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<h1>The Project Gutenberg eBook of Two Treatises of Government,
by John Locke</h1>
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Title: Two Treatises of Government
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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT ***
</pre>
<h3>SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT by JOHN LOCKE</h3>
<p>Digitized by Dave Gowan</p>
<p>John Locke's "Second Treatise of Government" was published in
1690. The complete unabridged text has been republished several
times in edited commentaries. This is based on the paperback
book, "John Locke Second Treatise of Government", Edited, with an
Introduction, By C.B. McPherson, Hackett Publishing Company,
Indianapolis and Cambridge, 1980. None of the McPherson edition
is included in the Etext; only the original words contained in
the 1690 Locke text is included. The 1690 edition text is free of
copyright.</p>
<p>This text is in the PUBLIC DOMAIN, posted to Wiretap 1 Jul
94.</p>
<p>This text was converted to HTML format in Fall 1996 and the
italics in the text added. Various errors in the wiretap version
due to scanning problems were removed.</p>
<hr size="4" noshade>
<br>
<br>
<center>
<h1>1690</h1>
</center>
<center>
<h1>TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT</h1>
</center>
<h2 align="CENTER">BY IOHN LOCKE</h2>
<p><br>
</p>
<blockquote>
<h2>SALUS POPULI SUPREMA LEX ESTO</h2>
LONDON PRINTED MDCLXXXVIIII REPRINTED, THE SIXTH TIME, BY A.
MILLAR, H. WOODFALL, 1. WHISTON AND B. WHITE, 1. RI- VINGTON, L.
DAVIS AND C. REYMERS, R. BALD- WIN, HAWES CLARKE AND COLLINS; W.
IOHN- STON, W. OWEN, 1. RICHARDSON, S. CROWDER, T. LONGMAN, B.
LAW, C. RIVINGTON, E. DILLY, R. WITHY, C. AND R. WARE, S, BAKER,
T. PAYNE, A. SHUCKBURGH, 1. HINXMAN MDCCLXIIII TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT. IN THE FORMER THE FALSE PRINCIPLES AND FOUNDATION OF
SIR ROBERT FILMER AND HIS FOLLOWERS ARE DETECTED AND OVERTHROWN.
THE LATTER IS AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL EXTENT AND
END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. <br>
<br>
</blockquote>
<center>
<h3>1764 EDITOR'S NOTE</h3>
</center>
<p>The present Edition of this Book has not only been collated
with the first three Editions, which were published during the
Author's Life, but also has the Advantage of his last Corrections
and Improvements, from a Copy delivered by him to Mr. Peter
Coste, communicated to the Editor, and now lodged in Christ
College, Cambridge.</p>
<hr>
<p><a name="PREFACE"></a></p>
<center>
<h3>PREFACE</h3>
</center>
<p>Reader, thou hast here the beginning and end of a discourse
concerning government; what fate has otherwise disposed ofthe
papers that should have filled up the middle, and were more than
all the rest, it is not worth while to tell thee. These, which
remain, I hope are sufficient to establish the throne of our
great restorer, our present King William; to make good his title,
in the consent of the people, which being the only one of all
lawful governments, he has more fully and clearly, than any
prince in Christendom; and to justify to the world the people of
England, whose love of their just and natural rights, with their
resolution to preserve them, saved the nation when it was on the
very brink of slavery and ruin. If these papers have that
evidence, I flatter myself is to be found in them, there will be
no great miss of those which are lost, and my reader may be
satisfied without them: for I imagine, I shall have neither the
time, nor inclination to repeat my pains, and fill up the wanting
part of my answer, by tracing Sir Robert again, through all the
windings and obscurities, which are to be met with in the several
branches of his wonderful system. The king, and body of the
nation, have since so thoroughly confuted his Hypothesis, that I
suppose nobody hereafter will have either the confidence to
appear against our common safety, and be again an advocate for
slavery; or the weakness to be deceived with contradictions
dressed up in a popular stile, and well-turned periods: for if
any one will be at the pains, himself, in those parts, which are
here untouched, to strip Sir Robert's discourses of the flourish
of doubtful expressions, and endeavour to reduce his words to
direct, positive, intelligible propositions, and then compare
them one with another, he will quickly be satisfied, there was
never so much glib nonsense put together in well-sounding
English. If he think it not worth while to examine his works all
thro', let him make an experiment in that part, where he treats
of usurpation; and let him try, whether he can, with all his
skill, make Sir Robert intelligible, and consistent with himself,
or common sense. I should not speak so plainly of a gentleman,
long since past answering, had not the pulpit, of late years,
publicly owned his doctrine, and made it the current divinity of
the times. It is necessary those men, who taking on them to be
teachers, have so dangerously misled others, should be openly
shewed of what authority this their Patriarch is, whom they have
so blindly followed, that so they may either retract what upon so
ill grounds they have vented, and cannot be maintained; or else
justify those principles which they preached up for gospel;
though they had no better an author than an English courtier: for
I should not have writ against Sir Robert, or taken the pains to
shew his mistakes, inconsistencies, and want of (what he so much
boasts of, and pretends wholly to build on) scripture-proofs,
were there not men amongst us, who, by crying up his books, and
espousing his doctrine, save me from the reproach of writing
against a dead adversary. They have been so zealous in this
point, that, if I have done him any wrong, I cannot hope they
should spare me. I wish, where they have done the truth and the
public wrong, they would be as ready to redress it, and allow its
just weight to this reflection, viz. that there cannot be done a
greater mischief to prince and people, than the propagating wrong
notions concerning government; that so at last all times might
not have reason to complain of the Drum Ecclesiastic. If any one,
concerned really for truth, undertake the confutation of my
Hypothesis, I promise him either to recant my mistake, upon fair
conviction; or to answer his difficulties. But he must remember
two things.<br>
First, That cavilling here and there, at some
expression, or little incident of my discourse, is not an answer
to my book.<br>
Secondly, That I shall not take railing for arguments,
nor think either of these worth my notice, though I shall always
look on myself as bound to give satisfaction to any one, who
shall appear to be conscientiously scrupulous in the point, and
shall shew any just grounds for his scruples.<br>
I have nothing more, but to advertise the reader, that
Observations stands for Observations on Hobbs, Milton, &c; and
that a bare quotation of pages always means pages of his
Patriarcha, Edition 1680.</p>
<center>
<h1>OF CIVIL-GOVERNMENT</h1>
</center>
<center>
<h2>Book II</h2>
</center>
<p><a name="CHAP. I"></a></p>
<h3>CHAPTER. I.</h3>
<p><a name="Sect. 1."></a>Sect. 1. It having been shewn in the
foregoing discourse,<br>
1. That <em>Adam</em> had not, either by natural
right of fatherhood, or by positive donation from God, any such
authority over his children, or dominion over the world, as is
pretended:<br>
2. That if he had, his heirs, yet, had no right to
it:<br>
3. That if his heirs had, there being no law of
nature nor positive law of God that determines which is the right
heir in all cases that may arise, the right of succession, and
consequently of bearing rule, could not have been certainly
determined:<br>
4. That if even that had been determined, yet the
knowledge of which is the eldest line of <em>Adam's</em>
posterity,being so long since utterly lost, that in the races of
mankind and families of the world, there remains not to one above
another, the least pretence to be the eldest house, and to have
the right of inheritance:<br>
5. All these premises having, as I think, been
