle with the numerical superiority of the -Peloponnesians. A victory would only be succeeded by another battle -against the same superiority: a reverse involves the loss of our -allies, the source of our strength, who will not remain quiet a day -after we become unable to march against them. We must cry not over the -loss of houses and land but of men's lives; since houses and land do -not gain men, but men them. And if I had thought that I could persuade -you, I would have bid you go out and lay them waste with your own -hands, and show the Peloponnesians that this at any rate will not make -you submit. - -"I have many other reasons to hope for a favourable issue, if you -can consent not to combine schemes of fresh conquest with the -conduct of the war, and will abstain from wilfully involving -yourselves in other dangers; indeed, I am more afraid of our own -blunders than of the enemy's devices. But these matters shall be -explained in another speech, as events require; for the present -dismiss these men with the answer that we will allow Megara the use of -our market and harbours, when the Lacedaemonians suspend their alien -acts in favour of us and our allies, there being nothing in the treaty -to prevent either one or the other: that we will leave the cities -independent, if independent we found them when we made the treaty, and -when the Lacedaemonians grant to their cities an independence not -involving subservience to Lacedaemonian interests, but such as each -severally may desire: that we are willing to give the legal -satisfaction which our agreements specify, and that we shall not -commence hostilities, but shall resist those who do commence them. -This is an answer agreeable at once to the rights and the dignity of -Athens. It must be thoroughly understood that war is a necessity; -but that the more readily we accept it, the less will be the ardour of -our opponents, and that out of the greatest dangers communities and -individuals acquire the greatest glory. Did not our fathers resist the -Medes not only with resources far different from ours, but even when -those resources had been abandoned; and more by wisdom than by -fortune, more by daring than by strength, did not they beat off the -barbarian and advance their affairs to their present height? We must -not fall behind them, but must resist our enemies in any way and in -every way, and attempt to hand down our power to our posterity -unimpaired." - -Such were the words of Pericles. The Athenians, persuaded of the -wisdom of his advice, voted as he desired, and answered the -Lacedaemonians as he recommended, both on the separate points and in -the general; they would do nothing on dictation, but were ready to -have the complaints settled in a fair and impartial manner by the -legal method, which the terms of the truce prescribed. So the envoys -departed home and did not return again. - -These were the charges and differences existing between the rival -powers before the war, arising immediately from the affair at -Epidamnus and Corcyra. Still intercourse continued in spite of them, -and mutual communication. It was carried on without heralds, but not -without suspicion, as events were occurring which were equivalent to a -breach of the treaty and matter for war. - - - - -BOOK II - -CHAPTER VI - -_Beginning of the Peloponnesian War - First Invasion of Attica - -Funeral Oration of Pericles_ - -The war between the Athenians and Peloponnesians and the allies on -either side now really begins. For now all intercourse except -through the medium of heralds ceased, and hostilities were commenced -and prosecuted without intermission. The history follows the -chronological order of events by summers and winters. - -The thirty years' truce which was entered into after the conquest of -Euboea lasted fourteen years. In the fifteenth, in the forty-eighth -year of the priestess-ship of Chrysis at Argos, in the ephorate of -Aenesias at Sparta, in the last month but two of the archonship of -Pythodorus at Athens, and six months after the battle of Potidaea, -just at the beginning of spring, a Theban force a little over three -hundred strong, under the command of their Boeotarchs, Pythangelus, -son of Phyleides, and Diemporus, son of Onetorides, about the first -watch of the night, made an armed entry into Plataea, a town of -Boeotia in alliance with Athens. The gates were opened to them by a -Plataean called Naucleides, who, with his party, had invited them -in, meaning to put to death the citizens of the opposite party, -bring over the city to Thebes, and thus obtain power for themselves. -This was arranged through Eurymachus, son of Leontiades, a person of -great influence at Thebes. For Plataea had always been at variance -with Thebes; and the latter, foreseeing that war was at hand, wished -to surprise her old enemy in time of peace, before hostilities had -actually broken out. Indeed this was how they got in so easily without -being observed, as no guard had been posted. After the soldiers had -grounded arms in the market-place, those who had invited them in -wished them to set to work at once and go to their enemies' houses. -This, however, the Thebans refused to do, but determined to make a -conciliatory proclamation, and if possible to come to a friendly -understanding with the citizens. Their herald accordingly invited -any who wished to resume their old place in the confederacy of their -countrymen to ground arms with them, for they thought that in this way -the city would readily join them. - -On becoming aware of the presence of the Thebans within their gates, -and of the sudden occupation of the town, the Plataeans concluded in -their alarm that more had entered than was really the case, the -night preventing their seeing them. They accordingly came to terms -and, accepting the proposal, made no movement; especially as the -Thebans offered none of them any violence. But somehow or other, -during the negotiations, they discovered the scanty numbers of the -Thebans, and decided that they could easily attack and overpower them; -the mass of the Plataeans being averse to revolting from Athens. At -all events they resolved to attempt it. Digging through the party -walls of the houses, they thus managed to join each other without -being seen going through the streets, in which they placed wagons -without the beasts in them, to serve as a barricade, and arranged -everything else as seemed convenient for the occasion. When everything -had been done that circumstances permitted, they watched their -opportunity and went out of their houses against the enemy. It was -still night, though daybreak was at hand: in daylight it was thought -that their attack would be met by men full of courage and on equal -terms with their assailants, while in darkness it would fall upon -panic-stricken troops, who would also be at a disadvantage from -their enemy's knowledge of the locality. So they made their assault at -once, and came to close quarters as quickly as they could. - -The Thebans, finding themselves outwitted, immediately closed up -to repel all attacks made upon them. Twice or thrice they beat back -their assailants. But the men shouted and charged them, the women -and slaves screamed and yelled from the houses and pelted them with -stones and tiles; besides, it had been raining hard all night; and -so at last their courage gave way, and they turned and fled through -the town. Most of the fugitives were quite ignorant of the right -ways out, and this, with the mud, and the darkness caused by the -moon being in her last quarter, and the fact that their pursuers -knew their way about and could easily stop their escape, proved -fatal to many. The only gate open was the one by which they had -entered, and this was shut by one of the Plataeans driving the spike -of a javelin into the bar instead of the bolt; so that even here there -was no longer any means of exit. They were now chased all over the -town. Some got on the wall and threw themselves over, in most cases -with a fatal result. One party managed to find a deserted gate, and -obtaining an axe from a woman, cut through the bar; but as they were -soon observed only a few succeeded in getting out. Others were cut off -in detail in different parts of the city. The most numerous and -compact body rushed into a large building next to the city wall: the -doors on the side of the street happened to be open, and the Thebans -fancied that they were the gates of the town, and that there was a -passage right through to the outside. The Plataeans, seeing their -enemies in a trap, now consulted whether they should set fire to the -building and burn them just as they were, or whether there was -anything else that they could do with them; until at length these -and the rest of the Theban survivors found wandering about the town -agreed to an unconditional surrender of themselves and their arms to -the Plataeans. - -While such was the fate of the party in Plataea, the rest of the -Thebans who were to have joined them with all their forces before -daybreak, in case of anything miscarrying with the body that had -entered, received the news of the affair on the road, and pressed -forward to their succour. Now Plataea is nearly eight miles from -Thebes, and their march delayed by the rain that had fallen in the -night, for the river Asopus had risen and was not easy of passage; and -so, having to march in the rain, and being hindered in crossing the -river, they arrived too late, and found the whole party either slain -or captive. When they learned what had happened, they at once formed a -design against the Plataeans outside the city. As the attack had -been made in time of peace, and was perfectly unexpected, there were -of course men and stock in the fields; and the Thebans wished if -possible to have some prisoners to exchange against their countrymen -in the town, should any chance to have been taken alive. Such was -their plan. But the Plataeans suspected their intention almost -before it was formed, and becoming alarmed for their fellow citizens -outside the town, sent a herald to the Thebans, reproaching them for -their unscrupulous attempt to seize their city in time of peace, and -warning them against any outrage on those outside. Should the -warning be disregarded, they threatened to put to death the men they -had in their hands, but added that, on the Thebans retiring from their -territory, they would surrender the prisoners to their friends. This -is the Theban account of the matter, and they say that they had an -oath given them. The Plataeans, on the other hand, do not admit any -promise of an immediate surrender, but make it contingent upon -subsequent negotiation: the oath they deny altogether. Be this as it -may, upon the Thebans retiring from their territory without committing -any injury, the Plataeans hastily got in whatever they had in the -country and immediately put the men to death. The prisoners were a -hundred and eighty in number; Eurymachus, the person with whom the -traitors had negotiated, being one. - -This done, the Plataeans sent a messenger to Athens, gave back the -dead to the Thebans under a truce, and arranged things in the city -as seemed best to meet the present emergency. The Athenians meanwhile, -having had word of the affair sent them immediately after its -occurrence, had instantly seized all the Boeotians in Attica, and sent -a herald to the Plataeans to forbid their proceeding to extremities -with their Theban prisoners without instructions from Athens. The news -of the men's death had of course not arrived; the first messenger -having left Plataea just when the Thebans entered it, the second -just after their defeat and capture; so there was no later news. -Thus the Athenians sent orders in ignorance of the facts; and the -herald on his arrival found the men slain. After this the Athenians -marched to Plataea and brought in provisions, and left a garrison in -the place, also taking away the women and children and such of the men -as were least efficient. - -After the affair at Plataea, the treaty had been broken by an -overt act, and Athens at once prepared for war, as did also Lacedaemon -and her allies. They resolved to send embassies to the King and to -such other of the barbarian powers as either party could look to for -assistance, and tried to ally themselves with the independent states -at home. Lacedaemon, in addition to the existing marine, gave orders -to the states that had declared for her in Italy and Sicily to build -vessels up to a grand total of five hundred, the quota of each city -being determined by its size, and also to provide a specified sum of -money. Till these were ready they were to remain neutral and to -admit single Athenian ships into their harbours. Athens on her part -reviewed her existing confederacy, and sent embassies to the places -more immediately round Peloponnese--Corcyra, Cephallenia, Acarnania, -and Zacynthus--perceiving that if these could be relied on she could -carry the war all round Peloponnese. - -And if both sides nourished the boldest hopes and put forth their -utmost strength for the war, this was only natural. Zeal is always -at its height at the commencement of an undertaking; and on this -particular occasion Peloponnese and Athens were both full of young men -whose inexperience made them eager to take up arms, while the rest -of Hellas stood straining with excitement at the conflict of its -leading cities. Everywhere predictions were being recited and -oracles being chanted by such persons as collect them, and this not -only in the contending cities. Further, some while before this, -there was an earthquake at Delos, for the first time in the memory -of the Hellenes. This was said and thought to be ominous of the events -impending; indeed, nothing of the kind that happened was allowed to -pass without remark. The good wishes of men made greatly for the -Lacedaemonians, especially as they proclaimed themselves the -liberators of Hellas. No private or public effort that could help them -in speech or action was omitted; each thinking that the cause suffered -wherever he could not himself see to it. So general was the -indignation felt against Athens, whether by those who wished to escape -from her empire, or were apprehensive of being absorbed by it. Such -were the preparations and such the feelings with which the contest -opened. - -The allies of the two belligerents were the following. These were -the allies of Lacedaemon: all the Peloponnesians within the Isthmus -except the Argives and Achaeans, who were neutral; Pellene being the -only Achaean city that first joined in the war, though her example was -afterwards followed by the rest. Outside Peloponnese the Megarians, -Locrians, Boeotians, Phocians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and -Anactorians. Of these, ships were furnished by the Corinthians, -Megarians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, and Leucadians; -and cavalry by the Boeotians, Phocians, and Locrians. The other states -sent infantry. This was the Lacedaemonian confederacy. That of -Athens comprised the Chians, Lesbians, Plataeans, the Messenians in -Naupactus, most of the Acarnanians, the Corcyraeans, Zacynthians, -and some tributary cities in the following countries, viz., Caria upon -the sea with her Dorian neighbours, Ionia, the Hellespont, the -Thracian towns, the islands lying between Peloponnese and Crete -towards the east, and all the Cyclades except Melos and Thera. Of -these, ships were furnished by Chios, Lesbos, and Corcyra, infantry -and money by the rest. Such were the allies of either party and -their resources for the war. - -Immediately after the affair at Plataea, Lacedaemon sent round -orders to the cities in Peloponnese and the rest of her confederacy to -prepare troops and the provisions requisite for a foreign campaign, in -order to invade Attica. The several states were ready at the time -appointed and assembled at the Isthmus: the contingent of each city -being two-thirds of its whole force. After the whole army had -mustered, the Lacedaemonian king, Archidamus, the leader of the -expedition, called together the generals of all the states and the -principal persons and officers, and exhorted them as follows: - -"Peloponnesians and allies, our fathers made many campaigns both -within and without Peloponnese, and the elder men among us here are -not without experience in war. Yet we have never set out with a larger -force than the present; and if our numbers and efficiency are -remarkable, so also is the power of the state against which we -march. We ought not then to show ourselves inferior to our -ancestors, or unequal to our own reputation. For the hopes and -attention of all Hellas are bent upon the present effort, and its -sympathy is with the enemy of the hated Athens. Therefore, numerous as -the invading army may appear to be, and certain as some may think it -that our adversary will not meet us in the field, this is no sort of -justification for the least negligence upon the march; but the -officers and men of each particular city should always be prepared for -the advent of danger in their own quarters. The course of war cannot -be foreseen, and its attacks are generally dictated by the impulse -of the moment; and where overweening self-confidence has despised -preparation, a wise apprehension often been able to make head -against superior numbers. Not that confidence is out of place in an -army of invasion, but in an enemy's country it should also be -accompanied by the precautions of apprehension: troops will by this -combination be best inspired for dealing a blow, and best secured -against receiving one. In the present instance, the city against which -we are going, far from being so impotent for defence, is on the -contrary most excellently equipped at all points; so that we have -every reason to expect that they will take the field against us, and -that if they have not set out already before we are there, they will -certainly do so when they see us in their territory wasting and -destroying their property. For men are always exasperated at suffering -injuries to which they are not accustomed, and on seeing them -inflicted before their very eyes; and where least inclined for -reflection, rush with the greatest heat to action. The Athenians are -the very people of all others to do this, as they aspire to rule the -rest of the world, and are more in the habit of invading and -ravaging their neighbours' territory, than of seeing their own treated -in the like fashion. Considering, therefore, the power of the state -against which we are marching, and the greatness of the reputation -which, according to the event, we shall win or lose for our -ancestors and ourselves, remember as you follow where you may be led -to regard discipline and vigilance as of the first importance, and -to obey with alacrity the orders transmitted to you; as nothing -contributes so much to the credit and safety of an army as the union -of large bodies by a single discipline." - -With this brief speech dismissing the assembly, Archidamus first -sent off Melesippus, son of Diacritus, a Spartan, to Athens, in case -she should be more inclined to submit on seeing the Peloponnesians -actually on the march. But the Athenians did not admit into the city -or to their assembly, Pericles having already carried a motion against -admitting either herald or embassy from the Lacedaemonians after -they had once marched out. - -The herald was accordingly sent away without an audience, and -ordered to be beyond the frontier that same day; in future, if those -who sent him had a proposition to make, they must retire to their -own territory before they dispatched embassies to Athens. An escort -was sent with Melesippus to prevent his holding communication with any -one. When he reached the frontier and was just going to be -dismissed, he departed with these words: "This day will be the -beginning of great misfortunes to the Hellenes." As soon as he arrived -at the camp, and Archidamus learnt that the Athenians had still no -thoughts of submitting, he at length began his march, and advanced -with his army into their territory. Meanwhile the Boeotians, sending -their contingent and cavalry to join the Peloponnesian expedition, -went to Plataea with the remainder and laid waste the country. - -While the Peloponnesians were still mustering at the Isthmus, or -on the march before they invaded Attica, Pericles, son of -Xanthippus, one of the ten generals of the Athenians, finding that the -invasion was to take place, conceived the idea that Archidamus, who -happened to be his friend, might possibly pass by his estate without -ravaging it. This he might do, either from a personal wish to oblige -him, or acting under instructions from Lacedaemon for the purpose of -creating a prejudice against him, as had been before attempted in -the demand for the expulsion of the accursed family. He accordingly -took the precaution of announcing to the Athenians in the assembly -that, although Archidamus was his friend, yet this friendship should -not extend to the detriment of the state, and that in case the enemy -should make his houses and lands an exception to the rest and not -pillage them, he at once gave them up to be public property, so that -they should not bring him into suspicion. He also gave the citizens -some advice on their present affairs in the same strain as before. -They were to prepare for the war, and to carry in their property -from the country. They were not to go out to battle, but to come -into the city and guard it, and get ready their fleet, in which -their real strength lay. They were also to keep a tight rein on -their allies--the strength of Athens being derived from the money -brought in by their payments, and success in war depending principally -upon conduct and capital. had no reason to despond. Apart from other -sources of income, an average revenue of six hundred talents of silver -was drawn from the tribute of the allies; and there were still six -thousand talents of coined silver in the Acropolis, out of nine -thousand seven hundred that had once been there, from which the -money had been taken for the porch of the Acropolis, the other -public buildings, and for Potidaea. This did not include the -uncoined gold and silver in public and private offerings, the sacred -vessels for the processions and games, the Median spoils, and -similar resources to the amount of five hundred talents. To this he -added the treasures of the other temples. These were by no means -inconsiderable, and might fairly be used. Nay, if they were ever -absolutely driven to it, they might take even the gold ornaments of -Athene herself; for the statue contained forty talents of pure gold -and it was all removable. This might be used for self-preservation, -and must every penny of it be restored. Such was their financial -position--surely a satisfactory one. Then they had an army of -thirteen thousand heavy infantry, besides sixteen thousand more in the -garrisons and on home duty at Athens. This was at first the number -of men on guard in the event of an invasion: it was composed of the -oldest and youngest levies and the resident aliens who had heavy -armour. The Phaleric wall ran for four miles, before it joined that -round the city; and of this last nearly five had a guard, although -part of it was left without one, viz., that between the Long Wall -and the Phaleric. Then there were the Long Walls to Piraeus, a -distance of some four miles and a half, the outer of which was manned. -Lastly, the circumference of Piraeus with Munychia was nearly seven -miles and a half; only half of this, however, was guarded. Pericles -also showed them that they had twelve hundred horse including -mounted archers, with sixteen hundred archers unmounted, and three -hundred galleys fit for service. Such were the resources of Athens -in the different departments when the Peloponnesian invasion was -impending and hostilities were being commenced. Pericles also urged -his usual arguments for expecting a favourable issue to the war. - -The Athenians listened to his advice, and began to carry in their -wives and children from the country, and all their household -furniture, even to the woodwork of their houses which they took -down. Their sheep and cattle they sent over to Euboea and the adjacent -islands. But they found it hard to move, as most of them had been -always used to live in the country. - -From very early times this had been more the case with the Athenians -than with others. Under Cecrops and the first kings, down to the reign -of Theseus, Attica had always consisted of a number of independent -townships, each with its own town hall and magistrates. Except in -times of danger the king at Athens was not consulted; in ordinary -seasons they carried on their government and settled their affairs -without his interference; sometimes even they waged war against him, -as in the case of the Eleusinians with Eumolpus against Erechtheus. In -Theseus, however, they had a king of equal intelligence and power; and -one of the chief features in his organization of the country was to -abolish the council-chambers and magistrates of the petty cities, -and to merge them in the single council-chamber and town hall of the -present capital. Individuals might still enjoy their private -property just as before, but they were henceforth compelled to have -only one political centre, viz., Athens; which thus counted all the -inhabitants of Attica among her citizens, so that when Theseus died he -left a great state behind him. Indeed, from him dates the Synoecia, or -Feast of Union; which is paid for by the state, and which the -Athenians still keep in honour of the goddess. Before this the city -consisted of the present citadel and the district beneath it looking -rather towards the south. This is shown by the fact that the temples -of the other deities, besides that of Athene, are in the citadel; -and even those that are outside it are mostly situated in this quarter -of the city, as that of the Olympian Zeus, of the Pythian Apollo, of -Earth, and of Dionysus in the Marshes, the same in whose honour the -older Dionysia are to this day celebrated in the month of Anthesterion -not only by the Athenians but also by their Ionian descendants. -There are also other ancient temples in this quarter. The fountain -too, which, since the alteration made by the tyrants, has been -called Enneacrounos, or Nine Pipes, but which, when the spring was -open, went by the name of Callirhoe, or Fairwater, was in those -days, from being so near, used for the most important offices. Indeed, -the old fashion of using the water before marriage and for other -sacred purposes is still kept up. Again, from their old residence in -that quarter, the citadel is still known among Athenians as the city. - -The Athenians thus long lived scattered over Attica in independent -townships. Even after the centralization of Theseus, old habit still -prevailed; and from the early times down to the present war most -Athenians still lived in the country with their families and -households, and were consequently not at all inclined to move now, -especially as they had only just restored their establishments after -the Median invasion. Deep was their trouble and discontent at -abandoning their houses and the hereditary temples of the ancient -constitution, and at having to change their habits of life and to -bid farewell to what each regarded as his native city. - -When they arrived at Athens, though a few had houses of their own to -go to, or could find an asylum with friends or relatives, by far the -greater number had to take up their dwelling in the parts of the -city that were not built over and in the temples and chapels of the -heroes, except the Acropolis and the temple of the Eleusinian -Demeter and such other Places as were always kept closed. The -occupation of the plot of ground lying below the citadel called the -Pelasgian had been forbidden by a curse; and there was also an ominous -fragment of a Pythian oracle which said: - -Leave the Pelasgian parcel desolate, -Woe worth the day that men inhabit it! - -Yet this too was now built over in the necessity of the moment. And in -my opinion, if the oracle proved true, it was in the opposite sense to -what was expected. For the misfortunes of the state did not arise from -the unlawful occupation, but the necessity of the occupation from -the war; and though the god did not mention this, he foresaw that it -would be an evil day for Athens in which the plot came to be -inhabited. Many also took up their quarters in the towers of the walls -or wherever else they could. For when they were all come in, the -city proved too small to hold them; though afterwards they divided the -Long Walls and a great part of Piraeus into lots and settled there. -All this while great attention was being given to the war; the -allies were being mustered, and an armament of a hundred ships -equipped for Peloponnese. Such was the state of preparation at Athens. - -Meanwhile the army of the Peloponnesians was advancing. The first -town they came to in Attica was Oenoe, where they to enter the -country. Sitting down before it, they prepared to assault the wall -with engines and otherwise. Oenoe, standing upon the Athenian and -Boeotian border, was of course a walled town, and was used as a -fortress by the Athenians in time of war. So the Peloponnesians -prepared for their assault, and wasted some valuable time before the -place. This delay brought the gravest censure upon Archidamus. Even -during the levying of the war he had credit for weakness and -Athenian sympathies by the half measures he had advocated; and after -the army had assembled he had further injured himself in public -estimation by his loitering at the Isthmus and the slowness with which -the rest of the march had been conducted. But all this was as -nothing to the delay at Oenoe. During this interval the Athenians were -carrying in their property; and it was the belief of the -Peloponnesians that a quick advance would have found everything -still out, had it not been for his procrastination. Such was the -feeling of the army towards Archidamus during the siege. But he, it is -said, expected that the Athenians would shrink from letting their land -be wasted, and would make their submission while it was still -uninjured; and this was why he waited. - -But after he had assaulted Oenoe, and every possible attempt to take -it had failed, as no herald came from Athens, he at last broke up -his camp and invaded Attica. This was about eighty days after the -Theban attempt upon Plataea, just in the middle of summer, when the -corn was ripe, and Archidamus, son of Zeuxis, king of Lacedaemon, -was in command. Encamping in Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, they -began their ravages, and putting to flight some Athenian horse at a -place called Rheiti, or the Brooks, they then advanced, keeping -Mount Aegaleus on their right, through Cropia, until they reached -Acharnae, the largest of the Athenian demes or townships. Sitting down -before it, they formed a camp there, and continued their ravages for a -long while. - -The reason why Archidamus remained in order of battle at Acharnae -during this incursion, instead of descending into the plain, is said -to have been this. He hoped that the Athenians might possibly be -tempted by the multitude of their youth and the unprecedented -efficiency of their service to come out to battle and attempt to -stop the devastation of their lands. Accordingly, as they had met -him at Eleusis or the Thriasian plain, he tried if they could be -provoked to a sally by the spectacle of a camp at Acharnae. He thought -the place itself a good position for encamping; and it seemed likely -that such an important part of the state as the three thousand heavy -infantry of the Acharnians would refuse to submit to the ruin of their -property, and would force a battle on the rest of the citizens. On the -other hand, should the Athenians not take the field during this -incursion, he could then fearlessly ravage the plain in future -invasions, and extend his advance up to the very walls of Athens. -After the Acharnians had lost their own property they would be less -willing to risk themselves for that of their neighbours; and so -there would be division in the Athenian counsels. These were the -motives of Archidamus for remaining at Acharnae. - -In the meanwhile, as long as the army was at Eleusis and the -Thriasian plain, hopes were still entertained of its not advancing any -nearer. It was remembered that Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias, king -of Lacedaemon, had invaded Attica with a Peloponnesian army fourteen -years before, but had retreated without advancing farther than Eleusis -and Thria, which indeed proved the cause of his exile from Sparta, -as it was thought he had been bribed to retreat. But when they saw the -army at Acharnae, barely seven miles from Athens, they lost all -patience. The territory of Athens was being ravaged before the very -eyes of the Athenians, a sight which the young men had never seen -before and the old only in the Median wars; and it was naturally -thought a grievous insult, and the determination was universal, -especially among the young men, to sally forth and stop it. Knots were -formed in the streets and engaged in hot discussion; for if the -proposed sally was warmly recommended, it was also in some cases -opposed. Oracles of the most various import were recited by the -collectors, and found eager listeners in one or other of the -disputants. Foremost in pressing for the sally were the Acharnians, as -constituting no small part of the army of the state, and as it was -their land that was being ravaged. In short, the whole city was in a -most excited state; Pericles was the object of general indignation; -his previous counsels were totally forgotten; he was abused for not -leading out the army which he commanded, and was made responsible -for the whole of the public suffering. - -He, meanwhile, seeing anger and infatuation just now in the -ascendant, and of his wisdom in refusing a sally, would not call -either assembly or meeting of the people, fearing the fatal results of -a debate inspired by passion and not by prudence. Accordingly he -addressed himself to the defence of the city, and kept it as quiet -as possible, though he constantly sent out cavalry to prevent raids on -the lands near the city from flying parties of the enemy. There was -a trifling affair at Phrygia between a squadron of the Athenian -horse with the Thessalians and the Boeotian cavalry; in which the -former had rather the best of it, until the heavy infantry advanced to -the support of the Boeotians, when the Thessalians and Athenians -were routed and lost a few men, whose bodies, however, were -recovered the same day without a truce. The next day the -Peloponnesians set up a trophy. Ancient alliance brought the -Thessalians to the aid of Athens; those who came being the Larisaeans, -Pharsalians, Cranonians, Pyrasians, Gyrtonians, and Pheraeans. The -Larisaean commanders were Polymedes and Aristonus, two party leaders -in Larisa; the Pharsalian general was Menon; each of the other -cities had also its own commander. - -In the meantime the Peloponnesians, as the Athenians did not come -out to engage them, broke up from Acharnae and ravaged some of the -demes between Mount Parnes and Brilessus. While they were in Attica -the Athenians sent off the hundred ships which they had been preparing -round Peloponnese, with a thousand heavy infantry and four hundred -archers on board, under the command of Carcinus, son of Xenotimus, -Proteas, son of Epicles, and Socrates, son of Antigenes. This armament -weighed anchor and started on its cruise, and the Peloponnesians, -after remaining in Attica as long as their provisions lasted, -retired through Boeotia by a different road to that by which they -had entered. As they passed Oropus they ravaged the territory of -Graea, which is held by the Oropians from Athens, and reaching -Peloponnese broke up to their respective cities. - -After they had retired the Athenians set guards by land and sea at -the points at which they intended to have regular stations during -the war. They also resolved to set apart a special fund of a -thousand talents from the moneys in the Acropolis. This was not to -be spent, but the current expenses of the war were to be otherwise -provided for. If any one should move or put to the vote a -proposition for using the money for any purpose whatever except that -of defending the city in the event of the enemy bringing a fleet to -make an attack by sea, it should be a capital offence. With this sum -of money they also set aside a special fleet of one hundred galleys, -the best ships of each year, with their captains. None of these were -to be used except with the money and against the same peril, should -such peril arise. - -Meanwhile the Athenians in the hundred ships round Peloponnese, -reinforced by a Corcyraean squadron of fifty vessels and some others -of the allies in those parts, cruised about the coasts and ravaged the -country. Among other places they landed in Laconia and made an assault -upon Methone; there being no garrison in the place, and the wall being -weak. But it so happened that Brasidas, son of Tellis, a Spartan, -was in command of a guard for the defence of the district. Hearing -of the attack, he hurried with a hundred heavy infantry to the -assistance of the besieged, and dashing through the army of the -Athenians, which was scattered over the country and had its -attention turned to the wall, threw himself into Methone. He lost a -few men in making good his entrance, but saved the place and won the -thanks of Sparta by his exploit, being thus the first officer who -obtained this notice during the war. The Athenians at once weighed -anchor and continued their cruise. Touching at Pheia in Elis, they -ravaged the country for two days and defeated a picked force of -three hundred men that had come from the vale of Elis and the -immediate neighbourhood to the rescue. But a stiff squall came down -upon them, and, not liking to face it in a place where there was no -harbour, most of them got on board their ships, and doubling Point -Ichthys sailed into the port of Pheia. In the meantime the Messenians, -and some others who could not get on board, marched over by land and -took Pheia. The fleet afterwards sailed round and picked them up and -then put to sea; Pheia being evacuated, as the main army of the Eleans -had now come up. The Athenians continued their cruise, and ravaged -other places on the coast. - -About the same time the Athenians sent thirty ships to cruise -round Locris and also to guard Euboea; Cleopompus, son of Clinias, -being in command. Making descents from the fleet he ravaged certain -places on the sea-coast, and captured Thronium and took hostages -from it. He also defeated at Alope the Locrians that had assembled -to resist him. - -During the summer the Athenians also expelled the Aeginetans with -their wives and children from Aegina, on the ground of their having -been the chief agents in bringing the war upon them. Besides, Aegina -lies so near Peloponnese that it seemed safer to send colonists of -their own to hold it, and shortly afterwards the settlers were sent -out. The banished Aeginetans found an asylum in Thyrea, which was -given to them by Lacedaemon, not only on account of her quarrel with -Athens, but also because the Aeginetans had laid her under obligations -at the time of the earthquake and the revolt of the Helots. The -territory of Thyrea is on the frontier of Argolis and Laconia, -reaching down to the sea. Those of the Aeginetans who did not settle -here were scattered over the rest of Hellas. - -The same summer, at the beginning of a new lunar month, the only -time by the way at which it appears possible, the sun was eclipsed -after noon. After it had assumed the form of a crescent and some of -the stars had come out, it returned to its natural shape. - -During the same summer Nymphodorus, son of Pythes, an Abderite, -whose sister Sitalces had married, was made their proxenus by the -Athenians and sent for to Athens. They had hitherto considered him -their enemy; but he had great influence with Sitalces, and they wished -this prince to become their ally. Sitalces was the son of Teres and -King of the Thracians. Teres, the father of Sitalces, was the first to -establish the great kingdom of the Odrysians on a scale quite -unknown to the rest of Thrace, a large portion of the Thracians -being independent. This Teres is in no way related to Tereus who -married Pandion's daughter Procne from Athens; nor indeed did they -belong to the same part of Thrace. Tereus lived in Daulis, part of -what is now called Phocis, but which at that time was inhabited by -Thracians. It was in this land that the women perpetrated the -outrage upon Itys; and many of the poets when they mention the -nightingale call it the Daulian bird. Besides, Pandion in -contracting an alliance for his daughter would consider the advantages -of mutual assistance, and would naturally prefer a match at the -above moderate distance to the journey of many days which separates -Athens from the Odrysians. Again the names are different; and this -Teres was king of the Odrysians, the first by the way who attained -to any power. Sitalces, his son, was now sought as an ally by the -Athenians, who desired his aid in the reduction of the Thracian -towns and of Perdiccas. Coming to Athens, Nymphodorus concluded the -alliance with Sitalces and made his son Sadocus an Athenian citizen, -and promised to finish the war in Thrace by persuading Sitalces to -send the Athenians a force of Thracian horse and targeteers. He also -reconciled them with Perdiccas, and induced them to restore Therme -to him; upon which Perdiccas at once joined the Athenians and -Phormio in an expedition against the Chalcidians. Thus Sitalces, son -of Teres, King of the Thracians, and Perdiccas, son of Alexander, King -of the Macedonians, became allies of Athens. - -Meanwhile the Athenians in the hundred vessels were still cruising -round Peloponnese. After taking Sollium, a town belonging to -Corinth, and presenting the city and territory to the Acarnanians of -Palaira, they stormed Astacus, expelled its tyrant Evarchus, and -gained the place for their confederacy. Next they sailed to the island -of Cephallenia and brought it over without using force. Cephallenia -lies off Acarnania and Leucas, and consists of four states, the -Paleans, Cranians, Samaeans, and Pronaeans. Not long afterwards the -fleet returned to Athens. Towards the autumn of this year the -Athenians invaded the Megarid with their whole levy, resident aliens -included, under the command of Pericles, son of Xanthippus. The -Athenians in the hundred ships round Peloponnese on their journey home -had just reached Aegina, and hearing that the citizens at home were in -full force at Megara, now sailed over and joined them. This was -without doubt the largest army of Athenians ever assembled, the -state being still in the flower of her strength and yet unvisited by -the plague. Full ten thousand heavy infantry were in the field, all -Athenian citizens, besides the three thousand before Potidaea. Then -the resident aliens who joined in the incursion were at least three -thousand strong; besides which there was a multitude of light -troops. They ravaged the greater part of the territory, and then -retired. Other incursions into the Megarid were afterwards made by the -Athenians annually during the war, sometimes only with cavalry, -sometimes with all their forces. This went on until the capture of -Nisaea. Atalanta also, the desert island off the Opuntian coast, was -towards the end of this summer converted into a fortified post by -the Athenians, in order to prevent privateers issuing from Opus and -the rest of Locris and plundering Euboea. Such were the events of this -summer after the return of the Peloponnesians from Attica. - -In the ensuing winter the Acarnanian Evarchus, wishing to return -to Astacus, persuaded the Corinthians to sail over with forty ships -and fifteen hundred heavy infantry and restore him; himself also -hiring some mercenaries. In command of the force were Euphamidas, -son of Aristonymus, Timoxenus, son of Timocrates, and Eumachus, son of -Chrysis, who sailed over and restored him and, after failing in an -attempt on some places on the Acarnanian coast which they were -desirous of gaining, began their voyage home. Coasting along shore -they touched at Cephallenia and made a descent on the Cranian -territory, and losing some men by the treachery of the Cranians, who -fell suddenly upon them after having agreed to treat, put to sea -somewhat hurriedly and returned home. - -In the same winter the Athenians gave a funeral at the public cost -to those who had first fallen in this war. It was a custom of their -ancestors, and the manner of it is as follows. Three days before the -ceremony, the bones of the dead are laid out in a tent which has -been erected; and their friends bring to their relatives such -offerings as they please. In the funeral procession cypress coffins -are borne in cars, one for each tribe; the bones of the deceased being -placed in the coffin of their tribe. Among these is carried one -empty bier decked for the missing, that is, for those whose bodies -could not be recovered. Any citizen or stranger who pleases, joins -in the procession: and the female relatives are there to wail at the -burial. The dead are laid in the public sepulchre in the Beautiful -suburb of the city, in which those who fall in war are always -buried; with the exception of those slain at Marathon, who for their -singular and extraordinary valour were interred on the spot where they -fell. After the bodies have been laid in the earth, a man chosen by -the state, of approved wisdom and eminent reputation, pronounces -over them an appropriate panegyric; after which all retire. Such is -the manner of the burying; and throughout the whole of the war, -whenever the occasion arose, the established custom was observed. -Meanwhile these were the first that had fallen, and Pericles, son of -Xanthippus, was chosen to pronounce their eulogium. When the proper -time arrived, he advanced from the sepulchre to an elevated platform -in order to be heard by as many of the crowd as possible, and spoke as -follows: - -"Most of my predecessors in this place have commended him who made -this speech part of the law, telling us that it is well that it should -be delivered at the burial of those who fall in battle. For myself, -I should have thought that the worth which had displayed itself in -deeds would be sufficiently rewarded by honours also shown by deeds; -such as you now see in this funeral prepared at the people's cost. And -I could have wished that the reputations of many brave men were not to -be imperilled in the mouth of a single individual, to stand or fall -according as he spoke well or ill. For it is hard to speak properly -upon a subject where it is even difficult to convince your hearers -that you are speaking the truth. On the one hand, the friend who is -familiar with every fact of the story may think that some point has -not been set forth with that fullness which he wishes and knows it -to deserve; on the other, he who is a stranger to the matter may be -led by envy to suspect exaggeration if he hears anything above his own -nature. For men can endure to hear others praised only so long as they -can severally persuade themselves of their own ability to equal the -actions recounted: when this point is passed, envy comes in and with -it incredulity. However, since our ancestors have stamped this -custom with their approval, it becomes my duty to obey the law and -to try to satisfy your several wishes and opinions as best I may. - -"I shall begin with our ancestors: it is both just and proper that -they should have the honour of the first mention on an occasion like -the present. They dwelt in the country without break in the succession -from generation to generation, and handed it down free to the -present time by their valour. And if our more remote ancestors deserve -praise, much more do our own fathers, who added to their inheritance -the empire which we now possess, and spared no pains to be able to -leave their acquisitions to us of the present generation. Lastly, -there are few parts of our dominions that have not been augmented by -those of us here, who are still more or less in the vigour of life; -while the mother country has been furnished by us with everything that -can enable her to depend on her own resources whether for war or for -peace. That part of our history which tells of the military -achievements which gave us our several possessions, or of the ready -valour with which either we or our fathers stemmed the tide of -Hellenic or foreign aggression, is a theme too familiar to my -hearers for me to dilate on, and I shall therefore pass it by. But -what was the road by which we reached our position, what the form of -government under which our greatness grew, what the national habits -out of which it sprang; these are questions which I may try to solve -before I proceed to my panegyric upon these men; since I think this to -be a subject upon which on the present occasion a speaker may properly -dwell, and to which the whole assemblage, whether citizens or -foreigners, may listen with advantage. - -"Our constitution does not copy the laws of neighbouring states; -we are rather a pattern to others than imitators ourselves. Its -administration favours the many instead of the few; this is why it -is called a democracy. If we look to the laws, they afford equal -justice to all in their private differences; if no social standing, -advancement in public life falls to reputation for capacity, class -considerations not being allowed to interfere with merit; nor again -does poverty bar the way, if a man is able to serve the state, he is -not hindered by the obscurity of his condition. The freedom which we -enjoy in our government extends also to our ordinary life. There, -far from exercising a jealous surveillance over each other, we do -not feel called upon to be angry with our neighbour for doing what -he likes, or even to indulge in those injurious looks which cannot -fail to be offensive, although they inflict no positive penalty. But -all this ease in our private relations does not make us lawless as -citizens. Against this fear is our chief safeguard, teaching us to -obey the magistrates and the laws, particularly such as regard the -protection of the injured, whether they are actually on the statute -book, or belong to that code which, although unwritten, yet cannot -be broken without acknowledged disgrace. - -"Further, we provide plenty of means for the mind to refresh -itself from business. We celebrate games and sacrifices all the year -round, and the elegance of our private establishments forms a daily -source of pleasure and helps to banish the spleen; while the magnitude -of our city draws the produce of the world into our harbour, so that -to the Athenian the fruits of other countries are as familiar a luxury -as those of his own. - -"If we turn to our military policy, there also we differ from our -antagonists. We throw open our city to the world, and never by alien -acts exclude foreigners from any opportunity of learning or observing, -although the eyes of an enemy may occasionally profit by our -liberality; trusting less in system and policy than to the native -spirit of our citizens; while in education, where our rivals from -their very cradles by a painful discipline seek after manliness, at -Athens we live exactly as we please, and yet are just as ready to -encounter every legitimate danger. In proof of this it may be -noticed that the Lacedaemonians do not invade our country alone, but -bring with them all their confederates; while we Athenians advance -unsupported into the territory of a neighbour, and fighting upon a -foreign soil usually vanquish with ease men who are defending their -homes. Our united force was never yet encountered by any enemy, -because we have at once to attend to our marine and to dispatch our -citizens by land upon a hundred different services; so that, -wherever they engage with some such fraction of our strength, a -success against a detachment is magnified into a victory over the -nation, and a defeat into a reverse suffered at the hands of our -entire people. And yet if with habits not of labour but of ease, and -courage not of art but of nature, we are still willing to encounter -danger, we have the double advantage of escaping the experience of -hardships in anticipation and of facing them in the hour of need as -fearlessly as those who are never free from them. - -"Nor are these the only points in which our city is worthy of -admiration. We cultivate refinement without extravagance and knowledge -without effeminacy; wealth we employ more for use than for show, and -place the real disgrace of poverty not in owning to the fact but in -declining the struggle against it. Our public men have, besides -politics, their private affairs to attend to, and our ordinary -citizens, though occupied with the pursuits of industry, are still -fair judges of public matters; for, unlike any other nation, regarding -him who takes no part in these duties not as unambitious but as -useless, we Athenians are able to judge at all events if we cannot -originate, and, instead of looking on discussion as a -stumbling-block in the way of action, we think it an indispensable -preliminary to any wise action at all. Again, in our enterprises we -present the singular spectacle of daring and deliberation, each -carried to its highest point, and both united in the same persons; -although usually decision is the fruit of ignorance, hesitation of -reflection. But the palm of courage will surely be adjudged most -justly to those, who best know the difference between hardship and -pleasure and yet are never tempted to shrink from danger. In -generosity we are equally singular, acquiring our friends by -conferring, not by receiving, favours. Yet, of course, the doer of the -favour is the firmer friend of the two, in order by continued kindness -to keep the recipient in his debt; while the debtor feels less -keenly from the very consciousness that the return he makes will be -a payment, not a free gift. And it is only the Athenians, who, -fearless of consequences, confer their benefits not from -calculations of expediency, but in the confidence of liberality. - -"In short, I say that as a city we are the school of Hellas, while I -doubt if the world can produce a man who, where he has only himself to -depend upon, is equal to so many emergencies, and graced by so happy a -versatility, as the Athenian. And that this is no mere boast thrown -out for the occasion, but plain matter of fact, the power of the state -acquired by these habits proves. For Athens alone of her -contemporaries is found when tested to be greater than her reputation, -and alone gives no occasion to her assailants to blush at the -antagonist by whom they have been worsted, or to her subjects to -question her title by merit to rule. Rather, the admiration of the -present and succeeding ages will be ours, since we have not left our -power without witness, but have shown it by mighty proofs; and far -from needing a Homer for our panegyrist, or other of his craft whose -verses might charm for the moment only for the impression which they -gave to melt at the touch of fact, we have forced every sea and land -to be the highway of our daring, and everywhere, whether for evil or -for good, have left imperishable monuments behind us. Such is the -Athens for which these men, in the assertion of their resolve not to -lose her, nobly fought and died; and well may every one of their -survivors be ready to suffer in her cause. - -"Indeed if I have dwelt at some length upon the character of our -country, it has been to show that our stake in the struggle is not the -same as theirs who have no such blessings to lose, and also that the -panegyric of the men over whom I am now speaking might be by -definite proofs established. That panegyric is now in a great -measure complete; for the Athens that I have celebrated is only what -the heroism of these and their like have made her, men whose fame, -unlike that of most Hellenes, will be found to be only commensurate -with their deserts. And if a test of worth be wanted, it is to be -found in their closing scene, and this not only in cases in which it -set the final seal upon their merit, but also in those in which it -gave the first intimation of their having any. For there is justice in -the claim that steadfastness in his country's battles should be as a -cloak to cover a man's other imperfections; since the good action -has blotted out the bad, and his merit as a citizen more than -outweighed his demerits as an individual. But none of these allowed -either wealth with its prospect of future enjoyment to unnerve his -spirit, or poverty with its hope of a day of freedom and riches to -tempt him to shrink from danger. No, holding that vengeance upon their -enemies was more to be desired than any personal blessings, and -reckoning this to be the most glorious of hazards, they joyfully -determined to accept the risk, to make sure of their vengeance, and to -let their wishes wait; and while committing to hope the uncertainty of -final success, in the business before them they thought fit to act -boldly and trust in themselves. Thus choosing to die resisting, rather -than to live submitting, they fled only from dishonour, but met danger -face to face, and after one brief moment, while at the summit of their -fortune, escaped, not from their fear, but from their glory. - -"So died these men as became Athenians. You, their survivors, must -determine to have as unfaltering a resolution in the field, though you -may pray that it may have a happier issue. And not contented with -ideas derived only from words of the advantages which are bound up -with the defence of your country, though these would furnish a -valuable text to a speaker even before an audience so alive to them as -the present, you must yourselves realize the power of Athens, and feed -your eyes upon her from day to day, till love of her fills your -hearts; and then, when all her greatness shall break upon you, you -must reflect that it was by courage, sense of duty, and a keen feeling -of honour in action that men were enabled to win all this, and that no -personal failure in an enterprise could make them consent to deprive -their country of their valour, but they laid it at her feet as the -most glorious contribution that they could offer. For this offering of -their lives made in common by them all they each of them -individually received that renown which never grows old, and for a -sepulchre, not so much that in which their bones have been -deposited, but that noblest of shrines wherein their glory is laid -up to be eternally remembered upon every occasion on which deed or -story shall call for its commemoration. For heroes have the whole -earth for their tomb; and in lands far from their own, where the -column with its epitaph declares it, there is enshrined in every -breast a record unwritten with no tablet to preserve it, except that -of the heart. These take as your model and, judging happiness to be -the fruit of freedom and freedom of valour, never decline the -dangers of war. For it is not the miserable that would most justly -be unsparing of their lives; these have nothing to hope for: it is -rather they to whom continued life may bring reverses as yet -unknown, and to whom a fall, if it came, would be most tremendous in -its consequences. And surely, to a man of spirit, the degradation of -cowardice must be immeasurably more grievous than the unfelt death -which strikes him in the midst of his strength and patriotism! - -"Comfort, therefore, not condolence, is what I have to offer to -the parents of the dead who may be here. Numberless are the chances to -which, as they know, the life of man is subject; but fortunate -indeed are they who draw for their lot a death so glorious as that -which has caused your mourning, and to whom life has been so exactly -measured as to terminate in the happiness in which it has been passed. -Still I know that this is a hard saying, especially when those are -in question of whom you will constantly be reminded by seeing in the -homes of others blessings of which once you also boasted: for grief is -felt not so much for the want of what we have never known, as for -the loss of that to which we have been long accustomed. Yet you who -are still of an age to beget children must bear up in the hope of -having others in their stead; not only will they help you to forget -those whom you have lost, but will be to the state at once a -reinforcement and a security; for never can a fair or just policy be -expected of the citizen who does not, like his fellows, bring to the -decision the interests and apprehensions of a father. While those of -you who have passed your prime must congratulate yourselves with the -thought that the best part of your life was fortunate, and that the -brief span that remains will be cheered by the fame of the departed. -For it is only the love of honour that never grows old; and honour -it is, not gain, as some would have it, that rejoices the heart of age -and helplessness. - -"Turning to the sons or brothers of the dead, I see an arduous -struggle before you. When a man is gone, all are wont to praise him, -and should your merit be ever so transcendent, you will still find -it difficult not merely to overtake, but even to approach their -renown. The living have envy to contend with, while those who are no -longer in our path are honoured with a goodwill into which rivalry -does not enter. On the other hand, if I must say anything on the -subject of female excellence to those of you who will now be in -widowhood, it will be all comprised in this brief exhortation. Great -will be your glory in not falling short of your natural character; and -greatest will be hers who is least talked of among the men, whether -for good or for bad. - -"My task is now finished. I have performed it to the best of my -ability, and in word, at least, the requirements of the law are now -satisfied. If deeds be in question, those who are here interred have -received part of their honours already, and for the rest, their -children will be brought up till manhood at the public expense: the -state thus offers a valuable prize, as the garland of victory in -this race of valour, for the reward both of those who have fallen -and their survivors. And where the rewards for merit are greatest, -there are found the best citizens. - -"And now that you have brought to a close your lamentations for your -relatives, you may depart." - - - - -CHAPTER VII - -_Second Year of the War - The Plague of Athens - Position and -Policy of Pericles - Fall of Potidaea_ - -Such was the funeral that took place during this winter, with -which the first year of the war came to an end. In the first days of -summer the Lacedaemonians and their allies, with two-thirds of their -forces as before, invaded Attica, under the command of Archidamus, son -of Zeuxidamus, King of Lacedaemon, and sat down and laid waste the -country. Not many days after their arrival in Attica the plague -first began to show itself among the Athenians. It was said that it -had broken out in many places previously in the neighbourhood of -Lemnos and elsewhere; but a pestilence of such extent and mortality -was nowhere remembered. Neither were the physicians at first of any -service, ignorant as they were of the proper way to treat it, but they -died themselves the most thickly, as they visited the sick most often; -nor did any human art succeed any better. Supplications in the -temples, divinations, and so forth were found equally futile, till the -overwhelming nature of the disaster at last put a stop to them -altogether. - -It first began, it is said, in the parts of Ethiopia above Egypt, -and thence descended into Egypt and Libya and into most of the -King's country. Suddenly falling upon Athens, it first attacked the -population in Piraeus--which was the occasion of their saying that -the Peloponnesians had poisoned the reservoirs, there being as yet -no wells there--and afterwards appeared in the upper city, when the -deaths became much more frequent. All speculation as to its origin and -its causes, if causes can be found adequate to produce so great a -disturbance, I leave to other writers, whether lay or professional; -for myself, I shall simply set down its nature, and explain the -symptoms by which perhaps it may be recognized by the student, if it -should ever break out again. This I can the better do, as I had the -disease myself, and watched its operation in the case of others. - -That year then is admitted to have been otherwise unprecedentedly -free from sickness; and such few cases as occurred all determined in -this. As a rule, however, there was no ostensible cause; but people in -good health were all of a sudden attacked by violent heats in the -head, and redness and inflammation in the eyes, the inward parts, such -as the throat or tongue, becoming bloody and emitting an unnatural and -fetid breath. These symptoms were followed by sneezing and hoarseness, -after which the pain soon reached the chest, and produced a hard -cough. When it fixed in the stomach, it upset it; and discharges of -bile of every kind named by physicians ensued, accompanied by very -great distress. In most cases also an ineffectual retching followed, -producing violent spasms, which in some cases ceased soon after, in -others much later. Externally the body was not very hot to the -touch, nor pale in its appearance, but reddish, livid, and breaking -out into small pustules and ulcers. But internally it burned so that -the patient could not bear to have on him clothing or linen even of -the very lightest description; or indeed to be otherwise than stark -naked. What they would have liked best would have been to throw -themselves into cold water; as indeed was done by some of the -neglected sick, who plunged into the rain-tanks in their agonies of -unquenchable thirst; though it made no difference whether they drank -little or much. Besides this, the miserable feeling of not being -able to rest or sleep never ceased to torment them. The body meanwhile -did not waste away so long as the distemper was at its height, but -held out to a marvel against its ravages; so that when they succumbed, -as in most cases, on the seventh or eighth day to the internal -inflammation, they had still some strength in them. But if they passed -this stage, and the disease descended further into the bowels, -inducing a violent ulceration there accompanied by severe diarrhoea, -this brought on a weakness which was generally fatal. For the disorder -first settled in the head, ran its course from thence through the -whole of the body, and, even where it did not prove mortal, it still -left its mark on the extremities; for it settled in the privy parts, -the fingers and the toes, and many escaped with the loss of these, -some too with that of their eyes. Others again were seized with an -entire loss of memory on their first recovery, and did not know either -themselves or their friends. - -But while the nature of the distemper was such as to baffle all -description, and its attacks almost too grievous for human nature to -endure, it was still in the following circumstance that its difference -from all ordinary disorders was most clearly shown. All the birds -and beasts that prey upon human bodies, either abstained from touching -them (though there were many lying unburied), or died after tasting -them. In proof of this, it was noticed that birds of this kind -actually disappeared; they were not about the bodies, or indeed to -be seen at all. But of course the effects which I have mentioned could -best be studied in a domestic animal like the dog. - -Such then, if we pass over the varieties of particular cases which -were many and peculiar, were the general features of the distemper. -Meanwhile the town enjoyed an immunity from all the ordinary -disorders; or if any case occurred, it ended in this. Some died in -neglect, others in the midst of every attention. No remedy was found -that could be used as a specific; for what did good in one case, did -harm in another. Strong and weak constitutions proved equally -incapable of resistance, all alike being swept away, although dieted -with the utmost precaution. By far the most terrible feature in the -malady was the dejection which ensued when any one felt himself -sickening, for the despair into which they instantly fell took away -their power of resistance, and left them a much easier prey to the -disorder; besides which, there was the awful spectacle of men dying -like sheep, through having caught the infection in nursing each other. -This caused the greatest mortality. On the one hand, if they were -afraid to visit each other, they perished from neglect; indeed many -houses were emptied of their inmates for want of a nurse: on the -other, if they ventured to do so, death was the consequence. This -was especially the case with such as made any pretensions to goodness: -honour made them unsparing of themselves in their attendance in -their friends' houses, where even the members of the family were at -last worn out by the moans of the dying, and succumbed to the force of -the disaster. Yet it was with those who had recovered from the disease -that the sick and the dying found most compassion. These knew what -it was from experience, and had now no fear for themselves; for the -same man was never attacked twice--never at least fatally. And such -persons not only received the congratulations of others, but -themselves also, in the elation of the moment, half entertained the -vain hope that they were for the future safe from any disease -whatsoever. - -An aggravation of the existing calamity was the influx from the -country into the city, and this was especially felt by the new -arrivals. As there were no houses to receive them, they had to be -lodged at the hot season of the year in stifling cabins, where the -mortality raged without restraint. The bodies of dying men lay one -upon another, and half-dead creatures reeled about the streets and -gathered round all the fountains in their longing for water. The -sacred places also in which they had quartered themselves were full of -corpses of persons that had died there, just as they were; for as -the disaster passed all bounds, men, not knowing what was to become of -them, became utterly careless of everything, whether sacred or -profane. All the burial rites before in use were entirely upset, and -they buried the bodies as best they could. Many from want of the -proper appliances, through so many of their friends having died -already, had recourse to the most shameless sepultures: sometimes -getting the start of those who had raised a pile, they threw their own -dead body upon the stranger's pyre and ignited it; sometimes they -tossed the corpse which they were carrying on the top of another -that was burning, and so went off. - -Nor was this the only form of lawless extravagance which owed its -origin to the plague. Men now coolly ventured on what they had -formerly done in a corner, and not just as they pleased, seeing the -rapid transitions produced by persons in prosperity suddenly dying and -those who before had nothing succeeding to their property. So they -resolved to spend quickly and enjoy themselves, regarding their -lives and riches as alike things of a day. Perseverance in what men -called honour was popular with none, it was so uncertain whether -they would be spared to attain the object; but it was settled that -present enjoyment, and all that contributed to it, was both honourable -and useful. Fear of gods or law of man there was none to restrain -them. As for the first, they judged it to be just the same whether -they worshipped them or not, as they saw all alike perishing; and -for the last, no one expected to live to be brought to trial for his -offences, but each felt that a far severer sentence had been already -passed upon them all and hung ever over their heads, and before this -fell it was only reasonable to enjoy life a little. - -Such was the nature of the calamity, and heavily did it weigh on the -Athenians; death raging within the city and devastation without. Among -other things which they remembered in their distress was, very -naturally, the following verse which the old men said had long ago -been uttered: - - A Dorian war shall come and with it death. - -So a dispute arose as to whether dearth and not death had not been the -word in the verse; but at the present juncture, it was of course -decided in favour of the latter; for the people made their -recollection fit in with their sufferings. I fancy, however, that if -another Dorian war should ever afterwards come upon us, and a dearth -should happen to accompany it, the verse will probably be read -accordingly. The oracle also which had been given to the -Lacedaemonians was now remembered by those who knew of it. When the -god was asked whether they should go to war, he answered that if -they put their might into it, victory would be theirs, and that he -would himself be with them. With this oracle events were supposed to -tally. For the plague broke out as soon as the Peloponnesians -invaded Attica, and never entering Peloponnese (not at least to an -extent worth noticing), committed its worst ravages at Athens, and -next to Athens, at the most populous of the other towns. Such was -the history of the plague. - -After ravaging the plain, the Peloponnesians advanced into the -Paralian region as far as Laurium, where the Athenian silver mines -are, and first laid waste the side looking towards Peloponnese, next -that which faces Euboea and Andros. But Pericles, who was still -general, held the same opinion as in the former invasion, and would -not let the Athenians march out against them. - -However, while they were still in the plain, and had not yet entered -the Paralian land, he had prepared an armament of a hundred ships -for Peloponnese, and when all was ready put out to sea. On board the -ships he took four thousand Athenian heavy infantry, and three hundred -cavalry in horse transports, and then for the first time made out of -old galleys; fifty Chian and Lesbian vessels also joining in the -expedition. When this Athenian armament put out to sea, they left -the Peloponnesians in Attica in the Paralian region. Arriving at -Epidaurus in Peloponnese they ravaged most of the territory, and -even had hopes of taking the town by an assault: in this however -they were not successful. Putting out from Epidaurus, they laid -waste the territory of Troezen, Halieis, and Hermione, all towns on -the coast of Peloponnese, and thence sailing to Prasiai, a maritime -town in Laconia, ravaged part of its territory, and took and sacked -the place itself; after which they returned home, but found the -Peloponnesians gone and no longer in Attica. - -During the whole time that the Peloponnesians were in Attica and the -Athenians on the expedition in their ships, men kept dying of the -plague both in the armament and in Athens. Indeed it was actually -asserted that the departure of the Peloponnesians was hastened by fear -of the disorder; as they heard from deserters that it was in the city, -and also could see the burials going on. Yet in this invasion they -remained longer than in any other, and ravaged the whole country, -for they were about forty days in Attica. - -The same summer Hagnon, son of Nicias, and Cleopompus, son of -Clinias, the colleagues of Pericles, took the armament of which he had -lately made use, and went off upon an expedition against the -Chalcidians in the direction of Thrace and Potidaea, which was still -under siege. As soon as they arrived, they brought up their engines -against Potidaea and tried every means of taking it, but did not -succeed either in capturing the city or in doing anything else -worthy of their preparations. For the plague attacked them here -also, and committed such havoc as to cripple them completely, even the -previously healthy soldiers of the former expedition catching the -infection from Hagnon's troops; while Phormio and the sixteen -hundred men whom he commanded only escaped by being no longer in the -neighbourhood of the Chalcidians. The end of it was that Hagnon -returned with his ships to Athens, having lost one thousand and -fifty out of four thousand heavy infantry in about forty days; -though the soldiers stationed there before remained in the country and -carried on the siege of Potidaea. - -After the second invasion of the Peloponnesians a change came over -the spirit of the Athenians. Their land had now been twice laid waste; -and war and pestilence at once pressed heavy upon them. They began -to find fault with Pericles, as the author of the war and the cause of -all their misfortunes, and became eager to come to terms with -Lacedaemon, and actually sent ambassadors thither, who did not however -succeed in their mission. Their despair was now complete and all -vented itself upon Pericles. When he saw them exasperated at the -present turn of affairs and acting exactly as he had anticipated, he -called an assembly, being (it must be remembered) still general, -with the double object of restoring confidence and of leading them -from these angry feelings to a calmer and more hopeful state of -mind. He accordingly came forward and spoke as follows: - -"I was not unprepared for the indignation of which I have been the -object, as I know its causes; and I have called an assembly for the -purpose of reminding you upon certain points, and of protesting -against your being unreasonably irritated with me, or cowed by your -sufferings. I am of opinion that national greatness is more for the -advantage of private citizens, than any individual well-being -coupled with public humiliation. A man may be personally ever so -well off, and yet if his country be ruined he must be ruined with -it; whereas a flourishing commonwealth always affords chances of -salvation to unfortunate individuals. Since then a state can support -the misfortunes of private citizens, while they cannot support hers, -it is surely the duty of every one to be forward in her defence, and -not like you to be so confounded with your domestic afflictions as -to give up all thoughts of the common safety, and to blame me for -having counselled war and yourselves for having voted it. And yet if -you are angry with me, it is with one who, as I believe, is second -to no man either in knowledge of the proper policy, or in the -ability to expound it, and who is moreover not only a patriot but an -honest one. A man possessing that knowledge without that faculty of -exposition might as well have no idea at all on the matter: if he -had both these gifts, but no love for his country, he would be but a -cold advocate for her interests; while were his patriotism not proof -against bribery, everything would go for a price. So that if you -thought that I was even moderately distinguished for these qualities -when you took my advice and went to war, there is certainly no -reason now why I should be charged with having done wrong. - -"For those of course who have a free choice in the matter and -whose fortunes are not at stake, war is the greatest of follies. But -if the only choice was between submission with loss of independence, -and danger with the hope of preserving that independence, in such a -case it is he who will not accept the risk that deserves blame, not he -who will. I am the same man and do not alter, it is you who change, -since in fact you took my advice while unhurt, and waited for -misfortune to repent of it; and the apparent error of my policy lies -in the infirmity of your resolution, since the suffering that it -entails is being felt by every one among you, while its advantage is -still remote and obscure to all, and a great and sudden reverse having -befallen you, your mind is too much depressed to persevere in your -resolves. For before what is sudden, unexpected, and least within -calculation, the spirit quails; and putting all else aside, the plague -has certainly been an emergency of this kind. Born, however, as you -are, citizens of a great state, and brought up, as you have been, with -habits equal to your birth, you should be ready to face the greatest -disasters and still to keep unimpaired the lustre of your name. For -the judgment of mankind is as relentless to the weakness that falls -short of a recognized renown, as it is jealous of the arrogance that -aspires higher than its due. Cease then to grieve for your private -afflictions, and address yourselves instead to the safety of the -commonwealth. - -"If you shrink before the exertions which the war makes necessary, -and fear that after all they may not have a happy result, you know the -reasons by which I have often demonstrated to you the groundlessness -of your apprehensions. If those are not enough, I will now reveal an -advantage arising from the greatness of your dominion, which I think -has never yet suggested itself to you, which I never mentioned in my -previous speeches, and which has so bold a sound that I should -scarce adventure it now, were it not for the unnatural depression -which I see around me. You perhaps think that your empire extends only -over your allies; I will declare to you the truth. The visible field -of action has two parts, land and sea. In the whole of one of these -you are completely supreme, not merely as far as you use it at -present, but also to what further extent you may think fit: in fine, -your naval resources are such that your vessels may go where they -please, without the King or any other nation on earth being able to -stop them. So that although you may think it a great privation to lose -the use of your land and houses, still you must see that this power is -something widely different; and instead of fretting on their -account, you should really regard them in the light of the gardens and -other accessories that embellish a great fortune, and as, in -comparison, of little moment. You should know too that liberty -preserved by your efforts will easily recover for us what we have -lost, while, the knee once bowed, even what you have will pass from -you. Your fathers receiving these possessions not from others, but -from themselves, did not let slip what their labour had acquired, -but delivered them safe to you; and in this respect at least you -must prove yourselves their equals, remembering that to lose what -one has got is more disgraceful than to be balked in getting, and -you must confront your enemies not merely with spirit but with -disdain. Confidence indeed a blissful ignorance can impart, ay, even -to a coward's breast, but disdain is the privilege of those who, -like us, have been assured by reflection of their superiority to their -adversary. And where the chances are the same, knowledge fortifies -courage by the contempt which is its consequence, its trust being -placed, not in hope, which is the prop of the desperate, but in a -judgment grounded upon existing resources, whose anticipations are -more to be depended upon. - -"Again, your country has a right to your services in sustaining -the glories of her position. These are a common source of pride to you -all, and you cannot decline the burdens of empire and still expect -to share its honours. You should remember also that what you are -fighting against is not merely slavery as an exchange for -independence, but also loss of empire and danger from the -animosities incurred in its exercise. Besides, to recede is no -longer possible, if indeed any of you in the alarm of the moment has -become enamoured of the honesty of such an unambitious part. For -what you hold is, to speak somewhat plainly, a tyranny; to take it -perhaps was wrong, but to let it go is unsafe. And men of these -retiring views, making converts of others, would quickly ruin a state; -indeed the result would be the same if they could live independent -by themselves; for the retiring and unambitious are never secure -without vigorous protectors at their side; in fine, such qualities are -useless to an imperial city, though they may help a dependency to an -unmolested servitude. - -"But you must not be seduced by citizens like these or angry with -me--who, if I voted for war, only did as you did yourselves--in spite -of the enemy having invaded your country and done what you could be -certain that he would do, if you refused to comply with his demands; -and although besides what we counted for, the plague has come upon -us--the only point indeed at which our calculation has been at fault. -It is this, I know, that has had a large share in making me more -unpopular than I should otherwise have been--quite undeservedly, -unless you are also prepared to give me the credit of any success with -which chance may present you. Besides, the hand of heaven must be -borne with resignation, that of the enemy with fortitude; this was the -old way at Athens, and do not you prevent it being so still. Remember, -too, that if your country has the greatest name in all the world, it -is because she never bent before disaster; because she has expended -more life and effort in war than any other city, and has won for -herself a power greater than any hitherto known, the memory of which -will descend to the latest posterity; even if now, in obedience to the -general law of decay, we should ever be forced to yield, still it will -be remembered that we held rule over more Hellenes than any other -Hellenic state, that we sustained the greatest wars against their -united or separate powers, and inhabited a city unrivalled by any -other in resources or magnitude. These glories may incur the censure -of the slow and unambitious; but in the breast of energy they will -awake emulation, and in those who must remain without them an -envious regret. Hatred and unpopularity at the moment have fallen to -the lot of all who have aspired to rule others; but where odium must -be incurred, true wisdom incurs it for the highest objects. Hatred -also is short-lived; but that which makes the splendour of the present -and the glory of the future remains for ever unforgotten. Make your -decision, therefore, for glory then and honour now, and attain both -objects by instant and zealous effort: do not send heralds to -Lacedaemon, and do not betray any sign of being oppressed by your -present sufferings, since they whose minds are least sensitive to -calamity, and whose hands are most quick to meet it, are the -greatest men and the greatest communities." - -Such were the arguments by which Pericles tried to cure the -Athenians of their anger against him and to divert their thoughts from -their immediate afflictions. As a community he succeeded in convincing -them; they not only gave up all idea of sending to Lacedaemon, but -applied themselves with increased energy to the war; still as -private individuals they could not help smarting under their -sufferings, the common people having been deprived of the little -that they were possessed, while the higher orders had lost fine -properties with costly establishments and buildings in the country, -and, worst of all, had war instead of peace. In fact, the public -feeling against him did not subside until he had been fined. Not -long afterwards, however, according to the way of the multitude, -they again elected him general and committed all their affairs to -his hands, having now become less sensitive to their private and -domestic afflictions, and understanding that he was the best man of -all for the public necessities. For as long as he was at the head of -the state during the peace, he pursued a moderate and conservative -policy; and in his time its greatness was at its height. When the -war broke out, here also he seems to have rightly gauged the power -of his country. He outlived its commencement two years and six months, -and the correctness of his previsions respecting it became better -known by his death. He told them to wait quietly, to pay attention -to their marine, to attempt no new conquests, and to expose the city -to no hazards during the war, and doing this, promised them a -favourable result. What they did was the very contrary, allowing -private ambitions and private interests, in matters apparently quite -foreign to the war, to lead them into projects unjust both to -themselves and to their allies--projects whose success would only -conduce to the honour and advantage of private persons, and whose -failure entailed certain disaster on the country in the war. The -causes of this are not far to seek. Pericles indeed, by his rank, -ability, and known integrity, was enabled to exercise an independent -control over the multitude--in short, to lead them instead of being -led by them; for as he never sought power by improper means, he was -never compelled to flatter them, but, on the contrary, enjoyed so high -an estimation that he could afford to anger them by contradiction. -Whenever he saw them unseasonably and insolently elated, he would with -a word reduce them to alarm; on the other hand, if they fell victims -to a panic, he could at once restore them to confidence. In short, -what was nominally a democracy became in his hands government by the -first citizen. With his successors it was different. More on a level -with one another, and each grasping at supremacy, they ended by -committing even the conduct of state affairs to the whims of the -multitude. This, as might have been expected in a great and -sovereign state, produced a host of blunders, and amongst them the -Sicilian expedition; though this failed not so much through a -miscalculation of the power of those against whom it was sent, as -through a fault in the senders in not taking the best measures -afterwards to assist those who had gone out, but choosing rather to -occupy themselves with private cabals for the leadership of the -commons, by which they not only paralysed operations in the field, but -also first introduced civil discord at home. Yet after losing most -of their fleet besides other forces in Sicily, and with faction -already dominant in the city, they could still for three years make -head against their original adversaries, joined not only by the -Sicilians, but also by their own allies nearly all in revolt, and at -last by the King's son, Cyrus, who furnished the funds for the -Peloponnesian navy. Nor did they finally succumb till they fell the -victims of their own intestine disorders. So superfluously abundant -were the resources from which the genius of Pericles foresaw an easy -triumph in the war over the unaided forces of the Peloponnesians. - -During the same summer the Lacedaemonians and their allies made an -expedition with a hundred ships against Zacynthus, an island lying off -the coast of Elis, peopled by a colony of Achaeans from Peloponnese, -and in alliance with Athens. There were a thousand Lacedaemonian heavy -infantry on board, and Cnemus, a Spartan, as admiral. They made a -descent from their ships, and ravaged most of the country; but as -the inhabitants would not submit, they sailed back home. - -At the end of the same summer the Corinthian Aristeus, Aneristus, -Nicolaus, and Stratodemus, envoys from Lacedaemon, Timagoras, a -Tegean, and a private individual named Pollis from Argos, on their way -to Asia to persuade the King to supply funds and join in the war, came -to Sitalces, son of Teres in Thrace, with the idea of inducing him, if -possible, to forsake the alliance of Athens and to march on Potidaea -then besieged by an Athenian force, and also of getting conveyed by -his means to their destination across the Hellespont to Pharnabazus, -who was to send them up the country to the King. But there chanced -to be with Sitalces some Athenian ambassadors--Learchus, son of -Callimachus, and Ameiniades, son of Philemon--who persuaded Sitalces' -son, Sadocus, the new Athenian citizen, to put the men into their -hands and thus prevent their crossing over to the King and doing their -part to injure the country of his choice. He accordingly had them -seized, as they were travelling through Thrace to the vessel in -which they were to cross the Hellespont, by a party whom he had sent -on with Learchus and Ameiniades, and gave orders for their delivery to -the Athenian ambassadors, by whom they were brought to Athens. On -their arrival, the Athenians, afraid that Aristeus, who had been -notably the prime mover in the previous affairs of Potidaea and -their Thracian possessions, might live to do them still more -mischief if he escaped, slew them all the same day, without giving -them a trial or hearing the defence which they wished to offer, and -cast their bodies into a pit; thinking themselves justified in using -in retaliation the same mode of warfare which the Lacedaemonians had -begun, when they slew and cast into pits all the Athenian and allied -traders whom they caught on board the merchantmen round Peloponnese. -Indeed, at the outset of the war, the Lacedaemonians butchered as -enemies all whom they took on the sea, whether allies of Athens or -neutrals. - -About the same time towards the close of the summer, the Ambraciot -forces, with a number of barbarians that they had raised, marched -against the Amphilochian Argos and the rest of that country. The -origin of their enmity against the Argives was this. This Argos and -the rest of Amphilochia were colonized by Amphilochus, son of -Amphiaraus. Dissatisfied with the state of affairs at home on his -return thither after the Trojan War, he built this city in the -Ambracian Gulf, and named it Argos after his own country. This was the -largest town in Amphilochia, and its inhabitants the most powerful. -Under the pressure of misfortune many generations afterwards, they -called in the Ambraciots, their neighbours on the Amphilochian border, -to join their colony; and it was by this union with the Ambraciots -that they learnt their present Hellenic speech, the rest of the -Amphilochians being barbarians. After a time the Ambraciots expelled -the Argives and held the city themselves. Upon this the -Amphilochians gave themselves over to the Acarnanians; and the two -together called the Athenians, who sent them Phormio as general and -thirty ships; upon whose arrival they took Argos by storm, and made -slaves of the Ambraciots; and the Amphilochians and Acarnanians -inhabited the town in common. After this began the alliance between -the Athenians and Acarnanians. The enmity of the Ambraciots against -the Argives thus commenced with the enslavement of their citizens; and -afterwards during the war they collected this armament among -themselves and the Chaonians, and other of the neighbouring -barbarians. Arrived before Argos, they became masters of the -country; but not being successful in their attacks upon the town, -returned home and dispersed among their different peoples. - -Such were the events of the summer. The ensuing winter the Athenians -sent twenty ships round Peloponnese, under the command of Phormio, who -stationed himself at Naupactus and kept watch against any one -sailing in or out of Corinth and the Crissaean Gulf. Six others went -to Caria and Lycia under Melesander, to collect tribute in those -parts, and also to prevent the Peloponnesian privateers from taking up -their station in those waters and molesting the passage of the -merchantmen from Phaselis and Phoenicia and the adjoining continent. -However, Melesander, going up the country into Lycia with a force of -Athenians from the ships and the allies, was defeated and killed in -battle, with the loss of a number of his troops. - -The same winter the Potidaeans at length found themselves no -longer able to hold out against their besiegers. The inroads of the -Peloponnesians into Attica had not had the desired effect of making -the Athenians raise the siege. Provisions there were none left; and so -far had distress for food gone in Potidaea that, besides a number of -other horrors, instances had even occurred of the people having -eaten one another. In this extremity they at last made proposals for -capitulating to the Athenian generals in command against -them--Xenophon, son of Euripides, Hestiodorus, son of Aristocleides, -and Phanomachus, son of Callimachus. The generals accepted their -proposals, seeing the sufferings of the army in so exposed a position; -besides which the state had already spent two thousand talents upon -the siege. The terms of the capitulation were as follows: a free -passage out for themselves, their children, wives and auxiliaries, -with one garment apiece, the women with two, and a fixed sum of -money for their journey. Under this treaty they went out to Chalcidice -and other places, according as was their power. The Athenians, -however, blamed the generals for granting terms without instructions -from home, being of opinion that the place would have had to surrender -at discretion. They afterwards sent settlers of their own to Potidaea, -and colonized it. Such were the events of the winter, and so ended the -second year of this war of which Thucydides was the historian. - - - -CHAPTER VIII - -_Third Year of the War - Investment of Plataea - Naval Victories -of Phormio - Thracian Irruption into Macedonia under Sitalces_ - -The next summer the Peloponnesians and their allies, instead of -invading Attica, marched against Plataea, under the command of -Archidamus, son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. He had -encamped his army and was about to lay waste the country, when the -Plataeans hastened to send envoys to him, and spoke as follows: -"Archidamus and Lacedaemonians, in invading the Plataean territory, -you do what is wrong in itself, and worthy neither of yourselves nor -of the fathers who begot you. Pausanias, son of Cleombrotus, your -countryman, after freeing Hellas from the Medes with the help of -those Hellenes who were willing to undertake the risk of the battle -fought near our city, offered sacrifice to Zeus the Liberator in the -marketplace of Plataea, and calling all the allies together restored -to the Plataeans their city and territory, and declared it -independent and inviolate against aggression or conquest. Should any -such be attempted, the allies present were to help according to their -power. Your fathers rewarded us thus for the courage and patriotism -that we displayed at that perilous epoch; but you do just the -contrary, coming with our bitterest enemies, the Thebans, to enslave -us. We appeal, therefore, to the gods to whom the oaths were then -made, to the gods of your ancestors, and lastly to those of our -country, and call upon you to refrain from violating our territory -or transgressing the oaths, and to let us live independent, as -Pausanias decreed." - -The Plataeans had got thus far when they were cut short by -Archidamus saying: "There is justice, Plataeans, in what you say, if -you act up to your words. According, to the grant of Pausanias, -continue to be independent yourselves, and join in freeing those of -your fellow countrymen who, after sharing in the perils of that -period, joined in the oaths to you, and are now subject to the -Athenians; for it is to free them and the rest that all this provision -and war has been made. I could wish that you would share our labours -and abide by the oaths yourselves; if this is impossible, do what we -have already required of you--remain neutral, enjoying your own; join -neither side, but receive both as friends, neither as allies for the -war. With this we shall be satisfied." Such were the words of -Archidamus. The Plataeans, after hearing what he had to say, went into -the city and acquainted the people with what had passed, and presently -returned for answer that it was impossible for them to do what he -proposed without consulting the Athenians, with whom their children -and wives now were; besides which they had their fears for the town. -After his departure, what was to prevent the Athenians from coming and -taking it out of their hands, or the Thebans, who would be included in -the oaths, from taking advantage of the proposed neutrality to make -a second attempt to seize the city? Upon these points he tried to -reassure them by saying: "You have only to deliver over the city and -houses to us Lacedaemonians, to point out the boundaries of your land, -the number of your fruit-trees, and whatever else can be numerically -stated, and yourselves to withdraw wherever you like as long as the -war shall last. When it is over we will restore to you whatever we -received, and in the interim hold it in trust and keep it in -cultivation, paying you a sufficient allowance." - -When they had heard what he had to say, they re-entered the city, -and after consulting with the people said that they wished first to -acquaint the Athenians with this proposal, and in the event of their -approving to accede to it; in the meantime they asked him to grant -them a truce and not to lay waste their territory. He accordingly -granted a truce for the number of days requisite for the journey, -and meanwhile abstained from ravaging their territory. The Plataean -envoys went to Athens, and consulted with the Athenians, and -returned with the following message to those in the city: "The -Athenians say, Plataeans, that they never hitherto, since we became -their allies, on any occasion abandoned us to an enemy, nor will -they now neglect us, but will help us according to their ability; -and they adjure you by the oaths which your fathers swore, to keep the -alliance unaltered." - -On the delivery of this message by the envoys, the Plataeans -resolved not to be unfaithful to the Athenians but to endure, if it -must be, seeing their lands laid waste and any other trials that might -come to them, and not to send out again, but to answer from the wall -that it was impossible for them to do as the Lacedaemonians -proposed. As soon as he had received this answer, King Archidamus -proceeded first to make a solemn appeal to the gods and heroes of -the country in words following: "Ye gods and heroes of the Plataean -territory, be my witnesses that not as aggressors originally, nor -until these had first departed from the common oath, did we invade -this land, in which our fathers offered you their prayers before -defeating the Medes, and which you made auspicious to the Hellenic -arms; nor shall we be aggressors in the measures to which we may now -resort, since we have made many fair proposals but have not been -successful. Graciously accord that those who were the first to -offend may be punished for it, and that vengeance may be attained by -those who would righteously inflict it." - -After this appeal to the gods Archidamus put his army in motion. -First he enclosed the town with a palisade formed of the fruit-trees -which they cut down, to prevent further egress from Plataea; next they -threw up a mound against the city, hoping that the largeness of the -force employed would ensure the speedy reduction of the place. They -accordingly cut down timber from Cithaeron, and built it up on -either side, laying it like lattice-work to serve as a wall to keep -the mound from spreading abroad, and carried to it wood and stones and -earth and whatever other material might help to complete it. They -continued to work at the mound for seventy days and nights without -intermission, being divided into relief parties to allow of some being -employed in carrying while others took sleep and refreshment; the -Lacedaemonian officer attached to each contingent keeping the men to -the work. But the Plataeans, observing the progress of the mound, -constructed a wall of wood and fixed it upon that part of the city -wall against which the mound was being erected, and built up bricks -inside it which they took from the neighbouring houses. The timbers -served to bind the building together, and to prevent its becoming weak -as it advanced in height; it had also a covering of skins and hides, -which protected the woodwork against the attacks of burning missiles -and allowed the men to work in safety. Thus the wall was raised to a -great height, and the mound opposite made no less rapid progress. -The Plataeans also thought of another expedient; they pulled out -part of the wall upon which the mound abutted, and carried the earth -into the city. - -Discovering this the Peloponnesians twisted up clay in wattles of -reed and threw it into the breach formed in the mound, in order to -give it consistency and prevent its being carried away like the -soil. Stopped in this way the Plataeans changed their mode of -operation, and digging a mine from the town calculated their way under -the mound, and began to carry off its material as before. This went on -for a long while without the enemy outside finding it out, so that for -all they threw on the top their mound made no progress in -proportion, being carried away from beneath and constantly settling -down in the vacuum. But the Plataeans, fearing that even thus they -might not be able to hold out against the superior numbers of the -enemy, had yet another invention. They stopped working at the large -building in front of the mound, and starting at either end of it -inside from the old low wall, built a new one in the form of a -crescent running in towards the town; in order that in the event of -the great wall being taken this might remain, and the enemy have to -throw up a fresh mound against it, and as they advanced within might -not only have their trouble over again, but also be exposed to -missiles on their flanks. While raising the mound the Peloponnesians -also brought up engines against the city, one of which was brought -up upon the mound against the great building and shook down a good -piece of it, to the no small alarm of the Plataeans. Others were -advanced against different parts of the wall but were lassoed and -broken by the Plataeans; who also hung up great beams by long iron -chains from either extremity of two poles laid on the wall and -projecting over it, and drew them up at an angle whenever any point -was threatened by the engine, and loosing their hold let the beam go -with its chains slack, so that it fell with a run and snapped off -the nose of the battering ram. - -After this the Peloponnesians, finding that their engines effected -nothing, and that their mound was met by the counterwork, concluded -that their present means of offence were unequal to the taking of -the city, and prepared for its circumvallation. First, however, they -determined to try the effects of fire and see whether they could -not, with the help of a wind, burn the town, as it was not a large -one; indeed they thought of every possible expedient by which the -place might be reduced without the expense of a blockade. They -accordingly brought faggots of brushwood and threw them from the -mound, first into the space between it and the wall; and this soon -becoming full from the number of hands at work, they next heaped the -faggots up as far into the town as they could reach from the top, -and then lighted the wood by setting fire to it with sulphur and -pitch. The consequence was a fire greater than any one had ever yet -seen produced by human agency, though it could not of course be -compared to the spontaneous conflagrations sometimes known to occur -through the wind rubbing the branches of a mountain forest together. -And this fire was not only remarkable for its magnitude, but was also, -at the end of so many perils, within an ace of proving fatal to the -Plataeans; a great part of the town became entirely inaccessible, -and had a wind blown upon it, in accordance with the hopes of the -enemy, nothing could have saved them. As it was, there is also a story -of heavy rain and thunder having come on by which the fire was put out -and the danger averted. - -Failing in this last attempt the Peloponnesians left a portion of -their forces on the spot, dismissing the rest, and built a wall of -circumvallation round the town, dividing the ground among the -various cities present; a ditch being made within and without the -lines, from which they got their bricks. All being finished by about -the rising of Arcturus, they left men enough to man half the wall, the -rest being manned by the Boeotians, and drawing off their army -dispersed to their several cities. The Plataeans had before sent off -their wives and children and oldest men and the mass of the -non-combatants to Athens; so that the number of the besieged left in -the place comprised four hundred of their own citizens, eighty -Athenians, and a hundred and ten women to bake their bread. This was -the sum total at the commencement of the siege, and there was no one -else within the walls, bond or free. Such were the arrangements made -for the blockade of Plataea. - -The same summer and simultaneously with the expedition against -Plataea, the Athenians marched with two thousand heavy infantry and -two hundred horse against the Chalcidians in the direction of Thrace -and the Bottiaeans, just as the corn was getting ripe, under the -command of Xenophon, son of Euripides, with two colleagues. Arriving -before Spartolus in Bottiaea, they destroyed the corn and had some -hopes of the city coming over through the intrigues of a faction -within. But those of a different way of thinking had sent to Olynthus; -and a garrison of heavy infantry and other troops arrived accordingly. -These issuing from Spartolus were engaged by the Athenians in front of -the town: the Chalcidian heavy infantry, and some auxiliaries with -them, were beaten and retreated into Spartolus; but the Chalcidian -horse and light troops defeated the horse and light troops of the -Athenians. The Chalcidians had already a few targeteers from Crusis, -and presently after the battle were joined by some others from -Olynthus; upon seeing whom the light troops from Spartolus, emboldened -by this accession and by their previous success, with the help of -the Chalcidian horse and the reinforcement just arrived again attacked -the Athenians, who retired upon the two divisions which they had -left with their baggage. Whenever the Athenians advanced, their -adversary gave way, pressing them with missiles the instant they began -to retire. The Chalcidian horse also, riding up and charging them just -as they pleased, at last caused a panic amongst them and routed and -pursued them to a great distance. The Athenians took refuge in -Potidaea, and afterwards recovered their dead under truce, and -returned to Athens with the remnant of their army; four hundred and -thirty men and all the generals having fallen. The Chalcidians and -Bottiaeans set up a trophy, took up their dead, and dispersed to their -several cities. - -The same summer, not long after this, the Ambraciots and -Chaonians, being desirous of reducing the whole of Acarnania and -detaching it from Athens, persuaded the Lacedaemonians to equip a -fleet from their confederacy and send a thousand heavy infantry to -Acarnania, representing that, if a combined movement were made by land -and sea, the coast Acarnanians would be unable to march, and the -conquest of Zacynthus and Cephallenia easily following on the -possession of Acarnania, the cruise round Peloponnese would be no -longer so convenient for the Athenians. Besides which there was a hope -of taking Naupactus. The Lacedaemonians accordingly at once sent off a -few vessels with Cnemus, who was still high admiral, and the heavy -infantry on board; and sent round orders for the fleet to equip as -quickly as possible and sail to Leucas. The Corinthians were the -most forward in the business; the Ambraciots being a colony of theirs. -While the ships from Corinth, Sicyon, and the neighbourhood were -getting ready, and those from Leucas, Anactorium, and Ambracia, -which had arrived before, were waiting for them at Leucas, Cnemus -and his thousand heavy infantry had run into the gulf, giving the slip -to Phormio, the commander of the Athenian squadron stationed off -Naupactus, and began at once to prepare for the land expedition. The -Hellenic troops with him consisted of the Ambraciots, Leucadians, -and Anactorians, and the thousand Peloponnesians with whom he came; -the barbarian of a thousand Chaonians, who, belonging to a nation that -has no king, were led by Photys and Nicanor, the two members of the -royal family to whom the chieftainship for that year had been -confided. With the Chaonians came also some Thesprotians, like them -without a king, some Molossians and Atintanians led by Sabylinthus, -the guardian of King Tharyps who was still a minor, and some -Paravaeans, under their king Oroedus, accompanied by a thousand -Orestians, subjects of King Antichus and placed by him under the -command of Oroedus. There were also a thousand Macedonians sent by -Perdiccas without the knowledge of the Athenians, but they arrived too -late. With this force Cnemus set out, without waiting for the fleet -from Corinth. Passing through the territory of Amphilochian Argos, and -sacking the open village of Limnaea, they advanced to Stratus the -Acarnanian capital; this once taken, the rest of the country, they -felt convinced, would speedily follow. - -The Acarnanians, finding themselves invaded by a large army by land, -and from the sea threatened by a hostile fleet, made no combined -attempt at resistance, but remained to defend their homes, and sent -for help to Phormio, who replied that, when a fleet was on the point -of sailing from Corinth, it was impossible for him to leave -Naupactus unprotected. The Peloponnesians meanwhile and their allies -advanced upon Stratus in three divisions, with the intention of -encamping near it and attempting the wall by force if they failed to -succeed by negotiation. The order of march was as follows: the -centre was occupied by the Chaonians and the rest of the barbarians, -with the Leucadians and Anactorians and their followers on the -right, and Cnemus with the Peloponnesians and Ambraciots on the -left; each division being a long way off from, and sometimes even -out of sight of, the others. The Hellenes advanced in good order, -keeping a look-out till they encamped in a good position; but the -Chaonians, filled with self-confidence, and having the highest -character for courage among the tribes of that part of the -continent, without waiting to occupy their camp, rushed on with the -rest of the barbarians, in the idea that they should take the town -by assault and obtain the sole glory of the enterprise. While they -were coming on, the Stratians, becoming aware how things stood, and -thinking that the defeat of this division would considerably -dishearten the Hellenes behind it, occupied the environs of the town -with ambuscades, and as soon as they approached engaged them at -close quarters from the city and the ambuscades. A panic seizing the -Chaonians, great numbers of them were slain; and as soon as they -were seen to give way the rest of the barbarians turned and fled. -Owing to the distance by which their allies had preceded them, neither -of the Hellenic divisions knew anything of the battle, but fancied -they were hastening on to encamp. However, when the flying -barbarians broke in upon them, they opened their ranks to receive -them, brought their divisions together, and stopped quiet where they -were for the day; the Stratians not offering to engage them, as the -rest of the Acarnanians had not yet arrived, but contenting themselves -with slinging at them from a distance, which distressed them -greatly, as there was no stirring without their armour. The -Acarnanians would seem to excel in this mode of warfare. - -As soon as night fell, Cnemus hastily drew off his army to the river -Anapus, about nine miles from Stratus, recovering his dead next day -under truce, and being there joined by the friendly Oeniadae, fell -back upon their city before the enemy's reinforcements came up. From -hence each returned home; and the Stratians set up a trophy for the -battle with the barbarians. - -Meanwhile the fleet from Corinth and the rest of the confederates in -the Crissaean Gulf, which was to have co-operated with Cnemus and -prevented the coast Acarnanians from joining their countrymen in the -interior, was disabled from doing so by being compelled about the same -time as the battle at Stratus to fight with Phormio and the twenty -Athenian vessels stationed at Naupactus. For they were watched, as -they coasted along out of the gulf, by Phormio, who wished to attack -in the open sea. But the Corinthians and allies had started for -Acarnania without any idea of fighting at sea, and with vessels more -like transports for carrying soldiers; besides which, they never -dreamed of the twenty Athenian ships venturing to engage their -forty-seven. However, while they were coasting along their own -shore, there were the Athenians sailing along in line with them; and -when they tried to cross over from Patrae in Achaea to the mainland on -the other side, on their way to Acarnania, they saw them again -coming out from Chalcis and the river Evenus to meet them. They -slipped from their moorings in the night, but were observed, and -were at length compelled to fight in mid passage. Each state that -contributed to the armament had its own general; the Corinthian -commanders were Machaon, Isocrates, and Agatharchidas. The -Peloponnesians ranged their vessels in as large a circle as possible -without leaving an opening, with the prows outside and the sterns -in; and placed within all the small craft in company, and their five -best sailers to issue out at a moment's notice and strengthen any -point threatened by the enemy. - -The Athenians, formed in line, sailed round and round them, and -forced them to contract their circle, by continually brushing past and -making as though they would attack at once, having been previously -cautioned by Phormio not to do so till he gave the signal. His hope -was that the Peloponnesians would not retain their order like a -force on shore, but that the ships would fall foul of one another -and the small craft cause confusion; and if the wind should blow -from the gulf (in expectation of which he kept sailing round them, and -which usually rose towards morning), they would not, he felt sure, -remain steady an instant. He also thought that it rested with him to -attack when he pleased, as his ships were better sailers, and that -an attack timed by the coming of the wind would tell best. When the -wind came down, the enemy's ships were now in a narrow space, and what -with the wind and the small craft dashing against them, at once fell -into confusion: ship fell foul of ship, while the crews were pushing -them off with poles, and by their shouting, swearing, and struggling -with one another, made captains' orders and boatswains' cries alike -inaudible, and through being unable for want of practice to clear -their oars in the rough water, prevented the vessels from obeying -their helmsmen properly. At this moment Phormio gave the signal, and -the Athenians attacked. Sinking first one of the admirals, they then -disabled all they came across, so that no one thought of resistance -for the confusion, but fled for Patrae and Dyme in Achaea. The -Athenians gave chase and captured twelve ships, and taking most of the -men out of them sailed to Molycrium, and after setting up a trophy -on the promontory of Rhium and dedicating a ship to Poseidon, returned -to Naupactus. As for the Peloponnesians, they at once sailed with -their remaining ships along the coast from Dyme and Patrae to Cyllene, -the Eleian arsenal; where Cnemus, and the ships from Leucas that -were to have joined them, also arrived after the battle at Stratus. - -The Lacedaemonians now sent to the fleet to Cnemus three -commissioners--Timocrates, Bradidas, and Lycophron--with orders to -prepare to engage again with better fortune, and not to be driven from -the sea by a few vessels; for they could not at all account for -their discomfiture, the less so as it was their first attempt at -sea; and they fancied that it was not that their marine was so -inferior, but that there had been misconduct somewhere, not -considering the long experience of the Athenians as compared with -the little practice which they had had themselves. The commissioners -were accordingly sent in anger. As soon as they arrived they set to -work with Cnemus to order ships from the different states, and to -put those which they already had in fighting order. Meanwhile -Phormio sent word to Athens of their preparations and his own victory, -and desired as many ships as possible to be speedily sent to him, as -he stood in daily expectation of a battle. Twenty were accordingly -sent, but instructions were given to their commander to go first to -Crete. For Nicias, a Cretan of Gortys, who was proxenus of the -Athenians, had persuaded them to sail against Cydonia, promising to -procure the reduction of that hostile town; his real wish being to -oblige the Polichnitans, neighbours of the Cydonians. He accordingly -went with the ships to Crete, and, accompanied by the Polichnitans, -laid waste the lands of the Cydonians; and, what with adverse winds -and stress of weather wasted no little time there. - -While the Athenians were thus detained in Crete, the -Peloponnesians in Cyllene got ready for battle, and coasted along to -Panormus in Achaea, where their land army had come to support them. -Phormio also coasted along to Molycrian Rhium, and anchored outside it -with twenty ships, the same as he had fought with before. This Rhium -was friendly to the Athenians. The other, in Peloponnese, lies -opposite to it; the sea between them is about three-quarters of a mile -broad, and forms the mouth of the Crissaean gulf. At this, the Achaean -Rhium, not far off Panormus, where their army lay, the -Peloponnesians now cast anchor with seventy-seven ships, when they saw -the Athenians do so. For six or seven days they remained opposite each -other, practising and preparing for the battle; the one resolved not -to sail out of the Rhia into the open sea, for fear of the disaster -which had already happened to them, the other not to sail into the -straits, thinking it advantageous to the enemy, to fight in the -narrows. At last Cnemus and Brasidas and the rest of the Peloponnesian -commanders, being desirous of bringing on a battle as soon as -possible, before reinforcements should arrive from Athens, and -noticing that the men were most of them cowed by the previous defeat -and out of heart for the business, first called them together and -encouraged them as follows: - -"Peloponnesians, the late engagement, which may have made some of -you afraid of the one now in prospect, really gives no just ground for -apprehension. Preparation for it, as you know, there was little -enough; and the object of our voyage was not so much to fight at sea -as an expedition by land. Besides this, the chances of war were -largely against us; and perhaps also inexperience had something to -do with our failure in our first naval action. It was not, -therefore, cowardice that produced our defeat, nor ought the -determination which force has not quelled, but which still has a -word to say with its adversary, to lose its edge from the result of an -accident; but admitting the possibility of a chance miscarriage, we -should know that brave hearts must be always brave, and while they -remain so can never put forward inexperience as an excuse for -misconduct. Nor are you so behind the enemy in experience as you are -ahead of him in courage; and although the science of your opponents -would, if valour accompanied it, have also the presence of mind to -carry out at in emergency the lesson it has learnt, yet a faint -heart will make all art powerless in the face of danger. For fear -takes away presence of mind, and without valour art is useless. -Against their superior experience set your superior daring, and -against the fear induced by defeat the fact of your having been then -unprepared; remember, too, that you have always the advantage of -superior numbers, and of engaging off your own coast, supported by -your heavy infantry; and as a rule, numbers and equipment give -victory. At no point, therefore, is defeat likely; and as for our -previous mistakes, the very fact of their occurrence will teach us -better for the future. Steersmen and sailors may, therefore, -confidently attend to their several duties, none quitting the -station assigned to them: as for ourselves, we promise to prepare -for the engagement at least as well as your previous commanders, and -to give no excuse for any one misconducting himself. Should any insist -on doing so, he shall meet with the punishment he deserves, while -the brave shall be honoured with the appropriate rewards of valour." - -The Peloponnesian commanders encouraged their men after this -fashion. Phormio, meanwhile, being himself not without fears for the -courage of his men, and noticing that they were forming in groups -among