clearly made out, it is impossible that the rulers now on earth
should make any benefit, or derive any the least shadow of
authority from that, which is held to be the fountain of all
power, <em>Adam's private dominion and paternal
jurisdiction:</em> so that he that will not give just occasion to
think that all government in the world is the product only of
force and violence, and that men live together by no other rules
but that of beasts, where the strongest carries it, and so lay a
foundation for perpetual disorder and mischief, tumult, sedition
and rebellion, (things that the followers of that hypothesis so
loudly cry out against) must of necessity find out another rise
of government, another original of political power, and another
way of designing and knowing the persons that have it, than what
<em>Sir Robert Filmer</em> hath taught us.</p>
<p><a name="Sect. 2."></a>Sect. 2. To this purpose, I think it
may not be amiss, to set down what I take to be political power;
that the power of a <em>magistrate</em> over a subject may be
distinguished from that of a <em>father</em> over his children, a
<em>master</em> over his servant, a <em>husband</em> over his
wife, and a <em>lord</em> over his slave. All which distinct
powers happening sometimes together in the same man, if he be
considered under these different relations, it may help us to
distinguish these powers one another and shew the difference
betwixt a ruler of a commonwealth, a father of a family, and a
captain of a galley.</p>
<p><a name="Sect. 3."></a>Sect. 3. <em>Political power,</em>
then, I take to be a <em>right</em> of making laws with penalties
of death, and consequently all less penalties, for the regulating
and preserving of property, and of employing the force of the
community, in the execution of such laws, and in the defence of
the common-wealth from foreign injury; and all this only for the
public good. <a name="CHAP. II"></a></p>
<center>
<h3>C H A P. I I.<br>
<br>
Of the State of Nature.</h3>
</center>
<p><a name="Sect. 4."></a>Sect. 4. TO understand political power
right, and derive it from its original, we must consider, what
state all men are naturally in, and that is, a <em>state of
perfect freedom</em> to order their actions, and dispose of their
possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of
the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the
will of any other man.<br>
A <em>state</em> also of <em>equality</em> wherin all the
power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than
another; there being nothing more evident, than that the
creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all
the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties,
should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or
subjection, unless the lord and master of them all should, by any
manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and
confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted
right to dominion and sovereignty.</p>
<p><a name="Sect. 5."></a>Sect. 5. This <em>equality</em> of men
by nature, the judicious Hooker looks upon as so evident in
itself, and beyond all question, that he makes it the foundation
of that obligation to mutual love amongst men, on which he builds
the duties they owe one another, and from whence he derives the
great maxims of justice and charity. His words are,</p>
<blockquote><em>The like natural inducement hath
brought men to know that it is no less their duty, to love others
than themselves; for seeing those things which are equal, must
needs all have one measure; if I cannot but wish to receive good,
even as much at every man's hands, as any man can wish unto his
own soul, how should I look to have any part of my desire herein
satisfied, unless myself be careful to satisfy the like desire,
which is undoubtedly in other men, being of one and the same
nature? To have any thing offered them repugnant to this desire,
must needs in all respects grieve them as much as me; so that if
I do harm, I must look to suffer, there being no reason that
others should shew greater measure of love to me, than they have
by me shewed unto them: my desire therefore to be loved of my
equals in nature as much as possible may be, imposeth upon me a
natural duty of bearing to them-ward fully the like affection;
from which relation of equality between ourselves and them that
are as ourselves, what several rules and canons natural reason
hath drawn, for direction of life, no man is ignorant .</em>Eccl.
Pol. Lib. 1.</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
<p><a name="Sect. 6."></a>Sect. 6. But though this be a <em>state
of liberty,</em> yet it is <em>not a state of licence:</em>
though man in that state have an uncontroulable liberty to
dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to
destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession,
but where some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for
it. The <em>state of nature</em> has a law of nature to govern
it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law,
teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all
<em>equal and independent,</em> no one ought to harm another in
his life, health, liberty, or possessions: for men being all the
workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the
servants of one sovereign master, sent into the world by his
order, and about his business; they are his property, whose
workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one another's
pleasure: and being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in
one community of nature, there cannot be supposed any such
<em>subordination</em> amongus, that may authorize us to destroy
one another, as if we were made for one another's uses, as the
inferior ranks of creatures are for our's. Every one, as he is
<em>bound to preserve himself,</em> and not to quit his station
wilfully, so by the like reason, when his own preservation comes
not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, <em>to preserve
the rest of mankind,</em> and may not, unless it be to do justice
on an offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends to
the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods
of another.</p>
<p><a name="Sect. 7."></a>Sect. 7. And that all men may be
restrained from invading others rights, and from doing hurt to
one another, and the law of nature be observed, which willeth the
peace and <em>preservation of all mankind,</em> the
<em>execution</em> of the law of nature is, in that state, put
into every man's hands, whereby every one has a right to punish
the transgressors of that law to such a degree, as may hinder its
violation: for the <em>law of nature</em> would, as all other
laws that concern men in this world 'be in vain, if there were no
body that in the state of nature had a <em>power to execute</em>
that law, and thereby preserve the innocent and restrain
offenders. And if any one in the state of nature may punish
another for any evil he has done, every one may do so: for in
that <em>state of perfect equality,</em> where naturally there is
no superiority or jurisdiction of one over another, what any may
do in prosecution of that law, every one must needs have a right
to do.</p>
<p><a name="Sect. 8."></a>Sect. 8. And thus, in the state of
nature, <em>one man comes by a power over another;</em> but yet
no absolute or arbitrary power, to use a criminal, when he has
got him in his hands, according to the passionate heats, or
boundless extravagancy of his own will; but only to retribute to
him, so far as calm reason and conscience dictate, what is
proportionate to his transgression, which is so much as may serve
for <em>reparation</em> and <em>restraint:</em> for these two are
the only reasons, why one man may lawfully do harm to another,
which is that we call <em>punishment.</em> In transgressing the
law of nature, the offender declares himself to live by another
rule than that of reason and common equity, which is that measure
God has set to the actions of men, for their mutual security; and
so he becomes dangerous to mankind, the tye, which is to secure
them from injury and violence, being slighted and broken by him.
Which being a trespass against the whole species, and the peace
and safety of it, provided for by the law of nature, every man
upon this score, by the right he hath to preserve mankind in
general, may restrain, or where it is necessary, destroy things
noxious to them, and so may bring such evil on any one, who hath
transgressed that law, as may make him repent the doing of it,
and thereby deter him, and by his example others, from doing the
like mischief. And in the case, and upon this ground, <em>every
man hath a right to punish the offender, and be executioner of
the law of nature.</em></p>
<p><a name="Sect. 9."></a>Sect. 9. 1 doubt not but this will seem
a very strange doctrine to some men: but before they condemn it,
I desire them to resolve me, by what right any prince or state
can put to death, or <em>punish an alien,</em> for any crime he
commits in their country. It is certain their laws, by virtue of
any sanction they receive from the promulgated will of the
legislative, reach not a stranger: they speak not to him, nor, if
they did, is he bound to hearken to them. The legislative
authority, by which they are in force over the subjects of that
commonwealth, hath no power over him. Those who have the supreme
power of making laws in <em>England, France</em> or
<em>Holland,</em> are to an <em>Indian,</em> but like the rest of
the world, men without authority: and therefore, if by the law of
nature every man hath not a power to punish offences against it,
as he soberly judges the case to require, I see not how the
magistrates of any community can punish an alien of another
country; since, in reference to him, they can have no more power
than what every man naturally may have over another.</p>
<p><a name="Sect. 10."></a>Sect, 10. Besides the crime which
consists in violating the law, and varying from the right rule of
reason, whereby a man so far becomes degenerate, and declares
himself to quit the principles of human nature, and to be a
noxious creature, there is commonly <em>injury</em> done to some
person or other, and some other man receives damage by his
transgression: in which case he who hath received any damage,
has, besides the right of punishment common to him with other
men, a particular right to seek <em>reparation</em> from him that
has done it: and any other person, who finds it just, may also
join with him that is injured, and assist him in recovering from
the offender so much as may make satisfaction for the harm he has
suffered.</p>
<p><a name="Sect. 11."></a>Sect. 11. From these <em>two distinct
rights,</em> the one of <em>punishing</em> the crime <em>for
restraint,</em> and preventing the like offence, which right of
punishing is in every body; the other of taking
<em>reparation,</em> which belongs only to the injured party,
comes it to pass that the magistrate, who by being magistrate
hath the common right of punishing put into his hands, can often,
where the public good demands not the execution of the law,
<em>remit</em> the punishment of criminal offences by his own
authority, but yet cannot <em>remit</em> the satisfaction due to
any private man for the damage he has received. That, he who has
suffered the damage has a right to demand in his own name, and he
alone can remit: the damnified person has this power of
appropriating to himself the goods or service of the offender,
<em>by right of self-preservation,</em> as every man has a power
to punish the crime, to prevent its being committed again, <em>by
the right he has of preserving all mankind,</em> and doing all
reasonable things he can in order to that end: and thus it is,
that every man, in the state of nature, has a power to kill a
murderer, both <em>to deter</em> others from doing the like
injury, which no reparation can compensate, by the example of the
punishment that attends it from every body, and also to secure
men from the attempts of a criminal, who having renounced reason,
the common rule and measure God hath given to mankind, hath, by
the unjust violence and slaughter he hath committed upon one,
declared war against all mankind, and therefore may be destroyed
as a <em>lion</em> or a <em>tyger,</em> one of those wild savage
beasts, with whom men can have no society nor security: and upon
this is grounded that great law of nature, <em>Whoso sheddeth
man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed.</em> And
<em>Cain</em> was so fully convinced, that every one had a right
to destroy such a criminal, that after the murder of his brother,
he cries out, <em>Every one that findeth me, shall slay me;</em>
so plain was it writ in the hearts of all mankind.</p>
<p><a name="Sect. 12."></a>Sect. 12. By the same reason may a man
in the state of nature <em>punish the lesser breaches</em> of
that law. It will perhaps be demanded, with death? I answer, each
transgression may be <em>punished</em> to that <em>degree,</em>
and with so much <em>severity,</em> as will suffice to make it an
ill bargain to the offender, give him cause to repent, and
terrify others from doing the like. Every offence, that can be
committed in the state of nature, may in the state of nature be
also punished equally, and as far forth as it may, in a
commonwealth: for though it would be besides my present purpose,
to enter here into the particulars of the law of nature, or its
<em>measures of punishment;</em> yet, it is certain there is such
a law, and that too, as intelligible and plain to a rational
creature, and a studier of that law, as the positive laws of
commonwealths; nay, possibly plainer; as much as reason is easier
to be understood, than the fancies and intricate contrivances of
men, following contrary and hidden interests put into words; for
so truly are a great part of the <em>municipal laws</em> of
countries, which are only so far right, as they are founded on
the law of nature, by which they are to be regulated and
interpreted.</p>
<p><a name="Sect. 13."></a>Sect. 13. To this strange doctrine,
viz. That <em>in the state of nature every one has the executive
power</em> of the law of nature, I doubt not but it will be
objected, that it is unreasonable for men to be judges in their
own cases, that self-love will make men partial to themselves and
their friends: and on the other side, that ill nature, passion
and revenge will carry them too far in punishing others; and
hence nothing but confusion and disorder will follow, and that
therefore God hath certainly appointed government to restrain the
partiality and violence of men. I easily grant, that <em>civil
government</em> is the proper remedy for the inconveniencies of
the state of nature, which must certainly be great, where men may
be judges in their own case, since it is easy to be imagined,
that he who was so unjust as to do his brother an injury, will
scarce be so just as to condemn himself for it: but I shall
desire those who make this objection, to remember, that
<em>absolute monarchs</em> are but men; and if government is to
be the remedy of those evils, which necessarily follow from men's
being judges in their own cases, and the state of nature is
therefore not to how much better it is than the state of nature,
where one man, commanding a multitude, has the liberty to be
judge in his own case, and may do to all his subjects whatever he
pleases, without the least liberty to any one to question or
controul those who execute his pleasure? and in whatsoever he
doth, whether led by reason, mistake or passion, must be
submitted to? much better it is in the state of nature, wherein
men are not bound to submit to the unjust will of another: and if
he that judges, judges amiss in his own, or any other case, he is
answerable for it to the rest of mankind.</p>
<p><a name="Sect. 14."></a>Sect. 14. It is often asked as a
mighty objection, <em>where are,</em> or ever were there any
<em>men in such a state of nature?</em> To which it may suffice
as an answer at present, that since all princes and rulers of
<em>independent</em> governments all through the world, are in a
state of nature, it is plain the world never was, nor ever will
be, without numbers of men in that state. I have named all
governors of <em>independent communities,</em> whether they are,
or are not, in league with others: for it is not every compact
that puts an end to the state of nature between men, but only
this one of agreeing together mutually to enter into one
community, and make one body politic; other promises, and
compacts, men may make one with another, and yet still be in the
state of nature. The promises and bargains for truck, &c;
between the two men in the desert island, mentioned by
<em>Garcilasso de la Vega,</em> in his history of <em>Peru;</em>
or between a <em>Swiss</em> and an <em>Indian,</em> in the woods
of <em>America,</em> are binding to them, though they are
perfectly in a state of nature, in reference to one another: for
truth and keeping of faith belongs to men, as men, and not as
members of society.</p>
<p><a name="Sect. 15."></a>Sect. 15. To those that say, there
were never any men in the state of nature, I will not only oppose
the authority of the judicious <em>Hooker, Eccl. Pol. lib. i.