themselves and were alarmed at the odds against them, desired to -call them together and give them confidence and counsel in the present -emergency. He had before continually told them, and had accustomed -their minds to the idea, that there was no numerical superiority -that they could not face; and the men themselves had long been -persuaded that Athenians need never retire before any quantity of -Peloponnesian vessels. At the moment, however, he saw that they were -dispirited by the sight before them, and wishing to refresh their -confidence, called them together and spoke as follows: - -"I see, my men, that you are frightened by the number of the -enemy, and I have accordingly called you together, not liking you to -be afraid of what is not really terrible. In the first place, the -Peloponnesians, already defeated, and not even themselves thinking -that they are a match for us, have not ventured to meet us on equal -terms, but have equipped this multitude of ships against us. Next, -as to that upon which they most rely, the courage which they suppose -constitutional to them, their confidence here only arises from the -success which their experience in land service usually gives them, and -which they fancy will do the same for them at sea. But this -advantage will in all justice belong to us on this element, if to them -on that; as they are not superior to us in courage, but we are each of -us more confident, according to our experience in our particular -department. Besides, as the Lacedaemonians use their supremacy over -their allies to promote their own glory, they are most of them being -brought into danger against their will, or they would never, after -such a decided defeat, have ventured upon a fresh engagement. You need -not, therefore, be afraid of their dash. You, on the contrary, inspire -a much greater and better founded alarm, both because of your late -victory and also of their belief that we should not face them unless -about to do something worthy of a success so signal. An adversary -numerically superior, like the one before us, comes into action -trusting more to strength than to resolution; while he who voluntarily -confronts tremendous odds must have very great internal resources to -draw upon. For these reasons the Peloponnesians fear our irrational -audacity more than they would ever have done a more commensurate -preparation. Besides, many armaments have before now succumbed to an -inferior through want of skill or sometimes of courage; neither of -which defects certainly are ours. As to the battle, it shall not be, -if I can help it, in the strait, nor will I sail in there at all; -seeing that in a contest between a number of clumsily managed -vessels and a small, fast, well-handled squadron, want of sea room -is an undoubted disadvantage. One cannot run down an enemy properly -without having a sight of him a good way off, nor can one retire at -need when pressed; one can neither break the line nor return upon -his rear, the proper tactics for a fast sailer; but the naval action -necessarily becomes a land one, in which numbers must decide the -matter. For all this I will provide as far as can be. Do you stay at -your posts by your ships, and be sharp at catching the word of -command, the more so as we are observing one another from so short a -distance; and in action think order and silence -all-important--qualities useful in war generally, and in naval -engagements in particular; and behave before the enemy in a manner -worthy of your past exploits. The issues you will fight for are -great--to destroy the naval hopes of the Peloponnesians or to bring -nearer to the Athenians their fears for the sea. And I may once more -remind you that you have defeated most of them already; and beaten men -do not face a danger twice with the same determination." - -Such was the exhortation of Phormio. The Peloponnesians finding that -the Athenians did not sail into the gulf and the narrows, in order -to lead them in whether they wished it or not, put out at dawn, and -forming four abreast, sailed inside the gulf in the direction of their -own country, the right wing leading as they had lain at anchor. In -this wing were placed twenty of their best sailers; so that in the -event of Phormio thinking that their object was Naupactus, and -coasting along thither to save the place, the Athenians might not be -able to escape their onset by getting outside their wing, but might be -cut off by the vessels in question. As they expected, Phormio, in -alarm for the place at that moment emptied of its garrison, as soon as -he saw them put out, reluctantly and hurriedly embarked and sailed -along shore; the Messenian land forces moving along also to support -him. The Peloponnesians seeing him coasting along with his ships in -single file, and by this inside the gulf and close inshore as they -so much wished, at one signal tacked suddenly and bore down in line at -their best speed on the Athenians, hoping to cut off the whole -squadron. The eleven leading vessels, however, escaped the -Peloponnesian wing and its sudden movement, and reached the more -open water; but the rest were overtaken as they tried to run -through, driven ashore and disabled; such of the crews being slain -as had not swum out of them. Some of the ships the Peloponnesians -lashed to their own, and towed off empty; one they took with the men -in it; others were just being towed off, when they were saved by the -Messenians dashing into the sea with their armour and fighting from -the decks that they had boarded. - -Thus far victory was with the Peloponnesians, and the Athenian fleet -destroyed; the twenty ships in the right wing being meanwhile in chase -of the eleven Athenian vessels that had escaped their sudden -movement and reached the more open water. These, with the exception of -one ship, all outsailed them and got safe into Naupactus, and -forming close inshore opposite the temple of Apollo, with their -prows facing the enemy, prepared to defend themselves in case the -Peloponnesians should sail inshore against them. After a while the -Peloponnesians came up, chanting the paean for their victory as they -sailed on; the single Athenian ship remaining being chased by a -Leucadian far ahead of the rest. But there happened to be a -merchantman lying at anchor in the roadstead, which the Athenian -ship found time to sail round, and struck the Leucadian in chase -amidships and sank her. An exploit so sudden and unexpected produced a -panic among the Peloponnesians; and having fallen out of order in -the excitement of victory, some of them dropped their oars and stopped -their way in order to let the main body come up--an unsafe thing to -do considering how near they were to the enemy's prows; while others -ran aground in the shallows, in their ignorance of the localities. - -Elated at this incident, the Athenians at one word gave a cheer, and -dashed at the enemy, who, embarrassed by his mistakes and the disorder -in which he found himself, only stood for an instant, and then fled -for Panormus, whence he had put out. The Athenians following on his -heels took the six vessels nearest them, and recovered those of -their own which had been disabled close inshore and taken in tow at -the beginning of the action; they killed some of the crews and took -some prisoners. On board the Leucadian which went down off the -merchantman, was the Lacedaemonian Timocrates, who killed himself when -the ship was sunk, and was cast up in the harbour of Naupactus. The -Athenians on their return set up a trophy on the spot from which -they had put out and turned the day, and picking up the wrecks and -dead that were on their shore, gave back to the enemy their dead under -truce. The Peloponnesians also set up a trophy as victors for the -defeat inflicted upon the ships they had disabled in shore, and -dedicated the vessel which they had taken at Achaean Rhium, side by -side with the trophy. After this, apprehensive of the reinforcement -expected from Athens, all except the Leucadians sailed into the -Crissaean Gulf for Corinth. Not long after their retreat, the twenty -Athenian ships, which were to have joined Phormio before the battle, -arrived at Naupactus. - -Thus the summer ended. Winter was now at hand; but dispersing the -fleet, which had retired to Corinth and the Crissaean Gulf, Cnemus, -Brasidas, and the other Peloponnesian captains allowed themselves to -be persuaded by the Megarians to make an attempt upon Piraeus, the -port of Athens, which from her decided superiority at sea had been -naturally left unguarded and open. Their plan was as follows: The -men were each to take their oar, cushion, and rowlock thong, and, -going overland from Corinth to the sea on the Athenian side, to get to -Megara as quickly as they could, and launching forty vessels, which -happened to be in the docks at Nisaea, to sail at once to Piraeus. -There was no fleet on the look-out in the harbour, and no one had -the least idea of the enemy attempting a surprise; while an open -attack would, it was thought, never be deliberately ventured on, or, -if in contemplation, would be speedily known at Athens. Their plan -formed, the next step was to put it in execution. Arriving by night -and launching the vessels from Nisaea, they sailed, not to Piraeus -as they had originally intended, being afraid of the risk, besides -which there was some talk of a wind having stopped them, but to the -point of Salamis that looks towards Megara; where there was a fort and -a squadron of three ships to prevent anything sailing in or out of -Megara. This fort they assaulted, and towed off the galleys empty, and -surprising the inhabitants began to lay waste the rest of the island. - -Meanwhile fire signals were raised to alarm Athens, and a panic -ensued there as serious as any that occurred during the war. The -idea in the city was that the enemy had already sailed into Piraeus: -in Piraeus it was thought that they had taken Salamis and might at any -moment arrive in the port; as indeed might easily have been done if -their hearts had been a little firmer: certainly no wind would have -prevented them. As soon as day broke, the Athenians assembled in -full force, launched their ships, and embarking in haste and uproar -went with the fleet to Salamis, while their soldiery mounted guard -in Piraeus. The Peloponnesians, on becoming aware of the coming -relief, after they had overrun most of Salamis, hastily sailed off -with their plunder and captives and the three ships from Fort -Budorum to Nisaea; the state of their ships also causing them some -anxiety, as it was a long while since they had been launched, and they -were not water-tight. Arrived at Megara, they returned back on foot to -Corinth. The Athenians finding them no longer at Salamis, sailed -back themselves; and after this made arrangements for guarding Piraeus -more diligently in future, by closing the harbours, and by other -suitable precautions. - -About the same time, at the beginning of this winter, Sitalces, -son of Teres, the Odrysian king of Thrace, made an expedition -against Perdiccas, son of Alexander, king of Macedonia, and the -Chalcidians in the neighbourhood of Thrace; his object being to -enforce one promise and fulfil another. On the one hand Perdiccas -had made him a promise, when hard pressed at the commencement of the -war, upon condition that Sitalces should reconcile the Athenians to -him and not attempt to restore his brother and enemy, the pretender -Philip, but had not offered to fulfil his engagement; on the other he, -Sitalces, on entering into alliance with the Athenians, had agreed -to put an end to the Chalcidian war in Thrace. These were the two -objects of his invasion. With him he brought Amyntas, the son of -Philip, whom he destined for the throne of Macedonia, and some -Athenian envoys then at his court on this business, and Hagnon as -general; for the Athenians were to join him against the Chalcidians -with a fleet and as many soldiers as they could get together. - -Beginning with the Odrysians, he first called out the Thracian -tribes subject to him between Mounts Haemus and Rhodope and the Euxine -and Hellespont; next the Getae beyond Haemus, and the other hordes -settled south of the Danube in the neighbourhood of the Euxine, who, -like the Getae, border on the Scythians and are armed in the same -manner, being all mounted archers. Besides these he summoned many of -the hill Thracian independent swordsmen, called Dii and mostly -inhabiting Mount Rhodope, some of whom came as mercenaries, others -as volunteers; also the Agrianes and Laeaeans, and the rest of the -Paeonian tribes in his empire, at the confines of which these lay, -extending up to the Laeaean Paeonians and the river Strymon, which -flows from Mount Scombrus through the country of the Agrianes and -Laeaeans; there the empire of Sitalces ends and the territory of the -independent Paeonians begins. Bordering on the Triballi, also -independent, were the Treres and Tilataeans, who dwell to the north of -Mount Scombrus and extend towards the setting sun as far as the -river Oskius. This river rises in the same mountains as the Nestus and -Hebrus, a wild and extensive range connected with Rhodope. - -The empire of the Odrysians extended along the seaboard from -Abdera to the mouth of the Danube in the Euxine. The navigation of -this coast by the shortest route takes a merchantman four days and -four nights with a wind astern the whole way: by land an active man, -travelling by the shortest road, can get from Abdera to the Danube -in eleven days. Such was the length of its coast line. Inland from -Byzantium to the Laeaeans and the Strymon, the farthest limit of its -extension into the interior, it is a journey of thirteen days for an -active man. The tribute from all the barbarian districts and the -Hellenic cities, taking what they brought in under Seuthes, the -successor of Sitalces, who raised it to its greatest height, -amounted to about four hundred talents in gold and silver. There -were also presents in gold and silver to a no less amount, besides -stuff, plain and embroidered, and other articles, made not only for -the king, but also for the Odrysian lords and nobles. For there was -here established a custom opposite to that prevailing in the Persian -kingdom, namely, of taking rather than giving; more disgrace being -attached to not giving when asked than to asking and being refused; -and although this prevailed elsewhere in Thrace, it was practised most -extensively among the powerful Odrysians, it being impossible to get -anything done without a present. It was thus a very powerful -kingdom; in revenue and general prosperity surpassing all in Europe -between the Ionian Gulf and the Euxine, and in numbers and military -resources coming decidedly next to the Scythians, with whom indeed -no people in Europe can bear comparison, there not being even in -Asia any nation singly a match for them if unanimous, though of course -they are not on a level with other races in general intelligence and -the arts of civilized life. - -It was the master of this empire that now prepared to take the -field. When everything was ready, he set out on his march for -Macedonia, first through his own dominions, next over the desolate -range of Cercine that divides the Sintians and Paeonians, crossing -by a road which he had made by felling the timber on a former campaign -against the latter people. Passing over these mountains, with the -Paeonians on his right and the Sintians and Maedians on the left, he -finally arrived at Doberus, in Paeonia, losing none of his army on the -march, except perhaps by sickness, but receiving some augmentations, -many of the independent Thracians volunteering to join him in the hope -of plunder; so that the whole is said to have formed a grand total -of a hundred and fifty thousand. Most of this was infantry, though -there was about a third cavalry, furnished principally by the -Odrysians themselves and next to them by the Getae. The most warlike -of the infantry were the independent swordsmen who came down from -Rhodope; the rest of the mixed multitude that followed him being -chiefly formidable by their numbers. - -Assembling in Doberus, they prepared for descending from the heights -upon Lower Macedonia, where the dominions of Perdiccas lay; for the -Lyncestae, Elimiots, and other tribes more inland, though -Macedonians by blood, and allies and dependants of their kindred, -still have their own separate governments. The country on the sea -coast, now called Macedonia, was first acquired by Alexander, the -father of Perdiccas, and his ancestors, originally Temenids from -Argos. This was effected by the expulsion from Pieria of the Pierians, -who afterwards inhabited Phagres and other places under Mount -Pangaeus, beyond the Strymon (indeed the country between Pangaeus -and the sea is still called the Pierian Gulf); of the Bottiaeans, at -present neighbours of the Chalcidians, from Bottia, and by the -acquisition in Paeonia of a narrow strip along the river Axius -extending to Pella and the sea; the district of Mygdonia, between -the Axius and the Strymon, being also added by the expulsion of the -Edonians. From Eordia also were driven the Eordians, most of whom -perished, though a few of them still live round Physca, and the -Almopians from Almopia. These Macedonians also conquered places -belonging to the other tribes, which are still theirs--Anthemus, -Crestonia, Bisaltia, and much of Macedonia proper. The whole is now -called Macedonia, and at the time of the invasion of Sitalces, -Perdiccas, Alexander's son, was the reigning king. - -These Macedonians, unable to take the field against so numerous an -invader, shut themselves up in such strong places and fortresses as -the country possessed. Of these there was no great number, most of -those now found in the country having been erected subsequently by -Archelaus, the son of Perdiccas, on his accession, who also cut -straight roads, and otherwise put the kingdom on a better footing as -regards horses, heavy infantry, and other war material than had been -done by all the eight kings that preceded him. Advancing from Doberus, -the Thracian host first invaded what had been once Philip's -government, and took Idomene by assault, Gortynia, Atalanta, and -some other places by negotiation, these last coming over for love of -Philip's son, Amyntas, then with Sitalces. Laying siege to Europus, -and failing to take it, he next advanced into the rest of Macedonia to -the left of Pella and Cyrrhus, not proceeding beyond this into -Bottiaea and Pieria, but staying to lay waste Mygdonia, Crestonia, and -Anthemus. - -The Macedonians never even thought of meeting him with infantry; but -the Thracian host was, as opportunity offered, attacked by handfuls of -their horse, which had been reinforced from their allies in the -interior. Armed with cuirasses, and excellent horsemen, wherever these -charged they overthrew all before them, but ran considerable risk in -entangling themselves in the masses of the enemy, and so finally -desisted from these efforts, deciding that they were not strong enough -to venture against numbers so superior. - -Meanwhile Sitalces opened negotiations with Perdiccas on the objects -of his expedition; and finding that the Athenians, not believing -that he would come, did not appear with their fleet, though they -sent presents and envoys, dispatched a large part of his army -against the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans, and shutting them up inside -their walls laid waste their country. While he remained in these -parts, the people farther south, such as the Thessalians, Magnetes, -and the other tribes subject to the Thessalians, and the Hellenes as -far as Thermopylae, all feared that the army might advance against -them, and prepared accordingly. These fears were shared by the -Thracians beyond the Strymon to the north, who inhabited the plains, -such as the Panaeans, the Odomanti, the Droi, and the Dersaeans, all -of whom are independent. It was even matter of conversation among -the Hellenes who were enemies of Athens whether he might not be -invited by his ally to advance also against them. Meanwhile he held -Chalcidice and Bottice and Macedonia, and was ravaging them all; but -finding that he was not succeeding in any of the objects of his -invasion, and that his army was without provisions and was suffering -from the severity of the season, he listened to the advice of Seuthes, -son of Spardacus, his nephew and highest officer, and decided to -retreat without delay. This Seuthes had been secretly gained by -Perdiccas by the promise of his sister in marriage with a rich -dowry. In accordance with this advice, and after a stay of thirty days -in all, eight of which were spent in Chalcidice, he retired home as -quickly as he could; and Perdiccas afterwards gave his sister -Stratonice to Seuthes as he had promised. Such was the history of -the expedition of Sitalces. - -In the course of this winter, after the dispersion of the -Peloponnesian fleet, the Athenians in Naupactus, under Phormio, -coasted along to Astacus and disembarked, and marched into the -interior of Acarnania with four hundred Athenian heavy infantry and -four hundred Messenians. After expelling some suspected persons from -Stratus, Coronta, and other places, and restoring Cynes, son of -Theolytus, to Coronta, they returned to their ships, deciding that -it was impossible in the winter season to march against Oeniadae, a -place which, unlike the rest of Acarnania, had been always hostile -to them; for the river Achelous flowing from Mount Pindus through -Dolopia and the country of the Agraeans and Amphilochians and the -plain of Acarnania, past the town of Stratus in the upper part of -its course, forms lakes where it falls into the sea round Oeniadae, -and thus makes it impracticable for an army in winter by reason of the -water. Opposite to Oeniadae lie most of the islands called -Echinades, so close to the mouths of the Achelous that that powerful -stream is constantly forming deposits against them, and has already -joined some of the islands to the continent, and seems likely in no -long while to do the same with the rest. For the current is strong, -deep, and turbid, and the islands are so thick together that they -serve to imprison the alluvial deposit and prevent its dispersing, -lying, as they do, not in one line, but irregularly, so as to leave no -direct passage for the water into the open sea. The islands in -question are uninhabited and of no great size. There is also a story -that Alcmaeon, son of Amphiraus, during his wanderings after the -murder of his mother was bidden by Apollo to inhabit this spot, -through an oracle which intimated that he would have no release from -his terrors until he should find a country to dwell in which had not -been seen by the sun, or existed as land at the time he slew his -mother; all else being to him polluted ground. Perplexed at this, -the story goes on to say, he at last observed this deposit of the -Achelous, and considered that a place sufficient to support life upon, -might have been thrown up during the long interval that had elapsed -since the death of his mother and the beginning of his wanderings. -Settling, therefore, in the district round Oeniadae, he founded a -dominion, and left the country its name from his son Acarnan. Such -is the story we have received concerning Alcmaeon. - -The Athenians and Phormio putting back from Acarnania and arriving -at Naupactus, sailed home to Athens in the spring, taking with them -the ships that they had captured, and such of the prisoners made in -the late actions as were freemen; who were exchanged, man for man. And -so ended this winter, and the third year of this war, of which -Thucydides was the historian. - - - - -BOOK III - -CHAPTER IX - -_Fourth and Fifth Years of the War - Revolt of Mitylene_ - -The next summer, just as the corn was getting ripe, the -Peloponnesians and their allies invaded Attica under the command of -Archidamus, son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, and sat -down and ravaged the land; the Athenian horse as usual attacking them, -wherever it was practicable, and preventing the mass of the light -troops from advancing from their camp and wasting the parts near the -city. After staying the time for which they had taken provisions, -the invaders retired and dispersed to their several cities. - -Immediately after the invasion of the Peloponnesians all Lesbos, -except Methymna, revolted from the Athenians. The Lesbians had -wished to revolt even before the war, but the Lacedaemonians would not -receive them; and yet now when they did revolt, they were compelled to -do so sooner than they had intended. While they were waiting until the -moles for their harbours and the ships and walls that they had in -building should be finished, and for the arrival of archers and corn -and other things that they were engaged in fetching from the Pontus, -the Tenedians, with whom they were at enmity, and the Methymnians, and -some factious persons in Mitylene itself, who were proxeni of -Athens, informed the Athenians that the Mitylenians were forcibly -uniting the island under their sovereignty, and that the -preparations about which they were so active, were all concerted -with the Boeotians their kindred and the Lacedaemonians with a view to -a revolt, and that, unless they were immediately prevented, Athens -would lose Lesbos. - -However, the Athenians, distressed by the plague, and by the war -that had recently broken out and was now raging, thought it a -serious matter to add Lesbos with its fleet and untouched resources to -the list of their enemies; and at first would not believe the -charge, giving too much weight to their wish that it might not be -true. But when an embassy which they sent had failed to persuade the -Mitylenians to give up the union and preparations complained of, -they became alarmed, and resolved to strike the first blow. They -accordingly suddenly sent off forty ships that had been got ready to -sail round Peloponnese, under the command of Cleippides, son of -Deinias, and two others; word having been brought them of a festival -in honour of the Malean Apollo outside the town, which is kept by -the whole people of Mitylene, and at which, if haste were made, they -might hope to take them by surprise. If this plan succeeded, well -and good; if not, they were to order the Mitylenians to deliver up -their ships and to pull down their walls, and if they did not obey, to -declare war. The ships accordingly set out; the ten galleys, forming -the contingent of the Mitylenians present with the fleet according -to the terms of the alliance, being detained by the Athenians, and -their crews placed in custody. However, the Mitylenians were -informed of the expedition by a man who crossed from Athens to Euboea, -and going overland to Geraestus, sailed from thence by a merchantman -which he found on the point of putting to sea, and so arrived at -Mitylene the third day after leaving Athens. The Mitylenians -accordingly refrained from going out to the temple at Malea, and -moreover barricaded and kept guard round the half-finished parts of -their walls and harbours. - -When the Athenians sailed in not long after and saw how things -stood, the generals delivered their orders, and upon the Mitylenians -refusing to obey, commenced hostilities. The Mitylenians, thus -compelled to go to war without notice and unprepared, at first -sailed out with their fleet and made some show of fighting, a little -in front of the harbour; but being driven back by the Athenian -ships, immediately offered to treat with the commanders, wishing, if -possible, to get the ships away for the present upon any tolerable -terms. The Athenian commanders accepted their offers, being themselves -fearful that they might not be able to cope with the whole of -Lesbos; and an armistice having been concluded, the Mitylenians sent -to Athens one of the informers, already repentant of his conduct, -and others with him, to try to persuade the Athenians of the innocence -of their intentions and to get the fleet recalled. In the meantime, -having no great hope of a favourable answer from Athens, they also -sent off a galley with envoys to Lacedaemon, unobserved by the -Athenian fleet which was anchored at Malea to the north of the town. - -While these envoys, reaching Lacedaemon after a difficult journey -across the open sea, were negotiating for succours being sent them, -the ambassadors from Athens returned without having effected anything; -and hostilities were at once begun by the Mitylenians and the rest -of Lesbos, with the exception of the Methymnians, who came to the -aid of the Athenians with the Imbrians and Lemnians and some few of -the other allies. The Mitylenians made a sortie with all their -forces against the Athenian camp; and a battle ensued, in which they -gained some slight advantage, but retired notwithstanding, not feeling -sufficient confidence in themselves to spend the night upon the field. -After this they kept quiet, wishing to wait for the chance of -reinforcements arriving from Peloponnese before making a second -venture, being encouraged by the arrival of Meleas, a Laconian, and -Hermaeondas, a Theban, who had been sent off before the insurrection -but had been unable to reach Lesbos before the Athenian expedition, -and who now stole in in a galley after the battle, and advised them to -send another galley and envoys back with them, which the Mitylenians -accordingly did. - -Meanwhile the Athenians, greatly encouraged by the inaction of the -Mitylenians, summoned allies to their aid, who came in all the quicker -from seeing so little vigour displayed by the Lesbians, and bringing -round their ships to a new station to the south of the town, fortified -two camps, one on each side of the city, and instituted a blockade -of both the harbours. The sea was thus closed against the Mitylenians, -who, however, commanded the whole country, with the rest of the -Lesbians who had now joined them; the Athenians only holding a limited -area round their camps, and using Malea more as the station for -their ships and their market. - -While the war went on in this way at Mitylene, the Athenians, -about the same time in this summer, also sent thirty ships to -Peloponnese under Asopius, son of Phormio; the Acarnanians insisting -that the commander sent should be some son or relative of Phormio. -As the ships coasted along shore they ravaged the seaboard of Laconia; -after which Asopius sent most of the fleet home, and himself went on -with twelve vessels to Naupactus, and afterwards raising the whole -Acarnanian population made an expedition against Oeniadae, the fleet -sailing along the Achelous, while the army laid waste the country. The -inhabitants, however, showing no signs of submitting, he dismissed the -land forces and himself sailed to Leucas, and making a descent upon -Nericus was cut off during his retreat, and most of his troops with -him, by the people in those parts aided by some coastguards; after -which the Athenians sailed away, recovering their dead from the -Leucadians under truce. - -Meanwhile the envoys of the Mitylenians sent out in the first ship -were told by the Lacedaemonians to come to Olympia, in order that -the rest of the allies might hear them and decide upon their matter, -and so they journeyed thither. It was the Olympiad in which the -Rhodian Dorieus gained his second victory, and the envoys having -been introduced to make their speech after the festival, spoke as -follows: - -"Lacedaemonians and allies, the rule established among the -Hellenes is not unknown to us. Those who revolt in war and forsake -their former confederacy are favourably regarded by those who -receive them, in so far as they are of use to them, but otherwise -are thought less well of, through being considered traitors to their -former friends. Nor is this an unfair way of judging, where the rebels -and the power from whom they secede are at one in policy and sympathy, -and a match for each other in resources and power, and where no -reasonable ground exists for the rebellion. But with us and the -Athenians this was not the case; and no one need think the worse of us -for revolting from them in danger, after having been honoured by -them in time of peace. - -"Justice and honesty will be the first topics of our speech, -especially as we are asking for alliance; because we know that there -can never be any solid friendship between individuals, or union -between communities that is worth the name, unless the parties be -persuaded of each other's honesty, and be generally congenial the -one to the other; since from difference in feeling springs also -difference in conduct. Between ourselves and the Athenians alliance -began, when you withdrew from the Median War and they remained to -finish the business. But we did not become allies of the Athenians for -the subjugation of the Hellenes, but allies of the Hellenes for -their liberation from the Mede; and as long as the Athenians led us -fairly we followed them loyally; but when we saw them relax their -hostility to the Mede, to try to compass the subjection of the allies, -then our apprehensions began. Unable, however, to unite and defend -themselves, on account of the number of confederates that had votes, -all the allies were enslaved, except ourselves and the Chians, who -continued to send our contingents as independent and nominally free. -Trust in Athens as a leader, however, we could no longer feel, judging -by the examples already given; it being unlikely that she would reduce -our fellow confederates, and not do the same by us who were left, if -ever she had the power. - -"Had we all been still independent, we could have had more faith -in their not attempting any change; but the greater number being their -subjects, while they were treating us as equals, they would -naturally chafe under this solitary instance of independence as -contrasted with the submission of the majority; particularly as they -daily grew more powerful, and we more destitute. Now the only sure -basis of an alliance is for each party to be equally afraid of the -other; he who would like to encroach is then deterred by the -reflection that he will not have odds in his favour. Again, if we were -left independent, it was only because they thought they saw their -way to empire more clearly by specious language and by the paths of -policy than by those of force. Not only were we useful as evidence -that powers who had votes, like themselves, would not, surely, join -them in their expeditions, against their will, without the party -attacked being in the wrong; but the same system also enabled them -to lead the stronger states against the weaker first, and so to -leave the former to the last, stripped of their natural allies, and -less capable of resistance. But if they had begun with us, while all -the states still had their resources under their own control, and -there was a centre to rally round, the work of subjugation would -have been found less easy. Besides this, our navy gave them some -apprehension: it was always possible that it might unite with you or -with some other power, and become dangerous to Athens. The court which -we paid to their commons and its leaders for the time being also -helped us to maintain our independence. However, we did not expect -to be able to do so much longer, if this war had not broken out, -from the examples that we had had of their conduct to the rest. - -"How then could we put our trust in such friendship or freedom as we -had here? We accepted each other against our inclination; fear made -them court us in war, and us them in peace; sympathy, the ordinary -basis of confidence, had its place supplied by terror, fear having -more share than friendship in detaining us in the alliance; and the -first party that should be encouraged by the hope of impunity was -certain to break faith with the other. So that to condemn us for being -the first to break off, because they delay the blow that we dread, -instead of ourselves delaying to know for certain whether it will be -dealt or not, is to take a false view of the case. For if we were -equally able with them to meet their plots and imitate their delay, we -should be their equals and should be under no necessity of being their -subjects; but the liberty of offence being always theirs, that of -defence ought clearly to be ours. - -"Such, Lacedaemonians and allies, are the grounds and the reasons of -our revolt; clear enough to convince our hearers of the fairness of -our conduct, and sufficient to alarm ourselves, and to make us turn to -some means of safety. This we wished to do long ago, when we sent to -you on the subject while the peace yet lasted, but were balked by your -refusing to receive us; and now, upon the Boeotians inviting us, we at -once responded to the call, and decided upon a twofold revolt, from -the Hellenes and from the Athenians, not to aid the latter in -harming the former, but to join in their liberation, and not to -allow the Athenians in the end to destroy us, but to act in time -against them. Our revolt, however, has taken place prematurely and -without preparation--a fact which makes it all the more incumbent on -you to receive us into alliance and to send us speedy relief, in order -to show that you support your friends, and at the same time do harm to -your enemies. You have an opportunity such as you never had before. -Disease and expenditure have wasted the Athenians: their ships are -either cruising round your coasts, or engaged in blockading us; and it -is not probable that they will have any to spare, if you invade them a -second time this summer by sea and land; but they will either offer no -resistance to your vessels, or withdraw from both our shores. Nor must -it be thought that this is a case of putting yourselves into danger -for a country which is not yours. Lesbos may appear far off, but -when help is wanted she will be found near enough. It is not in Attica -that the war will be decided, as some imagine, but in the countries by -which Attica is supported; and the Athenian revenue is drawn from -the allies, and will become still larger if they reduce us; as not -only will no other state revolt, but our resources will be added to -theirs, and we shall be treated worse than those that were enslaved -before. But if you will frankly support us, you will add to your -side a state that has a large navy, which is your great want; you will -smooth the way to the overthrow of the Athenians by depriving them -of their allies, who will be greatly encouraged to come over; and -you will free yourselves from the imputation made against you, of -not supporting insurrection. In short, only show yourselves as -liberators, and you may count upon having the advantage in the war. - -"Respect, therefore, the hopes placed in you by the Hellenes, and -that Olympian Zeus, in whose temple we stand as very suppliants; -become the allies and defenders of the Mitylenians, and do not -sacrifice us, who put our lives upon the hazard, in a cause in which -general good will result to all from our success, and still more -general harm if we fail through your refusing to help us; but be the -men that the Hellenes think you, and our fears desire." - -Such were the words of the Mitylenians. After hearing them out, -the Lacedaemonians and confederates granted what they urged, and -took the Lesbians into alliance, and deciding in favour of the -invasion of Attica, told the allies present to march as quickly as -possible to the Isthmus with two-thirds of their forces; and -arriving there first themselves, got ready hauling machines to carry -their ships across from Corinth to the sea on the side of Athens, in -order to make their attack by sea and land at once. However, the -zeal which they displayed was not imitated by the rest of the -confederates, who came in but slowly, being engaged in harvesting -their corn and sick of making expeditions. - -Meanwhile the Athenians, aware that the preparations of the enemy -were due to his conviction of their weakness, and wishing to show -him that he was mistaken, and that they were able, without moving -the Lesbian fleet, to repel with ease that with which they were -menaced from Peloponnese, manned a hundred ships by embarking the -citizens of Athens, except the knights and Pentacosiomedimni, and -the resident aliens; and putting out to the Isthmus, displayed their -power, and made descents upon Peloponnese wherever they pleased. A -disappointment so signal made the Lacedaemonians think that the -Lesbians had not spoken the truth; and embarrassed by the -non-appearance of the confederates, coupled with the news that the -thirty ships round Peloponnese were ravaging the lands near Sparta, -they went back home. Afterwards, however, they got ready a fleet to -send to Lesbos, and ordering a total of forty ships from the different -cities in the league, appointed Alcidas to command the expedition in -his capacity of high admiral. Meanwhile the Athenians in the hundred -ships, upon seeing the Lacedaemonians go home, went home likewise. - -If, at the time that this fleet was at sea, Athens had almost the -largest number of first-rate ships in commission that she ever -possessed at any one moment, she had as many or even more when the war -began. At that time one hundred guarded Attica, Euboea, and Salamis; a -hundred more were cruising round Peloponnese, besides those employed -at Potidaea and in other places; making a grand total of two hundred -and fifty vessels employed on active service in a single summer. It -was this, with Potidaea, that most exhausted her revenues--Potidaea -being blockaded by a force of heavy infantry (each drawing two -drachmae a day, one for himself and another for his servant), which -amounted to three thousand at first, and was kept at this number -down to the end of the siege; besides sixteen hundred with Phormio who -went away before it was over; and the ships being all paid at the same -rate. In this way her money was wasted at first; and this was the -largest number of ships ever manned by her. - -About the same time that the Lacedaemonians were at the Isthmus, the -Mitylenians marched by land with their mercenaries against Methymna, -which they thought to gain by treachery. After assaulting the town, -and not meeting with the success that they anticipated, they -withdrew to Antissa, Pyrrha, and Eresus; and taking measures for the -better security of these towns and strengthening their walls, -hastily returned home. After their departure the Methymnians marched -against Antissa, but were defeated in a sortie by the Antissians and -their mercenaries, and retreated in haste after losing many of their -number. Word of this reaching Athens, and the Athenians learning -that the Mitylenians were masters of the country and their own -soldiers unable to hold them in check, they sent out about the -beginning of autumn Paches, son of Epicurus, to take the command, -and a thousand Athenian heavy infantry; who worked their own passage -and, arriving at Mitylene, built a single wall all round it, forts -being erected at some of the strongest points. Mitylene was thus -blockaded strictly on both sides, by land and by sea; and winter now -drew near. - -The Athenians needing money for the siege, although they had for the -first time raised a contribution of two hundred talents from their own -citizens, now sent out twelve ships to levy subsidies from their -allies, with Lysicles and four others in command. After cruising to -different places and laying them under contribution, Lysicles went -up the country from Myus, in Caria, across the plain of the Meander, -as far as the hill of Sandius; and being attacked by the Carians and -the people of Anaia, was slain with many of his soldiers. - -The same winter the Plataeans, who were still being besieged by -the Peloponnesians and Boeotians, distressed by the failure of their -provisions, and seeing no hope of relief from Athens, nor any other -means of safety, formed a scheme with the Athenians besieged with them -for escaping, if possible, by forcing their way over the enemy's -walls; the attempt having been suggested by Theaenetus, son of -Tolmides, a soothsayer, and Eupompides, son of Daimachus, one of their -generals. At first all were to join: afterwards, half hung back, -thinking the risk great; about two hundred and twenty, however, -voluntarily persevered in the attempt, which was carried out in the -following way. Ladders were made to match the height of the enemy's -wall, which they measured by the layers of bricks, the side turned -towards them not being thoroughly whitewashed. These were counted by -many persons at once; and though some might miss the right -calculation, most would hit upon it, particularly as they counted over -and over again, and were no great way from the wall, but could see -it easily enough for their purpose. The length required for the -ladders was thus obtained, being calculated from the breadth of the -brick. - -Now the wall of the Peloponnesians was constructed as follows. It -consisted of two lines drawn round the place, one against the -Plataeans, the other against any attack on the outside from Athens, -about sixteen feet apart. The intermediate space of sixteen feet was -occupied by huts portioned out among the soldiers on guard, and -built in one block, so as to give the appearance of a single thick -wall with battlements on either side. At intervals of every ten -battlements were towers of considerable size, and the same breadth -as the wall, reaching right across from its inner to its outer face, -with no means of passing except through the middle. Accordingly on -stormy and wet nights the battlements were deserted, and guard kept -from the towers, which were not far apart and roofed in above. - -Such being the structure of the wall by which the Plataeans were -blockaded, when their preparations were completed, they waited for a -stormy night of wind and rain and without any moon, and then set -out, guided by the authors of the enterprise. Crossing first the ditch -that ran round the town, they next gained the wall of the enemy -unperceived by the sentinels, who did not see them in the darkness, or -hear them, as the wind drowned with its roar the noise of their -approach; besides which they kept a good way off from each other, that -they might not be betrayed by the clash of their weapons. They were -also lightly equipped, and had only the left foot shod to preserve -them from slipping in the mire. They came up to the battlements at one -of the intermediate spaces where they knew them to be unguarded: those -who carried the ladders went first and planted them; next twelve -light-armed soldiers with only a dagger and a breastplate mounted, led -by Ammias, son of Coroebus, who was the first on the wall; his -followers getting up after him and going six to each of the towers. -After these came another party of light troops armed with spears, -whose shields, that they might advance the easier, were carried by men -behind, who were to hand them to them when they found themselves in -presence of the enemy. After a good many had mounted they were -discovered by the sentinels in the towers, by the noise made by a tile -which was knocked down by one of the Plataeans as he was laying hold -of the battlements. The alarm was instantly given, and the troops -rushed to the wall, not knowing the nature of the danger, owing to the -dark night and stormy weather; the Plataeans in the town having also -chosen that moment to make a sortie against the wall of the -Peloponnesians upon the side opposite to that on which their men -were getting over, in order to divert the attention of the -besiegers. Accordingly they remained distracted at their several -posts, without any venturing to stir to give help from his own -station, and at a loss to guess what was going on. Meanwhile the three -hundred set aside for service on emergencies went outside the wall -in the direction of the alarm. Fire-signals of an attack were also -raised towards Thebes; but the Plataeans in the town at once displayed -a number of others, prepared beforehand for this very purpose, in -order to render the enemy's signals unintelligible, and to prevent his -friends getting a true idea of what was passing and coming to his -aid before their comrades who had gone out should have made good their -escape and be in safety. - -Meanwhile the first of the scaling party that had got up, after -carrying both the towers and putting the sentinels to the sword, -posted themselves inside to prevent any one coming through against -them; and rearing ladders from the wall, sent several men up on the -towers, and from their summit and base kept in check all of the -enemy that came up, with their missiles, while their main body planted -a number of ladders against the wall, and knocking down the -battlements, passed over between the towers; each as soon as he had -got over taking up his station at the edge of the ditch, and plying -from thence with arrows and darts any who came along the wall to -stop the passage of his comrades. When all were over, the party on the -towers came down, the last of them not without difficulty, and -proceeded to the ditch, just as the three hundred came up carrying -torches. The Plataeans, standing on the edge of the ditch in the dark, -had a good view of their opponents, and discharged their arrows and -darts upon the unarmed parts of their bodies, while they themselves -could not be so well seen in the obscurity for the torches; and thus -even the last of them got over the ditch, though not without effort -and difficulty; as ice had formed in it, not strong enough to walk -upon, but of that watery kind which generally comes with a wind more -east than north, and the snow which this wind had caused to fall -during the night had made the water in the ditch rise, so that they -could scarcely breast it as they crossed. However, it was mainly the -violence of the storm that enabled them to effect their escape at all. - -Starting from the ditch, the Plataeans went all together along the -road leading to Thebes, keeping the chapel of the hero Androcrates -upon their right; considering that the last road which the -Peloponnesians would suspect them of having taken would be that -towards their enemies' country. Indeed they could see them pursuing -with torches upon the Athens road towards Cithaeron and -Druoskephalai or Oakheads. After going for rather more than half a -mile upon the road to Thebes, the Plataeans turned off and took that -leading to the mountain, to Erythrae and Hysiae, and reaching the -hills, made good their escape to Athens, two hundred and twelve men in -all; some of their number having turned back into the town before -getting over the wall, and one archer having been taken prisoner at -the outer ditch. Meanwhile the Peloponnesians gave up the pursuit -and returned to their posts; and the Plataeans in the town, knowing -nothing of what had passed, and informed by those who had turned -back that not a man had escaped, sent out a herald as soon as it was -day to make a truce for the recovery of the dead bodies, and then, -learning the truth, desisted. In this way the Plataean party got -over and were saved. - -Towards the close of the same winter, Salaethus, a Lacedaemonian, -was sent out in a galley from Lacedaemon to Mitylene. Going by sea -to Pyrrha, and from thence overland, he passed along the bed of a -torrent, where the line of circumvallation was passable, and thus -entering unperceived into Mitylene told the magistrates that Attica -would certainly be invaded, and the forty ships destined to relieve -them arrive, and that he had been sent on to announce this and to -superintend matters generally. The Mitylenians upon this took courage, -and laid aside the idea of treating with the Athenians; and now this -winter ended, and with it ended the fourth year of the war of which -Thucydides was the historian. - -The next summer the Peloponnesians sent off the forty-two ships -for Mitylene, under Alcidas, their high admiral, and themselves and -their allies invaded Attica, their object being to distract the -Athenians by a double movement, and thus to make it less easy for them -to act against the fleet sailing to Mitylene. The commander in this -invasion was Cleomenes, in the place of King Pausanias, son of -Pleistoanax, his nephew, who was still a minor. Not content with -laying waste whatever had shot up in the parts which they had before -devastated, the invaders now extended their ravages to lands passed -over in their previous incursions; so that this invasion was more -severely felt by the Athenians than any except the second; the enemy -staying on and on until they had overrun most of the country, in the -expectation of hearing from Lesbos of something having been achieved -by their fleet, which they thought must now have got over. However, as -they did not obtain any of the results expected, and their -provisions began to run short, they retreated and dispersed to their -different cities. - -In the meantime the Mitylenians, finding their provisions failing, -while the fleet from Peloponnese was loitering on the way instead of -appearing at Mitylene, were compelled to come to terms with the -Athenians in the following manner. Salaethus having himself ceased -to expect the fleet to arrive, now armed the commons with heavy -armour, which they had not before possessed, with the intention of -making a sortie against the Athenians. The commons, however, no sooner -found themselves possessed of arms than they refused any longer to -obey their officers; and forming in knots together, told the -authorities to bring out in public the provisions and divide them -amongst them all, or they would themselves come to terms with the -Athenians and deliver up the city. - -The government, aware of their inability to prevent this, and of the -danger they would be in, if left out of the capitulation, publicly -agreed with Paches and the army to surrender Mitylene at discretion -and to admit the troops into the town; upon the understanding that the -Mitylenians should be allowed to send an embassy to Athens to plead -their cause, and that Paches should not imprison, make slaves of, or -put to death any of the citizens until its return. Such were the terms -of the capitulation; in spite of which the chief authors of the -negotiation with Lacedaemon were so completely overcome by terror when -the army entered that they went and seated themselves by the altars, -from which they were raised up by Paches under promise that he would -do them no wrong, and lodged by him in Tenedos, until he should -learn the pleasure of the Athenians concerning them. Paches also -sent some galleys and seized Antissa, and took such other military -measures as he thought advisable. - -Meanwhile the Peloponnesians in the forty ships, who ought to have -made all haste to relieve Mitylene, lost time in coming round -Peloponnese itself, and proceeding leisurely on the remainder of the -voyage, made Delos without having been seen by the Athenians at -Athens, and from thence arriving at Icarus and Myconus, there first -heard of the fall of Mitylene. Wishing to know the truth, they put -into Embatum, in the Erythraeid, about seven days after the capture of -the town. Here they learned the truth, and began to consider what they -were to do; and Teutiaplus, an Elean, addressed them as follows: - -"Alcidas and Peloponnesians who share with me the command of this -armament, my advice is to sail just as we are to Mitylene, before we -have been heard of. We may expect to find the Athenians as much off -their guard as men generally are who have just taken a city: this will -certainly be so by sea, where they have no idea of any enemy attacking -them, and where our strength, as it happens, mainly lies; while even -their land forces are probably scattered about the houses in the -carelessness of victory. If therefore we were to fall upon them -suddenly and in the night, I have hopes, with the help of the -well-wishers that we may have left inside the town, that we shall -become masters of the place. Let us not shrink from the risk, but -let us remember that this is just the occasion for one of the baseless -panics common in war: and that to be able to guard against these in -one's own case, and to detect the moment when an attack will find an -enemy at this disadvantage, is what makes a successful general." - -These words of Teutiaplus failing to move Alcidas, some of the -Ionian exiles and the Lesbians with the expedition began to urge -him, since this seemed too dangerous, to seize one of the Ionian -cities or the Aeolic town of Cyme, to use as a base for effecting -the revolt of Ionia. This was by no means a hopeless enterprise, as -their coming was welcome everywhere; their object would be by this -move to deprive Athens of her chief source of revenue, and at the same -time to saddle her with expense, if she chose to blockade them; and -they would probably induce Pissuthnes to join them in the war. -However, Alcidas gave this proposal as bad a reception as the other, -being eager, since he had come too late for Mitylene, to find -himself back in Peloponnese as soon as possible. - -Accordingly he put out from Embatum and proceeded along shore; and -touching at the Teian town, Myonnesus, there butchered most of the -prisoners that he had taken on his passage. Upon his coming to -anchor at Ephesus, envoys came to him from the Samians at Anaia, and -told him that he was not going the right way to free Hellas in -massacring men who had never raised a hand against him, and who were -not enemies of his, but allies of Athens against their will, and -that if he did not stop he would turn many more friends into enemies -than enemies into friends. Alcidas agreed to this, and let go all -the Chians still in his hands and some of the others that he had -taken; the inhabitants, instead of flying at the sight of his vessels, -rather coming up to them, taking them for Athenian, having no sort -of expectation that while the Athenians commanded the sea -Peloponnesian ships would venture over to Ionia. - -From Ephesus Alcidas set sail in haste and fled. He had been seen by -the Salaminian and Paralian galleys, which happened to be sailing from -Athens, while still at anchor off Clarus; and fearing pursuit he now -made across the open sea, fully determined to touch nowhere, if he -could help it, until he got to Peloponnese. Meanwhile news of him -had come in to Paches from the Erythraeid, and indeed from all -quarters. As Ionia was unfortified, great fears were felt that the -Peloponnesians coasting along shore, even if they did not intend to -stay, might make descents in passing and plunder the towns; and now -the Paralian and Salaminian, having seen him at Clarus, themselves -brought intelligence of the fact. Paches accordingly gave hot chase, -and continued the pursuit as far as the isle of Patmos, and then -finding that Alcidas had got on too far to be overtaken, came back -again. Meanwhile he thought it fortunate that, as he had not fallen in -with them out at sea, he had not overtaken them anywhere where they -would have been forced to encamp, and so give him the trouble of -blockading them. - -On his return along shore he touched, among other places, at Notium, -the port of Colophon, where the Colophonians had settled after the -capture of the upper town by Itamenes and the barbarians, who had been -called in by certain individuals in a party quarrel. The capture of -the town took place about the time of the second Peloponnesian -invasion of Attica. However, the refugees, after settling at Notium, -again split up into factions, one of which called in Arcadian and -barbarian mercenaries from Pissuthnes and, entrenching these in a -quarter apart, formed a new community with the Median party of the -Colophonians who joined them from the upper town. Their opponents -had retired into exile, and now called in Paches, who invited Hippias, -the commander of the Arcadians in the fortified quarter, to a -parley, upon condition that, if they could not agree, he was to be put -back safe and sound in the fortification. However, upon his coming out -to him, he put him into custody, though not in chains, and attacked -suddenly and took by surprise the fortification, and putting the -Arcadians and the barbarians found in it to the sword, afterwards took -Hippias into it as he had promised, and, as soon as he was inside, -seized him and shot him down. Paches then gave up Notium to the -Colophonians not of the Median party; and settlers were afterwards -sent out from Athens, and the place colonized according to Athenian -laws, after collecting all the Colophonians found in any of the -cities. - -Arrived at Mitylene, Paches reduced Pyrrha and Eresus; and finding -the Lacedaemonian, Salaethus, in hiding in the town, sent him off to -Athens, together with the Mitylenians that he had placed in Tenedos, -and any other persons that he thought concerned in the revolt. He also -sent back the greater part of his forces, remaining with the rest to -settle Mitylene and the rest of Lesbos as he thought best. - -Upon the arrival of the prisoners with Salaethus, the Athenians at -once put the latter to death, although he offered, among other things, -to procure the withdrawal of the Peloponnesians from Plataea, which -was still under siege; and after deliberating as to what they should -do with the former, in the fury of the moment determined to put to -death not only the prisoners at Athens, but the whole adult male -population of Mitylene, and to make slaves of the women and -children. It was remarked that Mitylene had revolted without being, -like the rest, subjected to the empire; and what above all swelled the -wrath of the Athenians was the fact of the Peloponnesian fleet -having ventured over to Ionia to her support, a fact which was held to -argue a long meditated rebellion. They accordingly sent a galley to -communicate the decree to Paches, commanding him to lose no time in -dispatching the Mitylenians. The morrow brought repentance with it and -reflection on the horrid cruelty of a decree, which condemned a -whole city to the fate merited only by the guilty. This was no -sooner perceived by the Mitylenian ambassadors at Athens and their -Athenian supporters, than they moved the authorities to put the -question again to the vote; which they the more easily consented to -do, as they themselves plainly saw that most of the citizens wished -some one to give them an opportunity for reconsidering the matter. -An assembly was therefore at once called, and after much expression of -opinion upon both sides, Cleon, son of Cleaenetus, the same who had -carried the former motion of putting the Mitylenians to death, the -most violent man at Athens, and at that time by far the most -powerful with the commons, came forward again and spoke as follows: - -"I have often before now been convinced that a democracy is -incapable of empire, and never more so than by your present change -of mind in the matter of Mitylene. Fears or plots being unknown to you -in your daily relations with each other, you feel just the same with -regard to your allies, and never reflect that the mistakes into -which you may be led by listening to their appeals, or by giving way -to your own compassion, are full of danger to yourselves, and bring -you no thanks for your weakness from your allies; entirely -forgetting that your empire is a despotism and your subjects -disaffected conspirators, whose obedience is ensured not by your -suicidal concessions, but by the superiority given you by your own -strength and not their loyalty. The most alarming feature in the -case is the constant change of measures with which we appear to be -threatened, and our seeming ignorance of the fact that bad laws -which are never changed are better for a city than good ones that have -no authority; that unlearned loyalty is more serviceable than -quick-witted insubordination; and that ordinary men usually manage -public affairs better than their more gifted fellows. The latter are -always wanting to appear wiser than the laws, and to overrule every -proposition brought forward, thinking that they cannot show their -wit in more important matters, and by such behaviour too often ruin -their country; while those who mistrust their own cleverness are -content to be less learned than the laws, and less able to pick -holes in the speech of a good speaker; and being fair judges rather -than rival athletes, generally conduct affairs successfully. These -we ought to imitate, instead of being led on by cleverness and -intellectual rivalry to advise your people against our real opinions. - -"For myself, I adhere to my former opinion, and wonder at those -who have proposed to reopen the case of the Mitylenians, and who are -thus causing a delay which is all in favour of the guilty, by making -the sufferer proceed against the offender with the edge of his anger -blunted; although where vengeance follows most closely upon the wrong, -it best equals it and most amply requites it. I wonder also who will -be the man who will maintain the contrary, and will pretend to show -that the crimes of the Mitylenians are of service to us, and our -misfortunes injurious to the allies. Such a man must plainly either -have such confidence in his rhetoric as to adventure to prove that -what has been once for all decided is still undetermined, or be bribed -to try to delude us by elaborate sophisms. In such contests the -state gives the rewards to others, and takes the dangers for -herself. The persons to blame are you who are so foolish as to -institute these contests; who go to see an oration as you would to see -a sight, take your facts on hearsay, judge of the practicability of -a project by the wit of its advocates, and trust for the truth as to -past events not to the fact which you saw more than to the clever -strictures which you heard; the easy victims of new-fangled arguments, -unwilling to follow received conclusions; slaves to every new paradox, -despisers of the commonplace; the first wish of every man being that -he could speak himself, the next to rival those who can speak by -seeming to be quite up with their ideas by applauding every hit almost -before it is made, and by being as quick in catching an argument as -you are slow in foreseeing its consequences; asking, if I may so -say, for something different from the conditions under which we -live, and yet comprehending inadequately those very conditions; very -slaves to the pleasure of the ear, and more like the audience of a -rhetorician than the council of a city. - -"In order to keep you from this, I proceed to show that no one state -has ever injured you as much as Mitylene. I can make allowance for -those who revolt because they cannot bear our empire, or who have been -forced to do so by the enemy. But for those who possessed an island -with fortifications; who could fear our enemies only by sea, and there -had their own force of galleys to protect them; who were independent -and held in the highest honour by you--to act as these have done, -this is not revolt--revolt implies oppression; it is deliberate and -wanton aggression; an attempt to ruin us by siding with our -bitterest enemies; a worse offence than a war undertaken on their -own account in the acquisition of power. The fate of those of their -neighbours who had already rebelled and had been subdued was no lesson -to them; their own prosperity could not dissuade them from -affronting danger; but blindly confident in the future, and full of -hopes beyond their power though not beyond their ambition, they -declared war and made their decision to prefer might to right, their -attack being determined not by provocation but by the moment which -seemed propitious. The truth is that great good fortune coming -suddenly and unexpectedly tends to make a people insolent; in most -cases it is safer for mankind to have success in reason than out of -reason; and it is easier for them, one may say, to stave off adversity -than to preserve prosperity. Our mistake has been to distinguish the -Mitylenians as we have done: had they been long ago treated like the -rest, they never would have so far forgotten themselves, human -nature being as surely made arrogant by consideration as it is awed by -firmness. Let them now therefore be punished as their crime -requires, and do not, while you condemn the aristocracy, absolve the -people. This is certain, that all attacked you without distinction, -although they might have come over to us and been now again in -possession of their city. But no, they thought it safer to throw in -their lot with the aristocracy and so joined their rebellion! Consider -therefore: if you subject to the same punishment the ally who is -forced to rebel by the enemy, and him who does so by his own free -choice, which of them, think you, is there that will not rebel upon -the slightest pretext; when the reward of success is freedom, and -the penalty of failure nothing so very terrible? We meanwhile shall -have to risk our money and our lives against one state after -another; and if successful, shall receive a ruined town from which -we can no longer draw the revenue upon which our strength depends; -while if unsuccessful, we shall have an enemy the more upon our hands, -and shall spend the time that might be employed in combating our -existing foes in warring with our own allies. - -"No hope, therefore, that rhetoric may instil or money purchase, -of the mercy due to human infirmity must be held out to the -Mitylenians. Their offence was not involuntary, but of malice and -deliberate; and mercy is only for unwilling offenders. I therefore, -now as before, persist against your reversing your first decision, -or giving way to the three failings most fatal to empire--pity, -sentiment, and indulgence. Compassion is due to those who can -reciprocate the feeling, not to those who will never pity us in -return, but are our natural and necessary foes: the orators who -charm us with sentiment may find other less important arenas for their -talents, in the place of one where the city pays a heavy penalty for a -momentary pleasure, themselves receiving fine acknowledgments for -their fine phrases; while indulgence should be shown towards those who -will be our friends in future, instead of towards men who will -remain just what they were, and as much our enemies as before. To -sum up shortly, I say that if you follow my advice you will do what is -just towards the Mitylenians, and at the same time expedient; while by -a different decision you will not oblige them so much as pass sentence -upon yourselves. For if they were right in rebelling, you must be -wrong in ruling. However, if, right or wrong, you determine to rule, -you must carry out your principle and punish the Mitylenians as your -interest requires; or else you must give up your empire and -cultivate honesty without danger. Make up your minds, therefore, to -give them like for like; and do not let the victims who escaped the -plot be more insensible than the conspirators who hatched it; but -reflect what they would have done if victorious over you, especially -they were the aggressors. It is they who wrong their neighbour without -a cause, that pursue their victim to the death, on account of the -danger which they foresee in letting their enemy survive; since the -object of a wanton wrong is more dangerous, if he escape, than an -enemy who has not this to complain of. Do not, therefore, be -traitors to yourselves, but recall as nearly as possible the moment of -suffering and the supreme importance which you then attached to -their reduction; and now pay them back in their turn, without yielding -to present weakness or forgetting the peril that once hung over you. -Punish them as they deserve, and teach your other allies by a striking -example that the penalty of rebellion is death. Let them once -understand this and you will not have so often to neglect your enemies -while you are fighting with your own confederates." - -Such were the words of Cleon. After him Diodotus, son of Eucrates, -who had also in the previous assembly spoken most strongly against -putting the Mitylenians to death, came forward and spoke as follows: - -"I do not blame the persons who have reopened the case of the -Mitylenians, nor do I approve the protests which we have heard against -important questions being frequently debated. I think the two things -most opposed to good counsel are haste and passion; haste usually goes -hand in hand with folly, passion with coarseness and narrowness of -mind. As for the argument that speech ought not to be the exponent -of action, the man who uses it must be either senseless or interested: -senseless if he believes it possible to treat of the uncertain -future through any other medium; interested if, wishing to carry a -disgraceful measure and doubting his ability to speak well in a bad -cause, he thinks to frighten opponents and hearers by well-aimed -calumny. What is still more intolerable is to accuse a speaker of -making a display in order to be paid for it. If ignorance only were -imputed, an unsuccessful speaker might retire with a reputation for -honesty, if not for wisdom; while the charge of dishonesty makes him -suspected, if successful, and thought, if defeated, not only a fool -but a rogue. The city is no gainer by such a system, since fear -deprives it of its advisers; although in truth, if our speakers are to -make such assertions, it would be better for the country if they could -not speak at all, as we should then make fewer blunders. The good -citizen ought to triumph not by frightening his opponents but by -beating them fairly in argument; and a wise city, without -over-distinguishing its best advisers, will nevertheless not deprive -them of their due, and, far from punishing an unlucky counsellor, will -not even regard him as disgraced. In this way successful orators would -be least tempted to sacrifice their convictions to popularity, in -the hope of still higher honours, and unsuccessful speakers to -resort to the same popular arts in order to win over the multitude. - -"This is not our way; and, besides, the moment that a man is -suspected of giving advice, however good, from corrupt motives, we -feel such a grudge against him for the gain which after all we are not -certain he will receive, that we deprive the city of its certain -benefit. Plain good advice has thus come to be no less suspected -than bad; and the advocate of the most monstrous measures is not -more obliged to use deceit to gain the people, than the best -counsellor is to lie in order to be believed. The city and the city -only, owing to these refinements, can never be served openly and -without disguise; he who does serve it openly being always suspected -of serving himself in some secret way in return. Still, considering -the magnitude of the interests involved, and the position of -affairs, we orators must make it our business to look a little farther -than you who judge offhand; especially as we, your advisers, are -responsible, while you, our audience, are not so. For if those who -gave the advice, and those who took it, suffered equally, you would -judge more calmly; as it is, you visit the disasters into which the -whim of the moment may have led you upon the single person of your -adviser, not upon yourselves, his numerous companions in error. - -"However, I have not come forward either to oppose or to accuse in -the matter of Mitylene; indeed, the question before us as sensible men -is not their guilt, but our interests. Though I prove them ever so -guilty, I shall not, therefore, advise their death, unless it be -expedient; nor though they should have claims to indulgence, shall I -recommend it, unless it be dearly for the good of the country. I -consider that we are deliberating for the future more than for the -present; and where Cleon is so positive as to the useful deterrent -effects that will follow from making rebellion capital, I, who -consider the interests of the future quite as much as he, as -positively maintain the contrary. And I require you not to reject my -useful considerations for his specious ones: his speech may have the -attraction of seeming the more just in your present temper against -Mitylene; but we are not in a court of justice, but in a political -assembly; and the question is not justice, but how to make the -Mitylenians useful to Athens. - -"Now of course communities have enacted the penalty of death for -many offences far lighter than this: still hope leads men to -venture, and no one ever yet put himself in peril without the inward -conviction that he would succeed in his design. Again, was there -ever city rebelling that did not believe that it possessed either in -itself or in its alliances resources adequate to the enterprise? -All, states and individuals, are alike prone to err, and there is no -law that will prevent them; or why should men have exhausted the -list of punishments in search of enactments to protect them from -evildoers? It is probable that in early times the penalties for the -greatest offences were less severe, and that, as these were -disregarded, the penalty of death has been by degrees in most cases -arrived at, which is itself disregarded in like manner. Either then -some means of terror more terrible than this must be discovered, or it -must be owned that this restraint is useless; and that as long as -poverty gives men the courage of necessity, or plenty fills them -with the ambition which belongs to insolence and pride, and the -other conditions of life remain each under the thraldom of some -fatal and master passion, so long will the impulse never be wanting to -drive men into danger. Hope also and cupidity, the one leading and the -other following, the one conceiving the attempt, the other -suggesting the facility of succeeding, cause the widest ruin, and, -although invisible agents, are far stronger than the dangers that -are seen. Fortune, too, powerfully helps the delusion and, by the -unexpected aid that she sometimes lends, tempts men to venture with -inferior means; and this is especially the case with communities, -because the stakes played for are the highest, freedom or empire, and, -when all are acting together, each man irrationally magnifies his -own capacity. In fine, it is impossible to prevent, and only great -simplicity can hope to prevent, human nature doing what it has once -set its mind upon, by force of law or by any other deterrent force -whatsoever. - -"We must not, therefore, commit ourselves to a false policy -through a belief in the efficacy of the punishment of death, or -exclude rebels from the hope of repentance and an early atonement of -their error. Consider a moment. At present, if a city that has already -revolted perceive that it cannot succeed, it will come to terms -while it is still able to refund expenses, and pay tribute afterwards. -In the other case, what city, think you, would not prepare better than -is now done, and hold out to the last against its besiegers, if it -is all one whether it surrender late or soon? And how can it be -otherwise than hurtful to us to be put to the expense of a siege, -because surrender is out of the question; and if we take the city, -to receive a ruined town from which we can no longer draw the -revenue which forms our real strength against the enemy? We must -not, therefore, sit as strict judges of the offenders to our own -prejudice, but rather see how by moderate chastisements we may be -enabled to benefit in future by the revenue-producing powers of our -dependencies; and we must make up our minds to look for our protection -not to legal terrors but to careful administration. At present we do -exactly the opposite. When a free community, held in subjection by -force, rises, as is only natural, and asserts its independence, it -is no sooner reduced than we fancy ourselves obliged to punish it -severely; although the right course with freemen is not to chastise -them rigorously when they do rise, but rigorously to watch them before -they rise, and to prevent their ever entertaining the idea, and, the -insurrection suppressed, to make as few responsible for it as -possible. - -"Only consider what a blunder you would commit in doing as Cleon -recommends. As things are at present, in all the cities the people -is your friend, and either does not revolt with the oligarchy, or, -if forced to do so, becomes at once the enemy of the insurgents; so -that in the war with the hostile city you have the masses on your -side. But if you butcher the people of Mitylene, who had nothing to do -with the revolt, and who, as soon as they got arms, of their own -motion surrendered the town, first you will commit the crime of -killing your benefactors; and next you will play directly into the -hands of the higher classes, who when they induce their cities to -rise, will immediately have the people on their side, through your -having announced in advance the same punishment for those who are -guilty and for those who are not. On the contrary, even if they were -guilty, you ought to seem not to notice it, in order to avoid -alienating the only class still friendly to us. In short, I consider -it far more useful for the preservation of our empire voluntarily to -put up with injustice, than to put to death, however justly, those -whom it is our interest to keep alive. As for Cleon's idea that in -punishment the claims of justice and expediency can both be satisfied, -facts do not confirm the possibility of such a combination. - -"Confess, therefore, that this is the wisest course, and without -conceding too much either to pity or to indulgence, by neither of -which motives do I any more than Cleon wish you to be influenced, upon -the plain merits of the case before you, be persuaded by me to try -calmly those of the Mitylenians whom Paches sent off as guilty, and to -leave the rest undisturbed. This is at once best for the future, and -most terrible to your enemies at the present moment; inasmuch as -good policy against an adversary is superior to the blind attacks of -brute force." - -Such were the words of Diodotus. The two opinions thus expressed -were the ones that most directly contradicted each other; and the -Athenians, notwithstanding their change of feeling, now proceeded to a -division, in which the show of hands was almost equal, although the -motion of Diodotus carried the day. Another galley was at once sent -off in haste, for fear that the first might reach Lesbos in the -interval, and the city be found destroyed; the first ship having about -a day and a night's start. Wine and barley-cakes were provided for the -vessel by the Mitylenian ambassadors, and great promises made if -they arrived in time; which caused the men to use such diligence -upon the voyage that they took their meals of barley-cakes kneaded -with oil and wine as they rowed, and only slept by turns while the -others were at the oar. Luckily they met with no contrary wind, and -the first ship making no haste upon so horrid an errand, while the -second pressed on in the manner described, the first arrived so little -before them, that Paches had only just had time to read the decree, -and to prepare to execute the sentence, when the second put into -port and prevented the massacre. The danger of Mitylene had indeed -been great. - -The other party whom Paches had sent off as the prime movers in -the rebellion, were upon Cleon's motion put to death by the Athenians, -the number being rather more than a thousand. The Athenians also -demolished the walls of the Mitylenians, and took possession of -their ships. Afterwards tribute was not imposed upon the Lesbians; but -all their land, except that of the Methymnians, was divided into three -thousand allotments, three hundred of which were reserved as sacred -for the gods, and the rest assigned by lot to Athenian shareholders, -who were sent out to the island. With these the Lesbians agreed to pay -a rent of two minae a year for each allotment, and cultivated the land -themselves. The Athenians also took possession of the towns on the -continent belonging to the Mitylenians, which thus became for the -future subject to Athens. Such were the events that took place at -Lesbos. - - - - -CHAPTER X - -_Fifth Year of the War - Trial and Execution of the Plataeans - -Corcyraean Revolution_ - -During the same summer, after the reduction of Lesbos, the Athenians -under Nicias, son of Niceratus, made an expedition against the -island of Minoa, which lies off Megara and was used as a fortified -post by the Megarians, who had built a tower upon it. Nicias wished to -enable the Athenians to maintain their blockade from this nearer -station instead of from Budorum and Salamis; to stop the Peloponnesian -galleys and privateers sailing out unobserved from the island, as they -had been in the habit of doing; and at the same time prevent -anything from coming into Megara. Accordingly, after taking two towers -projecting on the side of Nisaea, by engines from the sea, and -clearing the entrance into the channel between the island and the -shore, he next proceeded to cut off all communication by building a -wall on the mainland at the point where a bridge across a morass -enabled succours to be thrown into the island, which was not far off -from the continent. A few days sufficing to accomplish this, he -afterwards raised some works in the island also, and leaving a -garrison there, departed with his forces. - -About the same time in this summer, the Plataeans, being now without -provisions and unable to support the siege, surrendered to the -Peloponnesians in the following manner. An assault had been made -upon the wall, which the Plataeans were unable to repel. The -Lacedaemonian commander, perceiving their weakness, wished to avoid -taking the place by storm; his instructions from Lacedaemon having -been so conceived, in order that if at any future time peace should be -made with Athens, and they should agree each to restore the places -that they had taken in the war, Plataea might be held to have come -over voluntarily, and not be included in the list. He accordingly sent -a herald to them to ask if they were willing voluntarily to -surrender the town to the Lacedaemonians, and accept them as their -judges, upon the understanding that the guilty should be punished, but -no one without form of law. The Plataeans were now in the last state -of weakness, and the herald had no sooner delivered his message than -they surrendered the town. The Peloponnesians fed them for some days -until the judges from Lacedaemon, who were five in number, arrived. -Upon their arrival no charge was preferred; they simply called up -the Plataeans, and asked them whether they had done the Lacedaemonians -and allies any service in the war then raging. The Plataeans asked -leave to speak at greater length, and deputed two of their number to -represent them: Astymachus, son of Asopolaus, and Lacon, son of -Aeimnestus, proxenus of the Lacedaemonians, who came forward and spoke -as follows: - -"Lacedaemonians, when we surrendered our city we trusted in you, and -looked forward to a trial more agreeable to the forms of law than -the present, to which we had no idea of being subjected; the judges -also in whose hands we consented to place ourselves were you, and -you only (from whom we thought we were most likely to obtain justice), -and not other persons, as is now the case. As matters stand, we are -afraid that we have been doubly deceived. We have good reason to -suspect, not only that the issue to be tried is the most terrible of -all, but that you will not prove impartial; if we may argue from the -fact that no accusation was first brought forward for us to answer, -but we had ourselves to ask leave to speak, and from the question -being put so shortly, that a true answer to it tells against us, while -a false one can be contradicted. In this dilemma, our safest, and -indeed our only course, seems to be to say something at all risks: -placed as we are, we could scarcely be silent without being -tormented by the damning thought that speaking might have saved us. -Another difficulty that we have to encounter is the difficulty of -convincing you. Were we unknown to each other we might profit by -bringing forward new matter with which you were unacquainted: as it -is, we can tell you nothing that you do not know already, and we fear, -not that you have condemned us in your own minds of having failed in -our duty towards you, and make this our crime, but that to please a -third party we have to submit to a trial the result of which is -already decided. Nevertheless, we will place before you what we can -justly urge, not only on the question of the quarrel which the Thebans -have against us, but also as addressing you and the rest of the -Hellenes; and we will remind you of our good services, and endeavour -to prevail with you. - -"To your short question, whether we have done the Lacedaemonians and -allies any service in this war, we say, if you ask us as enemies, that -to refrain from serving you was not to do you injury; if as friends, -that you are more in fault for having marched against us. During the -peace, and against the Mede, we acted well: we have not now been the -first to break the peace, and we were the only Boeotians who then -joined in defending against the Mede the liberty of Hellas. Although -an inland people, we were present at the action at Artemisium; in -the battle that took place in our territory we fought by the side of -yourselves and Pausanias; and in all the other Hellenic exploits of -the time we took a part quite out of proportion to our strength. -Besides, you, as Lacedaemonians, ought not to forget that at the -time of the great panic at Sparta, after the earthquake, caused by the -secession of the Helots to Ithome, we sent the third part of our -citizens to assist you. - -"On these great and historical occasions such was the part that we -chose, although afterwards we became your enemies. For this you were -to blame. When we asked for your alliance against our Theban -oppressors, you rejected our petition, and told us to go to the -Athenians who were our neighbours, as you lived too far off. In the -war we never have done to you, and never should have done to you, -anything unreasonable. If we refused to desert the Athenians when -you asked us, we did no wrong; they had helped us against the -Thebans when you drew back, and we could no longer give them up with -honour; especially as we had obtained their alliance and had been -admitted to their citizenship at our own request, and after -receiving benefits at their hands; but it was plainly our duty loyally -to obey their orders. Besides, the faults that either of you may -commit in your supremacy must be laid, not upon the followers, but -on the chiefs that lead them astray. - -"With regard to the Thebans, they have wronged us repeatedly, and -their last aggression, which has been the means of bringing us into -our present position, is within your own knowledge. In seizing our -city in time of peace, and what is more at a holy time in the month, -they justly encountered our vengeance, in accordance with the -universal law which sanctions resistance to an invader; and it -cannot now be right that we should suffer on their account. By -taking your own immediate interest and their animosity as the test -of justice, you will prove yourselves to be rather waiters on -expediency than judges of right; although if they seem useful to you -now, we and the rest of the Hellenes gave you much more valuable -help at a time of greater need. Now you are the assailants, and others -fear you; but at the crisis to which we allude, when the barbarian -threatened all with slavery, the Thebans were on his side. It is just, -therefore, to put our patriotism then against our error now, if -error there has been; and you will find the merit outweighing the -fault, and displayed at a juncture when there were few Hellenes who -would set their valour against the strength of Xerxes, and when -greater praise was theirs who preferred the dangerous path of honour -to the safe course of consulting their own interest with respect to -the invasion. To these few we belonged, and highly were we honoured -for it; and yet we now fear to perish by having again acted on the -same principles, and chosen to act well with Athens sooner than wisely -with Sparta. Yet in justice the same cases should be decided in the -same way, and policy should not mean anything else than lasting -gratitude for the service of good ally combined with a proper -attention to one's own immediate interest. - -"Consider also that at present the Hellenes generally regard you -as a pattern of worth and honour; and if you pass an unjust sentence -upon us in this which is no obscure cause, but one in which you, the -judges, are as illustrious as we, the prisoners, are blameless, take -care that displeasure be not felt at an unworthy decision in the -matter of honourable men made by men yet more honourable than they, -and at the consecration in the national temples of spoils taken from -the Plataeans, the benefactors of Hellas. Shocking indeed will it seem -for Lacedaemonians to destroy Plataea, and for the city whose name -your fathers inscribed upon the tripod at Delphi for its good service, -to be by you blotted out from the map of Hellas, to please the -Thebans. To such a depth of misfortune have we fallen that, while -the Medes' success had been our ruin, Thebans now supplant us in -your once fond regards; and we have been subjected to two dangers, the -greatest of any--that of dying of starvation then, if we had not -surrendered our town, and now of being tried for our lives. So that we -Plataeans, after exertions beyond our power in the cause of the -Hellenes, are rejected by all, forsaken and unassisted; helped by none -of our allies, and reduced to doubt the stability of our only hope, -yourselves. - -"Still, in the name of the gods who once presided over our -confederacy, and of our own good service in the Hellenic cause, we -adjure you to relent; to recall the decision which we fear that the -Thebans may have obtained from you; to ask back the gift that you have -given them, that they disgrace not you by slaying us; to gain a pure -instead of a guilty gratitude, and not to gratify others to be -yourselves rewarded with shame. Our lives may be quickly taken, but it -will be a heavy task to wipe away the infamy of the deed; as we are no -enemies whom you might justly punish, but friends forced into taking -arms against you. To grant us our lives would be, therefore, a -righteous judgment; if you consider also that we are prisoners who -surrendered of their own accord, stretching out our hands for quarter, -whose slaughter Hellenic law forbids, and who besides were always your -benefactors. Look at the sepulchres of your fathers, slain by the -Medes and buried in our country, whom year by year we honoured with -garments and all other dues, and the first-fruits of all that our land -produced in their season, as friends from a friendly country and -allies to our old companions in arms. Should you not decide aright, -your conduct would be the very opposite to ours. Consider only: -Pausanias buried them thinking that he was laying them in friendly -ground and among men as friendly; but you, if you kill us and make the -Plataean territory Theban, will leave your fathers and kinsmen in a -hostile soil and among their murderers, deprived of the honours -which they now enjoy. What is more, you will enslave the land in which -the freedom of the Hellenes was won, make desolate the temples of -the gods to whom they prayed before they overcame the Medes, and -take away your ancestral sacrifices from those who founded and -instituted them. - -"It were not to your glory, Lacedaemonians, either to offend in this -way against the common law of the Hellenes and against your own -ancestors, or to kill us your benefactors to gratify another's -hatred without having been wronged yourselves: it were more so to -spare us and to yield to the impressions of a reasonable compassion; -reflecting not merely on the awful fate in store for us, but also on -the character of the sufferers, and on the impossibility of predicting -how soon misfortune may fall even upon those who deserve it not. We, -as we have a right to do and as our need impels us, entreat you, -calling aloud upon the gods at whose common altar all the Hellenes -worship, to hear our request, to be not unmindful of the oaths which -your fathers swore, and which we now plead--we supplicate you by the -tombs of your fathers, and appeal to those that are gone to save us -from falling into the hands of the Thebans and their dearest friends -from being given up to their most detested foes. We also remind you of -that day on which we did the most glorious deeds, by your fathers' -sides, we who now on this are like to suffer the most dreadful fate. -Finally, to do what is necessary and yet most difficult for men in our -situation--that is, to make an end of speaking, since with that -ending the peril of our lives draws near--in conclusion we say that -we did not surrender our city to the Thebans (to that we would have -preferred inglorious starvation), but trusted in and capitulated to -you; and it would be just, if we fail to persuade you, to put us -back in the same position and let us take the chance that falls to us. -And at the same time we adjure you not to give us up--your -suppliants, Lacedaemonians, out of your hands and faith, Plataeans -foremost of the Hellenic patriots, to Thebans, our most hated -enemies--but to be our saviours, and not, while you free the rest of -the Hellenes, to bring us to destruction." - -Such were the words of the Plataeans. The Thebans, afraid that the -Lacedaemonians might be moved by what they had heard, came forward and -said that they too desired to address them, since the Plataeans had, -against their wish, been allowed to speak at length instead of being -confined to a simple answer to the question. Leave being granted, -the Thebans spoke as follows: - -"We should never have asked to make this speech if the Plataeans -on their side had contented themselves with shortly answering the -question, and had not turned round and made charges against us, -coupled with a long defence of themselves upon matters outside the -present inquiry and not even the subject of accusation, and with -praise of what no one finds fault with. However, since they have -done so, we must answer their charges and refute their self-praise, in -order that neither our bad name nor their good may help them, but that -you may hear the real truth on both points, and so decide. - -"The origin of our quarrel was this. We settled Plataea some time -after the rest of Boeotia, together with other places out of which -we had driven the mixed population. The Plataeans not choosing to -recognize our supremacy, as had been first arranged, but separating -themselves from the rest of the Boeotians, and proving traitors to -their nationality, we used compulsion; upon which they went over to -the Athenians, and with them did as much harm, for which we -retaliated. - -"Next, when the barbarian invaded Hellas, they say that they were -the only Boeotians who did not Medize; and this is where they most -glorify themselves and abuse us. We say that if they did not Medize, -it was because the Athenians did not do so either; just as -afterwards when the Athenians attacked the Hellenes they, the -Plataeans, were again the only Boeotians who Atticized. And yet -consider the forms of our respective governments when we so acted. Our -city at that juncture had neither an oligarchical constitution in -which all the nobles enjoyed equal rights, nor a democracy, but that -which is most opposed to law and good government and nearest a -tyranny--the rule of a close cabal. These, hoping to strengthen their -individual power by the success of the Mede, kept down by force the -people, and brought him into the town. The city as a whole was not its -own mistress when it so acted, and ought not to be reproached for -the errors that it committed while deprived of its constitution. -Examine only how we acted after the departure of the Mede and the -recovery of the constitution; when the Athenians attacked the rest -of Hellas and endeavoured to subjugate our country, of the greater -part of which faction had already made them masters. Did not we -fight and conquer at Coronea and liberate Boeotia, and do we not now -actively contribute to the liberation of the rest, providing horses to -the cause and a force unequalled by that of any other state in the -confederacy? - -"Let this suffice to excuse us for our Medism. We will now endeavour -to show that you have injured the Hellenes more than we, and are -more deserving of condign punishment. It was in defence against us, -say you, that you became allies and citizens of Athens. If so, you -ought only to have called in the Athenians against us, instead of -joining them in attacking others: it was open to you to do this if you -ever felt that they were leading you where you did not wish to follow, -as Lacedaemon was already your ally against the Mede, as you so much -insist; and this was surely sufficient to keep us off, and above all -to allow you to deliberate in security. Nevertheless, of your own -choice and without compulsion you chose to throw your lot in with -Athens. And you say that it had been base for you to betray your -benefactors; but it was surely far baser and more iniquitous to -sacrifice the whole body of the Hellenes, your fellow confederates, -who were liberating Hellas, than the Athenians only, who were -enslaving it. The return that you made them was therefore neither -equal nor honourable, since you called them in, as you say, because -you were being oppressed yourselves, and then became their accomplices -in oppressing others; although baseness rather consists in not -returning like for like than in not returning what is justly due but -must be unjustly paid. - -"Meanwhile, after thus plainly showing that it was not for the -sake of the Hellenes that you alone then did not Medize, but because -the Athenians did not do so either, and you wished to side with them -and to be against the rest; you now claim the benefit of good deeds -done to please your neighbours. This cannot be admitted: you chose the -Athenians, and with them you must stand or fall. Nor can you plead the -league then made and claim that it should now protect you. You -abandoned that league, and offended against it by helping instead of -hindering the subjugation of the Aeginetans and others of its members, -and that not under compulsion, but while in enjoyment of the same -institutions that you enjoy to the present hour, and no one forcing -you as in our case. Lastly, an invitation was addressed to you -before you were blockaded to be neutral and join neither party: this -you did not accept. Who then merit the detestation of the Hellenes -more justly than you, you who sought their ruin under the mask of -honour? The former virtues that you allege you now show not to be -proper to your character; the real bent of your nature has been at -length damningly proved: when the Athenians took the path of injustice -you followed them. - -"Of our unwilling Medism and your wilful Atticizing this then is our -explanation. The last wrong wrong of which you complain consists in -our having, as you say, lawlessly invaded your town in time of peace -and festival. Here again we cannot think that we were more in fault -than yourselves. If of our own proper motion we made an armed attack -upon your city and ravaged your territory, we are guilty; but if the -first men among you in estate and family, wishing to put an end to the -foreign connection and to restore you to the common Boeotian -country, of their own free will invited us, wherein is our crime? -Where wrong is done, those who lead, as you say, are more to blame -than those who follow. Not that, in our judgment, wrong was done -either by them or by us. Citizens like yourselves, and with more at -stake than you, they opened their own walls and introduced us into -their own city, not as foes but as friends, to prevent the bad among -you from becoming worse; to give honest men their due; to reform -principles without attacking persons, since you were not to be -banished from your city, but brought home to your kindred, nor to be -made enemies to any, but friends alike to all. - -"That our intention was not hostile is proved by our behaviour. We -did no harm to any one, but publicly invited those who wished to -live under a national, Boeotian government to come over to us; which -as first you gladly did, and made an agreement with us and remained -tranquil, until you became aware of the smallness of our numbers. -Now it is possible that there may have been something not quite fair -in our entering without the consent of your commons. At any rate you -did not repay us in kind. Instead of refraining, as we had done, -from violence, and inducing us to retire by negotiation, you fell upon -us in violation of your agreement, and slew some of us in fight, of -which we do not so much complain, for in that there was a certain -justice; but others who held out their hands and received quarter, and -whose lives you subsequently promised us, you lawlessly butchered. -If this was not abominable, what is? And after these three crimes -committed one after the other--the violation of your agreement, the -murder of the men afterwards, and the lying breach of your promise not -to kill them, if we refrained from injuring your property in the -country--you still affirm that we are the criminals and yourselves -pretend to escape justice. Not so, if these your judges decide aright, -but you will be punished for all together. - -"Such, Lacedaemonians, are the facts. We have gone into them at some -length both on your account and on our own, that you may fed that -you will justly condemn the prisoners, and we, that we have given an -additional sanction to our vengeance. We would also prevent you from -being melted by hearing of their past virtues, if any such they had: -these may be fairly appealed to by the victims of injustice, but -only aggravate the guilt of criminals, since they offend against their -better nature. Nor let them gain anything by crying and wailing, by -calling upon your fathers' tombs and their own desolate condition. -Against this we point to the far more dreadful fate of our youth, -butchered at their hands; the fathers of whom either fell at -Coronea, bringing Boeotia over to you, or seated, forlorn old men by -desolate hearths, with far more reason implore your justice upon the -prisoners. The pity which they appeal to is rather due to men who -suffer unworthily; those who suffer justly as they do are on the -contrary subjects for triumph. For their present desolate condition -they have themselves to blame, since they wilfully rejected the better -alliance. Their lawless act was not provoked by any action of ours: -hate, not justice, inspired their decision; and even now the -satisfaction which they afford us is not adequate; they will suffer by -a legal sentence, not as they pretend as suppliants asking for quarter -in battle, but as prisoners who have surrendered upon agreement to -take their trial. Vindicate, therefore, Lacedaemonians, the Hellenic -law which they have broken; and to us, the victims of its violation, -grant the reward merited by our zeal. Nor let us be supplanted in your -favour by their harangues, but offer an example to the Hellenes, -that the contests to which you invite them are of deeds, not words: -good deeds can be shortly stated, but where wrong is done a wealth -of language is needed to veil its deformity. However, if leading -powers were to do what you are now doing, and putting one short -question to all alike were to decide accordingly, men would be less -tempted to seek fine phrases to cover bad actions." - -Such were the words of the Thebans. The Lacedaemonian judges decided -that the question whether they had received any service from the -Plataeans in the war, was a fair one for them to put; as they had -always invited them to be neutral, agreeably to the original -covenant of Pausanias after the defeat of the Mede, and had again -definitely offered them the same conditions before the blockade. -This offer having been refused, they were now, they conceived, by -the loyalty of their intention released from their covenant; and -having, as they considered, suffered evil at the hands of the -Plataeans, they brought them in again one by one and asked each of -them the same question, that is to say, whether they had done the -Lacedaemonians and allies any service in the war; and upon their -saying that they had not, took them out and slew them, all without -exception. The number of Plataeans thus massacred was not less than -two hundred, with twenty-five Athenians who had shared in the siege. -The women were taken as slaves. The city the Thebans gave for about -a year to some political emigrants from Megara and to the surviving -Plataeans of their own party to inhabit, and afterwards razed it to -the ground from the very foundations, and built on to the precinct -of Hera an inn two hundred feet square, with rooms all round above and -below, making use for this purpose of the roofs and doors of the -Plataeans: of the rest of the materials in the wall, the brass and the -iron, they made couches which they dedicated to Hera, for whom they -also built a stone chapel of a hundred feet square. The land they -confiscated and let out on a ten years' lease to Theban occupiers. The -adverse attitude of the Lacedaemonians in the whole Plataean affair -was mainly adopted to please the Thebans, who were thought to be -useful in the war at that moment raging. Such was the end of -Plataea, in the ninety-third year after she became the ally of Athens. - -Meanwhile, the forty ships of the Peloponnesians that had gone to -the relief of the Lesbians, and which we left flying across the open -sea, pursued by the Athenians, were caught in a storm off Crete, and -scattering from thence made their way to Peloponnese, where they found -at Cyllene thirteen Leucadian and Ambraciot galleys, with Brasidas, -son of Tellis, lately arrived as counsellor to Alcidas; the -Lacedaemonians, upon the failure of the Lesbian expedition, having -resolved to strengthen their fleet and sail to Corcyra, where a -revolution had broken out, so as to arrive there before the twelve -Athenian ships at Naupactus could be reinforced from Athens. -Brasidas and Alcidas began to prepare accordingly. - -The Corcyraean revolution began with the return of the prisoners -taken in the sea-fights off Epidamnus. These the Corinthians had -released, nominally upon the security of eight hundred talents given -by their proxeni, but in reality upon their engagement to bring over -Corcyra to Corinth. These men proceeded to canvass each of the -citizens, and to intrigue with the view of detaching the city from -Athens. Upon the arrival of an Athenian and a Corinthian vessel, -with envoys on board, a conference was held in which the Corcyraeans -voted to remain allies of the Athenians according to their -agreement, but to be friends of the Peloponnesians as they had been -formerly. Meanwhile, the returned prisoners brought Peithias, a -volunteer proxenus of the Athenians and leader of the commons, to -trial, upon the charge of enslaving Corcyra to Athens. He, being -acquitted, retorted by accusing five of the richest of their number of -cutting stakes in the ground sacred to Zeus and Alcinous; the legal -penalty being a stater for each stake. Upon their conviction, the -amount of the penalty being very large, they seated themselves as -suppliants in the temples to be allowed to pay it by instalments; -but Peithias, who was one of the senate, prevailed upon that body to -enforce the law; upon which the accused, rendered desperate by the -law, and also learning that Peithias had the intention, while still -a member of the senate, to persuade the people to conclude a defensive -and offensive alliance with Athens, banded together armed with -daggers, and suddenly bursting into the senate killed Peithias and -sixty others, senators and private persons; some few only of the party -of Peithias taking refuge in the Athenian galley, which had not yet -departed. - -After this outrage, the conspirators summoned the Corcyraeans to -an assembly, and said that this would turn out for the best, and would -save them from being enslaved by Athens: for the future, they moved to -receive neither party unless they came peacefully in a single ship, -treating any larger number as enemies. This motion made, they -compelled it to be adopted, and instantly sent off envoys to Athens to -justify what had been done and to dissuade the refugees there from any -hostile proceedings which might lead to a reaction. - -Upon the arrival of the embassy, the Athenians arrested the envoys -and all who listened to them, as revolutionists, and lodged them in -Aegina. Meanwhile a Corinthian galley arriving in the island with -Lacedaemonian envoys, the dominant Corcyraean party attacked the -commons and defeated them in battle. Night coming on, the commons took -refuge in the Acropolis and the higher parts of the city, and -concentrated themselves there, having also possession of the Hyllaic -harbour; their adversaries occupying the market-place, where most of -them lived, and the harbour adjoining, looking towards the mainland. - -The next day passed in skirmishes of little importance, each party -sending into the country to offer freedom to the slaves and to -invite them to join them. The mass of the slaves answered the appeal -of the commons; their antagonists being reinforced by eight hundred -mercenaries from the continent. - -After a day's interval hostilities recommenced, victory remaining -with the commons, who had the advantage in numbers and position, the -women also valiantly assisting them, pelting with tiles from the -houses, and supporting the melee with a fortitude beyond their sex. -Towards dusk, the oligarchs in full rout, fearing that the -victorious commons might assault and carry the arsenal and put them to -the sword, fired the houses round the marketplace and the -lodging-houses, in order to bar their advance; sparing neither their -own, nor those of their neighbours; by which much stuff of the -merchants was consumed and the city risked total destruction, if a -wind had come to help the flame by blowing on it. Hostilities now -ceasing, both sides kept quiet, passing the night on guard, while -the Corinthian ship stole out to sea upon the victory of the -commons, and most of the mercenaries passed over secretly to the -continent. - -The next day the Athenian general, Nicostratus, son of Diitrephes, -came up from Naupactus with twelve ships and five hundred Messenian -heavy infantry. He at once endeavoured to bring about a settlement, -and persuaded the two parties to agree together to bring to trial -ten of the ringleaders, who presently fled, while the rest were to -live in peace, making terms with each other, and entering into a -defensive and offensive alliance with the Athenians. This arranged, he -was about to sail away, when the leaders of the commons induced him to -leave them five of his ships to make their adversaries less disposed -to move, while they manned and sent with him an equal number of -their own. He had no sooner consented, than they began to enroll their -enemies for the ships; and these, fearing that they might be sent -off to Athens, seated themselves as suppliants in the temple of the -Dioscuri. An attempt on the part of Nicostratus to reassure them and -to persuade them to rise proving unsuccessful, the commons armed -upon this pretext, alleging the refusal of their adversaries to sail -with them as a proof of the hollowness of their intentions, and took -their arms out of their houses, and would have dispatched some whom -they fell in with, if Nicostratus had not prevented it. The rest of -the party, seeing what was going on, seated themselves as suppliants -in the temple of Hera, being not less than four hundred in number; -until the commons, fearing that they might adopt some desperate -resolution, induced them to rise, and conveyed them over to the island -in front of the temple, where provisions were sent across to them. - -At this stage in the revolution, on the fourth or fifth day after -the removal of the men to the island, the Peloponnesian ships -arrived from Cyllene where they had been stationed since their -return from Ionia, fifty-three in number, still under the command of -Alcidas, but with Brasidas also on board as his adviser; and -dropping anchor at Sybota, a harbour on the mainland, at daybreak made -sail for Corcyra. - -The Corcyraeans in great confusion and alarm at the state of -things in the city and at the approach of the invader, at once -proceeded to equip sixty vessels, which they sent out, as fast as they -were manned, against the enemy, in spite of the Athenians recommending -them to let them sail out first, and to follow themselves afterwards -with all their ships together. Upon their vessels coming up to the -enemy in this straggling fashion, two immediately deserted: in -others the crews were fighting among themselves, and there was no -order in anything that was done; so that the Peloponnesians, seeing -their confusion, placed twenty ships to oppose the Corcyraeans, and -ranged the rest against the twelve Athenian ships, amongst which -were the two vessels Salaminia and Paralus. - -While the Corcyraeans, attacking without judgment and in small -detachments, were already crippled by their own misconduct, the -Athenians, afraid of the numbers of the enemy and of being surrounded, -did not venture to attack the main body or even the centre of the -division opposed to them, but fell upon its wing and sank one -vessel; after which the Peloponnesians formed in a circle, and the -Athenians rowed round them and tried to throw them into disorder. -Perceiving this, the division opposed to the Corcyraeans, fearing a -repetition of the disaster of Naupactus, came to support their -friends, and the whole fleet now bore down, united, upon the -Athenians, who retired before it, backing water, retiring as leisurely -as possible in order to give the Corcyraeans time to escape, while the -enemy was thus kept occupied. Such was the character of this -sea-fight, which lasted until sunset. - -The Corcyraeans now feared that the enemy would follow up their -victory and sail against the town and rescue the men in the island, or -strike some other blow equally decisive, and accordingly carried the -men over again to the temple of Hera, and kept guard over the city. -The Peloponnesians, however, although victorious in the sea-fight, did -not venture to attack the town, but took the thirteen Corcyraean -vessels which they had captured, and with them sailed back to the -continent from whence they had put out. The next day equally they -refrained from attacking the city, although the disorder and panic -were at their height, and though Brasidas, it is said, urged -Alcidas, his superior officer, to do so, but they landed upon the -promontory of Leukimme and laid waste the country. - -Meanwhile the commons in Corcyra, being still in great fear of the -fleet attacking them, came to a parley with the suppliants and their -friends, in order to save the town; and prevailed upon some of them to -go on board the ships, of which they still manned thirty, against -the expected attack. But the Peloponnesians after ravaging the country -until midday sailed away, and towards nightfall were informed by -beacon signals of the approach of sixty Athenian vessels from -Leucas, under the command of Eurymedon, son of Thucles; which had been -sent off by the Athenians upon the news of the revolution and of the -fleet with Alcidas being about to sail for Corcyra. - -The Peloponnesians accordingly at once set off in haste by night for -home, coasting along shore; and hauling their ships across the Isthmus -of Leucas, in order not to be seen doubling it, so departed. The -Corcyraeans, made aware of the approach of the Athenian fleet and of -the departure of the enemy, brought the Messenians from outside the -walls into the town, and ordered the fleet which they had manned to -sail round into the Hyllaic harbour; and while it was so doing, slew -such of their enemies as they laid hands on, dispatching afterwards, -as they landed them, those whom they had persuaded to go on board -the ships. Next they went to the sanctuary of Hera and persuaded about -fifty men to take their trial, and condemned them all to death. The -mass of the suppliants who had refused to do so, on seeing what was -taking place, slew each other there in the consecrated ground; while -some hanged themselves upon the trees, and others destroyed themselves -as they were severally able. During seven days that Eurymedon stayed -with his sixty ships, the Corcyraeans were engaged in butchering those -of their fellow citizens whom they regarded as their enemies: and -although the crime imputed was that of attempting to put down the -democracy, some were slain also for private hatred, others by their -debtors because of the moneys owed to them. Death thus raged in -every shape; and, as usually happens at such times, there was no -length to which violence did not go; sons were killed by their -fathers, and suppliants dragged from the altar or slain upon it; while -some were even walled up in the temple of Dionysus and died there. - -So bloody was the march of the revolution, and the impression -which it made was the greater as it was one of the first to occur. -Later on, one may say, the whole Hellenic world was convulsed; -struggles being every, where made by the popular chiefs to bring in -the Athenians, and by the oligarchs to introduce the Lacedaemonians. -In peace there would have been neither the pretext nor the wish to -make such an invitation; but in war, with an alliance always at the -command of either faction for the hurt of their adversaries and -their own corresponding advantage, opportunities for bringing in the -foreigner were never wanting to the revolutionary parties. The -sufferings which revolution entailed upon the cities were many and -terrible, such as have occurred and always will occur, as long as -the nature of mankind remains the same; though in a severer or -milder form, and varying in their symptoms, according to the variety -of the particular cases. In peace and prosperity, states and -individuals have better sentiments, because they do not find -themselves suddenly confronted with imperious necessities; but war -takes away the easy supply of daily wants, and so proves a rough -master, that brings most men's characters to a level with their -fortunes. Revolution thus ran its course from city to city, and the -places which it arrived at last, from having heard what had been -done before, carried to a still greater excess the refinement of their -inventions, as manifested in the cunning of their enterprises and -the atrocity of their reprisals. Words had to change their ordinary -meaning and to take that which was now given them. Reckless audacity -came to be considered the courage of a loyal ally; prudent hesitation, -specious cowardice; moderation was held to be a cloak for unmanliness; -ability to see all sides of a question, inaptness to act on any. -Frantic violence became the attribute of manliness; cautious plotting, -a justifiable means of self-defence. The advocate of extreme -measures was always trustworthy; his opponent a man to be suspected. -To succeed in a plot was to have a shrewd head, to divine a plot a -still shrewder; but to try to provide against having to do either -was to break up your party and to be afraid of your adversaries. In -fine, to forestall an intending criminal, or to suggest the idea of -a crime where it was wanting, was equally commended until even blood -became a weaker tie than party, from the superior readiness of those -united by the latter to dare everything without reserve; for such -associations had not in view the blessings derivable from -established institutions but were formed by ambition for their -overthrow; and the confidence of their members in each other rested -less on any religious sanction than upon complicity in crime. The fair -proposals of an adversary were met with jealous precautions by the -stronger of the two, and not with a generous confidence. Revenge -also was held of more account than self-preservation. Oaths of -reconciliation, being only proffered on either side to meet an -immediate difficulty, only held good so long as no other weapon was at -hand; but when opportunity offered, he who first ventured to seize -it and to take his enemy off his guard, thought this perfidious -vengeance sweeter than an open one, since, considerations of safety -apart, success by treachery won him the palm of superior intelligence. -Indeed it is generally the case that men are readier to call rogues -clever than simpletons