sect.</em> 10, where he says, <em>The laws which have been
hitherto mentioned, i.e. the laws of nature, do bind men
absolutely, even as they are men, although they have never any
settled fellowship, never any solemn agreement amongst themselves
what to do, or not to do: but forasmuch as we are not by
ourselves sufficient to furnish ourselves with competent store of
things, needful for such a life as our nature doth desire, a life
fit for the dignity of man; therefore to supply those defects and
imperfections which are in us, as living single and solely by
ourselves, we are naturally induced to seek communion and
fellowship with others: this was the cause of men's uniting
themselves at first in politic societies.</em> But I moreover
affirm, that all men are naturally in that state, and remain so,
till by their own consents they make themselves members of some
politic society; and I doubt not in the sequel of this discourse,
to make it very clear.</p>
<hr>
<a name="CHAP. III."></a><br>
<br>
<h3 align="CENTER">C H A P. I I I.<br>
<br>
Of the State of War.</h3>
<p><a name="Sect. 16."></a>Sect. 16. THE <em>state of war</em> is
a state of <em>enmity</em> and <em>destruction:</em> and
therefore declaring by word or action, not a passionate and
hasty, but a sedate settled design upon another man's life,
<em>puts him in a state of war</em> with him against whom he has
declared such an intention, and so has exposed his life to the
other's power to be taken away by him, or any one that joins with
him in his defence, and espouses his quarrel; it being reasonable
and just, I should have a right to destroy that which threatens
me with destruction: for, <em>by the fundamental law of nature,
man being to be preserved</em> as much as possible, when all
cannot be preserved, the safety of the innocent is to be
preferred: and one may destroy a man who makes war upon him, or
has discovered an enmity to his being, for the same reason that
he may kill a <em>wolf</em> or a <em>lion;</em> because such men
are not under the ties of the commonlaw of reason, have no other
rule, but that of force and violence, and so may be treated as
beasts of prey, those dangerous and noxious creatures, that will
be sure to destroy him whenever he falls into their power.</p>
<p><a name="Sect. 17."></a>Sect, 17. And hence it is, that he who
attempts to get another man into his absolute power, does thereby
<em>put himself into a state of war</em> with him; it being to be
understood as a declaration of a design upon his life: for I have
reason to conclude, that he who would get me into his power
without my consent, would use me as he pleased when he had got me
there, and destroy me too when he had a fancy to it; for no body
can desire to <em>have me in his absolute power,</em> unless it
be to compel me by force to that which is against the right of my
freedom, i.e. make me a slave. To be free from such force is the
only security of my preservation; and reason bids me look on him,
as an enemy to my preservation, who would take away that
<em>freedom</em> which is the fence to it; so that he who makes
an <em>attempt to enslave</em> me, thereby puts himself into a
state of war with me. He that, in the state of nature, <em>would
take away the freedom</em> that belongs to any one in that state,
must necessarily be supposed to have a design to take away
everything else, that <em>freedom</em> being the foundation of
all the rest; as he that, in the state of society, would take
away the <em>freedom</em> belonging to those of that society or
commonwealth, must be supposed to design to take away from them
every thing else, and so be looked on as <em>in a state of
war.</em></p>
<p><a name="Sect. 18."></a>Sect. 18. This makes it lawful for a
man to <em>kill a thief,</em> who has not in the least hurt him,
nor declared any design upon his life, any farther than, by the
use of force, so to get him in his power, as to take away his
money, or what he pleases, from him; because using force, where
he has no right, to get me into his power, let his pretence be
what it will, I have no reason to suppose, that he, who would
<em>take away my liberty,</em> would not, when he had me in his
power, take away every thing else. And therefore it is lawful for
me to treat him as one who <em>has put himself into a state of
war</em> with me, i.e. kill him if I can; for to that hazard does
he justly expose himself, whoever introduces a state of war, and
is aggressor in it.</p>
<p><a name="Sect. 19."></a>Sect. 19. And here we have the plain
<em>difference between the state of nature and the state of
war,</em> which however some men have confounded, are as far
distant, as a state of peace, good will, mutual assistance and
preservation, and a state of enmity, malice, violence and mutual
destruction, are one from another. Men living together according
to reason, without a common superior on earth, with authority to
judge between them, is <em>properly the state of nature.</em> But
force, or a declared design of force, upon the person of another,
where there is no common superior on earth to appeal to for
relief, <em>is the state of war:</em> and it is the want of such
an appeal gives a man the right of war even against an
<em>aggressor,</em> tho' he be in society and a fellow subject.
Thus <em>a thief,</em> whom I cannot harm, but by appeal to the
law, for having stolen all that I am worth, I may kill, when he
sets on me to rob me but of my horse or coat; because the law,
which was made for my preservation, where it cannot interpose to
secure my life from present force, which, if lost, is capable of
no reparation, permits me my own defence, and the right of war, a
liberty to kill the aggressor, because the aggressor allows not
time to appeal to our common judge, nor the decision of the law,
for remedy in a case where the mischief may be irreparable. Want
of a common judge with authority, puts all men in a state of
nature: force without right, upon a man's person, makes a state
of war, both where there is, and is not, a common judge.</p>
<p><a name="Sect. 20."></a>Sect. 20. But when the actual force is
over, the <em>state of war ceases</em> between those that are in
society, and are equally on both sides subjected to the fair
determination of the law; because then there lies open the remedy
of appeal for the past injury, and to prevent future harm: but
where no such appeal is, as in the state of nature, for want of
positive laws, and judges with authority to appeal to, the state
of war once begun, continues, with a right to the innocent party
to destroy the other whenever he can, until the aggressor offers
peace, and desires reconciliation on such terms as may repair any
wrongs he has already done, and secure the innocent for the
future; nay, where an appeal to the law, and constituted judges,
lies open, but the remedy is denied by a manifest perverting of
justice, and a barefaced wresting of the laws to protect or
indemnify the violence or injuries of some men, or party of men,
<em>there</em> it is hard to imagine any thing but <em>a state of
war:</em> for wherever violence is used, and injury done, though
by hands appointed to administer justice, it is still violence
and injury, however coloured with the name, pretences, or forms
of law, the end whereof being to protect and redress the
innocent, by an unbiassed application of it, to all who are under
it; wherever that is not <em>bona fide</em> done, <em>war is
made</em> upon the sufferers, who having no appeal on earth to
right them, they are left to the only remedy in such cases, an
appeal to heaven.</p>
<p><a name="Sect. 21."></a>Sect. 21. To avoid this <em>state of
war</em> (wherein there is no appeal but to heaven, and wherein
every the least difference is apt to end, where there is no
authority to decide between the contenders) is one great reason
of men's putting themselves into society, and quitting the state
of nature: for where there is an authority, a power on earth,
from which relief can be had by <em>appeal,</em> there the
continuance of the <em>state of war</em> is excluded, and the
controversy is decided by that power. Had there been any such
court, any superior jurisdiction on earth, to determine the right
between <em>Jephtha</em> and the <em>Ammonites,</em> they had
never come to a <em>state of war:</em> but we see he was forced
to appeal to heaven. <em>The Lord the Judge</em> (says he) <em>be
judge this day between the children of</em> Israel <em>and the
children of</em> Ammon, <em>Judg. xi.</em> 27. and then
prosecuting, and relying on his appeal, he leads out his army to
battle: and therefore in such controversies, where the question
is put, <em>who shall be judge?</em> It cannot be meant, who
shall decide the controversy; every one knows what
<em>Jephtha</em> here tells us, that the <em>Lord the Judge</em>
shall judge. Where there is no judge on earth, the appeal lies to
God in heaven. That question then cannot mean, who shall judge,
whether another hath put himself in a <em>state of war</em> with
me, and whether I may, as <em>Jephtha</em> did, <em>appeal to
heaven</em> in it? of that I myself can only be judge in my own
conscience, as I will answer it, at the great day, to the supreme
judge of all men.</p>
<hr>
<a name="CHAP. IV."></a>
<h3 align="CENTER">CHAP. IV.<br>
<br>
Of SLAVERY.</h3>
<br>
<br>
<p><a name="Sect. 22."></a>Sect. 22. THE <em>natural liberty</em>
of man is to be free from any superior power on earth, and not to
be under the will or legislative authority of man, but to have
only the law of nature for his rule. The liberty of man, in
society, is to be under no other legislative power, but that
established, by consent, in the commonwealth; nor under the
dominion of any will, or restraint of any law, but what that
legislative shall enact, according to the trust put in it.