honest, and are as ashamed of being the -second as they are proud of being the first. The cause of all these -evils was the lust for power arising from greed and ambition; and from -these passions proceeded the violence of parties once engaged in -contention. The leaders in the cities, each provided with the -fairest professions, on the one side with the cry of political -equality of the people, on the other of a moderate aristocracy, sought -prizes for themselves in those public interests which they pretended -to cherish, and, recoiling from no means in their struggles for -ascendancy engaged in the direst excesses; in their acts of -vengeance they went to even greater lengths, not stopping at what -justice or the good of the state demanded, but making the party -caprice of the moment their only standard, and invoking with equal -readiness the condemnation of an unjust verdict or the authority of -the strong arm to glut the animosities of the hour. Thus religion -was in honour with neither party; but the use of fair phrases to -arrive at guilty ends was in high reputation. Meanwhile the moderate -part of the citizens perished between the two, either for not -joining in the quarrel, or because envy would not suffer them to -escape. - -Thus every form of iniquity took root in the Hellenic countries by -reason of the troubles. The ancient simplicity into which honour so -largely entered was laughed down and disappeared; and society became -divided into camps in which no man trusted his fellow. To put an end -to this, there was neither promise to be depended upon, nor oath -that could command respect; but all parties dwelling rather in their -calculation upon the hopelessness of a permanent state of things, were -more intent upon self-defence than capable of confidence. In this -contest the blunter wits were most successful. Apprehensive of their -own deficiencies and of the cleverness of their antagonists, they -feared to be worsted in debate and to be surprised by the combinations -of their more versatile opponents, and so at once boldly had -recourse to action: while their adversaries, arrogantly thinking -that they should know in time, and that it was unnecessary to secure -by action what policy afforded, often fell victims to their want of -precaution. - -Meanwhile Corcyra gave the first example of most of the crimes -alluded to; of the reprisals exacted by the governed who had never -experienced equitable treatment or indeed aught but insolence from -their rulers--when their hour came; of the iniquitous resolves of -those who desired to get rid of their accustomed poverty, and ardently -coveted their neighbours' goods; and lastly, of the savage and -pitiless excesses into which men who had begun the struggle, not in -a class but in a party spirit, were hurried by their ungovernable -passions. In the confusion into which life was now thrown in the -cities, human nature, always rebelling against the law and now its -master, gladly showed itself ungoverned in passion, above respect -for justice, and the enemy of all superiority; since revenge would not -have been set above religion, and gain above justice, had it not -been for the fatal power of envy. Indeed men too often take upon -themselves in the prosecution of their revenge to set the example of -doing away with those general laws to which all alike can look for -salvation in adversity, instead of allowing them to subsist against -the day of danger when their aid may be required. - -While the revolutionary passions thus for the first time displayed -themselves in the factions of Corcyra, Eurymedon and the Athenian -fleet sailed away; after which some five hundred Corcyraean exiles who -had succeeded in escaping, took some forts on the mainland, and -becoming masters of the Corcyraean territory over the water, made this -their base to Plunder their countrymen in the island, and did so -much damage as to cause a severe famine in the town. They also sent -envoys to Lacedaemon and Corinth to negotiate their restoration; but -meeting with no success, afterwards got together boats and mercenaries -and crossed over to the island, being about six hundred in all; and -burning their boats so as to have no hope except in becoming masters -of the country, went up to Mount Istone, and fortifying themselves -there, began to annoy those in the city and obtained command of the -country. - -At the close of the same summer the Athenians sent twenty ships -under the command of Laches, son of Melanopus, and Charoeades, son -of Euphiletus, to Sicily, where the Syracusans and Leontines were at -war. The Syracusans had for allies all the Dorian cities except -Camarina--these had been included in the Lacedaemonian confederacy -from the commencement of the war, though they had not taken any active -part in it--the Leontines had Camarina and the Chalcidian cities. In -Italy the Locrians were for the Syracusans, the Rhegians for their -Leontine kinsmen. The allies of the Leontines now sent to Athens and -appealed to their ancient alliance and to their Ionian origin, to -persuade the Athenians to send them a fleet, as the Syracusans were -blockading them by land and sea. The Athenians sent it upon the plea -of their common descent, but in reality to prevent the exportation -of Sicilian corn to Peloponnese and to test the possibility of -bringing Sicily into subjection. Accordingly they established -themselves at Rhegium in Italy, and from thence carried on the war -in concert with their allies. - - - - -CHAPTER XI - -_Year of the War - Campaigns of Demosthenes in Western Greece - -Ruin of Ambracia_ - -Summer was now over. The winter following, the plague a second -time attacked the Athenians; for although it had never entirely left -them, still there had been a notable abatement in its ravages. The -second visit lasted no less than a year, the first having lasted -two; and nothing distressed the Athenians and reduced their power more -than this. No less than four thousand four hundred heavy infantry in -the ranks died of it and three hundred cavalry, besides a number of -the multitude that was never ascertained. At the same time took -place the numerous earthquakes in Athens, Euboea, and Boeotia, -particularly at Orchomenus in the last-named country. - -The same winter the Athenians in Sicily and the Rhegians, with -thirty ships, made an expedition against the islands of Aeolus; it -being impossible to invade them in summer, owing to the want of water. -These islands are occupied by the Liparaeans, a Cnidian colony, who -live in one of them of no great size called Lipara; and from this as -their headquarters cultivate the rest, Didyme, Strongyle, and Hiera. -In Hiera the people in those parts believe that Hephaestus has his -forge, from the quantity of flame which they see it send out by night, -and of smoke by day. These islands lie off the coast of the Sicels and -Messinese, and were allies of the Syracusans. The Athenians laid waste -their land, and as the inhabitants did not submit, sailed back to -Rhegium. Thus the winter ended, and with it ended the fifth year of -this war, of which Thucydides was the historian. - -The next summer the Peloponnesians and their allies set out to -invade Attica under the command of Agis, son of Archidamus, and went -as far as the Isthmus, but numerous earthquakes occurring, turned back -again without the invasion taking place. About the same time that -these earthquakes were so common, the sea at Orobiae, in Euboea, -retiring from the then line of coast, returned in a huge wave and -invaded a great part of the town, and retreated leaving some of it -still under water; so that what was once land is now sea; such of -the inhabitants perishing as could not run up to the higher ground -in time. A similar inundation also occurred at Atalanta, the island -off the Opuntian Locrian coast, carrying away part of the Athenian -fort and wrecking one of two ships which were drawn up on the beach. -At Peparethus also the sea retreated a little, without however any -inundation following; and an earthquake threw down part of the wall, -the town hall, and a few other buildings. The cause, in my opinion, of -this phenomenon must be sought in the earthquake. At the point where -its shock has been the most violent, the sea is driven back and, -suddenly recoiling with redoubled force, causes the inundation. -Without an earthquake I do not see how such an accident could happen. - -During the same summer different operations were carried on by the -different belligerents in Sicily; by the Siceliots themselves against -each other, and by the Athenians and their allies: I shall however -confine myself to the actions in which the Athenians took part, -choosing the most important. The death of the Athenian general -Charoeades, killed by the Syracusans in battle, left Laches in the -sole command of the fleet, which he now directed in concert with the -allies against Mylae, a place belonging to the Messinese. Two -Messinese battalions in garrison at Mylae laid an ambush for the party -landing from the ships, but were routed with great slaughter by the -Athenians and their allies, who thereupon assaulted the -fortification and compelled them to surrender the Acropolis and to -march with them upon Messina. This town afterwards also submitted upon -the approach of the Athenians and their allies, and gave hostages -and all other securities required. - -The same summer the Athenians sent thirty ships round Peloponnese -under Demosthenes, son of Alcisthenes, and Procles, son of -Theodorus, and sixty others, with two thousand heavy infantry, against -Melos, under Nicias, son of Niceratus; wishing to reduce the -Melians, who, although islanders, refused to be subjects of Athens -or even to join her confederacy. The devastation of their land not -procuring their submission, the fleet, weighing from Melos, sailed -to Oropus in the territory of Graea, and landing at nightfall, the -heavy infantry started at once from the ships by land for Tanagra in -Boeotia, where they were met by the whole levy from Athens, -agreeably to a concerted signal, under the command of Hipponicus, -son of Callias, and Eurymedon, son of Thucles. They encamped, and -passing that day in ravaging the Tanagraean territory, remained -there for the night; and next day, after defeating those of the -Tanagraeans who sailed out against them and some Thebans who had -come up to help the Tanagraeans, took some arms, set up a trophy, -and retired, the troops to the city and the others to the ships. -Nicias with his sixty ships coasted alongshore and ravaged the Locrian -seaboard, and so returned home. - -About this time the Lacedaemonians founded their colony of -Heraclea in Trachis, their object being the following: the Malians -form in all three tribes, the Paralians, the Hiereans, and the -Trachinians. The last of these having suffered severely in a war -with their neighbours the Oetaeans, at first intended to give -themselves up to Athens; but afterwards fearing not to find in her the -security that they sought, sent to Lacedaemon, having chosen Tisamenus -for their ambassador. In this embassy joined also the Dorians from the -mother country of the Lacedaemonians, with the same request, as they -themselves also suffered from the same enemy. After hearing them, -the Lacedaemonians determined to send out the colony, wishing to -assist the Trachinians and Dorians, and also because they thought that -the proposed town would lie conveniently for the purposes of the war -against the Athenians. A fleet might be got ready there against -Euboea, with the advantage of a short passage to the island; and the -town would also be useful as a station on the road to Thrace. In -short, everything made the Lacedaemonians eager to found the place. -After first consulting the god at Delphi and receiving a favourable -answer, they sent off the colonists, Spartans, and Perioeci, -inviting also any of the rest of the Hellenes who might wish to -accompany them, except Ionians, Achaeans, and certain other -nationalities; three Lacedaemonians leading as founders of the colony, -Leon, Alcidas, and Damagon. The settlement effected, they fortified -anew the city, now called Heraclea, distant about four miles and a -half from Thermopylae and two miles and a quarter from the sea, and -commenced building docks, closing the side towards Thermopylae just by -the pass itself, in order that they might be easily defended. - -The foundation of this town, evidently meant to annoy Euboea (the -passage across to Cenaeum in that island being a short one), at -first caused some alarm at Athens, which the event however did nothing -to justify, the town never giving them any trouble. The reason of this -was as follows. The Thessalians, who were sovereign in those parts, -and whose territory was menaced by its foundation, were afraid that it -might prove a very powerful neighbour, and accordingly continually -harassed and made war upon the new settlers, until they at last wore -them out in spite of their originally considerable numbers, people -flocking from all quarters to a place founded by the Lacedaemonians, -and thus thought secure of prosperity. On the other hand the -Lacedaemonians themselves, in the persons of their governors, did -their full share towards ruining its prosperity and reducing its -population, as they frightened away the greater part of the -inhabitants by governing harshly and in some cases not fairly, and -thus made it easier for their neighbours to prevail against them. - -The same summer, about the same time that the Athenians were -detained at Melos, their fellow citizens in the thirty ships -cruising round Peloponnese, after cutting off some guards in an ambush -at Ellomenus in Leucadia, subsequently went against Leucas itself with -a large armament, having been reinforced by the whole levy of the -Acarnanians except Oeniadae, and by the Zacynthians and -Cephallenians and fifteen ships from Corcyra. While the Leucadians -witnessed the devastation of their land, without and within the -isthmus upon which the town of Leucas and the temple of Apollo -stand, without making any movement on account of the overwhelming -numbers of the enemy, the Acarnanians urged Demosthenes, the -Athenian general, to build a wall so as to cut off the town from the -continent, a measure which they were convinced would secure its -capture and rid them once and for all of a most troublesome enemy. - -Demosthenes however had in the meanwhile been persuaded by the -Messenians that it was a fine opportunity for him, having so large -an army assembled, to attack the Aetolians, who were not only the -enemies of Naupactus, but whose reduction would further make it easy -to gain the rest of that part of the continent for the Athenians. -The Aetolian nation, although numerous and warlike, yet dwelt in -unwalled villages scattered far apart, and had nothing but light -armour, and might, according to the Messenians, be subdued without -much difficulty before succours could arrive. The plan which they -recommended was to attack first the Apodotians, next the Ophionians, -and after these the Eurytanians, who are the largest tribe in Aetolia, -and speak, as is said, a language exceedingly difficult to understand, -and eat their flesh raw. These once subdued, the rest would easily -come in. - -To this plan Demosthenes consented, not only to please the -Messenians, but also in the belief that by adding the Aetolians to his -other continental allies he would be able, without aid from home, to -march against the Boeotians by way of Ozolian Locris to Kytinium in -Doris, keeping Parnassus on his right until he descended to the -Phocians, whom he could force to join him if their ancient -friendship for Athens did not, as he anticipated, at once decide -them to do so. Arrived in Phocis he was already upon the frontier of -Boeotia. He accordingly weighed from Leucas, against the wish of the -Acarnanians, and with his whole armament sailed along the coast to -Sollium, where he communicated to them his intention; and upon their -refusing to agree to it on account of the non-investment of Leucas, -himself with the rest of the forces, the Cephallenians, the -Messenians, and Zacynthians, and three hundred Athenian marines from -his own ships (the fifteen Corcyraean vessels having departed), -started on his expedition against the Aetolians. His base he -established at Oeneon in Locris, as the Ozolian Locrians were allies -of Athens and were to meet him with all their forces in the -interior. Being neighbours of the Aetolians and armed in the same way, -it was thought that they would be of great service upon the -expedition, from their acquaintance with the localities and the -warfare of the inhabitants. - -After bivouacking with the army in the precinct of Nemean Zeus, in -which the poet Hesiod is said to have been killed by the people of the -country, according to an oracle which had foretold that he should -die in Nemea, Demosthenes set out at daybreak to invade Aetolia. The -first day he took Potidania, the next Krokyle, and the third -Tichium, where he halted and sent back the booty to Eupalium in -Locris, having determined to pursue his conquests as far as the -Ophionians, and, in the event of their refusing to submit, to return -to Naupactus and make them the objects of a second expedition. -Meanwhile the Aetolians had been aware of his design from the moment -of its formation, and as soon as the army invaded their country came -up in great force with all their tribes; even the most remote -Ophionians, the Bomiensians, and Calliensians, who extend towards -the Malian Gulf, being among the number. - -The Messenians, however, adhered to their original advice. -Assuring Demosthenes that the Aetolians were an easy conquest, they -urged him to push on as rapidly as possible, and to try to take the -villages as fast as he came up to them, without waiting until the -whole nation should be in arms against him. Led on by his advisers and -trusting in his fortune, as he had met with no opposition, without -waiting for his Locrian reinforcements, who were to have supplied -him with the light-armed darters in which he was most deficient, he -advanced and stormed Aegitium, the inhabitants flying before him and -posting themselves upon the hills above the town, which stood on -high ground about nine miles from the sea. Meanwhile the Aetolians had -gathered to the rescue, and now attacked the Athenians and their -allies, running down from the hills on every side and darting their -javelins, falling back when the Athenian army advanced, and coming -on as it retired; and for a long while the battle was of this -character, alternate advance and retreat, in both which operations the -Athenians had the worst. - -Still as long as their archers had arrows left and were able to -use them, they held out, the light-armed Aetolians retiring before the -arrows; but after the captain of the archers had been killed and his -men scattered, the soldiers, wearied out with the constant -repetition of the same exertions and hard pressed by the Aetolians -with their javelins, at last turned and fled, and falling into -pathless gullies and places that they were unacquainted with, thus -perished, the Messenian Chromon, their guide, having also -unfortunately been killed. A great many were overtaken in the -pursuit by the swift-footed and light-armed Aetolians, and fell -beneath their javelins; the greater number however missed their road -and rushed into the wood, which had no ways out, and which was soon -fired and burnt round them by the enemy. Indeed the Athenian army fell -victims to death in every form, and suffered all the vicissitudes of -flight; the survivors escaped with difficulty to the sea and Oeneon in -Locris, whence they had set out. Many of the allies were killed, and -about one hundred and twenty Athenian heavy infantry, not a man -less, and all in the prime of life. These were by far the best men -in the city of Athens that fell during this war. Among the slain was -also Procles, the colleague of Demosthenes. Meanwhile the Athenians -took up their dead under truce from the Aetolians, and retired to -Naupactus, and from thence went in their ships to Athens; -Demosthenes staying behind in Naupactus and in the neighbourhood, -being afraid to face the Athenians after the disaster. - -About the same time the Athenians on the coast of Sicily sailed to -Locris, and in a descent which they made from the ships defeated the -Locrians who came against them, and took a fort upon the river Halex. - -The same summer the Aetolians, who before the Athenian expedition -had sent an embassy to Corinth and Lacedaemon, composed of Tolophus, -an Ophionian, Boriades, an Eurytanian, and Tisander, an Apodotian, -obtained that an army should be sent them against Naupactus, which had -invited the Athenian invasion. The Lacedaemonians accordingly sent off -towards autumn three thousand heavy infantry of the allies, five -hundred of whom were from Heraclea, the newly founded city in Trachis, -under the command of Eurylochus, a Spartan, accompanied by Macarius -and Menedaius, also Spartans. - -The army having assembled at Delphi, Eurylochus sent a herald to the -Ozolian Locrians; the road to Naupactus lying through their territory, -and he having besides conceived the idea of detaching them from -Athens. His chief abettors in Locris were the Amphissians, who were -alarmed at the hostility of the Phocians. These first gave hostages -themselves, and induced the rest to do the same for fear of the -invading army; first, their neighbours the Myonians, who held the most -difficult of the passes, and after them the Ipnians, Messapians, -Tritaeans, Chalaeans, Tolophonians, Hessians, and Oeanthians, all of -whom joined in the expedition; the Olpaeans contenting themselves with -giving hostages, without accompanying the invasion; and the Hyaeans -refusing to do either, until the capture of Polis, one of their -villages. - -His preparations completed, Eurylochus lodged the hostages in -Kytinium, in Doris, and advanced upon Naupactus through the country of -the Locrians, taking upon his way Oeneon and Eupalium, two of their -towns that refused to join him. Arrived in the Naupactian territory, -and having been now joined by the Aetolians, the army laid waste the -land and took the suburb of the town, which was unfortified; and after -this Molycrium also, a Corinthian colony subject to Athens. -Meanwhile the Athenian Demosthenes, who since the affair in Aetolia -had remained near Naupactus, having had notice of the army and fearing -for the town, went and persuaded the Acarnanians, although not without -difficulty because of his departure from Leucas, to go to the relief -of Naupactus. They accordingly sent with him on board his ships a -thousand heavy infantry, who threw themselves into the place and saved -it; the extent of its wall and the small number of its defenders -otherwise placing it in the greatest danger. Meanwhile Eurylochus -and his companions, finding that this force had entered and that it -was impossible to storm the town, withdrew, not to Peloponnese, but to -the country once called Aeolis, and now Calydon and Pleuron, and to -the places in that neighbourhood, and Proschium in Aetolia; the -Ambraciots having come and urged them to combine with them in -attacking Amphilochian Argos and the rest of Amphilochia and -Acarnania; affirming that the conquest of these countries would -bring all the continent into alliance with Lacedaemon. To this -Eurylochus consented, and dismissing the Aetolians, now remained quiet -with his army in those parts, until the time should come for the -Ambraciots to take the field, and for him to join them before Argos. - -Summer was now over. The winter ensuing, the Athenians in Sicily -with their Hellenic allies, and such of the Sicel subjects or allies -of Syracuse as had revolted from her and joined their army, marched -against the Sicel town Inessa, the acropolis of which was held by -the Syracusans, and after attacking it without being able to take -it, retired. In the retreat, the allies retreating after the Athenians -were attacked by the Syracusans from the fort, and a large part of -their army routed with great slaughter. After this, Laches and the -Athenians from the ships made some descents in Locris, and defeating -the Locrians, who came against them with Proxenus, son of Capaton, -upon the river Caicinus, took some arms and departed. - -The same winter the Athenians purified Delos, in compliance, it -appears, with a certain oracle. It had been purified before by -Pisistratus the tyrant; not indeed the whole island, but as much of it -as could be seen from the temple. All of it was, however, now purified -in the following way. All the sepulchres of those that had died in -Delos were taken up, and for the future it was commanded that no one -should be allowed either to die or to give birth to a child in the -island; but that they should be carried over to Rhenea, which is so -near to Delos that Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, having added Rhenea to -his other island conquests during his period of naval ascendancy, -dedicated it to the Delian Apollo by binding it to Delos with a chain. - -The Athenians, after the purification, celebrated, for the first -time, the quinquennial festival of the Delian games. Once upon a time, -indeed, there was a great assemblage of the Ionians and the -neighbouring islanders at Delos, who used to come to the festival, -as the Ionians now do to that of Ephesus, and athletic and poetical -contests took place there, and the cities brought choirs of dancers. -Nothing can be clearer on this point than the following verses of -Homer, taken from a hymn to Apollo: - - Phoebus, wherever thou strayest, far or near, - Delos was still of all thy haunts most dear. - Thither the robed Ionians take their way - With wife and child to keep thy holiday, - Invoke thy favour on each manly game, - And dance and sing in honour of thy name. - -That there was also a poetical contest in which the Ionians went -to contend, again is shown by the following, taken from the same hymn. -After celebrating the Delian dance of the women, he ends his song of -praise with these verses, in which he also alludes to himself: - - Well, may Apollo keep you all! and so, - Sweethearts, good-bye--yet tell me not I go - Out from your hearts; and if in after hours - Some other wanderer in this world of ours - Touch at your shores, and ask your maidens here - Who sings the songs the sweetest to your ear, - Think of me then, and answer with a smile, - 'A blind old man of Scio's rocky isle.' - -Homer thus attests that there was anciently a great assembly and -festival at Delos. In later times, although the islanders and the -Athenians continued to send the choirs of dancers with sacrifices, the -contests and most of the ceremonies were abolished, probably through -adversity, until the Athenians celebrated the games upon this occasion -with the novelty of horse-races. - -The same winter the Ambraciots, as they had promised Eurylochus when -they retained his army, marched out against Amphilochian Argos with -three thousand heavy infantry, and invading the Argive territory -occupied Olpae, a stronghold on a hill near the sea, which had been -formerly fortified by the Acarnanians and used as the place of assizes -for their nation, and which is about two miles and three-quarters from -the city of Argos upon the sea-coast. Meanwhile the Acarnanians went -with a part of their forces to the relief of Argos, and with the -rest encamped in Amphilochia at the place called Crenae, or the Wells, -to watch for Eurylochus and his Peloponnesians, and to prevent their -passing through and effecting their junction with the Ambraciots; -while they also sent for Demosthenes, the commander of the Aetolian -expedition, to be their leader, and for the twenty Athenian ships that -were cruising off Peloponnese under the command of Aristotle, son of -Timocrates, and Hierophon, son of Antimnestus. On their part, the -Ambraciots at Olpae sent a messenger to their own city, to beg them to -come with their whole levy to their assistance, fearing that the -army of Eurylochus might not be able to pass through the -Acarnanians, and that they might themselves be obliged to fight -single-handed, or be unable to retreat, if they wished it, without -danger. - -Meanwhile Eurylochus and his Peloponnesians, learning that the -Ambraciots at Olpae had arrived, set out from Proschium with all haste -to join them, and crossing the Achelous advanced through Acarnania, -which they found deserted by its population, who had gone to the -relief of Argos; keeping on their right the city of the Stratians -and its garrison, and on their left the rest of Acarnania. -Traversing the territory of the Stratians, they advanced through -Phytia, next, skirting Medeon, through Limnaea; after which they -left Acarnania behind them and entered a friendly country, that of the -Agraeans. From thence they reached and crossed Mount Thymaus, which -belongs to the Agraeans, and descended into the Argive territory after -nightfall, and passing between the city of Argos and the Acarnanian -posts at Crenae, joined the Ambraciots at Olpae. - -Uniting here at daybreak, they sat down at the place called -Metropolis, and encamped. Not long afterwards the Athenians in the -twenty ships came into the Ambracian Gulf to support the Argives, with -Demosthenes and two hundred Messenian heavy infantry, and sixty -Athenian archers. While the fleet off Olpae blockaded the hill from -the sea, the Acarnanians and a few of the Amphilochians, most of -whom were kept back by force by the Ambraciots, had already arrived at -Argos, and were preparing to give battle to the enemy, having chosen -Demosthenes to command the whole of the allied army in concert with -their own generals. Demosthenes led them near to Olpae and encamped, a -great ravine separating the two armies. During five days they remained -inactive; on the sixth both sides formed in order of battle. The -army of the Peloponnesians was the largest and outflanked their -opponents; and Demosthenes fearing that his right might be surrounded, -placed in ambush in a hollow way overgrown with bushes some four -hundred heavy infantry and light troops, who were to rise up at the -moment of the onset behind the projecting left wing of the enemy, -and to take them in the rear. When both sides were ready they joined -battle; Demosthenes being on the right wing with the Messenians and -a few Athenians, while the rest of the line was made up of the -different divisions of the Acarnanians, and of the Amphilochian -carters. The Peloponnesians and Ambraciots were drawn up pell-mell -together, with the exception of the Mantineans, who were massed on the -left, without however reaching to the extremity of the wing, where -Eurylochus and his men confronted the Messenians and Demosthenes. - -The Peloponnesians were now well engaged and with their -outflanking wing were upon the point of turning their enemy's right; -when the Acarnanians from the ambuscade set upon them from behind, and -broke them at the first attack, without their staying to resist; while -the panic into which they fell caused the flight of most of their -army, terrified beyond measure at seeing the division of Eurylochus -and their best troops cut to pieces. Most of the work was done by -Demosthenes and his Messenians, who were posted in this part of the -field. Meanwhile the Ambraciots (who are the best soldiers in those -countries) and the troops upon the right wing, defeated the division -opposed to them and pursued it to Argos. Returning from the pursuit, -they found their main body defeated; and hard pressed by the -Acarnanians, with difficulty made good their passage to Olpae, -suffering heavy loss on the way, as they dashed on without -discipline or order, the Mantineans excepted, who kept their ranks -best of any in the army during the retreat. - -The battle did not end until the evening. The next day Menedaius, -who on the death of Eurylochus and Macarius had succeeded to the -sole command, being at a loss after so signal a defeat how to stay and -sustain a siege, cut off as he was by land and by the Athenian fleet -by sea, and equally so how to retreat in safety, opened a parley -with Demosthenes and the Acarnanian generals for a truce and -permission to retreat, and at the same time for the recovery of the -dead. The dead they gave back to him, and setting up a trophy took -up their own also to the number of about three hundred. The retreat -demanded they refused publicly to the army; but permission to depart -without delay was secretly granted to the Mantineans and to -Menedaius and the other commanders and principal men of the -Peloponnesians by Demosthenes and his Acarnanian colleagues; who -desired to strip the Ambraciots and the mercenary host of foreigners -of their supporters; and, above all, to discredit the Lacedaemonians -and Peloponnesians with the Hellenes in those parts, as traitors and -self-seekers. - -While the enemy was taking up his dead and hastily burying them as -he could, and those who obtained permission were secretly planning -their retreat, word was brought to Demosthenes and the Acarnanians -that the Ambraciots from the city, in compliance with the first -message from Olpae, were on the march with their whole levy through -Amphilochia to join their countrymen at Olpae, knowing nothing of what -had occurred. Demosthenes prepared to march with his army against -them, and meanwhile sent on at once a strong division to beset the -roads and occupy the strong positions. In the meantime the -Mantineans and others included in the agreement went out under the -pretence of gathering herbs and firewood, and stole off by twos and -threes, picking on the way the things which they professed to have -come out for, until they had gone some distance from Olpae, when -they quickened their pace. The Ambraciots and such of the rest as -had accompanied them in larger parties, seeing them going on, pushed -on in their turn, and began running in order to catch them up. The -Acarnanians at first thought that all alike were departing without -permission, and began to pursue the Peloponnesians; and believing that -they were being betrayed, even threw a dart or two at some of their -generals who tried to stop them and told them that leave had been -given. Eventually, however, they let pass the Mantineans and -Peloponnesians, and slew only the Ambraciots, there being much dispute -and difficulty in distinguishing whether a man was an Ambraciot or a -Peloponnesian. The number thus slain was about two hundred; the rest -escaped into the bordering territory of Agraea, and found refuge -with Salynthius, the friendly king of the Agraeans. - -Meanwhile the Ambraciots from the city arrived at Idomene. Idomene -consists of two lofty hills, the higher of which the troops sent on by -Demosthenes succeeded in occupying after nightfall, unobserved by -the Ambraciots, who had meanwhile ascended the smaller and -bivouacked under it. After supper Demosthenes set out with the rest of -the army, as soon as it was evening; himself with half his force -making for the pass, and the remainder going by the Amphilochian -hills. At dawn he fell upon the Ambraciots while they were still abed, -ignorant of what had passed, and fully thinking that it was their -own countrymen--Demosthenes having purposely put the Messenians in -front with orders to address them in the Doric dialect, and thus to -inspire confidence in the sentinels, who would not be able to see them -as it was still night. In this way he routed their army as soon as -he attacked it, slaying most of them where they were, the rest -breaking away in flight over the hills. The roads, however, were -already occupied, and while the Amphilochians knew their own -country, the Ambraciots were ignorant of it and could not tell which -way to turn, and had also heavy armour as against a light-armed enemy, -and so fell into ravines and into the ambushes which had been set -for them, and perished there. In their manifold efforts to escape some -even turned to the sea, which was not far off, and seeing the Athenian -ships coasting alongshore just while the action was going on, swam off -to them, thinking it better in the panic they were in, to perish, if -perish they must, by the hands of the Athenians, than by those of -the barbarous and detested Amphilochians. Of the large Ambraciot force -destroyed in this manner, a few only reached the city in safety; while -the Acarnanians, after stripping the dead and setting up a trophy, -returned to Argos. - -The next day arrived a herald from the Ambraciots who had fled -from Olpae to the Agraeans, to ask leave to take up the dead that -had fallen after the first engagement, when they left the camp with -the Mantineans and their companions, without, like them, having had -permission to do so. At the sight of the arms of the Ambraciots from -the city, the herald was astonished at their number, knowing nothing -of the disaster and fancying that they were those of their own -party. Some one asked him what he was so astonished at, and how many -of them had been killed, fancying in his turn that this was the herald -from the troops at Idomene. He replied: "About two hundred"; upon -which his interrogator took him up, saying: "Why, the arms you see -here are of more than a thousand." The herald replied: "Then they -are not the arms of those who fought with us?" The other answered: -"Yes, they are, if at least you fought at Idomene yesterday." "But -we fought with no one yesterday; but the day before in the retreat." -"However that may be, we fought yesterday with those who came to -reinforce you from the city of the Ambraciots." When the herald -heard this and knew that the reinforcement from the city had been -destroyed, he broke into wailing and, stunned at the magnitude of -the present evils, went away at once without having performed his -errand, or again asking for the dead bodies. Indeed, this was by far -the greatest disaster that befell any one Hellenic city in an equal -number of days during this war; and I have not set down the number -of the dead, because the amount stated seems so out of proportion to -the size of the city as to be incredible. In any case I know that if -the Acarnanians and Amphilochians had wished to take Ambracia as the -Athenians and Demosthenes advised, they would have done so without a -blow; as it was, they feared that if the Athenians had it they would -be worse neighbours to them than the present. - -After this the Acarnanians allotted a third of the spoils to the -Athenians, and divided the rest among their own different towns. The -share of the Athenians was captured on the voyage home; the arms now -deposited in the Attic temples are three hundred panoplies, which -the Acarnanians set apart for Demosthenes, and which he brought to -Athens in person, his return to his country after the Aetolian -disaster being rendered less hazardous by this exploit. The -Athenians in the twenty ships also went off to Naupactus. The -Acarnanians and Amphilochians, after the departure of Demosthenes -and the Athenians, granted the Ambraciots and Peloponnesians who had -taken refuge with Salynthius and the Agraeans a free retreat from -Oeniadae, to which place they had removed from the country of -Salynthius, and for the future concluded with the Ambraciots a -treaty and alliance for one hundred years, upon the terms following. -It was to be a defensive, not an offensive alliance; the Ambraciots -could not be required to march with the Acarnanians against the -Peloponnesians, nor the Acarnanians with the Ambraciots against the -Athenians; for the rest the Ambraciots were to give up the places -and hostages that they held of the Amphilochians, and not to give help -to Anactorium, which was at enmity with the Acarnanians. With this -arrangement they put an end to the war. After this the Corinthians -sent a garrison of their own citizens to Ambracia, composed of three -hundred heavy infantry, under the command of Xenocleides, son of -Euthycles, who reached their destination after a difficult journey -across the continent. Such was the history of the affair of Ambracia. - -The same winter the Athenians in Sicily made a descent from their -ships upon the territory of Himera, in concert with the Sicels, who -had invaded its borders from the interior, and also sailed to the -islands of Aeolus. Upon their return to Rhegium they found the -Athenian general, Pythodorus, son of Isolochus, come to supersede -Laches in the command of the fleet. The allies in Sicily had sailed to -Athens and induced the Athenians to send out more vessels to their -assistance, pointing out that the Syracusans who already commanded -their land were making efforts to get together a navy, to avoid -being any longer excluded from the sea by a few vessels. The Athenians -proceeded to man forty ships to send to them, thinking that the war in -Sicily would thus be the sooner ended, and also wishing to exercise -their navy. One of the generals, Pythodorus, was accordingly sent -out with a few ships; Sophocles, son of Sostratides, and Eurymedon, -son of Thucles, being destined to follow with the main body. Meanwhile -Pythodorus had taken the command of Laches' ships, and towards the end -of winter sailed against the Locrian fort, which Laches had formerly -taken, and returned after being defeated in battle by the Locrians. - -In the first days of this spring, the stream of fire issued from -Etna, as on former occasions, and destroyed some land of the -Catanians, who live upon Mount Etna, which is the largest mountain -in Sicily. Fifty years, it is said, had elapsed since the last -eruption, there having been three in all since the Hellenes have -inhabited Sicily. Such were the events of this winter; and with it -ended the sixth year of this war, of which Thucydides was the -historian. - - - - -BOOK IV - -CHAPTER XII - -_Seventh Year of the War - Occupation of Pylos - Surrender of -the Spartan Army in Sphacteria_ - -Next summer, about the time of the corn's coming into ear, ten -Syracusan and as many Locrian vessels sailed to Messina, in Sicily, -and occupied the town upon the invitation of the inhabitants; and -Messina revolted from the Athenians. The Syracusans contrived this -chiefly because they saw that the place afforded an approach to -Sicily, and feared that the Athenians might hereafter use it as a base -for attacking them with a larger force; the Locrians because they -wished to carry on hostilities from both sides of the strait and to -reduce their enemies, the people of Rhegium. Meanwhile, the Locrians -had invaded the Rhegian territory with all their forces, to prevent -their succouring Messina, and also at the instance of some exiles from -Rhegium who were with them; the long factions by which that town had -been torn rendering it for the moment incapable of resistance, and -thus furnishing an additional temptation to the invaders. After -devastating the country the Locrian land forces retired, their ships -remaining to guard Messina, while others were being manned for the -same destination to carry on the war from thence. - -About the same time in the spring, before the corn was ripe, the -Peloponnesians and their allies invaded Attica under Agis, the son -of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, and sat down and laid waste -the country. Meanwhile the Athenians sent off the forty ships which -they had been preparing to Sicily, with the remaining generals -Eurymedon and Sophocles; their colleague Pythodorus having already -preceded them thither. These had also instructions as they sailed by -to look to the Corcyraeans in the town, who were being plundered by -the exiles in the mountain. To support these exiles sixty -Peloponnesian vessels had lately sailed, it being thought that the -famine raging in the city would make it easy for them to reduce it. -Demosthenes also, who had remained without employment since his return -from Acarnania, applied and obtained permission to use the fleet, if -he wished it, upon the coast of Peloponnese. - -Off Laconia they heard that the Peloponnesian ships were already -at Corcyra, upon which Eurymedon and Sophocles wished to hasten to the -island, but Demosthenes required them first to touch at Pylos and do -what was wanted there, before continuing their voyage. While they were -making objections, a squall chanced to come on and carried the fleet -into Pylos. Demosthenes at once urged them to fortify the place, it -being for this that he had come on the voyage, and made them observe -there was plenty of stone and timber on the spot, and that the place -was strong by nature, and together with much of the country round -unoccupied; Pylos, or Coryphasium, as the Lacedaemonians call it, -being about forty-five miles distant from Sparta, and situated in -the old country of the Messenians. The commanders told him that -there was no lack of desert headlands in Peloponnese if he wished to -put the city to expense by occupying them. He, however, thought that -this place was distinguished from others of the kind by having a -harbour close by; while the Messenians, the old natives of the -country, speaking the same dialect as the Lacedaemonians, could do -them the greatest mischief by their incursions from it, and would at -the same time be a trusty garrison. - -After speaking to the captains of companies on the subject, and -failing to persuade either the generals or the soldiers, he remained -inactive with the rest from stress of weather; until the soldiers -themselves wanting occupation were seized with a sudden impulse to -go round and fortify the place. Accordingly they set to work in -earnest, and having no iron tools, picked up stones, and put them -together as they happened to fit, and where mortar was needed, carried -it on their backs for want of hods, stooping down to make it stay -on, and clasping their hands together behind to prevent it falling -off; sparing no effort to be able to complete the most vulnerable -points before the arrival of the Lacedaemonians, most of the place -being sufficiently strong by nature without further fortifications. - -Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians were celebrating a festival, and also -at first made light of the news, in the idea that whenever they -chose to take the field the place would be immediately evacuated by -the enemy or easily taken by force; the absence of their army before -Athens having also something to do with their delay. The Athenians -fortified the place on the land side, and where it most required it, -in six days, and leaving Demosthenes with five ships to garrison it, -with the main body of the fleet hastened on their voyage to Corcyra -and Sicily. - -As soon as the Peloponnesians in Attica heard of the occupation of -Pylos, they hurried back home; the Lacedaemonians and their king -Agis thinking that the matter touched them nearly. Besides having made -their invasion early in the season, and while the corn was still -green, most of their troops were short of provisions: the weather also -was unusually bad for the time of year, and greatly distressed their -army. Many reasons thus combined to hasten their departure and to make -this invasion a very short one; indeed they only stayed fifteen days -in Attica. - -About the same time the Athenian general Simonides getting -together a few Athenians from the garrisons, and a number of the -allies in those parts, took Eion in Thrace, a Mendaean colony and -hostile to Athens, by treachery, but had no sooner done so than the -Chalcidians and Bottiaeans came up and beat him out of it, with the -loss of many of his soldiers. - -On the return of the Peloponnesians from Attica, the Spartans -themselves and the nearest of the Perioeci at once set out for -Pylos, the other Lacedaemonians following more slowly, as they had -just come in from another campaign. Word was also sent round -Peloponnese to come up as quickly as possible to Pylos; while the -sixty Peloponnesian ships were sent for from Corcyra, and being -dragged by their crews across the isthmus of Leucas, passed -unperceived by the Athenian squadron at Zacynthus, and reached -Pylos, where the land forces had arrived before them. Before the -Peloponnesian fleet sailed in, Demosthenes found time to send out -unobserved two ships to inform Eurymedon and the Athenians on board -the fleet at Zacynthus of the danger of Pylos and to summon them to -his assistance. While the ships hastened on their voyage in -obedience to the orders of Demosthenes, the Lacedaemonians prepared to -assault the fort by land and sea, hoping to capture with ease a work -constructed in haste, and held by a feeble garrison. Meanwhile, as -they expected the Athenian ships to arrive from Zacynthus, they -intended, if they failed to take the place before, to block up the -entrances of the harbour to prevent their being able to anchor -inside it. For the island of Sphacteria, stretching along in a line -close in front of the harbour, at once makes it safe and narrows its -entrances, leaving a passage for two ships on the side nearest Pylos -and the Athenian fortifications, and for eight or nine on that next -the rest of the mainland: for the rest, the island was entirely -covered with wood, and without paths through not being inhabited, -and about one mile and five furlongs in length. The inlets the -Lacedaemonians meant to close with a line of ships placed close -together, with their prows turned towards the sea, and, meanwhile, -fearing that the enemy might make use of the island to operate against -them, carried over some heavy infantry thither, stationing others -along the coast. By this means the island and the continent would be -alike hostile to the Athenians, as they would be unable to land on -either; and the shore of Pylos itself outside the inlet towards the -open sea having no harbour, and, therefore, presenting no point -which they could use as a base to relieve their countrymen, they, -the Lacedaemonians, without sea-fight or risk would in all probability -become masters of the place, occupied as it had been on the spur of -the moment, and unfurnished with provisions. This being determined, -they carried over to the island the heavy infantry, drafted by lot -from all the companies. Some others had crossed over before in -relief parties, but these last who were left there were four hundred -and twenty in number, with their Helot attendants, commanded by -Epitadas, son of Molobrus. - -Meanwhile Demosthenes, seeing the Lacedaemonians about to attack him -by sea and land at once, himself was not idle. He drew up under the -fortification and enclosed in a stockade the galleys remaining to -him of those which had been left him, arming the sailors taken out -of them with poor shields made most of them of osier, it being -impossible to procure arms in such a desert place, and even these -having been obtained from a thirty-oared Messenian privateer and a -boat belonging to some Messenians who happened to have come to them. -Among these Messenians were forty heavy infantry, whom he made use -of with the rest. Posting most of his men, unarmed and armed, upon the -best fortified and strong points of the place towards the interior, -with orders to repel any attack of the land forces, he picked sixty -heavy infantry and a few archers from his whole force, and with -these went outside the wall down to the sea, where he thought that the -enemy would most likely attempt to land. Although the ground was -difficult and rocky, looking towards the open sea, the fact that -this was the weakest part of the wall would, he thought, encourage -their ardour, as the Athenians, confident in their naval -superiority, had here paid little attention to their defences, and the -enemy if he could force a landing might feel secure of taking the -place. At this point, accordingly, going down to the water's edge, -he posted his heavy infantry to prevent, if possible, a landing, and -encouraged them in the following terms: - -"Soldiers and comrades in this adventure, I hope that none of you in -our present strait will think to show his wit by exactly calculating -all the perils that encompass us, but that you will rather hasten to -close with the enemy, without staying to count the odds, seeing in -this your best chance of safety. In emergencies like ours -calculation is out of place; the sooner the danger is faced the -better. To my mind also most of the chances are for us, if we will -only stand fast and not throw away our advantages, overawed by the -numbers of the enemy. One of the points in our favour is the -awkwardness of the landing. This, however, only helps us if we stand -our ground. If we give way it will be practicable enough, in spite -of its natural difficulty, without a defender; and the enemy will -instantly become more formidable from the difficulty he will have in -retreating, supposing that we succeed in repulsing him, which we shall -find it easier to do, while he is on board his ships, than after he -has landed and meets us on equal terms. As to his numbers, these -need not too much alarm you. Large as they may be he can only engage -in small detachments, from the impossibility of bringing to. -Besides, the numerical superiority that we have to meet is not that of -an army on land with everything else equal, but of troops on board -ship, upon an element where many favourable accidents are required -to act with effect. I therefore consider that his difficulties may -be fairly set against our numerical deficiencies, and at the same time -I charge you, as Athenians who know by experience what landing from -ships on a hostile territory means, and how impossible it is to -drive back an enemy determined enough to stand his ground and not to -be frightened away by the surf and the terrors of the ships sailing -in, to stand fast in the present emergency, beat back the enemy at the -water's edge, and save yourselves and the place." - -Thus encouraged by Demosthenes, the Athenians felt more confident, -and went down to meet the enemy, posting themselves along the edge -of the sea. The Lacedaemonians now put themselves in movement and -simultaneously assaulted the fortification with their land forces -and with their ships, forty-three in number, under their admiral, -Thrasymelidas, son of Cratesicles, a Spartan, who made his attack just -where Demosthenes expected. The Athenians had thus to defend -themselves on both sides, from the land and from the sea; the enemy -rowing up in small detachments, the one relieving the other--it being -impossible for many to bring to at once--and showing great ardour and -cheering each other on, in the endeavour to force a passage and to -take the fortification. He who most distinguished himself was -Brasidas. Captain of a galley, and seeing that the captains and -steersmen, impressed by the difficulty of the position, hung back even -where a landing might have seemed possible, for fear of wrecking their -vessels, he shouted out to them, that they must never allow the -enemy to fortify himself in their country for the sake of saving -timber, but must shiver their vessels and force a landing; and bade -the allies, instead of hesitating in such a moment to sacrifice -their ships for Lacedaemon in return for her many benefits, to run -them boldly aground, land in one way or another, and make themselves -masters of the place and its garrison. - -Not content with this exhortation, he forced his own steersman to -run his ship ashore, and stepping on to the gangway, was -endeavouring to land, when he was cut down by the Athenians, and after -receiving many wounds fainted away. Falling into the bows, his -shield slipped off his arm into the sea, and being thrown ashore was -picked up by the Athenians, and afterwards used for the trophy which -they set up for this attack. The rest also did their best, but were -not able to land, owing to the difficulty of the ground and the -unflinching tenacity of the Athenians. It was a strange reversal of -the order of things for Athenians to be fighting from the land, and -from Laconian land too, against Lacedaemonians coming from the sea; -while Lacedaemonians were trying to land from shipboard in their own -country, now become hostile, to attack Athenians, although the -former were chiefly famous at the time as an inland people and -superior by land, the latter as a maritime people with a navy that had -no equal. - -After continuing their attacks during that day and most of the next, -the Peloponnesians desisted, and the day after sent some of their -ships to Asine for timber to make engines, hoping to take by their -aid, in spite of its height, the wall opposite the harbour, where -the landing was easiest. At this moment the Athenian fleet from -Zacynthus arrived, now numbering fifty sail, having been reinforced by -some of the ships on guard at Naupactus and by four Chian vessels. -Seeing the coast and the island both crowded with heavy infantry, -and the hostile ships in harbour showing no signs of sailing out, at a -loss where to anchor, they sailed for the moment to the desert -island of Prote, not far off, where they passed the night. The next -day they got under way in readiness to engage in the open sea if the -enemy chose to put out to meet them, being determined in the event -of his not doing so to sail in and attack him. The Lacedaemonians -did not put out to sea, and having omitted to close the inlets as they -had intended, remained quiet on shore, engaged in manning their -ships and getting ready, in the case of any one sailing in, to fight -in the harbour, which is a fairly large one. - -Perceiving this, the Athenians advanced against them by each -inlet, and falling on the enemy's fleet, most of which was by this -time afloat and in line, at once put it to flight, and giving chase as -far as the short distance allowed, disabled a good many vessels and -took five, one with its crew on board; dashing in at the rest that had -taken refuge on shore, and battering some that were still being -manned, before they could put out, and lashing on to their own ships -and towing off empty others whose crews had fled. At this sight the -Lacedaemonians, maddened by a disaster which cut off their men on -the island, rushed to the rescue, and going into the sea with their -heavy armour, laid hold of the ships and tried to drag them back, each -man thinking that success depended on his individual exertions. -Great was the melee, and quite in contradiction to the naval tactics -usual to the two combatants; the Lacedaemonians in their excitement -and dismay being actually engaged in a sea-fight on land, while the -victorious Athenians, in their eagerness to push their success as -far as possible, were carrying on a land-fight from their ships. After -great exertions and numerous wounds on both sides they separated, -the Lacedaemonians saving their empty ships, except those first taken; -and both parties returning to their camp, the Athenians set up a -trophy, gave back the dead, secured the wrecks, and at once began to -cruise round and jealously watch the island, with its intercepted -garrison, while the Peloponnesians on the mainland, whose -contingents had now all come up, stayed where they were before Pylos. - -When the news of what had happened at Pylos reached Sparta, the -disaster was thought so serious that the Lacedaemonians resolved -that the authorities should go down to the camp, and decide on the -spot what was best to be done. There, seeing that it was impossible to -help their men, and not wishing to risk their being reduced by -hunger or overpowered by numbers, they determined, with the consent of -the Athenian generals, to conclude an armistice at Pylos and send -envoys to Athens to obtain a convention, and to endeavour to get -back their men as quickly as possible. - -The generals accepting their offers, an armistice was concluded upon -the terms following: - -That the Lacedaemonians should bring to Pylos and deliver up to -the Athenians the ships that had fought in the late engagement, and -all in Laconia that were vessels of war, and should make no attack -on the fortification either by land or by sea. - -That the Athenians should allow the Lacedaemonians on the mainland -to send to the men in the island a certain fixed quantity of corn -ready kneaded, that is to say, two quarts of barley meal, one pint -of wine, and a piece of meat for each man, and half the same -quantity for a servant. - -That this allowance should be sent in under the eyes of the -Athenians, and that no boat should sail to the island except openly. - -That the Athenians should continue to the island same as before, -without however landing upon it, and should refrain from attacking the -Peloponnesian troops either by land or by sea. - -That if either party should infringe any of these terms in the -slightest particular, the armistice should be at once void. - -That the armistice should hold good until the return of the -Lacedaemonian envoys from Athens--the Athenians sending them thither -in a galley and bringing them back again--and upon the arrival of the -envoys should be at an end, and the ships be restored by the Athenians -in the same state as they received them. - -Such were the terms of the armistice, and the ships were delivered -over to the number of sixty, and the envoys sent off accordingly. -Arrived at Athens they spoke as follows: - -"Athenians, the Lacedaemonians sent us to try to find some way of -settling the affair of our men on the island, that shall be at once -satisfactory to our interests, and as consistent with our dignity in -our misfortune as circumstances permit. We can venture to speak at -some length without any departure from the habit of our country. Men -of few words where many are not wanted, we can be less brief when -there is a matter of importance to be illustrated and an end to be -served by its illustration. Meanwhile we beg you to take what we may -say, not in a hostile spirit, nor as if we thought you ignorant and -wished to lecture you, but rather as a suggestion on the best course -to be taken, addressed to intelligent judges. You can now, if you -choose, employ your present success to advantage, so as to keep what -you have got and gain honour and reputation besides, and you can avoid -the mistake of those who meet with an extraordinary piece of good -fortune, and are led on by hope to grasp continually at something -further, through having already succeeded without expecting it. -While those who have known most vicissitudes of good and bad, have -also justly least faith in their prosperity; and to teach your city -and ours this lesson experience has not been wanting. - -"To be convinced of this you have only to look at our present -misfortune. What power in Hellas stood higher than we did? and yet -we are come to you, although we formerly thought ourselves more able -to grant what we are now here to ask. Nevertheless, we have not been -brought to this by any decay in our power, or through having our heads -turned by aggrandizement; no, our resources are what they have -always been, and our error has been an error of judgment, to which all -are equally liable. Accordingly, the prosperity which your city now -enjoys, and the accession that it has lately received, must not make -you fancy that fortune will be always with you. Indeed sensible men -are prudent enough to treat their gains as precarious, just as they -would also keep a clear head in adversity, and think that war, so -far from staying within the limit to which a combatant may wish to -confine it, will run the course that its chances prescribe; and -thus, not being puffed up by confidence in military success, they -are less likely to come to grief, and most ready to make peace, if -they can, while their fortune lasts. This, Athenians, you have a -good opportunity to do now with us, and thus to escape the possible -disasters which may follow upon your refusal, and the consequent -imputation of having owed to accident even your present advantages, -when you might have left behind you a reputation for power and -wisdom which nothing could endanger. - -"The Lacedaemonians accordingly invite you to make a treaty and to -end the war, and offer peace and alliance and the most friendly and -intimate relations in every way and on every occasion between us; -and in return ask for the men on the island, thinking it better for -both parties not to stand out to the end, on the chance of some -favourable accident enabling the men to force their way out, or of -their being compelled to succumb under the pressure of blockade. -Indeed if great enmities are ever to be really settled, we think it -will be, not by the system of revenge and military success, and by -forcing an opponent to swear to a treaty to his disadvantage, but when -the more fortunate combatant waives these his privileges, to be guided -by gentler feelings conquers his rival in generosity, and accords -peace on more moderate conditions than he expected. From that -moment, instead of the debt of revenge which violence must entail, his -adversary owes a debt of generosity to be paid in kind, and is -inclined by honour to stand to his agreement. And men oftener act in -this manner towards their greatest enemies than where the quarrel is -of less importance; they are also by nature as glad to give way to -those who first yield to them, as they are apt to be provoked by -arrogance to risks condemned by their own judgment. - -"To apply this to ourselves: if peace was ever desirable for both -parties, it is surely so at the present moment, before anything -irremediable befall us and force us to hate you eternally, -personally as well as politically, and you to miss the advantages that -we now offer you. While the issue is still in doubt, and you have -reputation and our friendship in prospect, and we the compromise of -our misfortune before anything fatal occur, let us be reconciled, -and for ourselves choose peace instead of war, and grant to the rest -of the Hellenes a remission from their sufferings, for which be sure -they will think they have chiefly you to thank. The war that they -labour under they know not which began, but the peace that concludes -it, as it depends on your decision, will by their gratitude be laid to -your door. By such a decision you can become firm friends with the -Lacedaemonians at their own invitation, which you do not force from -them, but oblige them by accepting. And from this friendship -consider the advantages that are likely to follow: when Attica and -Sparta are at one, the rest of Hellas, be sure, will remain in -respectful inferiority before its heads." - -Such were the words of the Lacedaemonians, their idea being that the -Athenians, already desirous of a truce and only kept back by their -opposition, would joyfully accept a peace freely offered, and give -back the men. The Athenians, however, having the men on the island, -thought that the treaty would be ready for them whenever they chose to -make it, and grasped at something further. Foremost to encourage -them in this policy was Cleon, son of Cleaenetus, a popular leader -of the time and very powerful with the multitude, who persuaded them -to answer as follows: First, the men in the island must surrender -themselves and their arms and be brought to Athens. Next, the -Lacedaemonians must restore Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaia, all -places acquired not by arms, but by the previous convention, under -which they had been ceded by Athens herself at a moment of disaster, -when a truce was more necessary to her than at present. This done they -might take back their men, and make a truce for as long as both -parties might agree. - -To this answer the envoys made no reply, but asked that -commissioners might be chosen with whom they might confer on each -point, and quietly talk the matter over and try to come to some -agreement. Hereupon Cleon violently assailed them, saying that he knew -from the first that they had no right intentions, and that it was -clear enough now by their refusing to speak before the people, and -wanting to confer in secret with a committee of two or three. No, if -they meant anything honest let them say it out before all. The -Lacedaemonians, however, seeing that whatever concessions they might -be prepared to make in their misfortune, it was impossible for them to -speak before the multitude and lose credit with their allies for a -negotiation which might after all miscarry, and on the other hand, -that the Athenians would never grant what they asked upon moderate -terms, returned from Athens without having effected anything. - -Their arrival at once put an end to the armistice at Pylos, and -the Lacedaemonians asked back their ships according to the convention. -The Athenians, however, alleged an attack on the fort in contravention -of the truce, and other grievances seemingly not worth mentioning, and -refused to give them back, insisting upon the clause by which the -slightest infringement made the armistice void. The Lacedaemonians, -after denying the contravention and protesting against their bad faith -in the matter of the ships, went away and earnestly addressed -themselves to the war. Hostilities were now carried on at Pylos upon -both sides with vigour. The Athenians cruised round the island all day -with two ships going different ways; and by night, except on the -seaward side in windy weather, anchored round it with their whole -fleet, which, having been reinforced by twenty ships from Athens -come to aid in the blockade, now numbered seventy sail; while the -Peloponnesians remained encamped on the continent, making attacks on -the fort, and on the look-out for any opportunity which might offer -itself for the deliverance of their men. - -Meanwhile the Syracusans and their allies in Sicily had brought up -to the squadron guarding Messina the reinforcement which we left -them preparing, and carried on the war from thence, incited chiefly by -the Locrians from hatred of the Rhegians, whose territory they had -invaded with all their forces. The Syracusans also wished to try their -fortune at sea, seeing that the Athenians had only a few ships -actually at Rhegium, and hearing that the main fleet destined to -join them was engaged in blockading the island. A naval victory, -they thought, would enable them to blockade Rhegium by sea and land, -and easily to reduce it; a success which would at once place their -affairs upon a solid basis, the promontory of Rhegium in Italy and -Messina in Sicily being so near each other that it would be impossible -for the Athenians to cruise against them and command the strait. The -strait in question consists of the sea between Rhegium and Messina, at -the point where Sicily approaches nearest to the continent, and is the -Charybdis through which the story makes Ulysses sail; and the -narrowness of the passage and the strength of the current that pours -in from the vast Tyrrhenian and Sicilian mains, have rightly given -it a bad reputation. - -In this strait the Syracusans and their allies were compelled to -fight, late in the day, about the passage of a boat, putting out -with rather more than thirty ships against sixteen Athenian and -eight Rhegian vessels. Defeated by the Athenians they hastily set off, -each for himself, to their own stations at Messina and Rhegium, with -the loss of one ship; night coming on before the battle was -finished. After this the Locrians retired from the Rhegian -territory, and the ships of the Syracusans and their allies united and -came to anchor at Cape Pelorus, in the territory of Messina, where -their land forces joined them. Here the Athenians and Rhegians -sailed up, and seeing the ships unmanned, made an attack, in which -they in their turn lost one vessel, which was caught by a grappling -iron, the crew saving themselves by swimming. After this the -Syracusans got on board their ships, and while they were being towed -alongshore to Messina, were again attacked by the Athenians, but -suddenly got out to sea and became the assailants, and caused them -to lose another vessel. After thus holding their own in the voyage -alongshore and in the engagement as above described, the Syracusans -sailed on into the harbour of Messina. - -Meanwhile the Athenians, having received warning that Camarina was -about to be betrayed to the Syracusans by Archias and his party, -sailed thither; and the Messinese took this opportunity to attack by -sea and land with all their forces their Chalcidian neighbour, -Naxos. The first day they forced the Naxians to keep their walls, -and laid waste their country; the next they sailed round with their -ships, and laid waste their land on the river Akesines, while their -land forces menaced the city. Meanwhile the Sicels came down from -the high country in great numbers, to aid against the Messinese; and -the Naxians, elated at the sight, and animated by a belief that the -Leontines and their other Hellenic allies were coming to their -support, suddenly sallied out from the town, and attacked and routed -the Messinese, killing more than a thousand of them; while the -remainder suffered severely in their retreat home, being attacked by -the barbarians on the road, and most of them cut off. The ships put in -to Messina, and afterwards dispersed for their different homes. The -Leontines and their allies, with the Athenians, upon this at once -turned their arms against the now weakened Messina, and attacked, -the Athenians with their ships on the side of the harbour, and the -land forces on that of the town. The Messinese, however, sallying -out with Demoteles and some Locrians who had been left to garrison the -city after the disaster, suddenly attacked and routed most of the -Leontine army, killing a great number; upon seeing which the Athenians -landed from their ships, and falling on the Messinese in disorder -chased them back into the town, and setting up a trophy retired to -Rhegium. After this the Hellenes in Sicily continued to make war on -each other by land, without the Athenians. - -Meanwhile the Athenians at Pylos were still besieging the -Lacedaemonians in the island, the Peloponnesian forces on the -continent remaining where they were. The blockade was very laborious -for the Athenians from want of food and water; there was no spring -except one in the citadel of Pylos itself, and that not a large one, -and most of them were obliged to grub up the shingle on the sea -beach and drink such water as they could find. They also suffered from -want of room, being encamped in a narrow space; and as there was no -anchorage for the ships, some took their meals on shore in their turn, -while the others were anchored out at sea. But their greatest -discouragement arose from the unexpectedly long time which it took -to reduce a body of men shut up in a desert island, with only brackish -water to drink, a matter which they had imagined would take them -only a few days. The fact was that the Lacedaemonians had made -advertisement for volunteers to carry into the island ground corn, -wine, cheese, and any other food useful in a siege; high prices -being offered, and freedom promised to any of the Helots who should -succeed in doing so. The Helots accordingly were most forward to -engage in this risky traffic, putting off from this or that part of -Peloponnese, and running in by night on the seaward side of the -island. They were best pleased, however, when they could catch a -wind to carry them in. It was more easy to elude the look-out of the -galleys, when it blew from the seaward, as it became impossible for -them to anchor round the island; while the Helots had their boats -rated at their value in money, and ran them ashore, without caring how -they landed, being sure to find the soldiers waiting for them at the -landing-places. But all who risked it in fair weather were taken. -Divers also swam in under water from the harbour, dragging by a cord -in skins poppyseed mixed with honey, and bruised linseed; these at -first escaped notice, but afterwards a look-out was kept for them. -In short, both sides tried every possible contrivance, the one to -throw in provisions, and the other to prevent their introduction. - -At Athens, meanwhile, the news that the army was in great -distress, and that corn found its way in to the men in the island, -caused no small perplexity; and the Athenians began to fear that -winter might come on and find them still engaged in the blockade. They -saw that the convoying of provisions round Peloponnese would be then -impossible. The country offered no resources in itself, and even in -summer they could not send round enough. The blockade of a place -without harbours could no longer be kept up; and the men would -either escape by the siege being abandoned, or would watch for bad -weather and sail out in the boats that brought in their corn. What -caused still more alarm was the attitude of the Lacedaemonians, who -must, it was thought by the Athenians, feel themselves on strong -ground not to send them any more envoys; and they began to repent -having rejected the treaty. Cleon, perceiving the disfavour with which -he was regarded for having stood in the way of the convention, now -said that their informants did not speak the truth; and upon the -messengers recommending them, if they did not believe them, to send -some commissioners to see, Cleon himself and Theagenes were chosen -by the Athenians as commissioners. Aware that he would now be -obliged either to say what had been already said by the men whom he -was slandering, or be proved a liar if he said the contrary, he told -the Athenians, whom he saw to be not altogether disinclined for a -fresh expedition, that instead of sending and wasting their time and -opportunities, if they believed what was told them, they ought to sail -against the men. And pointing at Nicias, son of Niceratus, then -general, whom he hated, he tauntingly said that it would be easy, if -they had men for generals, to sail with a force and take those in -the island, and that if he had himself been in command, he would -have done it. - -Nicias, seeing the Athenians murmuring against Cleon for not sailing -now if it seemed to him so easy, and further seeing himself the object -of attack, told him that for all that the generals cared, he might -take what force he chose and make the attempt. At first Cleon -fancied that this resignation was merely a figure of speech, and was -ready to go, but finding that it was seriously meant, he drew back, -and said that Nicias, not he, was general, being now frightened, and -having never supposed that Nicias would go so far as to retire in -his favour. Nicias, however, repeated his offer, and resigned the -command against Pylos, and called the Athenians to witness that he did -so. And as the multitude is wont to do, the more Cleon shrank from the -expedition and tried to back out of what he had said, the more they -encouraged Nicias to hand over his command, and clamoured at Cleon -to go. At last, not knowing how to get out of his words, he -undertook the expedition, and came forward and said that he was not -afraid of the Lacedaemonians, but would sail without taking any one -from the city with him, except the Lemnians and Imbrians that were -at Athens, with some targeteers that had come up from Aenus, and -four hundred archers from other quarters. With these and the -soldiers at Pylos, he would within twenty days either bring the -Lacedaemonians alive, or kill them on the spot. The Athenians could -not help laughing at his fatuity, while sensible men comforted -themselves with the reflection that they must gain in either -circumstance; either they would be rid of Cleon, which they rather -hoped, or if disappointed in this expectation, would reduce the -Lacedaemonians. - -After he had settled everything in the assembly, and the Athenians -had voted him the command of the expedition, he chose as his colleague -Demosthenes, one of the generals at Pylos, and pushed forward the -preparations for his voyage. His choice fell upon Demosthenes -because he heard that he was contemplating a descent on the island; -the soldiers distressed by the difficulties of the position, and -rather besieged than besiegers, being eager to fight it out, while the -firing of the island had increased the confidence of the general. He -had been at first afraid, because the island having never been -inhabited was almost entirely covered with wood and without paths, -thinking this to be in the enemy's favour, as he might land with a -large force, and yet might suffer loss by an attack from an unseen -position. The mistakes and forces of the enemy the wood would in a -great measure conceal from him, while every blunder of his own -troops would be at once detected, and they would be thus able to -fall upon him unexpectedly just where they pleased, the attack being -always in their power. If, on the other hand, he should force them -to engage in the thicket, the smaller number who knew the country -would, he thought, have the advantage over the larger who were -ignorant of it, while his own army might be cut off imperceptibly, -in spite of its numbers, as the men would not be able to see where -to succour each other. - -The Aetolian disaster, which had been mainly caused by the wood, had -not a little to do with these reflections. Meanwhile, one of the -soldiers who were compelled by want of room to land on the extremities -of the island and take their dinners, with outposts fixed to prevent a -surprise, set fire to a little of the wood without meaning to do so; -and as it came on to blow soon afterwards, almost the whole was -consumed before they were aware of it. Demosthenes was now able for -the first time to see how numerous the Lacedaemonians really were, -having up to this moment been under the impression that they took in -provisions for a smaller number; he also saw that the Athenians -thought success important and were anxious about it, and that it was -now easier to land on the island, and accordingly got ready for the -attempt, sent for troops from the allies in the neighbourhood, and -pushed forward his other preparations. At this moment Cleon arrived at -Pylos with the troops which he had asked for, having sent on word to -say that he was coming. The first step taken by the two generals after -their meeting was to send a herald to the camp on the mainland, to ask -if they were disposed to avoid all risk and to order the men on the -island to surrender themselves and their arms, to be kept in gentle -custody until some general convention should be concluded. - -On the rejection of this proposition the generals let one day -pass, and the next, embarking all their heavy infantry on board a -few ships, put out by night, and a little before dawn landed on both -sides of the island from the open sea and from the harbour, being -about eight hundred strong, and advanced with a run against the -first post in the island. - -The enemy had distributed his force as follows: In this first post -there were about thirty heavy infantry; the centre and most level -part, where the water was, was held by the main body, and by -Epitadas their commander; while a small party guarded the very end -of the island, towards Pylos, which was precipitous on the sea-side -and very difficult to attack from the land, and where there was also a -sort of old fort of stones rudely put together, which they thought -might be useful to them, in case they should be forced to retreat. -Such was their disposition. - -The advanced post thus attacked by the Athenians was at once put -to the sword, the men being scarcely out of bed and still arming, -the landing having taken them by surprise, as they fancied the ships -were only sailing as usual to their stations for the night. As soon as -day broke, the rest of the army landed, that is to say, all the -crews of rather more than seventy ships, except the lowest rank of -oars, with the arms they carried, eight hundred archers, and as many -targeteers, the Messenian reinforcements, and all the other troops -on duty round Pylos, except the garrison on the fort. The tactics of -Demosthenes had divided them into companies of two hundred, more or -less, and made them occupy the highest points in order to paralyse the -enemy by surrounding him on every side and thus leaving him without -any tangible adversary, exposed to the cross-fire of their host; plied -by those in his rear if he attacked in front, and by those on one -flank if he moved against those on the other. In short, wherever he -went he would have the assailants behind him, and these light-armed -assailants, the most awkward of all; arrows, darts, stones, and slings -making them formidable at a distance, and there being no means of -getting at them at close quarters, as they could conquer flying, and -the moment their pursuer turned they were upon him. Such was the -idea that inspired Demosthenes in his conception of the descent, and -presided over its execution. - -Meanwhile the main body of the troops in the island (that under -Epitadas), seeing their outpost cut off and an army advancing -against them, serried their ranks and pressed forward to close with -the Athenian heavy infantry in front of them, the light troops being -upon their flanks and rear. However, they were not able to engage or -to profit by their superior skill, the light troops keeping them in -check on either side with their missiles, and the heavy infantry -remaining stationary instead of advancing to meet them; and although -they routed the light troops wherever they ran up and approached too -closely, yet they retreated fighting, being lightly equipped, and -easily getting the start in their flight, from the difficult and -rugged nature of the ground, in an island hitherto desert, over -which the Lacedaemonians could not pursue them with their heavy -armour. - -After this skirmishing had lasted some little while, the -Lacedaemonians became unable to dash out with the same rapidity as -before upon the points attacked, and the light troops finding that -they now fought with less vigour, became more confident. They could -see with their own eyes that they were many times more numerous than -the enemy; they were now more familiar with his aspect and found him -less terrible, the result not having justified the apprehensions which -they had suffered, when they first landed in slavish dismay at the -idea of attacking Lacedaemonians; and accordingly their fear -changing to disdain, they now rushed all together with loud shouts -upon them, and pelted them with stones, darts, and arrows, whichever -came first to hand. The shouting accompanying their onset confounded -the Lacedaemonians, unaccustomed to this mode of fighting; dust rose -from the newly burnt wood, and it was impossible to see in front of -one with the arrows and stones flying through clouds of dust from -the hands of numerous assailants. The Lacedaemonians had now to -sustain a rude conflict; their caps would not keep out the arrows, -darts had broken off in the armour of the wounded, while they -themselves were helpless for offence, being prevented from using their -eyes to see what was before them, and unable to hear the words of -command for the hubbub raised by the enemy; danger encompassed them on -every side, and there was no hope of any means of defence or safety. - -At last, after many had been already wounded in the confined space -in which they were fighting, they formed in close order and retired on -the fort at the end of the island, which was not far off, and to their -friends who held it. The moment they gave way, the light troops became -bolder and pressed upon them, shouting louder than ever, and killed as -many as they came up with in their retreat, but most of the -Lacedaemonians made good their escape to the fort, and with the -garrison in it ranged themselves all along its whole extent to repulse -the enemy wherever it was assailable. The Athenians pursuing, unable -to surround and hem them in, owing to the strength of the ground, -attacked them in front and tried to storm the position. For a long -time, indeed for most of the day, both sides held out against all -the torments of the battle, thirst, and sun, the one endeavouring to -drive the enemy from the high ground, the other to maintain himself -upon it, it being now more easy for the Lacedaemonians to defend -themselves than before, as they could not be surrounded on the flanks. - -The struggle began to seem endless, when the commander of the -Messenians came to Cleon and Demosthenes, and told them that they were -losing their labour: but if they would give him some archers and light -troops to go round on the enemy's rear by a way he would undertake -to find, he thought he could force the approach. Upon receiving what -he asked for, he started from a point out of sight in order not to -be seen by the enemy, and creeping on wherever the precipices of the -island permitted, and where the Lacedaemonians, trusting to the -strength of the ground, kept no guard, succeeded after the greatest -difficulty in getting round without their seeing him, and suddenly -appeared on the high ground in their rear, to the dismay of the -surprised enemy and the still greater joy of his expectant friends. -The Lacedaemonians thus placed between two fires, and in the same -dilemma, to compare small things with great, as at Thermopylae, -where the defenders were cut off through the Persians getting round by -the path, being now attacked in front and behind, began to give way, -and overcome by the odds against them and exhausted from want of food, -retreated. - -The Athenians were already masters of the approaches when Cleon -and Demosthenes perceiving that, if the enemy gave way a single step -further, they would be destroyed by their soldiery, put a stop to -the battle and held their men back; wishing to take the Lacedaemonians -alive to Athens, and hoping that their stubbornness might relax on -hearing the offer of terms, and that they might surrender and yield to -the present overwhelming danger. Proclamation was accordingly made, to -know if they would surrender themselves and their arms to the -Athenians to be dealt at their discretion. - -The Lacedaemonians hearing this offer, most of them lowered their -shields and waved their hands to show that they accepted it. -Hostilities now ceased, and a parley was held between Cleon and -Demosthenes and Styphon, son of Pharax, on the other side; since -Epitadas, the first of the previous commanders, had been killed, and -Hippagretas, the next in command, left for dead among the slain, -though still alive, and thus the command had devolved upon Styphon -according to the law, in case of anything happening to his -superiors. Styphon and his companions said they wished to send a -herald to the Lacedaemonians on the mainland, to know what they were -to do. The Athenians would not let any of them go, but themselves -called for heralds from the mainland, and after questions had been -carried backwards and forwards two or three times, the last man that -passed over from the Lacedaemonians on the continent brought this -message: "The Lacedaemonians bid you to decide for yourselves so -long as you do nothing dishonourable"; upon which after consulting -together they surrendered themselves and their arms. The Athenians, -after guarding them that day and night, the next morning set up a -trophy in the island, and got ready to sail, giving their prisoners in -batches to be guarded by the captains of the galleys; and the -Lacedaemonians sent a herald and took up their dead. The number of the -killed and prisoners taken in the island was as follows: four -hundred and twenty heavy infantry had passed over; three hundred all -but eight were taken alive to Athens; the rest were killed. About a -hundred and twenty of the prisoners were Spartans. The Athenian loss -was small, the battle not having been fought at close quarters. - -The blockade in all, counting from the fight at sea to the battle in -the island, had lasted seventy-two days. For twenty of these, during -the absence of the envoys sent to treat for peace, the men had -provisions given them, for the rest they were fed by the smugglers. -Corn and other victual was found in the island; the commander Epitadas -having kept the men upon half rations. The Athenians and -Peloponnesians now each withdrew their forces from Pylos, and went -home, and crazy as Cleon's promise was, he fulfilled it, by bringing -the men to Athens within the twenty days as he had pledged himself -to do. - -Nothing that happened in the war surprised the Hellenes so much as -this. It was the opinion that no force or famine could make the -Lacedaemonians give up their arms, but that they would fight on as -they could, and die with them in their hands: indeed people could -scarcely believe that those who had surrendered were of the same stuff -as the fallen; and an Athenian ally, who some time after insultingly -asked one of the prisoners from the island if those that had fallen -were men of honour, received for answer that the atraktos--that is, -the arrow--would be worth a great deal if it could tell men of honour -from the rest; in allusion to the fact that the killed were those whom -the stones and the arrows happened to hit. - -Upon the arrival of the men the Athenians determined to keep them in -prison until the peace, and if the Peloponnesians invaded their -country in the interval, to bring them out and put them to death. -Meanwhile the defence of Pylos was not forgotten; the Messenians -from Naupactus sent to their old country, to which Pylos formerly -belonged, some of the likeliest of their number, and began a series of -incursions into Laconia, which their common dialect rendered most -destructive. The Lacedaemonians, hitherto without experience of -incursions or a warfare of the kind, finding the Helots deserting, and -fearing the march of revolution in their country, began to be -seriously uneasy, and in spite of their unwillingness to betray this -to the Athenians began to send envoys to Athens, and tried to -recover Pylos and the prisoners. The Athenians, however, kept grasping -at more, and dismissed envoy after envoy without their having effected -anything. Such was the history of the affair of Pylos. - - - - -CHAPTER XIII - -_Seventh and Eighth Years of the War - End of Corcyraean Revolution - -Peace of Gela - Capture of Nisaea_ - -The same summer, directly after these events, the Athenians made -an expedition against the territory of Corinth with eighty ships and -two thousand Athenian heavy infantry, and two hundred cavalry on board -horse transports, accompanied by the Milesians, Andrians, and -Carystians from the allies, under the command of Nicias, son of -Niceratus, with two colleagues. Putting out to sea they made land at -daybreak between Chersonese and Rheitus, at the beach of the country -underneath the Solygian hill, upon which the Dorians in old times -established themselves and carried on war against the Aeolian -inhabitants of Corinth, and where a village now stands called Solygia. -The beach where the fleet came to is about a mile and a half from -the village, seven miles from Corinth, and two and a quarter from -the Isthmus. The Corinthians had heard from Argos of the coming of the -Athenian armament, and had all come up to the Isthmus long before, -with the exception of those who lived beyond it, and also of five -hundred who were away in garrison in Ambracia and Leucadia; and they -were there in full force watching for the Athenians to land. These -last, however, gave them the slip by coming in the dark; and being -informed by signals of the fact the Corinthians left half their number -at Cenchreae, in case the Athenians should go against Crommyon, and -marched in all haste to the rescue. - -Battus, one of the two generals present at the action, went with a -company to defend the village of Solygia, which was unfortified; -Lycophron remaining to give battle with the rest. The Corinthians -first attacked the right wing of the Athenians, which had just -landed in front of Chersonese, and afterwards the rest of the army. -The battle was an obstinate one, and fought throughout hand to hand. -The right wing of the Athenians and Carystians, who had been placed at -the end of the line, received and with some difficulty repulsed the -Corinthians, who thereupon retreated to a wall upon the rising -ground behind, and throwing down the stones upon them, came on again -singing the paean, and being received by the Athenians, were again -engaged at close quarters. At this moment a Corinthian company -having come to the relief of the left wing, routed and pursued the -Athenian right to the sea, whence they were in their turn driven -back by the Athenians and Carystians from the ships. Meanwhile the -rest of the army on either side fought on tenaciously, especially -the right wing of the Corinthians, where Lycophron sustained the -attack of the Athenian left, which it was feared might attempt the -village of Solygia. - -After holding on for a long while without either giving way, the -Athenians aided by their horse, of which the enemy had none, at -length routed the Corinthians, who retired to the hill and, halting, -remained quiet there, without coming down again. It was in this rout -of the right wing that they had the most killed, Lycophron their -general being among the number. The rest of the army, broken and put -to flight in this way without being seriously pursued or hurried, -retired to the high ground and there took up its position. The -Athenians, finding that the enemy no longer offered to engage them, -stripped his dead and took up their own and immediately set up a -trophy. Meanwhile, the half of the Corinthians left at Cenchreae to -guard against the Athenians sailing on Crommyon, although unable to -see the battle for Mount Oneion, found out what was going on by the -dust, and hurried up to the rescue; as did also the older Corinthians -from the town, upon discovering what had occurred. The Athenians -seeing them all coming against them, and thinking that they were -reinforcements arriving from the neighbouring Peloponnesians, -withdrew in haste to their ships with their spoils and their own -dead, except two that they left behind, not being able to find them, -and going on board crossed over to the islands opposite, and from -thence sent a herald, and took up under truce the bodies which they -had left behind. Two hundred and twelve Corinthians fell in the -battle, and rather less than fifty Athenians. - -Weighing from the islands, the Athenians sailed the same day to -Crommyon in the Corinthian territory, about thirteen miles from the -city, and coming to anchor laid waste the country, and passed the -night there. The next day, after first coasting along to the territory -of Epidaurus and making a descent there, they came to Methana -between Epidaurus and Troezen, and drew a wall across and fortified -the isthmus of the peninsula, and left a post there from which -incursions were henceforth made upon the country of Troezen, Haliae, -and Epidaurus. After walling off this spot, the fleet sailed off home. - -While these events were going on, Eurymedon and Sophocles had put to -sea with the Athenian fleet from Pylos on their way to Sicily and, -arriving at Corcyra, joined the townsmen in an expedition against -the party established on Mount Istone, who had crossed over, as I have -mentioned, after the revolution and become masters of the country, -to the great hurt of the inhabitants. Their stronghold having been -taken by an attack, the garrison took refuge in a body upon some -high ground and there capitulated, agreeing to give up their mercenary -auxiliaries, lay down their arms, and commit themselves to the -discretion of the Athenian people. The generals carried them across -under truce to the island of Ptychia, to be kept in custody until they -could be sent to Athens, upon the understanding that, if any were -caught running away, all would lose the benefit of the treaty. -Meanwhile the leaders of the Corcyraean commons, afraid that the -Athenians might spare the lives of the prisoners, had recourse to -the following stratagem. They gained over some few men on the island -by secretly sending friends with instructions to provide them with a -boat, and to tell them, as if for their own sakes, that they had -best escape as quickly as possible, as the Athenian generals were -going to give them up to the Corcyraean people. - -These representations succeeding, it was so arranged that the men -were caught sailing out in the boat that was provided, and the -treaty became void accordingly, and the whole body were given up to -the Corcyraeans. For this result the Athenian generals were in a great -measure responsible; their evident disinclination to sail for -Sicily, and thus to leave to others the honour of conducting the men -to Athens, encouraged the intriguers in their design and seemed to -affirm the truth of their representations. The prisoners thus handed -over were shut up by the Corcyraeans in a large building, and -afterwards taken out by twenties and led past two lines of heavy -infantry, one on each side, being bound together, and beaten and -stabbed by the men in the lines whenever any saw pass a personal -enemy; while men carrying whips went by their side and hastened on the -road those that walked too slowly. - -As many as sixty men were taken out and killed in this way without -the knowledge of their friends in the building, who fancied they -were merely being moved from one prison to another. At last, -however, someone opened their eyes to the truth, upon which they -called upon the Athenians to kill them themselves, if such was their -pleasure, and refused any longer to go out of the building, and said -they would do all they could to prevent any one coming in. The -Corcyraeans, not liking themselves to force a passage by the doors, -got up on the top of the building, and breaking through the roof, -threw down the tiles and let fly arrows at them, from which the -prisoners sheltered themselves as well as they could. Most of their -number, meanwhile, were engaged in dispatching themselves by thrusting -into their throats the arrows shot by the enemy, and hanging -themselves with the cords taken from some beds that happened to be -there, and with strips made from their clothing; adopting, in short, -every possible means of self-destruction, and also falling victims -to the missiles of their enemies on the roof. Night came on while -these horrors were enacting, and most of it had passed before they -were concluded. When it was day the Corcyraeans threw them in layers -upon wagons and carried them out of the city. All the women taken in -the stronghold were sold as slaves. In this way the Corcyraeans of the -mountain were destroyed by the commons; and so after terrible excesses -the party strife came to an end, at least as far as the period of this -war is concerned, for of one party there was practically nothing left. -Meanwhile the Athenians sailed off to Sicily, their primary -destination, and carried on the war with their allies there. - -At the close of the summer, the Athenians at Naupactus and the -Acarnanians made an expedition against Anactorium, the Corinthian town -lying at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf, and took it by treachery; -and the Acarnanians themselves, sending settlers from all parts of -Acarnania, occupied the place. - -Summer was now over. During the winter ensuing, Aristides, son of -Archippus, one of the commanders of the Athenian ships sent to collect -money from the allies, arrested at Eion, on the Strymon, -Artaphernes, a Persian, on his way from the King to Lacedaemon. He was -conducted to Athens, where the Athenians got his dispatches translated -from the Assyrian character and read them. With numerous references to -other subjects, they in substance told the Lacedaemonians that the -King did not know what they wanted, as of the many ambassadors they -had sent him no two ever told the same story; if however they were -prepared to speak plainly they might send him some envoys with this -Persian. The Athenians afterwards sent back Artaphernes in a galley to -Ephesus, and ambassadors with him, who heard there of the death of -King Artaxerxes, son of Xerxes, which took place about that time, -and so returned home. - -The same winter the Chians pulled down their new wall at the command -of the Athenians, who suspected them of meditating an insurrection, -after first however obtaining pledges from the Athenians, and security -as far as this was possible for their continuing to treat them as -before. Thus the winter ended, and with it ended the seventh year of -this war of which Thucydides is the historian. - -In first days of the next summer there was an eclipse of the sun -at the time of new moon, and in the early part of the same month an -earthquake. Meanwhile, the Mitylenian and other Lesbian exiles set -out, for the most part from the continent, with mercenaries hired in -Peloponnese, and others levied on the spot, and took Rhoeteum, but -restored it without injury on the receipt of two thousand Phocaean -staters. After this they marched against Antandrus and took the town -by treachery, their plan being to free Antandrus and the rest of the -Actaean towns, formerly owned by Mitylene but now held by the -Athenians. Once fortified there, they would have every facility for -ship-building from the vicinity of Ida and the consequent abundance of -timber, and plenty of other supplies, and might from this base -easily ravage Lesbos, which was not far off, and make themselves -masters of the Aeolian towns on the continent. - -While these were the schemes of the exiles, the Athenians in the -same summer made an expedition with sixty ships, two thousand heavy -infantry, a few cavalry, and some allied troops from Miletus and other -parts, against Cythera, under the command of Nicias, son of Niceratus, -Nicostratus, son of Diotrephes, and Autocles, son of Tolmaeus. Cythera -is an island lying off Laconia, opposite Malea; the inhabitants are -Lacedaemonians of the class of the Perioeci; and an officer called the -judge of Cythera went over to the place annually from Sparta. A -garrison of heavy infantry was also regularly sent there, and great -attention paid to the island, as it was the landing-place for the -merchantmen from Egypt and Libya, and at the same time secured Laconia -from the attacks of privateers from the sea, at the only point where -it is assailable, as the whole coast rises abruptly towards the -Sicilian and Cretan seas. - -Coming to land here with their armament, the Athenians with ten -ships and two thousand Milesian heavy infantry took the town of -Scandea, on the sea; and with the rest of their forces landing on -the side of the island looking towards Malea, went against the lower -town of Cythera, where they found all the inhabitants encamped. A -battle ensuing, the Cytherians held their ground for some little -while, and then turned and fled into the upper town, where they soon -afterwards capitulated to Nicias and his colleagues, agreeing to leave -their fate to the decision of the Athenians, their lives only being -safe. A correspondence had previously been going on between Nicias and -certain of the inhabitants, which caused the surrender to be -effected more speedily, and upon terms more advantageous, present -and future, for the Cytherians; who would otherwise have been expelled -by the Athenians on account of their being Lacedaemonians and their -island being so near to Laconia. After the capitulation, the Athenians -occupied the town of Scandea near the harbour, and appointing a -garrison for Cythera, sailed to Asine, Helus, and most of the places -on the sea, and making descents and passing the night on shore at such -spots as were convenient, continued ravaging the country for about -seven days. - -The Lacedaemonians seeing the Athenians masters of Cythera, and -expecting descents of the kind upon their coasts, nowhere opposed them -in force, but sent garrisons here and there through the country, -consisting of as many heavy infantry as the points menaced seemed to -require, and generally stood very much upon the defensive. After the -severe and unexpected blow that had befallen them in the island, the -occupation of Pylos and Cythera, and the apparition on every side of a -war whose rapidity defied precaution, they lived in constant fear of -internal revolution, and now took the unusual step of raising four -hundred horse and a force of archers, and became more timid than -ever in military matters, finding themselves involved in a maritime -struggle, which their organization had never contemplated, and that -against Athenians, with whom an enterprise unattempted was always -looked upon as a success sacrificed. Besides this, their late numerous -reverses of fortune, coming close one upon another without any reason, -had thoroughly unnerved them, and they were always afraid of a -second disaster like that on the island, and thus scarcely dared to -take the field, but fancied that they could not stir without a -blunder, for being new to the experience of adversity they had lost -all confidence in themselves. - -Accordingly they now allowed the Athenians to ravage their seaboard, -without making any movement, the garrisons in whose neighbourhood -the descents were made always thinking their numbers insufficient, and -sharing the general feeling. A single garrison which ventured to -resist, near Cotyrta and Aphrodisia, struck terror by its charge -into the scattered mob of light troops, but retreated, upon being -received by the heavy infantry, with the loss of a few men and some -arms, for which the Athenians set up a trophy, and then sailed off -to Cythera. From thence they sailed round to Epidaurus Limera, ravaged -part of the country, and so came to Thyrea in the Cynurian -territory, upon the Argive and Laconian border. This district had been -given by its Lacedaemonian owners to the expelled Aeginetans to -inhabit, in return for their good offices at the time of the -earthquake and the rising of the Helots; and also because, although -subjects of Athens, they had always sided with Lacedaemon. - -While the Athenians were still at sea, the Aeginetans evacuated a -fort which they were building upon the coast, and retreated into the -upper town where they lived, rather more than a mile from the sea. One -of the Lacedaemonian district garrisons which was helping them in -the work, refused to enter here with them at their entreaty, -thinking it dangerous to shut themselves up within the wall, and -retiring to the high ground remained quiet, not considering themselves -a match for the enemy. Meanwhile the Athenians landed, and instantly -advanced with all their forces and took Thyrea. The town they burnt, -pillaging what was in it; the Aeginetans who were not slain in -action they took with them to Athens, with Tantalus, son of Patrocles, -their Lacedaemonian commander, who had been wounded and taken -prisoner. They also took with them a few men from Cythera whom they -thought it safest to remove. These the Athenians determined to lodge -in the islands: the rest of the Cytherians were to retain their -lands and pay four talents tribute; the Aeginetans captured to be -all put to death, on account of the old inveterate feud; and -Tantalus to share the imprisonment of the Lacedaemonians taken on -the island. - -The same summer, the inhabitants of Camarina and Gela in Sicily -first made an armistice with each other, after which embassies from -all the other Sicilian cities assembled at Gela to try to bring -about a pacification. After many expressions of opinion on one side -and the other, according to the griefs and pretensions of the -different parties complaining, Hermocrates, son of Hermon, a -Syracusan, the most influential man among them, addressed the -following words to the assembly: - -"If I now address you, Sicilians, it is not because my city is the -least in Sicily or the greatest sufferer by the war, but in order to -state publicly what appears to me to be the best policy for the -whole island. That war is an evil is a proposition so familiar to -every one that it would be tedious to develop it. No one is forced -to engage in it by ignorance, or kept out of it by fear, if he fancies -there is anything to be gained by it. To the former the gain appears -greater than the danger, while the latter would rather stand the -risk than put up with any immediate sacrifice. But if both should -happen to have chosen the wrong moment for acting in this way, -advice to make peace would not be unserviceable; and this, if we did -but see it, is just what we stand most in need of at the present -juncture. - -"I suppose that no one will dispute that we went to war at first -in order to serve our own several interests, that we are now, in -view of the same interests, debating how we can make peace; and that -if we separate without having as we think our rights, we shall go to -war again. And yet, as men of sense, we ought to see that our separate -interests are not alone at stake in the present congress: there is -also the question whether we have still time to save Sicily, the whole -of which in my opinion is menaced by Athenian ambition; and we ought -to find in the name of that people more imperious arguments for -peace than any which I can advance, when we see the first power in -Hellas watching our mistakes with the few ships that she has at -present in our waters, and under the fair name of alliance -speciously seeking to turn to account the natural hostility that -exists between us. If we go to war, and call in to help us a people -that are ready enough to carry their arms even where they are not -invited; and if we injure ourselves at our own expense, and at the -same time serve as the pioneers of their dominion, we may expect, when -they see us worn out, that they will one day come with a larger -armament, and seek to bring all of us into subjection. - -"And yet as sensible men, if we call in allies and court danger, -it should be in order to enrich our different countries with new -acquisitions, and not to ruin what they possess already; and we should -understand that the intestine discords which are so fatal to -communities generally, will be equally so to Sicily, if we, its -inhabitants, absorbed in our local quarrels, neglect the common enemy. -These considerations should reconcile individual with individual, -and city with city, and unite us in a common effort to save the -whole of Sicily. Nor should any one imagine that the Dorians only -are enemies of Athens, while the Chalcidian race is secured by its -Ionian blood; the attack in question is not inspired by hatred of -one of two nationalities, but by a desire for the good things in -Sicily, the common property of us all. This is proved by the -Athenian reception of the Chalcidian invitation: an ally who has never -given them any assistance whatever, at once receives from them -almost more than the treaty entitles him to. That the Athenians should -cherish this ambition and practise this policy is very excusable; -and I do not blame those who wish to rule, but those who are -over-ready to serve. It is just as much in men's nature to rule -those who submit to them, as it is to resist those who molest them; -one is not less invariable than the other. Meanwhile all who see these -dangers and refuse to provide for them properly, or who have come here -without having made up their minds that our first duty is to unite -to get rid of the common peril, are mistaken. The quickest way to be -rid of it is to make peace with each other; since the Athenians menace -us not from their own country, but from that of those who invited them -here. In this way instead of war issuing in war, peace quietly ends -our quarrels; and the guests who come hither under fair pretences -for bad ends, will have good reason for going away without having -attained them. - -"So far as regards the Athenians, such are the great advantages -proved inherent in a wise policy. Independently of this, in the face -of the universal consent, that peace is the first of blessings, how -can we refuse to make it amongst ourselves; or do you not think that -the good which you have, and the ills that you complain of, would be -better preserved and cured by quiet than by war; that peace has its -honours and splendours of a less perilous kind, not to mention the -numerous other blessings that one might dilate on, with the not less -numerous miseries of war? These considerations should teach you not to -disregard my words, but rather to look in them every one for his own -safety. If there be any here who feels certain either by right or -might to effect his object, let not this surprise be to him too severe -a disappointment. Let him remember that many before now have tried -to chastise a wrongdoer, and failing to punish their enemy have not -even saved themselves; while many who have trusted in force to gain an -advantage, instead of gaining anything more, have been doomed to -lose what they had. Vengeance is not necessarily successful because -wrong has been done, or strength sure because it is confident; but the -incalculable element in the future exercises the widest influence, and -is the most treacherous, and yet in fact the most useful of all -things, as it frightens us all equally, and thus makes us consider -before attacking each other. - -"Let us therefore now allow the undefined fear of this unknown -future, and the immediate terror of the Athenians' presence, to -produce their natural impression, and let us consider any failure to -carry out the programmes that we may each have sketched out for -ourselves as sufficiently accounted for by these obstacles, and send -away the intruder from the country; and if everlasting peace be -impossible between us, let us at all events make a treaty for as -long a term as possible, and put off our private differences to -another day. In fine, let us recognize that the adoption of my -advice will leave us each citizens of a free state, and as such -arbiters of our own destiny, able to return good or bad offices with -equal effect; while its rejection will make us dependent on others, -and thus not only impotent to repel an insult, but on the most -favourable supposition, friends to our direst enemies, and at feud -with our natural friends. - -"For myself, though, as I said at first, the representative of a -great city, and able to think less of defending myself than of -attacking others, I am prepared to concede something in prevision of -these dangers. I am not inclined to ruin myself for the sake of -hurting my enemies, or so blinded by animosity as to think myself -equally master of my own plans and of fortune which I cannot -command; but I am ready to give up anything in reason. I call upon the -rest of you to imitate my conduct of your own free will, without being -forced to do so by the enemy. There is no disgrace in connections -giving way to one another, a Dorian to a Dorian, or a Chalcidian to -his brethren; above and beyond this we are neighbours, live in the -same country, are girt by the same sea, and go by the same name of -Sicilians. We shall go to war again, I suppose, when the time comes, -and again make peace among ourselves by means of future congresses; -but the foreign invader, if we are wise, will always find us united -against him, since the hurt of one is the danger of all; and we -shall never, in future, invite into the island either allies or -mediators. By so acting we shall at the present moment do for Sicily a -double service, ridding her at once of the Athenians, and of civil -war, and in future shall live in freedom at home, and be less -menaced from abroad." - -Such were the words of Hermocrates. The Sicilians took his advice, -and came to an understanding among themselves to end the war, each -keeping what they had--the Camarinaeans taking Morgantina at a price -fixed to be paid to the Syracusans--and the allies of the Athenians -called the officers in command, and told them that they were going -to make peace and that they would be included in the treaty. The -generals assenting, the peace was concluded, and the Athenian fleet -afterwards sailed away from Sicily. Upon their arrival at Athens, -the Athenians banished Pythodorus and Sophocles, and fined Eurymedon -for having taken bribes to depart when they might have subdued Sicily. -So thoroughly had the present prosperity persuaded the citizens that -nothing could withstand them, and that they could achieve what was -possible and impracticable alike, with means ample or inadequate it -mattered not. The secret of this was their general extraordinary -success, which made them confuse their strength with their hopes. - -The same summer the Megarians in the city, pressed by the -hostilities of the Athenians, who invaded their country twice every -year with all their forces, and harassed by the incursions of their -own exiles at Pegae, who had been expelled in a revolution by the -popular party, began to ask each other whether it would not be -better to receive back their exiles, and free the town from one of its -two scourges. The friends of the emigrants, perceiving the -agitation, now more openly than before demanded the adoption of this -proposition; and the leaders of the commons, seeing that the -sufferings of the times had tired out the constancy of their -supporters, entered in their alarm into correspondence with the -Athenian generals, Hippocrates, son of Ariphron, and Demosthenes, -son of Alcisthenes, and resolved to betray the town, thinking this -less dangerous to themselves than the return of the party which they -had banished. It was accordingly arranged that the Athenians should -first take the long walls extending for nearly a mile from the city to -the port of Nisaea, to prevent the Peloponnesians coming to the rescue -from that place, where they formed the sole garrison to secure the -fidelity of Megara; and that after this the attempt should be made -to put into their hands the upper town, which it was thought would -then come over with less difficulty. - -The Athenians, after plans had been arranged between themselves -and their correspondents both as to words and actions, sailed by night -to Minoa, the island off Megara, with six hundred heavy infantry under -the command of Hippocrates, and took post in a quarry not far off, out -of which bricks used to be taken for the walls; while Demosthenes, the -other commander, with a detachment of Plataean light troops and -another of Peripoli, placed himself in ambush in the precinct of -Enyalius, which was still nearer. No one knew of it, except those -whose business it was to know that night. A little before daybreak, -the traitors in Megara began to act. Every night for a long time back, -under pretence of marauding, in order to have a means of opening the -gates, they had been used, with the consent of the officer in command, -to carry by night a sculling boat upon a cart along the ditch to the -sea, and so to sail out, bringing it back again before day upon the -cart, and taking it within the wall through the gates, in order, as -they pretended, to baffle the Athenian blockade at Minoa, there -being no boat to be seen in the harbour. On the present occasion the -cart was already at the gates, which had been opened in the usual -way for the boat, when the Athenians, with whom this had been -concerted, saw it, and ran at the top of their speed from the ambush -in order to reach the gates before they were shut again, and while the -cart was still there to prevent their being closed; their Megarian -accomplices at the same moment killing the guard at the gates. The -first to run in was Demosthenes with his Plataeans and Peripoli, -just where the trophy now stands; and he was no sooner within the -gates than the Plataeans engaged and defeated the nearest party of -Peloponnesians who had taken the alarm and come to the rescue, and -secured the gates for the approaching Athenian heavy infantry. - -After this, each of the Athenians as fast as they entered went -against the wall. A few of the Peloponnesian garrison stood their -ground at first, and tried to repel the assault, and some of them were -killed; but the main body took fright and fled; the night attack and -the sight of the Megarian traitors in arms against them making them -think that all Megara had gone over to the enemy. It so happened -also that the Athenian herald of his own idea called out and invited -any of the Megarians that wished, to join the Athenian ranks; and this -was no sooner heard by the garrison than they gave way, and, convinced -that they were the victims of a concerted attack, took refuge in -Nisaea. By daybreak, the walls being now taken and the Megarians in -the city in great agitation, the persons who had negotiated with the -Athenians, supported by the rest of the popular party which was -privy to the plot, said that they ought to open the gates and march -out to battle. It had been concerted between them that the Athenians -should rush in, the moment that the gates were opened, while the -conspirators were to be distinguished from the rest by being -anointed with oil, and so to avoid being hurt. They could open the -gates with more security, as four thousand Athenian heavy infantry -from Eleusis, and six hundred horse, had marched all night, according -to agreement, and were now close at hand. The conspirators were all -ready anointed and at their posts by the gates, when one of their -accomplices denounced the plot to the opposite party, who gathered -together and came in a body, and roundly said that they must not march -out--a thing they had never yet ventured on even when in greater force -than at present--or wantonly compromise the safety of the town, and -that if what they said was not attended to, the battle would have to -be fought in Megara. For the rest, they gave no signs of their -knowledge of the intrigue, but stoutly maintained that their advice -was the best, and meanwhile kept close by and watched the gates, -making it impossible for the conspirators to effect their purpose. - -The Athenian generals seeing that some obstacle had arisen, and that -the capture of the town by force was no longer practicable, at once -proceeded to invest Nisaea, thinking that, if they could take it -before relief arrived, the surrender of Megara would soon follow. -Iron, stone-masons, and everything else required quickly coming up -from Athens, the Athenians started from the wall which they -occupied, and from this point built a cross wall looking towards -Megara down to the sea on either side of Nisaea; the ditch and the -walls being divided among the army, stones and bricks taken from the -suburb, and the fruit-trees and timber cut down to make a palisade -wherever this seemed necessary; the houses also in the suburb with the -addition of battlements sometimes entering into the fortification. The -whole of this day the work continued, and by the afternoon of the next -the wall was all but completed, when the garrison in Nisaea, alarmed -by the absolute want of provisions, which they used to take in for the -day from the upper town, not anticipating any speedy relief from the -Peloponnesians, and supposing Megara to be hostile, capitulated to the -Athenians on condition that they should give up their arms, and should -each be ransomed for a stipulated sum; their Lacedaemonian -commander, and any others of his countrymen in the place, being left -to the discretion of the Athenians. On these conditions they -surrendered and came out, and the Athenians broke down the long -walls at their point of junction with Megara, took possession of -Nisaea, and went on with their other preparations. - -Just at this time the Lacedaemonian Brasidas, son of Tellis, -happened to be in the neighbourhood of Sicyon and Corinth, getting -ready an army for Thrace. As soon as he heard of the capture of the -walls, fearing for the Peloponnesians in Nisaea and the safety of -Megara, he sent to the Boeotians to meet him as quickly as possible at -Tripodiscus, a village so called of the Megarid, under Mount Geraneia, -and went himself, with two thousand seven hundred Corinthian heavy -infantry, four hundred Phliasians, six hundred Sicyonians, and such -troops of his own as he had already levied, expecting to find Nisaea -not yet taken. Hearing of its fall (he had marched out by night to -Tripodiscus), he took three hundred picked men from the army, -without waiting till his coming should be known, and came up to Megara -unobserved by the Athenians, who were down by the sea, ostensibly, and -really if possible, to attempt Nisaea, but above all to get into -Megara and secure the town. He accordingly invited the townspeople -to admit his party, saying that he had hopes of recovering Nisaea. - -However, one of the Megarian factions feared that he might expel -them and restore the exiles; the other that the commons, -apprehensive of this very danger, might set upon them, and the city be -thus destroyed by a battle within its gates under the eyes of the -ambushed Athenians. He was accordingly refused admittance, both -parties electing to remain quiet and await the event; each expecting a -battle between the Athenians and the relieving army, and thinking it -safer to see their friends victorious before declaring in their -favour. - -Unable to carry his point, Brasidas went back to the rest of the -army. At daybreak the Boeotians joined him. Having determined to -relieve Megara, whose danger they considered their own, even before -hearing from Brasidas, they were already in full force at Plataea, -when his messenger arrived to add spurs to their resolution; and -they at once sent on to him two thousand two hundred heavy infantry, -and six hundred horse, returning home with the main body. The whole -army thus assembled numbered six thousand heavy infantry. The Athenian -heavy infantry were drawn up by Nisaea and the sea; but the light -troops being scattered over the plain were attacked by the Boeotian -horse and driven to the sea, being taken entirely by surprise, as on -previous occasions no relief had ever come to the Megarians from any -quarter. Here the Boeotians were in their turn charged and engaged -by the Athenian horse, and a cavalry action ensued which lasted a long -time, and in which both parties claimed the victory. The Athenians -killed and stripped the leader of the Boeotian horse and some few of -his comrades who had charged right up to Nisaea, and remaining masters -of the bodies gave them back under truce, and set up a trophy; but -regarding the action as a whole the forces separated without either -side having gained a decisive advantage, the Boeotians returning to -their army and the Athenians to Nisaea. - -After this Brasidas and the army came nearer to the sea and to -Megara, and taking up a convenient position, remained quiet in order -of battle, expecting to be attacked by the Athenians and knowing -that the Megarians were waiting to see which would be the victor. This -attitude seemed to present two advantages. Without taking the -offensive or willingly provoking the hazards of a battle, they -openly showed their readiness to fight, and thus without bearing the -burden of the day would fairly reap its honours; while at the same -time they effectually served their interests at Megara. For if they -had failed to show themselves they would not have had a chance, but -would have certainly been considered vanquished, and have lost the -town. As it was, the Athenians might possibly not be inclined to -accept their challenge, and their object would be attained without -fighting. And so it turned out. The Athenians formed outside the -long walls and, the enemy not attacking, there remained motionless; -their generals having decided that the risk was too unequal. In fact -most of their objects had been already attained; and they would have -to begin a battle against superior numbers, and if victorious could -only gain Megara, while a defeat would destroy the flower of their -heavy soldiery. For the enemy it was different; as even the states -actually represented in his army risked each only a part of its entire -force, he might well be more audacious. Accordingly, after waiting for -some time without either side attacking, the Athenians withdrew to -Nisaea, and the Peloponnesians after them to the point from which they -had set out. The friends of the Megarian exiles now threw aside -their hesitation, and opened the gates to Brasidas and the -commanders from the different states--looking upon him as the victor -and upon the Athenians as having declined the battle--and receiving -them into the town proceeded to discuss matters with them; the party -in correspondence with the Athenians being paralysed by the turn -things had taken. - -Afterwards Brasidas let the allies go home, and himself went back to -Corinth, to prepare for his expedition to Thrace, his original -destination. The Athenians also returning home, the Megarians in the -city most implicated in the Athenian negotiation, knowing that they -had been detected, presently disappeared; while the rest conferred -with the friends of the exiles, and restored the party at Pegae, after -binding them under solemn oaths to take no vengeance for the past, and -only to consult the real interests of the town. However, as soon as -they were in office, they held a review of the heavy infantry, and -separating the battalions, picked out about a hundred of their -enemies, and of those who were thought to be most involved in the -correspondence with the Athenians, brought them before the people, and -compelling the vote to be given openly, had them condemned and -executed, and established a close oligarchy in the town--a revolution -which lasted a very long while, although effected by a very few -partisans. - - - - -CHAPTER XIV - -_Eighth and Ninth Years of the War - Invasion of Boeotia - -Fall of Amphipolis - Brilliant Successes of Brasidas_ - -The same summer the Mitylenians were about to fortify Antandrus, -as they had intended, when Demodocus and Aristides, the commanders -of the Athenian squadron engaged in levying subsidies, heard on the -Hellespont of what was being done to the place (Lamachus their -colleague having sailed with ten ships into the Pontus) and -conceived fears of its becoming a second Anaia-the place in which -the Samian exiles had established themselves to annoy Samos, helping -the Peloponnesians by sending pilots to their navy, and keeping the -city in agitation and receiving all its outlaws. They accordingly -got together a force from the allies and set sail, defeated in -battle the troops that met them from Antandrus, and retook the -place. Not long after, Lamachus, who had sailed into the Pontus, -lost his ships at anchor in the river Calex, in the territory of -Heraclea, rain having fallen in the interior and the flood coming -suddenly down upon them; and himself and his troops passed by land -through the Bithynian Thracians on the Asiatic side, and arrived at -Chalcedon, the Megarian colony at the mouth of the Pontus. - -The same summer the Athenian general, Demosthenes, arrived at -Naupactus with forty ships immediately after the return from the -Megarid. Hippocrates and himself had had overtures made to them by -certain men in the cities in Boeotia, who wished to change the -constitution and introduce a democracy as at Athens; Ptoeodorus, a -Theban exile, being the chief mover in this intrigue. The seaport -town of Siphae, in the bay of Crisae, in the Thespian territory, was -to be betrayed to them by one party; Chaeronea (a dependency of what -was formerly called the Minyan, now the Boeotian, Orchomenus) to be -put into their hands by another from that town, whose exiles were -very active in the business, hiring men in Peloponnese. Some Phocians -also were in the plot, Chaeronea being the frontier town of Boeotia -and close to Phanotis in Phocia. Meanwhile the Athenians were to -seize Delium, the sanctuary of Apollo, in the territory of Tanagra -looking towards Euboea; and all these events were to take place -simultaneously upon a day appointed, in order that the Boeotians -might be unable to unite to oppose them at Delium, being everywhere -detained by disturbances at home. Should the enterprise succeed, and -Delium be fortified, its authors confidently expected that even if no -revolution should immediately follow in Boeotia, yet with these -places in their hands, and the country being harassed by incursions, -and a refuge in each instance near for the partisans engaged in them, -things would not remain as they were, but that the rebels being -supported by the Athenians and the forces of the oligarchs divided, -it would be possible after a while to settle matters according to -their wishes. - -Such was the plot in contemplation. Hippocrates with a force -raised at home awaited the proper moment to take the field against the -Boeotians; while he sent on Demosthenes with the forty ships above -mentioned to Naupactus, to raise in those parts an army of Acarnanians -and of the other allies, and sail and receive Siphae from the -conspirators; a day having been agreed on for the simultaneous -execution of both these operations. Demosthenes on his arrival found -Oeniadae already compelled by the united Acarnanians to join the -Athenian confederacy, and himself raising all the allies in those -countries marched against and subdued Salynthius and the Agraeans; -after which he devoted himself to the preparations necessary to enable -him to be at Siphae by the time appointed. - -About the same time in the summer, Brasidas set out on his march for -the Thracian places with seventeen hundred heavy infantry, and -arriving at Heraclea in Trachis, from thence sent on a messenger to -his friends at Pharsalus, to ask them to conduct himself and his -army through the country. Accordingly there came to Melitia in -Achaia Panaerus, Dorus, Hippolochidas, Torylaus, and Strophacus, the -Chalcidian proxenus, under whose escort he resumed his march, being -accompanied also by other Thessalians, among whom was Niconidas from -Larissa, a friend of Perdiccas. It was never very easy to traverse -Thessaly without an escort; and throughout all Hellas for an armed -force to pass without leave through a neighbour's country was a -delicate step to take. Besides this the Thessalian people had always -sympathized with the Athenians. Indeed if instead of the customary -close oligarchy there had been a constitutional government in -Thessaly, he would never have been able to proceed; since even as it -was, he was met on his march at the river Enipeus by certain of the -opposite party who forbade his further progress, and complained of his -making the attempt without the consent of the nation. To this his -escort answered that they had no intention of taking him through -against their will; they were only friends in attendance on an -unexpected visitor. Brasidas himself added that he came as a friend to -Thessaly and its inhabitants, his arms not being directed against them -but against the Athenians, with whom he was at war, and that although -he knew of no quarrel between the Thessalians and Lacedaemonians to -prevent the two nations having access to each other's territory, he -neither would nor could proceed against their wishes; he could only -beg them not to stop him. With this answer they went away, and he took -the advice of his escort, and pushed on without halting, before a -greater force might gather to prevent him. Thus in the day that he set -out from Melitia he performed the whole distance to Pharsalus, and -encamped on the river Apidanus; and so to Phacium and from thence to -Perrhaebia. Here his Thessalian escort went back, and the -Perrhaebians, who are subjects of Thessaly, set him down at Dium in -the dominions of Perdiccas, a Macedonian town under Mount Olympus, -looking towards Thessaly. - -In this way Brasidas hurried through Thessaly before any one could -be got ready to stop him, and reached Perdiccas and Chalcidice. The -departure of the army from Peloponnese had been procured by the -Thracian towns in revolt against Athens and by Perdiccas, alarmed at -the successes of the Athenians. The Chalcidians thought that they -would be the first objects of an Athenian expedition, not that the -neighbouring towns which had not yet revolted did not also secretly -join in the invitation; and Perdiccas also had his apprehensions on -account of his old quarrels with the Athenians, although not openly at -war with them, and above all wished to reduce Arrhabaeus, king of -the Lyncestians. It had been less difficult for them to get an army to -leave Peloponnese, because of the ill fortune of the Lacedaemonians at -the present moment. The attacks of the Athenians upon Peloponnese, and -in particular upon Laconia, might, it was hoped, be diverted most -effectually by annoying them in return, and by sending an army to -their allies, especially as they were willing to maintain it and asked -for it to aid them in revolting. The Lacedaemonians were also glad -to have an excuse for sending some of the Helots out of the country, -for fear that the present aspect of affairs and the occupation of -Pylos might encourage them to move. Indeed fear of their numbers and -obstinacy even persuaded the Lacedaemonians to the action which I -shall now relate, their policy at all times having been governed by -the necessity of taking precautions against them. The Helots were -invited by a proclamation to pick out those of their number who -claimed to have most distinguished themselves against the enemy, in -order that they might receive their freedom; the object being to -test them, as it was thought that the first to claim their freedom -would be the most high-spirited and the most apt to rebel. As many -as two thousand were selected accordingly, who crowned themselves -and went round the temples, rejoicing in their new freedom. The -Spartans, however, soon afterwards did away with them, and no one ever -knew how each of them perished. The Spartans now therefore gladly sent -seven hundred as heavy infantry with Brasidas, who recruited the -rest of his force by means of money in Peloponnese. - -Brasidas himself was sent out by the Lacedaemonians mainly at his -own desire, although the Chalcidians also were eager to have a man -so thorough as he had shown himself whenever there was anything to -be done at Sparta, and whose after-service abroad proved of the utmost -use to his country. At the present moment his just and moderate -conduct towards the towns generally succeeded in procuring their -revolt, besides the places which he managed to take by treachery; -and thus when the Lacedaemonians desired to treat, as they -ultimately did, they had places to offer in exchange, and the burden -of war meanwhile shifted from Peloponnese. Later on in the war, -after the events in Sicily, the present valour and conduct of -Brasidas, known by experience to some, by hearsay to others, was -what mainly created in the allies of Athens a feeling for the -Lacedaemonians. He was the first who went out and showed himself so -good a man at all points as to leave behind him the conviction that -the rest were like him. - -Meanwhile his arrival in the Thracian country no sooner became known -to the Athenians than they declared war against Perdiccas, whom they -regarded as the author of the expedition, and kept a closer watch on -their allies in that quarter. - -Upon the arrival of Brasidas and his army, Perdiccas immediately -started with them and with his own forces against Arrhabaeus, son of -Bromerus, king of the Lyncestian Macedonians, his neighbour, with whom -he had a quarrel and whom he wished to subdue. However, when he -arrived with his army and Brasidas at the pass leading into Lyncus, -Brasidas told him that before commencing hostilities he wished to go -and try to persuade Arrhabaeus to become the ally of Lacedaemon, -this latter having already made overtures intimating his willingness -to make Brasidas arbitrator between them, and the Chalcidian envoys -accompanying him having warned him not to remove the apprehensions -of Perdiccas, in order to ensure his greater zeal in their cause. -Besides, the envoys of Perdiccas had talked at Lacedaemon about his -bringing many of the places round him into alliance with them; and -thus Brasidas thought he might take a larger view of the question of -Arrhabaeus. Perdiccas however retorted that he had not brought him -with him to arbitrate in their quarrel, but to put down the enemies -whom he might point out to him; and that while he, Perdiccas, -maintained half his army it was a breach of faith for Brasidas to -parley with Arrhabaeus. Nevertheless Brasidas disregarded the wishes -of Perdiccas and held the parley in spite of him, and suffered himself -to be persuaded to lead off the army without invading the country of -Arrhabaeus; after which Perdiccas, holding that faith had not been -kept with him, contributed only a third instead of half of the support -of the army. - -The same summer, without loss of time, Brasidas marched with the -Chalcidians against Acanthus, a colony of the Andrians, a little -before vintage. The inhabitants were divided into two parties on the -question of receiving him; those who had joined the Chalcidians in -inviting him, and the popular party. However, fear for their fruit, -which was still out, enabled Brasidas to persuade the multitude to -admit him alone, and to hear what he had to say before making a -decision; and he was admitted accordingly and appeared before the -people, and not being a bad speaker for a Lacedaemonian, addressed -them as follows: - -"Acanthians, the Lacedaemonians have sent out me and my army to make -good the reason that we gave for the war when we began it, viz., -that we were going to war with the Athenians in order to free -Hellas. Our delay in coming has been caused by mistaken expectations -as to the war at home, which led us to hope, by our own unassisted -efforts and without your risking anything, to effect the speedy -downfall of the Athenians; and you must not blame us for this, as we -are now come the moment that we were able, prepared with your aid to -do our best to subdue them. Meanwhile I am astonished at finding -your gates shut against me, and at not meeting with a better -welcome. We Lacedaemonians thought of you as allies eager to have -us, to whom we should come in spirit even before we were with you in -body; and in this expectation undertook all the risks of a march of -many days through a strange country, so far did our zeal carry us. -It will be a terrible thing if after this you have other intentions, -and mean to stand in the way of your own and Hellenic freedom. It is -not merely that you oppose me yourselves; but wherever I may go people -will be less inclined to join me, on the score that you, to whom I -first came--an important town like Acanthus, and prudent men like the -Acanthians--refused to admit me. I shall have nothing to prove that -the reason which I advance is the true one; it will be said either -that there is something unfair in the freedom which I offer, or that -I am in insufficient force and unable to protect you against an -attack from Athens. Yet when I went with the army which I now have to -the relief of Nisaea, the Athenians did not venture to engage me -although in greater force than I; and it is not likely they will -ever send across sea against you an army as numerous as they had at -Nisaea. And for myself, I have come here not to hurt but to free the -Hellenes, witness the solemn oaths by which I have bound my government -that the allies that I may bring over shall be independent; and -besides my object in coming is not by force or fraud to obtain your -alliance, but to offer you mine to help you against your Athenian -masters. I protest, therefore, against any suspicions of my intentions -after the guarantees which I offer, and equally so against doubts of -my ability to protect you, and I invite you to join me without -hesitation. - -"Some of you may hang back because they have private enemies, and -fear that I may put the city into the hands of a party: none need be -more tranquil than they. I am not come here to help this party or -that; and I do not consider that I should be bringing you freedom in -any real sense, if I should disregard your constitution, and enslave -the many to the few or the few to the many. This would be heavier than -a foreign yoke; and we Lacedaemonians, instead of being thanked for -our pains, should get neither honour nor glory, but, contrariwise, -reproaches. The charges which strengthen our hands in the war -against the Athenians would on our own showing be merited by -ourselves, and more hateful in us than in those who make no -pretensions to honesty; as it is more disgraceful for persons of -character to take what they covet by fair-seeming fraud than by open -force; the one aggression having for its justification the might which -fortune gives, the other being simply a piece of clever roguery. A -matter which concerns us thus nearly we naturally look to most -jealously; and over and above the oaths that I have mentioned, what -stronger assurance can you have, when you see that our words, compared -with the actual facts, produce the necessary conviction that it is our -interest to act as we say? - -"If to these considerations of mine you put in the plea of -inability, and claim that your friendly feeling should save you from -being hurt by your refusal; if you say that freedom, in your -opinion, is not without its dangers, and that it is right to offer -it to those who can accept it, but not to force it on any against -their will, then I shall take the gods and heroes of your country to -witness that I came for your good and was rejected, and shall do my -best to compel you by laying waste your land. I shall do so without -scruple, being justified by the necessity which constrains me, -first, to prevent the Lacedaemonians from being damaged by you, -their friends, in the event of your nonadhesion, through the moneys -that you pay to the Athenians; and secondly, to prevent the Hellenes -from being hindered by you in shaking off their servitude. Otherwise -indeed we should have no right to act as we propose; except in the -name of some public interest, what call should we Lacedaemonians -have to free those who do not wish it? Empire we do not aspire to: -it is what we are labouring to put down; and we should wrong the -greater number if we allowed you to stand in the way of the -independence that we offer to all. Endeavour, therefore, to decide -wisely, and strive to begin the work of liberation for the Hellenes, -and lay up for yourselves endless renown, while you escape private -loss, and cover your commonwealth with glory." - -Such were the words of Brasidas. The Acanthians, after much had been -said on both sides of the question, gave their votes in secret, and -the majority, influenced by the seductive arguments of Brasidas and by -fear for their fruit, decided to revolt from Athens; not however -admitting the army until they had taken his personal security for -the oaths sworn by his government before they sent him out, assuring -the independence of the allies whom he might bring over. Not long -after, Stagirus, a colony of the Andrians, followed their example -and revolted. - -Such were the events of this summer. It was in the first days of the -winter following that the places in Boeotia were to be put into the -hands of the Athenian generals, Hippocrates and Demosthenes, the -latter of whom was to go with his ships to Siphae, the former to -Delium. A mistake, however, was made in the days on which they were -each to start; and Demosthenes, sailing first to Siphae, with the -Acarnanians and many of the allies from those parts on board, failed -to effect anything, through the plot having been betrayed by -Nicomachus, a Phocian from Phanotis, who told the Lacedaemonians, -and they the Boeotians. Succours accordingly flocked in from all parts -of Boeotia, Hippocrates not being yet there to make his diversion, and -Siphae and Chaeronea were promptly secured, and the conspirators, -informed of the mistake, did not venture on any movement in the towns. - -Meanwhile Hippocrates made a levy in mass of the citizens, -resident aliens, and foreigners in Athens, and arrived at his -destination after the Boeotians had already come back from Siphae, and -encamping his army began to fortify Delium, the sanctuary of Apollo, -in the following manner. A trench was dug all round the temple and the -consecrated ground, and the earth thrown up from the excavation was -made to do duty as a wall, in which stakes were also planted, the -vines round the sanctuary being cut down and thrown in, together -with stones and bricks pulled down from the houses near; every -means, in short, being used to run up the rampart. Wooden towers -were also erected where they were wanted, and where there was no -part of the temple buildings left standing, as on the side where the -gallery once existing had fallen in. The work was begun on the third -day after leaving home, and continued during the fourth, and till -dinnertime on the fifth, when most of it being now finished the army -removed from Delium about a mile and a quarter on its way home. From -this point most of the light troops went straight on, while the -heavy infantry halted and remained where they were; Hippocrates having -stayed behind at Delium to arrange the posts, and to give directions -for the completion of such part of the outworks as had been left -unfinished. - -During the days thus employed the Boeotians were mustering at -Tanagra, and by the time that they had come in from all the towns, -found the Athenians already on their way home. The rest of the -eleven Boeotarchs were against giving battle, as the enemy was no -longer in Boeotia, the Athenians being just over the Oropian border, -when they halted; but Pagondas, son of Aeolidas, one of the Boeotarchs -of Thebes (Arianthides, son of Lysimachidas, being the other), and -then commander-in-chief, thought it best to hazard a battle. He -accordingly called the men to him, company after company, to prevent -their all leaving their arms at once, and urged them to attack the -Athenians, and stand the issue of a battle, speaking as follows: - -"Boeotians, the idea that we ought not to give battle to the -Athenians, unless we came up with them in Boeotia, is one which should -never have entered into the head of any of us, your generals. It was -to annoy Boeotia that they crossed the frontier and built a fort in -our country; and they are therefore, I imagine, our enemies wherever -we may come up with them, and from wheresoever they may have come to -act as enemies do. And if any one has taken up with the idea in -question for reasons of safety, it is high time for him to change -his mind. The party attacked, whose own country is in danger, can -scarcely discuss what is prudent with the calmness of men who are in -full enjoyment of what they have got, and are thinking of attacking -a neighbour in order to get more. It is your national habit, in your -country or out of it, to oppose the same resistance to a foreign -invader; and when that invader is Athenian, and lives upon your -frontier besides, it is doubly imperative to do so. As between -neighbours generally, freedom means simply a determination to hold -one's own; and with neighbours like these, who are trying to enslave -near and far alike, there is nothing for it but to fight it out to the -last. Look at the condition of the Euboeans and of most of the rest of -Hellas, and be convinced that others have to fight with their -neighbours for this frontier or that, but that for us conquest means -one frontier for the whole country, about which no dispute can be -made, for they will simply come and take by force what we have. So -much more have we to fear from this neighbour than from another. -Besides, people who, like the Athenians in the present instance, are -tempted by pride of strength to attack their neighbours, usually march -most confidently against those who keep still, and only defend -themselves in their own country, but think twice before they grapple -with those who meet them outside their frontier and strike the first -blow if opportunity offers. The Athenians have shown us this -themselves; the defeat which we inflicted upon them at Coronea, at the -time when our quarrels had allowed them to occupy the country, has -given great security to Boeotia until the present day. Remembering -this, the old must equal their ancient exploits, and the young, the -sons of the heroes of that time, must endeavour not to disgrace -their native valour; and trusting in the help of the god whose -temple has been sacrilegiously fortified, and in the victims which -in our sacrifices have proved propitious, we must march against the -enemy, and teach him that he must go and get what he wants by -attacking someone who will not resist him, but that men whose glory it -is to be always ready to give battle for the liberty of their own -country, and never unjustly to enslave that of others, will not let -him go without a struggle." - -By these arguments Pagondas persuaded the Boeotians to attack the -Athenians, and quickly breaking up his camp led his army forward, it -being now late in the day. On nearing the enemy, he halted in a -position where a hill intervening prevented the two armies from seeing -each other, and then formed and prepared for action. Meanwhile -Hippocrates at Delium, informed of the approach of the Boeotians, sent -orders to his troops to throw themselves into line, and himself joined -them not long afterwards, leaving about three hundred horse behind him -at Delium, at once to guard the place in case of attack, and to -watch their opportunity and fall upon the Boeotians during the battle. -The Boeotians placed a detachment to deal with these, and when -everything was arranged to their satisfaction appeared over the -hill, and halted in the order which they had determined on, to the -number of seven thousand heavy infantry, more than ten thousand -light troops, one thousand horse, and five hundred targeteers. On -their right were the Thebans and those of their province, in the -centre the Haliartians, Coronaeans, Copaeans, and the other people -around the lake, and on the left the Thespians, Tanagraeans, and -Orchomenians, the cavalry and the light troops being at the -extremity of each wing. The Thebans formed twenty-five shields deep, -the rest as they pleased. Such was the strength and disposition of the -Boeotian army. - -On the side of the Athenians, the heavy infantry throughout the -whole army formed eight deep, being in numbers equal to the enemy, -with the cavalry upon the two wings. Light troops regularly armed -there were none in the army, nor had there ever been any at Athens. -Those who had joined in the invasion, though many times more -numerous than those of the enemy, had mostly followed unarmed, as part -of the levy in mass of the citizens and foreigners at Athens, and -having started first on their way home were not present in any number. -The armies being now in line and upon the point of engaging, -Hippocrates, the general, passed along the Athenian ranks, and -encouraged them as follows: - -"Athenians, I shall only say a few words to you, but brave men -require no more, and they are addressed more to your understanding -than to your courage. None of you must fancy that we are going out -of our way to run this risk in the country of another. Fought in their -territory the battle will be for ours: if we conquer, the -Peloponnesians will never invade your country without the Boeotian -horse, and in one battle you will win Boeotia and in a manner free -Attica. Advance to meet them then like citizens of a country in -which you all glory as the first in Hellas, and like sons of the -fathers who beat them at Oenophyta with Myronides and thus gained -possession of Boeotia." - -Hippocrates had got half through the army with his exhortation, when -the Boeotians, after a few more hasty words from Pagondas, struck up -the paean, and came against them from the hill; the Athenians -advancing to meet them, and closing at a run. The extreme wing of -neither army came into action, one like the other being stopped by the -water-courses in the way; the rest engaged with the utmost -obstinacy, shield against shield. The Boeotian left, as far as the -centre, was worsted by the Athenians. The Thespians in that part of -the field suffered most severely. The troops alongside them having -given way, they were surrounded in a narrow space and cut down -fighting hand to hand; some of the Athenians also fell into -confusion in surrounding the enemy and mistook and so killed each -other. In this part of the field the Boeotians were beaten, and -retreated upon the troops still fighting; but the right, where the -Thebans were, got the better of the Athenians and shoved them -further and further back, though gradually at first. It so happened -also that Pagondas, seeing the distress of his left, had sent two -squadrons of horse, where they could not be seen, round the hill, -and their sudden appearance struck a panic into the victorious wing of -the Athenians, who thought that it was another army coming against -them. At length in both parts of the field, disturbed by this panic, -and with their line broken by the advancing Thebans, the whole -Athenian army took to flight. Some made for Delium and the sea, some -for Oropus, others for Mount Parnes, or wherever they had hopes of -safety, pursued and cut down by the Boeotians, and in particular by -the cavalry, composed partly of Boeotians and partly of Locrians, -who had come up just as the rout began. Night however coming on to -interrupt the pursuit, the mass of the fugitives escaped more easily -than they would otherwise have done. The next day the troops at Oropus -and Delium returned home by sea, after leaving a garrison in the -latter place, which they continued to hold notwithstanding the defeat. - -The Boeotians set up a trophy, took up their own dead, and -stripped those of the enemy, and leaving a guard over them retired -to Tanagra, there to take measures for attacking Delium. Meanwhile a -herald came from the Athenians to ask for the dead, but was met and -turned back by a Boeotian herald, who told him that he would effect -nothing until the return of himself the Boeotian herald, and who -then went on to the Athenians, and told them on the part of the -Boeotians that they had done wrong in transgressing the law of the -Hellenes. Of what use was the universal custom protecting the -temples in an invaded country, if the Athenians were to fortify Delium -and live there, acting exactly as if they were on unconsecrated -ground, and drawing and using for their purposes the water which they, -the Boeotians, never touched except for sacred uses? Accordingly for -the god as well as for themselves, in the name of the deities -concerned, and of Apollo, the Boeotians invited them first to evacuate -the temple, if they wished to take up the dead that belonged to them. - -After these words from the herald, the Athenians sent their own -herald to the Boeotians to say that they had not done any wrong to the -temple, and for the future would do it no more harm than they could -help; not having occupied it originally in any such design, but to -defend themselves from it against those who were really wronging them. -The law of the Hellenes was that conquest of a country, whether more -or less extensive, carried with it possession of the temples in that -country, with the obligation to keep up the usual ceremonies, at least -as far as possible. The Boeotians and most other people who had turned -out the owners of a country, and put themselves in their places by -force, now held as of right the temples which they originally -entered as usurpers. If the Athenians could have conquered more of -Boeotia this would have been the case with them: as things stood, -the piece of it which they had got they should treat as their own, and -not quit unless obliged. The water they had disturbed under the -impulsion of a necessity which they had not wantonly incurred, -having been forced to use it in defending themselves against the -Boeotians who first invaded Attica. Besides, anything done under the -pressure of war and danger might reasonably claim indulgence even in -the eye of the god; or why, pray, were the altars the asylum for -involuntary offences? Transgression also was a term applied to -presumptuous offenders, not to the victims of adverse circumstances. -In short, which were most impious--the Boeotians who wished to barter -dead bodies for holy places, or the Athenians who refused to give up -holy places to obtain what was theirs by right? The condition of -evacuating Boeotia must therefore be withdrawn. They were no longer in -Boeotia. They stood where they stood by the right of the sword. All -that the Boeotians had to do was to tell them to take up their dead -under a truce according to the national custom. - -The Boeotians replied that if they were in Boeotia, they must -evacuate that country before taking up their dead; if they were in -their own territory, they could do as they pleased: for they knew -that, although the Oropid where the bodies as it chanced were lying -(the battle having been fought on the borders) was subject to -Athens, yet the Athenians could not get them without their leave. -Besides, why should they grant a truce for Athenian ground? And what -could be fairer than to tell them to evacuate Boeotia if they wished -to get what they asked? The Athenian herald accordingly returned -with this answer, without having accomplished his object. - -Meanwhile the Boeotians at once sent for darters and slingers from -the Malian Gulf, and with two thousand Corinthian heavy infantry who -had joined them after the battle, the Peloponnesian garrison which had -evacuated Nisaea, and some Megarians with them, marched against -Delium, and attacked the fort, and after divers efforts finally -succeeded in taking it by an engine of the following description. They -sawed in two and scooped out a great beam from end to end, and fitting -it nicely together again like a pipe, hung by chains a cauldron at one -extremity, with which communicated an iron tube projecting from the -beam, which was itself in great part plated with iron. This they -brought up from a distance upon carts to the part of the wall -principally composed of vines and timber, and when it was near, -inserted huge bellows into their end of the beam and blew with them. -The blast passing closely confined into the cauldron, which was filled -with lighted coals, sulphur and pitch, made a great blaze, and set -fire to the wall, which soon became untenable for its defenders, who -left it and fled; and in this way the fort was taken. Of the -garrison some were killed and two hundred made prisoners; most of -the rest got on board their ships and returned home. - -Soon after the fall of Delium, which took place seventeen days after -the battle, the Athenian herald, without knowing what had happened, -came again for the dead, which were now restored by the Boeotians, who -no longer answered as at first. Not quite five hundred Boeotians -fell in the battle, and nearly one thousand Athenians, including -Hippocrates the general, besides a great number of light troops and -camp followers. - -Soon after this battle Demosthenes, after the failure of his -voyage to Siphae and of the plot on the town, availed himself of the -Acarnanian and Agraean troops and of the four hundred Athenian heavy -infantry which he had on board, to make a descent on the Sicyonian -coast. Before however all his ships had come to shore, the -Sicyonians came up and routed and chased to their ships those that had -landed, killing some and taking others prisoners; after which they set -up a trophy, and gave back the dead under truce. - -About the same time with the affair of Delium took place the death -of Sitalces, king of the Odrysians, who was defeated in battle, in a -campaign against the Triballi; Seuthes, son of Sparadocus, his nephew, -succeeding to the kingdom of the Odrysians, and of the rest of -Thrace ruled by Sitalces. - -The same winter Brasidas, with his allies in the Thracian places, -marched against Amphipolis, the Athenian colony on the river -Strymon. A settlement upon the spot on which the city now stands was -before attempted by Aristagoras, the Milesian (when he fled from -King Darius), who was however dislodged by the Edonians; and -thirty-two years later by the Athenians, who sent thither ten thousand -settlers of their own citizens, and whoever else chose to go. These -were cut off at Drabescus by the Thracians. Twenty-nine years after, -the Athenians returned (Hagnon, son of Nicias, being sent out as -leader of the colony) and drove out the Edonians, and founded a town -on the spot, formerly called Ennea Hodoi or Nine Ways. The base from -which they started was Eion, their commercial seaport at the mouth -of the river, not more than three miles from the present town, which -Hagnon named Amphipolis, because the Strymon flows round it on two -sides, and he built it so as to be conspicuous from the sea and land -alike, running a long wall across from river to river, to complete the -circumference. - -Brasidas now marched against this town, starting from Arne in -Chalcidice. Arriving about dusk at Aulon and Bromiscus, where the lake -of Bolbe runs into the sea, he supped there, and went on during the -night. The weather was stormy and it was snowing a little, which -encouraged him to hurry on, in order, if possible, to take every one -at Amphipolis by surprise, except the party who were to betray it. The -plot was carried on by some natives of Argilus, an Andrian colony, -residing in Amphipolis, where they had also other accomplices gained -over by Perdiccas or the Chalcidians. But the most active in the -matter were the inhabitants of Argilus itself, which is close by, -who had always been suspected by the Athenians, and had had designs on -the place. These men now saw their opportunity arrive with Brasidas, -and having for some time been in correspondence with their -countrymen in Amphipolis for the betrayal of the town, at once -received him into Argilus, and revolted from the Athenians, and that -same night took him on to the bridge over the river; where he found -only a small guard to oppose him, the town being at some distance from -the passage, and the walls not reaching down to it as at present. This -guard he easily drove in, partly through there being treason in -their ranks, partly from the stormy state of the weather and the -suddenness of his attack, and so got across the bridge, and -immediately became master of all the property outside; the -Amphipolitans having houses all over the quarter. - -The passage of Brasidas was a complete surprise to the people in the -town; and the capture of many of those outside, and the flight of -the rest within the wall, combined to produce great confusion among -the citizens; especially as they did not trust one another. It is even -said that if Brasidas, instead of stopping to pillage, had advanced -straight against the town, he would probably have taken it. In fact, -however, he established himself where he was and overran the country -outside, and for the present remained inactive, vainly awaiting a -demonstration on the part of his friends within. Meanwhile the party -opposed to the traitors proved numerous enough to prevent the gates -being immediately thrown open, and in concert with Eucles, the -general, who had come from Athens to defend the place, sent to the -other commander in Thrace, Thucydides, son of Olorus, the author of -this history, who was at the isle of Thasos, a Parian colony, half a -day's sail from Amphipolis, to tell him to come to their relief. On -receipt of this message he at once set sail with seven ships which -he had with him, in order, if possible, to reach Amphipolis in time to -prevent its capitulation, or in any case to save Eion. - -Meanwhile Brasidas, afraid of succours arriving by sea from -Thasos, and learning that Thucydides possessed the right of working -the gold mines in that part of Thrace, and had thus great influence -with the inhabitants of the continent, hastened to gain the town, if -possible, before the people of Amphipolis should be encouraged by -his arrival to hope that he could save them by getting together a -force of allies from the sea and from Thrace, and so refuse to -surrender. He accordingly offered moderate terms, proclaiming that any -of the Amphipolitans and Athenians who chose, might continue to -enjoy their property with full rights of citizenship; while those -who did not wish to stay had five days to depart, taking their -property with them. - -The bulk of the inhabitants, upon hearing this, began to change -their minds, especially as only a small number of the citizens were -Athenians, the majority having come from different quarters, and -many of the prisoners outside had relations within the walls. They -found the proclamation a fair one in comparison of what their fear had -suggested; the Athenians being glad to go out, as they thought they -ran more risk than the rest, and further, did not expect any speedy -relief, and the multitude generally being content at being left in -possession of their civic rights, and at such an unexpected reprieve -from danger. The partisans of Brasidas now openly advocated this -course, seeing that the feeling of the people had changed, and that -they no longer gave ear to the Athenian general present; and thus -the surrender was made and Brasidas was admitted by them on the -terms of his proclamation. In this way they gave up the city, and late -in the same day Thucydides and his ships entered the harbour of -Eion, Brasidas having just got hold of Amphipolis, and having been -within a night of taking Eion: had the ships been less prompt in -relieving it, in the morning it would have been his. - -After this Thucydides put all in order at Eion to secure it -against any present or future attack of Brasidas, and received such as -had elected to come there from the interior according to the terms -agreed on. Meanwhile Brasidas suddenly sailed with a number of boats -down the river to Eion to see if he could not seize the point -running out from the wall, and so command the entrance; at the same -time he attempted it by land, but was beaten off on both sides and had -to content himself with arranging matters at Amphipolis and in the -neighbourhood. Myrcinus, an Edonian town, also came over to him; the -Edonian king Pittacus having been killed by the sons of Goaxis and his -own wife Brauro; and Galepsus and Oesime, which are Thasian -colonies, not long after followed its example. Perdiccas too came up -immediately after the capture and joined in these arrangements. - -The news that Amphipolis was in the hands of the enemy caused -great alarm at Athens. Not only was the town valuable for the timber -it afforded for shipbuilding, and the money that it brought in; but -also, although the escort of the Thessalians gave the Lacedaemonians a -means of reaching the allies of Athens as far as the Strymon, yet as -long as they were not masters of the bridge but were watched on the -side of Eion by the Athenian galleys, and on the land side impeded -by a large and extensive lake formed by the waters of the river, it -was impossible for them to go any further. Now, on the contrary, the -path seemed open. There was also the fear of the allies revolting, -owing to the moderation displayed by Brasidas in all his conduct, -and to the declarations which he was everywhere making that he sent -out to free Hellas. The towns subject to the Athenians, hearing of the -capture of Amphipolis and of the terms accorded to it, and of the -gentleness of Brasidas, felt most strongly encouraged to change -their condition, and sent secret messages to him, begging him to -come on to them; each wishing to be the first to revolt. Indeed -there seemed to be no danger in so doing; their mistake in their -estimate of the Athenian power was as great as that power afterwards -turned out to be, and their judgment was based more upon blind wishing -than upon any sound prevision; for it is a habit of mankind to entrust -to careless hope what they long for, and to use sovereign reason to -thrust aside what they do not fancy. Besides the late severe blow -which the Athenians had met with in Boeotia, joined to the -seductive, though untrue, statements of Brasidas, about the -Athenians not having ventured to engage his single army at Nisaea, -made the allies confident, and caused them to believe that no Athenian -force would be sent against them. Above all the wish to do what was -agreeable at the moment, and the likelihood that they should find -the Lacedaemonians full of zeal at starting, made them eager to -venture. Observing this, the Athenians sent garrisons to the different -towns, as far as was possible at such short notice and in winter; -while Brasidas sent dispatches to Lacedaemon asking for -reinforcements, and himself made preparations for building galleys -in the Strymon. The Lacedaemonians however did not send him any, -partly through envy on the part of their chief men, partly because -they were more bent on recovering the prisoners of the island and -ending the war. - -The same winter the Megarians took and razed to the foundations -the long walls which had been occupied by the Athenians; and -Brasidas after the capture of Amphipolis marched with his allies -against Acte, a promontory running out from the King's dike with an -inward curve, and ending in Athos, a lofty mountain looking towards -the Aegean Sea. In it are various towns, Sane, an Andrian colony, -close to the canal, and facing the sea in the direction of Euboea; the -others being Thyssus, Cleone, Acrothoi, Olophyxus, and Dium, inhabited -by mixed barbarian races speaking the two languages. There is also a -small Chalcidian element; but the greater number are -Tyrrheno-Pelasgians once settled in Lemnos and Athens, and Bisaltians, -Crestonians, and Edonians; the towns being all small ones. Most of -these came over to Brasidas; but Sane and Dium held out and saw -their land ravaged by him and his army. - -Upon their not submitting, he at once marched against Torone in -Chalcidice, which was held by an Athenian garrison, having been -invited by a few persons who were prepared to hand over the town. -Arriving in the dark a little before daybreak, he sat down with his -army near the temple of the Dioscuri, rather more than a quarter of -a mile from the city. The rest of the town of Torone and the Athenians -in garrison did not perceive his approach; but his partisans knowing -that he was coming (a few of them had secretly gone out to meet him) -were on the watch for his arrival, and were no sooner aware of it than -they took it to them seven light-armed men with daggers, who alone -of twenty men ordered on this service dared to enter, commanded by -Lysistratus an Olynthian. These passed through the sea wall, and -without being seen went up and put to the sword the garrison of the -highest post in the town, which stands on a hill, and broke open the -postern on the side of Canastraeum. - -Brasidas meanwhile came a little nearer and then halted with his -main body, sending on one hundred targeteers to be ready to rush in -first, the moment that a gate should be thrown open and the beacon -lighted as agreed. After some time passed in waiting and wondering -at the delay, the targeteers by degrees got up close to the town. -The Toronaeans inside at work with the party that had entered had by -this time broken down the postern and opened the gates leading to -the market-place by cutting through the bar, and first brought some -men round and let them in by the postern, in order to strike a panic -into the surprised townsmen by suddenly attacking them from behind and -on both sides at once; after which they raised the fire-signal as -had been agreed, and took in by the market gates the rest of the -targeteers. - -Brasidas seeing the signal told the troops to rise, and dashed -forward amid the loud hurrahs of his men, which carried dismay among -the astonished townspeople. Some burst in straight by the gate, others -over some square pieces of timber placed against the wall (which has -fallen down and was being rebuilt) to draw up stones; Brasidas and the -greater number making straight uphill for the higher part of the town, -in order to take it from top to bottom, and once for all, while the -rest of the multitude spread in all directions. - -The capture of the town was effected before the great body of the -Toronaeans had recovered from their surprise and confusion; but the -conspirators and the citizens of their party at once joined the -invaders. About fifty of the Athenian heavy infantry happened to be -sleeping in the market-place when the alarm reached them. A few of -these were killed fighting; the rest escaped, some by land, others -to the two ships on the station, and took refuge in Lecythus, a fort -garrisoned by their own men in the corner of the town running out into -the sea and cut off by a narrow isthmus; where they were joined by the -Toronaeans of their party. - -Day now arrived, and the town being secured, Brasidas made a -proclamation to the Toronaeans who had taken refuge with the -Athenians, to come out, as many as chose, to their homes without -fearing for their rights or persons, and sent a herald to invite the -Athenians to accept a truce, and to evacuate Lecythus with their -property, as being Chalcidian ground. The Athenians refused this -offer, but asked for a truce for a day to take up their dead. Brasidas -granted it for two days, which he employed in fortifying the houses -near, and the Athenians in doing the same to their positions. -Meanwhile he called a meeting of the Toronaeans, and said very much -what he had said at Acanthus, namely, that they must not look upon -those who had negotiated with him for the capture of the town as bad -men or as traitors, as they had not acted as they had done from -corrupt motives or in order to enslave the city, but for the good -and freedom of Torone; nor again must those who had not shared in -the enterprise fancy that they would not equally reap its fruits, as -he had not come to destroy either city or individual. This was the -reason of his proclamation to those that had fled for refuge to the -Athenians: he thought none the worse of them for their friendship -for the Athenians; he believed that they had only to make trial of the -Lacedaemonians to like them as well, or even much better, as acting -much more justly: it was for want of such a trial that they were now -afraid of them. Meanwhile he warned all of them to prepare to be -staunch allies, and for being held responsible for all faults in -future: for the past, they had not wronged the Lacedaemonians but -had been wronged by others who were too strong for them, and any -opposition that they might have offered him could be excused. - -Having encouraged them with this address, as soon as the truce -expired he made his attack upon Lecythus; the Athenians defending -themselves from a poor wall and from some houses with parapets. One -day they beat him off; the next the enemy were preparing to bring up -an engine against them from which they meant to throw fire upon the -wooden defences, and the troops were already coming up to the point -where they fancied they could best bring up the engine, and where -place was most assailable; meanwhile the Athenians put a wooden -tower upon a house opposite, and carried up a quantity of jars and -casks of water and big stones, and a large number of men also -climbed up. The house thus laden too heavily suddenly broke down -with a loud crash; at which the men who were near and saw it were more -vexed than frightened; but those not so near, and still more those -furthest off, thought that the place was already taken at that -point, and fled in haste to the sea and the ships. - -Brasidas, perceiving that they were deserting the parapet, and -seeing what was going on, dashed forward with his troops, and -immediately took the fort, and put to the sword all whom he found in -it. In this way the place was evacuated by the Athenians, who went -across in their boats and ships to Pallene. Now there is a temple of -Athene in Lecythus, and Brasidas had proclaimed in the moment of -making the assault that he would give thirty silver minae to the man -first on the wall. Being now of opinion that the capture was -scarcely due to human means, he gave the thirty minae to the goddess -for her temple, and razed and cleared Lecythus, and made the whole -of it consecrated ground. The rest of the winter he spent in -settling the places in his hands, and in making designs upon the rest; -and with the expiration of the winter the eighth year of this war -ended. - -In the spring of the summer following, the Lacedaemonians and -Athenians made an armistice for a year; the Athenians thinking that -they would thus have full leisure to take their precautions before -Brasidas could procure the revolt of any more of their towns, and -might also, if it suited them, conclude a general peace; the -Lacedaemonians divining the actual fears of the Athenians, and -thinking that after once tasting a respite from trouble and misery -they would be more disposed to consent to a reconciliation, and to -give back the prisoners, and make a treaty for the longer period. -The great idea of the Lacedaemonians was to get back their men while -Brasidas's good fortune lasted: further successes might make the -struggle a less unequal one in Chalcidice, but would leave them -still deprived of their men, and even in Chalcidice not more than a -match for the Athenians and by no means certain of victory. An -armistice was accordingly concluded by Lacedaemon and her allies -upon the terms following: - -1. As to the temple and oracle of the Pythian Apollo, we are -agreed that whosoever will shall have access to it, without fraud or -fear, according to the usages of his forefathers. The Lacedaemonians -and the allies present agree to this, and promise to send heralds to -the Boeotians and Phocians, and to do their best to persuade them to -agree likewise. - -2. As to the treasure of the god, we agree to exert ourselves to -detect all malversators, truly and honestly following the customs of -our forefathers, we and you and all others willing to do so, all -following the customs of our forefathers. As to these points the -Lacedaemonians and the other allies are agreed as has been said. - -3. As to what follows, the Lacedaemonians and the other allies -agree, if the Athenians conclude a treaty, to remain, each of us in -our own territory, retaining our respective acquisitions: the garrison -in Coryphasium keeping within Buphras and Tomeus: that in Cythera -attempting no communication with the Peloponnesian confederacy, -neither we with them, nor they with us: that in Nisaea and Minoa not -crossing the road leading from the gates of the temple of Nisus to -that of Poseidon and from thence straight to the bridge at Minoa: -the Megarians and the allies being equally bound not to cross this -road, and the Athenians retaining the island they have taken, -without any communication on either side: as to Troezen, each side -retaining what it has, and as was arranged with the Athenians. - -4. As to the use of the sea, so far as refers to their own coast -and to that of their confederacy, that the Lacedaemonians and their -allies may voyage upon it in any vessel rowed by oars and of not -more than five hundred talents tonnage, not a vessel of war. - -5. That all heralds and embassies, with as many attendants as they -please, for concluding the war and adjusting claims, shall have free -passage, going and coming, to Peloponnese or Athens by land and by -sea. - -6. That during the truce, deserters whether bond or free shall -be received neither by you, nor by us. - -7. Further, that satisfaction shall be given by you to us and by -us to you according to the public law of our several countries, all -disputes being settled by law without recourse to hostilities. - -The Lacedaemonians and allies agree to these articles; but if -you have anything fairer or juster to suggest, come to Lacedaemon -and let us know: whatever shall be just will meet with no objection -either from the Lacedaemonians or from the allies. Only let those -who come come with full powers, as you desire us. The truce shall be -for one year. - -Approved by the people. - -The tribe of Acamantis had the prytany, Phoenippus was -secretary, Niciades chairman. Laches moved, in the name of the good -luck of the Athenians, that they should conclude the armistice upon -the terms agreed upon by the Lacedaemonians and the allies. It was -agreed accordingly in the popular assembly that the armistice should -be for one year, beginning that very day, the fourteenth of the -month of Elaphebolion; during which time ambassadors and heralds -should go and come between the two countries to discuss the bases of a -pacification. That the generals and prytanes should call an assembly -of the people, in which the Athenians should first consult on the -peace, and on the mode in which the embassy for putting an end to -the war should be admitted. That the embassy now present should at -once take the engagement before the people to keep well and truly this -truce for one year. - -On these terms the Lacedaemonians concluded with the Athenians and -their allies on the twelfth day of the Spartan month Gerastius; the -allies also taking the oaths. Those who concluded and poured the -libation were Taurus, son of Echetimides, Athenaeus, son of -Pericleidas, and Philocharidas, son of Eryxidaidas, Lacedaemonians; -Aeneas, son of Ocytus, and Euphamidas, son of Aristonymus, -Corinthians; Damotimus, son of Naucrates, and Onasimus, son of -Megacles, Sicyonians; Nicasus, son of Cecalus, and Menecrates, son -of Amphidorus, Megarians; and Amphias, son of Eupaidas, an Epidaurian; -and the Athenian generals Nicostratus, son of Diitrephes, Nicias, -son of Niceratus, and Autocles, son of Tolmaeus. Such was the -armistice, and during the whole of it conferences went on on the -subject of a pacification. - -In the days in which they were going backwards and forwards to these -conferences, Scione, a town in Pallene, revolted from Athens, and went -over to Brasidas. The Scionaeans say that they are Pallenians from -Peloponnese, and that their first founders on their voyage from Troy -were carried in to this spot by the storm which the Achaeans were -caught in, and there settled. The Scionaeans had no sooner revolted -than Brasidas crossed over by night to Scione, with a friendly -galley ahead and himself in a small boat some way behind; his idea -being that if he fell in with a vessel larger than the boat he would -have the galley to defend him, while a ship that was a match for the -galley would probably neglect the small vessel to attack the large -one, and thus leave him time to escape. His passage effected, he -called a meeting of the Scionaeans and spoke to the same effect as -at Acanthus and Torone, adding that they merited the utmost -commendation, in that, in spite of Pallene within the isthmus being -cut off by the Athenian occupation of Potidaea and of their own -practically insular position, they had of their own free will gone -forward to meet their liberty instead of timorously waiting until they -had been by force compelled to their own manifest good. This was a -sign that they would valiantly undergo any trial, however great; and -if he should order affairs as he intended, he should count them -among the truest and sincerest friends of the Lacedaemonians, and -would in every other way honour them. - -The Scionaeans were elated by his language, and even those who had -at first disapproved of what was being done catching the general -confidence, they determined on a vigorous conduct of the war, and -welcomed Brasidas with all possible honours, publicly crowning him -with a crown of gold as the liberator of Hellas; while private persons -crowded round him and decked him with garlands as though he had been -an athlete. Meanwhile Brasidas left them a small garrison for the -present and crossed back again, and not long afterwards sent over a -larger force, intending with the help of the Scionaeans to attempt -Mende and Potidaea before the Athenians should arrive; Scione, he -felt, being too like an island for them not to relieve it. He had -besides intelligence in the above towns about their betrayal. - -In the midst of his designs upon the towns in question, a galley -arrived with the commissioners carrying round the news of the -armistice, Aristonymus for the Athenians and Athenaeus for the -Lacedaemonians. The troops now crossed back to Torone, and the -commissioners gave Brasidas notice of the convention. All the -Lacedaemonian allies in Thrace accepted what had been done; and -Aristonymus made no difficulty about the rest, but finding, on -counting the days, that the Scionaeans had revolted after the date -of the convention, refused to include them in it. To this Brasidas -earnestly objected, asserting that the revolt took place before, and -would not give up the town. Upon Aristonymus reporting the case to -Athens, the people at once prepared to send an expedition to Scione. -Upon this, envoys arrived from Lacedaemon, alleging that this would be -a breach of the truce, and laying claim to the town upon the faith -of the assertion of Brasidas, and meanwhile offering to submit the -question to arbitration. Arbitration, however, was what the -Athenians did not choose to risk; being determined to send troops at -once to the place, and furious at the idea of even the islanders now -daring to revolt, in a vain reliance upon the power of the -Lacedaemonians by land. Besides the facts of the revolt were rather as -the Athenians contended, the Scionaeans having revolted two days after -the convention. Cleon accordingly succeeded in carrying a decree to -reduce and put to death the Scionaeans; and the Athenians employed the -leisure which they now enjoyed in preparing for the expedition. - -Meanwhile Mende revolted, a town in Pallene and a colony of the -Eretrians, and was received without scruple by Brasidas, in spite of -its having evidently come over during the armistice, on account of -certain infringements of the truce alleged by him against the -Athenians. This audacity of Mende was partly caused by seeing Brasidas -forward in the matter and by the conclusions drawn from his refusal to -betray Scione; and besides, the conspirators in Mende were few, and, -as I have already intimated, had carried on their practices too long -not to fear detection for themselves, and not to wish to force the -inclination of the multitude. This news made the Athenians more -furious than ever, and they at once prepared against both towns. -Brasidas, expecting their arrival, conveyed away to Olynthus in -Chalcidice the women and children of the Scionaeans and Mendaeans, and -sent over to them five hundred Peloponnesian heavy infantry and -three hundred Chalcidian targeteers, all under the command of -Polydamidas. - -Leaving these two towns to prepare together against the speedy -arrival of the Athenians, Brasidas and Perdiccas started on a second -joint expedition into Lyncus against Arrhabaeus; the latter with the -forces of his Macedonian subjects, and a corps of heavy infantry -composed of Hellenes domiciled in the country; the former with the -Peloponnesians whom he still had with him and the Chalcidians, -Acanthians, and the rest in such force as they were able. In all there -were about three thousand Hellenic heavy infantry, accompanied by -all the Macedonian cavalry with the Chalcidians, near one thousand -strong, besides an immense crowd of barbarians. On entering the -country of Arrhabaeus, they found the Lyncestians encamped awaiting -them, and themselves took up a position opposite. The infantry on -either side were upon a hill, with a plain between them, into which -the horse of both armies first galloped down and engaged a cavalry -action. After this the Lyncestian heavy infantry advanced from their -hill to join their cavalry and offered battle; upon which Brasidas and -Perdiccas also came down to meet them, and engaged and routed them -with heavy loss; the survivors taking refuge upon the heights and -there remaining inactive. The victors now set up a trophy and waited -two or three days for the Illyrian mercenaries who were to join -Perdiccas. Perdiccas then wished to go on and attack the villages of -Arrhabaeus, and to sit still no longer; but Brasidas, afraid that -the Athenians might sail up during his absence, and of something -happening to Mende, and seeing besides that the Illyrians did not -appear, far from seconding this wish was anxious to return. - -While they were thus disputing, the news arrived that the -Illyrians had actually betrayed Perdiccas and had joined Arrhabaeus; -and the fear inspired by their warlike character made both parties now -think it best to retreat. However, owing to the dispute, nothing had -been settled as to when they should start; and night coming on, the -Macedonians and the barbarian crowd took fright in a moment in one -of those mysterious panics to which great armies are liable; and -persuaded that an army many times more numerous than that which had -really arrived was advancing and all but upon them, suddenly broke and -fled in the direction of home, and thus compelled Perdiccas, who at -first did not perceive what had occurred, to depart without seeing -Brasidas, the two armies being encamped at a considerable distance -from each other. At daybreak Brasidas, perceiving that the Macedonians -had gone on, and that the Illyrians and Arrhabaeus were on the point -of attacking him, formed his heavy infantry into a square, with the -light troops in the centre, and himself also prepared to retreat. -Posting his youngest soldiers to dash out wherever the enemy should -attack them, he himself with three hundred picked men in the rear -intended to face about during the retreat and beat off the most -forward of their assailants, Meanwhile, before the enemy approached, -he sought to sustain the courage of his soldiers with the following -hasty exhortation: - -"Peloponnesians, if I did not suspect you of being dismayed at being -left alone to sustain the attack of a numerous and barbarian enemy, -I should just have said a few words to you as usual without further -explanation. As it is, in the face of the desertion of our friends and -the numbers of the enemy, I have some advice and information to offer, -which, brief as they must be, will, I hope, suffice for the more -important points. The bravery that you habitually display in war -does not depend on your having allies at your side in this or that -encounter, but on your native courage; nor have numbers any terrors -for citizens of states like yours, in which the many do not rule the -few, but rather the few the many, owing their position to nothing else -than to superiority in the field. Inexperience now makes you afraid of -barbarians; and yet the trial of strength which you had with the -Macedonians among them, and my own judgment, confirmed by what I -hear from others, should be enough to satisfy you that they will not -prove formidable. Where an enemy seems strong but is really weak, a -true knowledge of the facts makes his adversary the bolder, just as -a serious antagonist is encountered most confidently by those who do -not know him. Thus the present enemy might terrify an inexperienced -imagination; they are formidable in outward bulk, their loud yelling -is unbearable, and the brandishing of their weapons in the air has a -threatening appearance. But when it comes to real fighting with an -opponent who stands his ground, they are not what they seemed; they -have no regular order that they should be ashamed of deserting their -positions when hard pressed; flight and attack are with them equally -honourable, and afford no test of courage; their independent mode of -fighting never leaving any one who wants to run away without a fair -excuse for so doing. In short, they think frightening you at a -secure distance a surer game than meeting you hand to hand; -otherwise they would have done the one and not the other. You can thus -plainly see that the terrors with which they were at first invested -are in fact trifling enough, though to the eye and ear very prominent. -Stand your ground therefore when they advance, and again wait your -opportunity to retire in good order, and you will reach a place of -safety all the sooner, and will know for ever afterwards that rabble -such as these, to those who sustain their first attack, do but show -off their courage by threats of the terrible things that they are -going to do, at a distance, but with those who give way to them are -quick enough to display their heroism in pursuit when they can do so -without danger." - -With this brief address Brasidas began to lead off his army. -Seeing this, the barbarians came on with much shouting and hubbub, -thinking that he was flying and that they would overtake him and cut -him off. But wherever they charged they found the young men ready to -dash out against them, while Brasidas with his picked company -sustained their onset. Thus the Peloponnesians withstood the first -attack, to the surprise of the enemy, and afterwards received and -repulsed them as fast as they came on, retiring as soon as their -opponents became quiet. The main body of the barbarians ceased -therefore to molest the Hellenes with Brasidas in the open country, -and leaving behind a certain number to harass their march, the rest -went on after the flying Macedonians, slaying those with whom they -came up, and so arrived in time to occupy the narrow pass between -two hills that leads into the country of Arrhabaeus. They knew that -this was the only way by which Brasidas could retreat, and now -proceeded to surround him just as he entered the most impracticable -part of the road, in order to cut him off. - -Brasidas, perceiving their intention, told his three hundred to -run on without order, each as quickly as he could, to the hill which -seemed easiest to take, and to try to dislodge the barbarians -already there, before they should be joined by the main body closing -round him. These attacked and overpowered the party upon the hill, and -the main army of the Hellenes now advanced with less difficulty -towards it--the barbarians being terrified at seeing their men on -that side driven from the height and no longer following the main -body, who, they considered, had gained the frontier and made good -their escape. The heights once gained, Brasidas now proceeded more -securely, and the same day arrived at Arnisa, the first town in the -dominions of Perdiccas. The soldiers, enraged at the desertion of -the Macedonians, vented their rage on all their yokes of oxen which -they found on the road, and on any baggage which had tumbled off (as -might easily happen in the panic of a night retreat), by unyoking -and cutting down the cattle and taking the baggage for themselves. -From this moment Perdiccas began to regard Brasidas as an enemy and to -feel against the Peloponnesians a hatred which could not be -congenial to the adversary of the Athenians. However, he departed from -his natural interests and made it his endeavour to come to terms -with the latter and to get rid of the former. - -On his return from Macedonia to Torone, Brasidas found the Athenians -already masters of Mende, and remained quiet where he was, thinking it -now out of his power to cross over into Pallene and assist the -Mendaeans, but he kept good watch over Torone. For about the same time -as the campaign in Lyncus, the Athenians sailed upon the expedition -which we left them preparing against Mende and Scione, with fifty -ships, ten of which were Chians, one thousand Athenian heavy -infantry and six hundred archers, one hundred Thracian mercenaries and -some targeteers drawn from their allies in the neighbourhood, under -the command of Nicias, son of Niceratus, and Nicostratus, son of -Diitrephes. Weighing from Potidaea, the fleet came to land opposite -the temple of Poseidon, and proceeded against Mende; the men of -which town, reinforced by three hundred Scionaeans, with their -Peloponnesian auxiliaries, seven hundred heavy infantry in all, -under Polydamidas, they found encamped upon a strong hill outside -the city. These Nicias, with one hundred and twenty light-armed -Methonaeans, sixty picked men from the Athenian heavy infantry, and -all the archers, tried to reach by a path running up the hill, but -received a wound and found himself unable to force the position; while -Nicostratus, with all the rest of the army, advancing upon the hill, -which was naturally difficult, by a different approach further off, -was thrown into utter disorder; and the whole Athenian army narrowly -escaped being defeated. For that day, as the Mendaeans and their -allies showed no signs of yielding, the Athenians retreated and -encamped, and the Mendaeans at nightfall returned into the town. - -The next day the Athenians sailed round to the Scione side, and took -the suburb, and all day plundered the country, without any one -coming out against them, partly because of intestine disturbances in -the town; and the following night the three hundred Scionaeans -returned home. On the morrow Nicias advanced with half the army to the -frontier of Scione and laid waste the country; while Nicostratus -with the remainder sat down before the town near the upper gate on the -road to Potidaea. The arms of the Mendaeans and of their Peloponnesian -auxiliaries within the wall happened to be piled in that quarter, -where Polydamidas accordingly began to draw them up for battle, -encouraging the Mendaeans to make a sortie. At this moment one of -the popular party answered him factiously that they would not go out -and did not want a war, and for thus answering was dragged by the -arm and knocked about by Polydamidas. Hereupon the infuriated -commons at once seized their arms and rushed at the Peloponnesians and -at their allies of the opposite faction. The troops thus assaulted -were at once routed, partly from the suddenness of the conflict and -partly through fear of the gates being opened to the Athenians, with -whom they imagined that the attack had been concerted. As many as were -not killed on the spot took refuge in the citadel, which they had held -from the first; and the whole, Athenian army, Nicias having by this -time returned and being close to the city, now burst into Mende, which -had opened its gates without any convention, and sacked it just as -if they had taken it by storm, the generals even finding some -difficulty in restraining them from also massacring the inhabitants. -After this the Athenians told the Mendaeans that they might retain -their civil rights, and themselves judge the supposed authors of the -revolt; and cut off the party in the citadel by a wall built down to -the sea on either side, appointing troops to maintain the blockade. -Having thus secured Mende, they proceeded against Scione. - -The Scionaeans and Peloponnesians marched out against them, -occupying a strong hill in front of the town, which had to be captured -by the enemy before they could invest the place. The Athenians stormed -the hill, defeated and dislodged its occupants, and, having encamped -and set up a trophy, prepared for the work of circumvallation. Not -long after they had begun their operations, the auxiliaries besieged -in the citadel of Mende forced the guard by the sea-side and arrived -by night at Scione, into which most of them succeeded in entering, -passing through the besieging army. - -While the investment of Scione was in progress, Perdiccas sent a -herald to the Athenian generals and made peace with the Athenians, -through spite against Brasidas for the retreat from Lyncus, from which -moment indeed he had begun to negotiate. The Lacedaemonian -Ischagoras was just then upon the point of starting with an army -overland to join Brasidas; and Perdiccas, being now required by Nicias -to give some proof of the sincerity of his reconciliation to the -Athenians, and being himself no longer disposed to let the -Peloponnesians into his country, put in motion his friends in -Thessaly, with whose chief men he always took care to have -relations, and so effectually stopped the army and its preparation -that they did not even try the Thessalians. Ischagoras himself, -however, with Ameinias and Aristeus, succeeded in reaching Brasidas; -they had been commissioned by the Lacedaemonians to inspect the -state of affairs, and brought out from Sparta (in violation of all -precedent) some of their young men to put in command of the towns, -to guard against their being entrusted to the persons upon the spot. -Brasidas accordingly placed Clearidas, son of Cleonymus, in -Amphipolis, and Pasitelidas, son of Hegesander, in Torone. - -The same summer the Thebans dismantled the wall of the Thespians -on the charge of Atticism, having always wished to do so, and now -finding it an easy matter, as the flower of the Thespian youth had -perished in the battle with the Athenians. The same summer also the -temple of Hera at Argos was burnt down, through Chrysis, the -priestess, placing a lighted torch near the garlands and then -falling asleep, so that they all caught fire and were in a blaze -before she observed it. Chrysis that very night fled to Phlius for -fear of the Argives, who, agreeably to the law in such a case, -appointed another priestess named Phaeinis. Chrysis at the time of her -flight had been priestess for eight years of the present war and -half the ninth. At the close of the summer the investment of Scione -was completed, and the Athenians, leaving a detachment to maintain the -blockade, returned with the rest of their army. - -During the winter following, the Athenians and Lacedaemonians were -kept quiet by the armistice; but the Mantineans and Tegeans, and their -respective allies, fought a battle at Laodicium, in the Oresthid. -The victory remained doubtful, as each side routed one of the wings -opposed to them, and both set up trophies and sent spoils to Delphi. -After heavy loss on both sides the battle was undecided, and night -interrupted the action; yet the Tegeans passed the night on the -field and set up a trophy at once, while the Mantineans withdrew to -Bucolion and set up theirs afterwards. - -At the close of the same winter, in fact almost in spring, -Brasidas made an attempt upon Potidaea. He arrived by night, and -succeeded in planting a ladder against the wall without being -discovered, the ladder being planted just in the interval between -the passing round of the bell and the return of the man who brought it -back. Upon the garrison, however, taking the alarm immediately -afterwards, before his men came up, he quickly led off his troops, -without waiting until it was day. So ended the winter and the ninth -year of this war of which Thucydides is the historian. - - - - -BOOK V - -CHAPTER XV - -_Tenth Year of the War - Death of Cleon and Brasidas - -Peace of Nicias_ - -The next summer the truce for a year ended, after lasting until -the Pythian games. During the armistice the Athenians expelled the -Delians from Delos, concluding that they must have been polluted by -some old offence at the time of their consecration, and that this -had been the omission in the previous purification of the island, -which, as I have related, had been thought to have been duly -accomplished by the removal of the graves of the dead. The Delians had -Atramyttium in Asia given them by Pharnaces, and settled there as they -removed from Delos. - -Meanwhile Cleon prevailed on the Athenians to let him set sail at -the expiration of the armistice for the towns in the direction of -Thrace with twelve hundred heavy infantry and three hundred horse from -Athens, a large force of the allies, and thirty ships. First -touching at the still besieged Scione, and taking some heavy -infantry from the army there, he next sailed into Cophos, a harbour in -the territory of Torone, which is not far from the town. From -thence, having learnt from deserters that Brasidas was not in -Torone, and that its garrison was not strong enough to give him -battle, he advanced with his army against the town, sending ten -ships to sail round into the harbour. He first came to the -fortification lately thrown up in front of the town by Brasidas in -order to take in the suburb, to do which he had pulled down part of -the original wall and made it all one city. To this point Pasitelidas, -the Lacedaemonian commander, with such garrison as there was in the -place, hurried to repel the Athenian assault; but finding himself hard -pressed, and seeing the ships that had been sent round sailing into -the harbour, Pasitelidas began to be afraid that they might get up -to the city before its defenders were there and, the fortification -being also carried, he might be taken prisoner, and so abandoned the -outwork and ran into the town. But the Athenians from the ships had -already taken Torone, and their land forces following at his heels -burst in with him with a rush over the part of the old wall that had -been pulled down, killing some of the Peloponnesians and Toronaeans in -the melee, and making prisoners of the rest, and Pasitelidas their -commander amongst them. Brasidas meanwhile had advanced to relieve -Torone, and had only about four miles more to go when he heard of -its fall on the road, and turned back again. Cleon and the Athenians -set up two trophies, one by the harbour, the other by the -fortification and, making slaves of the wives and children of the -Toronaeans, sent the men with the Peloponnesians and any Chalcidians -that were there, to the number of seven hundred, to Athens; whence, -however, they all came home afterwards, the Peloponnesians on the -conclusion of peace, and the rest by being exchanged against other -prisoners with the Olynthians. About the same time Panactum, a -fortress on the Athenian border, was taken by treachery by the -Boeotians. Meanwhile Cleon, after placing a garrison in Torone, -weighed anchor and sailed around Athos on his way to Amphipolis. - -About the same time Phaeax, son of Erasistratus, set sail with two -colleagues as ambassador from Athens to Italy and Sicily. The -Leontines, upon the departure of the Athenians from Sicily after the -pacification, had placed a number of new citizens upon the roll, and -the commons had a design for redividing the land; but the upper -classes, aware of their intention, called in the Syracusans and -expelled the commons. These last were scattered in various directions; -but the upper classes came to an agreement with the Syracusans, -abandoned and laid waste their city, and went and lived at Syracuse, -where they were made citizens. Afterwards some of them were -dissatisfied, and leaving Syracuse occupied Phocaeae, a quarter of the -town of Leontini, and Bricinniae, a strong place in the Leontine -country, and being there joined by most of the exiled commons -carried on war from the fortifications. The Athenians hearing this, -sent Phaeax to see if they could not by some means so convince their -allies there and the rest of the Sicilians of the ambitious designs of -Syracuse as to induce them to form a general coalition against her, -and thus save the commons of Leontini. Arrived in Sicily, Phaeax -succeeded at Camarina and Agrigentum, but meeting with a repulse at -Gela did not go on to the rest, as he saw that he should not succeed -with them, but returned through the country of the Sicels to Catana, -and after visiting Bricinniae as he passed, and encouraging its -inhabitants, sailed back to Athens. - -During his voyage along the coast to and from Sicily, he treated -with some cities in Italy on the subject of friendship with Athens, -and also fell in with some Locrian settlers exiled from Messina, who -had been sent thither when the Locrians were called in by one of the -factions that divided Messina after the pacification of Sicily, and -Messina came for a time into the hands of the Locrians. These being -met by Phaeax on their return home received no injury at his hands, as -the Locrians had agreed with him for a treaty with Athens. They were -the only people of the allies who, when the reconciliation between the -Sicilians took place, had not made peace with her; nor indeed would -they have done so now, if they had not been pressed by a war with -the Hipponians and Medmaeans who lived on their border, and were -colonists of theirs. Phaeax meanwhile proceeded on his voyage, and -at length arrived at Athens. - -Cleon, whom we left on his voyage from Torone to Amphipolis, made -Eion his base, and after an unsuccessful assault upon the Andrian -colony of Stagirus, took Galepsus, a colony of Thasos, by storm. He -now sent envoys to Perdiccas to command his attendance with an army, -as provided by the alliance; and others to Thrace, to Polles, king -of the Odomantians, who was to bring as many Thracian mercenaries as -possible; and himself remained inactive in Eion, awaiting their -arrival. Informed of this, Brasidas on his part took up a position -of observation upon Cerdylium, a place situated in the Argilian -country on high ground across the river, not far from Amphipolis, -and commanding a view on all sides, and thus made it impossible for -Cleon's army to move without his seeing it; for he fully expected that -Cleon, despising the scanty numbers of his opponent, would march -against Amphipolis with the force that he had got with him. At the -same time Brasidas made his preparations, calling to his standard -fifteen hundred Thracian mercenaries and all the Edonians, horse and -targeteers; he also had a thousand Myrcinian and Chalcidian -targeteers, besides those in Amphipolis, and a force of heavy infantry -numbering altogether about two thousand, and three hundred Hellenic -horse. Fifteen hundred of these he had with him upon Cerdylium; the -rest were stationed with Clearidas in Amphipolis. - -After remaining quiet for some time, Cleon was at length obliged -to do as Brasidas expected. His soldiers, tired of their inactivity, -began also seriously to reflect on the weakness and incompetence of -their commander, and the skill and valour that would be opposed to -him, and on their own original unwillingness to accompany him. These -murmurs coming to the ears of Cleon, he resolved not to disgust the -army by keeping it in the same place, and broke up his camp and -advanced. The temper of the general was what it had been at Pylos, his -success on that occasion having given him confidence in his -capacity. He never dreamed of any one coming out to fight him, but -said that he was rather going up to view the place; and if he waited -for his reinforcements, it was not in order to make victory secure -in case he should be compelled to engage, but to be enabled to -surround and storm the city. He accordingly came and posted his army -upon a strong hill in front of Amphipolis, and proceeded to examine -the lake formed by the Strymon, and how the town lay on the side of -Thrace. He thought to retire at pleasure without fighting, as there -was no one to be seen upon the wall or coming out of the gates, all of -which were shut. Indeed, it seemed a mistake not to have brought -down engines with him; he could then have taken the town, there -being no one to defend it. - -As soon as Brasidas saw the Athenians in motion he descended himself -from Cerdylium and entered Amphipolis. He did not venture to go out in -regular order against the Athenians: he mistrusted his strength, and -thought it inadequate to the attempt; not in numbers--these were not -so unequal--but in quality, the flower of the Athenian army being in -the field, with the best of the Lemnians and Imbrians. He therefore -prepared to assail them by stratagem. By showing the enemy the -number of his troops, and the shifts which he had been put to to to -arm them, he thought that he should have less chance of beating him -than by not letting him have a sight of them, and thus learn how -good a right he had to despise them. He accordingly picked out a -hundred and fifty heavy infantry and, putting the rest under -Clearidas, determined to attack suddenly before the Athenians retired; -thinking that he should not have again such a chance of catching -them alone, if their reinforcements were once allowed to come up; -and so calling all his soldiers together in order to encourage them -and explain his intention, spoke as follows: - -"Peloponnesians, the character of the country from which we have -come, one which has always owed its freedom to valour, and the fact -that you are Dorians and the enemy you are about to fight Ionians, -whom you are accustomed to beat, are things that do not need further -comment. But the plan of attack that I propose to pursue, this it is -as well to explain, in order that the fact of our adventuring with a -part instead of with the whole of our forces may not damp your courage -by the apparent disadvantage at which it places you. I imagine it is -the poor opinion that he has of us, and the fact that he has no idea -of any one coming out to engage him, that has made the enemy march -up to the place and carelessly look about him as he is doing, -without noticing us. But the most successful soldier will always be -the man who most happily detects a blunder like this, and who -carefully consulting his own means makes his attack not so much by -open and regular approaches, as by seizing the opportunity of the -moment; and these stratagems, which do the greatest service to our -friends by most completely deceiving our enemies, have the most -brilliant name in war. Therefore, while their careless confidence -continues, and they are still thinking, as in my judgment they are now -doing, more of retreat than of maintaining their position, while their -spirit is slack and not high-strung with expectation, I with the men -under my command will, if possible, take them by surprise and fall -with a run upon their centre; and do you, Clearidas, afterwards, -when you see me already upon them, and, as is likely, dealing terror -among them, take with you the Amphipolitans, and the rest of the -allies, and suddenly open the gates and dash at them, and hasten to -engage as quickly as you can. That is our best chance of -establishing a panic among them, as a fresh assailant has always -more terrors for an enemy than the one he is immediately engaged with. -Show yourself a brave man, as a Spartan should; and do you, allies, -follow him like men, and remember that zeal, honour, and obedience -mark the good soldier, and that this day will make you either free men -and allies of Lacedaemon, or slaves of Athens; even if you escape -without personal loss of liberty or life, your bondage will be on -harsher terms than before, and you will also hinder the liberation -of the rest of the Hellenes. No cowardice then on your part, seeing -the greatness of the issues at stake, and I will show that what I -preach to others I can practise myself." - -After this brief speech Brasidas himself prepared for the sally, and -placed the rest with Clearidas at the Thracian gates to support him as -had been agreed. Meanwhile he had been seen coming down from Cerdylium -and then in the city, which is overlooked from the outside, -sacrificing near the temple of Athene; in short, all his movements had -been observed, and word was brought to Cleon, who had at the moment -gone on to look about him, that the whole of the enemy's force could -be seen in the town, and that the feet of horses and men in great -numbers were visible under the gates, as if a sally were intended. -Upon hearing this he went up to look, and having done so, being -unwilling to venture upon the decisive step of a battle before his -reinforcements came up, and fancying that he would have time to -retire, bid the retreat be sounded and sent orders to the men to -effect it by moving on the left wing in the direction of Eion, which -was indeed the only way practicable. This however not being quick -enough for him, he joined the retreat in person and made the right -wing wheel round, thus turning its unarmed side to the enemy. It was -then that Brasidas, seeing the Athenian force in motion and his -opportunity come, said to the men with him and the rest: "Those -fellows will never stand before us, one can see that by the way -their spears and heads are going. Troops which do as they do seldom -stand a charge. Quick, someone, and open the gates I spoke of, and let -us be out and at them with no fears for the result." Accordingly -issuing out by the palisade gate and by the first in the long wall -then existing, he ran at the top of his speed along the straight road, -where the trophy now stands as you go by the steepest part of the -hill, and fell upon and routed the centre of the Athenians, -panic-stricken by their own disorder and astounded at his audacity. At -the same moment Clearidas in execution of his orders issued out from -the Thracian gates to support him, and also attacked the enemy. The -result was that the Athenians, suddenly and unexpectedly attacked on -both sides, fell into confusion; and their left towards Eion, which -had already got on some distance, at once broke and fled. Just as it -was in full retreat and Brasidas was passing on to attack the right, -he received a wound; but his fall was not perceived by the -Athenians, as he was taken up by those near him and carried off the -field. The Athenian right made a better stand, and though Cleon, who -from the first had no thought of fighting, at once fled and was -overtaken and slain by a Myrcinian targeteer, his infantry forming -in close order upon the hill twice or thrice repulsed the attacks of -Clearidas, and did not finally give way until they were surrounded and -routed by the missiles of the Myrcinian and Chalcidian horse and the -targeteers. Thus the Athenian army was all now in flight; and such -as escaped being killed in the battle, or by the Chalcidian horse -and the targeteers, dispersed among the hills, and with difficulty -made their way to Eion. The men who had taken up and rescued Brasidas, -brought him into the town with the breath still in him: he lived to -hear of the victory of his troops, and not long after expired. The -rest of the army returning with Clearidas from the pursuit stripped -the dead and set up a trophy. - -After this all the allies attended in arms and buried Brasidas at the -public expense in the city, in front of what is now the marketplace, -and the Amphipolitans, having enclosed his tomb, ever afterwards -sacrifice to him as a hero and have given to him the honour of games -and annual offerings. They constituted him the founder of their -colony, and pulled down the Hagnonic erections, and obliterated -everything that could be interpreted as a memorial of his having -founded the place; for they considered that Brasidas had been their -preserver, and courting as they did the alliance of Lacedaemon for -fear of Athens, in their present hostile relations with the latter -they could no longer with the same advantage or satisfaction pay -Hagnon his honours. They also gave the Athenians back their dead. -About six hundred of the latter had fallen and only seven of the -enemy, owing to there having been no regular engagement, but the -affair of accident and panic that I have described. After taking up -their dead the Athenians sailed off home, while Clearidas and his -troops remained to arrange matters at Amphipolis. - -About the same time three Lacedaemonians--Ramphias, Autocharidas, -and Epicydidas--led a reinforcement of nine hundred heavy infantry to -the towns in the direction of Thrace, and arriving at Heraclea in -Trachis reformed matters there as seemed good to them. While they -delayed there, this battle took place and so the summer ended. - -With the beginning of the winter following, Ramphias and his -companions penetrated as far as Pierium in Thessaly; but as the -Thessalians opposed their further advance, and Brasidas whom they came -to reinforce was dead, they turned back home, thinking that the moment -had gone by, the Athenians being defeated and gone, and themselves not -equal to the execution of Brasidas's designs. The main cause however -of their return was because they knew that when they set out -Lacedaemonian opinion was really in favour of peace. - -Indeed it so happened that directly after the battle of Amphipolis -and the retreat of Ramphias from Thessaly, both sides ceased to -prosecute the war and turned their attention to peace. Athens had -suffered severely at Delium, and again shortly afterwards at -Amphipolis, and had no longer that confidence in her strength which -had made her before refuse to treat, in the belief of ultimate victory -which her success at the moment had inspired; besides, she was -afraid of her allies being tempted by her reverses to rebel more -generally, and repented having let go the splendid opportunity for -peace which the affair of Pylos had offered. Lacedaemon, on the -other hand, found the event of the war to falsify her notion that a -few years would suffice for the overthrow of the power of the -Athenians by the devastation of their land. She had suffered on the -island a disaster hitherto unknown at Sparta; she saw her country -plundered from Pylos and Cythera; the Helots were deserting, and she -was in constant apprehension that those who remained in Peloponnese -would rely upon those outside and take advantage of the situation to -renew their old attempts at revolution. Besides this, as chance -would have it, her thirty years' truce with the Argives was upon the -point of expiring; and they refused to renew it unless Cynuria were -restored to them; so that it seemed impossible to fight Argos and -Athens at once. She also suspected some of the cities in Peloponnese -of intending to go over to the enemy and that was indeed the case. - -These considerations made both sides disposed for an -accommodation; the Lacedaemonians being probably the most eager, as -they ardently desired to recover the men taken upon the island, the -Spartans among whom belonged to the first families and were -accordingly related to the governing body in Lacedaemon. -Negotiations had been begun directly after their capture, but the -Athenians in their hour of triumph would not consent to any reasonable -terms; though after their defeat at Delium, Lacedaemon, knowing that -they would be now more inclined to listen, at once concluded the -armistice for a year, during which they were to confer together and -see if a longer period could not be agreed upon. - -Now, however, after the Athenian defeat at Amphipolis, and the death -of Cleon and Brasidas, who had been the two principal opponents of -peace on either side--the latter from the success and honour which -war gave him, the former because he thought that, if tranquillity were -restored, his crimes would be more open to detection and his -slanders less credited--the foremost candidates for power in either -city, Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias, king of Lacedaemon, and Nicias, -son of Niceratus, the most fortunate general of his time, each desired -peace more ardently than ever. Nicias, while still happy and honoured, -wished to secure his good fortune, to obtain a present release from -trouble for himself and his countrymen, and hand down to posterity a -name as an ever-successful statesman, and thought the way to do this -was to keep out of danger and commit himself as little as possible -to fortune, and that peace alone made this keeping out of danger -possible. Pleistoanax, again, was assailed by his enemies for his -restoration, and regularly held up by them to the prejudice of his -countrymen, upon every reverse that befell them, as though his -unjust restoration were the cause; the accusation being that he and -his brother Aristocles had bribed the prophetess of Delphi to tell the -Lacedaemonian deputations which successively arrived at the temple -to bring home the seed of the demigod son of Zeus from abroad, else -they would have to plough with a silver share. In this way, it was -insisted, in time he had induced the Lacedaemonians in the -nineteenth year of his exile to Lycaeum (whither he had gone when -banished on suspicion of having been bribed to retreat from Attica, -and had built half his house within the consecrated precinct of Zeus -for fear of the Lacedaemonians), to restore him with the same dances -and sacrifices with which they had instituted their kings upon the -first settlement of Lacedaemon. The smart of this accusation, and -the reflection that in peace no disaster could occur, and that when -Lacedaemon had recovered her men there would be nothing for his -enemies to take hold of (whereas, while war lasted, the highest -station must always bear the scandal of everything that went wrong), -made him ardently desire a settlement. Accordingly this winter was -employed in conferences; and as spring rapidly approached, the -Lacedaemonians sent round orders to the cities to prepare for a -fortified occupation of Attica, and held this as a sword over the -heads of the Athenians to induce them to listen to their overtures; -and at last, after many claims had been urged on either side at the -conferences a peace was agreed on upon the following basis. Each party -was to restore its conquests, but Athens was to keep Nisaea; her -demand for Plataea being met by the Thebans asserting that they had -acquired the place not by force or treachery, but by the voluntary -adhesion upon agreement of its citizens; and the same, according to -the Athenian account, being the history of her acquisition of -Nisaea. This arranged, the Lacedaemonians summoned their allies, and -all voting for peace except the Boeotians, Corinthians, Eleans, and -Megarians, who did not approve of these proceedings, they concluded -the treaty and made peace, each of the contracting parties swearing to -the following articles: - -The Athenians and Lacedaemonians and their allies made a treaty, -and swore to it, city by city, as follows; - -1. Touching the national temples, there shall be a free passage by -land and by sea to all who wish it, to sacrifice, travel, consult, and -attend the oracle or games, according to the customs of their -countries. - -2. The temple and shrine of Apollo at Delphi and the Delphians -shall be governed by their own laws, taxed by their own state, and -judged by their own judges, the land and the people, according to -the custom of their country. - -3. The treaty shall be binding for fifty years upon the -Athenians and the allies of the Athenians, and upon the Lacedaemonians -and the allies of the Lacedaemonians, without fraud or hurt by land or -by sea. - -4. It shall not be lawful to take up arms, with intent to do hurt, -either for the Lacedaemonians and their allies against the Athenians -and their allies, or for the Athenians and their allies against the -Lacedaemonians and their allies, in any way or means whatsoever. But -should any difference arise between them they are to have recourse -to law and oaths, according as may be agreed between the parties. - -5. The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall give back -Amphipolis to the Athenians. Nevertheless, in the case of cities given -up by the Lacedaemonians to the Athenians, the inhabitants shall be -allowed to go where they please and to take their property with -them: and the cities shall be independent, paying only the tribute -of Aristides. And it shall not be lawful for the Athenians or their -allies to carry on war against them after the treaty has been -concluded, so long as the tribute is paid. The cities referred to -are Argilus, Stagirus, Acanthus, Scolus, Olynthus, and Spartolus. -These cities shall be neutral, allies neither of the Lacedaemonians -nor of the Athenians: but if the cities consent, it shall be lawful -for the Athenians to make them their allies, provided always that -the cities wish it. The Mecybernaeans, Sanaeans, and Singaeans shall -inhabit their own cities, as also the Olynthians and Acanthians: but -the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall give back Panactum to the -Athenians. - -6. The Athenians shall give back Coryphasium, Cythera, Methana, -Lacedaemonians that are in the prison at Athens or elsewhere in the -Athenian dominions, and shall let go the Peloponnesians besieged in -Scione, and all others in Scione that are allies of the -Lacedaemonians, and all whom Brasidas sent in there, and any others of -the allies of the Lacedaemonians that may be in the prison at Athens -or elsewhere in the Athenian dominions. - -7. The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall in like manner give -back any of the Athenians or their allies that they may have in -their hands. - -8. In the case of Scione, Torone, and Sermylium, and any other -cities that the Athenians may have, the Athenians may adopt such -measures as they please. - -9. The Athenians shall take an oath to the Lacedaemonians and -their allies, city by city. Every man shall swear by the most -binding oath of his country, seventeen from each city. The oath -shall be as follows; "I will abide by this agreement and treaty -honestly and without deceit." In the same way an oath shall be taken -by the Lacedaemonians and their allies to the Athenians: and the -oath shall be renewed annually by both parties. Pillars shall be -erected at Olympia, Pythia, the Isthmus, at Athens in the Acropolis, -and at Lacedaemon in the temple at Amyclae. - -10. If anything be forgotten, whatever it be, and on whatever -point, it shall be consistent with their oath for both parties, the -Athenians and Lacedaemonians, to alter it, according to their -discretion. - -The treaty begins from the ephoralty of Pleistolas in -Lacedaemon, on the 27th day of the month of Artemisium, and from the -archonship, of Alcaeus at Athens, on the 25th day of the month of -Elaphebolion. Those who took the oath and poured the libations for the -Lacedaemonians were Pleistoanax, Agis, Pleistolas, Damagetis, Chionis, -Metagenes, Acanthus, Daithus, Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, -Antippus, Tellis, Alcinadas, Empedias, Menas, and Laphilus: for the -Athenians, Lampon, Isthmonicus, Nicias, Laches, Euthydemus, Procles, -Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtilus, Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristocrates, -Iolcius, Timocrates, Leon, Lamachus, and Demosthenes. - -This treaty was made in the spring, just at the end of winter, -directly after the city festival of Dionysus, just ten years, with the -difference of a few days, from the first invasion of Attica and the -commencement of this war. This must be calculated by the seasons -rather than by trusting to the enumeration of the names of the several -magistrates or offices of honour that are used to mark past events. -Accuracy is impossible where an event may have occurred in the -beginning, or middle, or at any period in their tenure of office. -But by computing by summers and winters, the method adopted in this -history, it will be found that, each of these amounting to half a -year, there were ten summers and as many winters contained in this -first war. - -Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians, to whose lot it fell to begin the work -of restitution, immediately set free all the prisoners of war in their -possession, and sent Ischagoras, Menas, and Philocharidas as envoys to -the towns in the direction of Thrace, to order Clearidas to hand -over Amphipolis to the Athenians, and the rest of their allies each to -accept the treaty as it affected them. They, however, did not like its -terms, and refused to accept it; Clearidas also, willing to oblige the -Chalcidians, would not hand over the town, averring his inability to -do so against their will. Meanwhile he hastened in person to -Lacedaemon with envoys from the place, to defend his disobedience -against the possible accusations of Ischagoras and his companions, and -also to see whether it was too late for the agreement to be altered; -and on finding the Lacedaemonians were bound, quickly set out back -again with instructions from them to hand over the place, if possible, -or at all events to bring out the Peloponnesians that were in it. - -The allies happened to be present in person at Lacedaemon, and those -who had not accepted the treaty were now asked by the Lacedaemonians -to adopt it. This, however, they refused to do, for the same reasons -as before, unless a fairer one than the present were agreed upon; -and remaining firm in their determination were dismissed by the -Lacedaemonians, who now decided on forming an alliance with the -Athenians, thinking that Argos, who had refused the application of -Ampelidas and Lichas for a renewal of the treaty, would without Athens -be no longer formidable, and that the rest of the Peloponnese would be -most likely to keep quiet, if the coveted alliance of Athens were shut -against them. Accordingly, after conference with the Athenian -ambassadors, an alliance was agreed upon and oaths were exchanged, -upon the terms following: - -1. The Lacedaemonians shall be allies of the Athenians for fifty -years. - -2. Should any enemy invade the territory of Lacedaemon and -injure the Lacedaemonians, the Athenians shall help in such way as -they most effectively can, according to their power. But if the -invader be gone after plundering the country, that city shall be the -enemy of Lacedaemon and Athens, and shall be chastised by both, and -one shall not make peace without the other. This to be honestly, -loyally, and without fraud. - -3. Should any enemy invade the territory of Athens and injure -the Athenians, the Lacedaemonians shall help them in such way as -they most effectively can, according to their power. But if the -invader be gone after plundering the country, that city shall be the -enemy of Lacedaemon and Athens, and shall be chastised by both, and -one shall not make peace without the other. This to be honestly, -loyally, and without fraud. - -4. Should the slave population rise, the Athenians shall help -the Lacedaemonians with all their might, according to their power. - -5. This treaty shall be sworn to by the same persons on either -side that swore to the other. It shall be renewed annually by the -Lacedaemonians going to Athens for the Dionysia, and the Athenians -to Lacedaemon for the Hyacinthia, and a pillar shall be set up by -either party: at Lacedaemon near the statue of Apollo at Amyclae, -and at Athens on the Acropolis near the statue of Athene. Should the -Lacedaemonians and Athenians see to add to or take away from the -alliance in any particular, it shall be consistent with their oaths -for both parties to do so, according to their discretion. - -Those who took the oath for the Lacedaemonians were Pleistoanax, -Agis, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daithus, -Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Antippus, Alcinadas, Tellis, -Empedias, Menas, and Laphilus; for the Athenians, Lampon, -Isthmionicus, Laches, Nicias, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, -Myrtilus, Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, -Leon, Lamachus, and Demosthenes. - -This alliance was made not long after the treaty; and the -Athenians gave back the men from the island to the Lacedaemonians, and -the summer of the eleventh year began. This completes the history of -the first war, which occupied the whole of the ten years previously. - - - - -CHAPTER XVI - -_Feeling against Sparta in Peloponnese - League of the Mantineans, -Eleans, Argives, and Athenians - Battle of Mantinea and -breaking up of the League_ - -After the treaty and the alliance between the Lacedaemonians and -Athenians, concluded after the ten years' war, in the ephorate of -Pleistolas at Lacedaemon, and the archonship of Alcaeus at Athens, the -states which had accepted them were at peace; but the Corinthians -and some of the cities in Peloponnese trying to disturb the -settlement, a fresh agitation was instantly commenced by the allies -against Lacedaemon. Further, the Lacedaemonians, as time went on, -became suspected by the Athenians through their not performing some of -the provisions in the treaty; and though for six years and ten -months they abstained from invasion of each other's territory, yet -abroad an unstable armistice did not prevent either party doing the -other the most effectual injury, until they were finally obliged to -break the treaty made after the ten years' war and to have recourse to -open hostilities. - -The history of this period has been also written by the same -Thucydides, an Athenian, in the chronological order of events by -summers and winters, to the time when the Lacedaemonians and their -allies put an end to the Athenian empire, and took the Long Walls -and Piraeus. The war had then lasted for twenty-seven years in all. -Only a mistaken judgment can object to including the interval of -treaty in the war. Looked at by the light of facts it cannot, it -will be found, be rationally considered a state of peace, where -neither party either gave or got back all that they had agreed, -apart from the violations of it which occurred on both sides in the -Mantinean and Epidaurian wars and other instances, and the fact that -the allies in the direction of Thrace were in as open hostility as -ever, while the Boeotians had only a truce renewed every ten days. -So that the first ten years' war, the treacherous armistice that -followed it, and the subsequent war will, calculating by the -seasons, be found to make up the number of years which I have -mentioned, with the difference of a few days, and to afford an -instance of faith in oracles being for once justified by the event. -I certainly all along remember from the beginning to the end of the -war its being commonly declared that it would last thrice nine -years. I lived through the whole of it, being of an age to -comprehend events, and giving my attention to them in order to know -the exact truth about them. It was also my fate to be an exile from my -country for twenty years after my command at Amphipolis; and being -present with both parties, and more especially with the Peloponnesians -by reason of my exile, I had leisure to observe affairs somewhat -particularly. I will accordingly now relate the differences that arose -after the ten years' war, the breach of the treaty, and the -hostilities that followed. - -After the conclusion of the fifty years' truce and of the -subsequent alliance, the embassies from Peloponnese which had been -summoned for this business returned from Lacedaemon. The rest went -straight home, but the Corinthians first turned aside to Argos and -opened negotiations with some of the men in office there, pointing -out that Lacedaemon could have no good end in view, but only the -subjugation of Peloponnese, or she would never have entered into -treaty and alliance with the once detested Athenians, and that the -duty of consulting for the safety of Peloponnese had now fallen upon -Argos, who should immediately pass a decree inviting any Hellenic -state that chose, such state being independent and accustomed to meet -fellow powers upon the fair and equal ground of law and justice, to -make a defensive alliance with the Argives; appointing a few -individuals with plenipotentiary powers, instead of making the people -the medium of negotiation, in order that, in the case of an applicant -being rejected, the fact of his overtures might not be made public. -They said that many would come over from hatred of the Lacedaemonians. -After this explanation of their views, the Corinthians returned home. - -The persons with whom they had communicated reported the proposal to -their government and people, and the Argives passed the decree and -chose twelve men to negotiate an alliance for any Hellenic state -that wished it, except Athens and Lacedaemon, neither of which -should be able to join without reference to the Argive people. Argos -came into the plan the more readily because she saw that war with -Lacedaemon was inevitable, the truce being on the point of expiring; -and also because she hoped to gain the supremacy of Peloponnese. For -at this time Lacedaemon had sunk very low in public estimation -because of her disasters, while the Argives were in a most -flourishing condition, having taken no part in the Attic war, but -having on the contrary profited largely by their neutrality. The -Argives accordingly prepared to receive into alliance any of the -Hellenes that desired it. - -The Mantineans and their allies were the first to come over through -fear of the Lacedaemonians. Having taken advantage of the war against -Athens to reduce a large part of Arcadia into subjection, they -thought that Lacedaemon would not leave them undisturbed in their -conquests, now that she had leisure to interfere, and consequently -gladly turned to a powerful city like Argos, the historical enemy of -the Lacedaemonians, and a sister democracy. Upon the defection of -Mantinea, the rest of Peloponnese at once began to agitate the -propriety of following her example, conceiving that the Mantineans -not have changed sides without good reason; besides which they were -angry with Lacedaemon among other reasons for having inserted in the -treaty with Athens that it should be consistent with their oaths for -both parties, Lacedaemonians and Athenians, to add to or take away -from it according to their discretion. It was this clause that was -the real origin of the panic in Peloponnese, by exciting suspicions -of a Lacedaemonian and Athenian combination against their liberties: -any alteration should properly have been made conditional upon the -consent of the whole body of the allies. With these apprehensions -there was a very general desire in each state to place itself in -alliance with Argos. - -In the meantime the Lacedaemonians perceiving the agitation going on -in Peloponnese, and that Corinth was the author of it and was -herself about to enter into alliance with the Argives, sent -ambassadors thither in the hope of preventing what was in -contemplation. They accused her of having brought it all about, and -told her that she could not desert Lacedaemon and become the ally of -Argos, without adding violation of her oaths to the crime which she -had already committed in not accepting the treaty with Athens, when it -had been expressly agreed that the decision of the majority of the -allies should be binding, unless the gods or heroes stood in the -way. Corinth in her answer, delivered before those of her allies who -had like her refused to accept the treaty, and whom she had previously -invited to attend, refrained from openly stating the injuries she -complained of, such as the non-recovery of Sollium or Anactorium -from the Athenians, or any other point in which she thought she had -been prejudiced, but took shelter under the pretext that she could not -give up her Thracian allies, to whom her separate individual -security had been given, when they first rebelled with Potidaea, as -well as upon subsequent occasions. She denied, therefore, that she -committed any violation of her oaths to the allies in not entering -into the treaty with Athens; having sworn upon the faith of the gods -to her Thracian friends, she could not honestly give them up. Besides, -the expression was, "unless the gods or heroes stand in the way." -Now here, as it appeared to her, the gods stood in the way. This was -what she said on the subject of her former oaths. As to the Argive -alliance, she would confer with her friends and do whatever was right. -The Lacedaemonian envoys returning home, some Argive ambassadors who -happened to be in Corinth pressed her to conclude the alliance without -further delay, but were told to attend at the next congress to be held -at Corinth. - -Immediately afterwards an Elean embassy arrived, and first making an -alliance with Corinth went on from thence to Argos, according to their -instructions, and became allies of the Argives, their country being -just then at enmity with Lacedaemon and Lepreum. Some time back -there had been a war between the Lepreans and some of the Arcadians; -and the Eleans being called in by the former with the offer of half -their lands, had put an end to the war, and leaving the land in the -hands of its Leprean occupiers had imposed upon them the tribute of -a talent to the Olympian Zeus. Till the Attic war this tribute was -paid by the Lepreans, who then took the war as an excuse for no longer -doing so, and upon the Eleans using force appealed to Lacedaemon. -The case was thus submitted to her arbitrament; but the Eleans, -suspecting the fairness of the tribunal, renounced the reference and -laid waste the Leprean territory. The Lacedaemonians nevertheless -decided that the Lepreans were independent and the Eleans -aggressors, and as the latter did not abide by the arbitration, sent a -garrison of heavy infantry into Lepreum. Upon this the Eleans, holding -that Lacedaemon had received one of their rebel subjects, put -forward the convention providing that each confederate should come out -of the Attic war in possession of what he had when he went into it, -and considering that justice had not been done them went over to the -Argives, and now made the alliance through their ambassadors, who -had been instructed for that purpose. Immediately after them the -Corinthians and the Thracian Chalcidians became allies of Argos. -Meanwhile the Boeotians and Megarians, who acted together, remained -quiet, being left to do as they pleased by Lacedaemon, and thinking -that the Argive democracy would not suit so well with their -aristocratic government as the Lacedaemonian constitution. - -About the same time in this summer Athens succeeded in reducing -Scione, put the adult males to death, and, making slaves of the -women and children, gave the land for the Plataeans to live in. She -also brought back the Delians to Delos, moved by her misfortunes in -the field and by the commands of the god at Delphi. Meanwhile the -Phocians and Locrians commenced hostilities. The Corinthians and -Argives, being now in alliance, went to Tegea to bring about its -defection from Lacedaemon, seeing that, if so considerable a state -could be persuaded to join, all Peloponnese would be with them. But -when the Tegeans said that they would do nothing against Lacedaemon, -the hitherto zealous Corinthians relaxed their activity, and began -to fear that none of the rest would now come over. Still they went -to the Boeotians and tried to persuade them to alliance and a common -action generally with Argos and themselves, and also begged them to go -with them to Athens and obtain for them a ten days' truce similar to -that made between the Athenians and Boeotians not long after the fifty -years' treaty, and, in the event of the Athenians refusing, to throw -up the armistice, and not make any truce in future without Corinth. -These were the requests of the Corinthians. The Boeotians stopped them -on the subject of the Argive alliance, but went with them to Athens, -where however they failed to obtain the ten days' truce; the -Athenian answer being that the Corinthians had truce already, as being -allies of Lacedaemon. Nevertheless the Boeotians did not throw up -their ten days' truce, in spite of the prayers and reproaches of the -Corinthians for their breach of faith; and these last had to content -themselves with a de facto armistice with Athens. - -The same summer the Lacedaemonians marched into Arcadia with -their whole levy under Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias, king of -Lacedaemon, against the Parrhasians, who were subjects of Mantinea, -and a faction of whom had invited their aid. They also meant to -demolish, if possible, the fort of Cypsela which the Mantineans had -built and garrisoned in the Parrhasian territory, to annoy the -district of Sciritis in Laconia. The Lacedaemonians accordingly laid -waste the Parrhasian country, and the Mantineans, placing their town -in the hands of an Argive garrison, addressed themselves to the -defence of their confederacy, but being unable to save Cypsela or -the Parrhasian towns went back to Mantinea. Meanwhile the -Lacedaemonians made the Parrhasians independent, razed the fortress, -and returned home. - -The same summer the soldiers from Thrace who had gone out with -Brasidas came back, having been brought from thence after the treaty -by Clearidas; and the Lacedaemonians decreed that the Helots who had -fought with Brasidas should be free and allowed to live where they -liked, and not long afterwards settled them with the Neodamodes at -Lepreum, which is situated on the Laconian and Elean border; -Lacedaemon being at this time at enmity with Elis. Those however of -the Spartans who had been taken prisoners on the island and had -surrendered their arms might, it was feared, suppose that they were to -be subjected to some degradation in consequence of their misfortune, -and so make some attempt at revolution, if left in possession of their -franchise. These were therefore at once disfranchised, although some -of them were in office at the time, and thus placed under a disability -to take office, or buy and sell anything. After some time, however, -the franchise was restored to them. - -The same summer the Dians took Thyssus, a town on Acte by Athos in -alliance with Athens. During the whole of this summer intercourse -between the Athenians and Peloponnesians continued, although each -party began to suspect the other directly after the treaty, because of -the places specified in it not being restored. Lacedaemon, to whose -lot it had fallen to begin by restoring Amphipolis and the other -towns, had not done so. She had equally failed to get the treaty -accepted by her Thracian allies, or by the Boeotians or the -Corinthians; although she was continually promising to unite with -Athens in compelling their compliance, if it were longer refused. -She also kept fixing a time at which those who still refused to come -in were to be declared enemies to both parties, but took care not to -bind herself by any written agreement. Meanwhile the Athenians, seeing -none of these professions performed in fact, began to suspect the -honesty of her intentions, and consequently not only refused to comply -with her demands for Pylos, but also repented having given up the -prisoners from the island, and kept tight hold of the other places, -until Lacedaemon's part of the treaty should be fulfilled. Lacedaemon, -on the other hand, said she had done what she could, having given up -the Athenian prisoners of war in her possession, evacuated Thrace, and -performed everything else in her power. Amphipolis it was out of her -ability to restore; but she would endeavour to bring the Boeotians and -Corinthians into the treaty, to recover Panactum, and send home all -the Athenian prisoners of war in Boeotia. Meanwhile she required -that Pylos should be restored, or at all events that the Messenians -and Helots should be withdrawn, as her troops had been from Thrace, -and the place garrisoned, if necessary, by the Athenians themselves. -After a number of different conferences held during the summer, she -succeeded in persuading Athens to withdraw from Pylos the Messenians -and the rest of the Helots and deserters from Laconia, who were -accordingly settled by her at Cranii in Cephallenia. Thus during -this summer there was peace and intercourse between the two peoples. - -Next winter, however, the ephors under whom the treaty had been made -were no longer in office, and some of their successors were directly -opposed to it. Embassies now arrived from the Lacedaemonian -confederacy, and the Athenians, Boeotians, and Corinthians also -presented themselves at Lacedaemon, and after much discussion and no -agreement between them, separated for their several homes; when -Cleobulus and Xenares, the two ephors who were the most anxious to -break off the treaty, took advantage of this opportunity to -communicate privately with the Boeotians and Corinthians, and, -advising them to act as much as possible together, instructed the -former first to enter into alliance with Argos, and then try and bring -themselves and the Argives into alliance with Lacedaemon. The -Boeotians would so be least likely to be compelled to come into the -Attic treaty; and the Lacedaemonians would prefer gaining the -friendship and alliance of Argos even at the price of the hostility of -Athens and the rupture of the treaty. The Boeotians knew that an -honourable friendship with Argos had been long the desire of -Lacedaemon; for the Lacedaemonians believed that this would -considerably facilitate the conduct of the war outside Peloponnese. -Meanwhile they begged the Boeotians to place Panactum in her hands -in order that she might, if possible, obtain Pylos in exchange for it, -and so be more in a position to resume hostilities with Athens. - -After receiving these instructions for their governments from -Xenares and Cleobulus and their friends at Lacedaemon, the Boeotians -and Corinthians departed. On their way home they were joined by two -persons high in office at Argos, who had waited for them on the -road, and who now sounded them upon the possibility of the Boeotians -joining the Corinthians, Eleans, and Mantineans in becoming the allies -of Argos, in the idea that if this could be effected they would be -able, thus united, to make peace or war as they pleased either against -Lacedaemon or any other power. The Boeotian envoys were were pleased -at thus hearing themselves accidentally asked to do what their friends -at Lacedaemon had told them; and the two Argives perceiving that their -proposal was agreeable, departed with a promise to send ambassadors to -the Boeotians. On their arrival the Boeotians reported to the -Boeotarchs what had been said to them at Lacedaemon and also by the -Argives who had met them, and the Boeotarchs, pleased with the idea, -embraced it with the more eagerness from the lucky coincidence of -Argos soliciting the very thing wanted by their friends at Lacedaemon. -Shortly afterwards ambassadors appeared from Argos with the -proposals indicated; and the Boeotarchs approved of the terms and -dismissed the ambassadors with a promise to send envoys to Argos to -negotiate the alliance. - -In the meantime it was decided by the Boeotarchs, the Corinthians, -the Megarians, and the envoys from Thrace first to interchange oaths -together to give help to each other whenever it was required and not -to make war or peace except in common; after which the Boeotians and -Megarians, who acted together, should make the alliance with Argos. -But before the oaths were taken the Boeotarchs communicated these -proposals to the four councils of the Boeotians, in whom the supreme -power resides, and advised them to interchange oaths with all such -cities as should be willing to enter into a defensive league with -the Boeotians. But the members of the Boeotian councils refused -their assent to the proposal, being afraid of offending Lacedaemon -by entering into a league with the deserter Corinth; the Boeotarchs -not having acquainted them with what had passed at Lacedaemon and with -the advice given by Cleobulus and Xenares and the Boeotian partisans -there, namely, that they should become allies of Corinth and Argos -as a preliminary to a junction with Lacedaemon; fancying that, even if -they should say nothing about this, the councils would not vote -against what had been decided and advised by the Boeotarchs. This -difficulty arising, the Corinthians and the envoys from Thrace -departed without anything having been concluded; and the Boeotarchs, -who had previously intended after carrying this to try and effect -the alliance with Argos, now omitted to bring the Argive question -before the councils, or to send to Argos the envoys whom they had -promised; and a general coldness and delay ensued in the matter. - -In this same winter Mecyberna was assaulted and taken by the -Olynthians, having an Athenian garrison inside it. - -All this while negotiations had been going on between the -Athenians and Lacedaemonians about the conquests still retained by -each, and Lacedaemon, hoping that if Athens were to get back -Panactum from the Boeotians she might herself recover Pylos, now -sent an embassy to the Boeotians, and begged them to place Panactum -and their Athenian prisoners in her hands, in order that she might -exchange them for Pylos. This the Boeotians refused to do, unless -Lacedaemon made a separate alliance with them as she had done with -Athens. Lacedaemon knew that this would be a breach of faith to -Athens, as it had been agreed that neither of them should make peace -or war without the other; yet wishing to obtain Panactum which she -hoped to exchange for Pylos, and the party who pressed for the -dissolution of the treaty strongly affecting the Boeotian -connection, she at length concluded the alliance just as winter gave -way to spring; and Panactum was instantly razed. And so the eleventh -year of the war ended. - -In the first days of the summer following, the Argives, seeing -that the promised ambassadors from Boeotia did not arrive, and that -Panactum was being demolished, and that a separate alliance had been -concluded between the Boeotians and Lacedaemonians, began to be afraid -that Argos might be left alone, and all the confederacy go over to -Lacedaemon. They fancied that the Boeotians had been persuaded by -the Lacedaemonians to raze Panactum and to enter into the treaty -with the Athenians, and that Athens was privy to this arrangement, and -even her alliance, therefore, no longer open to them--a resource -which they had always counted upon, by reason of the dissensions -existing, in the event of the noncontinuance of their treaty with -Lacedaemon. In this strait the Argives, afraid that, as the result -of refusing to renew the treaty with Lacedaemon and of aspiring to the -supremacy in Peloponnese, they would have the Lacedaemonians, Tegeans, -Boeotians, and Athenians on their hands all at once, now hastily -sent off Eustrophus and Aeson, who seemed the persons most likely to -be acceptable, as envoys to Lacedaemon, with the view of making as -good a treaty as they could with the Lacedaemonians, upon such terms -as could be got, and being left in peace. - -Having reached Lacedaemon, their ambassadors proceeded to -negotiate the terms of the proposed treaty. What the Argives first -demanded was that they might be allowed to refer to the arbitration of -some state or private person the question of the Cynurian land, a -piece of frontier territory about which they have always been -disputing, and which contains the towns of Thyrea and Anthene, and -is occupied by the Lacedaemonians. The Lacedaemonians at first said -that they could not allow this point to be discussed, but were ready -to conclude upon the old terms. Eventually, however, the Argive -ambassadors succeeded in obtaining from them this concession: For -the present there was to be a truce for fifty years, but it should -be competent for either party, there being neither plague nor war in -Lacedaemon or Argos, to give a formal challenge and decide the -question of this territory by battle, as on a former occasion, when -both sides claimed the victory; pursuit not being allowed beyond the -frontier of Argos or Lacedaemon. The Lacedaemonians at first thought -this mere folly; but at last, anxious at any cost to have the -friendship of Argos they agreed to the terms demanded, and reduced -them to writing. However, before any of this should become binding, -the ambassadors were to return to Argos and communicate with their -people and, in the event of their approval, to come at the feast of -the Hyacinthia and take the oaths. - -The envoys returned accordingly. In the meantime, while the Argives -were engaged in these negotiations, the Lacedaemonian ambassadors-- -Andromedes, Phaedimus, and Antimenidas--who were to receive -the prisoners from the Boeotians and restore them and Panactum to -the Athenians, found that the Boeotians had themselves razed Panactum, -upon the plea that oaths had been anciently exchanged between their -people and the Athenians, after a dispute on the subject to the effect -that neither should inhabit the place, but that they should graze it -in common. As for the Athenian prisoners of war in the hands of the -Boeotians, these were delivered over to Andromedes and his colleagues, -and by them conveyed to Athens and given back. The envoys at the -same time announced the razing of Panactum, which to them seemed as -good as its restitution, as it would no longer lodge an enemy of -Athens. This announcement was received with great indignation by the -Athenians, who thought that the Lacedaemonians had played them -false, both in the matter of the demolition of Panactum, which ought -to have been restored to them standing, and in having, as they now -heard, made a separate alliance with the Boeotians, in spite of -their previous promise to join Athens in compelling the adhesion of -those who refused to accede to the treaty. The Athenians also -considered the other points in which Lacedaemon had failed in her -compact, and thinking that they had been overreached, gave an angry -answer to the ambassadors and sent them away. - -The breach between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians having gone thus -far, the party at Athens, also, who wished to cancel the treaty, -immediately put themselves in motion. Foremost amongst these was -Alcibiades, son of Clinias, a man yet young in years for any other -Hellenic city, but distinguished by the splendour of his ancestry. -Alcibiades thought the Argive alliance really preferable, not that -personal pique had not also a great deal to do with his opposition; he -being offended with the Lacedaemonians for having negotiated the -treaty through Nicias and Laches, and having overlooked him on account -of his youth, and also for not having shown him the respect due to the -ancient connection of his family with them as their proxeni, which, -renounced by his grandfather, he had lately himself thought to renew -by his attentions to their prisoners taken in the island. Being -thus, as he thought, slighted on all hands, he had in the first -instance spoken against the treaty, saying that the Lacedaemonians -were not to be trusted, but that they only treated, in order to be -enabled by this means to crush Argos, and afterwards to attack -Athens alone; and now, immediately upon the above occurring, he sent -privately to the Argives, telling them to come as quickly as -possible to Athens, accompanied by the Mantineans and Eleans, with -proposals of alliance; as the moment was propitious and he himself -would do all he could to help them. - -Upon receiving this message and discovering that the Athenians, -far from being privy to the Boeotian alliance, were involved in a -serious quarrel with the Lacedaemonians, the Argives paid no further -attention to the embassy which they had just sent to Lacedaemon on the -subject of the treaty, and began to incline rather towards the -Athenians, reflecting that, in the event of war, they would thus -have on their side a city that was not only an ancient ally of -Argos, but a sister democracy and very powerful at sea. They -accordingly at once sent ambassadors to Athens to treat for an -alliance, accompanied by others from Elis and Mantinea. - -At the same time arrived in haste from Lacedaemon an embassy -consisting of persons reputed well disposed towards the -Athenians--Philocharidas, Leon, and Endius--for fear that the -Athenians in their irritation might conclude alliance with the -Argives, and also to ask back Pylos in exchange for Panactum, and in -defence of the alliance with the Boeotians to plead that it had not -been made to hurt the Athenians. Upon the envoys speaking in the -senate upon these points, and stating that they had come with full -powers to settle all others at issue between them, Alcibiades became -afraid that, if they were to repeat these statements to the popular -assembly, they might gain the multitude, and the Argive alliance might -be rejected, and accordingly had recourse to the following -stratagem. He persuaded the Lacedaemonians by a solemn assurance -that if they would say nothing of their full powers in the assembly, -he would give back Pylos to them (himself, the present opponent of its -restitution, engaging to obtain this from the Athenians), and would -settle the other points at issue. His plan was to detach them from -Nicias and to disgrace them before the people, as being without -sincerity in their intentions, or even common consistency in their -language, and so to get the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans taken into -alliance. This plan proved successful. When the envoys appeared before -the people, and upon the question being put to them, did not say as -they had said in the senate, that they had come with full powers, -the Athenians lost all patience, and carried away by Alcibiades, who -thundered more loudly than ever against the Lacedaemonians, were ready -instantly to introduce the Argives and their companions and to take -them into alliance. An earthquake, however, occurring, before anything -definite had been done, this assembly was adjourned. - -In the assembly held the next day, Nicias, in spite of the -Lacedaemonians having been deceived themselves, and having allowed him -to be deceived also in not admitting that they had come with full -powers, still maintained that it was best to be friends with the -Lacedaemonians, and, letting the Argive proposals stand over, to -send once more to Lacedaemon and learn her intentions. The adjournment -of the war could only increase their own prestige and injure that of -their rivals; the excellent state of their affairs making it their -interest to preserve this prosperity as long as possible, while -those of Lacedaemon were so desperate that the sooner she could try -her fortune again the better. He succeeded accordingly in persuading -them to send ambassadors, himself being among the number, to invite -the Lacedaemonians, if they were really sincere, to restore Panactum -intact with Amphipolis, and to abandon their alliance with the -Boeotians (unless they consented to accede to the treaty), agreeably -to the stipulation which forbade either to treat without the other. -The ambassadors were also directed to say that the Athenians, had they -wished to play false, might already have made alliance with the -Argives, who were indeed come to Athens for that very purpose, and -went off furnished with instructions as to any other complaints that -the Athenians had to make. Having reached Lacedaemon, they -communicated their instructions, and concluded by telling the -Lacedaemonians that unless they gave up their alliance with the -Boeotians, in the event of their not acceding to the treaty, the -Athenians for their part would ally themselves with the Argives and -their friends. The Lacedaemonians, however, refused to give up the -Boeotian alliance--the party of Xenares the ephor, and such as shared -their view, carrying the day upon this point--but renewed the oaths -at the request of Nicias, who feared to return without having -accomplished anything and to be disgraced; as was indeed his fate, -he being held the author of the treaty with Lacedaemon. When he -returned, and the Athenians heard that nothing had been done at -Lacedaemon, they flew into a passion, and deciding that faith had -not been kept with them, took advantage of the presence of the Argives -and their allies, who had been introduced by Alcibiades, and made a -treaty and alliance with them upon the terms following: - -The Athenians, Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans, acting for -themselves and the allies in their respective empires, made a treaty -for a hundred years, to be without fraud or hurt by land and by sea. - -1. It shall not be lawful to carry on war, either for the Argives, -Eleans, Mantineans, and their allies, against the Athenians, or the -allies in the Athenian empire: or for the Athenians and their allies -against the Argives, Eleans, Mantineans, or their allies, in any way -or means whatsoever. - -The Athenians, Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans shall be allies for a -hundred years upon the terms following: - -2. If an enemy invade the country of the Athenians, the Argives, -Eleans, and Mantineans shall go to the relief of Athens, according -as the Athenians may require by message, in such way as they most -effectually can, to the best of their power. But if the invader be -gone after plundering the territory, the offending state shall be -the enemy of the Argives, Mantineans, Eleans, and Athenians, and war -shall be made against it by all these cities: and no one of the cities -shall be able to make peace with that state, except all the above -cities agree to do so. - -3. Likewise the Athenians shall go to the relief of Argos, -Mantinea, and Elis, if an enemy invade the country of Elis, -Mantinea, or Argos, according as the above cities may require by -message, in such way as they most effectually can, to the best of -their power. But if the invader be gone after plundering the -territory, the state offending shall be the enemy of the Athenians, -Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans, and war shall be made against it by -all these cities, and peace may not be made with that state except all -the above cities agree to it. - -4. No armed force shall be allowed to pass for hostile purposes -through the country of the powers contracting, or of the allies in -their respective empires, or to go by sea, except all the -cities--that is to say, Athens, Argos, Mantinea, and Elis--vote for -such passage. - -5. The relieving troops shall be maintained by the city sending -them for thirty days from their arrival in the city that has -required them, and upon their return in the same way: if their -services be desired for a longer period, the city that sent for them -shall maintain them, at the rate of three Aeginetan obols per day -for a heavy-armed soldier, archer, or light soldier, and an -Aeginetan drachma for a trooper. - -6. The city sending for the troops shall have the command when the -war is in its own country: but in case of the cities resolving upon -a joint expedition the command shall be equally divided among all -the cities. - -7. The treaty shall be sworn to by the Athenians for themselves -and their allies, by the Argives, Mantineans, Eleans, and their -allies, by each state individually. Each shall swear the oath most -binding in his country over full-grown victims: the oath being as -follows: - -"I STAND BY THE ALLIANCE AND ITS ARTICLES, JUSTLY, INNOCENTLY, AND -SINCERELY, AND I WILL NOT TRANSGRESS THE SAME IN ANY WAY OR MEANS -WHATSOEVER." - -The oath shall be taken at Athens by the Senate and the magistrates, -the Prytanes administering it: at Argos by the Senate, the Eighty, and the -Artynae, the Eighty administering it: at Mantinea by the Demiurgi, the -Senate, and the other magistrates, the Theori and Polemarchs -administering it: at Elis by the Demiurgi, the magistrates, and the -Six Hundred, the Demiurgi and the Thesmophylaces administering it. The -oaths shall be renewed by the Athenians going to Elis, Mantinea, and -Argos thirty days before the Olympic games: by the Argives, -Mantineans, and Eleans going to Athens ten days before the great feast -of the Panathenaea. The articles of the treaty, the oaths, and the -alliance shall be inscribed on a stone pillar by the Athenians in -the citadel, by the Argives in the market-place, in the temple of -Apollo: by the Mantineans in the temple of Zeus, in the -market-place: and a brazen pillar shall be erected jointly by them -at the Olympic games now at hand. Should the above cities see good -to make any addition in these articles, whatever all the above -cities shall agree upon, after consulting together, shall be binding. - -Although the treaty and alliances were thus concluded, still the -treaty between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians was not renounced by -either party. Meanwhile Corinth, although the ally of the Argives, did -not accede to the new treaty, any more than she had done to the -alliance, defensive and offensive, formed before this between the -Eleans, Argives, and Mantineans, when she declared herself content -with the first alliance, which was defensive only, and which bound -them to help each other, but not to join in attacking any. The -Corinthians thus stood aloof from their allies, and again turned their -thoughts towards Lacedaemon. - -At the Olympic games which were held this summer, and in which the -Arcadian Androsthenes was victor the first time in the wrestling and -boxing, the Lacedaemonians were excluded from the temple by the -Eleans, and thus prevented from sacrificing or contending, for -having refused to pay the fine specified in the Olympic law imposed -upon them by the Eleans, who alleged that they had attacked Fort -Phyrcus, and sent heavy infantry of theirs into Lepreum during the -Olympic truce. The amount of the fine was two thousand minae, two -for each heavy-armed soldier, as the law prescribes. The -Lacedaemonians sent envoys, and pleaded that the imposition was -unjust; saying that the truce had not yet been proclaimed at -Lacedaemon when the heavy infantry were sent off. But the Eleans -affirmed that the armistice with them had already begun (they proclaim -it first among themselves), and that the aggression of the -Lacedaemonians had taken them by surprise while they were living -quietly as in time of peace, and not expecting anything. Upon this the -Lacedaemonians submitted, that if the Eleans really believed that they -had committed an aggression, it was useless after that to proclaim the -truce at Lacedaemon; but they had proclaimed it notwithstanding, as -believing nothing of the kind, and from that moment the Lacedaemonians -had made no attack upon their country. Nevertheless the Eleans adhered -to what they had said, that nothing would persuade them that an -aggression had not been committed; if, however, the Lacedaemonians -would restore Lepreum, they would give up their own share of the money -and pay that of the god for them. - -As this proposal was not accepted, the Eleans tried a second. -Instead of restoring Lepreum, if this was objected to, the -Lacedaemonians should ascend the altar of the Olympian Zeus, as they -were so anxious to have access to the temple, and swear before the -Hellenes that they would surely pay the fine at a later day. This -being also refused, the Lacedaemonians were excluded from the -temple, the sacrifice, and the games, and sacrificed at home; the -Lepreans being the only other Hellenes who did not attend. Still the -Eleans were afraid of the Lacedaemonians sacrificing by force, and -kept guard with a heavy-armed company of their young men; being also -joined by a thousand Argives, the same number of Mantineans, and by -some Athenian cavalry who stayed at Harpina during the feast. Great -fears were felt in the assembly of the Lacedaemonians coming in -arms, especially after Lichas, son of Arcesilaus, a Lacedaemonian, had -been scourged on the course by the umpires; because, upon his horses -being the winners, and the Boeotian people being proclaimed the victor -on account of his having no right to enter, he came forward on the -course and crowned the charioteer, in order to show that the chariot -was his. After this incident all were more afraid than ever, and -firmly looked for a disturbance: the Lacedaemonians, however, kept -quiet, and let the feast pass by, as we have seen. After the Olympic -games, the Argives and the allies repaired to Corinth to invite her to -come over to them. There they found some Lacedaemonian envoys; and a -long discussion ensued, which after all ended in nothing, as an -earthquake occurred, and they dispersed to their different homes. - -Summer was now over. The winter following a battle took place -between the Heracleots in Trachinia and the Aenianians, Dolopians, -Malians, and certain of the Thessalians, all tribes bordering on and -hostile to the town, which directly menaced their country. -Accordingly, after having opposed and harassed it from its very -foundation by every means in their power, they now in this battle -defeated the Heracleots, Xenares, son of Cnidis, their Lacedaemonian -commander, being among the slain. Thus the winter ended and the -twelfth year of this war ended also. After the battle, Heraclea was so -terribly reduced that in the first days of the summer following the -Boeotians occupied the place and sent away the Lacedaemonian -Agesippidas for misgovernment, fearing that the town might be taken by -the Athenians while the Lacedaemonians were distracted with the -affairs of Peloponnese. The Lacedaemonians, nevertheless, were -offended with them for what they had done. - -The same summer Alcibiades, son of Clinias, now one of the -generals at Athens, in concert with the Argives and the allies, went -into Peloponnese with a few Athenian heavy infantry and archers and -some of the allies in those parts whom he took up as he passed, and -with this army marched here and there through Peloponnese, and settled -various matters connected with the alliance, and among other things -induced the Patrians to carry their walls down to the sea, intending -himself also to build a fort near the Achaean Rhium. However, the -Corinthians and Sicyonians, and all others who would have suffered -by its being built, came up and hindered him. - -The same summer war broke out between the Epidaurians and Argives. -The pretext was that the Epidaurians did not send an offering for -their pasture-land to Apollo Pythaeus, as they were bound to do, the -Argives having the chief management of the temple; but, apart from -this pretext, Alcibiades and the Argives were determined, if possible, -to gain possession of Epidaurus, and thus to ensure the neutrality -of Corinth and give the Athenians a shorter passage for their -reinforcements from Aegina than if they had to sail round Scyllaeum. -The Argives accordingly prepared to invade Epidaurus by themselves, to -exact the offering. - -About the same time the Lacedaemonians marched out with all their -people to Leuctra upon their frontier, opposite to Mount Lycaeum, -under the command of Agis, son of Archidamus, without any one -knowing their destination, not even the cities that sent the -contingents. The sacrifices, however, for crossing the frontier not -proving propitious, the Lacedaemonians returned home themselves, and -sent word to the allies to be ready to march after the month -ensuing, which happened to be the month of Carneus, a holy time for -the Dorians. Upon the retreat of the Lacedaemonians the Argives -marched out on the last day but three of the month before Carneus, and -keeping this as the day during the whole time that they were out, -invaded and plundered Epidaurus. The Epidaurians summoned their allies -to their aid, some of whom pleaded the month as an excuse; others came -as far as the frontier of Epidaurus and there remained inactive. - -While the Argives were in Epidaurus embassies from the cities -assembled at Mantinea, upon the invitation of the Athenians. The -conference having begun, the Corinthian Euphamidas said that their -actions did not agree with their words; while they were sitting -deliberating about peace, the Epidaurians and their allies and the -Argives were arrayed against each other in arms; deputies from each -party should first go and separate the armies, and then the talk about -peace might be resumed. In compliance with this suggestion, they -went and brought back the Argives from Epidaurus, and afterwards -reassembled, but without succeeding any better in coming to a -conclusion; and the Argives a second time invaded Epidaurus and -plundered the country. The Lacedaemonians also marched out to -Caryae; but the frontier sacrifices again proving unfavourable, they -went back again, and the Argives, after ravaging about a third of -the Epidaurian territory, returned home. Meanwhile a thousand Athenian -heavy infantry had come to their aid under the command of -Alcibiades, but finding that the Lacedaemonian expedition was at an -end, and that they were no longer wanted, went back again. - -So passed the summer. The next winter the Lacedaemonians managed -to elude the vigilance of the Athenians, and sent in a garrison of -three hundred men to Epidaurus, under the command of Agesippidas. Upon -this the Argives went to the Athenians and complained of their -having allowed an enemy to pass by sea, in spite of the clause in -the treaty by which the allies were not to allow an enemy to pass -through their country. Unless, therefore, they now put the -Messenians and Helots in Pylos to annoy the Lacedaemonians, they, -the Argives, should consider that faith had not been kept with them. -The Athenians were persuaded by Alcibiades to inscribe at the bottom -of the Laconian pillar that the Lacedaemonians had not kept their -oaths, and to convey the Helots at Cranii to Pylos to plunder the -country; but for the rest they remained quiet as before. During this -winter hostilities went on between the Argives and Epidaurians, -without any pitched battle taking place, but only forays and -ambuscades, in which the losses were small and fell now on one side -and now on the other. At the close of the winter, towards the -beginning of spring, the Argives went with scaling ladders to -Epidaurus, expecting to find it left unguarded on account of the war -and to be able to take it by assault, but returned unsuccessful. And -the winter ended, and with it the thirteenth year of the war ended -also. - -In the middle of the next summer the Lacedaemonians, seeing the -Epidaurians, their allies, in distress, and the rest of Peloponnese -either in revolt or disaffected, concluded that it was high time for -them to interfere if they wished to stop the progress of the evil, and -accordingly with their full force, the Helots included, took the field -against Argos, under the command of Agis, son of Archidamus, king of -the Lacedaemonians. The Tegeans and the other Arcadian allies of -Lacedaemon joined in the expedition. The allies from the rest of -Peloponnese and from outside mustered at Phlius; the Boeotians with -five thousand heavy infantry and as many light troops, and five -hundred horse and the same number of dismounted troopers; the -Corinthians with two thousand heavy infantry; the rest more or less as -might happen; and the Phliasians with all their forces, the army being -in their country. - -The preparations of the Lacedaemonians from the first had been known -to the Argives, who did not, however, take the field until the enemy -was on his road to join the rest at Phlius. Reinforced by the -Mantineans with their allies, and by three thousand Elean heavy -infantry, they advanced and fell in with the Lacedaemonians at -Methydrium in Arcadia. Each party took up its position upon a hill, -and the Argives prepared to engage the Lacedaemonians while they -were alone; but Agis eluded them by breaking up his camp in the night, -and proceeded to join the rest of the allies at Phlius. The Argives -discovering this at daybreak, marched first to Argos and then to the -Nemean road, by which they expected the Lacedaemonians and their -allies would come down. However, Agis, instead of taking this road -as they expected, gave the Lacedaemonians, Arcadians, and -Epidaurians their orders, and went along another difficult road, and -descended into the plain of Argos. The Corinthians, Pellenians, and -Phliasians marched by another steep road; while the Boeotians, -Megarians, and Sicyonians had instructions to come down by the -Nemean road where the Argives were posted, in order that, if the enemy -advanced into the plain against the troops of Agis, they might fall -upon his rear with their cavalry. These dispositions concluded, Agis -invaded the plain and began to ravage Saminthus and other places. - -Discovering this, the Argives came up from Nemea, day having now -dawned. On their way they fell in with the troops of the Phliasians -and Corinthians, and killed a few of the Phliasians and had perhaps -a few more of their own men killed by the Corinthians. Meanwhile the -Boeotians, Megarians, and Sicyonians, advancing upon Nemea according -to their instructions, found the Argives no longer there, as they -had gone down on seeing their property ravaged, and were now forming -for battle, the Lacedaemonians imitating their example. The Argives -were now completely surrounded; from the plain the Lacedaemonians -and their allies shut them off from their city; above them were the -Corinthians, Phliasians, and Pellenians; and on the side of Nemea -the Boeotians, Sicyonians, and Megarians. Meanwhile their army was -without cavalry, the Athenians alone among the allies not having yet -arrived. Now the bulk of the Argives and their allies did not see -the danger of their position, but thought that they could not have a -fairer field, having intercepted the Lacedaemonians in their own -country and close to the city. Two men, however, in the Argive army, -Thrasylus, one of the five generals, and Alciphron, the -Lacedaemonian proxenus, just as the armies were upon the point of -engaging, went and held a parley with Agis and urged him not to -bring on a battle, as the Argives were ready to refer to fair and -equal arbitration whatever complaints the Lacedaemonians might have -against them, and to make a treaty and live in peace in future. - -The Argives who made these statements did so upon their own -authority, not by order of the people, and Agis on his accepted -their proposals, and without himself either consulting the majority, -simply communicated the matter to a single individual, one of the high -officers accompanying the expedition, and granted the Argives a -truce for four months, in which to fulfil their promises; after -which he immediately led off the army without giving any explanation -to any of the other allies. The Lacedaemonians and allies followed -their general out of respect for the law, but amongst themselves -loudly blamed Agis for going away from so fair a field (the enemy -being hemmed in on every side by infantry and cavalry) without -having done anything worthy of their strength. Indeed this was by -far the finest Hellenic army ever yet brought together; and it -should have been seen while it was still united at Nemea, with the -Lacedaemonians in full force, the Arcadians, Boeotians, Corinthians, -Sicyonians, Pellenians, Phliasians and Megarians, and all these the -flower of their respective populations, thinking themselves a match -not merely for the Argive confederacy, but for another such added to -it. The army thus retired blaming Agis, and returned every man to -his home. The Argives however blamed still more loudly the persons who -had concluded the truce without consulting the people, themselves -thinking that they had let escape with the Lacedaemonians an -opportunity such as they should never see again; as the struggle would -have been under the walls of their city, and by the side of many and -brave allies. On their return accordingly they began to stone -Thrasylus in the bed of the Charadrus, where they try all military -causes before entering the city. Thrasylus fled to the altar, and so -saved his life; his property however they confiscated. - -After this arrived a thousand Athenian heavy infantry and three -hundred horse, under the command of Laches and Nicostratus; whom the -Argives, being nevertheless loath to break the truce with the -Lacedaemonians, begged to depart, and refused to bring before the -people, to whom they had a communication to make, until compelled to -do so by the entreaties of the Mantineans and Eleans, who were still -at Argos. The Athenians, by the mouth of Alcibiades their ambassador -there present, told the Argives and the allies that they had no -right to make a truce at all without the consent of their fellow -confederates, and now that the Athenians had arrived so opportunely -the war ought to be resumed. These arguments proving successful with -the allies, they immediately marched upon Orchomenos, all except the -Argives, who, although they had consented like the rest, stayed behind -at first, but eventually joined the others. They now all sat down -and besieged Orchomenos, and made assaults upon it; one of their -reasons for desiring to gain this place being that hostages from -Arcadia had been lodged there by the Lacedaemonians. The Orchomenians, -alarmed at the weakness of their wall and the numbers of the enemy, -and at the risk they ran of perishing before relief arrived, -capitulated upon condition of joining the league, of giving hostages -of their own to the Mantineans, and giving up those lodged with them -by the Lacedaemonians. Orchomenos thus secured, the allies now -consulted as to which of the remaining places they should attack next. -The Eleans were urgent for Lepreum; the Mantineans for Tegea; and -the Argives and Athenians giving their support to the Mantineans, -the Eleans went home in a rage at their not having voted for -Lepreum; while the rest of the allies made ready at Mantinea for going -against Tegea, which a party inside had arranged to put into their -hands. - -Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians, upon their return from Argos after -concluding the four months' truce, vehemently blamed Agis for not -having subdued Argos, after an opportunity such as they thought they -had never had before; for it was no easy matter to bring so many and -so good allies together. But when the news arrived of the capture of -Orchomenos, they became more angry than ever, and, departing from -all precedent, in the heat of the moment had almost decided to raze -his house, and to fine him ten thousand drachmae. Agis however -entreated them to do none of these things, promising to atone for -his fault by good service in the field, failing which they might -then do to him whatever they pleased; and they accordingly abstained -from razing his house or fining him as they had threatened to do, -and now made a law, hitherto unknown at Lacedaemon, attaching to him -ten Spartans as counsellors, without whose consent he should have no -power to lead an army out of the city. - -At this juncture arrived word from their friends in Tegea that, -unless they speedily appeared, Tegea would go over from them to the -Argives and their allies, if it had not gone over already. Upon this -news a force marched out from Lacedaemon, of the Spartans and Helots -and all their people, and that instantly and upon a scale never before -witnessed. Advancing to Orestheum in Maenalia, they directed the -Arcadians in their league to follow close after them to Tegea, and, -going on themselves as far as Orestheum, from thence sent back the -sixth part of the Spartans, consisting of the oldest and youngest men, -to guard their homes, and with the rest of their army arrived at -Tegea; where their Arcadian allies soon after joined them. Meanwhile -they sent to Corinth, to the Boeotians, the Phocians, and Locrians, -with orders to come up as quickly as possible to Mantinea. These had -but short notice; and it was not easy except all together, and after -waiting for each other, to pass through the enemy's country, which lay -right across and blocked up the line of communication. Nevertheless -they made what haste they could. Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians with the -Arcadian allies that had joined them, entered the territory of -Mantinea, and encamping near the temple of Heracles began to plunder -the country. - -Here they were seen by the Argives and their allies, who immediately -took up a strong and difficult position, and formed in order of -battle. The Lacedaemonians at once advanced against them, and came -on within a stone's throw or javelin's cast, when one of the older -men, seeing the enemy's position to be a strong one, hallooed to -Agis that he was minded to cure one evil with another; meaning that he -wished to make amends for his retreat, which had been so much -blamed, from Argos, by his present untimely precipitation. Meanwhile -Agis, whether in consequence of this halloo or of some sudden new idea -of his own, quickly led back his army without engaging, and entering -the Tegean territory, began to turn off into that of Mantinea the -water about which the Mantineans and Tegeans are always fighting, on -account of the extensive damage it does to whichever of the two -countries it falls into. His object in this was to make the Argives -and their allies come down from the hill, to resist the diversion of -the water, as they would be sure to do when they knew of it, and -thus to fight the battle in the plain. He accordingly stayed that -day where he was, engaged in turning off the water. The Argives and -their allies were at first amazed at the sudden retreat of the enemy -after advancing so near, and did not know what to make of it; but when -he had gone away and disappeared, without their having stirred to -pursue him, they began anew to find fault with their generals, who had -not only let the Lacedaemonians get off before, when they were so -happily intercepted before Argos, but who now again allowed them to -run away, without any one pursuing them, and to escape at their -leisure while the Argive army was leisurely betrayed. - The generals, half-stunned for the moment, afterwards led them -down from the hill, and went forward and encamped in the plain, with -the intention of attacking the enemy. - -The next day the Argives and their allies formed in the order in -which they meant to fight, if they chanced to encounter the enemy; and -the Lacedaemonians returning from the water to their old encampment by -the temple of Heracles, suddenly saw their adversaries close in -front of them, all in complete order, and advanced from the hill. A -shock like that of the present moment the Lacedaemonians do not ever -remember to have experienced: there was scant time for preparation, as -they instantly and hastily fell into their ranks, Agis, their king, -directing everything, agreeably to the law. For when a king is in -the field all commands proceed from him: he gives the word to the -Polemarchs; they to the Lochages; these to the Pentecostyes; these -again to the Enomotarchs, and these last to the Enomoties. In short -all orders required pass in the same way and quickly reach the troops; -as almost the whole Lacedaemonian army, save for a small part, -consists of officers under officers, and the care of what is to be -done falls upon many. - -In this battle the left wing was composed of the Sciritae, who in -a Lacedaemonian army have always that post to themselves alone; next -to these were the soldiers of Brasidas from Thrace, and the Neodamodes -with them; then came the Lacedaemonians themselves, company after -company, with the Arcadians of Heraea at their side. After these -were the Maenalians, and on the right wing the Tegeans with a few of -the Lacedaemonians at the extremity; their cavalry being posted upon -the two wings. Such was the Lacedaemonian formation. That of their -opponents was as follows: On the right were the Mantineans, the action -taking place in their country; next to them the allies from Arcadia; -after whom came the thousand picked men of the Argives, to whom the -state had given a long course of military training at the public -expense; next to them the rest of the Argives, and after them their -allies, the Cleonaeans and Orneans, and lastly the Athenians on the -extreme left, and lastly the Athenians on the extreme left, and -their own cavalry with them. - -Such were the order and the forces of the two combatants. The -Lacedaemonian army looked the largest; though as to putting down the -numbers of either host, or of the contingents composing it, I could -not do so with any accuracy. Owing to the secrecy of their -government the number of the Lacedaemonians was not known, and men are -so apt to brag about the forces of their country that the estimate -of their opponents was not trusted. The following calculation, -however, makes it possible to estimate the numbers of the -Lacedaemonians present upon this occasion. There were seven -companies in the field without counting the Sciritae, who numbered six -hundred men: in each company there were four Pentecostyes, and in -the Pentecosty four Enomoties. The first rank of the Enomoty was -composed of four soldiers: as to the depth, although they had not been -all drawn up alike, but as each captain chose, they were generally -ranged eight deep; the first rank along the whole line, exclusive of -the Sciritae, consisted of four hundred and forty-eight men. - -The armies being now on the eve of engaging, each contingent -received some words of encouragement from its own commander. The -Mantineans were, reminded that they were going to fight for their -country and to avoid returning to the experience of servitude after -having tasted that of empire; the Argives, that they would contend for -their ancient supremacy, to regain their once equal share of -Peloponnese of which they had been so long deprived, and to punish -an enemy and a neighbour for a thousand wrongs; the Athenians, of -the glory of gaining the honours of the day with so many and brave -allies in arms, and that a victory over the Lacedaemonians in -Peloponnese would cement and extend their empire, and would besides -preserve Attica from all invasions in future. These were the -incitements addressed to the Argives and their allies. The -Lacedaemonians meanwhile, man to man, and with their war-songs in -the ranks, exhorted each brave comrade to remember what he had -learnt before; well aware that the long training of action was of more -saving virtue than any brief verbal exhortation, though never so -well delivered. - -After this they joined battle, the Argives and their allies -advancing with haste and fury, the Lacedaemonians slowly and to the -music of many flute-players--a standing institution in their army, -that has nothing to do with religion, but is meant to make them -advance evenly, stepping in time, without break their order, as -large armies are apt to do in the moment of engaging. - -Just before the battle joined, King Agis resolved upon the following -manoeuvre. All armies are alike in this: on going into action they get -forced out rather on their right wing, and one and the other overlap -with this adversary's left; because fear makes each man do his best to -shelter his unarmed side with the shield of the man next him on the -right, thinking that the closer the shields are locked together the -better will he be protected. The man primarily responsible for this is -the first upon the right wing, who is always striving to withdraw from -the enemy his unarmed side; and the same apprehension makes the rest -follow him. On the present occasion the Mantineans reached with -their wing far beyond the Sciritae, and the Lacedaemonians and Tegeans -still farther beyond the Athenians, as their army was the largest. -Agis, afraid of his left being surrounded, and thinking that the -Mantineans outflanked it too far, ordered the Sciritae and -Brasideans to move out from their place in the ranks and make the line -even with the Mantineans, and told the Polemarchs Hipponoidas and -Aristocles to fill up the gap thus formed, by throwing themselves into -it with two companies taken from the right wing; thinking that his -right would still be strong enough and to spare, and that the line -fronting the Mantineans would gain in solidity. - -However, as he gave these orders in the moment of the onset, and -at short notice, it so happened that Aristocles and Hipponoidas -would not move over, for which offence they were afterwards banished -from Sparta, as having been guilty of cowardice; and the enemy -meanwhile closed before the Sciritae (whom Agis on seeing that the two -companies did not move over ordered to return to their place) had time -to fill up the breach in question. Now it was, however, that the -Lacedaemonians, utterly worsted in respect of skill, showed themselves -as superior in point of courage. As soon as they came to close -quarters with the enemy, the Mantinean right broke their Sciritae -and Brasideans, and, bursting in with their allies and the thousand -picked Argives into the unclosed breach in their line, cut up and -surrounded the Lacedaemonians, and drove them in full rout to the -wagons, slaying some of the older men on guard there. But the -Lacedaemonians, worsted in this part of the field, with the rest of -their army, and especially the centre, where the three hundred -knights, as they are called, fought round King Agis, fell on the older -men of the Argives and the five companies so named, and on the -Cleonaeans, the Orneans, and the Athenians next them, and instantly -routed them; the greater number not even waiting to strike a blow, but -giving way the moment that they came on, some even being trodden under -foot, in their fear of being overtaken by their assailants. - -The army of the Argives and their allies, having given way in this -quarter, was now completely cut in two, and the Lacedaemonian and -Tegean right simultaneously closing round the Athenians with the -troops that outflanked them, these last found themselves placed -between two fires, being surrounded on one side and already defeated -on the other. Indeed they would have suffered more severely than any -other part of the army, but for the services of the cavalry which they -had with them. Agis also on perceiving the distress of his left -opposed to the Mantineans and the thousand Argives, ordered all the -army to advance to the support of the defeated wing; and while this -took place, as the enemy moved past and slanted away from them, the -Athenians escaped at their leisure, and with them the beaten Argive -division. Meanwhile the Mantineans and their allies and the picked -body of the Argives ceased to press the enemy, and seeing their -friends defeated and the Lacedaemonians in full advance upon them, -took to flight. Many of the Mantineans perished; but the bulk of the -picked body of the Argives made good their escape. The flight and -retreat, however, were neither hurried nor long; the Lacedaemonians -fighting long and stubbornly until the rout of their enemy, but that -once effected, pursuing for a short time and not far. - -Such was the battle, as nearly as possible as I have described it; -the greatest that had occurred for a very long while among the -Hellenes, and joined by the most considerable states. The -Lacedaemonians took up a position in front of the enemy's dead, and -immediately set up a trophy and stripped the slain; they took up their -own dead and carried them back to Tegea, where they buried them, and -restored those of the enemy under truce. The Argives, Orneans, and -Cleonaeans had seven hundred killed; the Mantineans two hundred, and -the Athenians and Aeginetans also two hundred, with both their -generals. On the side of the Lacedaemonians, the allies did not suffer -any loss worth speaking of: as to the Lacedaemonians themselves it was -difficult to learn the truth; it is said, however, that there were -slain about three hundred of them. - -While the battle was impending, Pleistoanax, the other king, set out -with a reinforcement composed of the oldest and youngest men, and -got as far as Tegea, where he heard of the victory and went back -again. The Lacedaemonians also sent and turned back the allies from -Corinth and from beyond the Isthmus, and returning themselves -dismissed their allies, and kept the Carnean holidays, which -happened to be at that time. The imputations cast upon them by the -Hellenes at the time, whether of cowardice on account of the -disaster in the island, or of mismanagement and slowness generally, -were all wiped out by this single action: fortune, it was thought, -might have humbled them, but the men themselves were the same as ever. - -The day before this battle, the Epidaurians with all their forces -invaded the deserted Argive territory, and cut off many of the -guards left there in the absence of the Argive army. After the -battle three thousand Elean heavy infantry arriving to aid the -Mantineans, and a reinforcement of one thousand Athenians, all these -allies marched at once against Epidaurus, while the Lacedaemonians -were keeping the Carnea, and dividing the work among them began to -build a wall round the city. The rest left off; but the Athenians -finished at once the part assigned to them round Cape Heraeum; and -having all joined in leaving a garrison in the fortification in -question, they returned to their respective cities. - -Summer now came to an end. In the first days of the next winter, -when the Carnean holidays were over, the Lacedaemonians took the -field, and arriving at Tegea sent on to Argos proposals of -accommodation. They had before had a party in the town desirous of -overthrowing the democracy; and after the battle that had been fought, -these were now far more in a position to persuade the people to listen -to terms. Their plan was first to make a treaty with the -Lacedaemonians, to be followed by an alliance, and after this to -fall upon the commons. Lichas, son of Arcesilaus, the Argive proxenus, -accordingly arrived at Argos with two proposals from Lacedaemon, to -regulate the conditions of war or peace, according as they preferred -the one or the other. After much discussion, Alcibiades happening to -be in the town, the Lacedaemonian party, who now ventured to act -openly, persuaded the Argives to accept the proposal for -accommodation; which ran as follows: - -The assembly of the Lacedaemonians agrees to treat with the -Argives upon the terms following: - -1. The Argives shall restore to the Orchomenians their children, -and to the Maenalians their men, and shall restore the men they have -in Mantinea to the Lacedaemonians. - -2. They shall evacuate Epidaurus, and raze the fortification -there. If the Athenians refuse to withdraw from Epidaurus, they -shall be declared enemies of the Argives and of the Lacedaemonians, -and of the allies of the Lacedaemonians and the allies of the Argives. - -3. If the Lacedaemonians have any children in their custody, -they shall restore them every one to his city. - -4. As to the offering to the god, the Argives, if they wish, shall -impose an oath upon the Epidaurians, but, if not, they shall swear -it themselves. - -5. All the cities in Peloponnese, both small and great, shall be -independent according to the customs of their country. - -6. If any of the powers outside Peloponnese invade Peloponnesian -territory, the parties contracting shall unite to repel them, on -such terms as they may agree upon, as being most fair for the -Peloponnesians. - -7. All allies of the Lacedaemonians outside Peloponnese shall be -on the same footing as the Lacedaemonians, and the allies of the -Argives shall be on the same footing as the Argives, being left in -enjoyment of their own possessions. - -8. This treaty shall be shown to the allies, and shall be concluded, -if they approve; if the allies think fit, they may send the treaty -to be considered at home. - -The Argives began by accepting this proposal, and the -Lacedaemonian army returned home from Tegea. After this intercourse -was renewed between them, and not long afterwards the same party -contrived that the Argives should give up the league with the -Mantineans, Eleans, and Athenians, and should make a treaty and -alliance with the Lacedaemonians; which was consequently done upon the -terms following: - -The Lacedaemonians and Argives agree to a treaty and alliance -for fifty years upon the terms following: - -1. All disputes shall be decided by fair and impartial -arbitration, agreeably to the customs of the two countries. - -2. The rest of the cities in Peloponnese may be included in this -treaty and alliance, as independent and sovereign, in full enjoyment -of what they possess, all disputes being decided by fair and impartial -arbitration, agreeably to the customs of the said cities. - -3. All allies of the Lacedaemonians outside Peloponnese shall be -upon the same footing as the Lacedaemonians themselves, and the allies -of the Argives shall be upon the same footing as the Argives -themselves, continuing to enjoy what they possess. - -4. If it shall be anywhere necessary to make an expedition in -common, the Lacedaemonians and Argives shall consult upon it and -decide, as may be most fair for the allies. - -5. If any of the cities, whether inside or outside Peloponnese, -have a question whether of frontiers or otherwise, it must be settled, -but if one allied city should have a quarrel with another allied city, -it must be referred to some third city thought impartial by both -parties. Private citizens shall have their disputes decided -according to the laws of their several countries. - -The treaty and above alliance concluded, each party at once released -everything whether acquired by war or otherwise, and thenceforth -acting in common voted to receive neither herald nor embassy from -the Athenians unless they evacuated their forts and withdrew from -Peloponnese, and also to make neither peace nor war with any, except -jointly. Zeal was not wanting: both parties sent envoys to the -Thracian places and to Perdiccas, and persuaded the latter to join -their league. Still he did not at once break off from Athens, although -minded to do so upon seeing the way shown him by Argos, the original -home of his family. They also renewed their old oaths with the -Chalcidians and took new ones: the Argives, besides, sent -ambassadors to the Athenians, bidding them evacuate the fort at -Epidaurus. The Athenians, seeing their own men outnumbered by the rest -of the garrison, sent Demosthenes to bring them out. This general, -under colour of a gymnastic contest which he arranged on his -arrival, got the rest of the garrison out of the place, and shut the -gates behind them. Afterwards the Athenians renewed their treaty -with the Epidaurians, and by themselves gave up the fortress. - -After the defection of Argos from the league, the Mantineans, though -they held out at first, in the end finding themselves powerless -without the Argives, themselves too came to terms with Lacedaemon, and -gave up their sovereignty over the towns. The Lacedaemonians and -Argives, each a thousand strong, now took the field together, and -the former first went by themselves to Sicyon and made the -government there more oligarchical than before, and then both, -uniting, put down the democracy at Argos and set up an oligarchy -favourable to Lacedaemon. These events occurred at the close of the -winter, just before spring; and the fourteenth year of the war -ended. The next summer the people of Dium, in Athos, revolted from the -Athenians to the Chalcidians, and the Lacedaemonians settled affairs -in Achaea in a way more agreeable to the interests of their country. -Meanwhile the popular party at Argos little by little gathered new -consistency and courage, and waited for the moment of the -Gymnopaedic festival at Lacedaemon, and then fell upon the -oligarchs. After a fight in the city, victory declared for the -commons, who slew some of their opponents and banished others. The -Lacedaemonians for a long while let the messages of their friends at -Argos remain without effect. At last they put off the Gymnopaediae and -marched to their succour, but learning at Tegea the defeat of the -oligarchs, refused to go any further in spite of the entreaties of -those who had escaped, and returned home and kept the festival. -Later on, envoys arrived with messages from the Argives in the town -and from the exiles, when the allies were also at Sparta; and after -much had been said on both sides, the Lacedaemonians decided that -the party in the town had done wrong, and resolved to march against -Argos, but kept delaying and putting off the matter. Meanwhile the -commons at Argos, in fear of the Lacedaemonians, began again to -court the Athenian alliance, which they were convinced would be of the -greatest service to them; and accordingly proceeded to build long -walls to the sea, in order that in case of a blockade by land; with -the help of the Athenians they might have the advantage of importing -what they wanted by sea. Some of the cities in Peloponnese were also -privy to the building of these walls; and the Argives with all their -people, women and slaves not excepted, addressed themselves to the -work, while carpenters and masons came to them from Athens. - -Summer was now over. The winter following the Lacedaemonians, -hearing of the walls that were building, marched against Argos with -their allies, the Corinthians excepted, being also not without -intelligence in the city itself; Agis, son of Archidamus, their -king, was in command. The intelligence which they counted upon -within the town came to nothing; they however took and razed the walls -which were being built, and after capturing the Argive town Hysiae and -killing all the freemen that fell into their hands, went back and -dispersed every man to his city. After this the Argives marched into -Phlius and plundered it for harbouring their exiles, most of whom -had settled there, and so returned home. The same winter the Athenians -blockaded Macedonia, on the score of the league entered into by -Perdiccas with the Argives and Lacedaemonians, and also of his -breach of his engagements on the occasion of the expedition prepared -by Athens against the Chalcidians in the direction of Thrace and -against Amphipolis, under the command of Nicias, son of Niceratus, -which had to be broken up mainly because of his desertion. He was -therefore proclaimed an enemy. And thus the winter ended, and the -fifteenth year of the war ended with it. - - - - -CHAPTER XVII - -_Sixteenth Year of the War - The Melian Conference - Fate of Melos_ - -The next summer Alcibiades sailed with twenty ships to Argos and -seized the suspected persons still left of the Lacedaemonian faction -to the number of three hundred, whom the Athenians forthwith lodged in -the neighbouring islands of their empire. The Athenians also made an -expedition against the isle of Melos with thirty ships of their own, -six Chian, and two Lesbian vessels, sixteen hundred heavy infantry, -three hundred archers, and twenty mounted archers from Athens, and -about fifteen hundred heavy infantry from the allies and the -islanders. The Melians are a colony of Lacedaemon that would not -submit to the Athenians like the other islanders, and at first -remained neutral and took no part in the struggle, but afterwards upon -the Athenians using violence and plundering their territory, assumed -an attitude of open hostility. Cleomedes, son of Lycomedes, and -Tisias, son of Tisimachus, the generals, encamping in their -territory with the above armament, before doing any harm to their -land, sent envoys to negotiate. These the Melians did not bring before -the people, but bade them state the object of their mission to the -magistrates and the few; upon which the Athenian envoys spoke as -follows: - -Athenians. Since the negotiations are not to go on before the -people, in order that we may not be able to speak straight on -without interruption, and deceive the ears of the multitude by -seductive arguments which would pass without refutation (for we know -that this is the meaning of our being brought before the few), what if -you who sit there were to pursue a method more cautious still? Make no -set speech yourselves, but take us up at whatever you do not like, and -settle that before going any farther. And first tell us if this -proposition of ours suits you. - -The Melian commissioners answered: - -Melians. To the fairness of quietly instructing each other as you -propose there is nothing to object; but your military preparations are -too far advanced to agree with what you say, as we see you are come to -be judges in your own cause, and that all we can reasonably expect -from this negotiation is war, if we prove to have right on our side -and refuse to submit, and in the contrary case, slavery. - -Athenians. If you have met to reason about presentiments of the -future, or for anything else than to consult for the safety of your -state upon the facts that you see before you, we will give over; -otherwise we will go on. - -Melians. It is natural and excusable for men in our position to turn -more ways than one both in thought and utterance. However, the -question in this conference is, as you say, the safety of our country; -and the discussion, if you please, can proceed in the way which you -propose. - -Athenians. For ourselves, we shall not trouble you with specious -pretences--either of how we have a right to our empire because we -overthrew the Mede, or are now attacking you because of wrong that you -have done us--and make a long speech which would not be believed; and -in return we hope that you, instead of thinking to influence us by -saying that you did not join the Lacedaemonians, although their -colonists, or that you have done us no wrong, will aim at what is -feasible, holding in view the real sentiments of us both; since you -know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in -question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can -and the weak suffer what they must. - -Melians. As we think, at any rate, it is expedient--we speak as we -are obliged, since you enjoin us to let right alone and talk only of -interest--that you should not destroy what is our common protection, -the privilege of being allowed in danger to invoke what is fair and -right, and even to profit by arguments not strictly valid if they -can be got to pass current. And you are as much interested in this -as any, as your fall would be a signal for the heaviest vengeance -and an example for the world to meditate upon. - -Athenians. The end of our empire, if end it should, does not -frighten us: a rival empire like Lacedaemon, even if Lacedaemon was -our real antagonist, is not so terrible to the vanquished as -subjects who by themselves attack and overpower their rulers. This, -however, is a risk that we are content to take. We will now proceed to -show you that we are come here in the interest of our empire, and that -we shall say what we are now going to say, for the preservation of -your country; as we would fain exercise that empire over you without -trouble, and see you preserved for the good of us both. - -Melians. And how, pray, could it turn out as good for us to serve as -for you to rule? - -Athenians. Because you would have the advantage of submitting before -suffering the worst, and we should gain by not destroying you. - -Melians. So that you would not consent to our being neutral, friends -instead of enemies, but allies of neither side. - -Athenians. No; for your hostility cannot so much hurt us as your -friendship will be an argument to our subjects of our weakness, and -your enmity of our power. - -Melians. Is that your subjects' idea of equity, to put those who -have nothing to do with you in the same category with peoples that are -most of them your own colonists, and some conquered rebels? - -Athenians. As far as right goes they think one has as much of it -as the other, and that if any maintain their independence it is -because they are strong, and that if we do not molest them it is -because we are afraid; so that besides extending our empire we -should gain in security by your subjection; the fact that you are -islanders and weaker than others rendering it all the more important -that you should not succeed in baffling the masters of the sea. - -Melians. But do you consider that there is no security in the policy -which we indicate? For here again if you debar us from talking about -justice and invite us to obey your interest, we also must explain -ours, and try to persuade you, if the two happen to coincide. How -can you avoid making enemies of all existing neutrals who shall look -at case from it that one day or another you will attack them? And what -is this but to make greater the enemies that you have already, and -to force others to become so who would otherwise have never thought of -it? - -Athenians. Why, the fact is that continentals generally give us -but little alarm; the liberty which they enjoy will long prevent their -taking precautions against us; it is rather islanders like yourselves, -outside our empire, and subjects smarting under the yoke, who would be -the most likely to take a rash step and lead themselves and us into -obvious danger. - -Melians. Well then, if you risk so much to retain your empire, and -your subjects to get rid of it, it were surely great baseness and -cowardice in us who are still free not to try everything that can be -tried, before submitting to your yoke. - -Athenians. Not if you are well advised, the contest not being an -equal one, with honour as the prize and shame as the penalty, but a -question of self-preservation and of not resisting those who are far -stronger than you are. - -Melians. But we know that the fortune of war is sometimes more -impartial than the disproportion of numbers might lead one to suppose; -to submit is to give ourselves over to despair, while action still -preserves for us a hope that we may stand erect. - -Athenians. Hope, danger's comforter, may be indulged in by those who -have abundant resources, if not without loss at all events without -ruin; but its nature is to be extravagant, and those who go so far -as to put their all upon the venture see it in its true colours only -when they are ruined; but so long as the discovery would enable them -to guard against it, it is never found wanting. Let not this be the -case with you, who are weak and hang on a single turn of the scale; -nor be like the vulgar, who, abandoning such security as human means -may still afford, when visible hopes fail them in extremity, turn to -invisible, to prophecies and oracles, and other such inventions that -delude men with hopes to their destruction. - -Melians. You may be sure that we are as well aware as you of the -difficulty of contending against your power and fortune, unless the -terms be equal. But we trust that the gods may grant us fortune as -good as yours, since we are just men fighting against unjust, and that -what we want in power will be made up by the alliance of the -Lacedaemonians, who are bound, if only for very shame, to come to -the aid of their kindred. Our confidence, therefore, after all is -not so utterly irrational. - -Athenians. When you speak of the favour of the gods, we may as -fairly hope for that as yourselves; neither our pretensions nor our -conduct being in any way contrary to what men believe of the gods, -or practise among themselves. Of the gods we believe, and of men we -know, that by a necessary law of their nature they rule wherever -they can. And it is not as if we were the first to make this law, or -to act upon it when made: we found it existing before us, and shall -leave it to exist for ever after us; all we do is to make use of it, -knowing that you and everybody else, having the same power as we have, -would do the same as we do. Thus, as far as the gods are concerned, we -have no fear and no reason to fear that we shall be at a disadvantage. -But when we come to your notion about the Lacedaemonians, which -leads you to believe that shame will make them help you, here we bless -your simplicity but do not envy your folly. The Lacedaemonians, when -their own interests or their country's laws are in question, are the -worthiest men alive; of their conduct towards others much might be -said, but no clearer idea of it could be given than by shortly -saying that of all the men we know they are most conspicuous in -considering what is agreeable honourable, and what is expedient -just. Such a way of thinking does not promise much for the safety -which you now unreasonably count upon. - -Melians. But it is for this very reason that we now trust to their -respect for expediency to prevent them from betraying the Melians, -their colonists, and thereby losing the confidence of their friends in -Hellas and helping their enemies. - -Athenians. Then you do not adopt the view that expediency goes -with security, while justice and honour cannot be followed without -danger; and danger the Lacedaemonians generally court as little as -possible. - -Melians. But we believe that they would be more likely to face -even danger for our sake, and with more confidence than for others, as -our nearness to Peloponnese makes it easier for them to act, and our -common blood ensures our fidelity. - -Athenians. Yes, but what an intending ally trusts to is not the -goodwill of those who ask his aid, but a decided superiority of -power for action; and the Lacedaemonians look to this even more than -others. At least, such is their distrust of their home resources -that it is only with numerous allies that they attack a neighbour; now -is it likely that while we are masters of the sea they will cross over -to an island? - -Melians. But they would have others to send. The Cretan Sea is a -wide one, and it is more difficult for those who command it to -intercept others, than for those who wish to elude them to do so -safely. And should the Lacedaemonians miscarry in this, they would -fall upon your land, and upon those left of your allies whom -Brasidas did not reach; and instead of places which are not yours, you -will have to fight for your own country and your own confederacy. - -Athenians. Some diversion of the kind you speak of you may one day -experience, only to learn, as others have done, that the Athenians -never once yet withdrew from a siege for fear of any. But we are -struck by the fact that, after saying you would consult for the safety -of your country, in all this discussion you have mentioned nothing -which men might trust in and think to be saved by. Your strongest -arguments depend upon hope and the future, and your actual resources -are too scanty, as compared with those arrayed against you, for you to -come out victorious. You will therefore show great blindness of -judgment, unless, after allowing us to retire, you can find some -counsel more prudent than this. You will surely not be caught by -that idea of disgrace, which in dangers that are disgraceful, and at -the same time too plain to be mistaken, proves so fatal to mankind; -since in too many cases the very men that have their eyes perfectly -open to what they are rushing into, let the thing called disgrace, -by the mere influence of a seductive name, lead them on to a point -at which they become so enslaved by the phrase as in fact to fall -wilfully into hopeless disaster, and incur disgrace more disgraceful -as the companion of error, than when it comes as the result of -misfortune. This, if you are well advised, you will guard against; and -you will not think it dishonourable to submit to the greatest city -in Hellas, when it makes you the moderate offer of becoming its -tributary ally, without ceasing to enjoy the country that belongs to -you; nor when you have the choice given you between war and -security, will you be so blinded as to choose the worse. And it is -certain that those who do not yield to their equals, who keep terms -with their superiors, and are moderate towards their inferiors, on the -whole succeed best. Think over the matter, therefore, after our -withdrawal, and reflect once and again that it is for your country -that you are consulting, that you have not more than one, and that -upon this one deliberation depends its prosperity or ruin. - -The Athenians now withdrew from the conference; and the Melians, -left to themselves, came to a decision corresponding with what they -had maintained in the discussion, and answered: "Our resolution, -Athenians, is the same as it was at first. We will not in a moment -deprive of freedom a city that has been inhabited these seven -hundred years; but we put our trust in the fortune by which the gods -have preserved it until now, and in the help of men, that is, of the -Lacedaemonians; and so we will try and save ourselves. Meanwhile we -invite you to allow us to be friends to you and foes to neither party, -and to retire from our country after making such a treaty as shall -seem fit to us both." - -Such was the answer of the Melians. The Athenians now departing from -the conference said: "Well, you alone, as it seems to us, judging from -these resolutions, regard what is future as more certain than what -is before your eyes, and what is out of sight, in your eagerness, as -already coming to pass; and as you have staked most on, and trusted -most in, the Lacedaemonians, your fortune, and your hopes, so will you -be most completely deceived." - -The Athenian envoys now returned to the army; and the Melians -showing no signs of yielding, the generals at once betook themselves -to hostilities, and drew a line of circumvallation round the -Melians, dividing the work among the different states. Subsequently -the Athenians returned with most of their army, leaving behind them -a certain number of their own citizens and of the allies to keep guard -by land and sea. The force thus left stayed on and besieged the place. - -About the same time the Argives invaded the territory of Phlius -and lost eighty men cut off in an ambush by the Phliasians and -Argive exiles. Meanwhile the Athenians at Pylos took so much plunder -from the Lacedaemonians that the latter, although they still refrained -from breaking off the treaty and going to war with Athens, yet -proclaimed that any of their people that chose might plunder the -Athenians. The Corinthians also commenced hostilities with the -Athenians for private quarrels of their own; but the rest of the -Peloponnesians stayed quiet. Meanwhile the Melians attacked by night -and took the part of the Athenian lines over against the market, and -killed some of the men, and brought in corn and all else that they -could find useful to them, and so returned and kept quiet, while the -Athenians took measures to keep better guard in future. - -Summer was now over. The next winter the Lacedaemonians intended -to invade the Argive territory, but arriving at the frontier found the -sacrifices for crossing unfavourable, and went back again. This -intention of theirs gave the Argives suspicions of certain of their -fellow citizens, some of whom they arrested; others, however, -escaped them. About the same time the Melians again took another -part of the Athenian lines which were but feebly garrisoned. -Reinforcements afterwards arriving from Athens in consequence, under -the command of Philocrates, son of Demeas, the siege was now pressed -vigorously; and some treachery taking place inside, the Melians -surrendered at discretion to the Athenians, who put to death all the -grown men whom they took, and sold the women and children for -slaves, and subsequently sent out five hundred colonists and inhabited -the place themselves. - - - - -BOOK VI - -CHAPTER XVIII - -_Seventeenth Year of the War - The Sicilian Campaign - -Affair of the Hermae - Departure of the Expedition_ - -The same winter the Athenians resolved to sail again to Sicily, with -a greater armament than that under Laches and Eurymedon, and, if -possible, to conquer the island; most of them being ignorant of its -size and of the number of its inhabitants, Hellenic and barbarian, and -of the fact that they were undertaking a war not much inferior to that -against the Peloponnesians. For the voyage round Sicily in a -merchantman is not far short of eight days; and yet, large as the -island is, there are only two miles of sea to prevent its being -mainland. - -It was settled originally as follows, and the peoples that -occupied it are these. The earliest inhabitants spoken of in any -part of the country are the Cyclopes and Laestrygones; but I cannot -tell of what race they were, or whence they came or whither they went, -and must leave my readers to what the poets have said of them and to -what may be generally known concerning them. The Sicanians appear to -have been the next settlers, although they pretend to have been the -first of all and aborigines; but the facts show that they were -Iberians, driven by the Ligurians from the river Sicanus in Iberia. It -was from them that the island, before called Trinacria, took its -name of Sicania, and to the present day they inhabit the west of -Sicily. On the fall of Ilium, some of the Trojans escaped from the -Achaeans, came in ships to Sicily, and settled next to the Sicanians -under the general name of Elymi; their towns being called Eryx and -Egesta. With them settled some of the Phocians carried on their way -from Troy by a storm, first to Libya, and afterwards from thence to -Sicily. The Sicels crossed over to Sicily from their first home Italy, -flying from the Opicans, as tradition says and as seems not -unlikely, upon rafts, having watched till the wind set down the strait -to effect the passage; although perhaps they may have sailed over in -some other way. Even at the present day there are still Sicels in -Italy; and the country got its name of Italy from Italus, a king of -the Sicels, so called. These went with a great host to Sicily, -defeated the Sicanians in battle and forced them to remove to the -south and west of the island, which thus came to be called Sicily -instead of Sicania, and after they crossed over continued to enjoy the -richest parts of the country for near three hundred years before any -Hellenes came to Sicily; indeed they still hold the centre and north -of the island. There were also Phoenicians living all round Sicily, -who had occupied promontories upon the sea coasts and the islets -adjacent for the purpose of trading with the Sicels. But when the -Hellenes began to arrive in considerable numbers by sea, the -Phoenicians abandoned most of their stations, and drawing together -took up their abode in Motye, Soloeis, and Panormus, near the Elymi, -partly because they confided in their alliance, and also because these -are the nearest points for the voyage between Carthage and Sicily. - -These were the barbarians in Sicily, settled as I have said. Of -the Hellenes, the first to arrive were Chalcidians from Euboea with -Thucles, their founder. They founded Naxos and built the altar to -Apollo Archegetes, which now stands outside the town, and upon which -the deputies for the games sacrifice before sailing from Sicily. -Syracuse was founded the year afterwards by Archias, one of the -Heraclids from Corinth, who began by driving out the Sicels from the -island upon which the inner city now stands, though it is no longer -surrounded by water: in process of time the outer town also was -taken within the walls and became populous. Meanwhile Thucles and -the Chalcidians set out from Naxos in the fifth year after the -foundation of Syracuse, and drove out the Sicels by arms and founded -Leontini and afterwards Catana; the Catanians themselves choosing -Evarchus as their founder. - -About the same time Lamis arrived in Sicily with a colony from -Megara, and after founding a place called Trotilus beyond the river -Pantacyas, and afterwards leaving it and for a short while joining the -Chalcidians at Leontini, was driven out by them and founded Thapsus. -After his death his companions were driven out of Thapsus, and founded -a place called the Hyblaean Megara; Hyblon, a Sicel king, having given -up the place and inviting them thither. Here they lived two hundred -and forty-five years; after which they were expelled from the city and -the country by the Syracusan tyrant Gelo. Before their expulsion, -however, a hundred years after they had settled there, they sent out -Pamillus and founded Selinus; he having come from their mother country -Megara to join them in its foundation. Gela was founded by -Antiphemus from Rhodes and Entimus from Crete, who joined in leading a -colony thither, in the forty-fifth year after the foundation of -Syracuse. The town took its name from the river Gelas, the place where -the citadel now stands, and which was first fortified, being called -Lindii. The institutions which they adopted were Dorian. Near one -hundred and eight years after the foundation of Gela, the Geloans -founded Acragas (Agrigentum), so called from the river of that name, -and made Aristonous and Pystilus their founders; giving their own -institutions to the colony. Zancle was originally founded by pirates -from Cuma, the Chalcidian town in the country of the Opicans: -afterwards, however, large numbers came from Chalcis and the rest of -Euboea, and helped to people the place; the founders being Perieres -and Crataemenes from Cuma and Chalcis respectively. It first had the -name of Zancle given it by the Sicels, because the place is shaped -like a sickle, which the Sicels call zanclon; but upon the original -settlers being afterwards expelled by some Samians and other Ionians -who landed in Sicily flying from the Medes, and the Samians in their -turn not long afterwards by Anaxilas, tyrant of Rhegium, the town -was by him colonized with a mixed population, and its name changed -to Messina, after his old country. - -Himera was founded from Zancle by Euclides, Simus, and Sacon, most -of those who went to the colony being Chalcidians; though they were -joined by some exiles from Syracuse, defeated in a civil war, called -the Myletidae. The language was a mixture of Chalcidian and Doric, but -the institutions which prevailed were the Chalcidian. Acrae and -Casmenae were founded by the Syracusans; Acrae seventy years after -Syracuse, Casmenae nearly twenty after Acrae. Camarina was first -founded by the Syracusans, close upon a hundred and thirty-five -years after the building of Syracuse; its founders being Daxon and -Menecolus. But the Camarinaeans being expelled by arms by the -Syracusans for having revolted, Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, some time -later receiving their land in ransom for some Syracusan prisoners, -resettled Camarina, himself acting as its founder. Lastly, it was -again depopulated by Gelo, and settled once more for the third time by -the Geloans. - -Such is the list of the peoples, Hellenic and barbarian, -inhabiting Sicily, and such the magnitude of the island which the -Athenians were now bent upon invading; being ambitious in real truth -of conquering the whole, although they had also the specious design of -succouring their kindred and other allies in the island. But they were -especially incited by envoys from Egesta, who had come to Athens and -invoked their aid more urgently than ever. The Egestaeans had gone -to war with their neighbours the Selinuntines upon questions of -marriage and disputed territory, and the Selinuntines had procured the -alliance of the Syracusans, and pressed Egesta hard by land and sea. -The Egestaeans now reminded the Athenians of the alliance made in -the time of Laches, during the former Leontine war, and begged them to -send a fleet to their aid, and among a number of other -considerations urged as a capital argument that if the Syracusans were -allowed to go unpunished for their depopulation of Leontini, to ruin -the allies still left to Athens in Sicily, and to get the whole -power of the island into their hands, there would be a danger of their -one day coming with a large force, as Dorians, to the aid of their -Dorian brethren, and as colonists, to the aid of the Peloponnesians -who had sent them out, and joining these in pulling down the -Athenian empire. The Athenians would, therefore, do well to unite with -the allies still left to them, and to make a stand against the -Syracusans; especially as they, the Egestaeans, were prepared to -furnish money sufficient for the war. The Athenians, hearing these -arguments constantly repeated in their assemblies by the Egestaeans -and their supporters, voted first to send envoys to Egesta, to see -if there was really the money that they talked of in the treasury -and temples, and at the same time to ascertain in what posture was the -war with the Selinuntines. - -The envoys of the Athenians were accordingly dispatched to Sicily. -The same winter the Lacedaemonians and their allies, the Corinthians -excepted, marched into the Argive territory, and ravaged a small -part of the land, and took some yokes of oxen and carried off some -corn. They also settled the Argive exiles at Orneae, and left them a -few soldiers taken from the rest of the army; and after making a truce -for a certain while, according to which neither Orneatae nor Argives -were to injure each other's territory, returned home with the army. -Not long afterwards the Athenians came with thirty ships and six -hundred heavy infantry, and the Argives joining them with all their -forces, marched out and besieged the men in Orneae for one day; but -the garrison escaped by night, the besiegers having bivouacked some -way off. The next day the Argives, discovering it, razed Orneae to the -ground, and went back again; after which the Athenians went home in -their ships. Meanwhile the Athenians took by sea to Methone on the -Macedonian border some cavalry of their own and the Macedonian -exiles that were at Athens, and plundered the country of Perdiccas. -Upon this the Lacedaemonians sent to the Thracian Chalcidians, who had -a truce with Athens from one ten days to another, urging them to -join Perdiccas in the war, which they refused to do. And the winter -ended, and with it ended the sixteenth year of this war of which -Thucydides is the historian. - -Early in the spring of the following summer the Athenian envoys -arrived from Sicily, and the Egestaeans with them, bringing sixty -talents of uncoined silver, as a month's pay for sixty ships, which -they were to ask to have sent them. The Athenians held an assembly -and, after hearing from the Egestaeans and their own envoys a -report, as attractive as it was untrue, upon the state of affairs -generally, and in particular as to the money, of which, it was said, -there was abundance in the temples and the treasury, voted to send -sixty ships to Sicily, under the command of Alcibiades, son of -Clinias, Nicias, son of Niceratus, and Lamachus, son of Xenophanes, -who were appointed with full powers; they were to help the -Egestaeans against the Selinuntines, to restore Leontini upon -gaining any advantage in the war, and to order all other matters in -Sicily as they should deem best for the interests of Athens. Five days -after this a second assembly was held, to consider the speediest means -of equipping the ships, and to vote whatever else might be required by -the generals for the expedition; and Nicias, who had been chosen to -the command against his will, and who thought that the state was not -well advised, but upon a slight aid specious pretext was aspiring to -the conquest of the whole of Sicily, a great matter to achieve, came -forward in the hope of diverting the Athenians from the enterprise, -and gave them the following counsel: - -"Although this assembly was convened to consider the preparations to -be made for sailing to Sicily, I think, notwithstanding, that we -have still this question to examine, whether it be better to send out -the ships at all, and that we ought not to give so little consideration -to a matter of such moment, or let ourselves be persuaded by -foreigners into undertaking a war with which we have nothing to do. -And yet, individually, I gain in honour by such a course, and fear as -little as other men for my person--not that I think a man need be -any the worse citizen for taking some thought for his person and -estate; on the contrary, such a man would for his own sake desire -the prosperity of his country more than others--nevertheless, -as I have never spoken against my convictions to gain honour, I -shall not begin to do so now, but shall say what I think best. -Against your character any words of mine would be weak enough, if -I were to advise your keeping what you have got and not risking -what is actually yours for advantages which are dubious in themselves, -and which you may or may not attain. I will, therefore, content -myself with showing that your ardour is out of season, and your -ambition not easy of accomplishment. - -"I affirm, then, that you leave many enemies behind you here to go -yonder and bring more back with you. You imagine, perhaps, that the -treaty which you have made can be trusted; a treaty that will continue -to exist nominally, as long as you keep quiet--for nominal it has -become, owing to the practices of certain men here and at Sparta--but -which in the event of a serious reverse in any quarter would not delay -our enemies a moment in attacking us; first, because the convention -was forced upon them by disaster and was less honourable to them -than to us; and secondly, because in this very convention there are -many points that are still disputed. Again, some of the most -powerful states have never yet accepted the arrangement at all. Some -of these are at open war with us; others (as the Lacedaemonians do not -yet move) are restrained by truces renewed every ten days, and it is -only too probable that if they found our power divided, as we are -hurrying to divide it, they would attack us vigorously with the -Siceliots, whose alliance they would have in the past valued as they -would that of few others. A man ought, therefore, to consider these -points, and not to think of running risks with a country placed so -critically, or of grasping at another empire before we have secured -the one we have already; for in fact the Thracian Chalcidians have -been all these years in revolt from us without being yet subdued, -and others on the continents yield us but a doubtful obedience. -Meanwhile the Egestaeans, our allies, have been wronged, and we run to -help them, while the rebels who have so long wronged us still wait for -punishment. - -"And yet the latter, if brought under, might be kept under; while -the Sicilians, even if conquered, are too far off and too numerous -to be ruled without difficulty. Now it is folly to go against men -who could not be kept under even if conquered, while failure would -leave us in a very different position from that which we occupied -before the enterprise. The Siceliots, again, to take them as they -are at present, in the event of a Syracusan conquest (the favourite -bugbear of the Egestaeans), would to my thinking be even less -dangerous to us than before. At present they might possibly come -here as separate states for love of Lacedaemon; in the other case -one empire would scarcely attack another; for after joining the -Peloponnesians to overthrow ours, they could only expect to see the -same hands overthrow their own in the same way. The Hellenes in Sicily -would fear us most if we never went there at all, and next to this, if -after displaying our power we went away again as soon as possible. -We all know that that which is farthest off, and the reputation of -which can least be tested, is the object of admiration; at the least -reverse they would at once begin to look down upon us, and would -join our enemies here against us. You have yourselves experienced this -with regard to the Lacedaemonians and their allies, whom your -unexpected success, as compared with what you feared at first, has -made you suddenly despise, tempting you further to aspire to the -conquest of Sicily. Instead, however, of being puffed up by the -misfortunes of your adversaries, you ought to think of breaking -their spirit before giving yourselves up to confidence, and to -understand that the one thought awakened in the Lacedaemonians by -their disgrace is how they may even now, if possible, overthrow us and -repair their dishonour; inasmuch as military reputation is their -oldest and chiefest study. Our struggle, therefore, if we are wise, -will not be for the barbarian Egestaeans in Sicily, but how to -defend ourselves most effectually against the oligarchical -machinations of Lacedaemon. - -"We should also remember that we are but now enjoying some respite -from a great pestilence and from war, to the no small benefit of our -estates and persons, and that it is right to employ these at home on -our own behalf, instead of using them on behalf of these exiles -whose interest it is to lie as fairly as they can, who do nothing -but talk themselves and leave the danger to others, and who if they -succeed will show no proper gratitude, and if they fail will drag down -their friends with them. And if there be any man here, overjoyed at -being chosen to command, who urges you to make the expedition, -merely for ends of his own--specially if he be still too young to -command--who seeks to be admired for his stud of horses, but on -account of its heavy expenses hopes for some profit from his -appointment, do not allow such a one to maintain his private splendour -at his country's risk, but remember that such persons injure the -public fortune while they squander their own, and that this is a -matter of importance, and not for a young man to decide or hastily to -take in hand. - -"When I see such persons now sitting here at the side of that same -individual and summoned by him, alarm seizes me; and I, in my turn, -summon any of the older men that may have such a person sitting next -him not to let himself be shamed down, for fear of being thought a -coward if he do not vote for war, but, remembering how rarely -success is got by wishing and how often by forecast, to leave to -them the mad dream of conquest, and as a true lover of his country, -now threatened by the greatest danger in its history, to hold up his -hand on the other side; to vote that the Siceliots be left in the -limits now existing between us, limits of which no one can complain -(the Ionian sea for the coasting voyage, and the Sicilian across the -open main), to enjoy their own possessions and to settle their own -quarrels; that the Egestaeans, for their part, be told to end by -themselves with the Selinuntines the war which they began without -consulting the Athenians; and that for the future we do not enter into -alliance, as we have been used to do, with people whom we must help in -their need, and who can never help us in ours. - -"And you, Prytanis, if you think it your duty to care for the -commonwealth, and if you wish to show yourself a good citizen, put the -question to the vote, and take a second time the opinions of the -Athenians. If you are afraid to move the question again, consider that -a violation of the law cannot carry any prejudice with so many -abettors, that you will be the physician of your misguided city, and -that the virtue of men in office is briefly this, to do their -country as much good as they can, or in any case no harm that they can -avoid." - -Such were the words of Nicias. Most of the Athenians that came -forward spoke in favour of the expedition, and of not annulling what -had been voted, although some spoke on the other side. By far the -warmest advocate of the expedition was, however, Alcibiades, son of -Clinias, who wished to thwart Nicias both as his political opponent -and also because of the attack he had made upon him in his speech, and -who was, besides, exceedingly ambitious of a command by which he hoped -to reduce Sicily and Carthage, and personally to gain in wealth and -reputation by means of his successes. For the position he held among -the citizens led him to indulge his tastes beyond what his real -means would bear, both in keeping horses and in the rest of his -expenditure; and this later on had not a little to do with the ruin of -the Athenian state. Alarmed at the greatness of his licence in his own -life and habits, and of the ambition which he showed in all things -soever that he undertook, the mass of the people set him down as a -pretender to the tyranny, and became his enemies; and although -publicly his conduct of the war was as good as could be desired, -individually, his habits gave offence to every one, and caused them to -commit affairs to other hands, and thus before long to ruin the -city. Meanwhile he now came forward and gave the following advice to -the Athenians: - -"Athenians, I have a better right to command than others--I must -begin with this as Nicias has attacked me--and at the same time I -believe myself to be worthy of it. The things for which I am abused, -bring fame to my ancestors and to myself, and to the country profit -besides. The Hellenes, after expecting to see our city ruined by the -war, concluded it to be even greater than it really is, by reason of -the magnificence with which I represented it at the Olympic games, -when I sent into the lists seven chariots, a number never before -entered by any private person, and won the first prize, and was second -and fourth, and took care to have everything else in a style worthy of -my victory. Custom regards such displays as honourable, and they -cannot be made without leaving behind them an impression of power. -Again, any splendour that I may have exhibited at home in providing -choruses or otherwise, is naturally envied by my fellow citizens, -but in the eyes of foreigners has an air of strength as in the other -instance. And this is no useless folly, when a man at his own -private cost benefits not himself only, but his city: nor is it unfair -that he who prides himself on his position should refuse to be upon an -equality with the rest. He who is badly off has his misfortunes all to -himself, and as we do not see men courted in adversity, on the like -principle a man ought to accept the insolence of prosperity; or -else, let him first mete out equal measure to all, and then demand -to have it meted out to him. What I know is that persons of this -kind and all others that have attained to any distinction, although -they may be unpopular in their lifetime in their relations with -their fellow-men and especially with their equals, leave to -posterity the desire of claiming connection with them even without any -ground, and are vaunted by the country to which they belonged, not -as strangers or ill-doers, but as fellow-countrymen and heroes. Such -are my aspirations, and however I am abused for them in private, the -question is whether any one manages public affairs better than I do. -Having united the most powerful states of Peloponnese, without great -danger or expense to you, I compelled the Lacedaemonians to stake -their all upon the issue of a single day at Mantinea; and although -victorious in the battle, they have never since fully recovered -confidence. - -"Thus did my youth and so-called monstrous folly find fitting -arguments to deal with the power of the Peloponnesians, and by its -ardour win their confidence and prevail. And do not be afraid of my -youth now, but while I am still in its flower, and Nicias appears -fortunate, avail yourselves to the utmost of the services of us -both. Neither rescind your resolution to sail to Sicily, on the ground -that you would be going to attack a great power. The cities in -Sicily are peopled by motley rabbles, and easily change their -institutions and adopt new ones in their stead; and consequently the -inhabitants, being without any feeling of patriotism, are not provided -with arms for their persons, and have not regularly established -themselves on the land; every man thinks that either by fair words -or by party strife he can obtain something at the public expense, -and then in the event of a catastrophe settle in some other country, -and makes his preparations accordingly. From a mob like this you -need not look for either unanimity in counsel or concert in action; -but they will probably one by one come in as they get a fair offer, -especially if they are torn by civil strife as we are told. -Moreover, the Siceliots have not so many heavy infantry as they boast; -just as the Hellenes generally did not prove so numerous as each state -reckoned itself, but Hellas greatly over-estimated their numbers, -and has hardly had an adequate force of heavy infantry throughout this -war. The states in Sicily, therefore, from all that I can hear, will -be found as I say, and I have not pointed out all our advantages, -for we shall have the help of many barbarians, who from their hatred -of the Syracusans will join us in attacking them; nor will the -powers at home prove any hindrance, if you judge rightly. Our -fathers with these very adversaries, which it is said we shall now -leave behind us when we sail, and the Mede as their enemy as well, -were able to win the empire, depending solely on their superiority -at sea. The Peloponnesians had never so little hope against us as at -present; and let them be ever so sanguine, although strong enough to -invade our country even if we stay at home, they can never hurt us -with their navy, as we leave one of our own behind us that is a -match for them. - -"In this state of things what reason can we give to ourselves for -holding back, or what excuse can we offer to our allies in Sicily -for not helping them? They are our confederates, and we are bound to -assist them, without objecting that they have not assisted us. We -did not take them into alliance to have them to help us in Hellas, but -that they might so annoy our enemies in Sicily as to prevent them from -coming over here and attacking us. It is thus that empire has been -won, both by us and by all others that have held it, by a constant -readiness to support all, whether barbarians or Hellenes, that -invite assistance; since if all were to keep quiet or to pick and -choose whom they ought to assist, we should make but few new -conquests, and should imperil those we have already won. Men do not -rest content with parrying the attacks of a superior, but often strike -the first blow to prevent the attack being made. And we cannot fix the -exact point at which our empire shall stop; we have reached a position -in which we must not be content with retaining but must scheme to -extend it, for, if we cease to rule others, we are in danger of -being ruled ourselves. Nor can you look at inaction from the same -point of view as others, unless you are prepared to change your habits -and make them like theirs. - -"Be convinced, then, that we shall augment our power at home by this -adventure abroad, and let us make the expedition, and so humble the -pride of the Peloponnesians by sailing off to Sicily, and letting them -see how little we care for the peace that we are now enjoying; and -at the same time we shall either become masters, as we very easily -may, of the whole of Hellas through the accession of the Sicilian -Hellenes, or in any case ruin the Syracusans, to the no small -advantage of ourselves and our allies. The faculty of staying if -successful, or of returning, will be secured to us by our navy, as -we shall be superior at sea to all the Siceliots put together. And -do not let the do-nothing policy which Nicias advocates, or his -setting of the young against the old, turn you from your purpose, -but in the good old fashion by which our fathers, old and young -together, by their united counsels brought our affairs to their -present height, do you endeavour still to advance them; -understanding that neither youth nor old age can do anything the one -without the other, but that levity, sobriety, and deliberate -judgment are strongest when united, and that, by sinking into -inaction, the city, like everything else, will wear itself out, and -its skill in everything decay; while each fresh struggle will give -it fresh experience, and make it more used to defend itself not in -word but in deed. In short, my conviction is that a city not -inactive by nature could not choose a quicker way to ruin itself -than by suddenly adopting such a policy, and that the safest rule of -life is to take one's character and institutions for better and for -worse, and to live up to them as closely as one can." - -Such were the words of Alcibiades. After hearing him and the -Egestaeans and some Leontine exiles, who came forward reminding them -of their oaths and imploring their assistance, the Athenians became -more eager for the expedition than before. Nicias, perceiving that -it would be now useless to try to deter them by the old line of -argument, but thinking that he might perhaps alter their resolution by -the extravagance of his estimates, came forward a second time and -spoke as follows: - -"I see, Athenians, that you are thoroughly bent upon the expedition, -and therefore hope that all will turn out as we wish, and proceed to -give you my opinion at the present juncture. From all that I hear we -are going against cities that are great and not subject to one -another, or in need of change, so as to be glad to pass from -enforced servitude to an easier condition, or in the least likely to -accept our rule in exchange for freedom; and, to take only the -Hellenic towns, they are very numerous for one island. Besides Naxos -and Catana, which I expect to join us from their connection with -Leontini, there are seven others armed at all points just like our own -power, particularly Selinus and Syracuse, the chief objects of our -expedition. These are full of heavy infantry, archers, and darters, -have galleys in abundance and crowds to man them; they have also -money, partly in the hands of private persons, partly in the temples -at Selinus, and at Syracuse first-fruits from some of the barbarians -as well. But their chief advantage over us lies in the number of their -horses, and in the fact that they grow their corn at home instead of -importing it. - -"Against a power of this kind it will not do to have merely a weak -naval armament, but we shall want also a large land army to sail -with us, if we are to do anything worthy of our ambition, and are -not to be shut out from the country by a numerous cavalry; -especially if the cities should take alarm and combine, and we -should be left without friends (except the Egestaeans) to furnish us -with horse to defend ourselves with. It would be disgraceful to have -to retire under compulsion, or to send back for reinforcements, -owing to want of reflection at first: we must therefore start from -home with a competent force, seeing that we are going to sail far from -our country, and upon an expedition not like any which you may -undertaken undertaken the quality of allies, among your subject states -here in Hellas, where any additional supplies needed were easily drawn -from the friendly territory; but we are cutting ourselves off, and -going to a land entirely strange, from which during four months in -winter it is not even easy for a messenger get to Athens. - -"I think, therefore, that we ought to take great numbers of heavy -infantry, both from Athens and from our allies, and not merely from -our subjects, but also any we may be able to get for love or for money -in Peloponnese, and great numbers also of archers and slingers, to -make head against the Sicilian horse. Meanwhile we must have an -overwhelming superiority at sea, to enable us the more easily to carry -in what we want; and we must take our own corn in merchant vessels, -that is to say, wheat and parched barley, and bakers from the mills -compelled to serve for pay in the proper proportion; in order that -in case of our being weather-bound the armament may not want -provisions, as it is not every city that will be able to entertain -numbers like ours. We must also provide ourselves with everything else -as far as we can, so as not to be dependent upon others; and above all -we must take with us from home as much money as possible, as the -sums talked of as ready at Egesta are readier, you may be sure, in -talk than in any other way. - -"Indeed, even if we leave Athens with a force not only equal to that -of the enemy except in the number of heavy infantry in the field, -but even at all points superior to him, we shall still find it -difficult to conquer Sicily or save ourselves. We must not disguise -from ourselves that we go to found a city among strangers and enemies, -and that he who undertakes such an enterprise should be prepared to -become master of the country the first day he lands, or failing in -this to find everything hostile to him. Fearing this, and knowing that -we shall have need of much good counsel and more good fortune--a hard -matter for mortal man to aspire to--I wish as far as may be to make -myself independent of fortune before sailing, and when I do sail, to -be as safe as a strong force can make me. This I believe to be -surest for the country at large, and safest for us who are to go on -the expedition. If any one thinks differently I resign to him my -command." - -With this Nicias concluded, thinking that he should either disgust -the Athenians by the magnitude of the undertaking, or, if obliged to -sail on the expedition, would thus do so in the safest way possible. -The Athenians, however, far from having their taste for the voyage -taken away by the burdensomeness of the preparations, became more -eager for it than ever; and just the contrary took place of what -Nicias had thought, as it was held that he had given good advice, -and that the expedition would be the safest in the world. All alike -fell in love with the enterprise. The older men thought that they -would either subdue the places against which they were to sail, or -at all events, with so large a force, meet with no disaster; those -in the prime of life felt a longing for foreign sights and spectacles, -and had no doubt that they should come safe home again; while the idea -of the common people and the soldiery was to earn wages at the moment, -and make conquests that would supply a never-ending fund of pay for -the future. With this enthusiasm of the majority, the few that liked -it not, feared to appear unpatriotic by holding up their hands against -it, and so kept quiet. - -At last one of the Athenians came forward and called upon Nicias and -told him that he ought not to make excuses or put them off, but say at -once before them all what forces the Athenians should vote him. Upon -this he said, not without reluctance, that he would advise upon that -matter more at leisure with his colleagues; as far however as he could -see at present, they must sail with at least one hundred galleys--the -Athenians providing as many transports as they might determine, and -sending for others from the allies--not less than five thousand heavy -infantry in all, Athenian and allied, and if possible more; and the -rest of the armament in proportion; archers from home and from -Crete, and slingers, and whatever else might seem desirable, being got -ready by the generals and taken with them. - -Upon hearing this the Athenians at once voted that the generals -should have full powers in the matter of the numbers of the army and -of the expedition generally, to do as they judged best for the -interests of Athens. After this the preparations began; messages being -sent to the allies and the rolls drawn up at home. And as the city had -just recovered from the plague and the long war, and a number of young -men had grown up and capital had accumulated by reason of the truce, -everything was the more easily provided. - -In the midst of these preparations all the stone Hermae in the -city of Athens, that is to say the customary square figures, so common -in the doorways of private houses and temples, had in one night most -of them their fares mutilated. No one knew who had done it, but -large public rewards were offered to find the