Freedom then is not what <em>Sir Robert Filmer</em> tells us,
<em>Observations, A. 55. a liberty for every one to do what he
lists, to live as he pleases, and not to be tied by any
laws:</em> but <em>freedom of men under government</em> is, to
have a standing rule to live by, common to every one of that
society, and made by the legislative power erected in it; a
liberty to follow my own will in all things, where the rule
prescribes not; and not to be subject to the inconstant,
uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man: as <em>freedom
of nature</em> is, to be under no other restraint but the law of
nature.</p>
<p><a name="Sect. 23."></a>Sect. 23. This <em>freedom</em> from
absolute, arbitrary power, is so necessary to, and closely joined
with a man's preservation, that he cannot part with it, but by
what forfeits his preservation and life together: for a man, not
having the power of his own life, <em>cannot,</em> by compact, or
his own consent, <em>enslave himself</em> to any one, nor put
himself under the absolute, arbitrary power of another, to take
away his life, when he pleases. No body can give more power than
he has himself; and he that cannot take away his own life, cannot
give another power over it. Indeed, having by his fault forfeited
his own life, by some act that deserves death; he, to whom he has
forfeited it, may (when he has him in his power) delay to take
it, and make use of him to his own service, and he does him no
injury by it: for, whenever he finds the hardship of his slavery
outweigh the value of his life, it is in his power, by resisting
the will of his master, to draw on himself the death he
desires.</p>
<p><a name="Sect. 24."></a>Sect. 24. This is the perfect
condition of <em>slavery,</em> which is nothing else, but <em>the
state of war continued,between a lawful conqueror and a
captive:</em> for, if once <em>compact</em> enter between them,
and make an agreement for a limited power on the one side, and
obedience on the other, the <em>state of war and slavery
ceases</em>, as long as the compact endures: for, as has been
said, no man can, by agreement, pass over to another that which
he hath not in himself, a power over his own life.<br>
I confess, we find among the <em>Jews,</em> as well as
other nations, that men did sell themselves; but, it is plain,
this was only to <em>drudgery, not to slavery:</em> for, it is
evident, the person sold was not under an absolute, arbitrary,
despotical power: for the master could not have power to kill
him, at any time, whom, at a certain time, he was obliged to let
go free out of his service; and the master of such a servant was
so far from having an arbitrary power over his life, that he
could not, at pleasure, so much as maim him, but the loss of an
eye, or tooth, set him free, <em>Exod.</em> xxi.</p>
<hr>
<a name="CHAP.V."></a><br>
<br>
<h3 align="CENTER">CHAP. V.<br>
<br>
Of PROPERTY.</h3>
<p><a name="Sect. 25."></a>Sect. 25. Whether we consider natural
<em>reason,</em> which tells us, that men, being once born, have
a right to their preservation, and consequently to meat and
drink, and such other things as nature affords for their
subsistence: or <em>revelation,</em> which gives us an account of
those grants God made of the world to <em>Adam,</em> and to
<em>Noah,</em> and his sons, it is very clear, that God, as king
<em>David</em> says, <em>Psal.</em> cxv. 16. <em>has given the
earth to the children of men;</em> given it to mankind in common.
But this being supposed, it seems to some a very great
difficulty, how any one should ever come to have a
<em>property</em> in any thing: I will not content myself to
answer, that if it be difficult to make out <em>property,</em>
upon a supposition that God gave the world to <em>Adam,</em> and
his posterity in common, it is impossible that any man, but one
universal monarch, should have any property upon a supposition,
that God gave the world to Adam, and his heirs in succession,
exclusive of all the rest of his posterity. But I shall endeavour
to shew, how men might come to have a <em>property</em> in
several parts of that which God gave to mankind in common, and
that without any express compact of all the commoners.</p>
<p><a name="Sect. 26."></a>Sect. 26. God, who hath given the
world to men in common, hath also given them reason to make use
of it to the best advantage of life, and convenience. The earth,
and all that is therein, is given to men for the support and
comfort of their being. And tho' all the fruits it naturally
produces, and beasts it feeds, belong to mankind in common, as
they are produced by the spontaneous hand of nature; and no body
has originally a private dominion, exclusive of the rest of
mankind, in any of them, as they are thus in their natural state:
yet being given for the use of men, there must of necessity be
<em>a means to appropriate</em> them some way or other, before
they can be of any use, or at all beneficial to any particular
man. The fruit, or venison, which nourishes the <em>wild
Indian,</em> who knows no enclosure, and is still a tenant in
common, must be his, and so his, i.e. a part of him, that another
can no longer have any right to it, before it can do him any good
for the support of his life.</p>
<p><a name="Sect. 27."></a>Sect. 27. Though the earth, and all
inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a
<em>property</em> in his own <em>person:</em> this no body has
any right to but himself. The <em>labour</em> of his body, and
the <em>work</em> of his hands, we may say, are properly his.
Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath
provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his <em>labour</em> with,
and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it
his <em>property.</em> It being by him removed from the common
state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this <em>labour</em>
something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other
men: for this <em>labour</em> being the unquestionable property
of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is
once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good, left
in common for others.</p>
<p><a name="Sect. 28."></a>Sect. 28. He that is nourished by the
acorns he picked up under an oak, or the apples he gathered from
the trees in the wood, has certainly appropriated them to
himself. No body can deny but the nourishment is his. I ask then,
when did they begin to be his? when he digested? or when he eat?
or when he boiled? or when he brought them home? or when he
picked them up? and it is plain, if the first gathering made them
not his, nothing else could. That <em>labour</em> put a
distinction between them and common: that added something to them
more than nature, the common mother of all, had done; and so they
became his private right. And will any one say, he had no right
to those acorns or apples, he thus appropriated, because he had
not the consent of all mankind to make them his? Was it a robbery
thus to assume to himself what belonged to all in common? If such
a consent as that was necessary, man had starved, notwithstanding
the plenty God had given him. We see in <em>commons,</em> which
remain so by compact, that it is the taking any part of what is
common, and removing it out of the state nature leaves it in,
which <em>begins the property;</em> without which the common is
of no use. And the taking of this or that part, does not depend
on the express consent of all the commoners. Thus the grass my
horse has bit; the turfs my servant has cut; and the ore I have
digged in any place, where I have a right to them in common with
others, become my <em>property,</em> without the assignation or
consent of any body. The <em>labour</em> that was mine, removing
them out of that common state they were in, hath <em>fixed my
property</em> in them.</p>
<p><a name="Sect. 29."></a>Sect. 29. By making an explicit
consent of every commoner, necessary to any one's appropriating
to himself any part of what is given in common, children or
servants could not cut the meat, which their father or master had
provided for them in common, without assigning to every one his
peculiar part. Though the water running in the fountain be every
one's, yet who can doubt, but that in the pitcher is his only who
drew it out? His <em>labour</em> hath taken it out of the hands
of nature, where it was common, and belonged equally to all her
children, and <em>hath</em> thereby <em>appropriated</em> it to
himself.</p>
<p><a name="Sect. 30."></a>Sect. 30. Thus this law of reason
makes the deer that <em>Indian's</em> who hath killed it; it is
allowed to be his goods, who hath bestowed his labour upon it,
though before it was the common right of every one. And amongst
those who are counted the civilized part of mankind, who have
made and multiplied positive laws to determine <em>property,</em>
this original law of nature, for the <em>beginning of
property,</em> in what was before common, still takes place; and
by virtue thereof, what fish any one catches in the ocean, that
great and still remaining common of mankind; or what ambergrise
any one takes up here, is by the <em>labour</em> that removes it
out of that common state nature left it in, <em>made</em> his
<em>property,</em> who takes that pains about it. And even
amongst us, the hare that any one is hunting, is thought his who
pursues her during the chase: for being a beast that is still
looked upon as common, and no man's private possession; whoever
has employed so much <em>labour</em> about any of that kind, as
to find and pursue her, has thereby removed her from the state of
nature, wherein she was common, and hath <em>begun a
property.</em></p>
<p><a name="Sect. 31."></a>Sect. 31. It will perhaps be objected
to this, that if gathering the acorns, or other fruits of the
earth, &c; makes a right to them, then any one may
<em>ingross</em> as much as he will. To which I answer, Not so.