authors; and it was -further voted that any one who knew of any other act of impiety having -been committed should come and give information without fear of -consequences, whether he were citizen, alien, or slave. The matter was -taken up the more seriously, as it was thought to be ominous for the -expedition, and part of a conspiracy to bring about a revolution and -to upset the democracy. - -Information was given accordingly by some resident aliens and body -servants, not about the Hermae but about some previous mutilations -of other images perpetrated by young men in a drunken frolic, and of -mock celebrations of the mysteries, averred to take place in private -houses. Alcibiades being implicated in this charge, it was taken -hold of by those who could least endure him, because he stood in the -way of their obtaining the undisturbed direction of the people, and -who thought that if he were once removed the first place would be -theirs. These accordingly magnified the matter and loudly proclaimed -that the affair of the mysteries and the mutilation of the Hermae were -part and parcel of a scheme to overthrow the democracy, and that -nothing of all this had been done without Alcibiades; the proofs -alleged being the general and undemocratic licence of his life and -habits. - -Alcibiades repelled on the spot the charges in question, and also -before going on the expedition, the preparations for which were now -complete, offered to stand his trial, that it might be seen whether he -was guilty of the acts imputed to him; desiring to be punished if -found guilty, but, if acquitted, to take the command. Meanwhile he -protested against their receiving slanders against him in his absence, -and begged them rather to put him to death at once if he were -guilty, and pointed out the imprudence of sending him out at the -head of so large an army, with so serious a charge still undecided. -But his enemies feared that he would have the army for him if he -were tried immediately, and that the people might relent in favour -of the man whom they already caressed as the cause of the Argives -and some of the Mantineans joining in the expedition, and did their -utmost to get this proposition rejected, putting forward other orators -who said that he ought at present to sail and not delay the -departure of the army, and be tried on his return within a fixed -number of days; their plan being to have him sent for and brought home -for trial upon some graver charge, which they would the more easily -get up in his absence. Accordingly it was decreed that he should sail. - -After this the departure for Sicily took place, it being now about -midsummer. Most of the allies, with the corn transports and the -smaller craft and the rest of the expedition, had already received -orders to muster at Corcyra, to cross the Ionian Sea from thence in -a body to the Iapygian promontory. But the Athenians themselves, and -such of their allies as happened to be with them, went down to Piraeus -upon a day appointed at daybreak, and began to man the ships for -putting out to sea. With them also went down the whole population, one -may say, of the city, both citizens and foreigners; the inhabitants of -the country each escorting those that belonged to them, their friends, -their relatives, or their sons, with hope and lamentation upon their -way, as they thought of the conquests which they hoped to make, or -of the friends whom they might never see again, considering the long -voyage which they were going to make from their country. Indeed, at -this moment, when they were now upon the point of parting from one -another, the danger came more home to them than when they voted for -the expedition; although the strength of the armament, and the profuse -provision which they remarked in every department, was a sight that -could not but comfort them. As for the foreigners and the rest of -the crowd, they simply went to see a sight worth looking at and -passing all belief. - -Indeed this armament that first sailed out was by far the most -costly and splendid Hellenic force that had ever been sent out by a -single city up to that time. In mere number of ships and heavy -infantry that against Epidaurus under Pericles, and the same when -going against Potidaea under Hagnon, was not inferior; containing as -it did four thousand Athenian heavy infantry, three hundred horse, and -one hundred galleys accompanied by fifty Lesbian and Chian vessels and -many allies besides. But these were sent upon a short voyage and -with a scanty equipment. The present expedition was formed in -contemplation of a long term of service by land and sea alike, and was -furnished with ships and troops so as to be ready for either as -required. The fleet had been elaborately equipped at great cost to the -captains and the state; the treasury giving a drachma a day to each -seaman, and providing empty ships, sixty men-of-war and forty -transports, and manning these with the best crews obtainable; while -the captains gave a bounty in addition to the pay from the treasury to -the thranitae and crews generally, besides spending lavishly upon -figure-heads and equipments, and one and all making the utmost -exertions to enable their own ships to excel in beauty and fast -sailing. Meanwhile the land forces had been picked from the best -muster-rolls, and vied with each other in paying great attention to -their arms and personal accoutrements. From this resulted not only a -rivalry among themselves in their different departments, but an idea -among the rest of the Hellenes that it was more a display of power and -resources than an armament against an enemy. For if any one had -counted up the public expenditure of the state, and the private outlay -of individuals--that is to say, the sums which the state had already -spent upon the expedition and was sending out in the hands of the -generals, and those which individuals had expended upon their personal -outfit, or as captains of galleys had laid out and were still to lay -out upon their vessels; and if he had added to this the journey -money which each was likely to have provided himself with, -independently of the pay from the treasury, for a voyage of such -length, and what the soldiers or traders took with them for the -purpose of exchange--it would have been found that many talents in -all were being taken out of the city. Indeed the expedition became not -less famous for its wonderful boldness and for the splendour of its -appearance, than for its overwhelming strength as compared with the -peoples against whom it was directed, and for the fact that this was -the longest passage from home hitherto attempted, and the most -ambitious in its objects considering the resources of those who -undertook it. - -The ships being now manned, and everything put on board with which -they meant to sail, the trumpet commanded silence, and the prayers -customary before putting out to sea were offered, not in each ship -by itself, but by all together to the voice of a herald; and bowls -of wine were mixed through all the armament, and libations made by the -soldiers and their officers in gold and silver goblets. In their -prayers joined also the crowds on shore, the citizens and all others -that wished them well. The hymn sung and the libations finished, -they put out to sea, and first out in column then raced each other -as far as Aegina, and so hastened to reach Corcyra, where the rest -of the allied forces were also assembling. - - - - -CHAPTER XIX - -_Seventeenth Year of the War - Parties at Syracuse - Story of -Harmodius and Aristogiton - Disgrace of Alcibiades_ - -Meanwhile at Syracuse news came in from many quarters of the -expedition, but for a long while met with no credence whatever. -Indeed, an assembly was held in which speeches, as will be seen, -were delivered by different orators, believing or contradicting the -report of the Athenian expedition; among whom Hermocrates, son of -Hermon, came forward, being persuaded that he knew the truth of the -matter, and gave the following counsel: - -"Although I shall perhaps be no better believed than others have -been when I speak upon the reality of the expedition, and although I -know that those who either make or repeat statements thought not -worthy of belief not only gain no converts but are thought fools for -their pains, I shall certainly not be frightened into holding my -tongue when the state is in danger, and when I am persuaded that I can -speak with more authority on the matter than other persons. Much as -you wonder at it, the Athenians nevertheless have set out against us -with a large force, naval and military, professedly to help the -Egestaeans and to restore Leontini, but really to conquer Sicily, -and above all our city, which once gained, the rest, they think, -will easily follow. Make up your minds, therefore, to see them -speedily here, and see how you can best repel them with the means -under your hand, and do be taken off your guard through despising -the news, or neglect the common weal through disbelieving it. -Meanwhile those who believe me need not be dismayed at the force or -daring of the enemy. They will not be able to do us more hurt than -we shall do them; nor is the greatness of their armament altogether -without advantage to us. Indeed, the greater it is the better, with -regard to the rest of the Siceliots, whom dismay will make more -ready to join us; and if we defeat or drive them away, disappointed of -the objects of their ambition (for I do not fear for a moment that -they will get what they want), it will be a most glorious exploit -for us, and in my judgment by no means an unlikely one. Few indeed -have been the large armaments, either Hellenic or barbarian, that have -gone far from home and been successful. They cannot be more numerous -than the people of the country and their neighbours, all of whom -fear leagues together; and if they miscarry for want of supplies in -a foreign land, to those against whom their plans were laid none the -less they leave renown, although they may themselves have been the -main cause of their own discomfort. Thus these very Athenians rose -by the defeat of the Mede, in a great measure due to accidental -causes, from the mere fact that Athens had been the object of his -attack; and this may very well be the case with us also. - -"Let us, therefore, confidently begin preparations here; let us send -and confirm some of the Sicels, and obtain the friendship and alliance -of others, and dispatch envoys to the rest of Sicily to show that -the danger is common to all, and to Italy to get them to become our -allies, or at all events to refuse to receive the Athenians. I also -think that it would be best to send to Carthage as well; they are by -no means there without apprehension, but it is their constant fear -that the Athenians may one day attack their city, and they may perhaps -think that they might themselves suffer by letting Sicily be -sacrificed, and be willing to help us secretly if not openly, in one -way if not in another. They are the best able to do so, if they -will, of any of the present day, as they possess most gold and silver, -by which war, like everything else, flourishes. Let us also send to -Lacedaemon and Corinth, and ask them to come here and help us as -soon as possible, and to keep alive the war in Hellas. But the true -thing of all others, in my opinion, to do at the present moment, is -what you, with your constitutional love of quiet, will be slow to see, -and what I must nevertheless mention. If we Siceliots, all together, -or at least as many as possible besides ourselves, would only launch -the whole of our actual navy with two months' provisions, and meet the -Athenians at Tarentum and the Iapygian promontory, and show them -that before fighting for Sicily they must first fight for their -passage across the Ionian Sea, we should strike dismay into their -army, and set them on thinking that we have a base for our -defensive--for Tarentum is ready to receive us--while they have a wide -sea to cross with all their armament, which could with difficulty keep -its order through so long a voyage, and would be easy for us to attack -as it came on slowly and in small detachments. On the other hand, if -they were to lighten their vessels, and draw together their fast -sailers and with these attack us, we could either fall upon them -when they were wearied with rowing, or if we did not choose to do -so, we could retire to Tarentum; while they, having crossed with few -provisions just to give battle, would be hard put to it in desolate -places, and would either have to remain and be blockaded, or to try to -sail along the coast, abandoning the rest of their armament, and being -further discouraged by not knowing for certain whether the cities -would receive them. In my opinion this consideration alone would be -sufficient to deter them from putting out from Corcyra; and what -with deliberating and reconnoitring our numbers and whereabouts, -they would let the season go on until winter was upon them, or, -confounded by so unexpected a circumstance, would break up the -expedition, especially as their most experienced general has, as I -hear, taken the command against his will, and would grasp at the first -excuse offered by any serious demonstration of ours. We should also be -reported, I am certain, as more numerous than we really are, and men's -minds are affected by what they hear, and besides the first to attack, -or to show that they mean to defend themselves against an attack, -inspire greater fear because men see that they are ready for the -emergency. This would just be the case with the Athenians at -present. They are now attacking us in the belief that we shall not -resist, having a right to judge us severely because we did not help -the Lacedaemonians in crushing them; but if they were to see us -showing a courage for which they are not prepared, they would be -more dismayed by the surprise than they could ever be by our actual -power. I could wish to persuade you to show this courage; but if -this cannot be, at all events lose not a moment in preparing generally -for the war; and remember all of you that contempt for an assailant is -best shown by bravery in action, but that for the present the best -course is to accept the preparations which fear inspires as giving the -surest promise of safety, and to act as if the danger was real. That -the Athenians are coming to attack us, and are already upon the -voyage, and all but here--this is what I am sure of." - -Thus far spoke Hermocrates. Meanwhile the people of Syracuse were at -great strife among themselves; some contending that the Athenians -had no idea of coming and that there was no truth in what he said; -some asking if they did come what harm they could do that would not be -repaid them tenfold in return; while others made light of the whole -affair and turned it into ridicule. In short, there were few that -believed Hermocrates and feared for the future. Meanwhile Athenagoras, -the leader of the people and very powerful at that time with the -masses, came forward and spoke as follows: - -"For the Athenians, he who does not wish that they may be as -misguided as they are supposed to be, and that they may come here to -become our subjects, is either a coward or a traitor to his country; -while as for those who carry such tidings and fill you with so much -alarm, I wonder less at their audacity than at their folly if they -flatter themselves that we do not see through them. The fact is that -they have their private reasons to be afraid, and wish to throw the -city into consternation to have their own terrors cast into the -shade by the public alarm. In short, this is what these reports are -worth; they do not arise of themselves, but are concocted by men who -are always causing agitation here in Sicily. However, if you are -well advised, you will not be guided in your calculation of -probabilities by what these persons tell you, but by what shrewd men -and of large experience, as I esteem the Athenians to be, would be -likely to do. Now it is not likely that they would leave the -Peloponnesians behind them, and before they have well ended the war in -Hellas wantonly come in quest of a new war quite as arduous in Sicily; -indeed, in my judgment, they are only too glad that we do not go and -attack them, being so many and so great cities as we are. - -"However, if they should come as is reported, I consider Sicily -better able to go through with the war than Peloponnese, as being at -all points better prepared, and our city by itself far more than a -match for this pretended army of invasion, even were it twice as large -again. I know that they will not have horses with them, or get any -here, except a few perhaps from the Egestaeans; or be able to bring -a force of heavy infantry equal in number to our own, in ships which -will already have enough to do to come all this distance, however -lightly laden, not to speak of the transport of the other stores -required against a city of this magnitude, which will be no slight -quantity. In fact, so strong is my opinion upon the subject, that I do -not well see how they could avoid annihilation if they brought with -them another city as large as Syracuse, and settled down and carried -on war from our frontier; much less can they hope to succeed with -all Sicily hostile to them, as all Sicily will be, and with only a -camp pitched from the ships, and composed of tents and bare -necessaries, from which they would not be able to stir far for fear of -our cavalry. - -"But the Athenians see this as I tell you, and as I have reason to -know are looking after their possessions at home, while persons here -invent stories that neither are true nor ever will be. Nor is this the -first time that I see these persons, when they cannot resort to deeds, -trying by such stories and by others even more abominable to -frighten your people and get into their hands the government: it is -what I see always. And I cannot help fearing that trying so often they -may one day succeed, and that we, as long as we do not feel the smart, -may prove too weak for the task of prevention, or, when the -offenders are known, of pursuit. The result is that our city is rarely -at rest, but is subject to constant troubles and to contests as -frequent against herself as against the enemy, not to speak of -occasional tyrannies and infamous cabals. However, I will try, if -you will support me, to let nothing of this happen in our time, by -gaining you, the many, and by chastising the authors of such -machinations, not merely when they are caught in the act--a difficult -feat to accomplish--but also for what they have the wish though not -the power to do; as it is necessary to punish an enemy not only for -what he does, but also beforehand for what he intends to do, if the -first to relax precaution would not be also the first to suffer. I -shall also reprove, watch, and on occasion warn the few--the most -effectual way, in my opinion, of turning them from their evil courses. -And after all, as I have often asked, what would you have, young men? -Would you hold office at once? The law forbids it, a law enacted -rather because you are not competent than to disgrace you when -competent. Meanwhile you would not be on a legal equality with the -many! But how can it be right that citizens of the same state should -be held unworthy of the same privileges? - -"It will be said, perhaps, that democracy is neither wise nor -equitable, but that the holders of property are also the best fitted -to rule. I say, on the contrary, first, that the word demos, or -people, includes the whole state, oligarchy only a part; next, that if -the best guardians of property are the rich, and the best -counsellors the wise, none can hear and decide so well as the many; -and that all these talents, severally and collectively, have their -just place in a democracy. But an oligarchy gives the many their share -of the danger, and not content with the largest part takes and keeps -the whole of the profit; and this is what the powerful and young among -you aspire to, but in a great city cannot possibly obtain. - -"But even now, foolish men, most senseless of all the Hellenes -that I know, if you have no sense of the wickedness of your designs, -or most criminal if you have that sense and still dare to pursue -them--even now, if it is not a case for repentance, you may still -learn wisdom, and thus advance the interest of the country, the common -interest of us all. Reflect that in the country's prosperity the men -of merit in your ranks will have a share and a larger share than the -great mass of your fellow countrymen, but that if you have other -designs you run a risk of being deprived of all; and desist from -reports like these, as the people know your object and will not put up -with it. If the Athenians arrive, this city will repulse them in a -manner worthy of itself; we have moreover, generals who will see to -this matter. And if nothing of this be true, as I incline to -believe, the city will not be thrown into a panic by your -intelligence, or impose upon itself a self-chosen servitude by -choosing you for its rulers; the city itself will look into the -matter, and will judge your words as if they were acts, and, instead -of allowing itself to be deprived of its liberty by listening to -you, will strive to preserve that liberty, by taking care to have -always at hand the means of making itself respected." - -Such were the words of Athenagoras. One of the generals now stood up -and stopped any other speakers coming forward, adding these words of -his own with reference to the matter in hand: "It is not well for -speakers to utter calumnies against one another, or for their -hearers to entertain them; we ought rather to look to the intelligence -that we have received, and see how each man by himself and the city as -a whole may best prepare to repel the invaders. Even if there be no -need, there is no harm in the state being furnished with horses and -arms and all other insignia of war; and we will undertake to see to -and order this, and to send round to the cities to reconnoitre and -do all else that may appear desirable. Part of this we have seen to -already, and whatever we discover shall be laid before you." After -these words from the general, the Syracusans departed from the -assembly. - -In the meantime the Athenians with all their allies had now -arrived at Corcyra. Here the generals began by again reviewing the -armament, and made arrangements as to the order in which they were -to anchor and encamp, and dividing the whole fleet into three -divisions, allotted one to each of their number, to avoid sailing -all together and being thus embarrassed for water, harbourage, or -provisions at the stations which they might touch at, and at the -same time to be generally better ordered and easier to handle, by each -squadron having its own commander. Next they sent on three ships to -Italy and Sicily to find out which of the cities would receive them, -with instructions to meet them on the way and let them know before -they put in to land. - -After this the Athenians weighed from Corcyra, and proceeded to -cross to Sicily with an armament now consisting of one hundred and -thirty-four galleys in all (besides two Rhodian fifty-oars), of -which one hundred were Athenian vessels--sixty men-of-war, and forty -troopships--and the remainder from Chios and the other allies; five -thousand and one hundred heavy infantry in all, that is to say, -fifteen hundred Athenian citizens from the rolls at Athens and seven -hundred Thetes shipped as marines, and the rest allied troops, some of -them Athenian subjects, and besides these five hundred Argives, and -two hundred and fifty Mantineans serving for hire; four hundred and -eighty archers in all, eighty of whom were Cretans, seven hundred -slingers from Rhodes, one hundred and twenty light-armed exiles from -Megara, and one horse-transport carrying thirty horses. - -Such was the strength of the first armament that sailed over for the -war. The supplies for this force were carried by thirty ships of -burden laden with corn, which conveyed the bakers, stone-masons, and -carpenters, and the tools for raising fortifications, accompanied by -one hundred boats, like the former pressed into the service, besides -many other boats and ships of burden which followed the armament -voluntarily for purposes of trade; all of which now left Corcyra and -struck across the Ionian Sea together. The whole force making land -at the Iapygian promontory and Tarentum, with more or less good -fortune, coasted along the shores of Italy, the cities shutting -their markets and gates against them, and according them nothing but -water and liberty to anchor, and Tarentum and Locri not even that, -until they arrived at Rhegium, the extreme point of Italy. Here at -length they reunited, and not gaining admission within the walls -pitched a camp outside the city in the precinct of Artemis, where a -market was also provided for them, and drew their ships on shore and -kept quiet. Meanwhile they opened negotiations with the Rhegians, -and called upon them as Chalcidians to assist their Leontine -kinsmen; to which the Rhegians replied that they would not side with -either party, but should await the decision of the rest of the -Italiots, and do as they did. Upon this the Athenians now began to -consider what would be the best action to take in the affairs of -Sicily, and meanwhile waited for the ships sent on to come back from -Egesta, in order to know whether there was really there the money -mentioned by the messengers at Athens. - -In the meantime came in from all quarters to the Syracusans, as well -as from their own officers sent to reconnoitre, the positive tidings -that the fleet was at Rhegium; upon which they laid aside their -incredulity and threw themselves heart and soul into the work of -preparation. Guards or envoys, as the case might be, were sent round -to the Sicels, garrisons put into the posts of the Peripoli in the -country, horses and arms reviewed in the city to see that nothing -was wanting, and all other steps taken to prepare for a war which -might be upon them at any moment. - -Meanwhile the three ships that had been sent on came from Egesta -to the Athenians at Rhegium, with the news that so far from there -being the sums promised, all that could be produced was thirty -talents. The generals were not a little disheartened at being thus -disappointed at the outset, and by the refusal to join in the -expedition of the Rhegians, the people they had first tried to gain -and had had had most reason to count upon, from their relationship -to the Leontines and constant friendship for Athens. If Nicias was -prepared for the news from Egesta, his two colleagues were taken -completely by surprise. The Egestaeans had had recourse to the -following stratagem, when the first envoys from Athens came to inspect -their resources. They took the envoys in question to the temple of -Aphrodite at Eryx and showed them the treasures deposited there: -bowls, wine-ladles, censers, and a large number of other pieces of -plate, which from being in silver gave an impression of wealth quite -out of proportion to their really small value. They also privately -entertained the ships' crews, and collected all the cups of gold and -silver that they could find in Egesta itself or could borrow in the -neighbouring Phoenician and Hellenic towns, and each brought them to -the banquets as their own; and as all used pretty nearly the same, and -everywhere a great quantity of plate was shown, the effect was most -dazzling upon the Athenian sailors, and made them talk loudly of the -riches they had seen when they got back to Athens. The dupes in -question--who had in their turn persuaded the rest--when the news got -abroad that there was not the money supposed at Egesta, were much -blamed by the soldiers. - -Meanwhile the generals consulted upon what was to be done. The -opinion of Nicias was to sail with all the armament to Selinus, the -main object of the expedition, and if the Egestaeans could provide -money for the whole force, to advise accordingly; but if they could -not, to require them to supply provisions for the sixty ships that -they had asked for, to stay and settle matters between them and the -Selinuntines either by force or by agreement, and then to coast past -the other cities, and after displaying the power of Athens and proving -their zeal for their friends and allies, to sail home again (unless -they should have some sudden and unexpected opportunity of serving the -Leontines, or of bringing over some of the other cities), and not to -endanger the state by wasting its home resources. - -Alcibiades said that a great expedition like the present must not -disgrace itself by going away without having done anything; heralds -must be sent to all the cities except Selinus and Syracuse, and -efforts be made to make some of the Sicels revolt from the Syracusans, -and to obtain the friendship of others, in order to have corn and -troops; and first of all to gain the Messinese, who lay right in the -passage and entrance to Sicily, and would afford an excellent -harbour and base for the army. Thus, after bringing over the towns and -knowing who would be their allies in the war, they might at length -attack Syracuse and Selinus; unless the latter came to terms with -Egesta and the former ceased to oppose the restoration of Leontini. - -Lamachus, on the other hand, said that they ought to sail straight -to Syracuse, and fight their battle at once under the walls of the -town while the people were still unprepared, and the panic at its -height. Every armament was most terrible at first; if it allowed -time to run on without showing itself, men's courage revived, and they -saw it appear at last almost with indifference. By attacking suddenly, -while Syracuse still trembled at their coming, they would have the -best chance of gaining a victory for themselves and of striking a -complete panic into the enemy by the aspect of their numbers--which -would never appear so considerable as at present--by the anticipation -of coming disaster, and above all by the immediate danger of the -engagement. They might also count upon surprising many in the fields -outside, incredulous of their coming; and at the moment that the enemy -was carrying in his property the army would not want for booty if it -sat down in force before the city. The rest of the Siceliots would -thus be immediately less disposed to enter into alliance with the -Syracusans, and would join the Athenians, without waiting to see which -were the strongest. They must make Megara their naval station as a -place to retreat to and a base from which to attack: it was an -uninhabited place at no great distance from Syracuse either by land or -by sea. - -After speaking to this effect, Lamachus nevertheless gave his -support to the opinion of Alcibiades. After this Alcibiades sailed -in his own vessel across to Messina with proposals of alliance, but -met with no success, the inhabitants answering that they could not -receive him within their walls, though they would provide him with a -market outside. Upon this he sailed back to Rhegium. Immediately -upon his return the generals manned and victualled sixty ships out -of the whole fleet and coasted along to Naxos, leaving the rest of the -armament behind them at Rhegium with one of their number. Received -by the Naxians, they then coasted on to Catana, and being refused -admittance by the inhabitants, there being a Syracusan party in the -town, went on to the river Terias. Here they bivouacked, and the -next day sailed in single file to Syracuse with all their ships except -ten which they sent on in front to sail into the great harbour and see -if there was any fleet launched, and to proclaim by herald from -shipboard that the Athenians were come to restore the Leontines to -their country, as being their allies and kinsmen, and that such of -them, therefore, as were in Syracuse should leave it without fear -and join their friends and benefactors the Athenians. After making -this proclamation and reconnoitring the city and the harbours, and the -features of the country which they would have to make their base of -operations in the war, they sailed back to Catana. - -An assembly being held here, the inhabitants refused to receive -the armament, but invited the generals to come in and say what they -desired; and while Alcibiades was speaking and the citizens were -intent on the assembly, the soldiers broke down an ill-walled-up -postern gate without being observed, and getting inside the town, -flocked into the marketplace. The Syracusan party in the town no -sooner saw the army inside than they became frightened and withdrew, -not being at all numerous; while the rest voted for an alliance with -the Athenians and invited them to fetch the rest of their forces -from Rhegium. After this the Athenians sailed to Rhegium, and put off, -this time with all the armament, for Catana, and fell to work at their -camp immediately upon their arrival. - -Meanwhile word was brought them from Camarina that if they went -there the town would go over to them, and also that the Syracusans -were manning a fleet. The Athenians accordingly sailed alongshore with -all their armament, first to Syracuse, where they found no fleet -manning, and so always along the coast to Camarina, where they brought -to at the beach, and sent a herald to the people, who, however, -refused to receive them, saying that their oaths bound them to receive -the Athenians only with a single vessel, unless they themselves sent -for more. Disappointed here, the Athenians now sailed back again, -and after landing and plundering on Syracusan territory and losing -some stragglers from their light infantry through the coming up of the -Syracusan horse, so got back to Catana. - -There they found the Salaminia come from Athens for Alcibiades, with -orders for him to sail home to answer the charges which the state -brought against him, and for certain others of the soldiers who with -him were accused of sacrilege in the matter of the mysteries and of -the Hermae. For the Athenians, after the departure of the -expedition, had continued as active as ever in investigating the facts -of the mysteries and of the Hermae, and, instead of testing the -informers, in their suspicious temper welcomed all indifferently, -arresting and imprisoning the best citizens upon the evidence of -rascals, and preferring to sift the matter to the bottom sooner than -to let an accused person of good character pass unquestioned, owing to -the rascality of the informer. The commons had heard how oppressive -the tyranny of Pisistratus and his sons had become before it ended, -and further that that had been put down at last, not by themselves and -Harmodius, but by the Lacedaemonians, and so were always in fear and -took everything suspiciously. - -Indeed, the daring action of Aristogiton and Harmodius was -undertaken in consequence of a love affair, which I shall relate at -some length, to show that the Athenians are not more accurate than the -rest of the world in their accounts of their own tyrants and of the -facts of their own history. Pisistratus dying at an advanced age in -possession of the tyranny, was succeeded by his eldest son, Hippias, -and not Hipparchus, as is vulgarly believed. Harmodius was then in the -flower of youthful beauty, and Aristogiton, a citizen in the middle -rank of life, was his lover and possessed him. Solicited without -success by Hipparchus, son of Pisistratus, Harmodius told Aristogiton, -and the enraged lover, afraid that the powerful Hipparchus might -take Harmodius by force, immediately formed a design, such as his -condition in life permitted, for overthrowing the tyranny. In the -meantime Hipparchus, after a second solicitation of Harmodius, -attended with no better success, unwilling to use violence, arranged -to insult him in some covert way. Indeed, generally their government -was not grievous to the multitude, or in any way odious in practice; -and these tyrants cultivated wisdom and virtue as much as any, and -without exacting from the Athenians more than a twentieth of their -income, splendidly adorned their city, and carried on their wars, -and provided sacrifices for the temples. For the rest, the city was -left in full enjoyment of its existing laws, except that care was -always taken to have the offices in the hands of some one of the -family. Among those of them that held the yearly archonship at -Athens was Pisistratus, son of the tyrant Hippias, and named after his -grandfather, who dedicated during his term of office the altar to -the twelve gods in the market-place, and that of Apollo in the Pythian -precinct. The Athenian people afterwards built on to and lengthened -the altar in the market-place, and obliterated the inscription; but -that in the Pythian precinct can still be seen, though in faded -letters, and is to the following effect: - -Pisistratus, the son of Hippias, -Sent up this record of his archonship -In precinct of Apollo Pythias. - -That Hippias was the eldest son and succeeded to the government, -is what I positively assert as a fact upon which I have had more exact -accounts than others, and may be also ascertained by the following -circumstance. He is the only one of the legitimate brothers that -appears to have had children; as the altar shows, and the pillar -placed in the Athenian Acropolis, commemorating the crime of the -tyrants, which mentions no child of Thessalus or of Hipparchus, but -five of Hippias, which he had by Myrrhine, daughter of Callias, son of -Hyperechides; and naturally the eldest would have married first. -Again, his name comes first on the pillar after that of his father; -and this too is quite natural, as he was the eldest after him, and the -reigning tyrant. Nor can I ever believe that Hippias would have -obtained the tyranny so easily, if Hipparchus had been in power when -he was killed, and he, Hippias, had had to establish himself upon -the same day; but he had no doubt been long accustomed to overawe -the citizens, and to be obeyed by his mercenaries, and thus not only -conquered, but conquered with ease, without experiencing any of the -embarrassment of a younger brother unused to the exercise of -authority. It was the sad fate which made Hipparchus famous that got -him also the credit with posterity of having been tyrant. - -To return to Harmodius; Hipparchus having been repulsed in his -solicitations insulted him as he had resolved, by first inviting a -sister of his, a young girl, to come and bear a basket in a certain -procession, and then rejecting her, on the plea that she had never -been invited at all owing to her unworthiness. If Harmodius was -indignant at this, Aristogiton for his sake now became more -exasperated than ever; and having arranged everything with those who -were to join them in the enterprise, they only waited for the great -feast of the Panathenaea, the sole day upon which the citizens forming -part of the procession could meet together in arms without -suspicion. Aristogiton and Harmodius were to begin, but were to be -supported immediately by their accomplices against the bodyguard. -The conspirators were not many, for better security, besides which -they hoped that those not in the plot would be carried away by the -example of a few daring spirits, and use the arms in their hands to -recover their liberty. - -At last the festival arrived; and Hippias with his bodyguard was -outside the city in the Ceramicus, arranging how the different parts -of the procession were to proceed. Harmodius and Aristogiton had -already their daggers and were getting ready to act, when seeing one -of their accomplices talking familiarly with Hippias, who was easy -of access to every one, they took fright, and concluded that they were -discovered and on the point of being taken; and eager if possible to -be revenged first upon the man who had wronged them and for whom -they had undertaken all this risk, they rushed, as they were, within -the gates, and meeting with Hipparchus by the Leocorium recklessly -fell upon him at once, infuriated, Aristogiton by love, and -Harmodius by insult, and smote him and slew him. Aristogiton escaped -the guards at the moment, through the crowd running up, but was -afterwards taken and dispatched in no merciful way: Harmodius was -killed on the spot. - -When the news was brought to Hippias in the Ceramicus, he at once -proceeded not to the scene of action, but to the armed men in the -procession, before they, being some distance away, knew anything of -the matter, and composing his features for the occasion, so as not -to betray himself, pointed to a certain spot, and bade them repair -thither without their arms. They withdrew accordingly, fancying he had -something to say; upon which he told the mercenaries to remove the -arms, and there and then picked out the men he thought guilty and -all found with daggers, the shield and spear being the usual weapons -for a procession. - -In this way offended love first led Harmodius and Aristogiton to -conspire, and the alarm of the moment to commit the rash action -recounted. After this the tyranny pressed harder on the Athenians, and -Hippias, now grown more fearful, put to death many of the citizens, -and at the same time began to turn his eyes abroad for a refuge in -case of revolution. Thus, although an Athenian, he gave his -daughter, Archedice, to a Lampsacene, Aeantides, son of the tyrant -of Lampsacus, seeing that they had great influence with Darius. And -there is her tomb in Lampsacus with this inscription: - -Archedice lies buried in this earth, -Hippias her sire, and Athens gave her birth; -Unto her bosom pride was never known, -Though daughter, wife, and sister to the throne. - -Hippias, after reigning three years longer over the Athenians, was -deposed in the fourth by the Lacedaemonians and the banished -Alcmaeonidae, and went with a safe conduct to Sigeum, and to Aeantides -at Lampsacus, and from thence to King Darius; from whose court he -set out twenty years after, in his old age, and came with the Medes to -Marathon. - -With these events in their minds, and recalling everything they knew -by hearsay on the subject, the Athenian people grow difficult of -humour and suspicious of the persons charged in the affair of the -mysteries, and persuaded that all that had taken place was part of -an oligarchical and monarchical conspiracy. In the state of irritation -thus produced, many persons of consideration had been already thrown -into prison, and far from showing any signs of abating, public feeling -grew daily more savage, and more arrests were made; until at last -one of those in custody, thought to be the most guilty of all, was -induced by a fellow prisoner to make a revelation, whether true or not -is a matter on which there are two opinions, no one having been -able, either then or since, to say for certain who did the deed. -However this may be, the other found arguments to persuade him, that -even if he had not done it, he ought to save himself by gaining a -promise of impunity, and free the state of its present suspicions; -as he would be surer of safety if he confessed after promise of -impunity than if he denied and were brought to trial. He accordingly -made a revelation, affecting himself and others in the affair of the -Hermae; and the Athenian people, glad at last, as they supposed, to -get at the truth, and furious until then at not being able to discover -those who had conspired against the commons, at once let go the -informer and all the rest whom he had not denounced, and bringing -the accused to trial executed as many as were apprehended, and -condemned to death such as had fled and set a price upon their -heads. In this it was, after all, not clear whether the sufferers -had been punished unjustly, while in any case the rest of the city -received immediate and manifest relief. - -To return to Alcibiades: public feeling was very hostile to him, -being worked on by the same enemies who had attacked him before he -went out; and now that the Athenians fancied that they had got at -the truth of the matter of the Hermae, they believed more firmly -than ever that the affair of the mysteries also, in which he was -implicated, had been contrived by him in the same intention and was -connected with the plot against the democracy. Meanwhile it so -happened that, just at the time of this agitation, a small force of -Lacedaemonians had advanced as far as the Isthmus, in pursuance of -some scheme with the Boeotians. It was now thought that this had -come by appointment, at his instigation, and not on account of the -Boeotians, and that, if the citizens had not acted on the -information received, and forestalled them by arresting the prisoners, -the city would have been betrayed. The citizens went so far as to -sleep one night armed in the temple of Theseus within the walls. The -friends also of Alcibiades at Argos were just at this time suspected -of a design to attack the commons; and the Argive hostages deposited -in the islands were given up by the Athenians to the Argive people -to be put to death upon that account: in short, everywhere something -was found to create suspicion against Alcibiades. It was therefore -decided to bring him to trial and execute him, and the Salaminia was -sent to Sicily for him and the others named in the information, with -instructions to order him to come and answer the charges against -him, but not to arrest him, because they wished to avoid causing any -agitation in the army or among the enemy in Sicily, and above all to -retain the services of the Mantineans and Argives, who, it was -thought, had been induced to join by his influence. Alcibiades, with -his own ship and his fellow accused, accordingly sailed off with the -Salaminia from Sicily, as though to return to Athens, and went with -her as far as Thurii, and there they left the ship and disappeared, -being afraid to go home for trial with such a prejudice existing -against them. The crew of the Salaminia stayed some time looking for -Alcibiades and his companions, and at length, as they were nowhere -to be found, set sail and departed. Alcibiades, now an outlaw, crossed -in a boat not long after from Thurii to Peloponnese; and the Athenians -passed sentence of death by default upon him and those in his company. - - - - -CHAPTER XX - -_Seventeenth and Eighteenth Years of the War - Inaction of -the Athenian Army - Alcibiades at Sparta - Investment of Syracuse_ - -The Athenian generals left in Sicily now divided the armament into -two parts, and, each taking one by lot, sailed with the whole for -Selinus and Egesta, wishing to know whether the Egestaeans would -give the money, and to look into the question of Selinus and ascertain -the state of the quarrel between her and Egesta. Coasting along -Sicily, with the shore on their left, on the side towards the Tyrrhene -Gulf they touched at Himera, the only Hellenic city in that part of -the island, and being refused admission resumed their voyage. On their -way they took Hyccara, a petty Sicanian seaport, nevertheless at war -with Egesta, and making slaves of the inhabitants gave up the town -to the Egestaeans, some of whose horse had joined them; after which -the army proceeded through the territory of the Sicels until it -reached Catana, while the fleet sailed along the coast with the slaves -on board. Meanwhile Nicias sailed straight from Hyccara along the -coast and went to Egesta and, after transacting his other business and -receiving thirty talents, rejoined the forces. They now sold their -slaves for the sum of one hundred and twenty talents, and sailed round -to their Sicel allies to urge them to send troops; and meanwhile -went with half their own force to the hostile town of Hybla in the -territory of Gela, but did not succeed in taking it. - -Summer was now over. The winter following, the Athenians at once -began to prepare for moving on Syracuse, and the Syracusans on their -side for marching against them. From the moment when the Athenians -failed to attack them instantly as they at first feared and -expected, every day that passed did something to revive their courage; -and when they saw them sailing far away from them on the other side of -Sicily, and going to Hybla only to fail in their attempts to storm it, -they thought less of them than ever, and called upon their generals, -as the multitude is apt to do in its moments of confidence, to lead -them to Catana, since the enemy would not come to them. Parties also -of the Syracusan horse employed in reconnoitring constantly rode up to -the Athenian armament, and among other insults asked them whether they -had not really come to settle with the Syracusans in a foreign country -rather than to resettle the Leontines in their own. - -Aware of this, the Athenian generals determined to draw them out -in mass as far as possible from the city, and themselves in the -meantime to sail by night alongshore, and take up at their leisure a -convenient position. This they knew they could not so well do, if they -had to disembark from their ships in front of a force prepared for -them, or to go by land openly. The numerous cavalry of the -Syracusans (a force which they were themselves without) would then -be able to do the greatest mischief to their light troops and the -crowd that followed them; but this plan would enable them to take up a -position in which the horse could do them no hurt worth speaking of, -some Syracusan exiles with the army having told them of the spot -near the Olympieum, which they afterwards occupied. In pursuance of -their idea, the generals imagined the following stratagem. They sent -to Syracuse a man devoted to them, and by the Syracusan generals -thought to be no less in their interest; he was a native of Catana, -and said he came from persons in that place, whose names the Syracusan -generals were acquainted with, and whom they knew to be among the -members of their party still left in the city. He told them that the -Athenians passed the night in the town, at some distance from their -arms, and that if the Syracusans would name a day and come with all -their people at daybreak to attack the armament, they, their -friends, would close the gates upon the troops in the city, and set -fire to the vessels, while the Syracusans would easily take the camp -by an attack upon the stockade. In this they would be aided by many of -the Catanians, who were already prepared to act, and from whom he -himself came. - -The generals of the Syracusans, who did not want confidence, and who -had intended even without this to march on Catana, believed the man -without any sufficient inquiry, fixed at once a day upon which they -would be there, and dismissed him, and the Selinuntines and others -of their allies having now arrived, gave orders for all the Syracusans -to march out in mass. Their preparations completed, and the time fixed -for their arrival being at hand, they set out for Catana, and passed -the night upon the river Symaethus, in the Leontine territory. -Meanwhile the Athenians no sooner knew of their approach than they -took all their forces and such of the Sicels or others as had joined -them, put them on board their ships and boats, and sailed by night -to Syracuse. Thus, when morning broke the Athenians were landing -opposite the Olympieum ready to seize their camping ground, and the -Syracusan horse having ridden up first to Catana and found that all -the armament had put to sea, turned back and told the infantry, and -then all turned back together, and went to the relief of the city. - -In the meantime, as the march before the Syracusans was a long -one, the Athenians quietly sat down their army in a convenient -position, where they could begin an engagement when they pleased, -and where the Syracusan cavalry would have least opportunity of -annoying them, either before or during the action, being fenced off on -one side by walls, houses, trees, and by a marsh, and on the other -by cliffs. They also felled the neighbouring trees and carried them -down to the sea, and formed a palisade alongside of their ships, and -with stones which they picked up and wood hastily raised a fort at -Daskon, the most vulnerable point of their position, and broke down -the bridge over the Anapus. These preparations were allowed to go on -without any interruption from the city, the first hostile force to -appear being the Syracusan cavalry, followed afterwards by all the -foot together. At first they came close up to the Athenian army, and -then, finding that they did not offer to engage, crossed the -Helorine road and encamped for the night. - -The next day the Athenians and their allies prepared for battle, -their dispositions being as follows: Their right wing was occupied -by the Argives and Mantineans, the centre by the Athenians, and the -rest of the field by the other allies. Half their army was drawn up -eight deep in advance, half close to their tents in a hollow square, -formed also eight deep, which had orders to look out and be ready to -go to the support of the troops hardest pressed. The camp followers -were placed inside this reserve. The Syracusans, meanwhile, formed -their heavy infantry sixteen deep, consisting of the mass levy of -their own people, and such allies as had joined them, the strongest -contingent being that of the Selinuntines; next to them the cavalry of -the Geloans, numbering two hundred in all, with about twenty horse and -fifty archers from Camarina. The cavalry was posted on their right, -full twelve hundred strong, and next to it the darters. As the -Athenians were about to begin the attack, Nicias went along the lines, -and addressed these words of encouragement to the army and the nations -composing it: - -"Soldiers, a long exhortation is little needed by men like -ourselves, who are here to fight in the same battle, the force -itself being, to my thinking, more fit to inspire confidence than a -fine speech with a weak army. Where we have Argives, Mantineans, -Athenians, and the first of the islanders in the ranks together, it -were strange indeed, with so many and so brave companions in arms, -if we did not feel confident of victory; especially when we have -mass levies opposed to our picked troops, and what is more, Siceliots, -who may disdain us but will not stand against us, their skill not -being at all commensurate to their rashness. You may also remember -that we are far from home and have no friendly land near, except -what your own swords shall win you; and here I put before you a motive -just the reverse of that which the enemy are appealing to; their cry -being that they shall fight for their country, mine that we shall -fight for a country that is not ours, where we must conquer or -hardly get away, as we shall have their horse upon us in great -numbers. Remember, therefore, your renown, and go boldly against the -enemy, thinking the present strait and necessity more terrible than -they." - -After this address Nicias at once led on the army. The Syracusans -were not at that moment expecting an immediate engagement, and some -had even gone away to the town, which was close by; these now ran up -as hard as they could and, though behind time, took their places -here or there in the main body as fast as they joined it. Want of zeal -or daring was certainly not the fault of the Syracusans, either in -this or the other battles, but although not inferior in courage, so -far as their military science might carry them, when this failed -them they were compelled to give up their resolution also. On the -present occasion, although they had not supposed that the Athenians -would begin the attack, and although constrained to stand upon their -defence at short notice, they at once took up their arms and -advanced to meet them. First, the stone-throwers, slingers, and -archers of either army began skirmishing, and routed or were routed by -one another, as might be expected between light troops; next, -soothsayers brought forward the usual victims, and trumpeters urged on -the heavy infantry to the charge; and thus they advanced, the -Syracusans to fight for their country, and each individual for his -safety that day and liberty hereafter; in the enemy's army, the -Athenians to make another's country theirs and to save their own -from suffering by their defeat; the Argives and independent allies -to help them in getting what they came for, and to earn by victory -another sight of the country they had left behind; while the subject -allies owed most of their ardour to the desire of self-preservation, -which they could only hope for if victorious; next to which, as a -secondary motive, came the chance of serving on easier terms, after -helping the Athenians to a fresh conquest. - -The armies now came to close quarters, and for a long while fought -without either giving ground. Meanwhile there occurred some claps of -thunder with lightning and heavy rain, which did not fail to add to -the fears of the party fighting for the first time, and very little -acquainted with war; while to their more experienced adversaries these -phenomena appeared to be produced by the time of year, and much more -alarm was felt at the continued resistance of the enemy. At last the -Argives drove in the Syracusan left, and after them the Athenians -routed the troops opposed to them, and the Syracusan army was thus cut -in two and betook itself to flight. The Athenians did not pursue -far, being held in check by the numerous and undefeated Syracusan -horse, who attacked and drove back any of their heavy infantry whom -they saw pursuing in advance of the rest; in spite of which the -victors followed so far as was safe in a body, and then went back -and set up a trophy. Meanwhile the Syracusans rallied at the -Helorine road, where they re-formed as well as they could under the -circumstances, and even sent a garrison of their own citizens to the -Olympieum, fearing that the Athenians might lay hands on some of the -treasures there. The rest returned to the town. - -The Athenians, however, did not go to the temple, but collected -their dead and laid them upon a pyre, and passed the night upon the -field. The next day they gave the enemy back their dead under truce, -to the number of about two hundred and sixty, Syracusans and allies, -and gathered together the bones of their own, some fifty, Athenians -and allies, and taking the spoils of the enemy, sailed back to Catana. -It was now winter; and it did not seem possible for the moment to -carry on the war before Syracuse, until horse should have been sent -for from Athens and levied among the allies in Sicily--to do away -with their utter inferiority in cavalry--and money should have been -collected in the country and received from Athens, and until some of -the cities, which they hoped would be now more disposed to listen to -them after the battle, should have been brought over, and corn and all -other necessaries provided, for a campaign in the spring against -Syracuse. - -With this intention they sailed off to Naxos and Catana for the -winter. Meanwhile the Syracusans burned their dead and then held an -assembly, in which Hermocrates, son of Hermon, a man who with a -general ability of the first order had given proofs of military -capacity and brilliant courage in the war, came forward and encouraged -them, and told them not to let what had occurred make them give way, -since their spirit had not been conquered, but their want of -discipline had done the mischief. Still they had not been beaten by so -much as might have been expected, especially as they were, one might -say, novices in the art of war, an army of artisans opposed to the -most practised soldiers in Hellas. What had also done great mischief -was the number of the generals (there were fifteen of them) and the -quantity of orders given, combined with the disorder and -insubordination of the troops. But if they were to have a few -skilful generals, and used this winter in preparing their heavy -infantry, finding arms for such as had not got any, so as to make them -as numerous as possible, and forcing them to attend to their -training generally, they would have every chance of beating their -adversaries, courage being already theirs and discipline in the -field having thus been added to it. Indeed, both these qualities would -improve, since danger would exercise them in discipline, while their -courage would be led to surpass itself by the confidence which skill -inspires. The generals should be few and elected with full powers, and -an oath should be taken to leave them entire discretion in their -command: if they adopted this plan, their secrets would be better -kept, all preparations would be properly made, and there would be no -room for excuses. - -The Syracusans heard him, and voted everything as he advised, and -elected three generals, Hermocrates himself, Heraclides, son of -Lysimachus, and Sicanus, son of Execestes. They also sent envoys to -Corinth and Lacedaemon to procure a force of allies to join them, -and to induce the Lacedaemonians for their sakes openly to address -themselves in real earnest to the war against the Athenians, that they -might either have to leave Sicily or be less able to send -reinforcements to their army there. - -The Athenian forces at Catana now at once sailed against Messina, in -the expectation of its being betrayed to them. The intrigue, -however, after all came to nothing: Alcibiades, who was in the secret, -when he left his command upon the summons from home, foreseeing that -he would be outlawed, gave information of the plot to the friends of -the Syracusans in Messina, who had at once put to death its authors, -and now rose in arms against the opposite faction with those of -their way of thinking, and succeeded in preventing the admission of -the Athenians. The latter waited for thirteen days, and then, as -they were exposed to the weather and without provisions, and met -with no success, went back to Naxos, where they made places for -their ships to lie in, erected a palisade round their camp, and -retired into winter quarters; meanwhile they sent a galley to Athens -for money and cavalry to join them in the spring. During the winter -the Syracusans built a wall on to the city, so as to take in the -statue of Apollo Temenites, all along the side looking towards -Epipolae, to make the task of circumvallation longer and more -difficult, in case of their being defeated, and also erected a fort at -Megara and another in the Olympieum, and stuck palisades along the sea -wherever there was a landing Place. Meanwhile, as they knew that the -Athenians were wintering at Naxos, they marched with all their -people to Catana, and ravaged the land and set fire to the tents and -encampment of the Athenians, and so returned home. Learning also -that the Athenians were sending an embassy to Camarina, on the -strength of the alliance concluded in the time of Laches, to gain, -if possible, that city, they sent another from Syracuse to oppose -them. They had a shrewd suspicion that the Camarinaeans had not sent -what they did send for the first battle very willingly; and they now -feared that they would refuse to assist them at all in future, after -seeing the success of the Athenians in the action, and would join -the latter on the strength of their old friendship. Hermocrates, -with some others, accordingly arrived at Camarina from Syracuse, and -Euphemus and others from the Athenians; and an assembly of the -Camarinaeans having been convened, Hermocrates spoke as follows, in -the hope of prejudicing them against the Athenians: - -"Camarinaeans, we did not come on this embassy because we were -afraid of your being frightened by the actual forces of the Athenians, -but rather of your being gained by what they would say to you before -you heard anything from us. They are come to Sicily with the pretext -that you know, and the intention which we all suspect, in my opinion -less to restore the Leontines to their homes than to oust us from -ours; as it is out of all reason that they should restore in Sicily -the cities that they lay waste in Hellas, or should cherish the -Leontine Chalcidians because of their Ionian blood and keep in -servitude the Euboean Chalcidians, of whom the Leontines are a colony. -No; but the same policy which has proved so successful in Hellas is -now being tried in Sicily. After being chosen as the leaders of the -Ionians and of the other allies of Athenian origin, to punish the -Mede, the Athenians accused some of failure in military service, -some of fighting against each other, and others, as the case might be, -upon any colourable pretext that could be found, until they thus -subdued them all. In fine, in the struggle against the Medes, the -Athenians did not fight for the liberty of the Hellenes, or the -Hellenes for their own liberty, but the former to make their -countrymen serve them instead of him, the latter to change one -master for another, wiser indeed than the first, but wiser for evil. - -"But we are not now come to declare to an audience familiar with -them the misdeeds of a state so open to accusation as is the Athenian, -but much rather to blame ourselves, who, with the warnings we -possess in the Hellenes in those parts that have been enslaved through -not supporting each other, and seeing the same sophisms being now -tried upon ourselves--such as restorations of Leontine kinsfolk and -support of Egestaean allies--do not stand together and resolutely -show them that here are no Ionians, or Hellespontines, or islanders, -who change continually, but always serve a master, sometimes the -Mede and sometimes some other, but free Dorians from independent -Peloponnese, dwelling in Sicily. Or, are we waiting until we be -taken in detail, one city after another; knowing as we do that in no -other way can we be conquered, and seeing that they turn to this plan, -so as to divide some of us by words, to draw some by the bait of an -alliance into open war with each other, and to ruin others by such -flattery as different circumstances may render acceptable? And do we -fancy when destruction first overtakes a distant fellow countryman -that the danger will not come to each of us also, or that he who -suffers before us will suffer in himself alone? - -"As for the Camarinaean who says that it is the Syracusan, not he, -that is the enemy of the Athenian, and who thinks it hard to have to -encounter risk in behalf of my country, I would have him bear in -mind that he will fight in my country, not more for mine than for -his own, and by so much the more safely in that he will enter on the -struggle not alone, after the way has been cleared by my ruin, but -with me as his ally, and that the object of the Athenian is not so -much to punish the enmity of the Syracusan as to use me as a blind -to secure the friendship of the Camarinaean. As for him who envies -or even fears us (and envied and feared great powers must always -be), and who on this account wishes Syracuse to be humbled to teach us -a lesson, but would still have her survive, in the interest of his own -security the wish that he indulges is not humanly possible. A man -can control his own desires, but he cannot likewise control -circumstances; and in the event of his calculations proving -mistaken, he may live to bewail his own misfortune, and wish to be -again envying my prosperity. An idle wish, if he now sacrifice us -and refuse to take his share of perils which are the same, in -reality though not in name, for him as for us; what is nominally the -preservation of our power being really his own salvation. It was to be -expected that you, of all people in the world, Camarinaeans, being our -immediate neighbours and the next in danger, would have foreseen this, -and instead of supporting us in the lukewarm way that you are now -doing, would rather come to us of your own accord, and be now offering -at Syracuse the aid which you would have asked for at Camarina, if -to Camarina the Athenians had first come, to encourage us to resist -the invader. Neither you, however, nor the rest have as yet -bestirred yourselves in this direction. - -"Fear perhaps will make you study to do right both by us and by -the invaders, and plead that you have an alliance with the -Athenians. But you made that alliance, not against your friends, but -against the enemies that might attack you, and to help the Athenians -when they were wronged by others, not when as now they are wronging -their neighbours. Even the Rhegians, Chalcidians though they be, -refuse to help to restore the Chalcidian Leontines; and it would be -strange if, while they suspect the gist of this fine pretence and -are wise without reason, you, with every reason on your side, should -yet choose to assist your natural enemies, and should join with -their direst foes in undoing those whom nature has made your own -kinsfolk. This is not to do right; but you should help us without fear -of their armament, which has no terrors if we hold together, but -only if we let them succeed in their endeavours to separate us; -since even after attacking us by ourselves and being victorious in -battle, they had to go off without effecting their purpose. - -"United, therefore, we have no cause to despair, but rather new -encouragement to league together; especially as succour will come to -us from the Peloponnesians, in military matters the undoubted -superiors of the Athenians. And you need not think that your prudent -policy of taking sides with neither, because allies of both, is either -safe for you or fair to us. Practically it is not as fair as it -pretends to be. If the vanquished be defeated, and the victor conquer, -through your refusing to join, what is the effect of your abstention -but to leave the former to perish unaided, and to allow the latter -to offend unhindered? And yet it were more honourable to join those -who are not only the injured party, but your own kindred, and by so -doing to defend the common interests of Sicily and save your friends -the Athenians from doing wrong. - -"In conclusion, we Syracusans say that it is useless for us to -demonstrate either to you or to the rest what you know already as well -as we do; but we entreat, and if our entreaty fail, we protest that we -are menaced by our eternal enemies the Ionians, and are betrayed by -you our fellow Dorians. If the Athenians reduce us, they will owe -their victory to your decision, but in their own name will reap the -honour, and will receive as the prize of their triumph the very men -who enabled them to gain it. On the other hand, if we are the -conquerors, you will have to pay for having been the cause of our -danger. Consider, therefore; and now make your choice between the -security which present servitude offers and the prospect of conquering -with us and so escaping disgraceful submission to an Athenian master -and avoiding the lasting enmity of Syracuse." - -Such were the words of Hermocrates; after whom Euphemus, the -Athenian ambassador, spoke as follows: - -"Although we came here only to renew the former alliance, the attack -of the Syracusans compels us to speak of our empire and of the good -right we have to it. The best proof of this the speaker himself -furnished, when he called the Ionians eternal enemies of the -Dorians. It is the fact; and the Peloponnesian Dorians being our -superiors in numbers and next neighbours, we Ionians looked out for -the best means of escaping their domination. After the Median War we -had a fleet, and so got rid of the empire and supremacy of the -Lacedaemonians, who had no right to give orders to us more than we -to them, except that of being the strongest at that moment; and -being appointed leaders of the King's former subjects, we continue -to be so, thinking that we are least likely to fall under the dominion -of the Peloponnesians, if we have a force to defend ourselves with, -and in strict truth having done nothing unfair in reducing to -subjection the Ionians and islanders, the kinsfolk whom the Syracusans -say we have enslaved. They, our kinsfolk, came against their mother -country, that is to say against us, together with the Mede, and, -instead of having the courage to revolt and sacrifice their property -as we did when we abandoned our city, chose to be slaves themselves, -and to try to make us so. - -"We, therefore, deserve to rule because we placed the largest -fleet and an unflinching patriotism at the service of the Hellenes, -and because these, our subjects, did us mischief by their ready -subservience to the Medes; and, desert apart, we seek to strengthen -ourselves against the Peloponnesians. We make no fine profession of -having a right to rule because we overthrew the barbarian -single-handed, or because we risked what we did risk for the freedom -of the subjects in question any more than for that of all, and for our -own: no one can be quarrelled with for providing for his proper -safety. If we are now here in Sicily, it is equally in the interest of -our security, with which we perceive that your interest also -coincides. We prove this from the conduct which the Syracusans cast -against us and which you somewhat too timorously suspect; knowing that -those whom fear has made suspicious may be carried away by the charm -of eloquence for the moment, but when they come to act follow their -interests. - -"Now, as we have said, fear makes us hold our empire in Hellas, -and fear makes us now come, with the help of our friends, to order -safely matters in Sicily, and not to enslave any but rather to prevent -any from being enslaved. Meanwhile, let no one imagine that we are -interesting ourselves in you without your having anything to do with -us, seeing that, if you are preserved and able to make head against -the Syracusans, they will be less likely to harm us by sending -troops to the Peloponnesians. In this way you have everything to do -with us, and on this account it is perfectly reasonable for us to -restore the Leontines, and to make them, not subjects like their -kinsmen in Euboea, but as powerful as possible, to help us by annoying -the Syracusans from their frontier. In Hellas we are alone a match for -our enemies; and as for the assertion that it is out of all reason -that we should free the Sicilian, while we enslave the Chalcidian, the -fact is that the latter is useful to us by being without arms and -contributing money only; while the former, the Leontines and our other -friends, cannot be too independent. - -"Besides, for tyrants and imperial cities nothing is unreasonable if -expedient, no one a kinsman unless sure; but friendship or enmity is -everywhere an affair of time and circumstance. Here, in Sicily, our -interest is not to weaken our friends, but by means of their -strength to cripple our enemies. Why doubt this? In Hellas we treat -our allies as we find them useful. The Chians and Methymnians govern -themselves and furnish ships; most of the rest have harder terms and -pay tribute in money; while others, although islanders and easy for us -to take, are free altogether, because they occupy convenient positions -round Peloponnese. In our settlement of the states here in Sicily, -we should therefore; naturally be guided by our interest, and by fear, -as we say, of the Syracusans. Their ambition is to rule you, their -object to use the suspicions that we excite to unite you, and then, -when we have gone away without effecting anything, by force or through -your isolation, to become the masters of Sicily. And masters they must -become, if you unite with them; as a force of that magnitude would -be no longer easy for us to deal with united, and they would be more -than a match for you as soon as we were away. - -"Any other view of the case is condemned by the facts. When you -first asked us over, the fear which you held out was that of danger to -Athens if we let you come under the dominion of Syracuse; and it is -not right now to mistrust the very same argument by which you -claimed to convince us, or to give way to suspicion because we are -come with a larger force against the power of that city. Those whom -you should really distrust are the Syracusans. We are not able to stay -here without you, and if we proved perfidious enough to bring you into -subjection, we should be unable to keep you in bondage, owing to the -length of the voyage and the difficulty of guarding large, and in a -military sense continental, towns: they, the Syracusans, live close to -you, not in a camp, but in a city greater than the force we have -with us, plot always against you, never let slip an opportunity once -offered, as they have shown in the case of the Leontines and others, -and now have the face, just as if you were fools, to invite you to aid -them against the power that hinders this, and that has thus far -maintained Sicily independent. We, as against them, invite you to a -much more real safety, when we beg you not to betray that common -safety which we each have in the other, and to reflect that they, even -without allies, will, by their numbers, have always the way open to -you, while you will not often have the opportunity of defending -yourselves with such numerous auxiliaries; if, through your -suspicions, you once let these go away unsuccessful or defeated, you -will wish to see if only a handful of them back again, when the day is -past in which their presence could do anything for you. - -"But we hope, Camarinaeans, that the calumnies of the Syracusans -will not be allowed to succeed either with you or with the rest: we -have told you the whole truth upon the things we are suspected of, and -will now briefly recapitulate, in the hope of convincing you. We -assert that we are rulers in Hellas in order not to be subjects; -liberators in Sicily that we may not be harmed by the Sicilians; -that we are compelled to interfere in many things, because we have -many things to guard against; and that now, as before, we are come -as allies to those of you who suffer wrong in this island, not without -invitation but upon invitation. Accordingly, instead of making -yourselves judges or censors of our conduct, and trying to turn us, -which it were now difficult to do, so far as there is anything in -our interfering policy or in our character that chimes in with your -interest, this take and make use of; and be sure that, far from -being injurious to all alike, to most of the Hellenes that policy is -even beneficial. Thanks to it, all men in all places, even where we -are not, who either apprehend or meditate aggression, from the near -prospect before them, in the one case, of obtaining our intervention -in their favour, in the other, of our arrival making the venture -dangerous, find themselves constrained, respectively, to be moderate -against their will, and to be preserved without trouble of their -own. Do not you reject this security that is open to all who desire -it, and is now offered to you; but do like others, and instead of -being always on the defensive against the Syracusans, unite with us, -and in your turn at last threaten them." - -Such were the words of Euphemus. What the Camarinaeans felt was -this. Sympathizing with the Athenians, except in so far as they -might be afraid of their subjugating Sicily, they had always been at -enmity with their neighbour Syracuse. From the very fact, however, -that they were their neighbours, they feared the Syracusans most of -the two, and being apprehensive of their conquering even without them, -both sent them in the first instance the few horsemen mentioned, and -for the future determined to support them most in fact, although as -sparingly as possible; but for the moment in order not to seem to -slight the Athenians, especially as they had been successful in the -engagement, to answer both alike. Agreeably to this resolution they -answered that as both the contending parties happened to be allies -of theirs, they thought it most consistent with their oaths at present -to side with neither; with which answer the ambassadors of either -party departed. - -In the meantime, while Syracuse pursued her preparations for war, -the Athenians were encamped at Naxos, and tried by negotiation to gain -as many of the Sicels as possible. Those more in the low lands, and -subjects of Syracuse, mostly held aloof; but the peoples of the -interior who had never been otherwise than independent, with few -exceptions, at once joined the Athenians, and brought down corn to the -army, and in some cases even money. The Athenians marched against -those who refused to join, and forced some of them to do so; in the -case of others they were stopped by the Syracusans sending garrisons -and reinforcements. Meanwhile the Athenians moved their winter -quarters from Naxos to Catana, and reconstructed the camp burnt by the -Syracusans, and stayed there the rest of the winter. They also sent -a galley to Carthage, with proffers of friendship, on the chance of -obtaining assistance, and another to Tyrrhenia; some of the cities -there having spontaneously offered to join them in the war. They -also sent round to the Sicels and to Egesta, desiring them to send -them as many horses as possible, and meanwhile prepared bricks, -iron, and all other things necessary for the work of -circumvallation, intending by the spring to begin hostilities. - -In the meantime the Syracusan envoys dispatched to Corinth and -Lacedaemon tried as they passed along the coast to persuade the -Italiots to interfere with the proceedings of the Athenians, which -threatened Italy quite as much as Syracuse, and having arrived at -Corinth made a speech calling on the Corinthians to assist them on the -ground of their common origin. The Corinthians voted at once to aid -them heart and soul themselves, and then sent on envoys with them to -Lacedaemon, to help them to persuade her also to prosecute the war -with the Athenians more openly at home and to send succours to Sicily. -The envoys from Corinth having reached Lacedaemon found there -Alcibiades with his fellow refugees, who had at once crossed over in a -trading vessel from Thurii, first to Cyllene in Elis, and afterwards -from thence to Lacedaemon; upon the Lacedaemonians' own invitation, -after first obtaining a safe conduct, as he feared them for the part -he had taken in the affair of Mantinea. The result was that the -Corinthians, Syracusans, and Alcibiades, pressing all the same request -in the assembly of the Lacedaemonians, succeeded in persuading them; -but as the ephors and the authorities, although resolved to send -envoys to Syracuse to prevent their surrendering to the Athenians, -showed no disposition to send them any assistance, Alcibiades now came -forward and inflamed and stirred the Lacedaemonians by speaking as -follows: - -"I am forced first to speak to you of the prejudice with which I -am regarded, in order that suspicion may not make you disinclined to -listen to me upon public matters. The connection, with you as your -proxeni, which the ancestors of our family by reason of some -discontent renounced, I personally tried to renew by my good offices -towards you, in particular upon the occasion of the disaster at Pylos. -But although I maintained this friendly attitude, you yet chose to -negotiate the peace with the Athenians through my enemies, and thus to -strengthen them and to discredit me. You had therefore no right to -complain if I turned to the Mantineans and Argives, and seized other -occasions of thwarting and injuring you; and the time has now come -when those among you, who in the bitterness of the moment may have -been then unfairly angry with me, should look at the matter in its -true light, and take a different view. Those again who judged me -unfavourably, because I leaned rather to the side of the commons, must -not think that their dislike is any better founded. We have always -been hostile to tyrants, and all who oppose arbitrary power are called -commons; hence we continued to act as leaders of the multitude; -besides which, as democracy was the government of the city, it was -necessary in most things to conform to established conditions. -However, we endeavoured to be more moderate than the licentious temper -of the times; and while there were others, formerly as now, who -tried to lead the multitude astray--the same who banished me--our -party was that of the whole people, our creed being to do our part -in preserving the form of government under which the city enjoyed -the utmost greatness and freedom, and which we had found existing. -As for democracy, the men of sense among us knew what it was, and I -perhaps as well as any, as I have the more cause to complain of it; -but there is nothing new to be said of a patent absurdity; meanwhile -we did not think it safe to alter it under the pressure of your -hostility. - -"So much then for the prejudices with which I am regarded: I now can -call your attention to the questions you must consider, and upon which -superior knowledge perhaps permits me to speak. We sailed to Sicily -first to conquer, if possible, the Siceliots, and after them the -Italiots also, and finally to assail the empire and city of -Carthage. In the event of all or most of these schemes succeeding, -we were then to attack Peloponnese, bringing with us the entire -force of the Hellenes lately acquired in those parts, and taking a -number of barbarians into our pay, such as the Iberians and others -in those countries, confessedly the most warlike known, and building -numerous galleys in addition to those which we had already, timber -being plentiful in Italy; and with this fleet blockading Peloponnese -from the sea and assailing it with our armies by land, taking some -of the cities by storm, drawing works of circumvallation round others, -we hoped without difficulty to effect its reduction, and after this to -rule the whole of the Hellenic name. Money and corn meanwhile for -the better execution of these plans were to be supplied in -sufficient quantities by the newly acquired places in those countries, -independently of our revenues here at home. - -"You have thus heard the history of the present expedition from -the man who most exactly knows what our objects were; and the -remaining generals will, if they can, carry these out just the same. -But that the states in Sicily must succumb if you do not help them, -I will now show. Although the Siceliots, with all their -inexperience, might even now be saved if their forces were united, the -Syracusans alone, beaten already in one battle with all their people -and blockaded from the sea, will be unable to withstand the Athenian -armament that is now there. But if Syracuse falls, all Sicily falls -also, and Italy immediately afterwards; and the danger which I just -now spoke of from that quarter will before long be upon you. None need -therefore fancy that Sicily only is in question; Peloponnese will be -so also, unless you speedily do as I tell you, and send on board -ship to Syracuse troops that shall able to row their ships themselves, -and serve as heavy infantry the moment that they land; and what I -consider even more important than the troops, a Spartan as -commanding officer to discipline the forces already on foot and to -compel recusants to serve. The friends that you have already will thus -become more confident, and the waverers will be encouraged to join -you. Meanwhile you must carry on the war here more openly, that the -Syracusans, seeing that you do not forget them, may put heart into -their resistance, and that the Athenians may be less able to reinforce -their armament. You must fortify Decelea in Attica, the blow of -which the Athenians are always most afraid and the only one that -they think they have not experienced in the present war; the surest -method of harming an enemy being to find out what he most fears, and -to choose this means of attacking him, since every one naturally knows -best his own weak points and fears accordingly. The fortification in -question, while it benefits you, will create difficulties for your -adversaries, of which I shall pass over many, and shall only mention -the chief. Whatever property there is in the country will most of it -become yours, either by capture or surrender; and the Athenians will -at once be deprived of their revenues from the silver mines at -Laurium, of their present gains from their land and from the law -courts, and above all of the revenue from their allies, which will -be paid less regularly, as they lose their awe of Athens and see you -addressing yourselves with vigour to the war. The zeal and speed -with which all this shall be done depends, Lacedaemonians, upon -yourselves; as to its possibility, I am quite confident, and I have -little fear of being mistaken. - -"Meanwhile I hope that none of you will think any the worse of me -if, after having hitherto passed as a lover of my country, I now -actively join its worst enemies in attacking it, or will suspect -what I say as the fruit of an outlaw's enthusiasm. I am an outlaw from -the iniquity of those who drove me forth, not, if you will be guided -by me, from your service; my worst enemies are not you who only harmed -your foes, but they who forced their friends to become enemies; and -love of country is what I do not feel when I am wronged, but what I -felt when secure in my rights as a citizen. Indeed I do not consider -that I am now attacking a country that is still mine; I am rather -trying to recover one that is mine no longer; and the true lover of -his country is not he who consents to lose it unjustly rather than -attack it, but he who longs for it so much that he will go all lengths -to recover it. For myself, therefore, Lacedaemonians, I beg you to use -me without scruple for danger and trouble of every kind, and to -remember the argument in every one's mouth, that if I did you great -harm as an enemy, I could likewise do you good service as a friend, -inasmuch as I know the plans of the Athenians, while I only guessed -yours. For yourselves I entreat you to believe that your most -capital interests are now under deliberation; and I urge you to send -without hesitation the expeditions to Sicily and Attica; by the -presence of a small part of your forces you will save important cities -in that island, and you will destroy the power of Athens both -present and prospective; after this you will dwell in security and -enjoy the supremacy over all Hellas, resting not on force but upon -consent and affection." - -Such were the words of Alcibiades. The Lacedaemonians, who had -themselves before intended to march against Athens, but were still -waiting and looking about them, at once became much more in earnest -when they received this particular information from Alcibiades, and -considered that they had heard it from the man who best knew the truth -of the matter. Accordingly they now turned their attention to the -fortifying of Decelea and sending immediate aid to the Sicilians; -and naming Gylippus, son of Cleandridas, to the command of the -Syracusans, bade him consult with that people and with the Corinthians -and arrange for succours reaching the island, in the best and -speediest way possible under the circumstances. Gylippus desired the -Corinthians to send him at once two ships to Asine, and to prepare the -rest that they intended to send, and to have them ready to sail at the -proper time. Having settled this, the envoys departed from Lacedaemon. - -In the meantime arrived the Athenian galley from Sicily sent by -the generals for money and cavalry; and the Athenians, after hearing -what they wanted, voted to send the supplies for the armament and -the cavalry. And the winter ended, and with it ended the seventeenth -year of the present war of which Thucydides is the historian. - -The next summer, at the very beginning of the season, the -Athenians in Sicily put out from Catana, and sailed along shore to -Megara in Sicily, from which, as I have mentioned above, the -Syracusans expelled the inhabitants in the time of their tyrant -Gelo, themselves occupying the territory. Here the Athenians landed -and laid waste the country, and after an unsuccessful attack upon a -fort of the Syracusans, went on with the fleet and army to the river -Terias, and advancing inland laid waste the plain and set fire to -the corn; and after killing some of a small Syracusan party which they -encountered, and setting up a trophy, went back again to their -ships. They now sailed to Catana and took in provisions there, and -going with their whole force against Centoripa, a town of the -Sicels, acquired it by capitulation, and departed, after also -burning the corn of the Inessaeans and Hybleans. Upon their return -to Catana they found the horsemen arrived from Athens, to the number -of two hundred and fifty (with their equipments, but without their -horses which were to be procured upon the spot), and thirty mounted -archers and three hundred talents of silver. - -The same spring the Lacedaemonians marched against Argos, and went -as far as Cleonae, when an earthquake occurred and caused them to -return. After this the Argives invaded the Thyreatid, which is on -their border, and took much booty from the Lacedaemonians, which was -sold for no less than twenty-five talents. The same summer, not long -after, the Thespian commons made an attack upon the party in office, -which was not successful, but succours arrived from Thebes, and some -were caught, while others took refuge at Athens. - -The same summer the Syracusans learned that the Athenians had been -joined by their cavalry, and were on the point of marching against -them; and seeing that without becoming masters of Epipolae, a -precipitous spot situated exactly over the town, the Athenians could -not, even if victorious in battle, easily invest them, they determined -to guard its approaches, in order that the enemy might not ascend -unobserved by this, the sole way by which ascent was possible, as -the remainder is lofty ground, and falls right down to the city, and -can all be seen from inside; and as it lies above the rest the place -is called by the Syracusans Epipolae or Overtown. They accordingly -went out in mass at daybreak into the meadow along the river Anapus, -their new generals, Hermocrates and his colleagues, having just come -into office, and held a review of their heavy infantry, from whom they -first selected a picked body of six hundred, under the command of -Diomilus, an exile from Andros, to guard Epipolae, and to be ready -to muster at a moment's notice to help wherever help should be -required. - -Meanwhile the Athenians, the very same morning, were holding a -review, having already made land unobserved with all the armament from -Catana, opposite a place called Leon, not much more than half a mile -from Epipolae, where they disembarked their army, bringing the fleet -to anchor at Thapsus, a peninsula running out into the sea, with a -narrow isthmus, and not far from the city of Syracuse either by land -or water. While the naval force of the Athenians threw a stockade -across the isthmus and remained quiet at Thapsus, the land army -immediately went on at a run to Epipolae, and succeeded in getting -up by Euryelus before the Syracusans perceived them, or could come -up from the meadow and the review. Diomilus with his six hundred and -the rest advanced as quickly as they could, but they had nearly -three miles to go from the meadow before reaching them. Attacking in -this way in considerable disorder, the Syracusans were defeated in -battle at Epipolae and retired to the town, with a loss of about three -hundred killed, and Diomilus among the number. After this the -Athenians set up a trophy and restored to the Syracusans their dead -under truce, and next day descended to Syracuse itself; and no one -coming out to meet them, reascended and built a fort at Labdalum, upon -the edge of the cliffs of Epipolae, looking towards Megara, to serve -as a magazine for their baggage and money, whenever they advanced to -battle or to work at the lines. - -Not long afterwards three hundred cavalry came to them from -Egesta, and about a hundred from the Sicels, Naxians, and others; -and thus, with the two hundred and fifty from Athens, for whom they -had got horses from the Egestaeans and Catanians, besides others -that they bought, they now mustered six hundred and fifty cavalry in -all. After posting a garrison in Labdalum, they advanced to Syca, -where they sat down and quickly built the Circle or centre of their -wall of circumvallation. The Syracusans, appalled at the rapidity with -which the work advanced, determined to go out against them and give -battle and interrupt it; and the two armies were already in battle -array, when the Syracusan generals observed that their troops found -such difficulty in getting into line, and were in such disorder, -that they led them back into the town, except part of the cavalry. -These remained and hindered the Athenians from carrying stones or -dispersing to any great distance, until a tribe of the Athenian -heavy infantry, with all the cavalry, charged and routed the Syracusan -horse with some loss; after which they set up a trophy for the cavalry -action. - -The next day the Athenians began building the wall to the north of -the Circle, at the same time collecting stone and timber, which they -kept laying down towards Trogilus along the shortest line for their -works from the great harbour to the sea; while the Syracusans, -guided by their generals, and above all by Hermocrates, instead of -risking any more general engagements, determined to build a -counterwork in the direction in which the Athenians were going to -carry their wall. If this could be completed in time, the enemy's -lines would be cut; and meanwhile, if he were to attempt to -interrupt them by an attack, they would send a part of their forces -against him, and would secure the approaches beforehand with their -stockade, while the Athenians would have to leave off working with -their whole force in order to attend to them. They accordingly sallied -forth and began to build, starting from their city, running a cross -wall below the Athenian Circle, cutting down the olives and erecting -wooden towers. As the Athenian fleet had not yet sailed round into the -great harbour, the Syracusans still commanded the seacoast, and the -Athenians brought their provisions by land from Thapsus. - -The Syracusans now thought the stockades and stonework of their -counterwall sufficiently far advanced; and as the Athenians, afraid of -being divided and so fighting at a disadvantage, and intent upon their -own wall, did not come out to interrupt them, they left one tribe to -guard the new work and went back into the city. Meanwhile the -Athenians destroyed their pipes of drinking-water carried -underground into the city; and watching until the rest of the -Syracusans were in their tents at midday, and some even gone away into -the city, and those in the stockade keeping but indifferent guard, -appointed three hundred picked men of their own, and some men picked -from the light troops and armed for the purpose, to run suddenly as -fast as they could to the counterwork, while the rest of the army -advanced in two divisions, the one with one of the generals to the -city in case of a sortie, the other with the other general to the -stockade by the postern gate. The three hundred attacked and took -the stockade, abandoned by its garrison, who took refuge in the -outworks round the statue of Apollo Temenites. Here the pursuers burst -in with them, and after getting in were beaten out by the -Syracusans, and some few of the Argives and Athenians slain; after -which the whole army retired, and having demolished the counterwork -and pulled up the stockade, carried away the stakes to their own -lines, and set up a trophy. - -The next day the Athenians from the Circle proceeded to fortify -the cliff above the marsh which on this side of Epipolae looks towards -the great harbour; this being also the shortest line for their work to -go down across the plain and the marsh to the harbour. Meanwhile the -Syracusans marched out and began a second stockade, starting from -the city, across the middle of the marsh, digging a trench alongside -to make it impossible for the Athenians to carry their wall down to -the sea. As soon as the Athenians had finished their work at the cliff -they again attacked the stockade and ditch of the Syracusans. Ordering -the fleet to sail round from Thapsus into the great harbour of -Syracuse, they descended at about dawn from Epipolae into the plain, -and laying doors and planks over the marsh, where it was muddy and -firmest, crossed over on these, and by daybreak took the ditch and the -stockade, except a small portion which they captured afterwards. A -battle now ensued, in which the Athenians were victorious, the right -wing of the Syracusans flying to the town and the left to the river. -The three hundred picked Athenians, wishing to cut off their -passage, pressed on at a run to the bridge, when the alarmed -Syracusans, who had with them most of their cavalry, closed and routed -them, hurling them back upon the Athenian right wing, the first -tribe of which was thrown into a panic by the shock. Seeing this, -Lamachus came to their aid from the Athenian left with a few archers -and with the Argives, and crossing a ditch, was left alone with a -few that had crossed with him, and was killed with five or six of -his men. These the Syracusans managed immediately to snatch up in -haste and get across the river into a place of security, themselves -retreating as the rest of the Athenian army now came up. - -Meanwhile those who had at first fled for refuge to the city, seeing -the turn affairs were taking, now rallied from the town and formed -against the Athenians in front of them, sending also a part of their -number to the Circle on Epipolae, which they hoped to take while -denuded of its defenders. These took and destroyed the Athenian -outwork of a thousand feet, the Circle itself being saved by Nicias, -who happened to have been left in it through illness, and who now -ordered the servants to set fire to the engines and timber thrown down -before the wall; want of men, as he was aware, rendering all other -means of escape impossible. This step was justified by the result, the -Syracusans not coming any further on account of the fire, but -retreating. Meanwhile succours were coming up from the Athenians -below, who had put to flight the troops opposed to them; and the fleet -also, according to orders, was sailing from Thapsus into the great -harbour. Seeing this, the troops on the heights retired in haste, -and the whole army of the Syracusans re-entered the city, thinking -that with their present force they would no longer be able to hinder -the wall reaching the sea. - -After this the Athenians set up a trophy and restored to the -Syracusans their dead under truce, receiving in return Lamachus and -those who had fallen with him. The whole of their forces, naval and -military, being now with them, they began from Epipolae and the cliffs -and enclosed the Syracusans with a double wall down to the sea. -Provisions were now brought in for the armament from all parts of -Italy; and many of the Sicels, who had hitherto been looking to see -how things went, came as allies to the Athenians: there also arrived -three ships of fifty oars from Tyrrhenia. Meanwhile everything else -progressed favourably for their hopes. The Syracusans began to despair -of finding safety in arms, no relief having reached them from -Peloponnese, and were now proposing terms of capitulation among -themselves and to Nicias, who after the death of Lamachus was left -sole commander. No decision was come to, but, as was natural with -men in difficulties and besieged more straitly than before, there -was much discussion with Nicias and still more in the town. Their -present misfortunes had also made them suspicious of one another; -and the blame of their disasters was thrown upon the ill-fortune or -treachery of the generals under whose command they had happened; and -these were deposed and others, Heraclides, Eucles, and Tellias, -elected in their stead. - -Meanwhile the Lacedaemonian, Gylippus, and the ships from Corinth -were now off Leucas, intent upon going with all haste to the relief of -Sicily. The reports that reached them being of an alarming kind, and -all agreeing in the falsehood that Syracuse was already completely -invested, Gylippus abandoned all hope of Sicily, and wishing to save -Italy, rapidly crossed the Ionian Sea to Tarentum with the Corinthian, -Pythen, two Laconian, and two Corinthian vessels, leaving the -Corinthians to follow him after manning, in addition to their own ten, -two Leucadian and two Ambraciot ships. From Tarentum Gylippus first -went on an embassy to Thurii, and claimed anew the rights of -citizenship which his father had enjoyed; failing to bring over the -townspeople, he weighed anchor and coasted along Italy. Opposite the -Terinaean Gulf he was caught by the wind which blows violently and -steadily from the north in that quarter, and was carried out to sea; -and after experiencing very rough weather, remade Tarentum, where he -hauled ashore and refitted such of his ships as had suffered most from -the tempest. Nicias heard of his approach, but, like the Thurians, -despised the scanty number of his ships, and set down piracy as the -only probable object of the voyage, and so took no precautions for the -present. - -About the same time in this summer, the Lacedaemonians invaded Argos -with their allies, and laid waste most of the country. The Athenians -went with thirty ships to the relief of the Argives, thus breaking -their treaty with the Lacedaemonians in the most overt manner. Up to -this time incursions from Pylos, descents on the coast of the rest -of Peloponnese, instead of on the Laconian, had been the extent of -their co-operation with the Argives and Mantineans; and although the -Argives had often begged them to land, if only for a moment, with -their heavy infantry in Laconia, lay waste ever so little of it with -them, and depart, they had always refused to do so. Now, however, -under the command of Phytodorus, Laespodius, and Demaratus, they -landed at Epidaurus Limera, Prasiae, and other places, and plundered -the country; and thus furnished the Lacedaemonians with a better -pretext for hostilities against Athens. After the Athenians had -retired from Argos with their fleet, and the Lacedaemonians also, -the Argives made an incursion into the Phlisaid, and returned home -after ravaging their land and killing some of the inhabitants. - - - - -BOOK VII - -CHAPTER XXI - -_Eighteenth and Nineteenth Years of the War - Arrival of -Gylippus at Syracuse - Fortification of Decelea - -Successes of the Syracusans_ - -After refitting their ships, Gylippus and Pythen coasted along -from Tarentum to Epizephyrian Locris. They now received the more -correct information that Syracuse was not yet completely invested, but -that it was still possible for an army arriving at Epipolae to -effect an entrance; and they consulted, accordingly, whether they -should keep Sicily on their right and risk sailing in by sea, or, -leaving it on their left, should first sail to Himera and, taking with -them the Himeraeans and any others that might agree to join them, go -to Syracuse by land. Finally they determined to sail for Himera, -especially as the four Athenian ships which Nicias had at length -sent off, on hearing that they were at Locris, had not yet arrived -at Rhegium. Accordingly, before these reached their post, the -Peloponnesians crossed the strait and, after touching at Rhegium and -Messina, came to Himera. Arrived there, they persuaded the -Himeraeans to join in the war, and not only to go with them themselves -but to provide arms for the seamen from their vessels which they had -drawn ashore at Himera; and they sent and appointed a place for the -Selinuntines to meet them with all their forces. A few troops were -also promised by the Geloans and some of the Sicels, who were now -ready to join them with much greater alacrity, owing to the recent -death of Archonidas, a powerful Sicel king in that neighbourhood and -friendly to Athens, and owing also to the vigour shown by Gylippus -in coming from Lacedaemon. Gylippus now took with him about seven -hundred of his sailors and marines, that number only having arms, a -thousand heavy infantry and light troops from Himera with a body of -a hundred horse, some light troops and cavalry from Selinus, a few -Geloans, and Sicels numbering a thousand in all, and set out on his -march for Syracuse. - -Meanwhile the Corinthian fleet from Leucas made all haste to arrive; -and one of their commanders, Gongylus, starting last with a single -ship, was the first to reach Syracuse, a little before Gylippus. -Gongylus found the Syracusans on the point of holding an assembly to -consider whether they should put an end to the war. This he prevented, -and reassured them by telling them that more vessels were still to -arrive, and that Gylippus, son of Cleandridas, had been dispatched -by the Lacedaemonians to take the command. Upon this the Syracusans -took courage, and immediately marched out with all their forces to -meet Gylippus, who they found was now close at hand. Meanwhile -Gylippus, after taking Ietae, a fort of the Sicels, on his way, formed -his army in order of battle, and so arrived at Epipolae, and ascending -by Euryelus, as the Athenians had done at first, now advanced with the -Syracusans against the Athenian lines. His arrival chanced at a -critical moment. The Athenians had already finished a double wall of -six or seven furlongs to the great harbour, with the exception of a -small portion next the sea, which they were still engaged upon; and in -the remainder of the circle towards Trogilus on the other sea, -stones had been laid ready for building for the greater part of the -distance, and some points had been left half finished, while others -were entirely completed. The danger of Syracuse had indeed been great. - -Meanwhile the Athenians, recovering from the confusion into which -they had been first thrown by the sudden approach of Gylippus and -the Syracusans, formed in order of battle. Gylippus halted at a -short distance off and sent on a herald to tell them that, if they -would evacuate Sicily with bag and baggage within five days' time, -he was willing to make a truce accordingly. The Athenians treated this -proposition with contempt, and dismissed the herald without an answer. -After this both sides began to prepare for action. Gylippus, observing -that the Syracusans were in disorder and did not easily fall into -line, drew off his troops more into the open ground, while Nicias -did not lead on the Athenians but lay still by his own wall. When -Gylippus saw that they did not come on, he led off his army to the -citadel of the quarter of Apollo Temenites, and passed the night -there. On the following day he led out the main body of his army, and, -drawing them up in order of battle before the walls of the Athenians -to prevent their going to the relief of any other quarter, -dispatched a strong force against Fort Labdalum, and took it, and -put all whom he found in it to the sword, the place not being within -sight of the Athenians. On the same day an Athenian galley that lay -moored off the harbour was captured by the Syracusans. - -After this the Syracusans and their allies began to carry a single -wall, starting from the city, in a slanting direction up Epipolae, -in order that the Athenians, unless they could hinder the work, -might be no longer able to invest them. Meanwhile the Athenians, -having now finished their wall down to the sea, had come up to the -heights; and part of their wall being weak, Gylippus drew out his army -by night and attacked it. However, the Athenians who happened to be -bivouacking outside took the alarm and came out to meet him, upon -seeing which he quickly led his men back again. The Athenians now -built their wall higher, and in future kept guard at this point -themselves, disposing their confederates along the remainder of the -works, at the stations assigned to them. Nicias also determined to -fortify Plemmyrium, a promontory over against the city, which juts out -and narrows the mouth of the Great Harbour. He thought that the -fortification of this place would make it easier to bring in supplies, -as they would be able to carry on their blockade from a less distance, -near to the port occupied by the Syracusans; instead of being obliged, -upon every movement of the enemy's navy, to put out against them -from the bottom of the great harbour. Besides this, he now began to -pay more attention to the war by sea, seeing that the coming of -Gylippus had diminished their hopes by land. Accordingly, he -conveyed over his ships and some troops, and built three forts in -which he placed most of his baggage, and moored there for the future -the larger craft and men-of-war. This was the first and chief occasion -of the losses which the crews experienced. The water which they used -was scarce and had to be fetched from far, and the sailors could not -go out for firewood without being cut off by the Syracusan horse, -who were masters of the country; a third of the enemy's cavalry -being stationed at the little town of Olympieum, to prevent plundering -incursions on the part of the Athenians at Plemmyrium. Meanwhile -Nicias learned that the rest of the Corinthian fleet was -approaching, and sent twenty ships to watch for them, with orders to -be on the look-out for them about Locris and Rhegium and the -approach to Sicily. - -Gylippus, meanwhile, went on with the wall across Epipolae, using -the stones which the Athenians had laid down for their own wall, and -at the same time constantly led out the Syracusans and their allies, -and formed them in order of battle in front of the lines, the -Athenians forming against him. At last he thought that the moment -was come, and began the attack; and a hand-to-hand fight ensued -between the lines, where the Syracusan cavalry could be of no use; and -the Syracusans and their allies were defeated and took up their dead -under truce, while the Athenians erected a trophy. After this Gylippus -called the soldiers together, and said that the fault was not theirs -but his; he had kept their lines too much within the works, and had -thus deprived them of the services of their cavalry and darters. He -would now, therefore, lead them on a second time. He begged them to -remember that in material force they would be fully a match for -their opponents, while, with respect to moral advantages, it were -intolerable if Peloponnesians and Dorians should not feel confident of -overcoming Ionians and islanders with the motley rabble that -accompanied them, and of driving them out of the country. - -After this he embraced the first opportunity that offered of again -leading them against the enemy. Now Nicias and the Athenians held -the opinion that even if the Syracusans should not wish to offer -battle, it was necessary for them to prevent the building of the cross -wall, as it already almost overlapped the extreme point of their -own, and if it went any further it would from that moment make no -difference whether they fought ever so many successful actions, or -never fought at all. They accordingly came out to meet the Syracusans. -Gylippus led out his heavy infantry further from the fortifications -than on the former occasion, and so joined battle; posting his horse -and darters upon the flank of the Athenians in the open space, where -the works of the two walls terminated. During the engagement the -cavalry attacked and routed the left wing of the Athenians, which -was opposed to them; and the rest of the Athenian army was in -consequence defeated by the Syracusans and driven headlong within -their lines. The night following the Syracusans carried their wall -up to the Athenian works and passed them, thus putting it out of their -power any longer to stop them, and depriving them, even if -victorious in the field, of all chance of investing the city for the -future. - -After this the remaining twelve vessels of the Corinthians, -Ambraciots, and Leucadians sailed into the harbour under the command -of Erasinides, a Corinthian, having eluded the Athenian ships on -guard, and helped the Syracusans in completing the remainder of the -cross wall. Meanwhile Gylippus went into the rest of Sicily to raise -land and naval forces, and also to bring over any of the cities that -either were lukewarm in the cause or had hitherto kept out of the -war altogether. Syracusan and Corinthian envoys were also dispatched -to Lacedaemon and Corinth to get a fresh force sent over, in any way -that might offer, either in merchant vessels or transports, or in -any other manner likely to prove successful, as the Athenians too were -sending for reinforcements; while the Syracusans proceeded to man a -fleet and to exercise, meaning to try their fortune in this way -also, and generally became exceedingly confident. - -Nicias perceiving this, and seeing the strength of the enemy and his -own difficulties daily increasing, himself also sent to Athens. He had -before sent frequent reports of events as they occurred, and felt it -especially incumbent upon him to do so now, as he thought that they -were in a critical position, and that, unless speedily recalled or -strongly reinforced from home, they had no hope of safety. He -feared, however, that the messengers, either through inability to -speak, or through failure of memory, or from a wish to please the -multitude, might not report the truth, and so thought it best to write -a letter, to ensure that the Athenians should know his own opinion -without its being lost in transmission, and be able to decide upon the -real facts of the case. - -His emissaries, accordingly, departed with the letter and the -requisite verbal instructions; and he attended to the affairs of the -army, making it his aim now to keep on the defensive and to avoid -any unnecessary danger. - -At the close of the same summer the Athenian general Euetion marched -in concert with Perdiccas with a large body of Thracians against -Amphipolis, and failing to take it brought some galleys round into the -Strymon, and blockaded the town from the river, having his base at -Himeraeum. - -Summer was now over. The winter ensuing, the persons sent by Nicias, -reaching Athens, gave the verbal messages which had been entrusted -to them, and answered any questions that were asked them, and -delivered the letter. The clerk of the city now came forward and -read out to the Athenians the letter, which was as follows: - -"Our past operations, Athenians, have been made known to you by many -other letters; it is now time for you to become equally familiar -with our present condition, and to take your measures accordingly. -We had defeated in most of our engagements with them the Syracusans, -against whom we were sent, and we had built the works which we now -occupy, when Gylippus arrived from Lacedaemon with an army obtained -from Peloponnese and from some of the cities in Sicily. In our first -battle with him we were victorious; in the battle on the following day -we were overpowered by a multitude of cavalry and darters, and -compelled to retire within our lines. We have now, therefore, been -forced by the numbers of those opposed to us to discontinue the work -of circumvallation, and to remain inactive; being unable to make use -even of all the force we have, since a large portion of our heavy -infantry is absorbed in the defence of our lines. Meanwhile the -enemy have carried a single wall past our lines, thus making it -impossible for us to invest them in future, until this cross wall be -attacked by a strong force and captured. So that the besieger in -name has become, at least from the land side, the besieged in reality; -as we are prevented by their cavalry from even going for any -distance into the country. - -"Besides this, an embassy has been dispatched to Peloponnese to -procure reinforcements, and Gylippus has gone to the cities in Sicily, -partly in the hope of inducing those that are at present neutral to -join him in the war, partly of bringing from his allies additional -contingents for the land forces and material for the navy. For I -understand that they contemplate a combined attack, upon our lines -with their land forces and with their fleet by sea. You must none of -you be surprised that I say by sea also. They have discovered that the -length of the time we have now been in commission has rotted our ships -and wasted our crews, and that with the entireness of our crews and -the soundness of our ships the pristine efficiency of our navy has -departed. For it is impossible for us to haul our ships ashore and -careen them, because, the enemy's vessels being as many or more than -our own, we are constantly anticipating an attack. Indeed, they may be -seen exercising, and it lies with them to take the initiative; and not -having to maintain a blockade, they have greater facilities for drying -their ships. - -"This we should scarcely be able to do, even if we had plenty of -ships to spare, and were freed from our present necessity of -exhausting all our strength upon the blockade. For it is already -difficult to carry in supplies past Syracuse; and were we to relax our -vigilance in the slightest degree it would become impossible. The -losses which our crews have suffered and still continue to suffer -arise from the following causes. Expeditions for fuel and for -forage, and the distance from which water has to be fetched, cause our -sailors to be cut off by the Syracusan cavalry; the loss of our -previous superiority emboldens our slaves to desert; our foreign -seamen are impressed by the unexpected appearance of a navy against -us, and the strength of the enemy's resistance; such of them as were -pressed into the service take the first opportunity of departing to -their respective cities; such as were originally seduced by the -temptation of high pay, and expected little fighting and large -gains, leave us either by desertion to the enemy or by availing -themselves of one or other of the various facilities of escape which -the magnitude of Sicily affords them. Some even engage in trade -themselves and prevail upon the captains to take Hyccaric slaves on -board in their place; thus they have ruined the efficiency of our -navy. - -"Now I need not remind you that the time during which a crew is in -its prime is short, and that the number of sailors who can start a -ship on her way and keep the rowing in time is small. But by far my -greatest trouble is, that holding the post which I do, I am -prevented by the natural indocility of the Athenian seaman from -putting a stop to these evils; and that meanwhile we have no source -from which to recruit our crews, which the enemy can do from many -quarters, but are compelled to depend both for supplying the crews -in service and for making good our losses upon the men whom we brought -with us. For our present confederates, Naxos and Catana, are incapable -of supplying us. There is only one thing more wanting to our -opponents, I mean the defection of our Italian markets. If they were -to see you neglect to relieve us from our present condition, and -were to go over to the enemy, famine would compel us to evacuate, -and Syracuse would finish the war without a blow. - -"I might, it is true, have written to you something different and -more agreeable than this, but nothing certainly more useful, if it -is desirable for you to know the real state of things here before -taking your measures. Besides I know that it is your nature to love to -be told the best side of things, and then to blame the teller if the -expectations which he has raised in your minds are not answered by the -result; and I therefore thought it safest to declare to you the truth. - -"Now you are not to think that either your generals or your soldiers -have ceased to be a match for the forces originally opposed to them. -But you are to reflect that a general Sicilian coalition is being -formed against us; that a fresh army is expected from Peloponnese, -while the force we have here is unable to cope even with our present -antagonists; and you must promptly decide either to recall us or to -send out to us another fleet and army as numerous again, with a -large sum of money, and someone to succeed me, as a disease in the -kidneys unfits me for retaining my post. I have, I think, some claim -on your indulgence, as while I was in my prime I did you much good -service in my commands. But whatever you mean to do, do it at the -commencement of spring and without delay, as the enemy will obtain his -Sicilian reinforcements shortly, those from Peloponnese after a longer -interval; and unless you attend to the matter the former will be -here before you, while the latter will elude you as they have done -before." - -Such were the contents of Nicias's letter. When the Athenians had -heard it they refused to accept his resignation, but chose him two -colleagues, naming Menander and Euthydemus, two of the officers at the -seat of war, to fill their places until their arrival, that Nicias -might not be left alone in