The same law of nature, that does by this means give us property,
does also <em>bound</em> that <em>property</em> too. <em>God has
given us all things richly,</em> 1 Tim. vi. 12. is the voice of
reason confirmed by inspiration. But how far has he given it us?
<em>To enjoy.</em> As much as any one can make use of to any
advantage of life before it spoils, so much he may by his labour
fix a property in: whatever is beyond this, is more than his
share, and belongs to others. Nothing was made by God for man to
spoil or destroy. And thus, considering the plenty of natural
provisions there was a long time in the world, and the few
spenders; and to how small a part of that provision the industry
of one man could extend itself, and ingross it to the prejudice
of others; especially keeping within the <em>bounds,</em> set by
reason, of what might serve for his <em>use;</em> there could be
then little room for quarrels or contentions about property so
established.</p>
<p><a name="Sect. 32."></a>Sect. 32. But the <em>chief matter of
property</em> being now not the fruits of the earth, and the
beasts that subsist on it, but <em>the earth itself;</em> as that
which takes in and carries with it all the rest; I think it is
plain, that <em>property</em> in that too is acquired as the
former. As <em>much land</em> as a man tills, plants, improves,
cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his
<em>property.</em> He by his labour does, as it were, inclose it
from the common. Nor will it invalidate his right, to say every
body else has an equal title to it; and therefore he cannot
appropriate, he cannot inclose, without the consent of all his
fellow-commoners, all mankind. God, when he gave the world in
common to all mankind, commanded man also to labour, and the
penury of his condition required it of him. God and his reason
commanded him to subdue the earth, i.e. improve it for the
benefit of life, and therein lay out something upon it that was
his own, his labour. He that in obedience to this command of God,
subdued, tilled and sowed any part of it, thereby annexed to it
something that was his <em>property,</em> which another had no
title to, nor could without injury take from him.</p>
<p><a name="Sect. 33."></a>Sect. 33. Nor was this
<em>appropriation</em> of any parcel of land, by improving it,
any prejudice to any other man, since there was still enough, and
as good left; and more than the yet unprovided could use. So
that, in effect, there was never the less left for others because
of his enclosure for himself: for he that leaves as much as
another can make use of, does as good as take nothing at all. No
body could think himself injured by the drinking of another man,
though he took a good draught, who had a whole river of the same
water left him to quench his thirst: and the case of land and
water, where there is enough of both, is perfectly the same.</p>
<p><a name="Sect. 34."></a>Sect. 34. God gave the world to men in
common; but since he gave it them for their benefit, and the
greatest conveniencies of life they were capable to draw from it,
it cannot be supposed he meant it should always remain common and
uncultivated. He gave it to the use of the industrious and
rational, (and <em>labour</em> was to be his <em>title</em> to
it;) not to the fancy or covetousness of the quarrelsome and
contentious. He that had as good left for his improvement, as was
already taken up, needed not complain, ought not to meddle with
what was already improved by another's labour: if he did, it is
plain he desired the benefit of another's pains, which he had no
right to, and not the ground which God had given him in common
with others to labour on, and whereof there was as good left, as
that already possessed, and more than he knew what to do with, or
his industry could reach to.</p>
<p><a name="Sect. 35."></a>Sect. 35. It is true, in <em>land</em>
that is common in <em>England,</em> or any other country, where
there is plenty of people under government, who have money and
commerce, no one can inclose or appropriate any part, without the
consent of all his fellow-commoners; because this is left common
by compact, i.e. by the law of the land, which is not to be
violated. And though it be common, in respect of some men, it is
not so to all mankind; but is the joint property of this country,
or this parish. Besides, the remainder, after such enclosure,
would not be as good to the rest of the commoners, as the whole
was when they could all make use of the whole; whereas in the
beginning and first peopling of the great common of the world, it
was quite otherwise. The law man was under, was rather for
appropriating. God commanded, and his wants forced him to
<em>labour.</em> That was his <em>property</em> which could not
be taken from him where-ever he had fixed it. And hence subduing
or cultivating the earth, and having dominion, we see are joined
together. The one gave title to the other. So that God, by
commanding to subdue, gave authority so far to
<em>appropriate:</em> and the condition of human life, which
requires labour and materials to work on, necessarily introduces
private possessions.</p>
<p><a name="Sect. 36."></a>Sect. 36. The <em>measure of
property</em> nature has well set by the extent of men's
<em>labour</em> and the <em>conveniencies of life:</em> no man's
labour could subdue, or appropriate all; nor could his enjoyment
consume more than a small part; so that it was impossible for any
man, this way, to intrench upon the right of another, or acquire
to himself a property, to the prejudice of his neighbour, who
would still have room for as good, and as large a possession
(after the other had taken out his) as before it was
appropriated. This <em>measure</em> did confine every man's
<em>possession</em> to a very moderate proportion, and such as he
might appropriate to himself, without injury to any body, in the
first ages of the world, when men were more in danger to be lost,
by wandering from their company, in the then vast wilderness of
the earth, than to be straitened for want of room to plant in.
And the same <em>measure</em> may be allowed still without
prejudice to any body, as full as the world seems: for supposing
a man, or family, in the state they were at first peopling of the
world by the children of <em>Adam,</em> or <em>Noah;</em> let him
plant in some inland, vacant places of <em>America,</em> we shall
find that the <em>possessions</em> he could make himself, upon
the <em>measures</em> we have given, would not be very large,
nor, even to this day, prejudice the rest of mankind, or give
them reason to complain, or think themselves injured by this
man's incroachment, though the race of men have now spread
themselves to all the corners of the world, and do infinitely
exceed the small number was at the beginning. Nay, the extent of
<em>ground</em> is of so little value, <em>without labour,</em>
that I have heard it affirmed, that in <em>Spain</em> itself a
man may be permitted to plough, sow and reap, without being
disturbed, upon land he has no other title to, but only his
making use of it. But, on the contrary, the inhabitants think
themselves beholden to him, who, by his industry on neglected,
and consequently waste land, has increased the stock of corn,
which they wanted. But be this as it will, which I lay no stress
on; this I dare boldly affirm, that the same <em>rule of
propriety, (viz.)</em> that every man should have as much as he
could make use of, would hold still in the world, without
straitening any body; since there is land enough in the world to
suffice double the inhabitants, had not the invention of money,
and the tacit agreement of men to put a value on it, introduced
(by consent) larger possessions, and a right to them; which, how
it has done, I shall by and by shew more at large.</p>
<p><a name="Sect. 37."></a>Sect. 37. This is certain, that in the
beginning, before the desire of having more than man needed had
altered the intrinsic value of things, which depends only on
their usefulness to the life of man; or had <em>agreed, that a
little piece of yellow metal,</em> which would keep without
wasting or decay, should be worth a great piece of flesh, or a
whole heap of corn; though men had a right to appropriate, by
their labour, each one of himself, as much of the things of
nature, as he could use: yet this could not be much, nor to the
prejudice of others, where the same plenty was still left to
those who would use the same industry. To which let me add, that
he who appropriates land to himself by his labour, does not
lessen, but increase the common stock of mankind: for the
provisions serving to the support of human life, produced by one
acre of inclosed and cultivated land, are (to speak much within
compass) ten times more than those which are yielded by an acre
of land of an equal richness lying waste in common. And therefore
he that incloses land, and has a greater plenty of the
conveniencies of life from ten acres, than he could have from an
hundred left to nature, may truly be said to give ninety acres to
mankind: for his labour now supplies him with provisions out of
ten acres, which were but the product of an hundred lying in
common. I have here rated the improved land very low, in making
its product but as ten to one, when it is much nearer an hundred
to one: for I ask, whether in the wild woods and uncultivated
waste of <em>America,</em> left to nature, without any
improvement, tillage or husbandry, a thousand acres yield the
needy and wretched inhabitants as many conveniencies of life, as
ten acres of equally fertile land do in <em>Devonshire,</em>
where they are well cultivated?<br>
Before the appropriation of land, he who gathered as
much of the wild fruit, killed, caught, or tamed, as many of the
beasts, as he could; he that so imployed his pains about any of
the spontaneous products of nature, as any way to alter them from
the state which nature put them in, <em>by</em> placing any of
his <em>labour</em> on them, did thereby <em>acquire a propriety
in them:</em> but if they perished, in his possession, without
their due use; if the fruits rotted, or the venison putrified,
before he could spend it, he offended against the common law of
nature, and was liable to be punished; he invaded his neighbour's
share, for he had <em>no right, farther than his use</em> called
for any of them, and they might serve to afford him conveniencies
of life.</p>
<p><a name="Sect. 38."></a>Sect. 38. The same <em>measures</em>
governed the <em>possession of land</em> too: whatsoever he
tilled and reaped, laid up and made use of, before it spoiled,
that was his peculiar right; whatsoever he enclosed, and could
feed, and make use of, the cattle and product was also his. But
if either the grass of his enclosure rotted on the ground, or the
fruit of his planting perished without gathering, and laying up,
this part of the earth, notwithstanding his enclosure, was still
to be looked on as waste, and might be the possession of any
other. Thus, at the beginning, <em>Cain</em> might take as much
ground as he could till, and make it his own land, and yet leave
enough to <em>Abel's</em> sheep to feed on; a few acres would
serve for both their possessions. But as families increased, and
industry inlarged their stocks, their <em>possessions
inlarged</em> with the need of them; but yet it was commonly
<em>without any fixed property in the ground</em> they made use
of, till they incorporated, settled themselves together, and
built cities; and then, by consent, they came in time, to set out
the <em>bounds of their distinct territories,</em> and agree on
limits between them and their neighbours; and by laws within
themselves, settled the <em>properties</em> of those of the same
society: for we see, that in that part of the world which was
first inhabited, and therefore like to be best peopled, even as
low down as <em>Abraham's</em> time, they wandered with their
flocks, and their herds, which was their substance, freely up and
down; and this <em>Abraham</em> did, in a country where he was a
stranger. Whence it is plain, that at least a great part of the
land <em>lay in common;</em> that the inhabitants valued it not,
nor claimed property in any more than they made use of. But when
there was not room enough in the same place, for their herds to
feed together, they by consent, as <em>Abraham</em> and
<em>Lot</em> did, <em>Gen.</em> xiii. 5. separated</p>
<p><a name="Sect. 39."></a>Sect. 39. And thus, without supposing
any private dominion, and property in <em>Adam,</em> over all the
world, exclusive of all other men, which can no way be proved,
nor any one's property be made out from it; but supposing the
<em>world</em> given, as it was, to the children of men <em>in
common,</em> we see how <em>labour</em> could make men distinct
titles to several parcels of it, for their private uses; wherein
there could be no doubt of right, no room for quarrel.</p>
<p><a name="Sect. 40."></a>Sect. 40. Nor is it so strange, as
perhaps before consideration it may appear, that the <em>property
of labour</em> should be able to over-balance the community of
land: for it is <em>labour</em> indeed that puts the
<em>difference of value</em> on every thing; and let any one
consider what the difference is between an acre of land planted
with tobacco or sugar, sown with wheat or barley, and an acre of
the same land lying in common, without any husbandry upon it, and
he will find, that the improvement of <em>labour makes</em> the
far greater part of the value. I think it will be but a very
modest computation to say, that of the <em>products</em> of the
earth useful to the life of man nine tenths are the <em>effects
of labour:</em> nay, if we will rightly estimate things as they
come to our use, and cast up the several expences about them,
what in them is purely owing to <em>nature,</em> and what to
<em>labour,</em> we shall find, that in most of them ninety-nine
hundredths are wholly to be put on the account of
<em>labour.</em></p>
<p><a name="Sect. 41."></a>Sect. 41. There cannot be a clearer
demonstration of any thing, than several nations of the
<em>Americans</em> are of this, who are rich in land, and poor in
all the comforts of life; whom nature having furnished as
liberally as any other people, with the materials of plenty,
<em>i.e.</em> a fruitful soil, apt to produce in abundance, what
might serve for food, raiment, and delight; yet for <em>want of
improving it by labour,</em> have not one hundredth part of the
conveniencies we enjoy: and a king of a large and fruitful
territory there, feeds, lodges, and is clad worse than a
day-labourer in <em>England.</em></p>
<p><a name="Sect. 42."></a>Sect. 42. To make this a little
clearer, let us but trace some of the ordinary provisions of
life, through their several progresses, before they come to our
use, and see how much they receive of their <em>value from human
industry.</em> Bread, wine and cloth, are things of daily use,
and great plenty; yet notwithstanding, acorns, water and leaves,
or skins, must be our bread, drink and cloathing, did not
<em>labour</em> furnish us with these more useful commodities:
for whatever <em>bread</em> is more worth than acorns, wine than
water, and cloth or <em>silk,</em> than leaves, skins or moss,
that is wholly <em>owing to labour</em> and <em>industry;</em>
the one of these being the food and raiment which unassisted
nature furnishes us with; the other, provisions which our
industry and pains prepare for us, which how much they exceed the
other in value, when any one hath computed, he will then see how
much <em>labour makes the far greatest part of the value</em> of
things we enjoy in this world: and the ground which produces the
materials, is scarce to be reckoned in, as any, or at most, but a
very small part of it; so little, that even amongst us, land that
is left wholly to nature, that hath no improvement of pasturage,
tillage, or planting, is called, as indeed it is, <em>waste;</em>
and we shall find the benefit of it amount to little more than
nothing.<br>
This shews how much numbers of men are to be preferred
to largeness of dominions; and that the increase of lands, and
the right employing of them, is the great art of government: and
that prince, who shall be so wise and godlike, as by established
laws of liberty to secure protection and encouragement to the
honest industry of mankind, against the oppression of power and
narrowness of party, will quickly be too hard for his neighbours:
but this by the by. To return to the argument in hand,</p>
<p><a name="Sect. 43."></a>Sect. 43. An acre of land, that bears
here twenty bushels of wheat, and another in <em>America,</em>
which, with the same husbandry, would do the like, are, without
doubt, of the same natural intrinsic value: but yet the benefit
mankind receives from the one in a year, is worth 5l. and from
the other possibly not worth a penny, if all the profit an
<em>Indian</em> received from it were to be valued, and sold
here; at least, I may truly say, not one thousandth. It is
<em>labour</em> then which <em>puts the greatest part of value
upon land,</em> without which it would scarcely be worth any
thing: it is to that we owe the greatest part of all its useful
products; for all that the straw, bran, bread, of that acre of
wheat, is more worth than the product of an acre of as good land,
which lies waste, is all the effect of labour: for it is not
barely the plough-man's pains, the reaper's and thresher's toil,
and the baker's sweat, is to be counted into the <em>bread</em>
we eat; the labour of those who broke the oxen, who digged and
wrought the iron and stones, who felled and framed the timber
employed about the plough, mill, oven, or any other utensils,
which are a vast number, requisite to this corn, from its being
feed to be sown to its being made bread, must all be
<em>charged</em> on the account of labour, and received as an