his sickness to bear the whole weight of -affairs. They also voted to send out another army and navy, drawn -partly from the Athenians on the muster-roll, partly from the -allies. The colleagues chosen for Nicias were Demosthenes, son of -Alcisthenes, and Eurymedon, son of Thucles. Eurymedon was sent off -at once, about the time of the winter solstice, with ten ships, a -hundred and twenty talents of silver, and instructions to tell the -army that reinforcements would arrive, and that care would be taken of -them; but Demosthenes stayed behind to organize the expedition, -meaning to start as soon as it was spring, and sent for troops to -the allies, and meanwhile got together money, ships, and heavy -infantry at home. - -The Athenians also sent twenty vessels round Peloponnese to -prevent any one crossing over to Sicily from Corinth or Peloponnese. -For the Corinthians, filled with confidence by the favourable -alteration in Sicilian affairs which had been reported by the envoys -upon their arrival, and convinced that the fleet which they had before -sent out had not been without its use, were now preparing to -dispatch a force of heavy infantry in merchant vessels to Sicily, -while the Lacedaemonians did the like for the rest of Peloponnese. The -Corinthians also manned a fleet of twenty-five vessels, intending to -try the result of a battle with the squadron on guard at Naupactus, -and meanwhile to make it less easy for the Athenians there to hinder -the departure of their merchantmen, by obliging them to keep an eye -upon the galleys thus arrayed against them. - -In the meantime the Lacedaemonians prepared for their invasion of -Attica, in accordance with their own previous resolve, and at the -instigation of the Syracusans and Corinthians, who wished for an -invasion to arrest the reinforcements which they heard that Athens was -about to send to Sicily. Alcibiades also urgently advised the -fortification of Decelea, and a vigorous prosecution of the war. But -the Lacedaemonians derived most encouragement from the belief that -Athens, with two wars on her hands, against themselves and against the -Siceliots, would be more easy to subdue, and from the conviction -that she had been the first to infringe the truce. In the former -war, they considered, the offence had been more on their own side, -both on account of the entrance of the Thebans into Plataea in time of -peace, and also of their own refusal to listen to the Athenian offer -of arbitration, in spite of the clause in the former treaty that where -arbitration should be offered there should be no appeal to arms. For -this reason they thought that they deserved their misfortunes, and -took to heart seriously the disaster at Pylos and whatever else had -befallen them. But when, besides the ravages from Pylos, which went on -without any intermission, the thirty Athenian ships came out from -Argos and wasted part of Epidaurus, Prasiae, and other places; when -upon every dispute that arose as to the interpretation of any doubtful -point in the treaty, their own offers of arbitration were always -rejected by the Athenians, the Lacedaemonians at length decided that -Athens had now committed the very same offence as they had before -done, and had become the guilty party; and they began to be full of -ardour for the war. They spent this winter in sending round to their -allies for iron, and in getting ready the other implements for -building their fort; and meanwhile began raising at home, and also -by forced requisitions in the rest of Peloponnese, a force to be -sent out in the merchantmen to their allies in Sicily. Winter thus -ended, and with it the eighteenth year of this war of which Thucydides -is the historian. - -In the first days of the spring following, at an earlier period than -usual, the Lacedaemonians and their allies invaded Attica, under the -command of Agis, son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. They -began by devastating the parts bordering upon the plain, and next -proceeded to fortify Decelea, dividing the work among the different -cities. Decelea is about thirteen or fourteen miles from the city of -Athens, and the same distance or not much further from Boeotia; and -the fort was meant to annoy the plain and the richest parts of the -country, being in sight of Athens. While the Peloponnesians and -their allies in Attica were engaged in the work of fortification, -their countrymen at home sent off, at about the same time, the heavy -infantry in the merchant vessels to Sicily; the Lacedaemonians -furnishing a picked force of Helots and Neodamodes (or freedmen), -six hundred heavy infantry in all, under the command of Eccritus, a -Spartan; and the Boeotians three hundred heavy infantry, commanded -by two Thebans, Xenon and Nicon, and by Hegesander, a Thespian. -These were among the first to put out into the open sea, starting from -Taenarus in Laconia. Not long after their departure the Corinthians -sent off a force of five hundred heavy infantry, consisting partly -of men from Corinth itself, and partly of Arcadian mercenaries, placed -under the command of Alexarchus, a Corinthian. The Sicyonians also -sent off two hundred heavy infantry at same time as the Corinthians, -under the command of Sargeus, a Sicyonian. Meantime the -five-and-twenty vessels manned by Corinth during the winter lay -confronting the twenty Athenian ships at Naupactus until the heavy -infantry in the merchantmen were fairly on their way from Peloponnese; -thus fulfilling the object for which they had been manned -originally, which was to divert the attention of the Athenians from -the merchantmen to the galleys. - -During this time the Athenians were not idle. Simultaneously with -the fortification of Decelea, at the very beginning of spring, they -sent thirty ships round Peloponnese, under Charicles, son of -Apollodorus, with instructions to call at Argos and demand a force -of their heavy infantry for the fleet, agreeably to the alliance. At -the same time they dispatched Demosthenes to Sicily, as they had -intended, with sixty Athenian and five Chian vessels, twelve hundred -Athenian heavy infantry from the muster-roll, and as many of the -islanders as could be raised in the different quarters, drawing upon -the other subject allies for whatever they could supply that would -be of use for the war. Demosthenes was instructed first to sail -round with Charicles and to operate with him upon the coasts of -Laconia, and accordingly sailed to Aegina and there waited for the -remainder of his armament, and for Charicles to fetch the Argive -troops. - -In Sicily, about the same time in this spring, Gylippus came to -Syracuse with as many troops as he could bring from the cities which -he had persuaded to join. Calling the Syracusans together, he told -them that they must man as many ships as possible, and try their -hand at a sea-fight, by which he hoped to achieve an advantage in -the war not unworthy of the risk. With him Hermocrates actively joined -in trying to encourage his countrymen to attack the Athenians at -sea, saying that the latter had not inherited their naval prowess -nor would they retain it for ever; they had been landsmen even to a -greater degree than the Syracusans, and had only become a maritime -power when obliged by the Mede. Besides, to daring spirits like the -Athenians, a daring adversary would seem the most formidable; and -the Athenian plan of paralysing by the boldness of their attack a -neighbour often not their inferior in strength could now be used -against them with as good effect by the Syracusans. He was convinced -also that the unlooked-for spectacle of Syracusans daring to face -the Athenian navy would cause a terror to the enemy, the advantages of -which would far outweigh any loss that Athenian science might -inflict upon their inexperience. He accordingly urged them to throw -aside their fears and to try their fortune at sea; and the Syracusans, -under the influence of Gylippus and Hermocrates, and perhaps some -others, made up their minds for the sea-fight and began to man their -vessels. - -When the fleet was ready, Gylippus led out the whole army by -night; his plan being to assault in person the forts on Plemmyrium -by land, while thirty-five Syracusan galleys sailed according to -appointment against the enemy from the great harbour, and the -forty-five remaining came round from the lesser harbour, where they -had their arsenal, in order to effect a junction with those inside and -simultaneously to attack Plemmyrium, and thus to distract the -Athenians by assaulting them on two sides at once. The Athenians -quickly manned sixty ships, and with twenty-five of these engaged -the thirty-five of the Syracusans in the great harbour, sending the -rest to meet those sailing round from the arsenal; and an action now -ensued directly in front of the mouth of the great harbour, maintained -with equal tenacity on both sides; the one wishing to force the -passage, the other to prevent them. - -In the meantime, while the Athenians in Plemmyrium were down at -the sea, attending to the engagement, Gylippus made a sudden attack on -the forts in the early morning and took the largest first, and -afterwards the two smaller, whose garrisons did not wait for him, -seeing the largest so easily taken. At the fall of the first fort, the -men from it who succeeded in taking refuge in their boats and -merchantmen, found great difficulty in reaching the camp, as the -Syracusans were having the best of it in the engagement in the great -harbour, and sent a fast-sailing galley to pursue them. But when the -two others fell, the Syracusans were now being defeated; and the -fugitives from these sailed alongshore with more ease. The Syracusan -ships fighting off the mouth of the harbour forced their way through -the Athenian vessels and sailing in without any order fell foul of one -another, and transferred the victory to the Athenians; who not only -routed the squadron in question, but also that by which they were at -first being defeated in the harbour, sinking eleven of the Syracusan -vessels and killing most of the men, except the crews of three ships -whom they made prisoners. Their own loss was confined to three -vessels; and after hauling ashore the Syracusan wrecks and setting -up a trophy upon the islet in front of Plemmyrium, they retired to -their own camp. - -Unsuccessful at sea, the Syracusans had nevertheless the forts in -Plemmyrium, for which they set up three trophies. One of the two -last taken they razed, but put in order and garrisoned the two others. -In the capture of the forts a great many men were killed and made -prisoners, and a great quantity of property was taken in all. As the -Athenians had used them as a magazine, there was a large stock of -goods and corn of the merchants inside, and also a large stock -belonging to the captains; the masts and other furniture of forty -galleys being taken, besides three galleys which had been drawn up -on shore. Indeed the first and chiefest cause of the ruin of the -Athenian army was the capture of Plemmyrium; even the entrance of -the harbour being now no longer safe for carrying in provisions, as -the Syracusan vessels were stationed there to prevent it, and -nothing could be brought in without fighting; besides the general -impression of dismay and discouragement produced upon the army. - -After this the Syracusans sent out twelve ships under the command of -Agatharchus, a Syracusan. One of these went to Peloponnese with -ambassadors to describe the hopeful state of their affairs, and to -incite the Peloponnesians to prosecute the war there even more -actively than they were now doing, while the eleven others sailed to -Italy, hearing that vessels laden with stores were on their way to the -Athenians. After falling in with and destroying most of the vessels in -question, and burning in the Caulonian territory a quantity of -timber for shipbuilding, which had been got ready for the Athenians, -the Syracusan squadron went to Locri, and one of the merchantmen -from Peloponnese coming in, while they were at anchor there, -carrying Thespian heavy infantry, took these on board and sailed -alongshore towards home. The Athenians were on the look-out for them -with twenty ships at Megara, but were only able to take one vessel -with its crew; the rest getting clear off to Syracuse. There was -also some skirmishing in the harbour about the piles which the -Syracusans had driven in the sea in front of the old docks, to allow -their ships to lie at anchor inside, without being hurt by the -Athenians sailing up and running them down. The Athenians brought up -to them a ship of ten thousand talents burden furnished with wooden -turrets and screens, and fastened ropes round the piles from their -boats, wrenched them up and broke them, or dived down and sawed them -in two. Meanwhile the Syracusans plied them with missiles from the -docks, to which they replied from their large vessel; until at last -most of the piles were removed by the Athenians. But the most -awkward part of the stockade was the part out of sight: some of the -piles which had been driven in did not appear above water, so that -it was dangerous to sail up, for fear of running the ships upon -them, just as upon a reef, through not seeing them. However divers -went down and sawed off even these for reward; although the Syracusans -drove in others. Indeed there was no end to the contrivances to -which they resorted against each other, as might be expected between -two hostile armies confronting each other at such a short distance: -and skirmishes and all kinds of other attempts were of constant -occurrence. Meanwhile the Syracusans sent embassies to the cities, -composed of Corinthians, Ambraciots, and Lacedaemonians, to tell -them of the capture of Plemmyrium, and that their defeat in the -sea-fight was due less to the strength of the enemy than to their -own disorder; and generally, to let them know that they were full of -hope, and to desire them to come to their help with ships and -troops, as the Athenians were expected with a fresh army, and if the -one already there could be destroyed before the other arrived, the war -would be at an end. - -While the contending parties in Sicily were thus engaged, -Demosthenes, having now got together the armament with which he was to -go to the island, put out from Aegina, and making sail for -Peloponnese, joined Charicles and the thirty ships of the Athenians. -Taking on board the heavy infantry from Argos they sailed to -Laconia, and, after first plundering part of Epidaurus Limera, -landed on the coast of Laconia, opposite Cythera, where the temple -of Apollo stands, and, laying waste part of the country, fortified a -sort of isthmus, to which the Helots of the Lacedaemonians might -desert, and from whence plundering incursions might be made as from -Pylos. Demosthenes helped to occupy this place, and then immediately -sailed on to Corcyra to take up some of the allies in that island, and -so to proceed without delay to Sicily; while Charicles waited until he -had completed the fortification of the place and, leaving a garrison -there, returned home subsequently with his thirty ships and the -Argives also. - -This same summer arrived at Athens thirteen hundred targeteers, -Thracian swordsmen of the tribe of the Dii, who were to have sailed to -Sicily with Demosthenes. Since they had come too late, the Athenians -determined to send them back to Thrace, whence they had come; to -keep them for the Decelean war appearing too expensive, as the pay -of each man was a drachma a day. Indeed since Decelea had been first -fortified by the whole Peloponnesian army during this summer, and then -occupied for the annoyance of the country by the garrisons from the -cities relieving each other at stated intervals, it had been doing -great mischief to the Athenians; in fact this occupation, by the -destruction of property and loss of men which resulted from it, was -one of the principal causes of their ruin. Previously the invasions -were short, and did not prevent their enjoying their land during the -rest of the time: the enemy was now permanently fixed in Attica; at -one time it was an attack in force, at another it was the regular -garrison overrunning the country and making forays for its -subsistence, and the Lacedaemonian king, Agis, was in the field and -diligently prosecuting the war; great mischief was therefore done to -the Athenians. They were deprived of their whole country: more than -twenty thousand slaves had deserted, a great part of them artisans, -and all their sheep and beasts of burden were lost; and as the cavalry -rode out daily upon excursions to Decelea and to guard the country, -their horses were either lamed by being constantly worked upon rocky -ground, or wounded by the enemy. - -Besides, the transport of provisions from Euboea, which had before -been carried on so much more quickly overland by Decelea from -Oropus, was now effected at great cost by sea round Sunium; everything -the city required had to be imported from abroad, and instead of a -city it became a fortress. Summer and winter the Athenians were worn -out by having to keep guard on the fortifications, during the day by -turns, by night all together, the cavalry excepted, at the different -military posts or upon the wall. But what most oppressed them was that -they had two wars at once, and had thus reached a pitch of frenzy -which no one would have believed possible if he had heard of it before -it had come to pass. For could any one have imagined that even when -besieged by the Peloponnesians entrenched in Attica, they would still, -instead of withdrawing from Sicily, stay on there besieging in like -manner Syracuse, a town (taken as a town) in no way inferior to -Athens, or would so thoroughly upset the Hellenic estimate of their -strength and audacity, as to give the spectacle of a people which, -at the beginning of the war, some thought might hold out one year, -some two, none more than three, if the Peloponnesians invaded their -country, now seventeen years after the first invasion, after having -already suffered from all the evils of war, going to Sicily and -undertaking a new war nothing inferior to that which they already -had with the Peloponnesians? These causes, the great losses from -Decelea, and the other heavy charges that fell upon them, produced -their financial embarrassment; and it was at this time that they -imposed upon their subjects, instead of the tribute, the tax of a -twentieth upon all imports and exports by sea, which they thought -would bring them in more money; their expenditure being now not the -same as at first, but having grown with the war while their revenues -decayed. - -Accordingly, not wishing to incur expense in their present want of -money, they sent back at once the Thracians who came too late for -Demosthenes, under the conduct of Diitrephes, who was instructed, as -they were to pass through the Euripus, to make use of them if possible -in the voyage alongshore to injure the enemy. Diitrephes first -landed them at Tanagra and hastily snatched some booty; he then sailed -across the Euripus in the evening from Chalcis in Euboea and -disembarking in Boeotia led them against Mycalessus. The night he -passed unobserved near the temple of Hermes, not quite two miles -from Mycalessus, and at daybreak assaulted and took the town, which is -not a large one; the inhabitants being off their guard and not -expecting that any one would ever come up so far from the sea to -molest them, the wall too being weak, and in some places having -tumbled down, while in others it had not been built to any height, and -the gates also being left open through their feeling of security. -The Thracians bursting into Mycalessus sacked the houses and -temples, and butchered the inhabitants, sparing neither youth nor age, -but killing all they fell in with, one after the other, children and -women, and even beasts of burden, and whatever other living -creatures they saw; the Thracian race, like the bloodiest of the -barbarians, being even more so when it has nothing to fear. Everywhere -confusion reigned and death in all its shapes; and in particular -they attacked a boys' school, the largest that there was in the place, -into which the children had just gone, and massacred them all. In -short, the disaster falling upon the whole town was unsurpassed in -magnitude, and unapproached by any in suddenness and in horror. - -Meanwhile the Thebans heard of it and marched to the rescue, and -overtaking the Thracians before they had gone far, recovered the -plunder and drove them in panic to the Euripus and the sea, where -the vessels which brought them were lying. The greatest slaughter took -place while they were embarking, as they did not know how to swim, and -those in the vessels on seeing what was going on on on shore moored -them out of bowshot: in the rest of the retreat the Thracians made a -very respectable defence against the Theban horse, by which they -were first attacked, dashing out and closing their ranks according -to the tactics of their country, and lost only a few men in that -part of the affair. A good number who were after plunder were actually -caught in the town and put to death. Altogether the Thracians had -two hundred and fifty killed out of thirteen hundred, the Thebans -and the rest who came to the rescue about twenty, troopers and heavy -infantry, with Scirphondas, one of the Boeotarchs. The Mycalessians -lost a large proportion of their population. - -While Mycalessus thus experienced a calamity for its extent as -lamentable as any that happened in the war, Demosthenes, whom we -left sailing to Corcyra, after the building of the fort in Laconia, -found a merchantman lying at Phea in Elis, in which the Corinthian -heavy infantry were to cross to Sicily. The ship he destroyed, but the -men escaped, and subsequently got another in which they pursued -their voyage. After this, arriving at Zacynthus and Cephallenia, he -took a body of heavy infantry on board, and sending for some of the -Messenians from Naupactus, crossed over to the opposite coast of -Acarnania, to Alyzia, and to Anactorium which was held by the -Athenians. While he was in these parts he was met by Eurymedon -returning from Sicily, where he had been sent, as has been -mentioned, during the winter, with the money for the army, who told -him the news, and also that he had heard, while at sea, that the -Syracusans had taken Plemmyrium. Here, also, Conon came to them, the -commander at Naupactus, with news that the twenty-five Corinthian -ships stationed opposite to him, far from giving over the war, were -meditating an engagement; and he therefore begged them to send him -some ships, as his own eighteen were not a match for the enemy's -twenty-five. Demosthenes and Eurymedon, accordingly, sent ten of their -best sailers with Conon to reinforce the squadron at Naupactus, and -meanwhile prepared for the muster of their forces; Eurymedon, who -was now the colleague of Demosthenes, and had turned back in -consequence of his appointment, sailing to Corcyra to tell them to man -fifteen ships and to enlist heavy infantry; while Demosthenes raised -slingers and darters from the parts about Acarnania. - -Meanwhile the envoys, already mentioned, who had gone from -Syracuse to the cities after the capture of Plemmyrium, had -succeeded in their mission, and were about to bring the army that they -had collected, when Nicias got scent of it, and sent to the Centoripae -and Alicyaeans and other of the friendly Sicels, who held the -passes, not to let the enemy through, but to combine to prevent -their passing, there being no other way by which they could even -attempt it, as the Agrigentines would not give them a passage -through their country. Agreeably to this request the Sicels laid a -triple ambuscade for the Siceliots upon their march, and attacking -them suddenly, while off their guard, killed about eight hundred of -them and all the envoys, the Corinthian only excepted, by whom fifteen -hundred who escaped were conducted to Syracuse. - -About the same time the Camarinaeans also came to the assistance -of Syracuse with five hundred heavy infantry, three hundred darters, -and as many archers, while the Geloans sent crews for five ships, four -hundred darters, and two hundred horse. Indeed almost the whole of -Sicily, except the Agrigentines, who were neutral, now ceased merely -to watch events as it had hitherto done, and actively joined -Syracuse against the Athenians. - -While the Syracusans after the Sicel disaster put off any -immediate attack upon the Athenians, Demosthenes and Eurymedon, -whose forces from Corcyra and the continent were now ready, crossed -the Ionian Gulf with all their armament to the Iapygian promontory, -and starting from thence touched at the Choerades Isles lying off -Iapygia, where they took on board a hundred and fifty Iapygian darters -of the Messapian tribe, and after renewing an old friendship with -Artas the chief, who had furnished them with the darters, arrived at -Metapontium in Italy. Here they persuaded their allies the -Metapontines to send with them three hundred darters and two -galleys, and with this reinforcement coasted on to Thurii, where -they found the party hostile to Athens recently expelled by a -revolution, and accordingly remained there to muster and review the -whole army, to see if any had been left behind, and to prevail upon -the Thurians resolutely to join them in their expedition, and in the -circumstances in which they found themselves to conclude a defensive -and offensive alliance with the Athenians. - -About the same time the Peloponnesians in the twenty-five ships -stationed opposite to the squadron at Naupactus to protect the passage -of the transports to Sicily had got ready for engaging, and manning -some additional vessels, so as to be numerically little inferior to -the Athenians, anchored off Erineus in Achaia in the Rhypic country. -The place off which they lay being in the form of a crescent, the land -forces furnished by the Corinthians and their allies on the spot -came up and ranged themselves upon the projecting headlands on -either side, while the fleet, under the command of Polyanthes, a -Corinthian, held the intervening space and blocked up the entrance. -The Athenians under Diphilus now sailed out against them with -thirty-three ships from Naupactus, and the Corinthians, at first not -moving, at length thought they saw their opportunity, raised the -signal, and advanced and engaged the Athenians. After an obstinate -struggle, the Corinthians lost three ships, and without sinking any -altogether, disabled seven of the enemy, which were struck prow to -prow and had their foreships stove in by the Corinthian vessels, whose -cheeks had been strengthened for this very purpose. After an action of -this even character, in which either party could claim the victory -(although the Athenians became masters of the wrecks through the -wind driving them out to sea, the Corinthians not putting out again to -meet them), the two combatants parted. No pursuit took place, and no -prisoners were made on either side; the Corinthians and Peloponnesians -who were fighting near the shore escaping with ease, and none of the -Athenian vessels having been sunk. The Athenians now sailed back to -Naupactus, and the Corinthians immediately set up a trophy as victors, -because they had disabled a greater number of the enemy's ships. -Moreover they held that they had not been worsted, for the very same -reason that their opponent held that he had not been victorious; the -Corinthians considering that they were conquerors, if not decidedly -conquered, and the Athenians thinking themselves vanquished, because -not decidedly victorious. However, when the Peloponnesians sailed -off and their land forces had dispersed, the Athenians also set up a -trophy as victors in Achaia, about two miles and a quarter from -Erineus, the Corinthian station. - -This was the termination of the action at Naupactus. To return to -Demosthenes and Eurymedon: the Thurians having now got ready to join -in the expedition with seven hundred heavy infantry and three -hundred darters, the two generals ordered the ships to sail along -the coast to the Crotonian territory, and meanwhile held a review of -all the land forces upon the river Sybaris, and then led them -through the Thurian country. Arrived at the river Hylias, they here -received a message from the Crotonians, saying that they would not -allow the army to pass through their country; upon which the Athenians -descended towards the shore, and bivouacked near the sea and the mouth -of the Hylias, where the fleet also met them, and the next day -embarked and sailed along the coast touching at all the cities -except Locri, until they came to Petra in the Rhegian territory. - -Meanwhile the Syracusans hearing of their approach resolved to -make a second attempt with their fleet and their other forces on -shore, which they had been collecting for this very purpose in order -to do something before their arrival. In addition to other -improvements suggested by the former sea-fight which they now -adopted in the equipment of their navy, they cut down their prows to a -smaller compass to make them more solid and made their cheeks stouter, -and from these let stays into the vessels' sides for a length of six -cubits within and without, in the same way as the Corinthians had -altered their prows before engaging the squadron at Naupactus. The -Syracusans thought that they would thus have an advantage over the -Athenian vessels, which were not constructed with equal strength, -but were slight in the bows, from their being more used to sail -round and charge the enemy's side than to meet him prow to prow, and -that the battle being in the great harbour, with a great many ships in -not much room, was also a fact in their favour. Charging prow to prow, -they would stave in the enemy's bows, by striking with solid and stout -beaks against hollow and weak ones; and secondly, the Athenians for -want of room would be unable to use their favourite manoeuvre of -breaking the line or of sailing round, as the Syracusans would do -their best not to let them do the one, and want of room would -prevent their doing the other. This charging prow to prow, which had -hitherto been thought want of skill in a helmsman, would be the -Syracusans' chief manoeuvre, as being that which they should find most -useful, since the Athenians, if repulsed, would not be able to back -water in any direction except towards the shore, and that only for a -little way, and in the little space in front of their own camp. The -rest of the harbour would be commanded by the Syracusans; and the -Athenians, if hard pressed, by crowding together in a small space -and all to the same point, would run foul of one another and fall into -disorder, which was, in fact, the thing that did the Athenians most -harm in all the sea-fights, they not having, like the Syracusans, -the whole harbour to retreat over. As to their sailing round into -the open sea, this would be impossible, with the Syracusans in -possession of the way out and in, especially as Plemmyrium would be -hostile to them, and the mouth of the harbour was not large. - -With these contrivances to suit their skill and ability, and now -more confident after the previous sea-fight, the Syracusans attacked -by land and sea at once. The town force Gylippus led out a little -the first and brought them up to the wall of the Athenians, where it -looked towards the city, while the force from the Olympieum, that is -to say, the heavy infantry that were there with the horse and the -light troops of the Syracusans, advanced against the wall from the -opposite side; the ships of the Syracusans and allies sailing out -immediately afterwards. The Athenians at first fancied that they -were to be attacked by land only, and it was not without alarm that -they saw the fleet suddenly approaching as well; and while some were -forming upon the walls and in front of them against the advancing -enemy, and some marching out in haste against the numbers of horse and -darters coming from the Olympieum and from outside, others manned -the ships or rushed down to the beach to oppose the enemy, and when -the ships were manned put out with seventy-five sail against about -eighty of the Syracusans. - -After spending a great part of the day in advancing and retreating -and skirmishing with each other, without either being able to gain any -advantage worth speaking of, except that the Syracusans sank one or -two of the Athenian vessels, they parted, the land force at the same -time retiring from the lines. The next day the Syracusans remained -quiet, and gave no signs of what they were going to do; but Nicias, -seeing that the battle had been a drawn one, and expecting that they -would attack again, compelled the captains to refit any of the ships -that had suffered, and moored merchant vessels before the stockade -which they had driven into the sea in front of their ships, to serve -instead of an enclosed harbour, at about two hundred feet from each -other, in order that any ship that was hard pressed might be able to -retreat in safety and sail out again at leisure. These preparations -occupied the Athenians all day until nightfall. - -The next day the Syracusans began operations at an earlier hour, but -with the same plan of attack by land and sea. A great part of the -day the rivals spent as before, confronting and skirmishing with -each other; until at last Ariston, son of Pyrrhicus, a Corinthian, the -ablest helmsman in the Syracusan service, persuaded their naval -commanders to send to the officials in the city, and tell them to move -the sale market as quickly as they could down to the sea, and oblige -every one to bring whatever eatables he had and sell them there, -thus enabling the commanders to land the crews and dine at once -close to the ships, and shortly afterwards, the selfsame day, to -attack the Athenians again when they were not expecting it. - -In compliance with this advice a messenger was sent and the market -got ready, upon which the Syracusans suddenly backed water and -withdrew to the town, and at once landed and took their dinner upon -the spot; while the Athenians, supposing that they had returned to the -town because they felt they were beaten, disembarked at their -leisure and set about getting their dinners and about their other -occupations, under the idea that they done with fighting for that day. -Suddenly the Syracusans had manned their ships and again sailed -against them; and the Athenians, in great confusion and most of them -fasting, got on board, and with great difficulty put out to meet them. -For some time both parties remained on the defensive without engaging, -until the Athenians at last resolved not to let themselves be worn out -by waiting where they were, but to attack without delay, and giving -a cheer, went into action. The Syracusans received them, and -charging prow to prow as they had intended, stove in a great part of -the Athenian foreships by the strength of their beaks; the darters -on the decks also did great damage to the Athenians, but still greater -damage was done by the Syracusans who went about in small boats, ran -in upon the oars of the Athenian galleys, and sailed against their -sides, and discharged from thence their darts upon the sailors. - -At last, fighting hard in this fashion, the Syracusans gained the -victory, and the Athenians turned and fled between the merchantmen -to their own station. The Syracusan ships pursued them as far as the -merchantmen, where they were stopped by the beams armed with -dolphins suspended from those vessels over the passage. Two of the -Syracusan vessels went too near in the excitement of victory and -were destroyed, one of them being taken with its crew. After sinking -seven of the Athenian vessels and disabling many, and taking most of -the men prisoners and killing others, the Syracusans retired and set -up trophies for both the engagements, being now confident of having -a decided superiority by sea, and by no means despairing of equal -success by land. - - - - -CHAPTER XXII - -_Nineteenth Year of the War - Arrival of Demosthenes - Defeat of -the Athenians at Epipolae - Folly and Obstinancy of Nicias_ - -In the meantime, while the Syracusans were preparing for a second -attack upon both elements, Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived with -the succours from Athens, consisting of about seventy-three ships, -including the foreigners; nearly five thousand heavy infantry, -Athenian and allied; a large number of darters, Hellenic and -barbarian, and slingers and archers and everything else upon a -corresponding scale. The Syracusans and their allies were for the -moment not a little dismayed at the idea that there was to be no -term or ending to their dangers, seeing, in spite of the fortification -of Decelea, a new army arrive nearly equal to the former, and the -power of Athens proving so great in every quarter. On the other -hand, the first Athenian armament regained a certain confidence in the -midst of its misfortunes. Demosthenes, seeing how matters stood, -felt that he could not drag on and fare as Nicias had done, who by -wintering in Catana instead of at once attacking Syracuse had -allowed the terror of his first arrival to evaporate in contempt, -and had given time to Gylippus to arrive with a force from -Peloponnese, which the Syracusans would never have sent for if he -had attacked immediately; for they fancied that they were a match -for him by themselves, and would not have discovered their inferiority -until they were already invested, and even if they then sent for -succours, they would no longer have been equally able to profit by -their arrival. Recollecting this, and well aware that it was now on -the first day after his arrival that he like Nicias was most -formidable to the enemy, Demosthenes determined to lose no time in -drawing the utmost profit from the consternation at the moment -inspired by his army; and seeing that the counterwall of the -Syracusans, which hindered the Athenians from investing them, was a -single one, and that he who should become master of the way up to -Epipolae, and afterwards of the camp there, would find no difficulty -in taking it, as no one would even wait for his attack, made all haste -to attempt the enterprise. This he took to be the shortest way of -ending the war, as he would either succeed and take Syracuse, or would -lead back the armament instead of frittering away the lives of the -Athenians engaged in the expedition and the resources of the country -at large. - -First therefore the Athenians went out and laid waste the lands of -the Syracusans about the Anapus and carried all before them as at -first by land and by sea, the Syracusans not offering to oppose them -upon either element, unless it were with their cavalry and darters -from the Olympieum. Next Demosthenes resolved to attempt the -counterwall first by means of engines. As however the engines that -he brought up were burnt by the enemy fighting from the wall, and -the rest of the forces repulsed after attacking at many different -points, he determined to delay no longer, and having obtained the -consent of Nicias and his fellow commanders, proceeded to put in -execution his plan of attacking Epipolae. As by day it seemed -impossible to approach and get up without being observed, he ordered -provisions for five days, took all the masons and carpenters, and -other things, such as arrows, and everything else that they could want -for the work of fortification if successful, and, after the first -watch, set out with Eurymedon and Menander and the whole army for -Epipolae, Nicias being left behind in the lines. Having come up by the -hill of Euryelus (where the former army had ascended at first) -unobserved by the enemy's guards, they went up to the fort which the -Syracusans had there, and took it, and put to the sword part of the -garrison. The greater number, however, escaped at once and gave the -alarm to the camps, of which there were three upon Epipolae, -defended by outworks, one of the Syracusans, one of the other -Siceliots, and one of the allies; and also to the six hundred -Syracusans forming the original garrison for this part of Epipolae. -These at once advanced against the assailants and, falling in with -Demosthenes and the Athenians, were routed by them after a sharp -resistance, the victors immediately pushing on, eager to achieve the -objects of the attack without giving time for their ardour to cool; -meanwhile others from the very beginning were taking the counterwall -of the Syracusans, which was abandoned by its garrison, and pulling -down the battlements. The Syracusans and the allies, and Gylippus with -the troops under his command, advanced to the rescue from the -outworks, but engaged in some consternation (a night attack being a -piece of audacity which they had never expected), and were at first -compelled to retreat. But while the Athenians, flushed with their -victory, now advanced with less order, wishing to make their way as -quickly as possible through the whole force of the enemy not yet -engaged, without relaxing their attack or giving them time to rally, -the Boeotians made the first stand against them, attacked them, routed -them, and put them to flight. - -The Athenians now fell into great disorder and perplexity, so that -it was not easy to get from one side or the other any detailed account -of the affair. By day certainly the combatants have a clearer -notion, though even then by no means of all that takes place, no one -knowing much of anything that does not go on in his own immediate -neighbourhood; but in a night engagement (and this was the only one -that occurred between great armies during the war) how could any one -know anything for certain? Although there was a bright moon they saw -each other only as men do by moonlight, that is to say, they could -distinguish the form of the body, but could not tell for certain -whether it was a friend or an enemy. Both had great numbers of heavy -infantry moving about in a small space. Some of the Athenians were -already defeated, while others were coming up yet unconquered for -their first attack. A large part also of the rest of their forces -either had only just got up, or were still ascending, so that they did -not know which way to march. Owing to the rout that had taken place -all in front was now in confusion, and the noise made it difficult -to distinguish anything. The victorious Syracusans and allies were -cheering each other on with loud cries, by night the only possible -means of communication, and meanwhile receiving all who came against -them; while the Athenians were seeking for one another, taking all -in front of them for enemies, even although they might be some of -their now flying friends; and by constantly asking for the -watchword, which was their only means of recognition, not only -caused great confusion among themselves by asking all at once, but -also made it known to the enemy, whose own they did not so readily -discover, as the Syracusans were victorious and not scattered, and -thus less easily mistaken. The result was that if the Athenians fell -in with a party of the enemy that was weaker than they, it escaped -them through knowing their watchword; while if they themselves -failed to answer they were put to the sword. But what hurt them as -much, or indeed more than anything else, was the singing of the paean, -from the perplexity which it caused by being nearly the same on either -side; the Argives and Corcyraeans and any other Dorian peoples in -the army, struck terror into the Athenians whenever they raised -their paean, no less than did the enemy. Thus, after being once thrown -into disorder, they ended by coming into collision with each other -in many parts of the field, friends with friends, and citizens with -citizens, and not only terrified one another, but even came to blows -and could only be parted with difficulty. In the pursuit many perished -by throwing themselves down the cliffs, the way down from Epipolae -being narrow; and of those who got down safely into the plain, -although many, especially those who belonged to the first armament, -escaped through their better acquaintance with the locality, some of -the newcomers lost their way and wandered over the country, and were -cut off in the morning by the Syracusan cavalry and killed. - -The next day the Syracusans set up two trophies, one upon Epipolae -where the ascent had been made, and the other on the spot where the -first check was given by the Boeotians; and the Athenians took back -their dead under truce. A great many of the Athenians and allies -were killed, although still more arms were taken than could be -accounted for by the number of the dead, as some of those who were -obliged to leap down from the cliffs without their shields escaped -with their lives and did not perish like the rest. - -After this the Syracusans, recovering their old confidence at such -an unexpected stroke of good fortune, dispatched Sicanus with -fifteen ships to Agrigentum where there was a revolution, to induce if -possible the city to join them; while Gylippus again went by land into -the rest of Sicily to bring up reinforcements, being now in hope of -taking the Athenian lines by storm, after the result of the affair -on Epipolae. - -In the meantime the Athenian generals consulted upon the disaster -which had happened, and upon the general weakness of the army. They -saw themselves unsuccessful in their enterprises, and the soldiers -disgusted with their stay; disease being rife among them owing to -its being the sickly season of the year, and to the marshy and -unhealthy nature of the spot in which they were encamped; and the -state of their affairs generally being thought desperate. Accordingly, -Demosthenes was of opinion that they ought not to stay any longer; but -agreeably to his original idea in risking the attempt upon Epipolae, -now that this had failed, he gave his vote for going away without -further loss of time, while the sea might yet be crossed, and their -late reinforcement might give them the superiority at all events on -that element. He also said that it would be more profitable for the -state to carry on the war against those who were building -fortifications in Attica, than against the Syracusans whom it was no -longer easy to subdue; besides which it was not right to squander -large sums of money to no purpose by going on with the siege. - -This was the opinion of Demosthenes. Nicias, without denying the bad -state of their affairs, was unwilling to avow their weakness, or to -have it reported to the enemy that the Athenians in full council -were openly voting for retreat; for in that case they would be much -less likely to effect it when they wanted without discovery. Moreover, -his own particular information still gave him reason to hope that -the affairs of the enemy would soon be in a worse state than their -own, if the Athenians persevered in the siege; as they would wear -out the Syracusans by want of money, especially with the more -extensive command of the sea now given them by their present navy. -Besides this, there was a party in Syracuse who wished to betray the -city to the Athenians, and kept sending him messages and telling him -not to raise the siege. Accordingly, knowing this and really waiting -because he hesitated between the two courses and wished to see his way -more clearly, in his public speech on this occasion he refused to lead -off the army, saying he was sure the Athenians would never approve -of their returning without a vote of theirs. Those who would vote upon -their conduct, instead of judging the facts as eye-witnesses like -themselves and not from what they might hear from hostile critics, -would simply be guided by the calumnies of the first clever speaker; -while many, indeed most, of the soldiers on the spot, who now so -loudly proclaimed the danger of their position, when they reached -Athens would proclaim just as loudly the opposite, and would say -that their generals had been bribed to betray them and return. For -himself, therefore, who knew the Athenian temper, sooner than perish -under a dishonourable charge and by an unjust sentence at the hands of -the Athenians, he would rather take his chance and die, if die he -must, a soldier's death at the hand of the enemy. Besides, after -all, the Syracusans were in a worse case than themselves. What with -paying mercenaries, spending upon fortified posts, and now for a -full year maintaining a large navy, they were already at a loss and -would soon be at a standstill: they had already spent two thousand -talents and incurred heavy debts besides, and could not lose even ever -so small a fraction of their present force through not paying it, -without ruin to their cause; depending as they did more upon -mercenaries than upon soldiers obliged to serve, like their own. He -therefore said that they ought to stay and carry on the siege, and not -depart defeated in point of money, in which they were much superior. - -Nicias spoke positively because he had exact information of the -financial distress at Syracuse, and also because of the strength of -the Athenian party there which kept sending him messages not to -raise the siege; besides which he had more confidence than before in -his fleet, and felt sure at least of its success. Demosthenes, -however, would not hear for a moment of continuing the siege, but said -that if they could not lead off the army without a decree from Athens, -and if they were obliged to stay on, they ought to remove to Thapsus -or Catana; where their land forces would have a wide extent of country -to overrun, and could live by plundering the enemy, and would thus -do them damage; while the fleet would have the open sea to fight in, -that is to say, instead of a narrow space which was all in the enemy's -favour, a wide sea-room where their science would be of use, and where -they could retreat or advance without being confined or -circumscribed either when they put out or put in. In any case he was -altogether opposed to their staying on where they were, and insisted -on removing at once, as quickly and with as little delay as -possible; and in this judgment Eurymedon agreed. Nicias however -still objecting, a certain diffidence and hesitation came over them, -with a suspicion that Nicias might have some further information to -make him so positive. - - - - -CHAPTER XXIII - -_Nineteenth Year of the War - Battles in the Great Harbour - -Retreat and Annihilation of the Athenian Army_ - -While the Athenians lingered on in this way without moving from -where they were, Gylippus and Sicanus now arrived at Syracuse. Sicanus -had failed to gain Agrigentum, the party friendly to the Syracusans -having been driven out while he was still at Gela; but Gylippus was -accompanied not only by a large number of troops raised in Sicily, but -by the heavy infantry sent off in the spring from Peloponnese in the -merchantmen, who had arrived at Selinus from Libya. They had been -carried to Libya by a storm, and having obtained two galleys and -pilots from the Cyrenians, on their voyage alongshore had taken -sides with the Euesperitae and had defeated the Libyans who were -besieging them, and from thence coasting on to Neapolis, a -Carthaginian mart, and the nearest point to Sicily, from which it is -only two days' and a night's voyage, there crossed over and came to -Selinus. Immediately upon their arrival the Syracusans prepared to -attack the Athenians again by land and sea at once. The Athenian -generals seeing a fresh army come to the aid of the enemy, and that -their own circumstances, far from improving, were becoming daily -worse, and above all distressed by the sickness of the soldiers, now -began to repent of not having removed before; and Nicias no longer -offering the same opposition, except by urging that there should be no -open voting, they gave orders as secretly as possible for all to be -prepared to sail out from the camp at a given signal. All was at -last ready, and they were on the point of sailing away, when an -eclipse of the moon, which was then at the full, took place. Most of -the Athenians, deeply impressed by this occurrence, now urged the -generals to wait; and Nicias, who was somewhat over-addicted to -divination and practices of that kind, refused from that moment even -to take the question of departure into consideration, until they had -waited the thrice nine days prescribed by the soothsayers. - -The besiegers were thus condemned to stay in the country; and the -Syracusans, getting wind of what had happened, became more eager -than ever to press the Athenians, who had now themselves -acknowledged that they were no longer their superiors either by sea or -by land, as otherwise they would never have planned to sail away. -Besides which the Syracusans did not wish them to settle in any -other part of Sicily, where they would be more difficult to deal with, -but desired to force them to fight at sea as quickly as possible, in a -position favourable to themselves. Accordingly they manned their ships -and practised for as many days as they thought sufficient. When the -moment arrived they assaulted on the first day the Athenian lines, and -upon a small force of heavy infantry and horse sallying out against -them by certain gates, cut off some of the former and routed and -pursued them to the lines, where, as the entrance was narrow, the -Athenians lost seventy horses and some few of the heavy infantry. - -Drawing off their troops for this day, on the next the Syracusans -went out with a fleet of seventy-six sail, and at the same time -advanced with their land forces against the lines. The Athenians put -out to meet them with eighty-six ships, came to close quarters, and -engaged. The Syracusans and their allies first defeated the Athenian -centre, and then caught Eurymedon, the commander of the right wing, -who was sailing out from the line more towards the land in order to -surround the enemy, in the hollow and recess of the harbour, and -killed him and destroyed the ships accompanying him; after which -they now chased the whole Athenian fleet before them and drove them -ashore. - -Gylippus seeing the enemy's fleet defeated and carried ashore beyond -their stockades and camp, ran down to the breakwater with some of -his troops, in order to cut off the men as they landed and make it -easier for the Syracusans to tow off the vessels by the shore being -friendly ground. The Tyrrhenians who guarded this point for the -Athenians, seeing them come on in disorder, advanced out against -them and attacked and routed their van, hurling it into the marsh of -Lysimeleia. Afterwards the Syracusan and allied troops arrived in -greater numbers, and the Athenians fearing for their ships came up -also to the rescue and engaged them, and defeated and pursued them -to some distance and killed a few of their heavy infantry. They -succeeded in rescuing most of their ships and brought them down by -their camp; eighteen however were taken by the Syracusans and their -allies, and all the men killed. The rest the enemy tried to burn by -means of an old merchantman which they filled with faggots and -pine-wood, set on fire, and let drift down the wind which blew full on -the Athenians. The Athenians, however, alarmed for their ships, -contrived means for stopping it and putting it out, and checking the -flames and the nearer approach of the merchantman, thus escaped the -danger. - -After this the Syracusans set up a trophy for the sea-fight and -for the heavy infantry whom they had cut off up at the lines, where -they took the horses; and the Athenians for the rout of the foot -driven by the Tyrrhenians into the marsh, and for their own victory -with the rest of the army. - -The Syracusans had now gained a decisive victory at sea, where until -now they had feared the reinforcement brought by Demosthenes, and -deep, in consequence, was the despondency of the Athenians, and -great their disappointment, and greater still their regret for -having come on the expedition. These were the only cities that they -had yet encountered, similar to their own in character, under -democracies like themselves, which had ships and horses, and were of -considerable magnitude. They had been unable to divide and bring -them over by holding out the prospect of changes in their governments, -or to crush them by their great superiority in force, but had failed -in most of their attempts, and being already in perplexity, had now -been defeated at sea, where defeat could never have been expected, and -were thus plunged deeper in embarrassment than ever. - -Meanwhile the Syracusans immediately began to sail freely along -the harbour, and determined to close up its mouth, so that the -Athenians might not be able to steal out in future, even if they -wished. Indeed, the Syracusans no longer thought only of saving -themselves, but also how to hinder the escape of the enemy; -thinking, and thinking rightly, that they were now much the -stronger, and that to conquer the Athenians and their allies by land -and sea would win them great glory in Hellas. The rest of the Hellenes -would thus immediately be either freed or released from -apprehension, as the remaining forces of Athens would be henceforth -unable to sustain the war that would be waged against her; while they, -the Syracusans, would be regarded as the authors of this -deliverance, and would be held in high admiration, not only with all -men now living but also with posterity. Nor were these the only -considerations that gave dignity to the struggle. They would thus -conquer not only the Athenians but also their numerous allies, and -conquer not alone, but with their companions in arms, commanding -side by side with the Corinthians and Lacedaemonians, having offered -their city to stand in the van of danger, and having been in a great -measure the pioneers of naval success. - -Indeed, there were never so many peoples assembled before a single -city, if we except the grand total gathered together in this war under -Athens and Lacedaemon. The following were the states on either side -who came to Syracuse to fight for or against Sicily, to help to -conquer or defend the island. Right or community of blood was not -the bond of union between them, so much as interest or compulsion as -the case might be. The Athenians themselves being Ionians went against -the Dorians of Syracuse of their own free will; and the peoples -still speaking Attic and using the Athenian laws, the Lemnians, -Imbrians, and Aeginetans, that is to say the then occupants of Aegina, -being their colonists, went with them. To these must be also added the -Hestiaeans dwelling at Hestiaea in Euboea. Of the rest some joined -in the expedition as subjects of the Athenians, others as -independent allies, others as mercenaries. To the number of the -subjects paying tribute belonged the Eretrians, Chalcidians, Styrians, -and Carystians from Euboea; the Ceans, Andrians, and Tenians from -the islands; and the Milesians, Samians, and Chians from Ionia. The -Chians, however, joined as independent allies, paying no tribute, -but furnishing ships. Most of these were Ionians and descended from -the Athenians, except the Carystians, who are Dryopes, and although -subjects and obliged to serve, were still Ionians fighting against -Dorians. Besides these there were men of Aeolic race, the Methymnians, -subjects who provided ships, not tribute, and the Tenedians and -Aenians who paid tribute. These Aeolians fought against their -Aeolian founders, the Boeotians in the Syracusan army, because they -were obliged, while the Plataeans, the only native Boeotians opposed -to Boeotians, did so upon a just quarrel. Of the Rhodians and -Cytherians, both Dorians, the latter, Lacedaemonian colonists, -fought in the Athenian ranks against their Lacedaemonian countrymen -with Gylippus; while the Rhodians, Argives by race, were compelled -to bear arms against the Dorian Syracusans and their own colonists, -the Geloans, serving with the Syracusans. Of the islanders round -Peloponnese, the Cephallenians and Zacynthians accompanied the -Athenians as independent allies, although their insular position -really left them little choice in the matter, owing to the maritime -supremacy of Athens, while the Corcyraeans, who were not only -Dorians but Corinthians, were openly serving against Corinthians and -Syracusans, although colonists of the former and of the same race as -the latter, under colour of compulsion, but really out of free will -through hatred of Corinth. The Messenians, as they are now called in -Naupactus and from Pylos, then held by the Athenians, were taken -with them to the war. There were also a few Megarian exiles, whose -fate it was to be now fighting against the Megarian Selinuntines. - -The engagement of the rest was more of a voluntary nature. It was -less the league than hatred of the Lacedaemonians and the immediate -private advantage of each individual that persuaded the Dorian Argives -to join the Ionian Athenians in a war against Dorians; while the -Mantineans and other Arcadian mercenaries, accustomed to go against -the enemy pointed out to them at the moment, were led by interest to -regard the Arcadians serving with the Corinthians as just as much -their enemies as any others. The Cretans and Aetolians also served for -hire, and the Cretans who had joined the Rhodians in founding Gela, -thus came to consent to fight for pay against, instead of for, their -colonists. There were also some Acarnanians paid to serve, although -they came chiefly for love of Demosthenes and out of goodwill to the -Athenians whose allies they were. These all lived on the Hellenic side -of the Ionian Gulf. Of the Italiots, there were the Thurians and -Metapontines, dragged into the quarrel by the stern necessities of a -time of revolution; of the Siceliots, the Naxians and the Catanians; -and of the barbarians, the Egestaeans, who called in the Athenians, -most of the Sicels, and outside Sicily some Tyrrhenian enemies of -Syracuse and Iapygian mercenaries. - -Such were the peoples serving with the Athenians. Against these -the Syracusans had the Camarinaeans their neighbours, the Geloans -who live next to them; then passing over the neutral Agrigentines, the -Selinuntines settled on the farther side of the island. These -inhabit the part of Sicily looking towards Libya; the Himeraeans -came from the side towards the Tyrrhenian Sea, being the only Hellenic -inhabitants in that quarter, and the only people that came from thence -to the aid of the Syracusans. Of the Hellenes in Sicily the above -peoples joined in the war, all Dorians and independent, and of the -barbarians the Sicels only, that is to say, such as did not go over to -the Athenians. Of the Hellenes outside Sicily there were the -Lacedaemonians, who provided a Spartan to take the command, and a -force of Neodamodes or Freedmen, and of Helots; the Corinthians, who -alone joined with naval and land forces, with their Leucadian and -Ambraciot kinsmen; some mercenaries sent by Corinth from Arcadia; some -Sicyonians forced to serve, and from outside Peloponnese the -Boeotians. In comparison, however, with these foreign auxiliaries, the -great Siceliot cities furnished more in every department--numbers of -heavy infantry, ships, and horses, and an immense multitude besides -having been brought together; while in comparison, again, one may say, -with all the rest put together, more was provided by the Syracusans -themselves, both from the greatness of the city and from the fact that -they were in the greatest danger. - -Such were the auxiliaries brought together on either side, all of -which had by this time joined, neither party experiencing any -subsequent accession. It was no wonder, therefore, if the Syracusans -and their allies thought that it would win them great glory if they -could follow up their recent victory in the sea-fight by the capture -of the whole Athenian armada, without letting it escape either by -sea or by land. They began at once to close up the Great Harbour by -means of boats, merchant vessels, and galleys moored broadside -across its mouth, which is nearly a mile wide, and made all their -other arrangements for the event of the Athenians again venturing to -fight at sea. There was, in fact, nothing little either in their plans -or their ideas. - -The Athenians, seeing them closing up the harbour and informed of -their further designs, called a council of war. The generals and -colonels assembled and discussed the difficulties of the situation; -the point which pressed most being that they no longer had -provisions for immediate use (having sent on to Catana to tell them -not to send any, in the belief that they were going away), and that -they would not have any in future unless they could command the sea. -They therefore determined to evacuate their upper lines, to enclose -with a cross wall and garrison a small space close to the ships, -only just sufficient to hold their stores and sick, and manning all -the ships, seaworthy or not, with every man that could be spared -from the rest of their land forces, to fight it out at sea, and, if -victorious, to go to Catana, if not, to burn their vessels, form in -close order, and retreat by land for the nearest friendly place they -could reach, Hellenic or barbarian. This was no sooner settled than -carried into effect; they descended gradually from the upper lines and -manned all their vessels, compelling all to go on board who were of -age to be in any way of use. They thus succeeded in manning about -one hundred and ten ships in all, on board of which they embarked a -number of archers and darters taken from the Acarnanians and from -the other foreigners, making all other provisions allowed by the -nature of their plan and by the necessities which imposed it. All -was now nearly ready, and Nicias, seeing the soldiery disheartened -by their unprecedented and decided defeat at sea, and by reason of the -scarcity of provisions eager to fight it out as soon as possible, -called them all together, and first addressed them, speaking as -follows: - -"Soldiers of the Athenians and of the allies, we have all an equal -interest in the coming struggle, in which life and country are at -stake for us quite as much as they can be for the enemy; since if -our fleet wins the day, each can see his native city again, wherever -that city may be. You must not lose heart, or be like men without -any experience, who fail in a first essay and ever afterwards -fearfully forebode a future as disastrous. But let the Athenians among -you who have already had experience of many wars, and the allies who -have joined us in so many expeditions, remember the surprises of -war, and with the hope that fortune will not be always against us, -prepare to fight again in a manner worthy of the number which you -see yourselves to be. - -"Now, whatever we thought would be of service against the crush of -vessels in such a narrow harbour, and against the force upon the decks -of the enemy, from which we suffered before, has all been considered -with the helmsmen, and, as far as our means allowed, provided. A -number of archers and darters will go on board, and a multitude that -we should not have employed in an action in the open sea, where our -science would be crippled by the weight of the vessels; but in the -present land-fight that we are forced to make from shipboard all -this will be useful. We have also discovered the changes in -construction that we must make to meet theirs; and against the -thickness of their cheeks, which did us the greatest mischief, we have -provided grappling-irons, which will prevent an assailant backing -water after charging, if the soldiers on deck here do their duty; -since we are absolutely compelled to fight a land battle from the -fleet, and it seems to be our interest neither to back water -ourselves, nor to let the enemy do so, especially as the shore, except -so much of it as may be held by our troops, is hostile ground. - -"You must remember this and fight on as long as you can, and must -not let yourselves be driven ashore, but once alongside must make up -your minds not to part company until you have swept the heavy infantry -from the enemy's deck. I say this more for the heavy infantry than for -the seamen, as it is more the business of the men on deck; and our -land forces are even now on the whole the strongest. The sailors I -advise, and at the same time implore, not to be too much daunted by -their misfortunes, now that we have our decks better armed and greater -number of vessels. Bear in mind how well worth preserving is the -pleasure felt by those of you who through your knowledge of our -language and imitation of our manners were always considered -Athenians, even though not so in reality, and as such were honoured -throughout Hellas, and had your full share of the advantages of our -empire, and more than your share in the respect of our subjects and in -protection from ill treatment. You, therefore, with whom alone we -freely share our empire, we now justly require not to betray that -empire in its extremity, and in scorn of Corinthians, whom you have -often conquered, and of Siceliots, none of whom so much as presumed to -stand against us when our navy was in its prime, we ask you to repel -them, and to show that even in sickness and disaster your skill is -more than a match for the fortune and vigour of any other. - -"For the Athenians among you I add once more this reflection: You -left behind you no more such ships in your docks as these, no more -heavy infantry in their flower; if you do aught but conquer, our -enemies here will immediately sail thither, and those that are left of -us at Athens will become unable to repel their home assailants, -reinforced by these new allies. Here you will fall at once into the -hands of the Syracusans--I need not remind you of the intentions with -which you attacked them--and your countrymen at home will fall into -those of the Lacedaemonians. Since the fate of both thus hangs upon -this single battle, now, if ever, stand firm, and remember, each and -all, that you who are now going on board are the army and navy of -the Athenians, and all that is left of the state and the great name of -Athens, in whose defence if any man has any advantage in skill or -courage, now is the time for him to show it, and thus serve himself -and save all." - -After this address Nicias at once gave orders to man the ships. -Meanwhile Gylippus and the Syracusans could perceive by the -preparations which they saw going on that the Athenians meant to fight -at sea. They had also notice of the grappling-irons, against which -they specially provided by stretching hides over the prows and much of -the upper part of their vessels, in order that the irons when thrown -might slip off without taking hold. All being now ready, the -generals and Gylippus addressed them in the following terms: - -"Syracusans and allies, the glorious character of our past -achievements and the no less glorious results at issue in the coming -battle are, we think, understood by most of you, or you would never -have thrown yourselves with such ardour into the struggle; and if -there be any one not as fully aware of the facts as he ought to be, we -will declare them to him. The Athenians came to this country first -to effect the conquest of Sicily, and after that, if successful, of -Peloponnese and the rest of Hellas, possessing already the greatest -empire yet known, of present or former times, among the Hellenes. Here -for the first time they found in you men who faced their navy which -made them masters everywhere; you have already defeated them in the -previous sea-fights, and will in all likelihood defeat them again now. -When men are once checked in what they consider their special -excellence, their whole opinion of themselves suffers more than if -they had not at first believed in their superiority, the unexpected -shock to their pride causing them to give way more than their real -strength warrants; and this is probably now the case with the -Athenians. - -"With us it is different. The original estimate of ourselves which -gave us courage in the days of our unskilfulness has been -strengthened, while the conviction superadded to it that we must be -the best seamen of the time, if we have conquered the best, has -given a double measure of hope to every man among us; and, for the -most part, where there is the greatest hope, there is also the -greatest ardour for action. The means to combat us which they have -tried to find in copying our armament are familiar to our warfare, and -will be met by proper provisions; while they will never be able to -have a number of heavy infantry on their decks, contrary to their -custom, and a number of darters (born landsmen, one may say, -Acarnanians and others, embarked afloat, who will not know how to -discharge their weapons when they have to keep still), without -hampering their vessels and falling all into confusion among -themselves through fighting not according to their own tactics. For -they will gain nothing by the number of their ships--I say this to -those of you who may be alarmed by having to fight against odds--as a -quantity of ships in a confined space will only be slower in executing -the movements required, and most exposed to injury from our means of -offence. Indeed, if you would know the plain truth, as we are credibly -informed, the excess of their sufferings and the necessities of -their present distress have made them desperate; they have no -confidence in their force, but wish to try their fortune in the only -way they can, and either to force their passage and sail out, or after -this to retreat by land, it being impossible for them to be worse -off than they are. - -"The fortune of our greatest enemies having thus betrayed itself, -and their disorder being what I have described, let us engage in -anger, convinced that, as between adversaries, nothing is more -legitimate than to claim to sate the whole wrath of one's soul in -punishing the aggressor, and nothing more sweet, as the proverb has -it, than the vengeance upon an enemy, which it will now be ours to -take. That enemies they are and mortal enemies you all know, since -they came here to enslave our country, and if successful had in -reserve for our men all that is most dreadful, and for our children -and wives all that is most dishonourable, and for the whole city the -name which conveys the greatest reproach. None should therefore relent -or think it gain if they go away without further danger to us. This -they will do just the same, even if they get the victory; while if -we succeed, as we may expect, in chastising them, and in handing -down to all Sicily her ancient freedom strengthened and confirmed, -we shall have achieved no mean triumph. And the rarest dangers are -those in which failure brings little loss and success the greatest -advantage." - -After the above address to the soldiers on their side, the Syracusan -generals and Gylippus now perceived that the Athenians were manning -their ships, and immediately proceeded to man their own also. -Meanwhile Nicias, appalled by the position of affairs, realizing the -greatness and the nearness of the danger now that they were on the -point of putting out from shore, and thinking, as men are apt to think -in great crises, that when all has been done they have still something -left to do, and when all has been said that they have not yet said -enough, again called on the captains one by one, addressing each by -his father's name and by his own, and by that of his tribe, and -adjured them not to belie their own personal renown, or to obscure the -hereditary virtues for which their ancestors were illustrious: he -reminded them of their country, the freest of the free, and of the -unfettered discretion allowed in it to all to live as they pleased; -and added other arguments such as men would use at such a crisis, -and which, with little alteration, are made to serve on all -occasions alike--appeals to wives, children, and national -gods--without caring whether they are thought commonplace, but loudly -invoking them in the belief that they will be of use in the -consternation of the moment. Having thus admonished them, not, he -felt, as he would, but as he could, Nicias withdrew and led the troops -to the sea, and ranged them in as long a line as he was able, in order -to aid as far as possible in sustaining the courage of the men afloat; -while Demosthenes, Menander, and Euthydemus, who took the command on -board, put out from their own camp and sailed straight to the -barrier across the mouth of the harbour and to the passage left -open, to try to force their way out. - -The Syracusans and their allies had already put out with about the -same number of ships as before, a part of which kept guard at the -outlet, and the remainder all round the rest of the harbour, in -order to attack the Athenians on all sides at once; while the land -forces held themselves in readiness at the points at which the vessels -might put into the shore. The Syracusan fleet was commanded by Sicanus -and Agatharchus, who had each a wing of the whole force, with Pythen -and the Corinthians in the centre. When the rest of the Athenians came -up to the barrier, with the first shock of their charge they -overpowered the ships stationed there, and tried to undo the -fastenings; after this, as the Syracusans and allies bore down upon -them from all quarters, the action spread from the barrier over the -whole harbour, and was more obstinately disputed than any of the -preceding ones. On either side the rowers showed great zeal in -bringing up their vessels at the boatswains' orders, and the -helmsmen great skill in manoeuvring, and great emulation one with -another; while the ships once alongside, the soldiers on board did -their best not to let the service on deck be outdone by the others; in -short, every man strove to prove himself the first in his particular -department. And as many ships were engaged in a small compass (for -these were the largest fleets fighting in the narrowest space ever -known, being together little short of two hundred), the regular -attacks with the beak were few, there being no opportunity of -backing water or of breaking the line; while the collisions caused -by one ship chancing to run foul of another, either in flying from -or attacking a third, were more frequent. So long as a vessel was -coming up to the charge the men on the decks rained darts and arrows -and stones upon her; but once alongside, the heavy infantry tried to -board each other's vessel, fighting hand to hand. In many quarters -it happened, by reason of the narrow room, that a vessel was -charging an enemy on one side and being charged herself on another, -and that two or sometimes more ships had perforce got entangled -round one, obliging the helmsmen to attend to defence here, offence -there, not to one thing at once, but to many on all sides; while the -huge din caused by the number of ships crashing together not only -spread terror, but made the orders of the boatswains inaudible. The -boatswains on either side in the discharge of their duty and in the -heat of the conflict shouted incessantly orders and appeals to their -men; the Athenians they urged to force the passage out, and now if -ever to show their mettle and lay hold of a safe return to their -country; to the Syracusans and their allies they cried that it would -be glorious to prevent the escape of the enemy, and, conquering, to -exalt the countries that were theirs. The generals, moreover, on -either side, if they saw any in any part of the battle backing -ashore without being forced to do so, called out to the captain by -name and asked him--the Athenians, whether they were retreating -because they thought the thrice hostile shore more their own than -that sea which had cost them so much labour to win; the Syracusans, -whether they were flying from the flying Athenians, whom they well -knew to be eager to escape in whatever way they could. - -Meanwhile the two armies on shore, while victory hung in the -balance, were a prey to the most agonizing and conflicting emotions; -the natives thirsting for more glory than they had already won, -while the invaders feared to find themselves in even worse plight than -before. The all of the Athenians being set upon their fleet, their -fear for the event was like nothing they had ever felt; while their -view of the struggle was necessarily as chequered as the battle -itself. Close to the scene of action and not all looking at the same -point at once, some saw their friends victorious and took courage -and fell to calling upon heaven not to deprive them of salvation, -while others who had their eyes turned upon the losers, wailed and -cried aloud, and, although spectators, were more overcome than the -actual combatants. Others, again, were gazing at some spot where the -battle was evenly disputed; as the strife was protracted without -decision, their swaying bodies reflected the agitation of their minds, -and they suffered the worst agony of all, ever just within reach of -safety or just on the point of destruction. In short, in that one -Athenian army as long as the sea-fight remained doubtful there was -every sound to be heard at once, shrieks, cheers, "We win," "We lose," -and all the other manifold exclamations that a great host would -necessarily utter in great peril; and with the men in the fleet it was -nearly the same; until at last the Syracusans and their allies, -after the battle had lasted a long while, put the Athenians to flight, -and with much shouting and cheering chased them in open rout to the -shore. The naval force, one one way, one another, as many as were -not taken afloat now ran ashore and rushed from on board their ships -to their camp; while the army, no more divided, but carried away by -one impulse, all with shrieks and groans deplored the event, and ran -down, some to help the ships, others to guard what was left of their -wall, while the remaining and most numerous part already began to -consider how they should save themselves. Indeed, the panic of the -present moment had never been surpassed. They now suffered very nearly -what they had inflicted at Pylos; as then the Lacedaemonians with -the loss of their fleet lost also the men who had crossed over to -the island, so now the Athenians had no hope of escaping by land, -without the help of some extraordinary accident. - -The sea-fight having been a severe one, and many ships and lives -having been lost on both sides, the victorious Syracusans and their -allies now picked up their wrecks and dead, and sailed off to the city -and set up a trophy. The Athenians, overwhelmed by their misfortune, -never even thought of asking leave to take up their dead or wrecks, -but wished to retreat that very night. Demosthenes, however, went to -Nicias and gave it as his opinion that they should man the ships -they had left and make another effort to force their passage out -next morning; saying that they had still left more ships fit for -service than the enemy, the Athenians having about sixty remaining -as against less than fifty of their opponents. Nicias was quite of his -mind; but when they wished to man the vessels, the sailors refused -to go on board, being so utterly overcome by their defeat as no longer -to believe in the possibility of success. - -Accordingly they all now made up their minds to retreat by land. -Meanwhile the Syracusan Hermocrates--suspecting their intention, and -impressed by the danger of allowing a force of that magnitude to -retire by land, establish itself in some other part of Sicily, and -from thence renew the war--went and stated his views to the -authorities, and pointed out to them that they ought not to let the -enemy get away by night, but that all the Syracusans and their -allies should at once march out and block up the roads and seize and -guard the passes. The authorities were entirely of his opinion, and -thought that it ought to be done, but on the other hand felt sure that -the people, who had given themselves over to rejoicing, and were -taking their ease after a great battle at sea, would not be easily -brought to obey; besides, they were celebrating a festival, having -on that day a sacrifice to Heracles, and most of them in their rapture -at the victory had fallen to drinking at the festival, and would -probably consent to anything sooner than to take up their arms and -march out at that moment. For these reasons the thing appeared -impracticable to the magistrates; and Hermocrates, finding himself -unable to do anything further with them, had now recourse to the -following stratagem of his own. What he feared was that the -Athenians might quietly get the start of them by passing the most -difficult places during the night; and he therefore sent, as soon as -it was dusk, some friends of his own to the camp with some horsemen -who rode up within earshot and called out to some of the men, as -though they were well-wishers of the Athenians, and told them to -tell Nicias (who had in fact some correspondents who informed him of -what went on inside the town) not to lead off the army by night as the -Syracusans were guarding the roads, but to make his preparations at -his leisure and to retreat by day. After saying this they departed; -and their hearers informed the Athenian generals, who put off going -for that night on the strength of this message, not doubting its -sincerity. - -Since after all they had not set out at once, they now determined to -stay also the following day to give time to the soldiers to pack up as -well as they could the most useful articles, and, leaving everything -else behind, to start only with what was strictly necessary for -their personal subsistence. Meanwhile the Syracusans and Gylippus -marched out and blocked up the roads through the country by which -the Athenians were likely to pass, and kept guard at the fords of -the streams and rivers, posting themselves so as to receive them and -stop the army where they thought best; while their fleet sailed up -to the beach and towed off the ships of the Athenians. Some few were -burned by the Athenians themselves as they had intended; the rest -the Syracusans lashed on to their own at their leisure as they had -been thrown up on shore, without any one trying to stop them, and -conveyed to the town. - -After this, Nicias and Demosthenes now thinking that enough had been -done in the way of preparation, the removal of the army took place -upon the second day after the sea-fight. It was a lamentable scene, -not merely from the single circumstance that they were retreating -after having lost all their ships, their great hopes gone, and -themselves and the state in peril; but also in leaving the camp -there were things most grievous for every eye and heart to -contemplate. The dead lay unburied, and each man as he recognized a -friend among them shuddered with grief and horror; while the living -whom they were leaving behind, wounded or sick, were to the living far -more shocking than the dead, and more to be pitied than those who -had perished. These fell to entreating and bewailing until their -friends knew not what to do, begging them to take them and loudly -calling to each individual comrade or relative whom they could see, -hanging upon the necks of their tent-fellows in the act of -departure, and following as far as they could, and, when their -bodily strength failed them, calling again and again upon heaven and -shrieking aloud as they were left behind. So that the whole army being -filled with tears and distracted after this fashion found it not -easy to go, even from an enemy's land, where they had already suffered -evils too great for tears and in the unknown future before them feared -to suffer more. Dejection and self-condemnation were also rife among -them. Indeed they could only be compared to a starved-out town, and -that no small one, escaping; the whole multitude upon the march -being not less than forty thousand men. All carried anything they -could which might be of use, and the heavy infantry and troopers, -contrary to their wont, while under arms carried their own victuals, -in some cases for want of servants, in others through not trusting -them; as they had long been deserting and now did so in greater -numbers than ever. Yet even thus they did not carry enough, as there -was no longer food in the camp. Moreover their disgrace generally, and -the universality of their sufferings, however to a certain extent -alleviated by being borne in company, were still felt at the moment -a heavy burden, especially when they contrasted the splendour and -glory of their setting out with the humiliation in which it had ended. -For this was by far the greatest reverse that ever befell an -Hellenic army. They had come to enslave others, and were departing -in fear of being enslaved themselves: they had sailed out with -prayer and paeans, and now started to go back with omens directly -contrary; travelling by land instead of by sea, and trusting not in -their fleet but in their heavy infantry. Nevertheless the greatness of -the danger still impending made all this appear tolerable. - -Nicias seeing the army dejected and greatly altered, passed along -the ranks and encouraged and comforted them as far as was possible -under the circumstances, raising his voice still higher and higher -as he went from one company to another in his earnestness, and in -his anxiety that the benefit of his words might reach as many as -possible: - -"Athenians and allies, even in our present position we must still -hope on, since men have ere now been saved from worse straits than -this; and you must not condemn yourselves too severely either -because of your disasters or because of your present unmerited -sufferings. I myself who am not superior to any of you in -strength--indeed you see how I am in my sickness--and who in the gifts -of fortune am, I think, whether in private life or otherwise, the -equal of any, am now exposed to the same danger as the meanest among -you; and yet my life has been one of much devotion toward the gods, -and of much justice and without offence toward men. I have, therefore, -still a strong hope for the future, and our misfortunes do not terrify -me as much as they might. Indeed we may hope that they will be -lightened: our enemies have had good fortune enough; and if any of the -gods was offended at our expedition, we have been already amply -punished. Others before us have attacked their neighbours and have -done what men will do without suffering more than they could bear; and -we may now justly expect to find the gods more kind, for we have -become fitter objects for their pity than their jealousy. And then -look at yourselves, mark the numbers and efficiency of the heavy -infantry marching in your ranks, and do not give way too much to -despondency, but reflect that you are yourselves at once a city -wherever you sit down, and that there is no other in Sicily that could -easily resist your attack, or expel you when once established. The -safety and order of the march is for yourselves to look to; the one -thought of each man being that the spot on which he may be forced to -fight must be conquered and held as his country and stronghold. -Meanwhile we shall hasten on our way night and day alike, as our -provisions are scanty; and if we can reach some friendly place of -the Sicels, whom fear of the Syracusans still keeps true to us, you -may forthwith consider yourselves safe. A message has been sent on -to them with directions to meet us with supplies of food. To sum up, -be convinced, soldiers, that you must be brave, as there is no place -near for your cowardice to take refuge in, and that if you now -escape from the enemy, you may all see again what your hearts -desire, while those of you who are Athenians will raise up again the -great power of the state, fallen though it be. Men make the city and -not walls or ships without men in them." - -As he made this address, Nicias went along the ranks, and brought -back to their place any of the troops that he saw straggling out of -the line; while Demosthenes did as much for his part of the army, -addressing them in words very similar. The army marched in a hollow -square, the division under Nicias leading, and that of Demosthenes -following, the heavy infantry being outside and the baggage-carriers -and the bulk of the army in the middle. When they arrived at the -ford of the river Anapus there they found drawn up a body of the -Syracusans and allies, and routing these, made good their passage -and pushed on, harassed by the charges of the Syracusan horse and by -the missiles of their light troops. On that day they advanced about -four miles and a half, halting for the night upon a certain hill. On -the next they started early and got on about two miles further, and -descended into a place in the plain and there encamped, in order to -procure some eatables from the houses, as the place was inhabited, and -to carry on with them water from thence, as for many furlongs in -front, in the direction in which they were going, it was not -plentiful. The Syracusans meanwhile went on and fortified the pass -in front, where there was a steep hill with a rocky ravine on each -side of it, called the Acraean cliff. The next day the Athenians -advancing found themselves impeded by the missiles and charges of -the horse and darters, both very numerous, of the Syracusans and -allies; and after fighting for a long while, at length retired to -the same camp, where they had no longer provisions as before, it being -impossible to leave their position by reason of the cavalry. - -Early next morning they started afresh and forced their way to the -hill, which had been fortified, where they found before them the -enemy's infantry drawn up many shields deep to defend the -fortification, the pass being narrow. The Athenians assaulted the -work, but were greeted by a storm of missiles from the hill, which -told with the greater effect through its being a steep one, and unable -to force the passage, retreated again and rested. Meanwhile occurred -some claps of thunder and rain, as often happens towards autumn, which -still further disheartened the Athenians, who thought all these things -to be omens of their approaching ruin. While they were resting, -Gylippus and the Syracusans sent a part of their army to throw up -works in their rear on the way by which they had advanced; however, -the Athenians immediately sent some of their men and prevented them; -after which they retreated more towards the plain and halted for the -night. When they advanced the next day the Syracusans surrounded and -attacked them on every side, and disabled many of them, falling back -if the Athenians advanced and coming on if they retired, and in -particular assaulting their rear, in the hope of routing them in -detail, and thus striking a panic into the whole army. For a long -while the Athenians persevered in this fashion, but after advancing -for four or five furlongs halted to rest in the plain, the -Syracusans also withdrawing to their own camp. - -During the night Nicias and Demosthenes, seeing the wretched -condition of their troops, now in want of every kind of necessary, and -numbers of them disabled in the numerous attacks of the enemy, -determined to light as many fires as possible, and to lead off the -army, no longer by the same route as they had intended, but towards -the sea in the opposite direction to that guarded by the Syracusans. -The whole of this route was leading the army not to Catana but to -the other side of Sicily, towards Camarina, Gela, and the other -Hellenic and barbarian towns in that quarter. They accordingly lit a -number of fires and set out by night. Now all armies, and the greatest -most of all, are liable to fears and alarms, especially when they -are marching by night through an enemy's country and with the enemy -near; and the Athenians falling into one of these panics, the -leading division, that of Nicias, kept together and got on a good -way in front, while that of Demosthenes, comprising rather more than -half the army, got separated and marched on in some disorder. By -morning, however, they reached the sea, and getting into the -Helorine road, pushed on in order to reach the river Cacyparis, and to -follow the stream up through the interior, where they hoped to be -met by the Sicels whom they had sent for. Arrived at the river, they -found there also a Syracusan party engaged in barring the passage of -the ford with a wall and a palisade, and forcing this guard, crossed -the river and went on to another called the Erineus, according to -the advice of their guides. - -Meanwhile, when day came and the Syracusans and allies found that -the Athenians were gone, most of them accused Gylippus of having let -them escape on purpose, and hastily pursuing by the road which they -had no difficulty in finding that they had taken, overtook them -about dinner-time. They first came up with the troops under -Demosthenes, who were behind and marching somewhat slowly and in -disorder, owing to the night panic above referred to, and at once -attacked and engaged them, the Syracusan horse surrounding them with -more ease now that they were separated from the rest and hemming -them in on one spot. The division of Nicias was five or six miles on -in front, as he led them more rapidly, thinking that under the -circumstances their safety lay not in staying and fighting, unless -obliged, but in retreating as fast as possible, and only fighting when -forced to do so. On the other hand, Demosthenes was, generally -speaking, harassed more incessantly, as his post in the rear left -him the first exposed to the attacks of the enemy; and now, finding -that the Syracusans were in pursuit, he omitted to push on, in order -to form his men for battle, and so lingered until he was surrounded by -his pursuers and himself and the Athenians with him placed in the most -distressing position, being huddled into an enclosure with a wall -all round it, a road on this side and on that, and olive-trees in -great number, where missiles were showered in upon them from every -quarter. This mode of attack the Syracusans had with good reason -adopted in preference to fighting at close quarters, as to risk a -struggle with desperate men was now more for the advantage of the -Athenians than for their own; besides, their success had now become so -certain that they began to spare themselves a little in order not to -be cut off in the moment of victory, thinking too that, as it was, -they would be able in this way to subdue and capture the enemy. - -In fact, after plying the Athenians and allies all day long from -every side with missiles, they at length saw that they were worn out -with their wounds and other sufferings; and Gylippus and the -Syracusans and their allies made a proclamation, offering their -liberty to any of the islanders who chose to come over to them; and -some few cities went over. Afterwards a capitulation was agreed upon -for all the rest with Demosthenes, to lay down their arms on condition -that no one was to be put to death either by violence or -imprisonment or want of the necessaries of life. Upon this they -surrendered to the number of six thousand in all, laying down all -the money in their possession, which filled the hollows of four -shields, and were immediately conveyed by the Syracusans to the town. - -Meanwhile Nicias with his division arrived that day at the river -Erineus, crossed over, and posted his army upon some high ground -upon the other side. The next day the Syracusans overtook him and told -him that the troops under Demosthenes had surrendered, and invited him -to follow their example. Incredulous of the fact, Nicias asked for a -truce to send a horseman to see, and upon the return of the -messenger with the tidings that they had surrendered, sent a herald to -Gylippus and the Syracusans, saying that he was ready to agree with -them on behalf of the Athenians to repay whatever money the Syracusans -had spent upon the war if they would let his army go; and offered -until the money was paid to give Athenians as hostages, one for -every talent. The Syracusans and Gylippus rejected this proposition, -and attacked this division as they had the other, standing all round -and plying them with missiles until the evening. Food and -necessaries were as miserably wanting to the troops of Nicias as -they had been to their comrades; nevertheless they watched for the -quiet of the night to resume their march. But as they were taking up -their arms the Syracusans perceived it and raised their paean, upon -which the Athenians, finding that they were discovered, laid them down -again, except about three hundred men who forced their way through the -guards and went on during the night as they were able. - -As soon as it was day Nicias put his army in motion, pressed, as -before, by the Syracusans and their allies, pelted from every side -by their missiles, and struck down by their javelins. The Athenians -pushed on for the Assinarus, impelled by the attacks made upon them -from every side by a numerous cavalry and the swarm of other arms, -fancying that they should breathe more freely if once across the -river, and driven on also by their exhaustion and craving for water. -Once there they rushed in, and all order was at an end, each man -wanting to cross first, and the attacks of the enemy making it -difficult to cross at all; forced to huddle together, they fell -against and trod down one another, some dying immediately upon the -javelins, others getting entangled together and stumbling over the -articles of baggage, without being able to rise again. Meanwhile the -opposite bank, which was steep, was lined by the Syracusans, who -showered missiles down upon the Athenians, most of them drinking -greedily and heaped together in disorder in the hollow bed of the -river. The Peloponnesians also came down and butchered them, -especially those in the water, which was thus immediately spoiled, but -which they went on drinking just the same, mud and all, bloody as it -was, most even fighting to have it. - -At last, when many dead now lay piled one upon another in the -stream, and part of the army had been destroyed at the river, and -the few that escaped from thence cut off by the cavalry, Nicias -surrendered himself to Gylippus, whom he trusted more than he did -the Syracusans, and told him and the Lacedaemonians to do what they -liked with him, but to stop the slaughter of the soldiers. Gylippus, -after this, immediately gave orders to make prisoners; upon which -the rest were brought together alive, except a large number secreted -by the soldiery, and a party was sent in pursuit of the three -hundred who had got through the guard during the night, and who were -now taken with the rest. The number of the enemy collected as public -property was not considerable; but that secreted was very large, and -all Sicily was filled with them, no convention having been made in -their case as for those taken with Demosthenes. Besides this, a -large portion were killed outright, the carnage being very great, -and not exceeded by any in this Sicilian war. In the numerous other -encounters upon the march, not a few also had fallen. Nevertheless -many escaped, some at the moment, others served as slaves, and then -ran away subsequently. These found refuge at Catana. - -The Syracusans and their allies now mustered and took up the -spoils and as many prisoners as they could, and went back to the city. -The rest of their Athenian and allied captives were deposited in the -quarries, this seeming the safest way of keeping them; but Nicias -and Demosthenes were butchered, against the will of Gylippus, who -thought that it would be the crown of his triumph if he could take the -enemy's generals to Lacedaemon. One of them, as it happened, -Demosthenes, was one of her greatest enemies, on account of the affair -of the island and of Pylos; while the other, Nicias, was for the -same reasons one of her greatest friends, owing to his exertions to -procure the release of the prisoners by persuading the Athenians to -make peace. For these reasons the Lacedaemonians felt kindly towards -him; and it was in this that Nicias himself mainly confided when he -surrendered to Gylippus. But some of the Syracusans who had been in -correspondence with him were afraid, it was said, of his being put -to the torture and troubling their success by his revelations; others, -especially the Corinthians, of his escaping, as he was wealthy, by -means of bribes, and living to do them further mischief; and these -persuaded the allies and put him to death. This or the like was the -cause of the death of a man who, of all the Hellenes in my time, least -deserved such a fate, seeing that the whole course of his life had -been regulated with strict attention to virtue. - -The prisoners in the quarries were at first hardly treated by the -Syracusans. Crowded in a narrow hole, without any roof to cover -them, the heat of the sun and the stifling closeness of the air -tormented them during the day, and then the nights, which came on -autumnal and chilly, made them ill by the violence of the change; -besides, as they had to do everything in the same place for want of -room, and the bodies of those who died of their wounds or from the -variation in the temperature, or from similar causes, were left heaped -together one upon another, intolerable stenches arose; while hunger -and thirst never ceased to afflict them, each man during eight -months having only half a pint of water and a pint of corn given him -daily. In short, no single suffering to be apprehended by men thrust -into such a place was spared them. For some seventy days they thus -lived all together, after which all, except the Athenians and any -Siceliots or Italiots who had joined in the expedition, were sold. The -total number of prisoners taken it would be difficult to state -exactly, but it could not have been less than seven thousand. - -This was the greatest Hellenic achievement of any in thig war, or, -in my opinion, in Hellenic history; at once most glorious to the -victors, and most calamitous to the conquered. They were beaten at all -points and altogether; all that they suffered was great; they were -destroyed, as the saying is, with a total destruction, their fleet, -their army, everything was destroyed, and few out of many returned -home. Such were the events in Sicily. - - - - -BOOK VIII - -CHAPTER XXIV - -_Nineteenth and Twentieth Years of the War - Revolt of Ionia - -Intervention of Persia - The War in Ionia_ - -When the news was brought to Athens, for a long while they -disbelieved even the most respectable of the soldiers who had -themselves escaped from the scene of action and clearly reported the -matter, a destruction so complete not being thought credible. When the -conviction was forced upon them, they were angry with the orators -who had joined in promoting the expedition, just as if they had not -themselves voted it, and were enraged also with the reciters of -oracles and soothsayers, and all other omen-mongers of the time who -had encouraged them to hope that they should conquer Sicily. Already -distressed at all points and in all quarters, after what had now -happened, they were seized by a fear and consternation quite without -example. It was grievous enough for the state and for every man in his -proper person to lose so many heavy infantry, cavalry, and able-bodied -troops, and to see none left to replace them; but when they saw, also, -that they had not sufficient ships in their docks, or money in the -treasury, or crews for the ships, they began to despair of -salvation. They thought that their enemies in Sicily would immediately -sail with their fleet against Piraeus, inflamed by so signal a -victory; while their adversaries at home, redoubling all their -preparations, would vigorously attack them by sea and land at once, -aided by their own revolted confederates. Nevertheless, with such -means as they had, it was determined to resist to the last, and to -provide timber and money, and to equip a fleet as they best could, -to take steps to secure their confederates and above all Euboea, to -reform things in the city upon a more economical footing, and to elect -a board of elders to advise upon the state of affairs as occasion -should arise. In short, as is the way of a democracy, in the panic -of the moment they were ready to be as prudent as possible. - -These resolves were at once carried into effect. Summer was now -over. The winter ensuing saw all Hellas stirring under the -impression of the great Athenian disaster in Sicily. Neutrals now felt -that even if uninvited they ought no longer to stand aloof from the -war, but should volunteer to march against the Athenians, who, as they -severally reflected, would probably have come against them if the -Sicilian campaign had succeeded. Besides, they considered that the war -would now be short, and that it would be creditable for them to take -part in it. Meanwhile the allies of the Lacedaemonians felt all more -anxious than ever to see a speedy end to their heavy labours. But -above all, the subjects of the Athenians showed a readiness to -revolt even beyond their ability, judging the circumstances with -passion, and refusing even to hear of the Athenians being able to last -out the coming summer. Beyond all this, Lacedaemon was encouraged by -the near prospect of being joined in great force in the spring by -her allies in Sicily, lately forced by events to acquire their navy. -With these reasons for confidence in every quarter, the Lacedaemonians -now resolved to throw themselves without reserve into the war, -considering that, once it was happily terminated, they would be -finally delivered from such dangers as that which would have -threatened them from Athens, if she had become mistress of Sicily, and -that the overthrow of the Athenians would leave them in quiet -enjoyment of the supremacy over all Hellas. - -Their king, Agis, accordingly set out at once during this winter -with some troops from Decelea, and levied from the allies -contributions for the fleet, and turning towards the Malian Gulf -exacted a sum of money from the Oetaeans by carrying off most of their -cattle in reprisal for their old hostility, and, in spite of the -protests and opposition of the Thessalians, forced the Achaeans of -Phthiotis and the other subjects of the Thessalians in those parts -to give him money and hostages, and deposited the hostages at Corinth, -and tried to bring their countrymen into the confederacy. The -Lacedaemonians now issued a requisition to the cities for building a -hundred ships, fixing their own quota and that of the Boeotians at -twenty-five each; that of the Phocians and Locrians together at -fifteen; that of the Corinthians at fifteen; that of the Arcadians, -Pellenians, and Sicyonians together at ten; and that of the Megarians, -Troezenians, Epidaurians, and Hermionians together at ten also; and -meanwhile made every other preparation for commencing hostilities by -the spring. - -In the meantime the Athenians were not idle. During this same -winter, as they had determined, they contributed timber and pushed -on their ship-building, and fortified Sunium to enable their -corn-ships to round it in safety, and evacuated the fort in Laconia -which they had built on their way to Sicily; while they also, for -economy, cut down any other expenses that seemed unnecessary, and -above all kept a careful look-out against the revolt of their -confederates. - -While both parties were thus engaged, and were as intent upon -preparing for the war as they had been at the outset, the Euboeans -first of all sent envoys during this winter to Agis to treat of -their revolting from Athens. Agis accepted their proposals, and sent -for Alcamenes, son of Sthenelaidas, and Melanthus from Lacedaemon, -to take the command in Euboea. These accordingly arrived with some -three hundred Neodamodes, and Agis began to arrange for their crossing -over. But in the meanwhile arrived some Lesbians, who also wished to -revolt; and these being supported by the Boeotians, Agis was persuaded -to defer acting in the matter of Euboea, and made arrangements for the -revolt of the Lesbians, giving them Alcamenes, who was to have -sailed to Euboea, as governor, and himself promising them ten ships, -and the Boeotians the same number. All this was done without -instructions from home, as Agis while at Decelea with the army that he -commanded had power to send troops to whatever quarter he pleased, and -to levy men and money. During this period, one might say, the allies -obeyed him much more than they did the Lacedaemonians in the city, -as the force he had with him made him feared at once wherever he went. -While Agis was engaged with the Lesbians, the Chians and -Erythraeans, who were also ready to revolt, applied, not to him but at -Lacedaemon; where they arrived accompanied by an ambassador from -Tissaphernes, the commander of King Darius, son of Artaxerxes, in -the maritime districts, who invited the Peloponnesians to come over, -and promised to maintain their army. The King had lately called upon -him for the tribute from his government, for which he was in -arrears, being unable to raise it from the Hellenic towns by reason of -the Athenians; and he therefore calculated that by weakening the -Athenians he should get the tribute better paid, and should also -draw the Lacedaemonians into alliance with the King; and by this -means, as the King had commanded him, take alive or dead Amorges, -the bastard son of Pissuthnes, who was in rebellion on the coast of -Caria. - -While the Chians and Tissaphernes thus joined to effect the same -object, about the same time Calligeitus, son of Laophon, a Megarian, -and Timagoras, son of Athenagoras, a Cyzicene, both of them exiles -from their country and living at the court of Pharnabazus, son of -Pharnaces, arrived at Lacedaemon upon a mission from Pharnabazus, to -procure a fleet for the Hellespont; by means of which, if possible, he -might himself effect the object of Tissaphernes' ambition and cause -the cities in his government to revolt from the Athenians, and so -get the tribute, and by his own agency obtain for the King the -alliance of the Lacedaemonians. - -The emissaries of Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes treating apart, a -keen competition now ensued at Lacedaemon as to whether a fleet and -army should be sent first to Ionia and Chios, or to the Hellespont. -The Lacedaemonians, however, decidedly favoured the Chians and -Tissaphernes, who were seconded by Alcibiades, the family friend of -Endius, one of the ephors for that year. Indeed, this is how their -house got its Laconic name, Alcibiades being the family name of -Endius. Nevertheless the Lacedaemonians first sent to Chios Phrynis, -one of the Perioeci, to see whether they had as many ships as they -said, and whether their city generally was as great as was reported; -and upon his bringing word that they had been told the truth, -immediately entered into alliance with the Chians and Erythraeans, and -voted to send them forty ships, there being already, according to -the statement of the Chians, not less than sixty in the island. At -first the Lacedaemonians meant to send ten of these forty -themselves, with Melanchridas their admiral; but afterwards, an -earthquake having occurred, they sent Chalcideus instead of -Melanchridas, and instead of the ten ships equipped only five in -Laconia. And the winter ended, and with it ended also the nineteenth -year of this war of which Thucydides is the historian. - -At the beginning of the next summer the Chians were urging that -the fleet should be sent off, being afraid that the Athenians, from -whom all these embassies were kept a secret, might find out what was -going on, and the Lacedaemonians at once sent three Spartans to -Corinth to haul the ships as quickly as possible across the Isthmus -from the other sea to that on the side of Athens, and to order them -all to sail to Chios, those which Agis was equipping for Lesbos not -excepted. The number of ships from the allied states was thirty-nine -in all. - -Meanwhile Calligeitus and Timagoras did not join on behalf of Pharnabazus -in the expedition to Chios or give the money--twenty-five talents--which -they had brought with them to help in dispatching a force, but -determined to sail afterwards with another force by themselves. -Agis, on the other hand, seeing the Lacedaemonians bent upon -going to Chios first, himself came in to their views; and -the allies assembled at Corinth and held a council, in which -they decided to sail first to Chios under the command of Chalcideus, -who was equipping the five vessels in Laconia, then to Lesbos, -under the command of Alcamenes, the same whom Agis had fixed -upon, and lastly to go to the Hellespont, where the command was -given to Clearchus, son of Ramphias. Meanwhile they would take only -half the ships across the Isthmus first, and let those sail off at -once, in order that the Athenians might attend less to the departing -squadron than to those to be taken across afterwards, as no care had -been taken to keep this voyage secret through contempt of the -impotence of the Athenians, who had as yet no fleet of any account -upon the sea. Agreeably to this determination, twenty-one vessels were -at once conveyed across the Isthmus. - -They were now impatient to set sail, but the Corinthians were not -willing to accompany them until they had celebrated the Isthmian -festival, which fell at that time. Upon this Agis proposed to them -to save their scruples about breaking the Isthmian truce by taking the -expedition upon himself. The Corinthians not consenting to this, a -delay ensued, during which the Athenians conceived suspicions of -what was preparing at Chios, and sent Aristocrates, one of their -generals, and charged them with the fact, and, upon the denial of -the Chians, ordered them to send with them a contingent of ships, as -faithful confederates. Seven were sent accordingly. The reason of -the dispatch of the ships lay in the fact that the mass of the -Chians were not privy to the negotiations, while the few who were in -the secret did not wish to break with the multitude until they had -something positive to lean upon, and no longer expected the -Peloponnesians to arrive by reason of their delay. - -In the meantime the Isthmian games took place, and the Athenians, -who had been also invited, went to attend them, and now seeing more -clearly into the designs of the Chians, as soon as they returned to -Athens took measures to prevent the fleet putting out from Cenchreae -without their knowledge. After the festival the Peloponnesians set -sail with twenty-one ships for Chios, under the command of -Alcamenes. The Athenians first sailed against them with an equal -number, drawing off towards the open sea. The enemy, however, -turning back before he had followed them far, the Athenians returned -also, not trusting the seven Chian ships which formed part of their -number, and afterwards manned thirty-seven vessels in all and chased -him on his passage alongshore into Spiraeum, a desert Corinthian -port on the edge of the Epidaurian frontier. After losing one ship out -at sea, the Peloponnesians got the rest together and brought them to -anchor. The Athenians now attacked not only from the sea with their -fleet, but also disembarked upon the coast; and a melee ensued of -the most confused and violent kind, in which the Athenians disabled -most of the enemy's vessels and killed Alcamenes their commander, -losing also a few of their own men. - -After this they separated, and the Athenians, detaching a sufficient -number of ships to blockade those of the enemy, anchored with the rest -at the islet adjacent, upon which they proceeded to encamp, and sent to -Athens for reinforcements; the Peloponnesians having been joined on -the day after the battle by the Corinthians, who came to help the -ships, and by the other inhabitants in the vicinity not long -afterwards. These saw the difficulty of keeping guard in a desert -place, and in their perplexity at first thought of burning the -ships, but finally resolved to haul them up on shore and sit down -and guard them with their land forces until a convenient opportunity -for escaping should present itself. Agis also, on being informed of -the disaster, sent them a Spartan of the name of Thermon. The -Lacedaemonians first received the news of the fleet having put out -from the Isthmus, Alcamenes having been ordered by the ephors to -send off a horseman when this took place, and immediately resolved -to dispatch their own five vessels under Chalcideus, and Alcibiades -with him. But while they were full of this resolution came the -second news of the fleet having taken refuge in Spiraeum; and -disheartened at their first step in the Ionian war proving a -failure, they laid aside the idea of sending the ships from their -own country, and even wished to recall some that had already sailed. - -Perceiving this, Alcibiades again persuaded Endius and the other -ephors to persevere in the expedition, saying that the voyage would be -made before the Chians heard of the fleet's misfortune, and that as -soon as he set foot in Ionia, he should, by assuring them of the -weakness of the Athenians and the zeal of Lacedaemon, have no -difficulty in persuading the cities to revolt, as they would readily -believe his testimony. He also represented to Endius himself in -private that it would be glorious for him to be the means of making -Ionia revolt and the King become the ally of Lacedaemon, instead of -that honour being left to Agis (Agis, it must be remembered, was the -enemy of Alcibiades); and Endius and his colleagues thus persuaded, he -put to sea with the five ships and the Lacedaemonian Chalcideus, and -made all haste upon the voyage. - -About this time the sixteen Peloponnesian ships from Sicily, which -had served through the war with Gylippus, were caught on their -return off Leucadia and roughly handled by the twenty-seven Athenian -vessels under Hippocles, son of Menippus, on the lookout for the ships -from Sicily. After losing one of their number, the rest escaped from -the Athenians and sailed into Corinth. - -Meanwhile Chalcideus and Alcibiades seized all they met with on -their voyage, to prevent news of their coming, and let them go at -Corycus, the first point which they touched at in the continent. -Here they were visited by some of their Chian correspondents and, -being urged by them to sail up to the town without announcing their -coming, arrived suddenly before Chios. The many were amazed and -confounded, while the few had so arranged that the council should be -sitting at the time; and after speeches from Chalcideus and Alcibiades -stating that many more ships were sailing up, but saying nothing of -the fleet being blockaded in Spiraeum, the Chians revolted from the -Athenians, and the Erythraeans immediately afterwards. After this -three vessels sailed over to Clazomenae, and made that city revolt -also; and the Clazomenians immediately crossed over to the mainland -and began to fortify Polichna, in order to retreat there, in case of -necessity, from the island where they dwelt. - -While the revolted places were all engaged in fortifying and -preparing for the war, news of Chios speedily reached Athens. The -Athenians thought the danger by which they were now menaced great -and unmistakable, and that the rest of their allies would not -consent to keep quiet after the secession of the greatest of their -number. In the consternation of the moment they at once took off the -penalty attaching to whoever proposed or put to the vote a proposal -for using the thousand talents which they had jealously avoided -touching throughout the whole war, and voted to employ them to man a -large number of ships, and to send off at once under Strombichides, -son of Diotimus, the eight vessels, forming part of the blockading -fleet at Spiraeum, which had left the blockade and had returned -after pursuing and failing to overtake the vessels with Chalcideus. -These were to be followed shortly afterwards by twelve more under -Thrasycles, also taken from the blockade. They also recalled the seven -Chian vessels, forming part of their squadron blockading the fleet -in Spiraeum, and giving the slaves on board their liberty, put the -freemen in confinement, and speedily manned and sent out ten fresh -ships to blockade the Peloponnesians in the place of all those that -had departed, and decided to man thirty more. Zeal was not wanting, -and no effort was spared to send relief to Chios. - -In the meantime Strombichides with his eight ships arrived at Samos, -and, taking one Samian vessel, sailed to Teos and required them to -remain quiet. Chalcideus also set sail with twenty-three ships for -Teos from Chios, the land forces of the Clazomenians and Erythraeans -moving alongshore to support him. Informed of this in time, -Strombichides put out from Teos