effect of that: nature and the earth furnished only the almost
worthless materials, as in themselves. It would be a strange
<em>catalogue of things, that industry provided and made use of,
about every loaf of bread,</em> before it came to our use, if we
could trace them; iron, wood, leather, bark, timber, stone,
bricks, coals, lime, cloth, dying drugs, pitch, tar, masts,
ropes, and all the materials made use of in the ship, that
brought any of the commodities made use of by any of the workmen,
to any part of the work; all which it would be almost impossible,
at least too long, to reckon up.</p>
<p><a name="Sect. 44."></a>Sect. 44. From all which it is
evident, that though the things of nature are given in common,
yet man, by being master of himself, and <em>proprietor of his
own person, and the actions or labour of it, had still in himself
the great foundation of property;</em> and that, which made up
the great part of what he applied to the support or comfort of
his being, when invention and arts had improved the conveniencies
of life, was perfectly his own, and did not belong in common to
others.</p>
<p><a name="Sect. 45."></a>Sect. 45. Thus <em>labour,</em> in the
beginning, <em>gave a right of property,</em> wherever any one
was pleased to employ it upon what was common, which remained a
long while the far greater part, and is yet more than mankind
makes use of. Men, at first, for the most part, contented
themselves with what unassisted nature offered to their
necessities: and though afterwards, in some parts of the world,
(where the increase of people and stock, with the <em>use of
money,</em> had made land scarce, and so of some value) the
several <em>communities</em> settled the bounds of their distinct
territories, and by laws within themselves regulated the
properties of the private men of their society, and so, by
<em>compact</em> and agreement, <em>settled the property</em>
which labour and industry began; and the leagues that have been
made between several states and kingdoms, either expresly or
tacitly disowning all claim and right to the land in the others
possession, have, by common consent, given up their pretences to
their natural common right, which originally they had to those
countries, and so have, by <em>positive agreement, settled a
property</em> amongst themselves, in distinct parts and parcels
of the earth; yet there are still <em>great tracts of ground</em>
to be found, which (the inhabitants thereof not having joined
with the rest of mankind, in the consent of the use of their
common money) <em>lie waste,</em> and are more than the people
who dwell on it do, or can make use of, and so still lie in
common; tho' this can scarce happen amongst that part of mankind
that have consented to the use of money.</p>
<p><a name="Sect. 46."></a>Sect. 46. The greatest part of
<em>things really useful</em> to the life of man, and such as the
necessity of subsisting made the first commoners of the world
look after, as it cloth the <em>Americans</em> now, <em>are</em>
generally things of <em>short duration;</em> such as, if they are
not consumed by use, will decay and perish of themselves: gold,
silver and diamonds, are things that fancy or agreement hath put
the value on, more than real use, and the necessary support of
life. Now of those good things which nature hath provided in
common, every one had a right (as hath been said) to as much as
he could use, and <em>property</em> in all that he could effect
with his labour; all that his <em>industry</em> could extend to,
to alter from the state nature had put it in, was his. He that
<em>gathered</em> a hundred bushels of acorns or apples, had
thereby a <em>property</em> in them, they were his goods as soon
as gathered. He was only to look, that he used them before they
spoiled, else he took more than his share, and robbed others. And
indeed it was a foolish thing, as well as dishonest, to hoard up
more than he could make use of. If he gave away a part to any
body else, so that it perished not uselesly in his possession,
these he also made use of. And if he also bartered away plums,
that would have rotted in a week, for nuts that would last good
for his eating a whole year, he did no injury; he wasted not the
common stock; destroyed no part of the portion of goods that
belonged to others, so long as nothing perished uselesly in his
hands. Again, if he would give his nuts for a piece of metal,
pleased with its colour; or exchange his sheep for shells, or
wool for a sparkling pebble or a diamond, and keep those by him
all his life he invaded not the right of others, he might heap up
as much of these durable things as he pleased; the <em>exceeding
of the bounds of</em> his <em>just property</em> not lying in the
largeness of his possession, but the perishing of any thing
uselesly in it.</p>
<p><a name="Sect. 47."></a>Sect. 47. And thus <em>came in the use
of money,</em> some lasting thing that men might keep without
spoiling, and that by mutual consent men would take in exchange
for the truly useful, but perishable supports of life.</p>
<p><a name="Sect. 48."></a>Sect. 48. And as different degrees of
industry were apt to give men possessions in different
proportions, so this invention of money gave them the opportunity
to continue and enlarge them: for supposing an island, separate
from all possible commerce with the rest of the world, wherein
there were but an hundred families, but there were sheep, horses
and cows, with other useful animals, wholsome fruits, and land
enough for corn for a hundred thousand times as many, but nothing
in the island, either because of its commonness, or
perishableness, fit to supply the place of <em>money;</em> what
reason could any one have there to enlarge his possessions beyond
the use of his family, and a plentiful supply to its
<em>consumption,</em> either in what their own industry produced,
or they could barter for like perishable, useful commodities,
with others? Where there is not some thing, both lasting and
scarce, and so valuable to be hoarded up, there men will not be
apt to enlarge their <em>possessions of land,</em> were it never
so rich, never so free for them to take: for I ask, what would a
man value ten thousand, or an hundred thousand acres of excellent
<em>land,</em> ready cultivated, and well stocked too with
cattle, in the middle of the inland parts of <em>America,</em>
where he had no hopes of commerce with other parts of the world,
to draw <em>money</em> to him by the sale of the product? It
would not be worth the enclosing, and we should see him give up
again to the wild common of nature, whatever was more than would
supply the conveniencies of life to be had there for him and his
family.</p>
<p><a name="Sect. 49."></a>Sect. 49. Thus in thebeginning all the
world was <em>America,</em> and more so than that is now; for no
such thing as<em>money</em> was any where known. Find out
something that hath the <em>use and value of money</em> amongst
his neighbours, you shall see the same man will begin presently
to enlarge his possessions.</p>
<p><a name="Sect. 50."></a>Sect. 50. But since gold and silver,
being little useful to the life of man in proportion to food,
raiment, and carriage, has its <em>value</em> only from the
consent of men, whereof <em>labour yet makes,</em> in great part,
<em>the measure,</em> it is plain, that men have agreed to a
disproportionate and unequal <em>possession of the earth,</em>
they having, by a tacit and voluntary consent, found out, a way
how a man may fairly possess more land than he himself can use
the product of, by receiving in exchange for the overplus gold
and silver, which may be hoarded up without injury to any one;
these metals not spoiling or decaying in the hands of the
possessor. This partage of things in an inequality of private
possessions, men have made practicable out of the bounds of
society, and without compact, only by putting a value on gold and
silver, and tacitly agreeing in the use of money: for in
governments, the laws regulate the right of property, and the
possession of land is determined by positive constitutions.</p>
<p><a name="Sect. 51."></a>Sect. 51. And thus, I think, it is
very easy to conceive, without any difficulty, <em>how labour
could at first begin a title of property</em> in the common
things of nature, and how the spending it upon our uses bounded
it. So that there could then be no reason of quarrelling about
title, nor any doubt about the largeness of possession it gave.
Right and conveniency went together; for as a man had a right to
all he could employ his labour upon, so he had no temptation to
labour for more than he could make use of. This left no room for
controversy about the title, nor for encroachment on the right of
others; what portion a man carved to himself, was easily seen;
and it was useless, as well as dishonest, to carve himself too
much, or take more than he needed.</p>
<hr>
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