before their arrival, and while out at -sea, seeing the number of the ships from Chios, fled towards Samos, -chased by the enemy. The Teians at first would not receive the land -forces, but upon the flight of the Athenians took them into the -town. There they waited for some time for Chalcideus to return from -the pursuit, and as time went on without his appearing, began -themselves to demolish the wall which the Athenians had built on the -land side of the city of the Teians, being assisted by a few of the -barbarians who had come up under the command of Stages, the lieutenant -of Tissaphernes. - -Meanwhile Chalcideus and Alcibiades, after chasing Strombichides -into Samos, armed the crews of the ships from Peloponnese and left -them at Chios, and filling their places with substitutes from Chios -and manning twenty others, sailed off to effect the revolt of Miletus. -The wish of Alcibiades, who had friends among the leading men of the -Milesians, was to bring over the town before the arrival of the -ships from Peloponnese, and thus, by causing the revolt of as many -cities as possible with the help of the Chian power and of Chalcideus, -to secure the honour for the Chians and himself and Chalcideus, and, -as he had promised, for Endius who had sent them out. Not discovered -until their voyage was nearly completed, they arrived a little -before Strombichides and Thrasycles (who had just come with twelve -ships from Athens, and had joined Strombichides in pursuing them), and -occasioned the revolt of Miletus. The Athenians sailing up close on -their heels with nineteen ships found Miletus closed against them, and -took up their station at the adjacent island of Lade. The first -alliance between the King and the Lacedaemonians was now concluded -immediately upon the revolt of the Milesians, by Tissaphernes and -Chalcideus, and was as follows: - -The Lacedaemonians and their allies made a treaty with the King -and Tissaphernes upon the terms following: - -1. Whatever country or cities the King has, or the King's -ancestors had, shall be the king's: and whatever came in to the -Athenians from these cities, either money or any other thing, the King -and the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall jointly hinder the -Athenians from receiving either money or any other thing. - -2. The war with the Athenians shall be carried on jointly by the -King and by the Lacedaemonians and their allies: and it shall not be -lawful to make peace with the Athenians except both agree, the King on -his side and the Lacedaemonians and their allies on theirs. - -3. If any revolt from the King, they shall be the enemies of the -Lacedaemonians and their allies. And if any revolt from the -Lacedaemonians and their allies, they shall be the enemies of the King -in like manner. - -This was the alliance. After this the Chians immediately manned -ten more vessels and sailed for Anaia, in order to gain intelligence -of those in Miletus, and also to make the cities revolt. A message, -however, reaching them from Chalcideus to tell them to go back -again, and that Amorges was at hand with an army by land, they -sailed to the temple of Zeus, and there sighting ten more ships -sailing up with which Diomedon had started from Athens after -Thrasycles, fled, one ship to Ephesus, the rest to Teos. The Athenians -took four of their ships empty, the men finding time to escape ashore; -the rest took refuge in the city of the Teians; after which the -Athenians sailed off to Samos, while the Chians put to sea with -their remaining vessels, accompanied by the land forces, and caused -Lebedos to revolt, and after it Erae. After this they both returned -home, the fleet and the army. - -About the same time the twenty ships of the Peloponnesians in -Spiraeum, which we left chased to land and blockaded by an equal -number of Athenians, suddenly sallied out and defeated the -blockading squadron, took four of their ships, and, sailing back to -Cenchreae, prepared again for the voyage to Chios and Ionia. Here they -were joined by Astyochus as high admiral from Lacedaemon, henceforth -invested with the supreme command at sea. The land forces now -withdrawing from Teos, Tissaphernes repaired thither in person with an -army and completed the demolition of anything that was left of the -wall, and so departed. Not long after his departure Diomedon arrived -with ten Athenian ships, and, having made a convention by which the -Teians admitted him as they had the enemy, coasted along to Erae, and, -failing in an attempt upon the town, sailed back again. - -About this time took place the rising of the commons at Samos -against the upper classes, in concert with some Athenians, who were -there in three vessels. The Samian commons put to death some two -hundred in all of the upper classes, and banished four hundred more, -and themselves took their land and houses; after which the Athenians -decreed their independence, being now sure of their fidelity, and -the commons henceforth governed the city, excluding the landholders -from all share in affairs, and forbidding any of the commons to give -his daughter in marriage to them or to take a wife from them in -future. - -After this, during the same summer, the Chians, whose zeal continued -as active as ever, and who even without the Peloponnesians found -themselves in sufficient force to effect the revolt of the cities -and also wished to have as many companions in peril as possible, -made an expedition with thirteen ships of their own to Lesbos; the -instructions from Lacedaemon being to go to that island next, and from -thence to the Hellespont. Meanwhile the land forces of the -Peloponnesians who were with the Chians and of the allies on the spot, -moved alongshore for Clazomenae and Cuma, under the command of Eualas, -a Spartan; while the fleet under Diniadas, one of the Perioeci, -first sailed up to Methymna and caused it to revolt, and, leaving four -ships there, with the rest procured the revolt of Mitylene. - -In the meantime Astyochus, the Lacedaemonian admiral, set sail -from Cenchreae with four ships, as he had intended, and arrived at -Chios. On the third day after his arrival, the Athenian ships, -twenty-five in number, sailed to Lesbos under Diomedon and Leon, who -had lately arrived with a reinforcement of ten ships from Athens. Late -in the same day Astyochus put to sea, and taking one Chian vessel with -him sailed to Lesbos to render what assistance he could. Arrived at -Pyrrha, and from thence the next day at Eresus, he there learned -that Mitylene had been taken, almost without a blow, by the Athenians, -who had sailed up and unexpectedly put into the harbour, had beaten -the Chian ships, and landing and defeating the troops opposed to -them had become masters of the city. Informed of this by the -Eresians and the Chian ships, which had been left with Eubulus at -Methymna, and had fled upon the capture of Mitylene, and three of -which he now fell in with, one having been taken by the Athenians, -Astyochus did not go on to Mitylene, but raised and armed Eresus, and, -sending the heavy infantry from his own ships by land under -Eteonicus to Antissa and Methymna, himself proceeded alongshore -thither with the ships which he had with him and with the three -Chians, in the hope that the Methymnians upon seeing them would be -encouraged to persevere in their revolt. As, however, everything -went against him in Lesbos, he took up his own force and sailed back -to Chios; the land forces on board, which were to have gone to the -Hellespont, being also conveyed back to their different cities. -After this six of the allied Peloponnesian ships at Cenchreae joined -the forces at Chios. The Athenians, after restoring matters to their -old state in Lesbos, set sail from thence and took Polichna, the place -that the Clazomenians were fortifying on the continent, and carried -the inhabitants back to their town upon the island, except the authors -of the revolt, who withdrew to Daphnus; and thus Clazomenae became -once more Athenian. - -The same summer the Athenians in the twenty ships at Lade, -blockading Miletus, made a descent at Panormus in the Milesian -territory, and killed Chalcideus the Lacedaemonian commander, who -had come with a few men against them, and the third day after sailed -over and set up a trophy, which, as they were not masters of the -country, was however pulled down by the Milesians. Meanwhile Leon -and Diomedon with the Athenian fleet from Lesbos issuing from the -Oenussae, the isles off Chios, and from their forts of Sidussa and -Pteleum in the Erythraeid, and from Lesbos, carried on the war against -the Chians from the ships, having on board heavy infantry from the -rolls pressed to serve as marines. Landing in Cardamyle and in -Bolissus they defeated with heavy loss the Chians that took the -field against them and, laying desolate the places in that -neighbourhood, defeated the Chians again in another battle at -Phanae, and in a third at Leuconium. After this the Chians ceased to -meet them in the field, while the Athenians devastated the country, -which was beautifully stocked and had remained uninjured ever since -the Median wars. Indeed, after the Lacedaemonians, the Chians are -the only people that I have known who knew how to be wise in -prosperity, and who ordered their city the more securely the greater -it grew. Nor was this revolt, in which they might seem to have erred -on the side of rashness, ventured upon until they had numerous and -gallant allies to share the danger with them, and until they perceived -the Athenians after the Sicilian disaster themselves no longer denying -the thoroughly desperate state of their affairs. And if they were -thrown out by one of the surprises which upset human calculations, -they found out their mistake in company with many others who believed, -like them, in the speedy collapse of the Athenian power. While they -were thus blockaded from the sea and plundered by land, some of the -citizens undertook to bring the city over to the Athenians. Apprised -of this the authorities took no action themselves, but brought -Astyochus, the admiral, from Erythrae, with four ships that he had -with him, and considered how they could most quietly, either by taking -hostages or by some other means, put an end to the conspiracy. - -While the Chians were thus engaged, a thousand Athenian heavy -infantry and fifteen hundred Argives (five hundred of whom were -light troops furnished with armour by the Athenians), and one thousand -of the allies, towards the close of the same summer sailed from Athens -in forty-eight ships, some of which were transports, under the command -of Phrynichus, Onomacles, and Scironides, and putting into Samos -crossed over and encamped at Miletus. Upon this the Milesians came out -to the number of eight hundred heavy infantry, with the Peloponnesians -who had come with Chalcideus, and some foreign mercenaries of -Tissaphernes, Tissaphernes himself and his cavalry, and engaged the -Athenians and their allies. While the Argives rushed forward on -their own wing with the careless disdain of men advancing against -Ionians who would never stand their charge, and were defeated by the -Milesians with a loss little short of three hundred men, the Athenians -first defeated the Peloponnesians, and driving before them the -barbarians and the ruck of the army, without engaging the Milesians, -who after the rout of the Argives retreated into the town upon -seeing their comrades worsted, crowned their victory by grounding -their arms under the very walls of Miletus. Thus, in this battle, -the Ionians on both sides overcame the Dorians, the Athenians -defeating the Peloponnesians opposed to them, and the Milesians the -Argives. After setting up a trophy, the Athenians prepared to draw a -wall round the place, which stood upon an isthmus; thinking that, if -they could gain Miletus, the other towns also would easily come over -to them. - -Meanwhile about dusk tidings reached them that the fifty-five -ships from Peloponnese and Sicily might be instantly expected. Of -these the Siceliots, urged principally by the Syracusan Hermocrates to -join in giving the finishing blow to the power of Athens, furnished -twenty-two--twenty from Syracuse, and two from Silenus; and the -ships that we left preparing in Peloponnese being now ready, both -squadrons had been entrusted to Therimenes, a Lacedaemonian, to take -to Astyochus, the admiral. They now put in first at Leros the island -off Miletus, and from thence, discovering that the Athenians were -before the town, sailed into the Iasic Gulf, in order to learn how -matters stood at Miletus. Meanwhile Alcibiades came on horseback to -Teichiussa in the Milesian territory, the point of the gulf at which -they had put in for the night, and told them of the battle in which he -had fought in person by the side of the Milesians and Tissaphernes, -and advised them, if they did not wish to sacrifice Ionia and their -cause, to fly to the relief of Miletus and hinder its investment. - -Accordingly they resolved to relieve it the next morning. -Meanwhile Phrynichus, the Athenian commander, had received precise -intelligence of the fleet from Leros, and when his colleagues -expressed a wish to keep the sea and fight it out, flatly refused -either to stay himself or to let them or any one else do so if he -could help it. Where they could hereafter contend, after full and -undisturbed preparation, with an exact knowledge of the number of -the enemy's fleet and of the force which they could oppose to him, -he would never allow the reproach of disgrace to drive him into a risk -that was unreasonable. It was no disgrace for an Athenian fleet to -retreat when it suited them: put it as they would, it would be more -disgraceful to be beaten, and to expose the city not only to disgrace, -but to the most serious danger. After its late misfortunes it could -hardly be justified in voluntarily taking the offensive even with -the strongest force, except in a case of absolute necessity: much less -then without compulsion could it rush upon peril of its own seeking. -He told them to take up their wounded as quickly as they could and the -troops and stores which they had brought with them, and leaving behind -what they had taken from the enemy's country, in order to lighten -the ships, to sail off to Samos, and there concentrating all their -ships to attack as opportunity served. As he spoke so he acted; and -thus not now more than afterwards, nor in this alone but in all that -he had to do with, did Phrynichus show himself a man of sense. In this -way that very evening the Athenians broke up from before Miletus, -leaving their victory unfinished, and the Argives, mortified at -their disaster, promptly sailed off home from Samos. - -As soon as it was morning the Peloponnesians weighed from Teichiussa -and put into Miletus after the departure of the Athenians; they stayed -one day, and on the next took with them the Chian vessels originally -chased into port with Chalcideus, and resolved to sail back for the -tackle which they had put on shore at Teichiussa. Upon their arrival -Tissaphernes came to them with his land forces and induced them to -sail to Iasus, which was held by his enemy Amorges. Accordingly they -suddenly attacked and took Iasus, whose inhabitants never imagined -that the ships could be other than Athenian. The Syracusans -distinguished themselves most in the action. Amorges, a bastard of -Pissuthnes and a rebel from the King, was taken alive and handed -over to Tissaphernes, to carry to the King, if he chose, according -to his orders: Iasus was sacked by the army, who found a very great -booty there, the place being wealthy from ancient date. The -mercenaries serving with Amorges the Peloponnesians received and -enrolled in their army without doing them any harm, since most of them -came from Peloponnese, and handed over the town to Tissaphernes with -all the captives, bond or free, at the stipulated price of one Doric -stater a head; after which they returned to Miletus. Pedaritus, son of -Leon, who had been sent by the Lacedaemonians to take the command at -Chios, they dispatched by land as far as Erythrae with the mercenaries -taken from Amorges; appointing Philip to remain as governor of -Miletus. - -Summer was now over. The winter following, Tissaphernes put Iasus in -a state of defence, and passing on to Miletus distributed a month's -pay to all the ships as he had promised at Lacedaemon, at the rate -of an Attic drachma a day for each man. In future, however, he was -resolved not to give more than three obols, until he had consulted the -King; when if the King should so order he would give, he said, the -full drachma. However, upon the protest of the Syracusan general -Hermocrates (for as Therimenes was not admiral, but only accompanied -them in order to hand over the ships to Astyochus, he made little -difficulty about the pay), it was agreed that the amount of five -ships' pay should be given over and above the three obols a day for -each man; Tissaphernes paying thirty talents a month for fifty-five -ships, and to the rest, for as many ships as they had beyond that -number, at the same rate. - -The same winter the Athenians in Samos, having been joined by -thirty-five more vessels from home under Charminus, Strombichides, and -Euctemon, called in their squadron at Chios and all the rest, -intending to blockade Miletus with their navy, and to send a fleet and -an army against Chios; drawing lots for the respective services. -This intention they carried into effect; Strombichides, Onamacles, and -Euctemon sailing against Chios, which fell to their lot, with thirty -ships and a part of the thousand heavy infantry, who had been to -Miletus, in transports; while the rest remained masters of the sea -with seventy-four ships at Samos, and advanced upon Miletus. - -Meanwhile Astyochus, whom we left at Chios collecting the hostages -required in consequence of the conspiracy, stopped upon learning -that the fleet with Therimenes had arrived, and that the affairs of -the league were in a more flourishing condition, and putting out to -sea with ten Peloponnesian and as many Chian vessels, after a futile -attack upon Pteleum, coasted on to Clazomenae, and ordered the -Athenian party to remove inland to Daphnus, and to join the -Peloponnesians, an order in which also joined Tamos the king's -lieutenant in Ionia. This order being disregarded, Astyochus made an -attack upon the town, which was unwalled, and having failed to take it -was himself carried off by a strong gale to Phocaea and Cuma, while -the rest of the ships put in at the islands adjacent to -Clazomenae--Marathussa, Pele, and Drymussa. Here they were detained -eight days by the winds, and, plundering and consuming all the -property of the Clazomenians there deposited, put the rest on -shipboard and sailed off to Phocaea and Cuma to join Astyochus. - -While he was there, envoys arrived from the Lesbians who wished to -revolt again. With Astyochus they were successful; but the Corinthians -and the other allies being averse to it by reason of their former -failure, he weighed anchor and set sail for Chios, where they -eventually arrived from different quarters, the fleet having been -scattered by a storm. After this Pedaritus, whom we left marching -along the coast from Miletus, arrived at Erythrae, and thence -crossed over with his army to Chios, where he found also about five -hundred soldiers who had been left there by Chalcideus from the five -ships with their arms. Meanwhile some Lesbians making offers to -revolt, Astyochus urged upon Pedaritus and the Chians that they -ought to go with their ships and effect the revolt of Lesbos, and so -increase the number of their allies, or, if not successful, at all -events harm the Athenians. The Chians, however, turned a deaf ear to -this, and Pedaritus flatly refused to give up to him the Chian -vessels. - -Upon this Astyochus took five Corinthian and one Megarian vessel, -with another from Hermione, and the ships which had come with him from -Laconia, and set sail for Miletus to assume his command as admiral; -after telling the Chians with many threats that he would certainly not -come and help them if they should be in need. At Corycus in the -Erythraeid he brought to for the night; the Athenian armament -sailing from Samos against Chios being only separated from him by a -hill, upon the other side of which it brought to; so that neither -perceived the other. But a letter arriving in the night from Pedaritus -to say that some liberated Erythraean prisoners had come from Samos to -betray Erythrae, Astyochus at once put back to Erythrae, and so just -escaped falling in with the Athenians. Here Pedaritus sailed over to -join him; and after inquiry into the pretended treachery, finding that -the whole story had been made up to procure the escape of the men from -Samos, they acquitted them of the charge, and sailed away, Pedaritus -to Chios and Astyochus to Miletus as he had intended. - -Meanwhile the Athenian armament sailing round Corycus fell in with -three Chian men-of-war off Arginus, and gave immediate chase. A -great storm coming on, the Chians with difficulty took refuge in the -harbour; the three Athenian vessels most forward in the pursuit -being wrecked and thrown up near the city of Chios, and the crews -slain or taken prisoners. The rest of the Athenian fleet took refuge -in the harbour called Phoenicus, under Mount Mimas, and from thence -afterwards put into Lesbos and prepared for the work of fortification. - -The same winter the Lacedaemonian Hippocrates sailed out from -Peloponnese with ten Thurian ships under the command of Dorieus, son -of Diagoras, and two colleagues, one Laconian and one Syracusan -vessel, and arrived at Cnidus, which had already revolted at the -instigation of Tissaphernes. When their arrival was known at -Miletus, orders came to them to leave half their squadron to guard -Cnidus, and with the rest to cruise round Triopium and seize all the -merchantmen arriving from Egypt. Triopium is a promontory of Cnidus -and sacred to Apollo. This coming to the knowledge of the Athenians, -they sailed from Samos and captured the six ships on the watch at -Triopium, the crews escaping out of them. After this the Athenians -sailed into Cnidus and made an assault upon the town, which was -unfortified, and all but took it; and the next day assaulted it again, -but with less effect, as the inhabitants had improved their defences -during the night, and had been reinforced by the crews escaped from -the ships at Triopium. The Athenians now withdrew, and after -plundering the Cnidian territory sailed back to Samos. - -About the same time Astyochus came to the fleet at Miletus. The -Peloponnesian camp was still plentifully supplied, being in receipt of -sufficient pay, and the soldiers having still in hand the large -booty taken at Iasus. The Milesians also showed great ardour for the -war. Nevertheless the Peloponnesians thought the first convention with -Tissaphernes, made with Chalcideus, defective, and more advantageous -to him than to them, and consequently while Therimenes was still there -concluded another, which was as follows: - -The convention of the Lacedaemonians and the allies with King -Darius and the sons of the King, and with Tissaphernes for a treaty -and friendship, as follows: - -1. Neither the Lacedaemonians nor the allies of the Lacedaemonians -shall make war against or otherwise injure any country or cities -that belong to King Darius or did belong to his father or to his -ancestors; neither shall the Lacedaemonians nor the allies of the -Lacedaemonians exact tribute from such cities. Neither shall King -Darius nor any of the subjects of the King make war against or -otherwise injure the Lacedaemonians or their allies. - -2. If the Lacedaemonians or their allies should require any -assistance from the King, or the King from the Lacedaemonians or their -allies, whatever they both agree upon they shall be right in doing. - -3. Both shall carry on jointly the war against the Athenians and -their allies: and if they make peace, both shall do so jointly. - -4. The expense of all troops in the King's country, sent for by -the King, shall be borne by the King. - -5. If any of the states comprised in this convention with the King -attack the King's country, the rest shall stop them and aid the King -to the best of their power. And if any in the King's country or in the -countries under the King's rule attack the country of the -Lacedaemonians or their allies, the King shall stop it and help them -to the best of his power. - -After this convention Therimenes handed over the fleet to Astyochus, -sailed off in a small boat, and was lost. The Athenian armament had -now crossed over from Lesbos to Chios, and being master by sea and -land began to fortify Delphinium, a place naturally strong on the land -side, provided with more than one harbour, and also not far from the -city of Chios. Meanwhile the Chians remained inactive. Already -defeated in so many battles, they were now also at discord among -themselves; the execution of the party of Tydeus, son of Ion, by -Pedaritus upon the charge of Atticism, followed by the forcible -imposition of an oligarchy upon the rest of the city, having made them -suspicious of one another; and they therefore thought neither -themselves not the mercenaries under Pedaritus a match for the -enemy. They sent, however, to Miletus to beg Astyochus to assist them, -which he refused to do, and was accordingly denounced at Lacedaemon by -Pedaritus as a traitor. Such was the state of the Athenian affairs -at Chios; while their fleet at Samos kept sailing out against the -enemy in Miletus, until they found that he would not accept their -challenge, and then retired again to Samos and remained quiet. - -In the same winter the twenty-seven ships equipped by the -Lacedaemonians for Pharnabazus through the agency of the Megarian -Calligeitus, and the Cyzicene Timagoras, put out from Peloponnese -and sailed for Ionia about the time of the solstice, under the command -of Antisthenes, a Spartan. With them the Lacedaemonians also sent -eleven Spartans as advisers to Astyochus; Lichas, son of Arcesilaus, -being among the number. Arrived at Miletus, their orders were to aid -in generally superintending the good conduct of the war; to send off -the above ships or a greater or less number to the Hellespont to -Pharnabazus, if they thought proper, appointing Clearchus, son of -Ramphias, who sailed with them, to the command; and further, if they -thought proper, to make Antisthenes admiral, dismissing Astyochus, -whom the letters of Pedaritus had caused to be regarded with -suspicion. Sailing accordingly from Malea across the open sea, the -squadron touched at Melos and there fell in with ten Athenian ships, -three of which they took empty and burned. After this, being afraid -that the Athenian vessels escaped from Melos might, as they in fact -did, give information of their approach to the Athenians at Samos, -they sailed to Crete, and having lengthened their voyage by way of -precaution made land at Caunus in Asia, from whence considering -themselves in safety they sent a message to the fleet at Miletus for a -convoy along the coast. - -Meanwhile the Chians and Pedaritus, undeterred by the backwardness -of Astyochus, went on sending messengers pressing him to come with all -the fleet to assist them against their besiegers, and not to leave the -greatest of the allied states in Ionia to be shut up by sea and -overrun and pillaged by land. There were more slaves at Chios than -in any one other city except Lacedaemon, and being also by reason of -their numbers punished more rigorously when they offended, most of -them, when they saw the Athenian armament firmly established in the -island with a fortified position, immediately deserted to the enemy, -and through their knowledge of the country did the greatest -mischief. The Chians therefore urged upon Astyochus that it was his -duty to assist them, while there was still a hope and a possibility of -stopping the enemy's progress, while Delphinium was still in process -of fortification and unfinished, and before the completion of a higher -rampart which was being added to protect the camp and fleet of their -besiegers. Astyochus now saw that the allies also wished it and -prepared to go, in spite of his intention to the contrary owing to the -threat already referred to. - -In the meantime news came from Caunus of the arrival of the -twenty-seven ships with the Lacedaemonian commissioners; and -Astyochus, postponing everything to the duty of convoying a fleet of -that importance, in order to be more able to command the sea, and to -the safe conduct of the Lacedaemonians sent as spies over his -behaviour, at once gave up going to Chios and set sail for Caunus. -As he coasted along he landed at the Meropid Cos and sacked the -city, which was unfortified and had been lately laid in ruins by an -earthquake, by far the greatest in living memory, and, as the -inhabitants had fled to the mountains, overran the country and made -booty of all it contained, letting go, however, the free men. From Cos -arriving in the night at Cnidus he was constrained by the -representations of the Cnidians not to disembark the sailors, but to -sail as he was straight against the twenty Athenian vessels, which -with Charminus, one of the commanders at Samos, were on the watch -for the very twenty-seven ships from Peloponnese which Astyochus was -himself sailing to join; the Athenians in Samos having heard from -Melos of their approach, and Charminus being on the look-out off Syme, -Chalce, Rhodes, and Lycia, as he now heard that they were at Caunus. - -Astyochus accordingly sailed as he was to Syme, before he was -heard of, in the hope of catching the enemy somewhere out at sea. -Rain, however, and foggy weather encountered him, and caused his ships -to straggle and get into disorder in the dark. In the morning his -fleet had parted company and was most of it still straggling round the -island, and the left wing only in sight of Charminus and the -Athenians, who took it for the squadron which they were watching for -from Caunus, and hastily put out against it with part only of their -twenty vessels, and attacking immediately sank three ships and -disabled others, and had the advantage in the action until the main -body of the fleet unexpectedly hove in sight, when they were -surrounded on every side. Upon this they took to flight, and after -losing six ships with the rest escaped to Teutlussa or Beet Island, -and from thence to Halicarnassus. After this the Peloponnesians put -into Cnidus and, being joined by the twenty-seven ships from Caunus, -sailed all together and set up a trophy in Syme, and then returned -to anchor at Cnidus. - -As soon as the Athenians knew of the sea-fight, they sailed with all -the ships at Samos to Syme, and, without attacking or being attacked -by the fleet at Cnidus, took the ships' tackle left at Syme, and -touching at Lorymi on the mainland sailed back to Samos. Meanwhile the -Peloponnesian ships, being now all at Cnidus, underwent such repairs -as were needed; while the eleven Lacedaemonian commissioners conferred -with Tissaphernes, who had come to meet them, upon the points which -did not satisfy them in the past transactions, and upon the best and -mutually most advantageous manner of conducting the war in future. The -severest critic of the present proceedings was Lichas, who said that -neither of the treaties could stand, neither that of Chalcideus, nor -that of Therimenes; it being monstrous that the King should at this -date pretend to the possession of all the country formerly ruled by -himself or by his ancestors--a pretension which implicitly put back -under the yoke all the islands--Thessaly, Locris, and everything as -far as Boeotia--and made the Lacedaemonians give to the Hellenes -instead of liberty a Median master. He therefore invited Tissaphernes -to conclude another and a better treaty, as they certainly would not -recognize those existing and did not want any of his pay upon such -conditions. This offended Tissaphernes so much that he went away in -a rage without settling anything. - - - - -CHAPTER XXV - -_Twentieth and Twenty-first Years of the War - Intrigues of -Alcibiades - Withdrawal of the Persian Subsidies - Oligarchical -Coup d'Etat at Athens - Patriotism of the Army at Samos_ - -The Peloponnesians now determined to sail to Rhodes, upon the -invitation of some of the principal men there, hoping to gain an -island powerful by the number of its seamen and by its land forces, -and also thinking that they would be able to maintain their fleet from -their own confederacy, without having to ask for money from -Tissaphernes. They accordingly at once set sail that same winter -from Cnidus, and first put in with ninety-four ships at Camirus in the -Rhodian country, to the great alarm of the mass of the inhabitants, -who were not privy to the intrigue, and who consequently fled, -especially as the town was unfortified. They were afterwards, however, -assembled by the Lacedaemonians together with the inhabitants of the -two other towns of Lindus and Ialysus; and the Rhodians were persuaded -to revolt from the Athenians and the island went over to the -Peloponnesians. Meanwhile the Athenians had received the alarm and set -sail with the fleet from Samos to forestall them, and came within -sight of the island, but being a little too late sailed off for the -moment to Chalce, and from thence to Samos, and subsequently waged war -against Rhodes, issuing from Chalce, Cos, and Samos. - -The Peloponnesians now levied a contribution of thirty-two talents -from the Rhodians, after which they hauled their ships ashore and -for eighty days remained inactive. During this time, and even earlier, -before they removed to Rhodes, the following intrigues took place. -After the death of Chalcideus and the battle at Miletus, Alcibiades -began to be suspected by the Peloponnesians; and Astyochus received -from Lacedaemon an order from them to put him to death, he being the -personal enemy of Agis, and in other respects thought unworthy of -confidence. Alcibiades in his alarm first withdrew to Tissaphernes, -and immediately began to do all he could with him to injure the -Peloponnesian cause. Henceforth becoming his adviser in everything, he -cut down the pay from an Attic drachma to three obols a day, and -even this not paid too regularly; and told Tissaphernes to say to -the Peloponnesians that the Athenians, whose maritime experience was -of an older date than their own, only gave their men three obols, -not so much from poverty as to prevent their seamen being corrupted by -being too well off, and injuring their condition by spending money -upon enervating indulgences, and also paid their crews irregularly -in order to have a security against their deserting in the arrears -which they would leave behind them. He also told Tissaphernes to bribe -the captains and generals of the cities, and so to obtain their -connivance--an expedient which succeeded with all except the -Syracusans, Hermocrates alone opposing him on behalf of the whole -confederacy. Meanwhile the cities asking for money Alcibiades sent -off, by roundly telling them in the name of Tissaphernes that it was -great impudence in the Chians, the richest people in Hellas, not -content with being defended by a foreign force, to expect others to -risk not only their lives but their money as well in behalf of their -freedom; while the other cities, he said, had had to pay largely to -Athens before their rebellion, and could not justly refuse to -contribute as much or even more now for their own selves. He also -pointed out that Tissaphernes was at present carrying on the war at -his own charges, and had good cause for economy, but that as soon as -he received remittances from the king he would give them their pay -in full and do what was reasonable for the cities. - -Alcibiades further advised Tissaphernes not to be in too great a -hurry to end the war, or to let himself be persuaded to bring up the -Phoenician fleet which he was equipping, or to provide pay for more -Hellenes, and thus put the power by land and sea into the same -hands; but to leave each of the contending parties in possession of -one element, thus enabling the king when he found one troublesome to -call in the other. For if the command of the sea and land were -united in one hand, he would not know where to turn for help to -overthrow the dominant power; unless he at last chose to stand up -himself, and go through with the struggle at great expense and hazard. -The cheapest plan was to let the Hellenes wear each other out, at a -small share of the expense and without risk to himself. Besides, he -would find the Athenians the most convenient partners in empire as -they did not aim at conquests on shore, and carried on the war upon -principles and with a practice most advantageous to the King; being -prepared to combine to conquer the sea for Athens, and for the King -all the Hellenes inhabiting his country, whom the Peloponnesians, on -the contrary, had come to liberate. Now it was not likely that the -Lacedaemonians would free the Hellenes from the Hellenic Athenians, -without freeing them also from the barbarian Mede, unless overthrown -by him in the meanwhile. Alcibiades therefore urged him to wear them -both out at first, and, after docking the Athenian power as much as he -could, forthwith to rid the country of the Peloponnesians. In the main -Tissaphernes approved of this policy, so far at least as could be -conjectured from his behaviour; since he now gave his confidence to -Alcibiades in recognition of his good advice, and kept the -Peloponnesians short of money, and would not let them fight at sea, -but ruined their cause by pretending that the Phoenician fleet would -arrive, and that they would thus be enabled to contend with the odds -in their favour, and so made their navy lose its efficiency, which had -been very remarkable, and generally betrayed a coolness in the war -that was too plain to be mistaken. - -Alcibiades gave this advice to Tissaphernes and the King, with -whom he then was, not merely because he thought it really the best, -but because he was studying means to effect his restoration to his -country, well knowing that if he did not destroy it he might one day -hope to persuade the Athenians to recall him, and thinking that his -best chance of persuading them lay in letting them see that he -possessed the favour of Tissaphernes. The event proved him to be -right. When the Athenians at Samos found that he had influence with -Tissaphernes, principally of their own motion (though partly also -through Alcibiades himself sending word to their chief men to tell the -best men in the army that, if there were only an oligarchy in the -place of the rascally democracy that had banished him, he would be -glad to return to his country and to make Tissaphernes their -friend), the captains and chief men in the armament at once embraced -the idea of subverting the democracy. - -The design was first mooted in the camp, and afterwards from -thence reached the city. Some persons crossed over from Samos and -had an interview with Alcibiades, who immediately offered to make -first Tissaphernes, and afterwards the King, their friend, if they -would give up the democracy and make it possible for the King to trust -them. The higher class, who also suffered most severely from the -war, now conceived great hopes of getting the government into their -own hands, and of triumphing over the enemy. Upon their return to -Samos the emissaries formed their partisans into a club, and openly -told the mass of the armament that the King would be their friend, and -would provide them with money, if Alcibiades were restored and the -democracy abolished. The multitude, if at first irritated by these -intrigues, were nevertheless kept quiet by the advantageous prospect -of the pay from the King; and the oligarchical conspirators, after -making this communication to the people, now re-examined the proposals -of Alcibiades among themselves, with most of their associates. -Unlike the rest, who thought them advantageous and trustworthy, -Phrynichus, who was still general, by no means approved of the -proposals. Alcibiades, he rightly thought, cared no more for an -oligarchy than for a democracy, and only sought to change the -institutions of his country in order to get himself recalled by his -associates; while for themselves their one object should be to avoid -civil discord. It was not the King's interest, when the Peloponnesians -were now their equals at sea, and in possession of some of the chief -cities in his empire, to go out of his way to side with the -Athenians whom he did not trust, when he might make friends of the -Peloponnesians who had never injured him. And as for the allied states -to whom oligarchy was now offered, because the democracy was to be put -down at Athens, he well knew that this would not make the rebels -come in any the sooner, or confirm the loyal in their allegiance; as -the allies would never prefer servitude with an oligarchy or democracy -to freedom with the constitution which they actually enjoyed, to -whichever type it belonged. Besides, the cities thought that the -so-called better classes would prove just as oppressive as the -commons, as being those who originated, proposed, and for the most -part benefited from the acts of the commons injurious to the -confederates. Indeed, if it depended on the better classes, the -confederates would be put to death without trial and with violence; -while the commons were their refuge and the chastiser of these men. -This he positively knew that the cities had learned by experience, and -that such was their opinion. The propositions of Alcibiades, and the -intrigues now in progress, could therefore never meet with his -approval. - -However, the members of the club assembled, agreeably to their -original determination, accepted what was proposed, and prepared to -send Pisander and others on an embassy to Athens to treat for the -restoration of Alcibiades and the abolition of the democracy in the -city, and thus to make Tissaphernes the friend of the Athenians. - -Phrynichus now saw that there would be a proposal to restore -Alcibiades, and that the Athenians would consent to it; and fearing -after what he had said against it that Alcibiades, if restored, -would revenge himself upon him for his opposition, had recourse to the -following expedient. He sent a secret letter to the Lacedaemonian -admiral Astyochus, who was still in the neighbourhood of Miletus, to -tell him that Alcibiades was ruining their cause by making -Tissaphernes the friend of the Athenians, and containing an express -revelation of the rest of the intrigue, desiring to be excused if he -sought to harm his enemy even at the expense of the interests of his -country. However, Astyochus, instead of thinking of punishing -Alcibiades, who, besides, no longer ventured within his reach as -formerly, went up to him and Tissaphernes at Magnesia, communicated to -them the letter from Samos, and turned informer, and, if report may be -trusted, became the paid creature of Tissaphernes, undertaking to -inform him as to this and all other matters; which was also the reason -why he did not remonstrate more strongly against the pay not being -given in full. Upon this Alcibiades instantly sent to the -authorities at Samos a letter against Phrynichus, stating what he -had done, and requiring that he should be put to death. Phrynichus -distracted, and placed in the utmost peril by the denunciation, sent -again to Astyochus, reproaching him with having so ill kept the secret -of his previous letter, and saying that he was now prepared to give -them an opportunity of destroying the whole Athenian armament at -Samos; giving a detailed account of the means which he should -employ, Samos being unfortified, and pleading that, being in danger of -his life on their account, he could not now be blamed for doing this -or anything else to escape being destroyed by his mortal enemies. This -also Astyochus revealed to Alcibiades. - -Meanwhile Phrynichus having had timely notice that he was playing -him false, and that a letter on the subject was on the point of -arriving from Alcibiades, himself anticipated the news, and told the -army that the enemy, seeing that Samos was unfortified and the fleet -not all stationed within the harbour, meant to attack the camp, that -he could be certain of this intelligence, and that they must fortify -Samos as quickly as possible, and generally look to their defences. It -will be remembered that he was general, and had himself authority to -carry out these measures. Accordingly they addressed themselves to the -work of fortification, and Samos was thus fortified sooner than it -would otherwise have been. Not long afterwards came the letter from -Alcibiades, saying that the army was betrayed by Phrynichus, and the -enemy about to attack it. Alcibiades, however, gained no credit, it -being thought that he was in the secret of the enemy's designs, and -had tried to fasten them upon Phrynichus, and to make out that he -was their accomplice, out of hatred; and consequently far from hurting -him he rather bore witness to what he had said by this intelligence. - -After this Alcibiades set to work to persuade Tissaphernes to become -the friend of the Athenians. Tissaphernes, although afraid of the -Peloponnesians because they had more ships in Asia than the Athenians, -was yet disposed to be persuaded if he could, especially after his -quarrel with the Peloponnesians at Cnidus about the treaty of -Therimenes. The quarrel had already taken place, as the Peloponnesians -were by this time actually at Rhodes; and in it the original -argument of Alcibiades touching the liberation of all the towns by the -Lacedaemonians had been verified by the declaration of Lichas that -it was impossible to submit to a convention which made the King master -of all the states at any former time ruled by himself or by his -fathers. - -While Alcibiades was besieging the favour of Tissaphernes with an -earnestness proportioned to the greatness of the issue, the Athenian -envoys who had been dispatched from Samos with Pisander arrived at -Athens, and made a speech before the people, giving a brief summary of -their views, and particularly insisting that, if Alcibiades were -recalled and the democratic constitution changed, they could have -the King as their ally, and would be able to overcome the -Peloponnesians. A number of speakers opposed them on the question of -the democracy, the enemies of Alcibiades cried out against the scandal -of a restoration to be effected by a violation of the constitution, -and the Eumolpidae and Ceryces protested in behalf of the mysteries, -the cause of his banishment, and called upon the gods to avert his -recall; when Pisander, in the midst of much opposition and abuse, came -forward, and taking each of his opponents aside asked him the -following question: In the face of the fact that the Peloponnesians -had as many ships as their own confronting them at sea, more cities in -alliance with them, and the King and Tissaphernes to supply them -with money, of which the Athenians had none left, had he any hope of -saving the state, unless someone could induce the King to come over to -their side? Upon their replying that they had not, he then plainly -said to them: "This we cannot have unless we have a more moderate form -of government, and put the offices into fewer hands, and so gain the -King's confidence, and forthwith restore Alcibiades, who is the only -man living that can bring this about. The safety of the state, not the -form of its government, is for the moment the most pressing -question, as we can always change afterwards whatever we do not like." - -The people were at first highly irritated at the mention of an -oligarchy, but upon understanding clearly from Pisander that this -was the only resource left, they took counsel of their fears, and -promised themselves some day to change the government again, and -gave way. They accordingly voted that Pisander should sail with ten -others and make the best arrangement that they could with Tissaphernes -and Alcibiades. At the same time the people, upon a false accusation -of Pisander, dismissed Phrynichus from his post together with his -colleague Scironides, sending Diomedon and Leon to replace them in the -command of the fleet. The accusation was that Phrynichus had -betrayed Iasus and Amorges; and Pisander brought it because he thought -him a man unfit for the business now in hand with Alcibiades. Pisander -also went the round of all the clubs already existing in the city -for help in lawsuits and elections, and urged them to draw together -and to unite their efforts for the overthrow of the democracy; and -after taking all other measures required by the circumstances, so that -no time might be lost, set off with his ten companions on his voyage -to Tissaphernes. - -In the same winter Leon and Diomedon, who had by this time joined -the fleet, made an attack upon Rhodes. The ships of the Peloponnesians -they found hauled up on shore, and, after making a descent upon the -coast and defeating the Rhodians who appeared in the field against -them, withdrew to Chalce and made that place their base of -operations instead of Cos, as they could better observe from thence if -the Peloponnesian fleet put out to sea. Meanwhile Xenophantes, a -Laconian, came to Rhodes from Pedaritus at Chios, with the news that -the fortification of the Athenians was now finished, and that, -unless the whole Peloponnesian fleet came to the rescue, the cause -in Chios must be lost. Upon this they resolved to go to his relief. In -the meantime Pedaritus, with the mercenaries that he had with him -and the whole force of the Chians, made an assault upon the work round -the Athenian ships and took a portion of it, and got possession of -some vessels that were hauled up on shore, when the Athenians -sallied out to the rescue, and first routing the Chians, next defeated -the remainder of the force round Pedaritus, who was himself killed, -with many of the Chians, a great number of arms being also taken. - -After this the Chians were besieged even more straitly than before -by land and sea, and the famine in the place was great. Meanwhile -the Athenian envoys with Pisander arrived at the court of -Tissaphernes, and conferred with him about the proposed agreement. -However, Alcibiades, not being altogether sure of Tissaphernes (who -feared the Peloponnesians more than the Athenians, and besides -wished to wear out both parties, as Alcibiades himself had -recommended), had recourse to the following stratagem to make the -treaty between the Athenians and Tissaphernes miscarry by reason of -the magnitude of his demands. In my opinion Tissaphernes desired -this result, fear being his motive; while Alcibiades, who now saw that -Tissaphernes was determined not to treat on any terms, wished the -Athenians to think, not that he was unable to persuade Tissaphernes, -but that after the latter had been persuaded and was willing to join -them, they had not conceded enough to him. For the demands of -Alcibiades, speaking for Tissaphernes, who was present, were so -extravagant that the Athenians, although for a long while they -agreed to whatever he asked, yet had to bear the blame of failure: -he required the cession of the whole of Ionia, next of the islands -adjacent, besides other concessions, and these passed without -opposition; at last, in the third interview, Alcibiades, who now -feared a complete discovery of his inability, required them to allow -the King to build ships and sail along his own coast wherever and with -as many as he pleased. Upon this the Athenians would yield no further, -and concluding that there was nothing to be done, but that they had -been deceived by Alcibiades, went away in a passion and proceeded to -Samos. - -Tissaphernes immediately after this, in the same winter, proceeded -along shore to Caunus, desiring to bring the Peloponnesian fleet -back to Miletus, and to supply them with pay, making a fresh -convention upon such terms as he could get, in order not to bring -matters to an absolute breach between them. He was afraid that if many -of their ships were left without pay they would be compelled to engage -and be defeated, or that their vessels being left without hands the -Athenians would attain their objects without his assistance. Still -more he feared that the Peloponnesians might ravage the continent in -search of supplies. Having calculated and considered all this, -agreeably to his plan of keeping the two sides equal, he now sent -for the Peloponnesians and gave them pay, and concluded with them a -third treaty in words following: - -In the thirteenth year of the reign of Darius, while Alexippidas -was ephor at Lacedaemon, a convention was concluded in the plain of -the Maeander by the Lacedaemonians and their allies with Tissaphernes, -Hieramenes, and the sons of Pharnaces, concerning the affairs of the -King and of the Lacedaemonians and their allies. - -1. The country of the King in Asia shall be the King's, and the -King shall treat his own country as he pleases. - -2. The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall not invade or -injure the King's country: neither shall the King invade or injure -that of the Lacedaemonians or of their allies. If any of the -Lacedaemonians or of their allies invade or injure the King's country, -the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall prevent it: and if any -from the King's country invade or injure the country of the -Lacedaemonians or of their allies, the King shall prevent it. - -3. Tissaphernes shall provide pay for the ships now present, -according to the agreement, until the arrival of the King's vessels: -but after the arrival of the King's vessels the Lacedaemonians and -their allies may pay their own ships if they wish it. If, however, -they choose to receive the pay from Tissaphernes, Tissaphernes shall -furnish it: and the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall repay him at -the end of the war such moneys as they shall have received. - -4. After the vessels have arrived, the ships of the Lacedaemonians -and of their allies and those of the King shall carry on the war -jointly, according as Tissaphernes and the Lacedaemonians and their -allies shall think best. If they wish to make peace with the -Athenians, they shall make peace also jointly. - -This was the treaty. After this Tissaphernes prepared to bring up -the Phoenician fleet according to agreement, and to make good his -other promises, or at all events wished to make it appear that he -was so preparing. - -Winter was now drawing towards its close, when the Boeotians took -Oropus by treachery, though held by an Athenian garrison. Their -accomplices in this were some of the Eretrians and of the Oropians -themselves, who were plotting the revolt of Euboea, as the place was -exactly opposite Eretria, and while in Athenian hands was -necessarily a source of great annoyance to Eretria and the rest of -Euboea. Oropus being in their hands, the Eretrians now came to -Rhodes to invite the Peloponnesians into Euboea. The latter, -however, were rather bent on the relief of the distressed Chians, -and accordingly put out to sea and sailed with all their ships from -Rhodes. Off Triopium they sighted the Athenian fleet out at sea -sailing from Chalce, and, neither attacking the other, arrived, the -latter at Samos, the Peloponnesians at Miletus, seeing that it was -no longer possible to relieve Chios without a battle. And this -winter ended, and with it ended the twentieth year of this war of -which Thucydides is the historian. - -Early in the spring of the summer following, Dercyllidas, a Spartan, -was sent with a small force by land to the Hellespont to effect the -revolt of Abydos, which is a Milesian colony; and the Chians, while -Astyochus was at a loss how to help them, were compelled to fight at -sea by the pressure of the siege. While Astyochus was still at -Rhodes they had received from Miletus, as their commander after the -death of Pedaritus, a Spartan named Leon, who had come out with -Antisthenes, and twelve vessels which had been on guard at Miletus, -five of which were Thurian, four Syracusans, one from Anaia, one -Milesian, and one Leon's own. Accordingly the Chians marched out in -mass and took up a strong position, while thirty-six of their ships -put out and engaged thirty-two of the Athenians; and after a tough -fight, in which the Chians and their allies had rather the best of it, -as it was now late, retired to their city. - -Immediately after this Dercyllidas arrived by land from Miletus; and -Abydos in the Hellespont revolted to him and Pharnabazus, and -Lampsacus two days later. Upon receipt of this news Strombichides -hastily sailed from Chios with twenty-four Athenian ships, some -transports carrying heavy infantry being of the number, and -defeating the Lampsacenes who came out against him, took Lampsacus, -which was unfortified, at the first assault, and making prize of the -slaves and goods restored the freemen to their homes, and went on to -Abydos. The inhabitants, however, refusing to capitulate, and his -assaults failing to take the place, he sailed over to the coast -opposite, and appointed Sestos, the town in the Chersonese held by the -Medes at a former period in this history, as the centre for the -defence of the whole Hellespont. - -In the meantime the Chians commanded the sea more than before; and -the Peloponnesians at Miletus and Astyochus, hearing of the -sea-fight and of the departure of the squadron with Strombichides, -took fresh courage. Coasting along with two vessels to Chios, -Astyochus took the ships from that place, and now moved with the whole -fleet upon Samos, from whence, however, he sailed back to Miletus, -as the Athenians did not put out against him, owing to their -suspicions of one another. For it was about this time, or even before, -that the democracy was put down at Athens. When Pisander and the -envoys returned from Tissaphernes to Samos they at once strengthened -still further their interest in the army itself, and instigated the -upper class in Samos to join them in establishing an oligarchy, the -very form of government which a party of them had lately risen to -avoid. At the same time the Athenians at Samos, after a consultation -among themselves, determined to let Alcibiades alone, since he refused -to join them, and besides was not the man for an oligarchy; and now -that they were once embarked, to see for themselves how they could -best prevent the ruin of their cause, and meanwhile to sustain the -war, and to contribute without stint money and all else that might -be required from their own private estates, as they would henceforth -labour for themselves alone. - -After encouraging each other in these resolutions, they now at -once sent off half the envoys and Pisander to do what was necessary at -Athens (with instructions to establish oligarchies on their way in all -the subject cities which they might touch at), and dispatched the -other half in different directions to the other dependencies. -Diitrephes also, who was in the neighbourhood of Chios, and had been -elected to the command of the Thracian towns, was sent off to his -government, and arriving at Thasos abolished the democracy there. -Two months, however, had not elapsed after his departure before the -Thasians began to fortify their town, being already tired of an -aristocracy with Athens, and in daily expectation of freedom from -Lacedaemon. Indeed there was a party of them (whom the Athenians had -banished), with the Peloponnesians, who with their friends in the town -were already making every exertion to bring a squadron, and to -effect the revolt of Thasos; and this party thus saw exactly what they -most wanted done, that is to say, the reformation of the government -without risk, and the abolition of the democracy which would have -opposed them. Things at Thasos thus turned out just the contrary to -what the oligarchical conspirators at Athens expected; and the same in -my opinion was the case in many of the other dependencies; as the -cities no sooner got a moderate government and liberty of action, than -they went on to absolute freedom without being at all seduced by the -show of reform offered by the Athenians. - -Pisander and his colleagues on their voyage alongshore abolished, as -had been determined, the democracies in the cities, and also took some -heavy infantry from certain places as their allies, and so came to -Athens. Here they found most of the work already done by their -associates. Some of the younger men had banded together, and -secretly assassinated one Androcles, the chief leader of the -commons, and mainly responsible for the banishment of Alcibiades; -Androcles being singled out both because he was a popular leader and -because they sought by his death to recommend themselves to -Alcibiades, who was, as they supposed, to be recalled, and to make -Tissaphernes their friend. There were also some other obnoxious -persons whom they secretly did away with in the same manner. Meanwhile -their cry in public was that no pay should be given except to -persons serving in the war, and that not more than five thousand -should share in the government, and those such as were most able to -serve the state in person and in purse. - -But this was a mere catchword for the multitude, as the authors of -the revolution were really to govern. However, the Assembly and the -Council of the Bean still met notwithstanding, although they discussed -nothing that was not approved of by the conspirators, who both -supplied the speakers and reviewed in advance what they were to say. -Fear, and the sight of the numbers of the conspirators, closed the -mouths of the rest; or if any ventured to rise in opposition, he was -presently put to death in some convenient way, and there was neither -search for the murderers nor justice to be had against them if -suspected; but the people remained motionless, being so thoroughly -cowed that men thought themselves lucky to escape violence, even -when they held their tongues. An exaggerated belief in the numbers -of the conspirators also demoralized the people, rendered helpless -by the magnitude of the city, and by their want of intelligence with -each other, and being without means of finding out what those -numbers really were. For the same reason it was impossible for any one -to open his grief to a neighbour and to concert measures to defend -himself, as he would have had to speak either to one whom he did not -know, or whom he knew but did not trust. Indeed all the popular -party approached each other with suspicion, each thinking his -neighbour concerned in what was going on, the conspirators having in -their ranks persons whom no one could ever have believed capable of -joining an oligarchy; and these it was who made the many so -suspicious, and so helped to procure impunity for the few, by -confirming the commons in their mistrust of one another. - -At this juncture arrived Pisander and his colleagues, who lost no -time in doing the rest. First they assembled the people, and moved -to elect ten commissioners with full powers to frame a constitution, -and that when this was done they should on an appointed day lay before -the people their opinion as to the best mode of governing the city. -Afterwards, when the day arrived, the conspirators enclosed the -assembly in Colonus, a temple of Poseidon, a little more than a mile -outside the city; when the commissioners simply brought forward this -single motion, that any Athenian might propose with impunity -whatever measure he pleased, heavy penalties being imposed upon any -who should indict for illegality, or otherwise molest him for so -doing. The way thus cleared, it was now plainly declared that all -tenure of office and receipt of pay under the existing institutions -were at an end, and that five men must be elected as presidents, who -should in their turn elect one hundred, and each of the hundred -three apiece; and that this body thus made up to four hundred should -enter the council chamber with full powers and govern as they judged -best, and should convene the five thousand whenever they pleased. - -The man who moved this resolution was Pisander, who was throughout -the chief ostensible agent in putting down the democracy. But he who -concerted the whole affair, and prepared the way for the -catastrophe, and who had given the greatest thought to the matter, was -Antiphon, one of the best men of his day in Athens; who, with a head -to contrive measures and a tongue to recommend them, did not willingly -come forward in the assembly or upon any public scene, being ill -looked upon by the multitude owing to his reputation for talent; and -who yet was the one man best able to aid in the courts, or before -the assembly, the suitors who required his opinion. Indeed, when he -was afterwards himself tried for his life on the charge of having been -concerned in setting up this very government, when the Four Hundred -were overthrown and hardly dealt with by the commons, he made what -would seem to be the best defence of any known up to my time. -Phrynichus also went beyond all others in his zeal for the -oligarchy. Afraid of Alcibiades, and assured that he was no stranger -to his intrigues with Astyochus at Samos, he held that no oligarchy -was ever likely to restore him, and once embarked in the enterprise, -proved, where danger was to be faced, by far the staunchest of them -all. Theramenes, son of Hagnon, was also one of the foremost of the -subverters of the democracy--a man as able in council as in debate. -Conducted by so many and by such sagacious heads, the enterprise, -great as it was, not unnaturally went forward; although it was no -light matter to deprive the Athenian people of its freedom, almost a -hundred years after the deposition of the tyrants, when it had been -not only not subject to any during the whole of that period, but -accustomed during more than half of it to rule over subjects of its -own. - -The assembly ratified the proposed constitution, without a single -opposing voice, and was then dissolved; after which the Four Hundred -were brought into the council chamber in the following way. On account -of the enemy at Decelea, all the Athenians were constantly on the wall -or in the ranks at the various military posts. On that day the persons -not in the secret were allowed to go home as usual, while orders -were given to the accomplices of the conspirators to hang about, -without making any demonstration, at some little distance from the -posts, and in case of any opposition to what was being done, to -seize the arms and put it down. There were also some Andrians and -Tenians, three hundred Carystians, and some of the settlers in -Aegina come with their own arms for this very purpose, who had -received similar instructions. These dispositions completed, the -Four Hundred went, each with a dagger concealed about his person, -accompanied by one hundred and twenty Hellenic youths, whom they -employed wherever violence was needed, and appeared before the -Councillors of the Bean in the council chamber, and told them to -take their pay and be gone; themselves bringing it for the whole of -the residue of their term of office, and giving it to them as they -went out. - -Upon the Council withdrawing in this way without venturing any -objection, and the rest of the citizens making no movement, the Four -Hundred entered the council chamber, and for the present contented -themselves with drawing lots for their Prytanes, and making their -prayers and sacrifices to the gods upon entering office, but -afterwards departed widely from the democratic system of government, -and except that on account of Alcibiades they did not recall the -exiles, ruled the city by force; putting to death some men, though not -many, whom they thought it convenient to remove, and imprisoning and -banishing others. They also sent to Agis, the Lacedaemonian king, at -Decelea, to say that they desired to make peace, and that he might -reasonably be more disposed to treat now that he had them to deal with -instead of the inconstant commons. - -Agis, however, did not believe in the tranquillity of the city, or -that the commons would thus in a moment give up their ancient liberty, -but thought that the sight of a large Lacedaemonian force would be -sufficient to excite them if they were not already in commotion, of -which he was by no means certain. He accordingly gave to the envoys of -the Four Hundred an answer which held out no hopes of an -accommodation, and sending for large reinforcements from -Peloponnese, not long afterwards, with these and his garrison from -Decelea, descended to the very walls of Athens; hoping either that -civil disturbances might help to subdue them to his terms, or that, in -the confusion to be expected within and without the city, they might -even surrender without a blow being struck; at all events he thought -he would succeed in seizing the Long Walls, bared of their -defenders. However, the Athenians saw him come close up, without -making the least disturbance within the city; and sending out their -cavalry, and a number of their heavy infantry, light troops, and -archers, shot down some of his soldiers who approached too near, and -got possession of some arms and dead. Upon this Agis, at last -convinced, led his army back again and, remaining with his own -troops in the old position at Decelea, sent the reinforcement back -home, after a few days' stay in Attica. After this the Four Hundred -persevering sent another embassy to Agis, and now meeting with a -better reception, at his suggestion dispatched envoys to Lacedaemon to -negotiate a treaty, being desirous of making peace. - -They also sent ten men to Samos to reassure the army, and to explain -that the oligarchy was not established for the hurt of the city or the -citizens, but for the salvation of the country at large; and that -there were five thousand, not four hundred only, concerned; -although, what with their expeditions and employments abroad, the -Athenians had never yet assembled to discuss a question important -enough to bring five thousand of them together. The emissaries were -also told what to say upon all other points, and were so sent off -immediately after the establishment of the new government, which -feared, as it turned out justly, that the mass of seamen would not -be willing to remain under the oligarchical constitution, and, the -evil beginning there, might be the means of their overthrow. - -Indeed at Samos the question of the oligarchy had already entered -upon a new phase, the following events having taken place just at -the time that the Four Hundred were conspiring. That part of the -Samian population which has been mentioned as rising against the upper -class, and as being the democratic party, had now turned round, and -yielding to the solicitations of Pisander during his visit, and of the -Athenians in the conspiracy at Samos, had bound themselves by oaths to -the number of three hundred, and were about to fall upon the rest of -their fellow citizens, whom they now in their turn regarded as the -democratic party. Meanwhile they put to death one Hyperbolus, an -Athenian, a pestilent fellow that had been ostracized, not from fear -of his influence or position, but because he was a rascal and a -disgrace to the city; being aided in this by Charminus, one of the -generals, and by some of the Athenians with them, to whom they had -sworn friendship, and with whom they perpetrated other acts of the -kind, and now determined to attack the people. The latter got wind -of what was coming, and told two of the generals, Leon and Diomedon, -who, on account of the credit which they enjoyed with the commons, -were unwilling supporters of the oligarchy; and also Thrasybulus and -Thrasyllus, the former a captain of a galley, the latter serving -with the heavy infantry, besides certain others who had ever been -thought most opposed to the conspirators, entreating them not to -look on and see them destroyed, and Samos, the sole remaining stay -of their empire, lost to the Athenians. Upon hearing this, the persons -whom they addressed now went round the soldiers one by one, and -urged them to resist, especially the crew of the Paralus, which was -made up entirely of Athenians and freemen, and had from time out of -mind been enemies of oligarchy, even when there was no such thing -existing; and Leon and Diomedon left behind some ships for their -protection in case of their sailing away anywhere themselves. -Accordingly, when the Three Hundred attacked the people, all these -came to the rescue, and foremost of all the crew of the Paralus; and -the Samian commons gained the victory, and putting to death some -thirty of the Three Hundred, and banishing three others of the -ringleaders, accorded an amnesty to the rest, and lived together under -a democratic government for the future. - -The ship Paralus, with Chaereas, son of Archestratus, on board, an -Athenian who had taken an active part in the revolution, was now -without loss of time sent off by the Samians and the army to Athens to -report what had occurred; the fact that the Four Hundred were in power -not being yet known. When they sailed into harbour the Four Hundred -immediately arrested two or three of the Parali and, taking the vessel -from the rest, shifted them into a troopship and set them to keep -guard round Euboea. Chaereas, however, managed to secrete himself as -soon as he saw how things stood, and returning to Samos, drew a -picture to the soldiers of the horrors enacting at Athens, in which -everything was exaggerated; saying that all were punished with -stripes, that no one could say a word against the holders of power, -that the soldiers' wives and children were outraged, and that it was -intended to seize and shut up the relatives of all in the army at -Samos who were not of the government's way of thinking, to be put to -death in case of their disobedience; besides a host of other injurious -inventions. - -On hearing this the first thought of the army was to fall upon the -chief authors of the oligarchy and upon all the rest concerned. -Eventually, however, they desisted from this idea upon the men of -moderate views opposing it and warning them against ruining their -cause, with the enemy close at hand and ready for battle. After -this, Thrasybulus, son of Lycus, and Thrasyllus, the chief leaders -in the revolution, now wishing in the most public manner to change the -government at Samos to a democracy, bound all the soldiers by the most -tremendous oaths, and those of the oligarchical party more than any, -to accept a democratic government, to be united, to prosecute actively -the war with the Peloponnesians, and to be enemies of the Four -Hundred, and to hold no communication with them. The same oath was -also taken by all the Samians of full age; and the soldiers associated -the Samians in all their affairs and in the fruits of their dangers, -having the conviction that there was no way of escape for themselves -or for them, but that the success of the Four Hundred or of the -enemy at Miletus must be their ruin. - -The struggle now was between the army trying to force a democracy -upon the city, and the Four Hundred an oligarchy upon the camp. -Meanwhile the soldiers forthwith held an assembly, in which they -deposed the former generals and any of the captains whom they -suspected, and chose new captains and generals to replace them, -besides Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, whom they had already. They also -stood up and encouraged one another, and among other things urged that -they ought not to lose heart because the city had revolted from -them, as the party seceding was smaller and in every way poorer in -resources than themselves. They had the whole fleet with which to -compel the other cities in their empire to give them money just as -if they had their base in the capital, having a city in Samos which, -so far from wanting strength, had when at war been within an ace of -depriving the Athenians of the command of the sea, while as far as the -enemy was concerned they had the same base of operations as before. -Indeed, with the fleet in their hands, they were better able to -provide themselves with supplies than the government at home. It was -their advanced position at Samos which had throughout enabled the home -authorities to command the entrance into Piraeus; and if they -refused to give them back the constitution, they would now find that -the army was more in a position to exclude them from the sea than they -were to exclude the army. Besides, the city was of little or no use -towards enabling them to overcome the enemy; and they had lost nothing -in losing those who had no longer either money to send them (the -soldiers having to find this for themselves), or good counsel, which -entitles cities to direct armies. On the contrary, even in this the -home government had done wrong in abolishing the institutions of their -ancestors, while the army maintained the said institutions, and -would try to force the home government to do so likewise. So that even -in point of good counsel the camp had as good counsellors as the city. -Moreover, they had but to grant him security for his person and his -recall, and Alcibiades would be only too glad to procure them the -alliance of the King. And above all if they failed altogether, with -the navy which they possessed, they had numbers of places to retire to -in which they would find cities and lands. - -Debating together and comforting themselves after this manner, -they pushed on their war measures as actively as ever; and the ten -envoys sent to Samos by the Four Hundred, learning how matters stood -while they were still at Delos, stayed quiet there. - About this time a cry arose among the soldiers in the -Peloponnesian fleet at Miletus that Astyochus and Tissaphernes were -ruining their cause. Astyochus had not been willing to fight at -sea--either before, while they were still in full vigour and the -fleet of the Athenians small, or now, when the enemy was, as they were -informed, in a state of sedition and his ships not yet united--but -kept them waiting for the Phoenician fleet from Tissaphernes, which -had only a nominal existence, at the risk of wasting away in -inactivity. While Tissaphernes not only did not bring up the fleet in -question, but was ruining their navy by payments made irregularly, and -even then not made in full. They must therefore, they insisted, delay -no longer, but fight a decisive naval engagement. The Syracusans were -the most urgent of any. - -The confederates and Astyochus, aware of these murmurs, had -already decided in council to fight a decisive battle; and when the -news reached them of the disturbance at Samos, they put to sea with -all their ships, one hundred and ten in number, and, ordering the -Milesians to move by land upon Mycale, set sail thither. The Athenians -with the eighty-two ships from Samos were at the moment lying at -Glauce in Mycale, a point where Samos approaches near to the -continent; and, seeing the Peloponnesian fleet sailing against them, -retired into Samos, not thinking themselves numerically strong -enough to stake their all upon a battle. Besides, they had notice from -Miletus of the wish of the enemy to engage, and were expecting to be -joined from the Hellespont by Strombichides, to whom a messenger had -been already dispatched, with the ships that had gone from Chios to -Abydos. The Athenians accordingly withdrew to Samos, and the -Peloponnesians put in at Mycale, and encamped with the land forces -of the Milesians and the people of the neighbourhood. The next day -they were about to sail against Samos, when tidings reached them of -the arrival of Strombichides with the squadron from the Hellespont, -upon which they immediately sailed back to Miletus. The Athenians, -thus reinforced, now in their turn sailed against Miletus with a -hundred and eight ships, wishing to fight a decisive battle, but, as -no one put out to meet them, sailed back to Samos. - - - - -CHAPTER XXVI - -_Twenty-first Year of the War - Recall of Alcibiades to Samos - -Revolt of Euboea and Downfall of the Four Hundred - -Battle of Cynossema_ - -In the same summer, immediately after this, the Peloponnesians -having refused to fight with their fleet united, through not -thinking themselves a match for the enemy, and being at a loss where -to look for money for such a number of ships, especially as -Tissaphernes proved so bad a paymaster, sent off Clearchus, son of -Ramphias, with forty ships to Pharnabazus, agreeably to the original -instructions from Peloponnese; Pharnabazus inviting them and being -prepared to furnish pay, and Byzantium besides sending offers to -revolt to them. These Peloponnesian ships accordingly put out into the -open sea, in order to escape the observation of the Athenians, and -being overtaken by a storm, the majority with Clearchus got into -Delos, and afterwards returned to Miletus, whence Clearchus -proceeded by land to the Hellespont to take the command: ten, however, -of their number, under the Megarian Helixus, made good their passage -to the Hellespont, and effected the revolt of Byzantium. After this, -the commanders at Samos were informed of it, and sent a squadron -against them to guard the Hellespont; and an encounter took place -before Byzantium between eight vessels on either side. - -Meanwhile the chiefs at Samos, and especially Thrasybulus, who -from the moment that he had changed the government had remained firmly -resolved to recall Alcibiades, at last in an assembly brought over the -mass of the soldiery, and upon their voting for his recall and -amnesty, sailed over to Tissaphernes and brought Alcibiades to -Samos, being convinced that their only chance of salvation lay in -his bringing over Tissaphernes from the Peloponnesians to -themselves. An assembly was then held in which Alcibiades complained -of and deplored his private misfortune in having been banished, and -speaking at great length upon public affairs, highly incited their -hopes for the future, and extravagantly magnified his own influence -with Tissaphernes. His object in this was to make the oligarchical -government at Athens afraid of him, to hasten the dissolution of the -clubs, to increase his credit with the army at Samos and heighten -their own confidence, and lastly to prejudice the enemy as strongly as -possible against Tissaphernes, and blast the hopes which they -entertained. Alcibiades accordingly held out to the army such -extravagant promises as the following: that Tissaphernes had -solemnly assured him that if he could only trust the Athenians they -should never want for supplies while he had anything left, no, not -even if he should have to coin his own silver couch, and that he would -bring the Phoenician fleet now at Aspendus to the Athenians instead of -to the Peloponnesians; but that he could only trust the Athenians if -Alcibiades were recalled to be his security for them. - -Upon hearing this and much more besides, the Athenians at once -elected him general together with the former ones, and put all their -affairs into his hands. There was now not a man in the army who -would have exchanged his present hopes of safety and vengeance upon -the Four Hundred for any consideration whatever; and after what they -had been told they were now inclined to disdain the enemy before them, -and to sail at once for Piraeus. To the plan of sailing for Piraeus, -leaving their more immediate enemies behind them, Alcibiades opposed -the most positive refusal, in spite of the numbers that insisted -upon it, saying that now that he had been elected general he would -first sail to Tissaphernes and concert with him measures for -carrying on the war. Accordingly, upon leaving this assembly, he -immediately took his departure in order to have it thought that -there was an entire confidence between them, and also wishing to -increase his consideration with Tissaphernes, and to show that he -had now been elected general and was in a position to do him good or -evil as he chose; thus managing to frighten the Athenians with -Tissaphernes and Tissaphernes with the Athenians. - -Meanwhile the Peloponnesians at Miletus heard of the recall of -Alcibiades and, already distrustful of Tissaphernes, now became far -more disgusted with him than ever. Indeed after their refusal to go -out and give battle to the Athenians when they appeared before -Miletus, Tissaphernes had grown slacker than ever in his payments; and -even before this, on account of Alcibiades, his unpopularity had -been on the increase. Gathering together, just as before, the soldiers -and some persons of consideration besides the soldiery began to reckon -up how they had never yet received their pay in full; that what they -did receive was small in quantity, and even that paid irregularly, and -that unless they fought a decisive battle or removed to some station -where they could get supplies, the ships' crews would desert; and that -it was all the fault of Astyochus, who humoured Tissaphernes for his -own private advantage. - -The army was engaged in these reflections, when the following -disturbance took place about the person of Astyochus. Most of the -Syracusan and Thurian sailors were freemen, and these the freest crews -in the armament were likewise the boldest in setting upon Astyochus -and demanding their pay. The latter answered somewhat stiffly and -threatened them, and when Dorieus spoke up for his own sailors even -went so far as to lift his baton against him; upon seeing which the -mass of men, in sailor fashion, rushed in a fury to strike -Astyochus. He, however, saw them in time and fled for refuge to an -altar; and they were thus parted without his being struck. Meanwhile -the fort built by Tissaphernes in Miletus was surprised and taken by -the Milesians, and the garrison in it turned out--an act which met -with the approval of the rest of the allies, and in particular of the -Syracusans, but which found no favour with Lichas, who said moreover -that the Milesians and the rest in the King's country ought to show -a reasonable submission to Tissaphernes and to pay him court, until -the war should be happily settled. The Milesians were angry with him -for this and for other things of the kind, and upon his afterwards -dying of sickness, would not allow him to be buried where the -Lacedaemonians with the army desired. - -The discontent of the army with Astyochus and Tissaphernes had -reached this pitch, when Mindarus arrived from Lacedaemon to succeed -Astyochus as admiral, and assumed the command. Astyochus now set -sail for home; and Tissaphernes sent with him one of his confidants, -Gaulites, a Carian, who spoke the two languages, to complain of the -Milesians for the affair of the fort, and at the same time to defend -himself against the Milesians, who were, as he was aware, on their way -to Sparta chiefly to denounce his conduct, and had with them -Hermocrates, who was to accuse Tissaphernes of joining with Alcibiades -to ruin the Peloponnesian cause and of playing a double game. Indeed -Hermocrates had always been at enmity with him about the pay not being -restored in full; and eventually when he was banished from Syracuse, -and new commanders--Potamis, Myscon, and Demarchus--had come out to -Miletus to the ships of the Syracusans, Tissaphernes, pressed harder -than ever upon him in his exile, and among other charges against him -accused him of having once asked him for money, and then given himself -out as his enemy because he failed to obtain it. - -While Astyochus and the Milesians and Hermocrates made sail for -Lacedaemon, Alcibiades had now crossed back from Tissaphernes to -Samos. After his return the envoys of the Four Hundred sent, as has -been mentioned above, to pacify and explain matters to the forces at -Samos, arrived from Delos; and an assembly was held in which they -attempted to speak. The soldiers at first would not hear them, and -cried out to put to death the subverters of the democracy, but at -last, after some difficulty, calmed down and gave them a hearing. Upon -this the envoys proceeded to inform them that the recent change had -been made to save the city, and not to ruin it or to deliver it over -to the enemy, for they had already had an opportunity of doing this -when he invaded the country during their government; that all the Five -Thousand would have their proper share in the government; and that -their hearers' relatives had neither outrage, as Chaereas had -slanderously reported, nor other ill treatment to complain of, but -were all in undisturbed enjoyment of their property just as they had -left them. Besides these they made a number of other statements -which had no better success with their angry auditors; and amid a host -of different opinions the one which found most favour was that of -sailing to Piraeus. Now it was that Alcibiades for the first time -did the state a service, and one of the most signal kind. For when the -Athenians at Samos were bent upon sailing against their countrymen, in -which case Ionia and the Hellespont would most certainly at once -have passed into possession of the enemy, Alcibiades it was who -prevented them. At that moment, when no other man would have been able -to hold back the multitude, he put a stop to the intended -expedition, and rebuked and turned aside the resentment felt, on -personal grounds, against the envoys; he dismissed them with an answer -from himself, to the effect that he did not object to the government -of the Five Thousand, but insisted that the Four Hundred should be -deposed and the Council of Five Hundred reinstated in power: meanwhile -any retrenchments for economy, by which pay might be better found -for the armament, met with his entire approval. Generally, he bade -them hold out and show a bold face to the enemy, since if the city -were saved there was good hope that the two parties might some day -be reconciled, whereas if either were once destroyed, that at Samos, -or that at Athens, there would no longer be any one to be reconciled -to. Meanwhile arrived envoys from the Argives, with offers of -support to the Athenian commons at Samos: these were thanked by -Alcibiades, and dismissed with a request to come when called upon. The -Argives were accompanied by the crew of the Paralus, whom we left -placed in a troopship by the Four Hundred with orders to cruise -round Euboea, and who being employed to carry to Lacedaemon some -Athenian envoys sent by the Four Hundred--Laespodias, Aristophon, and -Melesias--as they sailed by Argos laid hands upon the envoys, and -delivering them over to the Argives as the chief subverters of the -democracy, themselves, instead of returning to Athens, took the Argive -envoys on board, and came to Samos in the galley which had been -confided to them. - -The same summer at the time that the return of Alcibiades coupled -with the general conduct of Tissaphernes had carried to its height the -discontent of the Peloponnesians, who no longer entertained any -doubt of his having joined the Athenians, Tissaphernes wishing, it -would seem, to clear himself to them of these charges, prepared to -go after the Phoenician fleet to Aspendus, and invited Lichas to go -with him; saying that he would appoint Tamos as his lieutenant to -provide pay for the armament during his own absence. Accounts -differ, and it is not easy to ascertain with what intention he went to -Aspendus, and did not bring the fleet after all. That one hundred -and forty-seven Phoenician ships came as far as Aspendus is certain; -but why they did not come on has been variously accounted for. Some -think that he went away in pursuance of his plan of wasting the -Peloponnesian resources, since at any rate Tamos, his lieutenant, -far from being any better, proved a worse paymaster than himself: -others that he brought the Phoenicians to Aspendus to exact money from -them for their discharge, having never intended to employ them: others -again that it was in view of the outcry against him at Lacedaemon, -in order that it might be said that he was not in fault, but that -the ships were really manned and that he had certainly gone to fetch -them. To myself it seems only too evident that he did not bring up the -fleet because he wished to wear out and paralyse the Hellenic -forces, that is, to waste their strength by the time lost during his -journey to Aspendus, and to keep them evenly balanced by not -throwing his weight into either scale. Had he wished to finish the -war, he could have done so, assuming of course that he made his -appearance in a way which left no room for doubt; as by bringing up -the fleet he would in all probability have given the victory to the -Lacedaemonians, whose navy, even as it was, faced the Athenian more as -an equal than as an inferior. But what convicts him most clearly, is -the excuse which he put forward for not bringing the ships. He said -that the number assembled was less than the King had ordered; but -surely it would only have enhanced his credit if he spent little of -the King's money and effected the same end at less cost. In any -case, whatever was his intention, Tissaphernes went to Aspendus and -saw the Phoenicians; and the Peloponnesians at his desire sent a -Lacedaemonian called Philip with two galleys to fetch the fleet. - -Alcibiades finding that Tissaphernes had gone to Aspendus, himself -sailed thither with thirteen ships, promising to do a great and -certain service to the Athenians at Samos, as he would either bring -the Phoenician fleet to the Athenians, or at all events prevent its -joining the Peloponnesians. In all probability he had long known -that Tissaphernes never meant to bring the fleet at all, and wished to -compromise him as much as possible in the eyes of the Peloponnesians -through his apparent friendship for himself and the Athenians, and -thus in a manner to oblige him to join their side. - -While Alcibiades weighed anchor and sailed eastward straight for -Phaselis and Caunus, the envoys sent by the Four Hundred to Samos -arrived at Athens. Upon their delivering the message from -Alcibiades, telling them to hold out and to show a firm front to the -enemy, and saying that he had great hopes of reconciling them with the -army and of overcoming the Peloponnesians, the majority of the members -of the oligarchy, who were already discontented and only too much -inclined to be quit of the business in any safe way that they could, -were at once greatly strengthened in their resolve. These now banded -together and strongly criticized the administration, their leaders -being some of the principal generals and men in office under the -oligarchy, such as Theramenes, son of Hagnon, Aristocrates, son of -Scellias, and others; who, although among the most prominent members -of the government (being afraid, as they said, of the army at Samos, -and most especially of Alcibiades, and also lest the envoys whom -they had sent to Lacedaemon might do the state some harm without the -authority of the people), without insisting on objections to the -excessive concentration of power in a few hands, yet urged that the -Five Thousand must be shown to exist not merely in name but in -reality, and the constitution placed upon a fairer basis. But this was -merely their political cry; most of them being driven by private -ambition into the line of conduct so surely fatal to oligarchies -that arise out of democracies. For all at once pretend to be not -only equals but each the chief and master of his fellows; while -under a democracy a disappointed candidate accepts his defeat more -easily, because he has not the humiliation of being beaten by his -equals. But what most clearly encouraged the malcontents was the power -of Alcibiades at Samos, and their own disbelief in the stability of -the oligarchy; and it was now a race between them as to which should -first become the leader of the commons. - -Meanwhile the leaders and members of the Four Hundred most opposed -to a democratic form of government--Phrynichus who had had the -quarrel with Alcibiades during his command at Samos, Aristarchus the -bitter and inveterate enemy of the commons, and Pisander and -Antiphon and others of the chiefs who already as soon as they -entered upon power, and again when the army at Samos seceded from them -and declared for a democracy, had sent envoys from their own body to -Lacedaemon and made every effort for peace, and had built the wall -in Eetionia--now redoubled their exertions when their envoys returned -from Samos, and they saw not only the people but their own most -trusted associates turning against them. Alarmed at the state of -things at Athens as at Samos, they now sent off in haste Antiphon -and Phrynichus and ten others with injunctions to make peace with -Lacedaemon upon any terms, no matter what, that should be at all -tolerable. Meanwhile they pushed on more actively than ever with the -wall in Eetionia. Now the meaning of this wall, according to -Theramenes and his supporters, was not so much to keep out the army of -Samos, in case of its trying to force its way into Piraeus, as to be -able to let in, at pleasure, the fleet and army of the enemy. For -Eetionia is a mole of Piraeus, close alongside of the entrance of -the harbour, and was now fortified in connection with the wall already -existing on the land side, so that a few men placed in it might be -able to command the entrance; the old wall on the land side and the -new one now being built within on the side of the sea, both ending -in one of the two towers standing at the narrow mouth of the -harbour. They also walled off the largest porch in Piraeus which was -in immediate connection with this wall, and kept it in their own -hands, compelling all to unload there the corn that came into the -harbour, and what they had in stock, and to take it out from thence -when they sold it. - -These measures had long provoked the murmurs of Theramenes, and when -the envoys returned from Lacedaemon without having effected any -general pacification, he affirmed that this wall was like to prove the -ruin of the state. At this moment forty-two ships from Peloponnese, -including some Siceliot and Italiot vessels from Locri and Tarentum, -had been invited over by the Euboeans and were already riding off -Las in Laconia preparing for the voyage to Euboea, under the command -of Agesandridas, son of Agesander, a Spartan. Theramenes now -affirmed that this squadron was destined not so much to aid Euboea -as the party fortifying Eetionia, and that unless precautions were -speedily taken the city would be surprised and lost. This was no -mere calumny, there being really some such plan entertained by the -accused. Their first wish was to have the oligarchy without giving -up the empire; failing this to keep their ships and walls and be -independent; while, if this also were denied them, sooner than be -the first victims of the restored democracy, they were resolved to -call in the enemy and make peace, give up their walls and ships, and -at all costs retain possession of the government, if their lives -were only assured to them. - -For this reason they pushed forward the construction of their work -with posterns and entrances and means of introducing the enemy, -being eager to have it finished in time. Meanwhile the murmurs against -them were at first confined to a few persons and went on in secret, -until Phrynichus, after his return from the embassy to Lacedaemon, was -laid wait for and stabbed in full market by one of the Peripoli, -falling down dead before he had gone far from the council chamber. The -assassin escaped; but his accomplice, an Argive, was taken and put -to the torture by the Four Hundred, without their being able to -extract from him the name of his employer, or anything further than -that he knew of many men who used to assemble at the house of the -commander of the Peripoli and at other houses. Here the matter was -allowed to drop. This so emboldened Theramenes and Aristocrates and -the rest of their partisans in the Four Hundred and out of doors, that -they now resolved to act. For by this time the ships had sailed -round from Las, and anchoring at Epidaurus had overrun Aegina; and -Theramenes asserted that, being bound for Euboea, they would never -have sailed in to Aegina and come back to anchor at Epidaurus, -unless they had been invited to come to aid in the designs of which he -had always accused the government. Further inaction had therefore -now become impossible. In the end, after a great many seditious -harangues and suspicions, they set to work in real earnest. The -heavy infantry in Piraeus building the wall in Eetionia, among whom -was Aristocrates, a colonel, with his own tribe, laid hands upon -Alexicles, a general under the oligarchy and the devoted adherent of -the cabal, and took him into a house and confined him there. In this -they were assisted by one Hermon, commander of the Peripoli in -Munychia, and others, and above all had with them the great bulk of -the heavy infantry. As soon as the news reached the Four Hundred, -who happened to be sitting in the council chamber, all except the -disaffected wished at once to go to the posts where the arms were, and -menaced Theramenes and his party. Theramenes defended himself, and -said that he was ready immediately to go and help to rescue Alexicles; -and taking with him one of the generals belonging to his party, went -down to Piraeus, followed by Aristarchus and some young men of the -cavalry. All was now panic and confusion. Those in the city imagined -that Piraeus was already taken and the prisoner put to death, while -those in Piraeus expected every moment to be attacked by the party -in the city. The older men, however, stopped the persons running up -and down the town and making for the stands of arms; and Thucydides -the Pharsalian, proxenus of the city, came forward and threw himself -in the way of the rival factions, and appealed to them not to ruin the -state, while the enemy was still at hand waiting for his -opportunity, and so at length succeeded in quieting them and in -keeping their hands off each other. Meanwhile Theramenes came down -to Piraeus, being himself one of the generals, and raged and stormed -against the heavy infantry, while Aristarchus and the adversaries of -the people were angry in right earnest. Most of the heavy infantry, -however, went on with the business without faltering, and asked -Theramenes if he thought the wall had been constructed for any good -purpose, and whether it would not be better that it should be pulled -down. To this he answered that if they thought it best to pull it -down, he for his part agreed with them. Upon this the heavy infantry -and a number of the people in Piraeus immediately got up on the -fortification and began to demolish it. Now their cry to the multitude -was that all should join in the work who wished the Five Thousand to -govern instead of the Four Hundred. For instead of saying in so many -words "all who wished the commons to govern," they still disguised -themselves under the name of the Five Thousand; being afraid that -these might really exist, and that they might be speaking to one of -their number and get into trouble through ignorance. Indeed this was -why the Four Hundred neither wished the Five Thousand to exist, nor to -have it known that they did not exist; being of opinion that to give -themselves so many partners in empire would be downright democracy, -while the mystery in question would make the people afraid of one -another. - -The next day the Four Hundred, although alarmed, nevertheless -assembled in the council chamber, while the heavy infantry in Piraeus, -after having released their prisoner Alexicles and pulled down the -fortification, went with their arms to the theatre of Dionysus, -close to Munychia, and there held an assembly in which they decided to -march into the city, and setting forth accordingly halted in the -Anaceum. Here they were joined by some delegates from the Four -Hundred, who reasoned with them one by one, and persuaded those whom -they saw to be the most moderate to remain quiet themselves, and to -keep in the rest; saying that they would make known the Five Thousand, -and have the Four Hundred chosen from them in rotation, as should be -decided by the Five Thousand, and meanwhile entreated them not to ruin -the state or drive it into the arms of the enemy. After a great many -had spoken and had been spoken to, the whole body of heavy infantry -became calmer than before, absorbed by their fears for the country -at large, and now agreed to hold upon an appointed day an assembly -in the theatre of Dionysus for the restoration of concord. - -When the day came for the assembly in the theatre, and they were -upon the point of assembling, news arrived that the forty-two ships -under Agesandridas were sailing from Megara along the coast of -Salamis. The people to a man now thought that it was just what -Theramenes and his party had so often said, that the ships were -sailing to the fortification, and concluded that they had done well to -demolish it. But though it may possibly have been by appointment -that Agesandridas hovered about Epidaurus and the neighbourhood, he -would also naturally be kept there by the hope of an opportunity -arising out of the troubles in the town. In any case the Athenians, on -receipt of the news immediately ran down in mass to Piraeus, seeing -themselves threatened by the enemy with a worse war than their war -among themselves, not at a distance, but close to the harbour of -Athens. Some went on board the ships already afloat, while others -launched fresh vessels, or ran to defend the walls and the mouth of -the harbour. - -Meanwhile the Peloponnesian vessels sailed by, and rounding Sunium -anchored between Thoricus and Prasiae, and afterwards arrived at -Oropus. The Athenians, with revolution in the city, and unwilling to -lose a moment in going to the relief of their most important -possession (for Euboea was everything to them now that they were -shut out from Attica), were compelled to put to sea in haste and -with untrained crews, and sent Thymochares with some vessels to -Eretria. These upon their arrival, with the ships already in Euboea, -made up a total of thirty-six vessels, and were immediately forced -to engage. For Agesandridas, after his crews had dined, put out from -Oropus, which is about seven miles from Eretria by sea; and the -Athenians, seeing him sailing up, immediately began to man their -vessels. The sailors, however, instead of being by their ships, as -they supposed, were gone away to purchase provisions for their -dinner in the houses in the outskirts of the town; the Eretrians -having so arranged that there should be nothing on sale in the -marketplace, in order that the Athenians might be a long time in -manning their ships, and, the enemy's attack taking them by -surprise, might be compelled to put to sea just as they were. A signal -also was raised in Eretria to give them notice in Oropus when to put -to sea. The Athenians, forced to put out so poorly prepared, engaged -off the harbour of Eretria, and after holding their own for some -little while notwithstanding, were at length put to flight and -chased to the shore. Such of their number as took refuge in Eretria, -which they presumed to be friendly to them, found their fate in that -city, being butchered by the inhabitants; while those who fled to -the Athenian fort in the Eretrian territory, and the vessels which got -to Chalcis, were saved. The Peloponnesians, after taking twenty-two -Athenian ships, and killing or making prisoners of the crews, set up a -trophy, and not long afterwards effected the revolt of the whole of -Euboea (except Oreus, which was held by the Athenians themselves), and -made a general settlement of the affairs of the island. - -When the news of what had happened in Euboea reached Athens, a panic -ensued such as they had never before known. Neither the disaster in -Sicily, great as it seemed at the time, nor any other had ever so much -alarmed them. The camp at Samos was in revolt; they had no more -ships or men to man them; they were at discord among themselves and -might at any moment come to blows; and a disaster of this magnitude -coming on the top of all, by which they lost their fleet, and worst of -all Euboea, which was of more value to them than Attica, could not -occur without throwing them into the deepest despondency. Meanwhile -their greatest and most immediate trouble was the possibility that the -enemy, emboldened by his victory, might make straight for them and -sail against Piraeus, which they had no longer ships to defend; and -every moment they expected him to arrive. This, with a little more -courage, he might easily have done, in which case he would either have -increased the dissensions of the city by his presence, or, if he had -stayed to besiege it, have compelled the fleet from Ionia, although -the enemy of the oligarchy, to come to the rescue of their country and -of their relatives, and in the meantime would have become master of -the Hellespont, Ionia, the islands, and of everything as far as -Euboea, or, to speak roundly, of the whole Athenian empire. But -here, as on so many other occasions, the Lacedaemonians proved the -most convenient people in the world for the Athenians to be at war -with. The wide difference between the two characters, the slowness and -want of energy of the Lacedaemonians as contrasted with the dash and -enterprise of their opponents, proved of the greatest service, -especially to a maritime empire like Athens. Indeed this was shown -by the Syracusans, who were most like the Athenians in character, -and also most successful in combating them. - -Nevertheless, upon receipt of the news, the Athenians manned -twenty ships and called immediately a first assembly in the Pnyx, -where they had been used to meet formerly, and deposed the Four -Hundred and voted to hand over the government to the Five Thousand, of -which body all who furnished a suit of armour were to be members, -decreeing also that no one should receive pay for the discharge of any -office, or if he did should be held accursed. Many other assemblies -were held afterwards, in which law-makers were elected and all other -measures taken to form a constitution. It was during the first -period of this constitution that the Athenians appear to have -enjoyed the best government that they ever did, at least in my time. -For the fusion of the high and the low was effected with judgment, and -this was what first enabled the state to raise up her head after her -manifold disasters. They also voted for the recall of Alcibiades and -of other exiles, and sent to him and to the camp at Samos, and urged -them to devote themselves vigorously to the war. - -Upon this revolution taking place, the party of Pisander and -Alexicles and the chiefs of the oligarchs immediately withdrew to -Decelea, with the single exception of Aristarchus, one of the -generals, who hastily took some of the most barbarian of the archers -and marched to Oenoe. This was a fort of the Athenians upon the -Boeotian border, at that moment besieged by the Corinthians, irritated -by the loss of a party returning from Decelea, who had been cut off by -the garrison. The Corinthians had volunteered for this service, and -had called upon the Boeotians to assist them. After communicating with -them, Aristarchus deceived the garrison in Oenoe by telling them -that their countrymen in the city had compounded with the -Lacedaemonians, and that one of the terms of the capitulation was that -they must surrender the place to the Boeotians. The garrison -believed him as he was general, and besides knew nothing of what had -occurred owing to the siege, and so evacuated the fort under truce. In -this way the Boeotians gained possession of Oenoe, and the oligarchy -and the troubles at Athens ended. - -To return to the Peloponnesians in Miletus. No pay was forthcoming -from any of the agents deputed by Tissaphernes for that purpose upon -his departure for Aspendus; neither the Phoenician fleet nor -Tissaphernes showed any signs of appearing, and Philip, who had been -sent with him, and another Spartan, Hippocrates, who was at -Phaselis, wrote word to Mindarus, the admiral, that the ships were not -coming at all, and that they were being grossly abused by -Tissaphernes. Meanwhile Pharnabazus was inviting them to come, and -making every effort to get the fleet and, like Tissaphernes, to -cause the revolt of the cities in his government still subject to -Athens, founding great hopes on his success; until at length, at about -the period of the summer which we have now reached, Mindarus yielded -to his importunities, and, with great order and at a moment's -notice, in order to elude the enemy at Samos, weighed anchor with -seventy-three ships from Miletus and set sail for the Hellespont. -Thither sixteen vessels had already preceded him in the same summer, -and had overrun part of the Chersonese. Being caught in a storm, -Mindarus was compelled to run in to Icarus and, after being detained -five or six days there by stress of weather, arrived at Chios. - -Meanwhile Thrasyllus had heard of his having put out from Miletus, -and immediately set sail with fifty-five ships from Samos, in haste to -arrive before him in the Hellespont. But learning that he was at -Chios, and expecting that he would stay there, he posted scouts in -Lesbos and on the continent opposite to prevent the fleet moving -without his knowing it, and himself coasted along to Methymna, and -gave orders to prepare meal and other necessaries, in order to -attack them from Lesbos in the event of their remaining for any length -of time at Chios. Meanwhile he resolved to sail against Eresus, a town -in Lesbos which had revolted, and, if he could, to take it. For some -of the principal Methymnian exiles had carried over about fifty -heavy infantry, their sworn associates, from Cuma, and hiring others -from the continent, so as to make up three hundred in all, chose -Anaxander, a Theban, to command them, on account of the community of -blood existing between the Thebans and the Lesbians, and first -attacked Methymna. Balked in this attempt by the advance of the -Athenian guards from Mitylene, and repulsed a second time in a -battle outside the city, they then crossed the mountain and effected -the revolt of Eresus. Thrasyllus accordingly determined to go there -with all his ships and to attack the place. Meanwhile Thrasybulus -had preceded him thither with five ships from Samos, as soon as he -heard that the exiles had crossed over, and coming too late to save -Eresus, went on and anchored before the town. Here they were joined -also by two vessels on their way home from the Hellespont, and by -the ships of the Methymnians, making a grand total of sixty-seven -vessels; and the forces on board now made ready with engines and every -other means available to do their utmost to storm Eresus. - -In the meantime Mindarus and the Peloponnesian fleet at Chios, after -taking provisions for two days and receiving three Chian pieces of -money for each man from the Chians, on the third day put out in -haste from the island; in order to avoid falling in with the ships -at Eresus, they did not make for the open sea, but keeping Lesbos on -their left, sailed for the continent. After touching at the port of -Carteria, in the Phocaeid, and dining, they went on along the -Cumaean coast and supped at Arginusae, on the continent over against -Mitylene. From thence they continued their voyage along the coast, -although it was late in the night, and arriving at Harmatus on the -continent opposite Methymna, dined there; and swiftly passing -Lectum, Larisa, Hamaxitus, and the neighbouring towns, arrived a -little before midnight at Rhoeteum. Here they were now in the -Hellespont. Some of the ships also put in at Sigeum and at other -places in the neighbourhood. - -Meanwhile the warnings of the fire signals and the sudden increase -in the number of fires on the enemy's shore informed the eighteen -Athenian ships at Sestos of the approach of the Peloponnesian fleet. -That very night they set sail in haste just as they were, and, hugging -the shore of the Chersonese, coasted along to Elaeus, in order to sail -out into the open sea away from the fleet of the enemy. - -After passing unobserved the sixteen ships at Abydos, which had -nevertheless been warned by their approaching friends to be on the -alert to prevent their sailing out, at dawn they sighted the fleet -of Mindarus, which immediately gave chase. All had not time to get -away; the greater number however escaped to Imbros and Lemnos, while -four of the hindmost were overtaken off Elaeus. One of these was -stranded opposite to the temple of Protesilaus and taken with its -crew, two others without their crews; the fourth was abandoned on -the shore of Imbros and burned by the enemy. - -After this the Peloponnesians were joined by the squadron from -Abydos, which made up their fleet to a grand total of eighty-six -vessels; they spent the day in unsuccessfully besieging Elaeus, and -then sailed back to Abydos. Meanwhile the Athenians, deceived by their -scouts, and never dreaming of the enemy's fleet getting by undetected, -were tranquilly besieging Eresus. As soon as they heard the news -they instantly abandoned Eresus, and made with all speed for the -Hellespont, and after taking two of the Peloponnesian ships which -had been carried out too far into the open sea in the ardour of the -pursuit and now fell in their way, the next day dropped anchor at -Elaeus, and, bringing back the ships that had taken refuge at -Imbros, during five days prepared for the coming engagement. - -After this they engaged in the following way. The Athenians formed in -column and sailed close alongshore to Sestos; upon perceiving which -the Peloponnesians put out from Abydos to meet them. Realizing that -a battle was now imminent, both combatants extended their flank; the -Athenians along the Chersonese from Idacus to Arrhiani with -seventy-six ships; the Peloponnesians from Abydos to Dardanus with -eighty-six. The Peloponnesian right wing was occupied by the -Syracusans, their left by Mindarus in person with the best sailers -in the navy; the Athenian left by Thrasyllus, their right by -Thrasybulus, the other commanders being in different parts of the -fleet. The Peloponnesians hastened to engage first, and outflanking -with their left the Athenian right sought to cut them off, if -possible, from sailing out of the straits, and to drive their centre -upon the shore, which was not far off. The Athenians perceiving -their intention extended their own wing and outsailed them, while -their left had by this time passed the point of Cynossema. This, -however, obliged them to thin and weaken their centre, especially as -they had fewer ships than the enemy, and as the coast round Point -Cynossema formed a sharp angle which prevented their seeing what was -going on on the other side of it. - -The Peloponnesians now attacked their centre and drove ashore the -ships of the Athenians, and disembarked to follow up their victory. No -help could be given to the centre either by the squadron of -Thrasybulus on the right, on account of the number of ships -attacking him, or by that of Thrasyllus on the left, from whom the -point of Cynossema hid what was going on, and who was also hindered by -his Syracusan and other opponents, whose numbers were fully equal to -his own. At length, however, the Peloponnesians in the confidence of -victory began to scatter in pursuit of the ships of the enemy, and -allowed a considerable part of their fleet to get into disorder. On -seeing this the squadron of Thrasybulus discontinued their lateral -movement and, facing about, attacked and routed the ships opposed to -them, and next fell roughly upon the scattered vessels of the -victorious Peloponnesian division, and put most of them to flight -without a blow. The Syracusans also had by this time given way -before the squadron of Thrasyllus, and now openly took to flight -upon seeing the flight of their comrades. - -The rout was now complete. Most of the Peloponnesians fled for -refuge first to the river Midius, and afterwards to Abydos. Only a few -ships were taken by the Athenians; as owing to the narrowness of the -Hellespont the enemy had not far to go to be in safety. Nevertheless -nothing could have been more opportune for them than this victory. -Up to this time they had feared the Peloponnesian fleet, owing to a -number of petty losses and to the disaster in Sicily; but they now -ceased to mistrust themselves or any longer to think their enemies -good for anything at sea. Meanwhile they took from the enemy eight -Chian vessels, five Corinthian, two Ambraciot, two Boeotian, one -Leucadian, Lacedaemonian, Syracusan, and Pellenian, losing fifteen -of their own. After setting up a trophy upon Point Cynossema, securing -the wrecks, and restoring to the enemy his dead under truce, they sent -off a galley to Athens with the news of their victory. The arrival -of this vessel with its unhoped-for good news, after the recent -disasters of Euboea, and in the revolution at Athens, gave fresh -courage to the Athenians, and caused them to believe that if they -put their shoulders to the wheel their cause might yet prevail. - -On the fourth day after the sea-fight the Athenians in Sestos having -hastily refitted their ships sailed against Cyzicus, which had -revolted. Off Harpagium and Priapus they sighted at anchor the eight -vessels from Byzantium, and, sailing up and routing the troops on -shore, took the ships, and then went on and recovered the town of -Cyzicus, which was unfortified, and levied money from the citizens. In -the meantime the Peloponnesians sailed from Abydos to Elaeus, and -recovered such of their captured galleys as were still uninjured, -the rest having been burned by the Elaeusians, and sent Hippocrates -and Epicles to Euboea to fetch the squadron from that island. - -About the same time Alcibiades returned with his thirteen ships from -Caunus and Phaselis to Samos, bringing word that he had prevented -the Phoenician fleet from joining the Peloponnesians, and had made -Tissaphernes more friendly to the Athenians than before. Alcibiades -now manned nine more ships, and levied large sums of money from the -Halicarnassians, and fortified Cos. After doing this and placing a -governor in Cos, he sailed back to Samos, autumn being now at hand. -Meanwhile Tissaphernes, upon hearing that the Peloponnesian fleet -had sailed from Miletus to the Hellespont, set off again back from -Aspendus, and made all sail for Ionia. While the Peloponnesians were -in the Hellespont, the Antandrians, a people of Aeolic extraction, -conveyed by land across Mount Ida some heavy infantry from Abydos, and -introduced them into the town; having been ill-treated by Arsaces, the -Persian lieutenant of Tissaphernes. This same Arsaces had, upon -pretence of a secret quarrel, invited the chief men of the Delians -to undertake military service (these were Delians who had settled at -Atramyttium after having been driven from their homes by the Athenians -for the sake of purifying Delos); and after drawing them out from -their town as his friends and allies, had laid wait for them at -dinner, and surrounded them and caused them to be shot down by his -soldiers. This deed made the Antandrians fear that he might some day -do them some mischief; and as he also laid upon them burdens too heavy -for them to bear, they expelled his garrison from their citadel. - -Tissaphernes, upon hearing of this act of the Peloponnesians in -addition to what had occurred at Miletus and Cnidus, where his -garrisons had been also expelled, now saw that the breach between them -was serious; and fearing further injury from them, and being also -vexed to think that Pharnabazus should receive them, and in less -time and at less cost perhaps succeed better against Athens than he -had done, determined to rejoin them in the Hellespont, in order to -complain of the events at Antandros and excuse himself as best he -could in the matter of the Phoenician fleet and of the other charges -against him. Accordingly he went first to Ephesus and offered -sacrifice to Artemis. . . . - -[When the winter after this summer is over the twenty-first year -of this war will be completed. ] - -THE END - - - - - - -End of Project Gutenberg's The History of the Peloponnesian War, by Thucydides - -*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR *** - -This file should be named plpwr10.txt or plpwr10.zip -Corrected EDITIONS of our eBooks get a new NUMBER, plpwr11.txt -VERSIONS based on separate sources get new LETTER, plpwr10a.txt - -This etext was prepared by Albert Imrie, Colorado, USA - -Project Gutenberg eBooks are often created from several printed -editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the US -unless a copyright notice is included. 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